Switzerland – 2020 Review of Constitutional Law: Constitutional and Administrative Law amid the COVID-19 Pandemic by Reich, Johannes








Switzerland [2019 Review of Swiss Federal Constitutional Law] in: Richard
Albert/David Landau/Pietro Faraguna/Simon Drugda (eds.), 2019 Global
Review of Constitutional Law, Boston MA: 2020
Reich, Johannes




Reich, Johannes (2020). Switzerland [2019 Review of Swiss Federal Constitutional Law] in: Richard
Albert/David Landau/Pietro Faraguna/Simon Drugda (eds.), 2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law,
Boston MA: 2020. In: Albert, Richard; Landau, David; Faraguna, Pietro; Drugda, Simon. 2019 Global
Review of Constitutional Law. Boston College: I-CONnect Clough Center, 333-337.
I·CONnect-Clough Center
2019 Global Review of 
Constitutional Law
Richard Albert, David Landau,  
Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda
Editors 
© 2020 I•CONnect
Electronically published by I•CONnect and the Clough Center 
for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College. 
www.iconnectblog.com | www.bc.edu/cloughcenter
ISBN: 978-0-692-15916-3
2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 1
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION 
A Renewed Partnership in Support  
of Constitutional Democracy



























































































































































2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 3
4 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
INTRODUCTION
2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 5
The Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College is delighted and honored to join 
forces again with I-CONNect in providing this important resource to scholars of constitutional democracy around the 
world. I extend my deep gratitude to the editors of the Global Review. The work of commissioning, reviewing and 
compiling the reports into a coherent whole is demanding and time-consuming. The final product is, as in previous 
years, outstanding. One should not forget that this year’s work was done under the difficult circumstances brought 
about by a global pandemic. I look forward to next year’s report as the authoritative resource for how the legal systems 
of the world have absorbed this tremendous shock to the political, economic and constitutional fundamentals of our 
world.
The Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy aims to offer a platform that meets, in depth and scope, 
the urgency of the ongoing challenges to constitutional democracy. Each year, we welcome to Boston College – in 
person or, given the current situation, virtually - some of the world’s leading jurists, historians, political scientists, 
philosophers and social theorists. The Center also welcomes visiting scholars from around the world, and I use this 
opportunity to encourage interested scholars to contact us. More information about the Center’s activities, including 
free access to the Clough Archive, is available at http://www.bc.edu/centers/cloughcenter.html.  
I am grateful to the staff of the Clough Center, and especially Gaurie Pandey, for their work on the production of this 
Global Review. My friend Richard Albert continues to have my gratitude and admiration for identifying the need for 
such a resource and his original and bold vision for how to meet it. 
A RENEWED PARTNERSHIP IN SUPPORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 
Vlad Perju
Director, Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy  
Professor, Boston College Law School 
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Welcome to the fourth edition of the I·CONnect-Clough Center Global Review of Constitutional Law. We were unsure 
whether the worldwide public health emergency would permit its publication. We are therefore immensely grateful to 
our dedicated team of collaborators for making this possible. 
The Global Review was born in 2017, with the publication of the 2016 Global Review. Our articulated goal at that time 
remains the same today: to offer readers systemic knowledge about jurisdiction-specific constitutional law that has 
previously been limited mainly to local networks. The Global Review seeks to increase the base of knowledge upon 
which scholars and judges can draw; we do this by making public law developments around the world available to 
all in an easily digestible format. Our ambition is to make our vast world smaller, more familiar, and more accessible.
This year the Global Review features over 70 jurisdictions. We continue to grow, slowly but steadily. With the help of 
our current roster of contributors and with new interest from our readers and others, we hope every year to continue 
to expand our coverage of the world.
A project like this is not possible without a great team. We thank our contributors for preparing their outstanding 
jurisditional reports. We also thank the leadership team at the International Journal of Constitutional Law—Gráinne 
de Búrca and Joseph Weiler, Co-Editors-in-Chief, as well as Marcela Prieto Rudolphy and Sergio Verdugo, Associate 
Editors—for publishing a few contributions from this year’s Global Review focused on Central and Eastern Europe. 
We express our sincerest thanks to Gaurie Pandey at the Center for Centers at Boston College for her tremendous work 
in designing this beautiful volume. And we thank Trish Do at the University of Texas at Austin for her assistance on 
this project from start to finish.
We extend a special word of thanks to Vlad Perju, Professor of Law and Director of the Clough Center for the Study 
of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College. He has been a global leader in constitutionalism, including as a 
convenor of scholarly programs of the highest importance, as a scholar whose work has elaborated and defended 
the values of constitutionalism, and as a public servant involved in helping countries, including his native Romania, 
rethink their constitutional arrangements in the service of the deepest commitments of constitutionalism. We thank 
him for partnering with us to produce the Global Review.
We invite interested authors from new jurisdictions to contact us via email at iconnecteditors@gmail.com to 
express their interest in producing a report for next year’s Global Review. And, as always, we welcome feedback, 
recommendations, and questions from our readers. 
YEAR FOUR OF THE GLOBAL REVIEW
Richard Albert and David Landau
Founding Co-Editors of I·CONnect and Co-Editors of the Global Review
Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda
Co-Editors of the Global Review
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Albania
Arta Vorpsi
Professor of Law, PhD
University of Tirana, Law Faculty
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2019 in Albania was characterized 
by political polarization. Parliamentary life 
was impaired by a prolonged boycott from 
opposition parties, which later relinquished 
en bloc their parliamentary mandates in 
February 2019. Furthermore, the opposition 
also boycotted the local elections on 30 June 
2019. They intended to put pressure on the 
government with the boycott, but the strate-
gy ultimately backfired. 
In connection to the above, a conflict be-
tween the President of the Republic and the 
governing majority took place. The conflict 
was triggered by the initiative of the Presi-
dent to issue a decree on the postponement 
of local elections without any prior consul-
tation with the major political parties. The 
main argument used by the President was 
the boycott by the parliamentary opposition. 
This unprecedented act of the President and 
also the appointment of a new constitutional 
judge contrary to the proper constitutional 
procedure served as the main arguments (ev-
idence) for the governing majority to initiate 
an impeachment procedure against the Presi-
dent, which has not yet concluded. 
This report will focus on the ongoing results 
of justice reform, such as the vetting process 
and the establishment or renewal of justice 
institutions (re)designed by the constitution-
al reform approved in 2016. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS  
Controversial local elections
The political environment remained polar-
ized throughout 2019. The opposition car-
ried out repeated boycotts of parliamentary 
activities. These activities culminated in 
February 2019 when the main opposition 
parties decided to relinquish their parlia-
mentary mandates en bloc. This led to de-
lays in the approval of electoral reform and 
the adoption of amendments to the Law on 
the Status of Judges and Prosecutors, after 
a prior decision of the Constitutional Court, 
which declared as unconstitutional some of 
the legal provisions. More than half of the 
relinquished parliamentary mandates were 
reassigned by the Central Election Commis-
sion (CEC) from the list of respective political 
parties of the opposition. Consequently, quo-
rum for the full functionality of Parliament 
was maintained. However, the opposition did 
not accept the new members of Parliament 
and excluded them as party members. The 
constitutionality of the replacement the ‘old’ 
MPs with ‘new’ ones from the lists raised the 
question of a democratic representation of 
the people, which is still unresolved since the 
Constitutional Court has currently no quorum 
to decide on the merit of a case (see below). 
Following the boycott of the Parliament, the 
united opposition ultimately decided not to 
participate in the local elections of 30 June 
2019. The reason for this decision was an 
ALBANIA
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1 Art. 90, para 2, 3 of the Constitution. 
2 See opinion CDL-AD (2019)019, para 14.
ultimatum by the opposition for the Prime 
Minister to resign from office and appoint a 
temporary (technical) government until both 
parliamentary and local elections took place. 
This request was ignored by the governing 
majority, which decided not to postpone the 
local elections despite the boycott of the op-
position. 
The political conflict became even fiercer 
when the President of the Republic, with-
out being consulted by the political parties, 
issued a decree to annul the local elections, 
without setting any new date. The main ar-
gument used by the President was that the 
political parties had not found any compro-
mise and that there could not be a democratic 
electoral process if only candidates from one 
party (governing party), meaning the social-
ist majority, entered the race. The socialist 
majority accused the President of the Repub-
lic of acting partially, because one of the op-
position parties had been previously founded 
by the head of state, and is currently headed 
by the first lady. Taking into consideration 
his affiliation with the opposition, the Pres-
ident was in an obvious conflict of interest 
and could not be in a position to play the role 
of a neutral arbiter, as he should have been. 
The parliamentary majority, as well as the 
CEC, ignored the act of the President. The 
CEC scheduled the local elections for 30 
June 2019, as decided earlier in the year. The 
President of the Republic issued another de-
cree, which set 13 October 2019 as the new 
date for holding the “postponed” local elec-
tions. The Parliament and CEC considered 
the presidential decree unconstitutional and 
thus did not update the new election date. 
The local elections were held on 30 June 
2019, and for the first time since the demo-
cratic changes in 1990, they were uncontest-
ed in more than 90% of the municipalities, 
which led to a 100% win of all local gov-
ernments by the socialist party and its allies. 
President’s impeachment process
 
The actions of the President of the Repub-
lic in issuing several decrees on the date of 
local elections as stated above gave the par-
liamentary majority a legal ground to initi-
ate an impeachment procedure for the very 
first time in Albanian history. Further, earlier 
that year, in January 2019, the President of 
the Republic refused to appoint the Foreign 
Minister proposed by the Prime Minister, 
arguing that the candidate was not adequate 
and experienced enough to lead Albania to-
ward European integration. The Prime Min-
ister refused to propose another candidate 
and took the Foreign Minister portfolio him-
self, sending the President a clear message 
about his formal role in appointing mem-
bers of the Cabinet. Based on these actions 
by the President, on July 2019, the majority 
decided to establish a parliamentary investi-
gation committee, which had to collect facts 
and arguments proving ‘severe breaches of 
the Constitution’ by the President, which is 
one of the reasons for discharging him from 
duty.1 If the Parliament concludes that there 
are severe breaches of the Constitution by 
the President, it might decide with a quali-
fied majority to dismiss him. The decision 
of the Parliament has to be verified by the 
Constitutional Court. 
In this instance, if the President overstepped 
his competences by not appointing the For-
eign Minister, the Constitutional Court had 
to decide based on the request of the Prime 
Minister. Meanwhile, the investigation com-
mittee decided to seek an amicus curiae from 
the Council of Europe’s Venice Commis-
sion; specifically, whether the actions of the 
President with regard to local elections could 
be classified as in conformity with the role of 
the head of state in a parliamentary democ-
racy. The Venice Commission stated that the 
postponement of the elections was subject to 
clear conditions: the situations of emergency 
requiring such a measure are provided for in 
detail (war, threats to national integrity, natu-
ral disasters and so on) by the Constitution or 
by statute, and the President can only under-
take the measure of postponing elections in 
circumstances that demonstrate the existence 
of one of these situations.2 In the absence of 
a statutory provision on the issue, the Pres-
ident can only cancel elections for local 
government bodies in a situation that meets 
the criteria for taking emergency measures. 
Even then, the President needs a specific, ad 
hoc legal basis to do so. 
This conclusion is supported by the general 
interpretative rule, according to which ex-
press regulation of emergency powers in the 
Constitution and laws restricts recourse to any 
complementary unwritten emergency pow-
ers to very exceptional situations; primarily 
to situations of factual or legal impossibility 
that are not explicitly provided for by written 
emergency law. Cancelling elections is pos-
sible only in situations that meet the require-
ment for declaring a state of emergency. How-
ever, the applicable constitutional rules for 
emergencies were not followed in this case. 
Neither was there a political consensus, which 
would have allowed for the establishment of 
an ad hoc legal basis. Cancelling elections 
also affects electoral rights recognized by in-
ternational human rights instruments, and the 
mere application of actus contrarius is pre-
vented by the requirement of proportionality 
of any interference. The absence of a legal 
basis and the availability of alternatives (post-
poning the elections according to emergency 
measures under Article 170 of the Constitu-
tion or the resumption of political dialogue 
after the elections) render the interference 
with the electoral rights disproportionate. The 
electoral boycott by political parties, even if 
they represent an important share of the elec-
torate, cannot prevent regular elections from 
taking place. Otherwise, these parties would 
obtain advantage to forestall any elections 
completely. 
The year 2019 will be remembered as the year 
of continued conflict between the President 
and the governing majority. Shortly after the 
delivery of amicus curiae, another unprece-
dented presidential act occurred. He appoint-
ed a judge to the Constitutional Court against 
constitutional and legal provisions, contrary 
to the whole newly adopted reform, especially 
the independence of the nomination of judges 
from political influences. After the unlawful 
nomination of the constitutional judge, the 
parliamentary majority proposed to widen the 
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object of the investigation against the Presi-
dent with another allegation and again seek 
the Venice Commission’s opinion on wheth-
er this nomination conformed with European 
standards on the appointment of judges based 
on a deadlock mechanism.
Since the parliamentary committee is still in 
the process of collecting facts, it will be for 
the Assembly and finally the Constitutional 
Court to establish whether cancelling, then 
postponing the local elections, refusing to ap-
point a Cabinet’s member and also nominat-
ing a judge without taking into consideration 
the anti-deadlock mechanism amount to a vi-
olation of the Constitution to the extent that 
necessitates an impeachment of the President. 
The establishment of anti-corruption  
structure
After establishing two new justice institu-
tions, the High Judicial Council (HJC) and 
High Prosecutorial Council (HPC), designed 
by the constitutional reform adopted in 
2016,3 the process for election of a new Gen-
eral Prosecutor and Anticorruption Structures 
(meaning a Special Prosecutor on Anti-Cor-
ruption and the Special Investigation Unit in-
dependent from General Prosecutor and also 
other state power), began. 
The constitutional amendments introduced 
a new election formula for the General 
Prosecutor, which reduces the margin of 
appreciation of the Assembly. The HPC se-
lects and ranks three candidates; then the 
list with the ranked candidates is forwarded 
to the Assembly, which shall elect one of the 
candidates by three-fifths majority of votes 
within 30 days from receipt of the list. If 
the Assembly fails to elect a candidate, the 
first ranked is ipso jure considered elected. 
These anti-deadlock mechanisms aim at 
motivating the Assembly to find an agree-
ment on one candidate. Otherwise, anoth-
er body, i.e., the HPC, will do the election. 
Three out of four candidates were magis-
trates, one a lawyer. Following a transpar-
ent call and fair screening procedure carried 
out by the HPC, on 5 December 2019 the 
new General Prosecutor was elected with a 
qualified majority. 
As for the Specialized Prosecution Office, 
the HPC appointed the first eight pros-
ecutors, who will investigate corruption 
allegations or other crimes against public 
officials. The process of electing the Head 
of the Special Investigation Unit and inves-
tigations officers is ongoing.
The difficult renewal process of the  
Constitutional Court 
As a result of the implementation of the 
vetting process of all judges and prosecutors 
in Albania, the Constitutional Court has not 
been able to hear any case in full composi-
tion since spring 2018. From January 2019 
to November 2019, the Court had only one 
judge. In November 2019, three new judges 
were elected. 
An eligibility requirement for the position 
of judge on the Constitutional Court is the 
successful passing of the vetting (screening) 
process. Stakeholders and observers have 
perceived the vetting as going relatively 
slowly considering the five-year constitu-
tional deadline and the total number of circa 
800 cases. The main reasons for the pace of 
the process relate to the investigation phase, 
which does not have a time limit according 
to the law, as well as the inexperience or lack 
of professionalism of the Albanian institu-
tions in charge of issuing information related 
to assessments. The main reason for dismiss-
al is problems with asset declarations. 
This process has impacted the renewal pro-
cess of the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court. In February 2018, the pro-
cess began of nominating and electing three 
constitutional judges, whose mandate ended 
according to the law. Later in 2018 and in 
spring 2019, other vacancies (six in total, 
four full mandate and two partial) were an-
nounced since the former judges were dis-
missed from duty by the vetting institutions. 
The process of electing three new judges 
took more than a year and a half because not 
only judges and prosecutors on duty but also 
the candidates who would run for new va-
cancies at different justice institutions were 
‘obligated’ to go through a screening process 
(meaning the verification process of their as-
sets, background and professionalism). 
The election of judges to the Constitutional 
Court has been a matter of political debate 
since its foundation. It should be mentioned 
that from 1992 until 1998 the constitutional 
judges were elected partly (4) by the Presi-
dent and partly (5) by the Parliament. After 
the entering into force of the new Constitu-
tion in 1998, their appointment was divided 
between the President and the Parliament. 
For several years, there was an ongoing con-
flict between the Parliament and the Presi-
dent about who has what power to appoint 
apex court judges. Even the Constitution-
al Court’s case-law could not resolve this 
dispute since there was a need for political 
consensus. This led to an extension of the 
mandate of the judges who remained on duty 
for more than nine years or even 12 years. 
The solution came through the recent consti-
tutional and legal reform on the justice sys-
tem of 2016, including constitutional justice. 
The most important novelties were related to 
more detailed professional criteria as well as 
a new detailed procedure for appointment.
Following 2016’s justice reform, it was 
proposed that the appointment process of 
constitutional judges be divided between 
three bodies to avoid the frequent blocking 
of the process by political clashes between 
the parliamentary majority and the Presi-
dent. According to the new system, each 
of the three bodies has an exclusive power 
to nominate judges: the Parliament elects 
three judges, the President of the Republic 
shall nominate three judges and the Supreme 
Court selects three judges.4 The aim of this 
model of appointment is not only to avoid 
the blocking of process but also to minimize 
political influence during the nomination 
stage. For many years, the nomination of 
constitutional judges has been hijacked by 
political disputes between the President and 
3 See also the Albania Report of 2017. 
4 Article 125 of the Constitution and Article 7 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.
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the Parliament, discouraging the best law-
yers from running for any possible vacancy 
on the Constitutional Court because of the 
overwhelming fear of engaging themselves 
in the political whirlwind.5  
Apart from the formal appointment process, 
another new development of the reform was 
the provisions on the professional and mor-
al integrity criteria as well as the manner 
and procedure for their evaluation by a spe-
cial body: the Justice Appointment Council 
(JAC), which is an ad hoc body constituted 
by judges and prosecutors at different levels 
of jurisdiction, elected by lot. The Justice 
Appointment Council6 serves as a profes-
sional filter to rank the candidates according 
to their professional background. It sends 
this ranking list to three election bodies 
(Parliament, President and Supreme Court), 
which have to elect one of the three high-
est-ranked candidates. If one of the bodies 
or all three fail or refuse to choose one can-
didate, the candidate ranked first on the list 
shall be considered appointed (anti-deadlock 
mechanism, which is also found in other 
election processes regarding justice insti-
tutions). The whole process is meant to be 
characterized by transparency and publicity, 
the features that were previously missing 
from the process of appointing constitutional 
judges.7 The JAC started to function prop-
erly in January 2018, two and a half years 
after the adoption of the Constitution, after 
its members went through a vetting process 
themselves. 
After the announcement of the six vacancies 
on the Constitutional Court, the JAC began 
the screening process of the candidates, 
which lasted until early October 2019. At 
the end, there were only six candidates for 
four vacancies, and the other two vacancies 
reopened due to a lack of candidates. On 7 
October, the JAC sent the President the lists 
for two vacancies, and on 14 October 2019, 
the lists for two other vacancies were sent to 
the Parliament to elect one of the three first-
ranked candidates as a judge on the Constitu-
tional Court. According to the law, the Pres-
ident has 30 days to appoint the judge from 
among the ranking list. The procedure of the 
Assembly invokes a hearing with the ranked 
candidates with the Law Committee and vot-
ing with a three-fifths majority; in any case, 
the Assembly shall complete this procedure 
within 30 days from the day of receipt of the 
ranking list. In both cases, the law foresees 
that if the candidate is not elected and ap-
pointed within 30 days, then the first-ranked 
candidate by the JAC is considered elected. 
Again, an anti-deadlock mechanism applies. 
This was also one of the goals of the justice 
reform of 2016. 
What happened was far from what the consti-
tutional and legal framework foresaw. After 
the termination of the 30-day deadline and 
after the President did not act, the JAC con-
firmed that the first-ranked candidate was 
nominated to be a judge on the Constitution-
al Court. Some days before the exhaustion of 
the 30-day time limit, the President made an 
allegation about the selection process carried 
out by the JAC, claiming it was not transpar-
ent, which was perceived by observers as a 
‘surprise move’ since during the whole pro-
cess a representative of the President’s office 
was present, and never made this allegation 
in more than a year and a half. Based on the 
allegation, the President refused to invite the 
nominated judge (the first-ranked candidate) 
to take an oath. It should be mentioned that 
a judge may exercise his/her duty after he/
she has taken the oath before the President 
(Article 129 of the Constitution). Given the 
facts, the nominated judge made a declara-
tion in written form that contained the oath 
formula, signed it before a public notary 
and sent it to the President of the Republic, 
since the latter refused to invite her to take 
an oath officially. After this step, the Presi-
dent again acted unconstitutionally, putting 
the whole process of renewal of the Consti-
tutional Court and its legitimacy in jeopar-
dy: he nominated another candidate as judge 
and invited her immediately to take an oath. 
The nomination by the President took place 
after the expiration of the 30 days and the 
candidate nominated was not ranked as one 
of the first three, as the Constitution and the 
law stipulate. Furthermore, not only did the 
President nominate the candidate beyond the 
time limit foreseen by the law but she was 
also not part of the first three ranked can-
didates approved by the JAC. This process 
boiled down to constitutional violations by 
the President, which caused an unclear and 
confusing situation for the Constitutional 
Court. Because of all these actions, two law-
yers were nominated for one vacancy on the 
Court. The Court itself was unable to decide 
on the matter because of the lack of a neces-
sary quorum (there are only three judges and 
the minimal quorum to decide on the merit 
of a case is six). 
Based on these developments, the Parliament 
approved a resolution through which it con-
sidered the nomination of another candidate 
by the President as unconstitutional, inviting 
all state institutions, including the Constitu-
tional Court, not to consider this act of the 
President. The Parliament went further in 
widening the scope of the committee inves-
tigating the President for another potential 
constitutional violation. A further step was 
asking for a second opinion from the Venice 
Commission for another amicus curiae; the 
Parliament sought advice whether the acts of 
the President conform to the best European 
or international practice for nominating con-
stitutional judges against the concept of an 
anti-deadlock mechanism, which serves to 
prohibit the dependence of this process from 
political influences or interests. It can reason-
ably be expected that the Venice Commission 
will issue an opinion by mid-March 2020.
 
 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES   
As mentioned above, the Constitutional 
Court has not been in a position to decide on 
the merits of cases since spring 2018 because 
of the lack of a quorum. Currently, only three 
judges are engaged with the screening of ad-
missibility criteria. 
5 Decisions no.2/2001; no.20/2009; no.24/2011; and no.41/2012 of the Constitutional Court. 
6 Article 149/d of the Constitution. 
7 Articles 7, 7a, 7b and 7c of the Law on Constitutional Court.
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Nonetheless, several applications await res-
olution, which are shortly presented below:
1. Prime Minister v. President of the 
Republic: Nomination of Cabinet’s Member 
 
More than a year after winning the election, 
the Prime Minister decided to replace the 
Foreign Minister with a new and younger 
‘face’. The President, who argued that the 
candidate was very young and inexperienced 
for the job, refused the proposal of the PM. 
This led to an open conflict between the 
President and Prime Minister, who refused 
to propose another candidate and decided to 
take over this portfolio himself. Meanwhile, 
he put in motion the Constitutional Court to 
decide on this matter, alleging a conflict of 
competence between the Government and 
the President because the latter has no power 
to impose the Prime Minister to choose his 
Cabinet’s members, but only approve them, 
which conforms to the concept of parliamen-
tarian regime. The case is pending before the 
Court to be decided on the merit.
 
2. The National Theater Law
The Municipality of Tirana, also supported 
by the executive, proposed a plan to build 
a new National Theater to replace the old 
building (situated in the center of Tira-
na), which, according to them, is severely 
damaged and reconstruction or repair is too 
expensive for the state budget. According to 
the proposal, the new building will be con-
structed and invested by a private enterprise 
based on a formula of public-private part-
nership. As a result, close to the new theater 
would also be constructed four skyscrapers. 
This proposal was controversially dis-
cussed and caused a strong public reaction 
not only among the actors but also by the 
civil society, claiming that the real reason 
behind the new plan is to gain profit by the 
business-inducing skyscrapers. Following 
the already open conflicts between him and 
the Prime Minister, the President of the 
Republic submitted a request to the Con-
stitutional Court to declare the law on the 
demolition of the National Theater building 
unconstitutional.  
3. Nomination of a Judge to the  
Constitutional Court 
As explained above, the legitimacy of the 
nomination of the new judge by the Presi-
dent will be decided by the Court itself. The 
case constitutes a looming challenge for the 
Court as it will determine the future of the in-
dependence of the institution. It can reason-
ably be foreseen that by the end of 2020, the 
Court could be in full composition to decide 
which nominated judge has to take the seat 
on the Court.  
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
 
From the political point of view, the most 
important matter is the ongoing electoral 
reform, which requires the readiness and 
willingness of political parties to cooperate. 
Currently, the opposition is divided into two 
large groups: one represented in Parliament 
(also called ‘parliamentary opposition’) and 
the other taking actions ‘outside’ the Parlia-
ment. It remains unclear if there will be a 
successful electoral reform and if there will 
be a compromise to organize new elections, 
as the ‘outside’ opposition demands. At the 
same time, the ‘outside’ opposition cannot 
approve any drafts or take part in the law-
making, as it is not represented in the Parlia-
ment. This is also a precondition for opening 
negotiations with the EU and should be done 
before May 2020, when discussions about 
EU enlargement will be held.
An equally important issue is the continued 
implementation of justice reform. The es-
tablishment or renewal of the justice insti-
tutions is taking a considerable amount of 
time, which has led to a complex situation 
affecting human rights of individuals seek-
ing justice. The full functionality of both the 
Constitutional Court and Supreme Court is 
crucial for a democracy and the rule of law. 
There are pending cases (not so much before 
the Constitutional Court as before the Su-
preme Court) waiting to be adjudicated. This 
strongly affects the rights of the citizens, 
who need justice delivered within a reason-
able time. There are already cases before the 
ECtHR against Albania claiming non-effec-
tive domestic remedies because both high 
Courts have been out of function for almost 
two years. Looking ahead in 2020, there is 
still hope that action will be taken to achieve 
the full composition or at least the minimal 
quorum for both Courts to decide on the 
merits of complaints. It should be taken into 
consideration that some representatives of 
state institutions constantly engage in con-
duct intended to slow down or even hinder 
and thwart the process of implementation 
of justice reform, which is showing its first 
effects on de-politicisation of justice institu-
tions in Albania. 
V. FURTHER READING
 
Arta Vorpsi, “The Constitutional Justice and 
Its Impact in Preserving the Rule of Law in 
Albania,” in Encyclopedia of Contemporary 
Constitutionalism (Springer International, 
forthcoming 2020)
Opinion CDL-AD (2019)019 (https://www.
venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pd-
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I. INTRODUCTION
We ended our 2018 report by saying that, 
[a]part from a few significant cases, 
what immediately lies ahead is a presi-
dential election in October 2019, which 
may indirectly affect the future of the 
Court and test the justices’ consistency.
The election in question returned a Pero-
nist administration led by President Alberto 
Fernández and now Vice-President Cristina 
Fernández. This unfolded amidst yet another 
serious economic crisis and escalating pov-
erty rates, which faded any hopes outgoing 
President Macri could have of getting him-
self reelected. 
In this context, the Supreme Court was not 
at the front of public concerns, but some of 
its decisions during the year had wide impli-
cations. We will discuss a handful of cases 
from 2019 that hinted at trends that were be-
ginning to solidify at a divided Court but that 
the new political reality may modify.  
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS  
Several of the cases we review suggest a rift 
within the Court and the emergence of a ma-
jority coalition formed by Justices Lorenzetti, 
Maqueda and Rosatti – nicknamed by the 
press, accurately or not, the “Peronist” ma-
jority.2 Reinforcing a tendency we noted last 
year, Justice Rosenkrantz (the Court’s Presi-
dent) often voted by himself or dissented, and 
in some cases this was true of Justice Highton 
as well. While a full account of voting pat-
terns escapes us here, this tentative trend may 
be explained by ideological reasons that coin-
cided with the justices’ distance to the govern-
ment or a public perception of that distance, a 
perception that may be partly influenced by 
the decisions justices make. 
In the cases that most heavily impacted gov-
ernmental interests, as in 2017-2018, Justice 
Rosenkrantz dissented, showing some will-
ingness to defer to the political branches on 
complex issues with financial implications. 
He also refrained from embracing broad con-
stitutional constructions and seemed to adopt 
a narrow approach to adjudication. On the 
other hand, the above-mentioned coalition 
emerged in cases in which broad principles 
of law were used to protect rights against 
powerful governmental interests. That was 
the case in the pension cases we discuss 
next, but also in a handful of environmental 
decisions in which those justices sided with 
whatever party was making a stronger claim 
of protecting the environment.3
The political sea change of 2019 within the 
context of a raging economic crisis may af-
fect these coalitions, putting the justices’ 
consistency to the test – their approach both 
ARGENTINA
1 During Justice Rosenkrantz’s confirmation process, González-Bertomeu submitted a letter of support.
2 Rodríguez-Niell P, ‘El germen de la «mayoría peronista» desvela a la Casa Rosada’ La Nación (Bue-
nos Aires, 4 November 2018) https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/el-germen-de-la-mayoria-peronis-
ta-desvela-a-la-casa-rosada-nid2188295 accessed 11 January 2020. 
3 Barrick Exploraciones Argentinas CSJ140/2011(47-B)/CS1 [2019]; Nordi, Amneris Lelia CS-
J180/2010(46-N)/CS1 [2019].
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to interpretation and their role, their com-
mitment to rights protection, and the defer-
ence to political decisions in the face of an 
executive wielding, once again, emergency 
powers. In the last days of the year, Congress 
passed a package of emergency measures 
including delegations to the Executive. Ex-
ercising these powers, President Fernández 
froze a statutory pension update that was due 
at the end of the year. He chose to decide 
those updates discretionarily for 180 days, a 
period during which he is supposed to draft a 
new formula to be sent to Congress. 
Pensions, taxes, and federalism
Because of myriad factors characterizing the 
country – recurrent economic crises, infla-
tion, pension cuts – pensions have long been 
a central concern, and cases involving them 
have been a fixture at the Court. Decisions in 
these cases usually have severe financial im-
plications. Last year we commented on one 
such case (Blanco). In 2019, a similar voting 
pattern to that in Blanco resurfaced in a case 
(García) concerning pensioners’ duty to pay 
income tax.4 A 79-year-old with health issues 
said that the rate she faced – equaling over 
one-quarter of her pension – was excessive 
and unconstitutional. A majority (Justices 
Highton, Maqueda, Lorenzetti, and Rosatti) 
sided with her, saying that the 1994 amend-
ment had embedded a duty to offer special 
treatment to vulnerable sectors of the popu-
lation, among them pensioners. It argued that 
the tax system had to be sensitive to the way 
it affected the people it regulated. The sys-
tem only considered income levels without 
attention to pensioners’ specific “condition 
of vulnerability due to old age or illness.” In 
the majority’s view, this placed plaintiff at a 
disadvantage because of her circumstances, 
even if her pension was much higher than 
the median. And it violated equality, which 
implies the need to treat different situations 
differently. The Court ordered the admin-
istration to stop demanding payment from 
plaintiff and asked Congress to enact mea-
sures singling out pensioners of advanced 
age or with health issues for favorable treat-
ment apart from considering income levels. 
A series of similar decisions followed.
Dissenting, Justice Rosenkrantz said that it 
had not been shown the statute was unconsti-
tutional. He claimed that in 2016, Congress 
had established that pensioners were expected 
to pay the tax only if receiving relatively high 
pensions, six times the minimum at the time, 
which was not a regressive measure. Plain-
tiff’s pension was higher than this. Moreover, 
plaintiff had not shown that her payment of 
the tax affected her ability to afford her health 
and utility expenses. Rosenkrantz acknowl-
edged the protections afforded pensioners but 
said that they were not incompatible with the 
duty to pay taxes. The justice cited the Court’s 
case law, determining that Congress had dis-
cretion within reasonable boundaries to pon-
der all interests at play to determine how 
to tax. In his view, the notion that the gov-
ernment fell short of what each of us would 
wish it had done concerning pensioners could 
not be turned “into an argument against the 
constitutionality of a regime that … relies on 
value judgments, facts, and strategies…” that 
Congress is expected to ponder. 
Another momentous decision involving taxes 
(Entre Ríos) featured clear federalism traits.5 
A majority stated that a (progressive) presi-
dential decree lowering in practice the income 
tax rate for workers and the value-added tax 
rate for basic groceries violated the consti-
tution since it detracted sums from the prov-
inces that the latter had committed to ensure 
proper operation. 
Since the early 1900s, the provinces have 
delegated taxing powers to the federal gov-
ernment.6 A tax-sharing scheme was even-
tually adopted according to which the gov-
ernment collects most taxes and redistributes 
them to the provinces.7 Today, a large por-
tion of the provinces’ budgets come from the 
government, and, at the same time, provinc-
es provide the most basic services.8 In 1994, 
a constitutional amendment mandated the 
distribution of tax funds not earmarked and 
the enactment of a statute to be approved by 
each province with criteria for distribution.9 
The statute has not been adopted; in its place, 
the system is guided by a collection of rules, 
including statutes passed by both Congress 
and the provinces.10  
In Entre Ríos, a majority (Justices Maqueda, 
Lorenzetti and Rosatti) sided with a province 
seeking an interim order as plaintiff. The jus-
tices said that the decree unilaterally modi-
fied the tax distribution system, something 
that only Congress acting within its purview 
and with the provinces’ approval could do. 
Also, the province had already committed 
those sums to the funding of its regular ac-
tivities. The Court provisionally ordered the 
federal government to shoulder the differ-
ence in the sums collected before and after 
the decree.  
Again, the decision found Justice Rosenk-
rantz dissenting alone. Apart from saying 
that the province lacked standing and inter-
est to seek a declaration of unconstitution-
ality, he maintained that the legislation con-
cerning distribution did not give provinces 
any right to determine the tax policy or to a 
specific level of resources. The statute only 
established provinces’ right to receive the tax 
sums already collected by the federal gov-
ernment. Also, variations in those sums from 
4 García, María Isabel FPA7789/2015/CS1-CA1 [2019].
5 Entre Ríos, Provincia de CSJ1829/2019/1 [2019].  
6 Juan González-Bertomeu, “The Constitution of Argentina”, in: Conrado Hübner Mendes and Roberto Gargarella, The Oxford Handbook of Constitutional 
Law in Latin America, 2020. 
7 Id.
8 Id. Alberto Porto, “Introducción” in Alberto Porto (ed), Disparidades Regionales y Federalismo Fiscal (EDULP 2004).
9 Id. Constitution of Argentina, section 75.2.
10 Id González-Bertomeu, id.
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one year to the next were foreseeable and did 
not allow the simple assumption that a prov-
ince had been irreversibly harmed as a result. 
Assigning provinces the right to outright ob-
ject to the federal government’s decisions to 
levy taxes or set rates would seem to create 
an imbalance in the country’s federal struc-
ture, tilting it toward a confederal arrange-
ment. (This does not consider the fact that 
the change had been introduced by a decree, 
not a statute, in violation of the principle of 
legality.) However, this should not deny that 
provinces are in a tight bind. Having ceded 
most taxing power to the federal govern-
ment, they heavily depend on the taxes the 
latter collects. If Congress or the Executive 
were free to eliminate a tax overnight with-
out any rearrangement, a province would be 
forced to bear the brunt without many alter-
natives, since the federal government has 
shown hostility towards the provinces’ full 
exercise of their taxing powers. Fair play 
seems to require some form of accommoda-
tion or negotiation involving the provinces.
III. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL 
CASES  
While our next focus is on elections, other 
relevant decisions concern free speech, crim-
inal due process, and compensation for vic-
tims of state-sponsored terrorism. Now, the 
Court does not always provide a clear depic-
tion of facts. More perplexing, the justices’ 
opinions usually diverge in those depictions. 
This has long been a feature in the Court’s 
decision making but it is high time it chang-
es. It is hard to assess a decision without a 
full grasp of the facts, and the facts should be 
identical to everyone. 
1. Elections
Since early on, the Court has embraced a 
set of “passive virtues” doctrines to dodge 
politically charged cases, although in recent 
decades it has moved towards a more relaxed 
stance concerning justiciability. Occasional-
ly, the Court decides cases dealing with elec-
toral institutions, often involving partisan 
strategies to achieve or hold onto power. In 
2019, it intervened in two such cases. 
In Unión Cívica Radical,11 a local branch of 
the coalition then in power challenged an 
amendment to the constitution of the La Rioja 
province involving reelection. The constitu-
tion allows for one immediate reelection, in-
cluding the case of a vice-governor who then 
runs for governor. The amendment aimed 
to remove the limitation for those who had 
first served as vice-governor before serving 
as governor, the case of the sitting governor. 
Amendments passed by the local legislature 
are to be ratified in a referendum coinciding 
with “the following general election”; with 
time ticking, the government rushed this pro-
cess by calling a special election. The consti-
tution also says that the amendment will be 
considered rejected only if a majority votes it 
down and if that majority represents at least 
35 percent of registered voters. Twenty-five 
percent of such voters had voted “yes” but 
fewer than 35 percent had voted “no.” The 
plaintiff also challenged this rule. In a deci-
sion signed by Justices Maqueda, Lorenzetti, 
and Rosatti, with concurring opinions by 
Justices Rosenkrantz and Highton, the Court 
sided with the plaintiffs.
The decision revolved around how to inter-
pret both the term “the following general 
election” and the 35 percent requirement. 
The majority dealt quickly with the former; 
among other reasons, common sense dictates 
that “general” is the opposite of particular or 
special. It also said that the (literal) inter-
pretation of the constitution the local bodies 
had selected meant that an amendment could 
be deemed approved even if a majority was 
against it since it presumed that those not 
voting were in favor of it. In this case, 75 
percent of voters had not voted in favor. The 
majority concluded that the only interpre-
tation of the clause that made it compatible 
with both the local and the federal constitu-
tions’ protection of popular sovereignty was 
to consider (in opposition to its plain mean-
ing) that an amendment would be ratified if 
supported by a majority of at least 35 per-
cent of registered voters. Citing a previous 
decision, the majority ended by saying that 
the country’s history offered a plethora of 
attempts to force republican principles to ad-
vance a politician’s interests, suggesting that 
it was time to stop. 
The second case (FPV) involved a challenge 
by the Peronist-Kirchnerista coalition, then 
in the opposition, to an attempt by a gover-
nor (a government’s ally) to run for reelec-
tion.12 The governor had first been elected 
as vice-governor and, days later, was sworn 
in as governor after the governor died. He 
was then reelected. The local constitution 
included a clause identical to the one dis-
cussed above limiting a second immediate 
reelection, establishing that “[t]he gover-
nor and vice-governor can be reelected or 
succeed each other” (recíprocamente) only 
once. The governor was seemingly prevent-
ed from running again, and so did plaintiff 
claim. The province asserted that the local 
constitution’s interpretation was reserved to 
the province’s authorities. It added that the 
governor’s case was outside the scope of the 
second reelection ban since the names in the 
complete governor/vice-governor ticket in 
each election had been different and the ban 
only applied if both officials had jointly suc-
ceeded each other.  
A majority (Justices Maqueda, Lorenzetti, 
and Rosatti) agreed with the plaintiffs. The 
reelection clause was clear enough; the 
ban applied to the case of a governor or 
vice-governor reelected as such, who could 
not run for a third term, as well as to the 
case of an official serving in one position 
who then serves in the other, either joining 
a ticket with the same person as before or 
not. Interpreting otherwise would be tanta-
mount to allowing for unlimited reelection if 
only one of the members of the ticket stands 
again, and this would clash with republican 
principles. The majority added that an orig-
inalist interpretation of the local convention 
debates suggested the same answer. It closed 
with the same paragraph concerning previ-
11 Unión Cívica Radical de la Provincia de La Rioja CSJ125/2019 [2019]. 
12 Frente para la Victoria-Distrito Río Negro CSJ449/2019 [2019].
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ous attempts at forcing institutions.
 
Justices Rosenkrantz and Highton each 
dissented via similar votes. In line with 
long-existing standards, the respect for lo-
cal autonomy demanded that the Court ab-
stain from trumping the province’s judges’ 
interpretation of the local constitution if it 
did not involve a clear departure from the 
plain meaning of the text. The meaning of 
the reelection clause was not straightfor-
ward, and the province’s interpretation was 
not unreasonable. The justices justified their 
seemingly different stance in the La Rioja 
case by saying that, in that case, it was plain 
that the election in question was illegitimate. 
Both also denied that an interpretation of the 
convention’s debates backed the plaintiffs. 
According to Justice Rosenkrantz, it was not 
unreasonable to consider that those drafting 
the constitution wanted to limit the prospect 
of the two officials serving again in reverse 
order but not the prospect of only one of 
them doing it. 
To us, the majority was right. The straight-
forward interpretation was that the clause 
referred to both the case of the two officials 
jointly succeeding each other or to any of 
them succeeding the other. The clause’s tar-
get seemed to be the person running each 
time, not the complete ticket. If no one would 
claim that a governor can be indefinitely re-
elected if she picks a different running mate 
each time, why would this be different in the 
case of a vice-governor later serving as gov-
ernor? But even if the portion of the clause 
“or succeed each other” could reasonably be 
interpreted as referring to the joint ticket si-
multaneously seeking reelection in reverse 
order, this would entail that the previous por-
tion “[t]he governor and vice-governor can 
be reelected” also referred to the joint ticket, 
with clear implications for the case. 
Consider a similar example: “Anne will be 
the coach in the 2020 season and Joan will 
be assistant coach; their job can be extend-
ed only for another year or they can succeed 
each other only for another year.” If the sec-
ond italicized passage is taken to mean that 
the extension regulation is only applicable if 
both take the other person’s post, the first, 
by implication, could only mean that the ex-
tension regulation is applicable only if each 
person’s job remains the same in the new 
term. Both cases share the sentence’s subject 
(“the governor and vice-governor”). And the 
presence of the word recíprocamente (each 
other) does not change things, since, as the 
majority said, the word simply appears to 
clarify the verb “succeed” by establishing 
that it refers to any of the two officials seek-
ing the other’s job. 
Thus, taking the province’s interpretation to 
its logical conclusion, the reelection clause 
only regulated two cases: the case of the 
two officials succeeding each other at the 
same time and the case of the governor and 
vice-governor jointly seeking reelection 
without changing their posts. If so, the gov-
ernor’s case when running for his current 
term – a vice-governor then elected as gov-
ernor without the former governor running 
for vice-governor – fell outside the scope of 
that regulation, which explicitly considered 
the post of vice-governor. (We are sorry for 
the mouthful.) But reelection can only be 
constitutional if an explicit clause allows 
it, which means that the governor’s current 
term was…illegitimate! Granted, this is an 
odd result, but it is the corollary of the prov-
ince’s interpretation. The La Rioja governor 
did not seem to read a similar clause as al-
ready granting him the right to run again.  
2. Freedom of Expression
Almost all the freedom of expression cas-
es the Court decided depicted the proverbial 
scenario of public figures seeking damages 
for alleged defamation. The thread that links 
them is a growing gulf between the justices 
as to how already-settled tests to adjudicate 
freedom of expression cases apply in practice. 
In García,13 a majority opinion by Justices 
Rosenkrantz, Highton, and Rosatti employed 
the 1986 Campillay test.14 The test states that 
no media outlet is to be held liable for erro-
neous information produced by a third party 
if the source was identified, a conditional 
mode was used or the name of the person 
involved was withheld. The majority extend-
ed Campillay’s first tenet to remove a news 
outlet’s liability for defamation regarding the 
work of a freelance journalist not formally 
employed by it since the journalist himself 
was deemed the source. This decision, seem-
ingly protective of speech, was not so, since 
it may have a chilling effect on freelancers, 
for under García the outlets they publish on 
would not stand by them in case of a claim. 
This was raised by Justices Maqueda and 
Lorenzetti, who reached a non-liability out-
come through the analysis of the content of 
the objected news item, which they deemed 
as containing value judgments that “did not 
go beyond the … tolerance needed … when 
the issue is of public interest.”  
Other cases show that the distinction between 
tolerable and intolerable criticism can be dif-
ficult to manage. In Martínez,15 a plurality 
found that remarks to the effect that a pub-
lic official was “complicit” in an “impunity 
pact” were fair game; dissenting, Justices 
Maqueda and Lorenzetti each said that the 
official’s honor had been compromised. In 
De Sanctis,16 a different plurality considered 
that unearthing an old allegation of gender 
violence to criticize a political appointment 
was off-limits, since the allegation (for two 
justices a value judgment, and for one a fac-
tual claim) had been unnecessarily brought 
up in the context of a more general political 
criticism and interfered with the plaintiff’s 
private life. Justices Rosenkrantz and High-
ton dissented. What made the criticism in 
Martínez acceptable and that in De Sanctis 
off-limits was unclear, and to us, both sets 
of remarks seemed to be covered by the con-
stitution, what Justices Highton and Rosenk-
rantz rightly claimed. 
13 García, Stella Marys y otro CSJ395/2014(50-G)/CS1 [2019].
14 Campillay, Julio César 308 Fallos 789 [1986].
15  Martínez de Sucre, Virgilio Juan CSJ1109/2012(48-M)/CS1 [2019]. 
16  De Sanctis, Guillermo CSJ498/2012(48-D)/CS1 [2019]. 
2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 17
In short, while the Court’s case law still se-
appears protective of free speech, the bal-
ancing approach that seems to be emerging 
is to be closely followed, as it may weaken 
the more rule-like adjudication techniques of 
Campillay and the actual malice test, both 
long accepted by the Court.
3. The Right to a Speedy Trial 
In the 1980s, with the return to democrat-
ic rule, the Court displayed a liberal stance 
concerning criminal defendants’ due process 
rights, a trend that wavered in the 1990s but 
gained renewed vigor in the early 2000s. We 
highlight three cases from 2019 related to 
the violation of the right to a speedy trial, a 
chronic problem. 
In Farina,17 a majority (no full dissents) or-
dered the definitive dismissal of proceed-
ings against a woman sentenced in 2005 to 
two years plus a professional interdiction 
for involuntary manslaughter, a crime from 
2000. A round of appeals against the convic-
tion was still open in 2019, largely because 
of the Buenos Aires province judges’ inter-
pretation of the events that interrupted the 
national penal code’s period of prescription 
(or statute of limitations). The judges had 
chosen an interpretation unfavorable to the 
woman that went against the Court’s previ-
ous interpretation. The majority argued that 
the judges’ stubbornness in holding to their 
view disrespected the Court’s authority to set 
precedents to be followed and violated the 
woman’s right to a speedy trial. 
In Espíndola,18 originating in the same prov-
ince, the three voting justices overturned an 
appeals decision that upheld a sentence to 
seven years for robbery from 2007 and urged 
the local Supreme Court to speed up pro-
ceedings. Finally, in Rojas,19 two convicted 
women for murder in the Misiones province 
had spent 9-12 years detained without a de-
finitive sentence. A unanimous Court sided 
with defendants when they claimed that their 
right to an ample revision of the conviction 
had not been guaranteed. The Court found 
serious violations to the presumption of in-
nocence, and, given the time elapsed, decid-
ed to acquit the defendants. 
4. Compensation for Victims of the  
Dictatorship 
Apart from criminal proceedings against 
those responsible for grave human rights 
violations during the last dictatorship (1976-
1983), the country has awarded victims of 
state-sponsored terrorism official compen-
sation. On several occasions, the Court has 
intervened in issues dealing with them. In 
Fernández,20 a person forced to leave the 
country sought compensation. The relevant 
statute’s text provides it to those illegally de-
tained, but in many decisions, the Court said 
that the statute covered cases of forced exile 
as well, and so it extended its application. Yet 
a ministry decided to afford exiled individu-
als only a quarter of the sum given to those 
detained. The Court (Justice Rosenkrantz did 
not vote) struck down such regulation, say-
ing that only another statute could alter the 
interpretation repeatedly made by the Court.
In Ingegnieros,  the daughter of a disappeared 
person sued for compensation from the com-
pany (Techint) where her father worked. She 
invoked the workplace injury labor law, ar-
guing that her father had been abducted by 
state forces during his workday under the 
company’s complicit stance. In her view, the 
statute of limitations had not elapsed since 
the compensation she asked originated in 
a crime against humanity that does not pre-
scribe. Through three concurring opinions 
(Justices Rosenkrantz, Highton, and Loren-
zetti), the Court denied her claim by invok-
ing previous case law establishing that, while 
criminal proceedings regarding these crimes 
do not prescribe, civil actions involving com-
pensation do. Justices Maqueda and Rosatti 
dissented. They underscored the seriousness 
of the offense, the violence displayed by the 
dictatorship towards unions and workers, and 
the complicity of the company. The Court had 
decided that crimes like the one against the 
plaintiff’s father did not prescribe, so it was 
inconsistent to conclude that monetary com-
pensation for those crimes did. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Speculating about future scenarios in unpre-
dictable Argentina is pointless. Looming on 
the horizon is the constitutional validity of 
some of the emergency measures passed in 
2019. But more interesting to us is the ex-
tent that the political change affects justices’ 
behavior. The last three years of a Court 
serving under a non-Peronist government 
with two new appointees had begun to offer 
a picture of where things were headed. The 
political change may lead to realignments. 
Where will the chips fall next time? 
17 Farina, Haydée CSJ2148/2015/RH1 [2019]. 
18 Espíndola, Juan Gabriel CSJ1381/2018/RH1 [2019]. 
19 Expte. N 48669/2015 CSJ 367/2018/C51 [2019].
20 Fernández, María CAF3972/2017/CA1-CS1 [2019].
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The triennial Australian federal election was 
held in May 2019 and saw the incumbent 
Liberal/National conservative coalition gov-
ernment re-elected for a third term with 77 
seats in the 151-seat House of Representa-
tives (an increase of 1 seat compared to the 
2016 election) and a two-seat majority gov-
ernment. This was a surprise result as almost 
all polls predicted a change in government.
In 2019, the Australian citizenry enjoyed 
relative stability at the apex of the execu-
tive branch of government. The year under 
review was the first full calendar year in re-
cent Australian history where a sitting prime 
minister was not under threat, perceived or 
actual, from internal leadership challenges. 
The catalyst was an earlier change in party 
rules of both major political parties in 2018 
which restricted the ability to remove a party 
leader and sitting prime minister. This is a 
marked departure from the preceding term of 
coup culture resulting in five prime ministers 
in five years.
Despite this stability, a 2019 study produced 
troubling findings: 41% of voters are dissat-
isfied with the state of democracy in Austra-
lia (the highest dissatisfaction rate since the 
1970s constitutional crisis); 75% do not trust 
the Australian government to do the right 
thing; and only 12% believe government is 
run for all of the people.1  
At least some of the public dissatisfaction 
with government is likely due to what might 
be called the “press freedom” controversies 
of 2019. Such controversies included high-
ly contentious police raids on a journalist’s 
home and the offices of Australia’s national 
broadcaster. These raids are generally un-
derstood to relate to government attempts to 
identify sources of leaked information about 
national security issues. Similarly controver-
sial was the continued criminal prosecution 
of Australian lawyer Bernard Collaery and a 
person known only as “Witness K” for their 
whistleblowing on Australia’s bugging of 
Timor Leste government offices during oil 
and gas treaty negotiations. 
Against this background, several develop-
ments took place, including progress in the 
struggle for indigenous constitutional rec-
ognition and the drafting of a religious dis-
crimination bill, both of which are expatiated 
on immediately below. A thematic string of 
judicial decisions relating to rights and other 
noteworthy cases is discussed further below. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Religious Discrimination
The Australian Constitution contains a re-
ligious freedom clause modelled on the 
First Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States. However, unlike the United 
States, religious freedom is rarely litigat-
ed in Australian courts. This looks set to 
change with the imminent passage of a na-
tional Religious Discrimination Bill.
The Religious Discrimination Bill has its 
genesis in the May 2018 Report of the Re-
ligious Freedom Review. The first exposure 
draft of the Bill was released in August 
2019 and received over 6000 submissions. 
As a result, a second revised exposure draft 
AUSTRALIA
1 Sarah Cameron and Ian McAllister, The 2019 Australian Federal Election: Results from the Australian 
Election Study (Australian National University, December 2019).
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was released in December 2019. The Bill is 
expected to be introduced to Parliament in 
February 2020.
Among other objectives, the Bill seeks to 
eliminate discrimination against persons on 
the grounds of “religious belief or activity” 
in a range of areas of public life (this is not to 
be confused with the public sector and sim-
ply refers to certain aspects of a citizen’s in-
teractions with society) and to allow people 
to make “statements of belief.” Of course, 
there are limitations to these ideals.
A person will be able to exercise a right of 
complaint if four criteria are satisfied. First, 
the person must hold or engage in a “reli-
gious belief or activity” or be associated with 
someone who does. “Religious belief or ac-
tivity” is defined as “(a) holding a religious 
belief; or (b) engaging in lawful religious ac-
tivity; or (c) not holding a religious belief; or 
(d) not engaging in, or refusing to engage in, 
lawful religious activity.” “Religious belief” 
is intentionally not defined to allow the en-
capsulation of emerging faiths over time as 
well as atheism and agnosticism. Similarly, 
“religious activity” is itself not defined and 
is broader than mere religious observances 
such as prayers and fasting. It must, howev-
er, be a lawful activity.
Second, the person must have been subject 
to direct or indirect discrimination on the 
grounds of religious belief or activity. Com-
plaints of condition, requirement or practice 
under indirect discrimination are subject to 
the reasonableness test. Either aware of ju-
dicial challenges in applying this or wishing 
to usurp the task, the Bill sets out non-ex-
haustive factors needing to be weighed such 
as the nature and extent of the resulting dis-
advantage and the feasibility of overcoming 
it. In what has become known as the “Israel 
Folau clause,”2 much publicity has been given 
to a clause prohibiting large employers from 
setting a rule that indirectly discriminates on 
religious grounds where the rule is “other than 
in the course of the employee’s employment.”
Third, the discrimination must occur in one 
of the enumerated areas of public life, which 
include work, education, access to premises, 
accommodation, sport and clubs.
Fourth, some specific exceptions and ex-
emptions must not apply. For example, some 
types of otherwise discriminatory conduct 
in aged care facilities, religious hospitals, 
accommodation providers, religious camps, 
conference sites and other settings may not 
be discriminatory if certain tests are met, 
including that if a person could reasonably 
consider it to be in accordance with the re-
ligious group’s or person’s faith. However, 
this test is left to a person of the same reli-
gion as the group or individual whose con-
duct is in question. Arguably, this naively 
assumes intra-religion unanimity. The intent 
is to reflect the realities of society and pre-
serve the “religious ethos” of the institution 
or gathering. Then there is a certain class of 
health practitioners who can conscientious-
ly object to providing a health service (not 
a treatment) or dispensing certain drugs be-
cause of their religious belief or activity.
Additionally, under the Bill, a statement of 
belief will not amount to discrimination if it 
is held in good faith and if it is one that a 
person of the same religion (or non-religion) 
could reasonably consider to be consistent 
with that religion (or non-religion). 
No doubt the Bill will be subject to consid-
erable debate in Parliament in early 2020. 
However, it is very likely to pass into law 
with most of its central components intact. 
This will be a significant change to Austra-
lia’s legal landscape and will supplement the 
already extant national legislation prohibit-
ing discrimination based on race, sex, dis-
ability and age.
Indigenous Constitutional Recognition
The vexed, recurring, long-standing and un-
resolved question of how to constitutionally 
recognise indigenous peoples of Australia 
has haunted successive governments. Many 
have attempted to seize the opportunity 
without success. There has been no consen-
sus on how this is to be achieved.
Should a simple act of Parliament be passed? 
Should a treaty be entered into? Or should, as 
appears to find current favour, an amendment 
to the Constitution of Australia be made? If 
so, should this recognition be confined to the 
preamble (which will be legally inconsequen-
tial and scenically symbolic) or should there 
be a substantive insertion into the Constitu-
tion itself (which would then fall to the courts 
to interpret)? What form should the recogni-
tion take, and what shall be its scope?
The current government made a pre-election 
commitment in May 2019 to recognise Ab-
original and Torres Strait Islander Austra-
lians in the Constitution. However, the Aus-
tralian Constitution can only be amended 
with the approval of the Australian people. 
A proposed change must be approved by the 
Parliament and then be voted on by Austra-
lians in a referendum. A referendum is only 
passed if it is approved by a majority of vot-
ers in a majority of states, and by a majority 
of voters across the country. This high bar 
has resulted in a modest 18% success rate 
of constitutional amendments in Australia’s 
119-year history.
 
The unperturbed government, therefore, 
made a pre-election commitment to fund a 
$7.3 million consultation process with Ab-
original and Torres Strait Islander peoples of 
Australia to establish a clear model that will 
be taken to, and for ensuring a successful 
outcome of, the $160 million referendum for 
constitutional recognition.
In November 2019, the Minister of Indige-
nous Australians set up a Senior Advisory 
Group that will, in turn, oversee a yet-to-
be-created Local/Regional Advisory Group 
and a National Advisory Group that will take 
carriage of the consultation and co-design 
process.
A referendum has been promised during the 
current 46th Parliament ending in 2022.
2 Israel Falou, a footballer and fundamentalist Christian, posted to social media that homosexuals, among others, would go to hell. Rugby Australia terminat-
ed his contract and legal action ensued. A confidential settlement was reached in December 2019.  
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Clubb v Edwards; Preston v Avery – 
freedom of political communication
In recent history, the High Court of Austra-
lia (Australia’s highest court) has generally 
decided no more than one case invoking the 
implied freedom of political communication 
each year. In 2019, however, the Court de-
cided five such cases, implicating as diverse 
topics as electoral donations and the regu-
lation of social media use in the workplace. 
Arguably the most significant cases, which 
were heard together, were Clubb v Edwards 
and Preston v Avery.
In these two cases, the Court considered the 
constitutional validity of two similar laws, in 
the States of Victoria and Tasmania, which 
prohibit protests (or protest-type activities) 
in the vicinity of abortion clinics. Each of 
these two laws makes it a criminal offence 
to contravene the relevant prohibition. Mrs 
Clubb and Mr Preston were convicted of 
similar offences in their respective States 
and each sought to challenge their convic-
tions on the basis that the law was invalid 
for infringing the Australian Constitution’s 
implied freedom of political communication.
In a 180-page decision – the longest of all de-
cisions delivered by the Court in 2019 – the 
Court found the laws to be constitutionally 
valid. While the final result was unanimous, 
the decision illustrates significant differenc-
es of opinion amongst members of the Court 
as to the details of the constitutional doctrine 
at issue. In particular, the Court was divided 
as to the appropriateness of “proportionality” 
testing to determine whether a law will of-
fend against the implied freedom of political 
communication. While proportionality test-
ing is orthodox in constitutional and public 
law in countries like Canada,3 New Zealand4 
and the United Kingdom,5 it is a subject of 
great controversy in Australia.6 
The division of opinion over the utility of 
proportionality testing began in 2015 when 
the Court split four members to three in fa-
vour of proportionality.7 In Clubb, the new-
est member of the Court expressed support 
for proportionality testing, taking the num-
ber of justices in favour to five (out of a 
possible seven). The remaining two justices 
– Gageler and Gordon JJ – continued to ex-
press strident criticisms of proportionality 
testing. While Gageler and Gordon JJ are un-
likely to change their views any time soon,8 
Clubb may be taken to have authoritatively 
established that proportionality is now an 
aspect of Australian law with respect to the 
implied freedom of political communication. 
It remains to be seen whether proportionality 
testing will be imported into other constitu-
tional or administrative law doctrines.9  
2. Work Health Authority v Outback Bal-
looning Pty Ltd – inconsistency of laws
This case provided the High Court with the 
opportunity to reconsider the constitutional 
doctrine governing inconsistency of laws in 
the Australian federation. Clear rules to re-
solve conflicts of laws are essential to the 
functional co-existence of the federal juris-
diction and the six States and ten federal Ter-
ritories (including three “internal” or main-
land Territories). 
Generally speaking, where an inconsistency 
arises between a valid federal law and a State 
or Territory law, the federal law prevails to 
the extent of the inconsistency. However, 
Australian courts have long struggled in de-
termining whether two laws are inconsistent 
or capable of operating concurrently.
The facts giving rise to this case are tragic. 
A woman boarding a hot air balloon in the 
Northern Territory died when her scarf was 
sucked into the inflation fan and she was 
dragged into the machine. The ballooning 
company was prosecuted for failing to com-
ply with a duty in the Northern Territory 
workplace health and safety legislation. The 
ballooning company argued that the North-
ern Territory law was invalid or inoperative 
because it was inconsistent with federal avi-
ation law. The Court held, by a majority, that 
there was no inconsistency. In doing so, the 
Court appeared to move towards a stream-
lined test for the inconsistency of laws.
Since 1937, Australian courts have devel-
oped two complementary tests for determin-
ing inconsistency of laws – tests for “direct” 
and “indirect” inconsistency.10  Direct incon-
sistency occurs where a State or Territory 
law would “alter, impair or detract from” 
the operation of federal law. Indirect incon-
sistency occurs where a State or Territory 
law purports to operate in an area in which a 
federal law “cover[s] the field.” In Outback 
Ballooning, Gageler J described the direct/
indirect inconsistency dichotomy as “con-
ceptually problematic but stubbornly per-
sistent.”11  In separate judgments, both Gage-
ler and Edelman JJ suggested that a single 
test ought to be adopted, namely, whether the 
State or Territory law would “alter, impair or 
detract from the operation” of federal law.12 
While the remaining members of the Court 
retained the dual tests, it appears that Gagel-
er and Edelman JJ may have planted the seed 
for a long-overdue simplification of this area 
of law. Notably, in a subsequent 2019 case 
concerning the inconsistency of laws, only 
one member of the High Court referred to 
the direct/indirect inconsistency dichotomy, 
and that was Edelman J, who again acknowl-
edged the distinction to be “artificial.”13 
3 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 (SCC).
4 R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1.
5 Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] AC 700.
6 See generally Adrienne Stone, ‘Proportionality and Its Alternatives’ (2019) Fed L Rev 1.
7 McCloy v New South Wales [2015] HCA 34, (2015) 257 CLR 178.
8 See Comcare v Banerji [2019] HCA 23, (2019) 372 ALR 42.
9 See Anthony Mason, ‘The Use of Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Law’ (2016) 27(2) Pub L Rev 10; Janina Boughey, ‘The Reasonableness of 
Proportionality in the Australian Administrative Law Context’ (2015) 43(1) Fed L Rev 59.
10 Victoria v The Commonwealth [1937] HCA 82, (1937) 58 CLR 618.
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In any event, a majority of the Court in Out-
back Ballooning ultimately held that there 
was no relevant inconsistency between the 
two laws, thus the Northern Territory law 
was valid and operative, and the prosecution 
could proceed. To reach its conclusion, the 
Court interpreted the federal law modestly, 
to preserve the operation of the Northern 
Territory law. This holding will be viewed 
with justified optimism for those lawyers, 
scholars and advocates who have sought to 
resist the century-long trend towards central-
isation of Australian law-making power in 
the federal Parliament.
3. Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection v SZMTA – judicial review
The border between administrative and con-
stitutional law is indistinct, especially in 
Australia where the Constitution vests the 
federal courts with jurisdiction to grant ad-
ministrative law remedies in respect of ac-
tions or decisions taken by the executive. Ad-
mittedly, most judicial review proceedings 
are now determined within statutory regimes 
rather than by constitutional writs. However, 
the concept of “jurisdictional error” – that 
is, a decision maker’s error that renders the 
decision beyond power – remains of central 
constitutional significance to the judiciary’s 
role in policing the exercise of government 
power. Perhaps surprisingly, the basic ques-
tion of when an error is jurisdictional, as op-
posed to an error within the jurisdiction, has 
vexed the Court for a quarter of a century.14 
This question commonly arises when a party 
seeking to challenge an administrative deci-
sion asserts that they were denied procedural 
fairness (or natural justice) and that the de-
nial constitutes jurisdictional error. Six such 
cases – all in the sphere of immigration law 
– arrived in the High Court in 2019, three 
under the shared case name of Minister for 
Immigration and Border Protection v SZM-
TA. This case provides a convenient vehicle 
for exploring the High Court’s significant 
development of the law in this area.
In SZMTA, three applicants had their visa 
refusals confirmed by the relevant Tribunal 
without being informed of certain poten-
tially relevant information provided to the 
Tribunal by the Department of Immigration 
and Border Protection. The visa applicants 
sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s de-
cisions to affirm the visa refusals, asserting 
that the decisions were infected by a jurisdic-
tional error by virtue of denials of procedural 
fairness. The High Court unanimously held 
that there had been denials of procedural 
fairness. However, a majority of the Court 
held that the denials were not “material” and 
thus did not amount to jurisdictional errors.
In coming to this conclusion, the majority 
appears to have fortified the “materiality 
threshold” showing that must be met by par-
ties seeking judicial review of administrative 
action for jurisdictional error.15 The majority 
explained that a breach of procedural fair-
ness will constitute jurisdiction error “if, 
and only if, the breach is material … in the 
sense that it operates to deprive the applicant 
of the possibility of a successful outcome.”16 
In other words, an error “is material to a de-
cision only if compliance could realistically 
have resulted in a different decision.”17  
Furthermore, the majority’s reasoning estab-
lishes that materiality is a question of fact 
that must be proved by every party asserting 
jurisdictional error (assuming materiality is 
put in issue by the opposing party).18 Nettle 
and Gordon JJ, writing together, rejected the 
idea that “materiality” must be shown for 
an error to be jurisdictional. Their Honours 
wrote that people affected by administrative 
decisions are entitled to “know where they 
stand” and this requires that decisions must 
be made “according to the statute and not … 
subject to some margin of error … described 
as ‘materiality.’”19 
The Court’s decision is, in one sense, a high-
ly technical decision relating to a rarefied 
and conceptual question of administrative 
law. Yet the decision will also have profound 
practical consequences for individuals seek-
ing to challenge procedurally unfair govern-
ment decisions. Given the newly-explained 
materiality requirement, individuals who 
have been treated unfairly in a very real 
sense may nevertheless be denied remedies 
because they are unable to show that the 
unfairness was “material” in the requisite 
sense. Nettle and Gordon JJ acknowledged 
as much; however, they were in the dissent 
on this point, and it must be accepted that 
materiality is now firmly entrenched in Aus-
tralian law.
4. Vella v Commission of Police (NSW) – 
separation of powers
Australia is the only Western democracy 
without a constitutional bill of rights or na-
tional human rights legislation. However, 
the Australian Constitution’s strict separa-
tion of powers has been interpreted by the 
High Court to render invalid certain laws 
that in other countries might offend against 
due process protections. In the seminal 
1996 decision of Kable v Director of Public 
Prosecutions (NSW),20 the High Court held 
that a law would be invalid as offending 
the constitutional separation of powers if it 
conferred upon a court a function that sub-
stantially impaired the court’s institutional 
integrity as a repository of federal judicial 
power. Since that decision, several laws 
11 Work Health Authority v Outback Ballooning Pty Ltd [2019] HCA 2, (2019) 363 ALR 188, para. [67].
12 Ibid, paras [70]-[72], [105].
13 Williams v Wreck Bay Aboriginal Community Council [2019] HCA 4, (2019) 363 ALR 631, para. [138].
14 Kirsten Walker QC, ‘Jurisdictional Error Since Craig’ (2016) 86 Aust Inst for Admin L Forum 35.
15 See also Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34, (2018) 264 CLR 123, para. [29].
16 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3, (2019) 264 CLR 421, para. [2].
17 Ibid, para. [45].
18 Ibid, para. [4].
19 Ibid, paras [88]-[89].
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have been challenged on this basis, most 
commonly “preventative” laws that purport 
to allow courts to make orders restricting 
an individual’s liberty absent any criminal 
finding of guilt. However, the promise of 
Kable has rarely been fulfilled, and most 
such legislative challenges have failed. Vel-
la continues this trend.
In Vella, the “preventative” law at issue was 
one which gave the courts the power – in civil 
proceedings – to make orders restricting the 
liberty of persons convicted of or involved in 
serious criminal activity. Under a provision 
of that statute, the police had applied to the 
courts for orders restraining and prohibiting 
Mr Vella from engaging in certain activities, 
including prohibiting him from associating 
with certain persons, attending at certain 
places, travelling in any vehicle between 
9pm and 6am, possessing more than one 
mobile phone and having access to any en-
crypted communications. In essence, the po-
lice asserted that the orders were necessary 
because Mr Vella was involved in serious 
criminal activity with “outlaw motorcycle 
gangs.” Mr Vella challenged the validity of 
the law, arguing that it unconstitutionally en-
listed the courts to do the executive’s bidding 
in a manner that was inconsistent with the 
judicial function.
A majority of the High Court held the law 
to be valid, reasoning by analogy with “pre-
ventative” statutory regimes relating to ter-
rorism, organised criminal activity and sex-
ual offenders that had survived past Kable 
challenges. Ultimately, the majority held that 
the law did not enlist the courts to do the ex-
ecutive’s bidding in a non-judicial manner, 
but rather required “the court to conduct an 
assessment of future risk and to balance cri-
teria within a wide degree of judicial eval-
uation.”21 Gageler and Gordon JJ dissented, 
holding that the challenged law was inval-
id for effectively enlisting the judiciary “to 
perform a personalised legislative function 
at the behest of the executive.”22  Gageler 
and Gordon JJ were subtly critical of the 
majority’s analogical reasoning, suggesting 
that the Kable doctrine had died a “death 
by a thousand cuts.”23 At least one academ-
ic writer has already echoed the dissenters’ 
description of the “creeping normalisation” 
by which the institutional distinctiveness and 
independence of the judiciary is incremen-
tally diluted.24 
Vella stands as a warning to the limited in-
dividual rights protections contained in the 
Australian Constitution. For those who care 
about judicial rights protection in Australia, 
Vella will be disappointing, but it may also 
galvanise support for national human rights 
legislation to address the deficiencies in ex-
isting judicial protections.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
Aside from likely further progress of the Re-
ligious Discrimination Bill and efforts for 
indigenous constitutional recognition, it is 
likely that 2020 will see the development of 
key themes in the 2019 High Court’s juris-
prudence. There are already cases on the 
High Court’s docket relating to the separa-
tion of powers and the implied freedom of 
political communication. Press freedom, a 
controversial issue in public debate in 2019, 
will finally reach the High Court in 2020 in 
the form of a journalist’s challenge to a fed-
eral warrant to raid her home in relation to 
an alleged offence relating to the communi-
cation of official secrets.
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I. INTRODUCTION  
2019 turned out to be an almost dramatic 
year of constitutional developments. The 
main crisis concerned the succession of 
events after the so-called ‘Ibiza scandal’ in 
which Austria’s then- Vice-Chancellor had 
been involved before he took office. The en-
suing changes in the federal government, its 
final breakdown after a no-confidence vote 
in the National Council; the appointment of 
an expert government, headed by Austria’s 
first female Federal Chancellor who had for-
merly been the first female President of the 
Austrian Constitutional Court; and elections 
of the National Council three years earlier 
than regularly provided came unexpectedly. 
Less unexpected was the fact that the Con-
stitutional Court had to deal with a number 
of the former Federal Government’s main 
political projects. In late 2019, the Court de-
livered several decisions that repealed major 
provisions in recently enacted legislation on 
digital surveillance and minimum social aid, 
while the Court was less critical on the fu-
sion of previously self-governing social in-
surance agencies. Apart from the unexpected 
elections to the National Council, elections to 
the European Parliament took place in May 
2019 and elections to the Land Parliament 
of Vorarlberg in October 2019. In Styria, the 
new Land Parliament was elected already in 
November 2019, while the regular schedule 
was set in 2020. All elections showed a sim-
ilar trend: on the one hand, the conservative 
People’s Party, led by the former Federal 
Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, won far ahead 
of all other parties. On the other hand, both 
the right-wing Freedom Party, which had 
formed part of the former Federal Govern-
ment, and the Social Democrats lost a large 
part of their electoral support. The Greens, in 
their turn, returned to the National Council 
in which they had lost all their mandates two 
years before and will form the new Federal 
Government as a junior partner together with 
the People’s Party in early 2020.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Several amendments to the fragmented Aus-
trian Federal Constitution, which not only 
consists of the Federal Constitutional Act 
(Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz, hence: B-VG) 
but also of a large number of other consti-
tutional documents, were made in 2019, the 
most important of which was enacted in Jan-
uary 2019.1 Part of it, concerned with dereg-
ulation and the abolition of mutual approval 
rights of the federation and the Länder, respec-
tively, has already entered into force, while its 
major part will enter into force at the begin-
ning of 2020. This part will simplify the Aus-
trian allocation of powers since most of the 
competences under Art 12 B-VG – according 
to which the federation is responsible to en-
act framework laws in a number of enlisted 
fields while the Länder enact implementing 
laws and execute them – are transformed into 
either exclusive federal or Land competenc-
es, with only some competences remaining 
as shared powers. Both the federation and the 
Länder will lose and win powers by means 
of this amendment, to which also the Social 
Democrat opposition in the National Council 
consented so that the constitutional majority 
of two-thirds could be reached. However, no 
opposition party was willing to contribute 
to a constitutional majority for the provision 
on a headwear ban regarding children in el-
ementary schools. While the federation is re-
AUSTRIA
1 BGBl I 2019/14.
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sponsible for such legislation in elementary 
schools, the Länder had agreed to enact sim-
ilar provisions relating to children in nursery 
schools in 2018.2 Nevertheless, the provision 
on a headwear ban regarding children in ele-
mentary schools was enacted as part of an or-
dinary law3 and afterwards challenged before 
the Constitutional Court, which will decide 
on its constitutionality in 2020. Further to the 
constitutional reform of January 2019, a new 
Art 30b was inserted into the B-VG dealing 
with the disciplinary law regarding civil ser-
vants working in the Administrative Office of 
Parliament, the Court of Auditors or the Fed-
eral Ombudsman.4 A new state aim on water 
supply and water as a public good was more-
over entrenched in the Federal Constitution-
al Act on Sustainability, Animal Protection, 
Comprehensive Environmental Protection, 
Safeguarding of Water and Food Supply and 
Research.5 
Numerous other constitutional reforms with 
very different content and character were pro-
posed by the political parties in the National 
Council after the breakdown of the Federal 
Government but none received the necessary 
majority. A constitutional act on a ‘debt brake’ 
targeted at the territorial tiers was indeed ap-
proved in the National Council, but did not 
receive the required majority in the Federal 
Council.6 This constituted one of the few cas-
es where the Federal Council, as the second 
chamber, commands an absolute veto right, 
since the concerned act would have curtailed 
Länder competences (Art 44 para 2 B-VG). 
The debt brake was, however, not opposed for 
truly federalistic reasons but because of party 
politics. The same goes for another exercise 
of the same veto power in February 2019, 
when the Federal Council did not approve a 
proposed amendment to the Ecological Power 
Act 2012.7 Prior to these two cases, the Fed-
eral Council had never vetoed a bill under Art 
44 para 2 B-VG. However, neither its previ-
ous silence nor these two vetoes are token of a 
particular federalism-mindedness of the Fed-
eral Council but rather of party allegiances.
The most important constitutional events in 
2019, however, were triggered by the afore-
mentioned ‘Ibiza scandal’ and ensuing conse-
quences. On 17 May 2019, a secretly record-
ed video from summer 2017 was published 
that showed the Vice-Chancellor – who at 
that time was not Vice-Chancellor but just 
the leader of the oppositional Freedom Party 
– talking privately to several persons, one of 
whom was supposed to be related to a Russian 
oligarch but was actually a decoy. The discus-
sion concerned Austrian media and possible 
donors to the Freedom party as well as future 
public contracts after the upcoming elections. 
While both the legality of the video itself, 
which was recorded by still unknown instiga-
tors, and the legality of the statements made 
in the discussion remain to be clarified by the 
courts, the political effects were enormous: on 
18 May 2019, the Vice-Chancellor resigned 
from his office. On the same day, however, 
the Federal Chancellor announced his inten-
tion to have new elections, stating that he 
would be unable to continue his cooperation 
with the Freedom Party in the Federal Gov-
ernment. In the following days, the Minister 
of the Interior, who belonged to the Freedom 
Party, was removed from office by the Fed-
eral President on the proposal of the Federal 
Chancellor. Other Ministers belonging to the 
Freedom Party resigned from their offices on 
their own account shortly afterwards. 
The Federal Chancellor proposed some new 
Ministers who were subsequently appointed 
by the Federal President. However, an ad hoc 
majority in the National Council, mainly con-
sisting of members of the Freedom Party and 
the Social Democrats, motioned a vote of no 
confidence against the whole Federal Govern-
ment – and for the first time ever in Austrian 
history, this motion was backed by a majority. 
The Federal President was thus compelled to 
formally dismiss the Federal Chancellor and 
remaining members of his government from 
office and to appoint an interim Federal Gov-
ernment just for a few days to allow the Fed-
eral President the necessary time to seek per-
sons who could form an expert government 
capable of serving for a couple of months 
until the elections of the National Council had 
taken place and a new ‘political’ Federal Gov-
ernment could be appointed in accordance 
with the election results. 
In these days, the Federal President com-
mended the ‘elegance and beauty’ of Austria’s 
Kelsenian Constitution, which still granted 
stability and an orderly legal management 
of the political events that rather suggested 
speaking of a ‘governmental’ than a ‘consti-
tutional crisis’.8 It is indeed fascinating to see 
how many provisions of the Federal Consti-
tution that had almost been regarded as ‘dead 
law’ had suddenly become effective in prac-
tice. The Federal President appointed Brigitte 
Bierlein, hitherto the President of the Consti-
tutional Court, as the new Federal Chancellor; 
Clemens Jabloner, a highly renowned scholar 
of constitutional law and former President of 
the Administrative Court, as the Vice-Chan-
cellor; and several other experts as further 
members of the Federal Government. All of 
them were still in office at the end of 2019 and 
continued to operate as Austria’s first expert 
government until the new Federal Govern-
ment was appointed in January 2020. While 
the expert government was highly commend-
ed for its professional authority and political 
self-restraint, the National Council, before 
and after its election, has shown sometimes 
immoderate legislative activity across the 
political parties, which, even despite the re-
freshing effect of an ‘active’ Parliament, bears 
serious risks of short-sighted and uncouth leg-
islation. 
2 See Anna Gamper, ‘Austria’ (2019) I·CONnect-Clough Center 2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law 13, 14.
3 § 43a Schulunterrichtsgesetz (School Education Act), BGBl I 2019/54.
4 BGBl I 2019/57.
5 BGBl I 2013/111 as amended by BGBl I 2019/82.
6 928/A 2 July 2019 (XXVI. GP).
7 505/A 22 November 2018 (XXVI. GP).
8 Press Statement of 21 May 2019.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In 2018, the Constitutional Court decided 
on 5,481 cases, while 5,665 new cases were 
filed, and 1,523 cases were still open at the 
end of 2018.9 The statistical data for 2019 
has not been published yet, but the number 
of cases has been rising continuously so that 
an even greater number of cases may be ex-
pected for 2019. Asylum cases, meanwhile, 
constitute more than half of the decisions, 
often consisting of prima-facie refusals, be-
cause they evidently appear to be without 
any chance of success regarding the merits 
of the case. However, in those asylum cas-
es that the Constitutional Court admitted for 
a closer examination of the merits, it near-
ly always repealed the challenged decisions 
taken by the Federal Administrative Court 
because fundamental rights of the respective 
asylum seekers, such as family life or the 
right of equal treatment between foreigners, 
had been violated. 
Apart from the large number of asylum 
cases, the Constitutional Court also dealt 
with several cases that had received par-
ticular attention in the public because they 
had been important political projects of the 
former Federal Government that had been 
composed by the People’s Party and the 
Freedom Party. These cases were concerned 
with federal laws that were examined by the 
Constitutional Court under Art 140 B-VG. 
However, the Constitutional Court dealt also 
with several laws of the Länder and indeed 
repealed some pieces of their legislation. 
Moreover, due to the wide range of powers 
exercised by the Court, the majority of deci-
sions were made under other constitutional 
provisions, in particular Art 144 B-VG, ac-
cording to which the Constitutional Court 
examines decisions taken by the administra-
tive courts (such as the aforementioned asy-
lum decisions) whether they either violate 
constitutionally guaranteed rights and/or any 
rights because of the application of an illegal 
general norm, such as an unconstitutional 
law or an illegal regulation.
1. VfGH 18 June 2019, G 150-151/2018-34, 
G 155/2018-32: Non-smoker protection I
In this decision, which was based on both an 
appeal by the Land Government of Vienna 
and some individual persons, the Consti-
tutional Court decided that the challenged 
provisions of the Tobacco and Non-Smok-
er Protection Act were constitutional. This 
Act had been amended several times over 
the past years, and the challenged version 
was the outcome of an amendment taken in 
2018.10 While an exception to the general 
smoking ban in restaurants should have ex-
pired according to the previous legislation, 
the amendment of 2018, politically demand-
ed by the Freedom Party in the Federal Gov-
ernment, prolonged this exception in order 
to allow smoking under certain limited con-
ditions in small restaurants or larger restau-
rants with several rooms if the main room 
had been dedicated for nonsmokers. The 
issue had been very controversial among 
people generally and restaurateurs specifi-
cally, and even been the object of a largely 
supported citizens’ initiative (‘stop smok-
ing’) in 2018, which, however, had not been 
followed by the desired legislative measures 
during the former Federal Government. The 
Constitutional Court upheld the challenged 
provision, arguing that even though smok-
ing was a social phenomenon detrimental 
to health, the legal system allowed for many 
kinds of social behavior in a liberal society, 
even if detrimental to other interests that had 
to be balanced with them. According to the 
Constitutional Court, the lawmaker, being 
vested with wide discretion regarding this 
matter, had allowed exceptions from the 
general smoking ban specifically in restau-
rants as opposed to other public places where 
smoking was absolutely prohibited, but only 
under limited conditions which neither vi-
olated the principle of equality, nor any le-
gitimate expectations nor Art 2 or 8 ECHR 
(which form part of the Austrian Federal 
Constitution).
2. VfGH 3 October 2019, G 189/2019-8;  
4 December 2019, G 258/2019-4; 4  
December 2019, G 267/2019-4: Non- 
smoker protection II
After the breakdown of the Federal Gov-
ernment, which was followed by a phase of 
coalition-free alliances and political major-
ities in the National Council, the People’s 
Party sided with the other political parties, 
except the Freedom Party, in order to amend 
the Tobacco and Non-Smoker Protection Act 
once again.11 This time, the aforementioned 
exception for restaurants was eliminated so 
that smoking would be absolutely prohibit-
ed in restaurants. This amendment, too, was 
challenged before the Constitutional Court, 
which refused the appeals in several deci-
sions in a prima facie way. Remarkably, the 
Constitutional Court also found that an ab-
solute smoking ban was constitutional. The 
Court shortly referred to its previous judge-
ments, according to which the lawmaker had 
wide discretion to balance the various inter-
ests related to (non-)smoking in restaurants. 
Also, the equal application of the absolute 
smoking ban for restaurants, nightclubs and 
shisha bars – even though smoking is an in-
herent feature of the latter category of bars 
– was held to be constitutional. As a result, 
the Constitutional Court in one and the same 
year both found the exceptions to a general 
smoking ban and an absolute smoking ban 
constitutional provided that the lawmaker 
made use of its wide discretion in a non-arbi-
trary and proportional way. The case shows 
also that the Constitutional Court grants the 
lawmaker some political discretion but that 
it is not always predictable in which fields of 
law and under which conditions this discre-
tion is larger or smaller, as also some of the 
following cases show.
3. VfGH 11 December 2019, G 72-74/2019-
48, G 181-182/2019-18: Digital surveillance
In this decision, the Constitutional Court re-
pealed, at the appeal of a number of members 
of the National Council according to Art 140 
para 1 subpara 2 B-VG, some provisions of 
9 See the Constitutional Court’s annual report 2018, https://www.vfgh.gv.at/downloads/taetigkeitsberichte/VfGH_Taetigkeitsbericht_2018.pdf.
10 BGBl I 2018/13.
11 BGBl I 2019/66.
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the Security Police Act, the Road Traffic Act 
and the Code of Criminal Procedure. These 
provisions had been enacted with the inten-
tion of combatting crime and terrorism by 
new digital surveillance measures.12 Firstly, 
the Constitutional Court held that a provision 
which had authorized the security authorities 
to identify traced vehicles and drivers secret-
ly by the means of digital imaging violated 
Art 8 ECHR and § 1 Data Protection Act be-
cause they interfered too widely with private 
data and private life, even of third persons, 
and were thus disproportionate; similarly, the 
saving and further processing of such data as 
well as personal data originally derived by 
‘section-control’ instruments on motorways 
for criminal law-related purposes were too 
unlimited and therefore unconstitutional. 
Further, the secret installation of spyware – 
the so-called ‘Federal Trojan’ – by the secu-
rity authorities in order to control encrypted 
messages was found to be a violation of Art 
8 ECHR because of lacking limits and, thus, 
violating the principle of proportionality. Fi-
nally, the constitutionally guaranteed sancti-
ty of the home – protected by Art 9 StGG 
of 1867 and an act from 1862 for the Pro-
tection of the Sanctity of the Home, both of 
which still form part of today’s Federal Con-
stitution – was also violated by a provision 
that allowed the authorities to enter private 
homes in order to install the spyware. The 
Constitutional Court had no doubt that such 
measures would be highly useful for the de-
tection and prevention of crimes as an im-
portant public interest, but at the same time 
held that an empowerment to exercise such 
instruments had to be much more limited in 
order not to establish a ‘surveillance state’.
4. VfGH 13 December 2019, G 67-71/2019-
53; 13 December 2019, G 78-81/2019-56; 13 
December 2019, G 113/2019-27, G 116/2019-
27, G 119-120/2019-22; 13 December 2019, 
G 211-213/2019-21: Social insurance reform
The Austrian (public) social insurance sys-
tem had consisted of a large number of differ-
ent social insurance bodies that were vested 
with the right to self-government (Art 120a-
c B-VG). The former Federal Government 
decided to amalgamate some of these, in par-
ticular the territorial health insurance bod-
ies situated in the nine Länder, which were 
transformed into the new Austrian health in-
surance agency. A number of appeals were 
lodged against this and other measures pro-
vided by the Social Insurance Organisation 
Act.13 However, the Constitutional Court, in 
four decisions amounting to more than 600 
pages, found the main part of the reform, 
namely the amalgamation as such, as well as 
some other measures, constitutional; among 
these, the equal representation of employers 
and employees in the new Austrian health 
insurance agency and other social insurance 
agencies, the elimination of health insurance 
agencies of individual enterprises and of the 
controlling councils of the previous social 
insurance agencies, the Federal Minister’s 
right to supervision regarding the adequacy 
of the agency’s self-administration, the com-
position of the new head agency and certain 
transfers from previous bodies and functions 
to others.
Only some comparatively minor issues were 
found unconstitutional; these include the 
provisions regarding capability tests required 
for the delegation of representatives of em-
ployers and employees in social insurance 
bodies, ministerial supervision over certain 
resolutions with a big financial impact, new 
controlling functions of taxing authorities 
over the social insurance agencies and the 
Federal Minister’s right to bind the standing 
orders of the agencies to pattern standing or-
ders, to require them to adjourn certain items 
on their agendas, to give certain instructions 
and to delegate certain functions or persons. 
However, the main corpus of this contro-
versial reform was upheld; in particular, 
this concerned the amalgamation of existing 
self-governing social insurance agencies, 
the composition of the representative bodies 
and the extension of the Federal Minister’s 
supervision, even though the Constitutional 
Court set some limits to it. Whether the re-
form will indeed realize the intended mod-
ernization and reduction of costs through 
amalgamation and unification, without be-
ing detrimental to part of the insured persons 
that had hitherto received different health 
insurance services depending on the respec-
tive Land social insurance agency to which 
they had belonged previously, will have to 
be seen in the next couple of years.
5. VfGH 12 December 2019, G 164/2019-25, 
G 171/2019-24: Minimum social aid
In 2019, the federation had for the first 
time made use of its competence to enact 
framework legislation regarding minimum 
social aid under Art 12 para 1 subpara 1 
B-VG. Hitherto, the Länder had been com-
petent to legislate fully on that matter, since 
the federation had abstained from using its 
framework legislative power. As a result, 
the Länder had enacted different laws re-
garding minimum social aid, some of which 
had been found partly unconstitutional by 
the Constitutional Court. The former Fed-
eral Government intended to reduce mini-
mum social aid throughout the federal state, 
especially with regard to large families and 
persons entitled to asylum without adequate 
language capacities, and therefore enacted a 
framework law on social minimum aid14 that, 
even though it may only regulate the princi-
ples of minimum social aid, is binding to the 
Länder that, in this case, are only allowed to 
enact implementing laws and execute these. 
The enactment of the federal framework law 
induced a number of members of the Feder-
al Council to challenge many provisions of 
that law (together with some accompanying 
provisions) before the Constitutional Court 
under Art 140 para 1 subpara 2 B-VG that, 
however, repealed only part of them. As far 
as the distribution of powers was concerned, 
the Constitutional Court confirmed that the 
federation was indeed competent to enact 
such provisions under the respective subject 
matter in Art 12 para 1 subpara 1 B-VG and 
that there was still some discretion left for 
the implementing legislation of the Länder. 
With regard to the content of these provi-
sions, however, some of them were held 
12 BGBl I 2018/27.
13 BGBl I 2018/100.
14 BGBl I 2019/41.
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to be unconstitutional. The Constitutional 
Court granted that the lawmaker had wide 
discretion with regard to social measures in 
cases of need and was not obliged to give un-
limited aid if undesired social consequences 
ensued. It was also held to be constitution-
al to basically provide only degressive aid 
in cases of families with several children. 
The challenged provision according to 
which maximum (but no minimum) quotas, 
amounting only to very small benefits, ap-
plied to the third, fourth, etc., child – oth-
er than in the case of adults – violated the 
principle of equality (Art 7 B-VG) as well as 
the children’s right to optimal care for their 
welfare (Art 1 of the Federal Constitutional 
Act of the Rights of the Child). The provi-
sion according to which handicapped people 
received social minimum aid in accordance 
with the extent of their handicap was con-
sidered constitutional, though, as well as the 
limitation of money transfers to households 
with several people, since minors and non-
cash benefits had been excepted by that law. 
However, part of the aid was only granted 
upon the condition of a high linguistic capac-
ity that qualified for a job – B1 level in Ger-
man or C1 level in English for all EU citizens, 
and B1 level in German for non-EU-citizens 
(apart from certain other social integration 
requirements, including persons entitled to 
asylum) – which was considered critically 
by the Constitutional Court. It violated the 
principle of equality in its various entrench-
ments (i.e., both with regard to the relation-
ship between Austrian citizens and other EU 
citizens and with regard to persons entitled to 
asylum vis-à-vis non EU-citizens) since the 
Constitutional Court did not find it necessary 
that these persons should command such a 
linguistic proficiency in order to get a job. 
Still, the Constitutional Court admitted that 
the lawmaker could – in principle, though 
not excessively – make minimum social aid 
conditional on the willingness to qualify for 
a job, also in terms of language. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In January 2020, a new coalition government 
between the People’s Party and the Greens 
was appointed by the Federal President. 
They will not command a constitutional ma-
jority in the National Council, which will 
make it difficult for them to enact constitu-
tional legislation, quite apart from the large 
ideological gap between both parties. Fur-
ther, Land parliamentary elections will take 
place in Burgenland and in Vienna. Since the 
former President of the Constitutional Court 
had to resign because she became the Federal 
Chancellor heading the expert government, 
the Court has been temporarily presided over 
by its Vice-President. The appointment of 
the new President, which needs a proposal 
by the Federal Government, was postponed 
until the new Federal Government takes 
office since the Federal Chancellor was re-
luctant to take part in a decision on her own 
successor. Finally, after the constitutional 
centenaries celebrated in 2018 (Republic 
of Austria) and 2019 (female suffrage and 
some constitutional jubilees in the Länder), 
the B-VG, enacted on 1 October 1920, will 
celebrate its 100th birthday in 2020. 
V. FURTHER READING
Walter Berka/Christina Binder/Benjamin 
Kneihs, Die Grundrechte (2nd edn, Österre-
ich, 2019)
Peter Bußjäger (ed), 3. November 1918. Die 
Länder und der neue Staat (New Academic 
Press, 2019)
Harald Eberhard and others (eds), VfGG. 
Kommentar zum Verfassungsgerichtshofge-
setz 1953 (Facultas, 2019)
Theo Öhlinger/Harald Eberhard, Ver-
fassungsrecht (12th edn, Facultas, 2019)
Österreichischer Juristentag (ed), Öffentli-
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I. INTRODUCTION
 
The year 2019 was significant for Bangla-
desh democracy with the new Awami League 
government being installed. The status of 
participatory democracy has been in decline 
since 2014, when the major opposition par-
ties started boycotting both national and lo-
cal elections. The 11th general elections in 
December 2018 seemed to bring in a silver 
lining of hope for participatory and deliber-
ative democracy, but it soon began to fade. 
The elections were marred by massive rig-
ging, resulting in the citizens’ loss of interest 
in voting, which was reflected in the local 
government elections held in 2019. 
The judiciary remained occupied with hear-
ing many bail petitions by the interned op-
position members as well as some corrupt 
junior ruling party leaders. On a positive 
note, the Supreme Court continued with its 
selective activism, handing down several 
landmark judgments in the areas of gender 
violence, children’s rights, environmental 
protection, and compensatory justice. Re-
grettably, however, the Court maintained its 
passivity on the questions of civic and po-
litical rights. Notably, the Supreme Court’s 
strength increased in 2019 with new appoint-
ments to the High Court Division (HCD).
Interestingly, the last quarter of 2019 wit-
nessed, in a rare fashion, several arrests 
of the ruling party members on charges of 
corruption and running illegal casinos. The 
government reiterated its commmitment 
against corruption, drugs, and terrorism. 
The newly formed parliament commenced 
its first session on January 30 with an ‘offi-
cial’ opposition party, an electoral ally of the 
ruling party, which was not given a share in 
the Cabinet this time. Parliament enacted 19 
bills, including one that allows trade unions 
and prohibits child labour in the Export Pro-
cessing Zones.  
Below, we begin with major constitutional 
developments in Part II that covers national 
and local elections and their aftermaths, law-
making, and controversies in politics. The 
third part of this report analyzes some select 
constitutional cases, followed by the conclu-
sion in Part IV.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
11th Parliament and the New Government 
Following the 11th general election of 30 
December 2018, the year 2019 began with a 
lot of controversies and media reports of vote 
rigging, opposition exclusions, and violence. 
In our 2018 report, we highlighted the ten-
sions and controversies preceding the 11th 
national elections. The Awami League (AL) 
came to power for the third consecutive term 
with an unprecedented and controversial 
victory, claiming 288 out of 300 seats. The 
ruling party has been running the show since 
2009. The major opposition, the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP), which boycotted 
the previous 2014 elections, formed a stra-
tegic alliance called the Oikya Front (united 
front) with some other political parties. The 
alliance had won a total of just eight seats 
while the BNP secured six seats individually. 
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The first quarter of 2019 passed in uncer-
tainty regarding the BNP and its alliance 
joining the parliament. The Constitution 
provides that if an MP-elect does not take 
the oath within 90 days of the first session 
of parliament, their seat will turn vacant. In 
January, the Secretary General of the BNP, 
who had won a constituency, declared that 
his party would not join parliament, claim-
ing that the elections were a farce. However, 
an elected member of the BNP alliance took 
oath quickly. Following this dramatic event, 
all other MPs-elects but the BNP Secretary 
General joined the current parliament on 30 
April. Therefore, one of the BNP seats was 
declared vacant for failure to take the oath 
within the deadline. In a by-election in June, 
another BNP leader won that seat and took 
the oath accordingly. The BNP is the main ri-
val of the Awami League, and hence the rul-
ing party saw the BNP’s joining parliament 
as a source of legitimacy for the elections. 
There were even unsubstantiated reports that 
the government security agencies created 
pressure on the BNP and its alliance to join 
parliament.
The government, however, declared the Ja-
tiya Party, an electoral alliance of the ruling 
party, as the official opposition in parliament. 
The head of the Jatiya Party, former military 
dictator and President General HM Ershad, 
was declared to be the opposition leader. 
After Ershad’s death, his wife Rowshan Er-
shad succeeded to that position. It has been 
a curious, authoritarian development in Ban-
gladeshi politics that the ‘opposition party’ 
is fully controlled and managed by the ruling 
party. Unlike the previous term (2014-2018), 
the official opposition party has been kept 
out of the current Cabinet.  
Following elections, a new Cabinet was 
formed within a week. This has been the 
fourth Cabinet under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Sheikh Hasina. Interestingly, the 
current 55-member Cabinet has introduced a 
good number of new ministers, some from 
among the younger parliamentarians, with 
almost all senior leaders having been ex-
cluded. 
Local Government Elections 
As a unitary state, Bangladesh does not have 
regional or provincial governments. Local 
governments in Bangladesh are statutory 
bodies elected by direct votes, and they oper-
ate at several levels – union of villages, sub-
districts, districts, municipalities, and cities. 
In 2019, elections were held at the Upazila 
(sub-district) level for 491 Upazila Parish-
ads (Upazila Councils), which are elected 
for five years. In 2019, the Upazila polls 
were held for the first time under political 
party nominations along with the party elec-
toral symbols. Earlier, these elections were 
non-partisan, although political parties used 
to informally support their candidates. 
The BNP officially boycotted the local gov-
ernment elections as a protest to the contro-
versial 11th national election. Many news-
paper reports claimed that over a hundred 
BNP leaders contested the polls as indepen-
dent candidates, the majority of whom were 
expelled from the party for breaching party 
rules. Later in the year, when some seats of 
chairs of Upazila Councils became vacant in 
October, the BNP decided to participate in 
the polls.  
Results of these local elections show the in-
creasing party dominance of the ruling party 
in Bangladesh politics. The Awami League 
had won the majority of Upazila Councils. 
Around 130 independent candidates had 
won too, but most of them were indeed de-
fecting members of the Awami League. Like 
the national elections, these local elections 
were also allegedly unfair and had witnessed 
many instances of violence. The polls result-
ed in an unprecedentedly low turnover, an 
average of around 35-40%. 
When closely examined, both the national 
and local elections show an increasing dem-
ocratic backsliding in Bangladesh.1 Having 
the same party in power for over 11 years in 
a row through mostly controversial elections 
has gradually resulted in a sharp fall in par-
ticipatory and deliberative democracy. Mul-
tiple reports and surveys suggest that rigged 
elections, violence, and the absence of an ef-
fective opposition in parliament for a decade 
have all contributed to Bangladesh’s current 
problem of democratic backsliding.2  
Strike on Illegal Casinos: Combating  
Corruption? 
In the last quarter of the year, the government 
launched a sudden crackdown on illegal ca-
sinos that were being secretly run for years 
by the ruling party members, surprising the 
common people. The constitution does not 
prohibit gambling but requires the state to 
adopt measures against it. This state duty is 
to be found among the non-justiciable princi-
ples of state policy. However, an 1867 colo-
nial law prohibits and penalizes public gam-
bling, which does not cover modern forms 
of gambling including casinos. In a sudden 
move, the Prime Minister warned members 
of the ruling party-affiliated youth’s party 
against their excesses and corruption. Police 
action soon followed against those who were 
running casinos and other illegal businesses. 
As a result, a good number of ruling party 
people were arrested and prosecuted.  
Interestingly, none of the arrestees were 
prosecuted for running casinos unlawfully 
but on charges of money laundering or ille-
gal possession of drugs and arms. Back in 
2016, the HCD issued a rule nisi against the 
authorities, asking them to stop gambling in 
social clubs in Dhaka. The Appellate Divi-
sion of the Supreme Court also asked the 
authorities to comply with the HCD’s order 
within eight weeks. These orders went in 
vain until recently, and many have critiqued 
the police for their failure to take measures 
against the ruling party members involved in 
the illegal businesses. The Prime Minister’s 
announcement of ‘zero tolerance’ on corrup-
1 See, for example, Abu E. Sarker and Faraha Nawaz, ‘Clientelism, Partyarchy and Democratic Backsliding: A Case Study of Local Government Elections in 
Bangladesh’, 26(1) South Asian Survey (2019): 70.
2 See, among others, William Milam, ‘Democracy to Autocracy: Bangladesh in Context’, Friday Times, April 19, 2019, at: https://www.thefridaytimes.com/
democracy-to-autocracy-bangladesh-in-context/.
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tion and illicit money thus received much 
acclamation.  
New Judicial Appointments 
In October 2019, the President appointed 
nine ‘additional’ judges to the HCD of the 
Supreme Court, turning the total strength of 
that division to 101 judges, of which 79 have 
been appointed during three regimes of the 
current ruling party since 2009. Like previ-
ous cases, the new 2019 appointments were 
controversial and based on political consid-
erations. Of the nine new appointees, four 
were drawn from among the district judges. 
Two of them were presiding judges in polit-
ically sensitive corruption cases involving 
BNP leaders, including Begum Khaleda Zia, 
and delivered convictions with severe pun-
ishments ranging from various jail terms to 
the death penalty. They were appointed in 
supersession of over a hundred senior dis-
trict judges. Other additional judges were 
drawn from among the practicing advocates, 
of whom two were deputy attorneys-general 
and the rest known to be associated with  the 
ruling party politics at the Bar. Only one ap-
pointee was a woman.  
New Legislation: The Export Processing 
Zones (EPZ) Labour Act 2019 
Parliament enacted altogether 19 pieces of 
legislation in 2019, of which the above Act 
merits a special mention for its relevance to 
constitutional rights. After a long wait, the 
EPZ Labour Act 2019 was enacted to pro-
hibit child labor and allow trade unions in 
the Export Processing Zones (EPZs). The 
premier labour law of the country (an Act 
of 2006) fails to give appropriate legal pro-
tection to workers in EPZs. In Bangladesh, 
EPZs that house foreign corporations are 
considered important industry zones essen-
tial to the country’s growth. Because of this, 
trade unions and industrial actions remained 
prohibited in the EPZs on the assumption 
that unionists would hamper production.3 As 
such, the workers in EPZs were somewhat 
denied the right to form unions and they had 
been facing discrimination vis-à-vis other 
workers in an ordinary factory/establish-
ment. The 2019 Act now allows a limited 
right to join trade unions, without using the 
nomenclature. The Act prefers the term ‘as-
sociation’ to ‘trade union’. In addition, the 
2019 Act completely bans child labor in an 
EPZ area, going a step further than the 2006 
Labour Act that prohibits labor of children 
below the age of 14. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
1. Human Rights and Peace for Bangladesh 
(HRPB) v. Bangladesh: River as a Legal 
Person
A human rights organization, HRPB, brought 
a judicial review petition before the High 
Court Division in November 2016, seeking 
to prevent earth-filling and encroachments in 
the Turag River near Dhaka. A judicial en-
quiry ensued which found at least 30 illegal 
establishments in the Turag, and the Court 
issued a provisional injunction mandating 
the demolition of the so-detected illegal 
structures on the river. In February 2019, the 
HCD handed down its final decision4 in the 
case, issuing several remedies and, interest-
ingly, declaring that rivers have a legal per-
sonality and are entitled to enjoy the right to 
exist and flow. Bangladesh is arguably the 
first country in the world to accord to all of 
its rivers the same legal status as humans. 
The Court exercised what can be seen as pa-
rens patrae jurisdiction. It endowed the Na-
tional River Protection Commission (NRPC) 
with legal guardianship over Bangladeshi 
rivers. The Court seems to have been moved 
by the New Zealand parliament’s recent 
decision to attribute the Whanganui River 
with legal personhood in 2017, and a simi-
lar Indian judicial decision according legal 
personality to the Ganges and Yamuna Riv-
ers. However, the Indian decision was over-
turned by the Supreme Court based on the 
concerned government’s argument of the un-
sustainability of the ruling in cases of natural 
calamities. In addition, Bolivia and Ecuador 
have enacted laws to provide for the rights 
of rivers.  
The 283-page judgment on the rivers’ legal 
personality has been hailed as ‘historic’ or 
‘momentous’ for some extraordinary Court 
directives such as the one asking the govern-
ment to initiate measures, within six months, 
to amend the relevant statute to make the 
NRPC an independent and efficient body so 
that it can play the role of guardian of the 
rivers. Another directive was to ask the Elec-
tion Commission not to allow any person to 
run in elections if there was an accusation of 
river-grabbing against them. We, however, 
stand cautious in glorifying the rivers’ le-
gal personality judgment. Aren’t mere judi-
cial remedies pursuant to the relevant laws 
protecting the rivers and the water bodies 
enough so far as the Court is involved? We 
are, however, hopeful that the judgment will 
play an important catalytic role in ensuring 
the sustainable use of river resources and 
protect them from further degradation from 
pollution and human activities. That the gov-
ernment has already shown proactivity to re-
store some water bodies, rivers, and canals in 
Dhaka is a testimony to the probable impact 
of the judgment. 
2. Compensation for Rape Victims
On February 6, a young woman was raped 
by two policemen in Manikganj inside the 
police station. The victim and her aunt went 
to the police station to get money back they 
had lent to an officer. The creditors were 
locked up in an adjacent guesthouse for days 
for showing the ‘audacity’ of claiming mon-
ey back from a policeman. During her un-
lawful internment, the two policemen raped 
the young woman. The women were threat-
ened that they would be killed if they lodged 
any complaint. Nevertheless, they brought 
suit, and the policemen were found guilty in 
an initial inquiry. 
Later, two human rights organizations filed 
a public interest litigation (PIL) in which the 
HCD issued an interim compensation order 
3 See the EPZ Workers’ Associations and Industrial Relations Act, 2004 (now repealed) and EPZ Workers’ Welfare Associations and Industrial Relations Act, 2010. 
4 But the judgment was actually issued in July. 
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on March 10, 2019, asking the authorities 
to pay BDT 5 million to the victim. In the 
field of compensatory jurisprudence, this in-
terim decision was a groundbreaking ruling 
in that the Court for the first time recognized 
the state’s responsibility to provide repara-
tions to rape victims. Rape and other forms 
of gender-based violence have been sharply 
increasing in the past few years. As reported 
in our 2018 report, the Supreme Court has 
been increasingly proactive in recent years 
in awarding compensation under constitu-
tional judicial review jurisdiction, mostly 
over issues of ordinary wrongs such as road 
accidents, public negligence, medical neg-
ligence, and industrial accidents. Until this 
interim decision, gender-based violence had 
always been considered an individual crim-
inal responsibility. Inspired by this decision, 
the HCD in June 2019 again awarded dam-
ages of BDT 5 million against the concerned 
authorities over a case of the deaths of two 
victims of rape. This time, the Court also 
asked the government to frame an interim 
scheme of rehabilitation and compensation 
for rape victims.  
3. BLAST v. Bangladesh: Gender Equality in 
the Muslim Marriage Contract 
Deciding a writ petition (judicial review) of 
2014 by the Bangladesh Legal Aid and Ser-
vices Trust (BLAST), the HCD on August 25, 
2019 handed down a judgment declaring that 
the Bangla word kumari (meaning ‘virgin’) 
in the Nikahnama (the Muslim marriage con-
tract) is violative of the constitutional princi-
ple of equality. A Muslim marriage is regis-
tered by way of registering the Nikahnama. 
A column in the Nikahnama asks whether the 
bride is a virgin or not. The Court directed 
the authorities to modify the Nikahnama by 
replacing that derogatory word with a Bang-
la equivalent of the term ‘unmarried’. It also 
asked the government to amend the Nikahna-
ma, requiring the disclosure of the marital sta-
tus of both the parties to the marriage in order 
to ensure gender equality as guaranteed in the 
Constitution. 
4. On Children’s Rights 
In 2019, the High Court Division delivered a 
couple of judgments on children’s rights. In a 
notable suo motu action, prompted by a news-
paper report on the internment of children in 
correction centres, the Court on October 31, 
20195 issued an interim directive to immedi-
ately release all children under 12 who were 
given punishments by mobile courts. It also 
granted bails of six months to all children be-
tween 12 to 18 years of age. Later, the Court 
followed up to see whether those children 
were released by the authorities. In the rule 
nisi that remains pending at the time of writ-
ing, the HCD asked the government to ex-
plain why arrest, detention, and convictions 
of children by mobile courts should not be 
declared unlawful. Relevantly, mobile courts 
are conducted by executive magistrates for 
the summary trial of certain specific offences. 
The 2009 law establishing mobile courts was 
struck down by the HCD in 2017 for under-
mining the constitutional principle of judicial 
independence (see our 2017 report).6 An ap-
peal against this decision is now pending be-
fore the Supreme Court’s Appellate Division.  
In CCB Foundation v. National Human 
Rights Commission (NHRC), the HCD in a 
decision in November abashed the NHRC 
for its inaction and failure to discharge stat-
utory obligations. It was a 2013 case of tor-
ture and brutality to a child domestic work-
er by her employer in Dhaka. The incident 
was widely reported and criticized at the 
time but the NHRC did not take any action 
in this horrendous instance of the breach of 
child rights. The constituent Act empowers 
the NHRC to investigate and take actions in 
relation to complaints of human rights viola-
tions. The CCB Foundation lodged a public 
interest litigation in December 2018 seeking 
to compel the NHRC to comply with its legal 
duties. The Court found that the NHRC was 
not doing enough in the protection of human 
rights of the people and asked the Commis-
sion to be a vigilant and proactive body. The 
decision, although it has limitations in terms 
of its impact on human rights, was hailed by 
many for its value as a wake-up call to the 
country’s Human Rights Commission.  
As the first case on children’s rights above 
shows, the regime of juvenile justice and the 
state of children’s rights in Bangladesh are 
riddled with problems of injustice despite 
the existence of the Children’s Act 2013. In 
a criminal appeal (No. 7533 of 2019), the 
HCD expressed its concern over the incon-
sistency of a few laws relating to children 
with the premier child rights statute of 2013. 
The Court asked the government to amend 
those laws to remove the inconsistencies so 
children’s rights are better protected. It also 
found several defects in the 2013 law that 
are contributing, in its opinion, to a ‘chaos’ 
in the adjudication of cases concerning chil-
dren both at the apex and junior courts.
In an exceptional PIL by a lawyer and her 
nine-month-old boy, the HCD on 27 Octo-
ber 2019 issued a rule nisi and delivered an 
interim remedy by way of directing the gov-
ernment to set up breast-feeding and baby 
care corners at all workplaces such as shop-
ping malls, airports, bus stops, and railway 
stations. This instance of judicial activism 
has been widely acclaimed by human rights 
organizations and the general public.
5. On the Right to Health and Others 
In order to stop organ trades, the 1999 Hu-
man Organs Transplantation Act prohibits 
donation of human organs by non-relatives 
of the recipient. As a result, Bangladeshi pa-
tients are forced to travel overseas to get the 
organ transplantations done, which obvious-
ly everyone just cannot afford. The 1999 law 
has, therefore, been in question for violating 
the people’s right to health and freedom of 
choice as part of the constitutional ‘right to 
life’. In 2017, a writ petition before the HCD 
challenged the constitutionality of the im-
pugned law. The Court heard seven special-
ist doctors as experts, all of whom endorsed 
the rationality of the law, as they feared that 
poor people would otherwise indulge in sell-
ing off their organs haphazardly. The Court 
5 Per Sheikh Hasan Arif and M. Mahmudur Hasan, JJ. 
5 Kamruzzaman v Bangladesh, WP No. 8437 of 2011 (HCD, Supreme Court, 11 May 2017).  
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took a different view and in a decision in De-
cember 2019 directed the government that 
measures be taken to amend the impugned 
law within six months. Further, the govern-
ment was asked to stop illicit human organ 
trading as well as to enact regulations to 
ensure feasible and safe organ donations by 
non-relatives. 
Earlier, in June 2019, in a PIL case by 
BLAST, the High Court Division ordered 
the government to form a committee with the 
task of issuing guidelines on Cesarean sec-
tions at all private and public hospitals and 
clinics to prevent medically unnecessary Ce-
sareans, the number of which has been very 
large in the country. In another writ petition, 
the HCD in February issued a rule nisi along 
with an interim order requiring the govern-
ment to adopt measures to ensure the health 
and medical facilities of prisoners. Later, the 
Court sought a report on existing medical fa-
cilities and available physicians from prison 
authorities, which they requested in Novem-
ber. As the report revealed, there were only 
10 doctors in 68 prisons as against 131 posts, 
while 16 newly appointed doctors did not do 
any work. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In view of the absolute or ‘brute’ majority 
in the current parliament with no opposition 
party in the real sense of the term as a fol-
low-up from the previous term, the ruling 
party’s challenge in 2019 was to open space 
for wider political participation and dem-
ocratic practices. This challenge remained 
largely unmet. Local elections, for example, 
became extremely controversial while the 
voters’ turnover was at a remarkably low 
threshold.  
Particularly since 2014, Bangladesh’s de-
mocracy has been on a sharp decline in 
terms of multi-party constitutional politics, 
electoral fairness, freedom of expression, 
and other democratic norms such as ac-
countability. 2019 did not witness any major 
developments towards constitutional liberal-
ization except for the real opposition’s com-
ing back to parliament. A good development 
was some instances of judicial activism vis-
à-vis rights of the people, but the Court can 
be critiqued for being selective. Although on 
a small scale, the drive against corrupt party 
members merits appreciation. Democracy, 
after all, means ensuring the people’s access 
to public resources and services without dis-
crimination that corruption tends to deter. 
The year 2020 will be a significant and criti-
cal one, should the government want to com-
bine its ‘development’ vision with the peo-
ple’s right to live in a meaningful and quality 
democracy. Ensuring the creation of a mul-
tiparty political environment and means of 
accountability are all the more important as 
Bangladesh prepares to celebrate the 50th 
year of its founding in 2021. The present 
government has a developmental manifesto 
titled ‘vision 2021’, with some infrastruc-
tural developments and steady economic 
growth in mind. On the other hand, there is 
no denying that corruption and the absence 
of accountability in the governance system 
increasingly pose a serious threat to the re-
alization of the founding goals of the nation. 
Given the aforementioned action against 
corruption and illegal casino businesses by 
party members, we anticipate some law-
making and judicial activity to tackle the 
problem of gambling and casinos. In 2019, 
reform in the higher education sector was a 
much-talked-about issue. We therefore also 
anticipate some major changes in this area, 
but ensuring academic freedom might prove 
a challenge if recent restrictions on it are any 
guide. 
V. FURTHER READING
Abdullah Al Faruque & Hussain Mohammad 
Fazlul Bari, ‘Arbitrary Arrest and Detention 
in Bangladesh’, in 19(2) Australian J. of 
Asian Law (2019: Article 10, 2019): <https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3396356>
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two main evolutions are elaborated below 
since they constituted important constitu-
tional developments in Belgium throughout 
2019. Firstly, the (failed) attempt to amend 
Article 7bis of the Constitution to enable 
the adoption of a ‘Special Climate Act for 
Belgium’. Secondly, the adoption of a list 
of constitutional provisions susceptible for 
amendment, the subsequent elections held 
on 26 May 2019 and the still ongoing ardu-
ous formation of a federal government. Next, 
the article gives an overview of the main 
cases of the Belgian Constitutional Court of 
the past year that may be of interest to an 
international audience as regards freedom of 
religion and worship, access to justice, (bio-)
ethical questions, the fight against terrorism, 
environmental protection and freedom of 
establishment. Finally, the overview looks 
ahead to several interesting pending cases as 
well as a current and future vacancy on the 
Constitutional Court.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. Climate Change and the Constitution
Following the important mobilisation around 
the climate crisis in Belgium (and around the 
globe) at the end of 2018 and towards the 
spring of 2019, a group of academics of vari-
ous universities prepared a draft of a ‘Special 
Climate Act for Belgium’1 and presented it 
to the public on 1 February 2019.2 The draft 
built on a series of academic seminars and 
a national dialogue on climate change gov-
ernance organised in 2018,3 and was meant 
to improve climate governance in Belgium. 
The competences to deal with climate 
change mitigation and adaptation are indeed 
scattered over the federal, regional and, to a 
lesser extent, community governments. The 
proposal concerned a special act – to be ad-
opted by a two-thirds majority as well as by 
a majority of both linguistic groups in the 
Federal Parliament – that aims to strengthen 
the coordination of climate policies between 
the federal government and the federated 
entities of Belgium, to set long-term and 
ambitious climate policy objectives and to 
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ropean Union (EU) Regulation 2018/1999.4 
That regulation provides, inter alia, that pe-
riodically, integrated national energy and cli-
mate plans be prepared and submitted to the 
European Commission, with national objec-
tives, targets and contributions for the five 
dimensions of the Energy Union, subject to 
public consultation and in the framework of 
a national multilevel climate and energy dia-
logue. Furthermore, long-term strategies and 
integrated national energy and climate prog-
ress reports should be set up.
The proposal was immediately picked up by 
a series of parliamentarians from different 
parties, and a special parliamentary com-
mittee was set up to consider it.5 The leg-
islative section of the Council of State was 
of the opinion that an additional legal basis 
in the Constitution was needed to be able to 
include climate change policy principles and 
objectives in such a special act. Therefore, a 
proposal to complement Article 7bis of the 
Constitution, providing that in the exercise 
of their respective competences, the Feder-
al State, the Communities and the Regions 
pursue the objectives of sustainable develop-
ment, with a sentence saying ‘in particular, 
they co-operate towards an effective climate 
policy in accordance with the objectives, 
principles and modalities established by a 
law adopted by a majority laid down in Ar-
ticle 4, last paragraph’, was introduced in 
Parliament.6 It was adopted by a majority in 
the relevant committee but failed to obtain 
a two-thirds majority in the Plenary Assem-
bly of the Chamber of Representatives on 28 
March 2019 after a long and lively debate7 
that was intensely followed by climate ac-
tivists.8 This may be seen as temporary set-
back, as Article 7bis has again been included 
in the articles of the Constitution that can be 
amended in the current legislature.
2. Constitutional amendment, elections and 
government formation 
After intense debate and controversy be-
tween Parliament and the minority govern-
ment (that fell and turned it into a caretaker 
government with limited powers on 21 De-
cember 2018) regarding the latter’s power 
to veto the list of Parliament with constitu-
tional provisions susceptible to amendment, 
a (limited) list with constitutional provisions 
susceptible to amendment was approved by 
Parliament and the government. According 
to the constitutional amendment procedure 
of Article 195 of the Constitution, the ap-
proval of that list is necessary to be able to 
amend the Constitution with a two-thirds 
majority in the second reading after inter-
vening elections.
Elections for the European Parliament, the 
Federal Parliament and the parliaments of 
the federated entities (the three Regions and 
the three Communities) were held on 26 
May 2019. Within a few months, govern-
ments on the level of the Regions and Com-
munities were established. However, on the 
federal level, the formation of a government 
again turned into a cumbersome process (af-
ter the 2010 elections it took 541 days, an 
unofficial world record). To explore the pos-
sibilities to form a government coalition, the 
King appointed Didier Reynders (MR) and 
Johan Vande Lanotte (SP.A) as informateurs, 
subsequently Geert Bourgeois (N-VA) and 
Rudy Demotte (PS) as pre-formateurs, fol-
lowed by Paul Magnette (PS) as pre-forma-
teur and then Joachim Coens (CD&V) and 
George-Louis Bouchez (MR) as informa-
teurs. After months of exploring possibilities 
in vain, the puzzle seemed almost impos-
sible, especially given the tension between 
the largest Flemish party, N-VA (right-wing 
and nationalist), and largest Walloon party, 
PS (left-wing), and from time to time even a 
veto to govern with each other.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In 2019, the Belgian Constitutional Court 
delivered 206 judgments and handled 266 
cases in total. Regarding the nature of the 
complaints, conflicts of competences be-
tween the federated entities and the federal 
state only represented 5% of the judgments 
in 2019. The majority of cases concerned the 
infringement of fundamental rights. In 2019, 
the principle of equality and non-discrimina-
tion was still the most invoked principle be-
fore the Court (54%), followed by review of 
compliance with the socioeconomic rights of 
Article 23 of the Constitution (8%), the right 
to private and family life of Article 22 (7%), 
the guarantees in taxation matters of Articles 
170 and 172 (6%), the jurisdictional warran-
ties of Article 13 (4%), the rights of the child 
of Article 22bis (4%), the personal freedom 
and legality of criminal charges of Article 
12 (2%), the property rights of Article 16 
(2%) and the freedom and equality in edu-
cation of Article 24 (2%). References were 
made to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in 
58 cases. Moreover, the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU was also regularly reflected in the 
judgments of the Constitutional Court, with 
references to this case law in 27 cases. Ref-
erences to other sources of international law 
can be found in 34 cases. The Court also re-
ferred four cases for a preliminary ruling to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). 
1. Freedom of Religion and Worship
A Walloon decree in May 2017 dealt with 
the recognition and the obligations of insti-
tutions entrusted with the management of the 
goods and incomes generated by recognised 
4 Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate 
Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 
2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Directives 2009/119/EC and 
(EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, O.J. N° 328 of 21.12.2018.
5 https://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/54/3517/54K3517004.pdf 
6 https://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/54/3642/54K3642001.pdf 
7 https://www.dekamer.be/doc/PCRI/pdf/54/ip278.pdf 76 MPs were in favour, 66 MPs were against.
8 https://www.commondreams.org/news/2019/03/25/ahead-key-vote-belgians-occupy-climate-demand-constitutional-amendment
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religions. This decree established a proce-
dure for the recognition of local religious 
denominations derived from religions rec-
ognised by the federal state. It also contained 
a registration procedure that applied to local 
religious denominations derived from both 
the religions recognised and non-recognised 
by the federal state. To be recognised, the re-
ligious denomination has to be registered as 
a legal entity for at least three years. In its 
judgment no. 2019/203, the Constitutional 
Court assessed whether the Walloon legisla-
ture (1) exceeded its powers, (2) violated the 
right to freedom of religion and worship and 
(3) acted in a discriminatory manner.
     
Regarding (1), the Court held that the Wal-
loon Region was competent to adopt the 
contested decree based on its competence 
to manage goods and incomes generated by 
the recognised religions. However, the Court 
considered that the Walloon legislature, in 
view of the federal competence as to the rec-
ognition of religions, was not competent for 
the registration procedure for the religions 
not recognised by the federal state. The de-
cree was only annulled as to this point. Re-
garding (2), the Court recalled that the right 
to freedom of religion and worship includes 
the organisational autonomy of religious 
denominations and that interferences with 
this right must be justified, proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued and necessary in 
a democratic society. The Court stated that 
the registration of local religious denomina-
tions and the requirement of having a legal 
structure three years before the application 
for recognition is submitted are legitimate 
objectives. Moreover, while the local reli-
gious denomination must register as a legal 
entity, it does not necessarily have to adopt 
a legal personality. Consequently, the Court 
ruled that the Walloon decree did not violate 
the right to freedom of religion and worship. 
Regarding (3), the Court did not consider the 
Walloon decree to be discriminatory, inter 
alia, because the requirement that an appli-
cation for recognition must contain a solemn 
declaration concerning compliance with the 
fundamental rights and freedoms applies to 
all recognised religions. 
Finally, the Court, called to decide on wheth-
er the Unstunned Slaughter Ban introduced 
in the Flemish Region is compatible with the 
freedom of religion, referred for a prelimi-
nary ruling to the EU Court of Justice (case 
no. 53/2019). The most important question 
was whether EU Member States are permit-
ted under EU law to adopt rules such as those 
contained in the Decree of the Flemish Re-
gion. 
2. Access to Justice  
In judgment nos. 2019/129 and 2019/131, 
the Constitutional Court annulled the provi-
sions of the Flemish Decree on Local Gov-
ernance that had completely abrogated the 
right of one or more citizens to engage in le-
gal proceedings on behalf of the municipal-
ity and province (the so-called right to ‘sub-
stitution’). The right to substitution provides 
important procedural options for individual 
citizens in legal proceedings on environmen-
tal law, such as under the 1993 Act on the 
prohibitory injunction in the sphere of the 
environment. This act grants citizens a right 
to engage in legal proceedings for the pro-
tection of the environment (e.g., challenging 
an illegal permit) without having to provide 
a personal interest in the matter. In this case, 
the court can order a prohibitory injunction 
when practices cause serious damage to the 
environment.
In these judgments the Court ruled that, by 
abrogating these provisions, the legislature 
violated Article 23 of the Belgian Constitu-
tion (which enshrines social and economic 
rights, such as the right to a healthy environ-
ment). The Court referred to the ‘standstill 
obligation’, which imposes on the govern-
ment the obligation to maintain the existing 
level of protection unless there are reasons 
of public interest for not doing so. The Court 
stated that by abrogating the provisions, the 
Flemish legislature had significantly reduced 
the level of protection provided by the right 
to a healthy environment without any reason 
of public interest. First, legal action by citi-
zens on behalf of the municipality or prov-
ince only aims to subject the lawfulness of 
an act to judicial review. This perpetuates 
the participation by citizens to a democrat-
ic state governed by the rule of law. Second, 
the existence of an alternative legal remedy 
does not constitute a reason of public inter-
est that could justify a significant reduction 
of the existing level of protection, especially 
when it provides for a higher threshold for 
accessing justice, e.g., when citizens would 
be required to unite in advance. Third, it is 
up to the courts to impose sanctions for pos-
sible abuse by citizens. 
3. (Bio-)Ethical Questions
In 2019, the Court delivered several judg-
ments that addressed questions of a(n) (bio-)
ethical nature. For instance, in case no. 
89/2019, it upheld the differential treatment 
between the criminalisation of all sexual re-
lations between an adult and a minor young-
er than 16, and the criminalisation of only 
those sexual relations between an adult and 
a minor older than 16 that happened without 
the latter’s consent. In case no. 19/2019, the 
Court held for the first time that strict scru-
tiny is necessary in cases involving differen-
tial treatment based on sexual orientation. It 
had only done so before in relation to ‘birth’ 
and ‘gender’.
In the groundbreaking judgment no. 
99/2019, the Court found the federal Gen-
der Recognition Act (GRA) of 25 June 2017 
unconstitutional on several points. The case 
was brought before the Court by three Bel-
gian LGBTIQ+ interest groups. The GRA 
had considerably facilitated the procedure 
to change one’s officially registered sex 
by abolishing all requirements of a psy-
cho-medical nature with which transgender 
persons primarily had to comply. In other 
words, the legislature based the new frame-
work for legal gender recognition on the 
principle of gender self-determination. How-
ever, the Court considered that the Act con-
tained a lacuna insofar as the sex registration 
was limited to the binary categories of male 
and female. From the perspective of gender 
self-determination, it found it not reason-
ably justified that persons with a non-binary 
gender identity were still required to accept 
a sex registration that did not correspond to 
their actual gender identity. Although the 
Court suggested some ways to implement 
its judgment – such as the addition of one or 
more categories for sex registration, or the 
removal of sex and gender as elements of the 
individual civil status – it falls solely upon 
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the federal legislature to remedy the un-
constitutionality. In addition, the Court also 
annulled the GRA provisions that rendered 
legal gender recognition in principle irrevo-
cable and only allowed for a single change 
of the first name for transgender persons. 
This means that gender-fluid persons will be 
able to repeatedly change their registered sex 
based on the same administrative procedure. 
In case no. 122/2019, the Court also had to 
address the temporary exclusion from blood 
and plasma donation of, inter alia, men who 
have sex with men (MSM) during twelve 
months after their last sexual contact with 
another man. The legislature had ended the 
permanent ban of MSM in 2017, following 
a 2015 judgment by the EU Court of Justice 
in the Léger case. In its judgment, which 
thoroughly reviewed all scientific materials 
available to the legislature, the Constitution-
al Court upheld the exclusion of MSM from 
blood donation, yet annulled their exclusion 
from plasma donation, given the possibility 
to apply less restrictive means. It ordered the 
legislature to remedy the unconstitutionality 
within a time limit of two years.
4. Fight Against Terrorism
The fight against terrorism is a permanent 
concern for all public authorities. An arti-
cle of the Code of Criminal Investigation 
introduced by the Act of 17 May 2017 on 
promoting the fight against terrorism sets 
out two separate obligations for members of 
staff of social security institutions bound by 
professional confidentiality. The impugned 
legislation requires them to report of their 
own accord to the public prosecutor any in-
formation gathered in the course of their du-
ties ‘that may constitute serious evidence of 
a terrorist offence’ under the Criminal Code, 
provided that this does not involve personal 
medical data (active reporting requirement). 
The same persons are required to report 
without delay to the public prosecutor any 
administrative information which the latter 
requests and deems necessary to obtain in 
connection with the investigation of terrorist 
offences, even if such information is cov-
ered by the professional confidentiality by 
which the staff member who obtained it is 
bound (passive reporting requirement). The 
Act makes refusal to report the information a 
criminal offence. 
In case no. 44/2019, the Court upheld the 
passive reporting requirement. It ruled that 
the exception to professional confidential-
ity resulting from the impugned reporting 
requirement is compatible with the right to 
respect for private life. The active reporting 
requirement, however, was considered to be 
incompatible with the principle of offenc-
es and penalties being established by law. 
Pointing out that the commission of a terror-
ist offence required, inter alia, criminal in-
tent, the Court took the view that a member 
of staff of a social security institution had 
neither the skills nor the resources neces-
sary for ascertaining whether another per-
son intended to commit a terrorist offence. 
It accordingly concluded that the impugned 
legislation did not enable the professionals it 
covered to determine satisfactorily whether 
they were committing a criminal offence by 
reporting information because they wished 
to comply with the law in question. The 
Court consequently held that the impugned 
terms employed to define the active report-
ing requirement were too vague and there-
fore annulled the requirement.
In another case, the Court scrutinized the 
Act on the Intelligence and Security Service. 
The absence of an active a posteriori noti-
fication by that Service of the application 
of secret surveillance measures was found 
to be incompatible with the right to respect 
for private life. The Court considered that a 
mere notification ‘on-demand’ renders the 
possibility to challenge those measures by 
the person to whom they were secretly ap-
plied ‘purely theoretical’. The use of mobile 
cameras in public places by agents of the 
Service, however, was found to be constitu-
tional (case no. 41/2019).
In case no. 135/2019, the Court referred sev-
eral preliminary questions to the EU Court 
of Justice in light of the review of the law 
requiring transportation providers and travel 
operators to communicate passenger infor-
mation. The Court inquired, among other 
questions, whether the system of the PNR 
Directive, transposed by the contested law, is 
compatible with the right to respect for pri-
vate life and the protection of personal data.
  
5. Environmental Protection
Local governments across the country are 
trying to improve air quality, among other 
measures, by setting up low-emission zones 
(LEZ). Access to a LEZ is limited or banned 
for the most polluting forms of motorised 
traffic. An ordinance passed by the Brussels 
legislature allowed its government to set up 
a permanent LEZ for the entirety of the Cap-
ital Region. In its judgment no. 37/2019, the 
Constitutional Court first adjudicated a com-
petence issue. The general police of traffic 
and transport is a federal competence. The 
Court nevertheless agreed that setting up a 
LEZ was a matter of environmental protec-
tion and complementary traffic regulation, 
both belonging to the competences of the 
Regions. Second, the Court concluded that 
the right to property of car owners does not 
necessarily take precedence over environ-
mental or health interests. Given Belgium’s 
obligations under EU law to improve air 
quality, the limitation of property rights was 
not unreasonable. Third, taking into account 
a number of flanking measures, the LEZ 
policy was not discriminatory towards finan-
cially less well-off citizens.
6. Freedom of Establishment
Decades ago, the Belgian legislature adopted 
a particular arrangement for port labor. It is 
based on the principle that only recognised 
port laborers can engage in this economic 
activity so that whoever is in need of port 
labor is forced to recruit recognized port la-
borers. Not doing so is a criminal offence. 
The rationale for the monopoly was safety 
and specialisation. No such monopoly exists 
for labor, other than (un)loading ships, out-
side of port areas. Of course, this type of leg-
islation raises both non-discrimination issues 
and concerns regarding freedoms of services 
and establishment under EU law. Limitations 
of these freedoms can only be justified un-
der specific conditions. In its judgment no. 
94/2019, the Constitutional Court referred 
two preliminary questions to the EU Court 
of Justice. The first question aimed at inter-
preting the freedom of establishment provid-
ed in Article 49 TFEU (Treaty on the Func-
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tioning of the European Union). This would 
allow the Constitutional Court to assess the 
justifiability of the port labor system. The 
second question concerned the possibility of 
provisionally maintaining certain effects of 
the system in case it was found to violate EU 
law.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
On January 1, 2020, 320 cases were pend-
ing before the Constitutional Court. Some of 
these cases are of interest to an international 
audience. Our report on 2018 already men-
tioned some important cases that were still 
pending at the end of 2019. The Court must 
still decide whether the Unstunned Slaughter 
Ban introduced in the Flemish and Walloon 
Regions is compatible with the freedom of 
religion, the separation of church and state 
and the freedom of labour and enterprise. 
Various pending cases concern the right to 
privacy; in particular, the obligation to com-
municate personal data (for instance, client 
data by Airbnb hosts and Air companies) to 
the authorities. Furthermore, cases are still 
pending on the Act to Combat Squatting 
and the act providing that there should be a 
minimum service of the railways in case of 
industrial action. Other internationally rele-
vant pending cases since 2019 relate to the 
constitutionality of the digital fingerprint 
and the fireworks ban.
As reported in our 2018 contribution, Jus-
tice Erik Derycke, from the Dutch-speak-
ing group of former MPs, retired from the 
Constitutional Court in October 2019. Yas-
mine Kherbache replaced him. She was, on 
the proposal of the Flemish Socialist Party 
(SP.A), nominated by a broad majority of 
the Chamber of Representatives, and sub-
sequently appointed by the King. She an-
nounced shortly before the vote in Parlia-
ment that she had taken steps to renounce 
her second, Algerian, nationality, securing 
in that way the votes of the Flemish Nation-
alist Party (N-VA) that held an opinion that 
a Judge of the Constitutional Court could 
only be loyal to one nationality, and hence 
not to a second one.9 With this appointment, 
the Court now counts four female judges, all 
belonging to the Dutch-speaking group, and 
thus meets the minimum gender balance re-
quirement introduced in the Special Act on 
the Constitutional Court in 2014.
Justice Jean-Paul Snappe, from the 
French-speaking group of former MPs, 
retired in November 2019. The nomina-
tion of a successor, on a proposal by the 
French-speaking Green Party (Ecolo), by the 
Senate – according to an unwritten propor-
tionality rule that should assure diversity of 
opinions amongst the justices of the Court 
– proved to be problematic. The proposed 
candidate, Zakia Khatabbi, former co-pres-
ident of Ecolo, was depicted by the N-VA as 
an ‘open border activist’, overcritical of the 
policies of the former center-right federal 
government and not fit to become a justice 
of the Court, as she does not hold a law de-
gree.10 The Flemish Far-Right Party (Vlaams 
Belang) also took that position. During 
a second vote in the Senate on 17 January 
2020, she missed the necessary two-thirds 
majority for the nomination by two votes, so 
the procedure has to start all over again with 
a call for candidates. Another replacement 
will be necessary when the Dutch-speaking 
President André Alen retires in September 
2020. The various replacements and nomi-
nations of justices of the Court fueled public 
and academic debate about the current rules 
and procedures. The main critics and pro-
posals argue that one should review the com-
pulsory quota of six justices with a political 
background, whether a law degree should be 
required of former MPs and whether public 
hearings should be held by Parliament in the 
course of the nomination procedure.11 
9 https://www.dekamer.be/doc/PCRI/pdf/55/ip013.pdf, p. 27.
10 The Special Act on the Constitutional Court does not require former MPs to hold a law degree in order to become a judge on the Constitutional Court.
11 T. Moonen, House of Courts? De vernieuwing van het Grondwettelijk Hof, Rechtskundig Weekblad, 2019-20, 443-456.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During 2019, the Central Election Commis-
sion of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), 
which organizes and conducts the country’s 
elections, was placed under full scrutiny. In 
2016, the Constitutional Court of B&H ruled 
that several provisions of the Election Law 
were not in conformity with B&H’s Consti-
tution. To date, the Parliamentary Assembly 
has not taken steps to amend the Election 
Law. This is because several ethnic political 
parties continue to have a decisive influence 
in the Parliamentary Assembly. Decisions 
are then the result of balancing interests 
among constituent peoples. As in the case 
of the Election Law, established bargaining 
instruments and mechanisms have caused a 
status quo in decision-making procedures. 
The Central Election Commission has tried 
to apply the decision of the Constitutional 
Court by issuing an instruction. Ever since, 
the instruction has caused controversy and 
raised several constitutional cases in the 
Constitutional Court.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
The Election Law governs elections at all 
levels in B&H. The Central Election Com-
mission organizes and conducts elections. 
In 2016, in its decision U-23/14, the Consti-
tutional Court ruled that certain provisions 
of the Election Law were not in conformity 
with the Constitution. One of the provisions 
was that ‘each of the constituent peoples1 
shall be allocated one seat in every canton’. 
Other unconstitutional provisions includ-
ed those that define the number and ethnic 
belonging of the delegates of the House of 
Peoples in the Parliament of the Federation 
of B&H based on the results of the 1991 
census.2 Nevertheless, the Parliamentary 
Assembly failed to amend the Election Law 
within the stipulated time. This forced the 
Constitutional Court to render the provisions 
ineffective in 2017.
Meanwhile, the 2018 elections were ap-
proaching. Because of the complex situation, 
the Central Election Commission issued the 
Instruction Amending the Instruction on 
the Procedure for Administering Indirect 
Elections for the Bodies of Authority in 
B&H under the Election Law of B&H (the 
Instruction on Amendments). According to 
the Constitution of the Federation of B&H, 
the constituent peoples and Others3 shall be 
proportionately represented. However, such 
proportionate representation should be based 
on the results of the 1991 census. In fact, 
all calculations requiring demographic data 
should be based on the 1991 census until 
Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Agreement4 is 
fully implemented. In the meantime, during 
2013, the Central Census Bureau of B&H or-
ganized and conducted the first census after 
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA
1 There are three constituent peoples: The Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. 
2 Others are those that are not constituent peoples (national minorities and nationally undeclared).
3 The 1991 population census in B&H was the last census before an armed conflict in the country 
broke out in 1992. After the conflict, it was used as the basis to ensure proportional representation of 
the constituent peoples.
4 The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina contains 11 annexes, where Annex 4 is 
the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is also known by different names including the Dayton 
Accords, Dayton Agreement and the Dayton-Paris Agreement.
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the armed conflict that took place between 
1992 and 1995. 
There are two problems related to this. First-
ly, a comparison between the 1991 census 
and the 2013 census underlines the differ-
ences in ethnic composition before and af-
ter the 1992-1995 conflict. The comparison 
between the two censuses shows that ethnic 
belonging is territorially embedded. Some 
cities and municipalities that were once pre-
dominantly populated by one constituent 
people became almost entirely populated 
by another. Some cities and municipalities 
became unpopulated. Some cities and mu-
nicipalities that once had a mixed popula-
tion became almost entirely populated by 
one constituent people. Secondly, Annex 7 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement regulates 
the return of refugees and displaced persons 
to B&H after the conflict. It is the Office of 
the High Representative that is authorized to 
deliver a decision to confirm that Annex 7 
is fully implemented. Since the Office has 
not made this decision so far, Annex 7 is not 
considered to have been implemented. At the 
same time, one cannot disregard the ruling 
of the Constitutional Court. This raises a 
question about the distribution of mandates 
according to decision U-23/14 of the Court 
and the Instruction on Amendments. This 
is because there have been two conflicting 
opinions about which census should be ap-
plied as a basis for calculations. Because of 
this, several constitutional cases related to 
the issue were brought before the Court.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. U-24/18: Constitutionality of the Instruc-
tion on Amendments – Deciding on imple-
menting regulations
This case challenged the constitutionality 
of the Instruction on Amendments. The ap-
plicant (27 representatives in the House of 
Representatives of the Parliament) wanted a 
review of the constitutionality of the Instruc-
tion on Amendments. The applicant specif-
ically referred to decision U-23/14. As pre-
viously mentioned, this decision established 
that certain provisions of the Election Law 
were not in conformity with the Constitu-
tion. These include the provision that ‘each 
of the constituent peoples shall be allocat-
ed one seat in every canton’ as well as the 
provisions that define the number and eth-
nic belonging of the delegates in the House 
of Peoples in Parliament based on the 1991 
census. The Constitutional Court ordered the 
Parliamentary Assembly to harmonize the 
provisions with the Constitution no later than 
six months from the day of delivery of the 
decision. However, in July 2017, the Court 
established that the Parliamentary Assembly 
had failed to enforce its decision within the 
given time limit, and rendered the provisions 
ineffective the day after its ruling was pub-
lished in the Official Gazette of B&H. The 
applicant argued that the Central Election 
Commission used the 2013 census when it 
issued the distribution of mandates. Accord-
ing to the applicant, this was contrary to the 
Constitution and the Election Law. Further, 
the applicant pointed out that the Instruc-
tion on Amendments outlines the distribu-
tion of mandates partly contrary to decision 
U-23/14. Because of this and because these 
are the issues arising from the Constitution, 
the applicant concluded that the case met the 
conditions for decision-making and review 
by the Constitutional Court.
The Constitutional Court rejected the request 
as inadmissible since it was not competent to 
make a decision. The Court concluded that 
the impugned Instruction on Amendments 
was an implementing regulation, passed 
by the Central Election Commission to im-
plement the Election Law in the process of 
administering indirect elections for the bod-
ies of authority in B&H, which determined 
the preliminary number of delegates to the 
House of Peoples of the Parliament to be 
elected from cantonal assemblies. Taking 
into account the fact that it concerned a tem-
porary provision, the Constitutional Court 
concluded that the case was not about a 
general act, the constitutionality of which it 
could review. In the content of the request in 
the case at hand, the Constitutional Court did 
not find any reason why the impugned im-
plementing act of the Central Election Com-
mission would raise an issue of violation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Therefore, the Court concluded that it was 
not competent to decide on the review of the 
constitutionality of the impugned act of the 
Central Election Commission. 
2. U-1/19: Compatibility of the Instruction 
on Amendments – Deciding on the merits of 
a dispute pending before an ordinary court
This case challenged the compatibility of the 
Instruction on Amendments. The applicant 
(judge of the Court of B&H) filed a request5 
for a review of the compatibility of the In-
struction on Amendments. The applicant 
stated that several plaintiffs (three political 
parties and the Sarajevo Canton) initiated an 
administrative dispute against the Central 
Election Commission that issued the Instruc-
tion on Amendments. The applicant argued 
that the statement of claim was based on a 
review of constitutionality and lawfulness 
of a bylaw. Based on this, the applicant con-
cluded that the case met the conditions for 
decision-making and review by the Consti-
tutional Court. Additionally, the applicant 
stated that this case was of fundamental im-
portance because the aim was to resolve the 
issue of constitutionality completely. 
The Court rejected the request as inadmissi-
ble since the it was not competent to make a 
decision. The Court concluded that the case 
was not about the situation referred to in Ar-
ticle VI(3)(c) of the Constitution.6 In earlier 
cases, the Constitutional Court had judged 
that this jurisdiction of the Court (the possi-
bility granted to any court in B&H to refer an 
issue to the Court) could not be interpreted 
that it had the jurisdiction to decide the mer-
its of a dispute initiated before an ordinary 
court. The Constitutional Court established 
that it could decide on the compatibility of 
law with the Constitution if that law was to 
be applied by the ordinary court resolving 
the dispute under its subject matter jurisdic-
5 Initially, the applicant filed two requests. The Constitutional Court took a decision on the joinder of the requests in respect of which the Constitutional Court 
conduced one set of proceedings and took a single decision.
6 The Constitutional Court has appellate jurisdiction over issues under the Constitution of B&H arising out of a judgment of any other court in the country.
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tion. The Court pointed out that its decision 
on the compatibility of law with the Consti-
tution does not deal with the issue of whether 
and in which manner the ordinary court will 
apply the law in the case pending before it. 
Therefore, the Constitutional Court could 
not decide on the merits of a dispute pending 
before an ordinary court. Finally, the Court 
referred to the relevant views taken in its de-
cision U-24/18. 
3. U-3/19: Constitutionality of the Instruc-
tion on Amendments – Restating a previous 
decision
This case challenged the constitutionality of 
the Instruction of Amendments. The appli-
cant (chair of the House of Representatives 
of the Parliamentary Assembly of B&H) 
filed a request for review of the constitu-
tionality of the Instruction on Amendments. 
The applicant argued that the Instruction on 
Amendments was not in conformity to the 
Constitution of B&H, the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). The applicant alleged that 
the Central Election Commission was not 
responsible for the adoption of the Instruc-
tion on Amendments as the Election Law of 
B&H does not provide for the possibility or 
authority based on which the Commission 
could do so. Thus, the applicant claimed 
that the Commission assumed the role of the 
legislator. Further, the applicant found trou-
blesome that the implementation of Annex 7 
of the Constitution had not been completed. 
Even in the event of the completion of the 
implementation of Annex 7, it was the leg-
islator that was obliged to prescribe specific 
criteria based on which the seats of members 
of the House of Peoples of the Parliament of 
the Federation of B&H shall be filled. Then, 
the Central Election Commission may de-
termine the number of delegates from each 
constituent people and the Others who are 
selected. The applicant claimed that the 
Constitutional Court, under the provision of 
Article VI(3)(a) of the Constitution7 had ju-
risdiction to deal with this matter since the 
case relates to a dispute between the institu-
tions of B&H. 
The Constitutional Court rejected the request 
as inadmissible. The Court pointed out that it 
already decided the same issue and adopted 
its decision U-24/18, and it did not follow 
from the allegations presented in the request 
that there was a basis for adopting a different 
decision. The Court noted that in the pres-
ent request, the applicant presented a differ-
ent argumentation to a certain extent when 
challenging the instruction of the Central 
Election Commission. However, the Court 
held that the essential complaints were the 
same, although the applicant’s starting point 
was different, and that the responses given in 
decision U-24/18 may apply to the present 
case. Having adhered to the views expressed 
in decision U-24/18, the Constitutional Court 
held that the applicant’s arguments were not 
capable of calling into question the view 
which the Court expressed in its decision 
U-24/18, which may (also) be applied to the 
allegations expressed in the present request 
for review of constitutionality. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In 2019 the Constitutional Court had a hand-
ful of cases in which it decided on (1) a vio-
lation of the right to a fair trial in relation to 
the adoption of a decision within a reason-
able time limit and (2) a violation of the right 
to effective legal remedies. In 2020, the Con-
stitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
will most likely continue to be overburdened 
with appellations that it examine whether the 
constitutional rights (the right to a fair trial, 
the right of access to court, the right to an 
effective legal remedy, etc.) have been vio-
lated or disregarded and whether the appli-
cation of the law was, possibly, arbitrary or 
discriminatory. 
V. FURTHER READING
P. Popelier and M. Sahadžić (eds.), Consti-
tutional Asymmetry in Multinational Feder-
alism, Managing Multinationalism in Multi-
tiered Systems, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan 
(2019).
M. Sahadžić, ‘Mild Asymmetry and Eth-
noterritorial Overlap in Charge of the Con-
sequences of Multinationalism. A Country 
Study of Constitutional Asymmetry in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina’, in P. Popelier and M. 
Sahadžić (eds.), Constitutional Asymmetry 
in Multinational Federalism, Managing 
Multinationalism in Multi-tiered Systems, 
Cham: Palgrave Macmillan (2019).
P. Popelier and M. Sahadžić, ‘Linking Con-
stitutional Asymmetry with Multinational-
ism. An Attempt to Crack the Code in Five 
Hypotheses’, in P. Popelier and M. Sahadžić 
(eds.), Constitutional Asymmetry in Multina-
tional Federalism, Managing Multinational-
ism in Multi-tiered Systems, Cham: Palgrave 
Macmillan (2019).
7 The Constitutional Court of B&H has exclusive jurisdiction to decide any dispute that arises under the Constitution of B&H between the Entities or between 
B&H and an Entity or Entities, or between institutions of B&H.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2020, Brazil joined a growing list of coun-
tries governed by elected leaders with a pop-
ulist and conservative profile. President Bol-
sonaro was elected on a political platform that 
included kick-starting the economy, embrac-
ing the law and order agenda (including easing 
restrictions on guns, cracking down on crime, 
and protecting police or military officers who 
kill on duty), and implementing conservative 
policies that particularly targeted indigenous, 
LGBT, sexual, and reproductive rights as well 
as environmental protection. During a first 
year in office described by most observers as 
turbulent and divisive, a set of constitutional 
questions emerged: Would democratic insti-
tutions defend themselves from potential at-
tacks? Or would the country follow the path 
of democratic backsliding? 
The good news is that the 1988 Constitution 
built a rather solid system of checks and bal-
ances with an extensive catalogue of funda-
mental rights that proved to be capable of 
limiting executive power. Interestingly, one 
of the characteristics of the Brazilian politi-
cal system that has been subject to the most 
criticism, “coalition presidentialism” – re-
quiring the President to form a stable legis-
lative coalition allowing for governability in 
the context of a hyper-fragmented multi-par-
ty system – has served as a shield against il-
liberal setbacks. 
Because Mr. Bolsonaro runs the country 
without a steady majority coalition in Con-
gress (in part because he refused to do so, 
calling it “old politics”), Congress has taken 
a clear lead in policymaking and in check-
ing the President’s power. On the one hand, 
Congress has pushed ahead the President’s 
economic reform. For instance, the passing 
of a major pension reform was mainly at-
tributed to the efforts of the House Speaker, 
Rodrigo Maia. On the other hand, it rejected 
or amended provisional measures (tempo-
rary executive decrees which are submitted 
to Congress for analysis and approval) used 
by the President to advance his conservative 
political agenda. One of the most prominent 
cases was the rejection by Congress of the 
provisional measure that transferred the 
power over indigenous land demarcation 
from Brazil’s National Indigenous Affairs 
Agency to the Ministry of Agriculture, in an 
effort to paralyze land demarcation. 
In this context, while the Brazilian Supreme 
Federal Court (STF) was not the protago-
nist, it did not serve merely as a bystander. 
As this report demonstrates, in exceptional 
but relevant cases, the Court curbed overtly 
undemocratic measures (e.g., by prohibiting 
BRAZIL
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the elimination of participatory councils) 
and sent clear signs that it would continue 
to uphold minority rights (e.g., by crimi-
nalizing homophobic acts). In all of these 
cases, Supreme Court decisions have been 
either unanimous or agreed to by a large ma-
jority of the Justices. Yet, as this report also 
reveals, the Court’s most divisive decisions 
and most impactful workload continued to 
be devoted to examining criminal questions 
related to Operation Car Wash and the fight 
against corruption more generally. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
In our review for the 2018 Global Review of 
Constitutional Law, we concluded that the 
Brazilian Supreme Court would face a diffi-
cult dilemma in 2019, the first year of Pres-
ident Jair Bolsonaro’s term. In view of the 
growing polarization in the country and the 
potential attacks on Brazilian democracy by 
a populist government associated with the 
defense of Brazil’s last civil-military dicta-
torship (1954-1985) and contempt for minori-
ties, the odds were that the Supreme Court 
would be a central player in constraining the 
executive’s power. Despite this scenario, its 
Chief Justice, Dias Toffoli, suggested at the 
time that the Court would adopt more self-re-
straint and let political matters be decided by 
political agents. The dilemma was self-ev-
ident. As we argued, “while this may sound 
prudent, depending on the degree of self-re-
straint, it may also be interpreted as a sign 
that the Court is washing its hands of politics 
when Brazil may need it the most to defend 
core democratic values.”1 
2019 is over and that dilemma, in retrospect, 
may have become more nuanced still. It is not 
that the Court did not react to the government’s 
visibly authoritarian impulses – it did in some 
relevant cases, as we discuss in the next ses-
sion – or that it decided not to interfere in po-
litical matters. It is simply that the Supreme 
Court was offset by Congress, an unexpected 
scenario given that many congressmen were 
elected by riding the wave that also helped 
elect President Bolsonaro, and that wiped 
many traditional and left-leaning politicians 
off the map. The Brazilian Congress played 
an important role in blocking or slowing the 
advance of some governmental measures that 
were clearly aimed at disrupting the rule of 
law and subverting horizontal accountability.
It is a comparably striking phenomenon. 
Countries that have featured similar markers 
of “democratic decay”,2 such as populism, 
rising polarization, attacks on civil liberties 
and on the media, and a widespread anti-sys-
temic and antipluralist rhetoric, have not 
found in their parliaments a safe guardian of 
democracy. In fact, in countries like Hunga-
ry3 and Turkey,4 we see quite the opposite. In 
such countries, constitutional courts become 
the last resource in which citizens can trust, 
though the courts’ capacity to exert such a role 
has proven rather limited. In Brazil, instead, 
institutional design and longstanding practic-
es – i.e., the high level of party fragmentation 
and so-called “coalitional presidentialism”,5 
which raise the stakes of coordination be-
tween presidents and Congress – have placed 
Congress in a favorable bargaining position. 
Added to that is the government’s staggering 
inability to negotiate its agenda with Con-
gress, which it associates with corruption. 
The outcome is a rising countermovement 
towards strengthening legislative authority.6 
The new interactions between the executive 
and legislative branches have resulted in a set 
of the government’s proposals being rejected 
in Congress or – what might even be political-
ly less costly – deliberately not even brought 
to discussion.
This unexpected scenario demands a reas-
sessment of the Court’s dilemma. After all, 
beneath Chief Justice Dias Toffoli’s sug-
gestion of judicial self-restraint may lie a 
genuine concern with the growing politici-
zation of the Constitutional Court. With an 
active Congress promoting a more effective, 
though imperfect, check on the executive’s 
power, the consequence is that a politically 
engaged Supreme Court would be disruptive. 
Moreover, in a polarized environment, the 
stakes are naturally higher for a Court whose 
political capital has waned over the years7 
despite – or even because of – its rising po-
litical clout, and whose lack of collaborative 
decision-making has become standard prac-
tice.8 Although the Court played a relevant 
role in protecting Brazilian democracy in 
2019, its structural dysfunctionalities (main-
ly the justices’ disproportionate individual 
power)9 have negatively affected its capacity 
to present itself as a legitimate guardian of 
the Constitution and have downgraded the 
technical aura that usually surrounds consti-
tutional courts. 
This is particularly true when we explore the 
way the Court has behaved in the face of the 
so-called “Operation Car Wash”,10  the most 
1 L.R. Barroso, J.Z. Benvindo, A. Osório, Brazil, in: R. Albert et al., 2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law (I-CONnect and the Clough Center for the 
Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College 2019) 36.
2 See Democratic Decay & Renewal (DEM-DEC) project at: https://www.democratic-decay.org/
3 See Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai, and Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Hungary’s Iliberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution’ (2012), 23 Journal of Democracy 138, 
138-46.
4 See Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu, ‘The Perils of “Turkish Presidentialism”’ (2018), 52 Review of Middle East Studies 43, 43-53.
5 See S. Abranches, Presidencialismo de Coalizão (Companhia das Letras 2018), 440, 440.
6 Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, ‘The Party Fragmentation Paradox in Brazil: A Shield Against Authoritarianism?’, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Oct. 24, 2019, at http://
www.iconnectblog.com/2019/10/the-party-fragmentation-paradox-in-brazil-a-shield-against-authoritarianism/
7 See Reynaldo Turollo Jr., STF é reprovado tanto quanto Bolsonaro, mas menos que Congresso, diz Datafolha (Folha de S. Paulo, 29 Dec., 2019), https://
www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/12/stf-e-reprovado-tanto-quanto-bolsonaro-mas-menos-que-congresso-diz-datafolha.shtml
8 Virgílio Afonso da Silva, ‘Deciding without Deliberating’ (2013), 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 557, 557-84.
9 See Diego Werneck Arguelhes and Ivar A. Hartmann, ‘Timing Control without Docket Control’ (2017), 5 Journal of Law and Courts 105, 105-40.
10 See Tom Gerald Daly, ‘Populism, Public Law, and Democratic Decay in Brazil: Understanding the Rise of Jair Bolsonaro’ (2019), International Human 
Rights Researchers’ Workshop: ‘Democratic Backsliding and Human Rights.
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comprehensive criminal case ever in Brazil-
ian history, which has significant impacts on 
the political landscape. Whenever the Court 
needed to decide matters associated with that 
operation, its dilemma gained new layers of 
complexity. One in particular should be sin-
gled out: since politicization can reach new 
highs in such landmark cases, the extent to 
which the Court is willing to balance con-
stitutional guarantees with an alleged “social 
sentiment” has been a key factor in shaping 
much of its relevance as an effective insti-
tutional check. The dilemma then becomes 
the degree to which the Court aims to behave 
as a horizontal accountability institution and 
how such balancing may intertwine or con-
flict with a more active parliament and a 
highly polarized society. 
The major developments in 2019 were part 
of this now-even-more-intense dilemma. 
The “Operation Car Wash” cases – and oth-
ers associated with it – have all been crucial 
for understanding the Court’s challenges that 
lie ahead. The most impactful case in 2019 
was the new precedent determining that a 
convict may remain free until the criminal 
sentence is final and all appeals have been 
exhausted,11 overturning, by a 6 to 5 major-
ity, a precedent set in 2016. This decision 
resulted in freeing ex-President Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva from prison, with obvious im-
pacts on the political context. The legal and 
political scenario was to a certain extent im-
pacted by the leaks of personal communica-
tions between Sergio Moro, the former fed-
eral judge who was presiding over Operation 
Car Wash and who later became Bolsonaro’s 
Minister of Justice, and federal prosecutors, 
which led the ex-President’s lawyers and 
supporters to raise questions about the im-
partiality of such judgments.12 The episode 
also raised an ethical discussion on the use of 
such materials, since they were the product 
of the invasion of private communications 
by hackers. The main arguments focused on 
the interpretation of an unamendable clause, 
on the one hand, and on the very meaning 
and credibility of the criminal justice system 
on the other. Yet it would be wrong to dis-
regard that the Court was also dealing with 
the dilemma of how to present itself in such 
a turbulent political landscape. The balance 
between adopting more political behavior by 
listening to the “social sentiment” or, rather, 
acting towards preserving its capacity to in-
dependently exert horizontal accountability 
was visibly on the table. 2019 was thereby 
a challenging year for the Court, which the 
next section will explore further. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In this section, we highlight the most im-
portant constitutional law cases decided by 
the STF in 2019. The cases are divided into 
two main topics – Fundamental Rights and 
Criminal Law – and presented in chronolog-
ical order.
Fundamental Rights
1. RE 494.6017, decided 03/28/2019, Major-
ity Opinion by Justice Edson Fachin: Ani-
mal sacrifice in African-derived religions in 
Brazil and free exercise of religious beliefs
The Plenary of the Supreme Court upheld 
as constitutional the provision of the Animal 
Welfare Code of the State of Rio Grande do 
Sul, which, in response to the escalation of 
religious intolerance targeting adherents of 
Afro-Brazilian religions, expressly stated 
that the free exercise of cults and liturgies 
of African-derived religions should not be 
considered animal cruelty. A relevant aspect, 
highlighted during the trial, was that animal 
sacrifice was not employed for entertain-
ment purposes but rather for the exercise of 
a fundamental right: religious freedom.
2. RE 1.054.110-RG, Rapporteur Justice 
Luís Roberto Barroso; ADPF 449, Rappor-
teur Justice Luiz Fux, decided 05/09/2019: 
Prohibition of Uber and ridesharing apps 
by local laws
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous deci-
sion, struck down as unconstitutional local 
laws that prohibited or disproportionately 
restricted the urban transportation services 
provided by drivers registered on ridesharing 
applications (such as Uber, Cabify, and 99 
Taxi). According to the Court, such restric-
tions violate the right to free enterprise, the 
“social value of work,” and economic free-
dom, which are provided for in the Brazilian 
Constitution.
3. RE 657.718, Majority Opinion by Justice 
Luís Roberto Barroso, decided 05/22/2019: 
Constitutional right to healthcare and pre-
scription of drugs without health agency 
approval
The Plenary of the Supreme Court discussed 
whether the constitutional right to health-
care creates a duty upon the State to provide 
patients with drugs that have not been ap-
proved by the Brazilian Health Regulatory 
Agency (Anvisa), the equivalent of the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The 
case was prompted by the growing right-to-
health litigation in Brazil, which, in practice, 
contributed to health inequalities, draining 
scarce budgetary resources from the public 
healthcare system to provide access to ex-
pensive, experimental, or unapproved drugs 
to individual claimants. The majority held 
that the State does not have a duty to supply 
patients with experimental drugs that are still 
at the stage of clinical trial and have not been 
evaluated for safety and efficacy. In addition, 
the Court found that only in exceptional cas-
es, in which there is an unreasonable delay 
by the health agency in processing the drug 
approval application, judicial decisions may 
require the State to supply drugs that have 
not yet been approved, provided that certain 
additional criteria are met (e.g., the drug has 
already been approved by the FDA or other 
recognized health agencies).
4. ADO 26, Rapporteur Justice Celso de 
Mello; MI 4.733, Rapporteur Justice Edson 
Fachin, decided 06/13/2019: Criminaliza-
tion of homophobic acts
The Supreme Court ruled that Congress 
failed its constitutional duty to enact legis-
11 ADC 43, 44, 54, Rap. Justice Marco Aurélio (07. Nov. 2019).
12 See Andrew Fishman et al., ‘Breach of Ethics’ (The Intercept, 9 June 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/06/09/brazil-lula-operation-car-wash-ser-
gio-moro/
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lation criminalizing acts of discrimination 
and hate against gay and transgender people. 
As a remedy, the Court determined that the 
Anti-Racism Law (Law No. 7,716, 1989) 
shall apply to impose criminal penalties for 
discriminatory conduct related to sexual ori-
entation and gender identity until legislation 
criminalizing homophobic acts is passed.
5. ADI 6.121 MC – Rapporteur Justice Mar-
co Aurélio, decided 06/13/2019: Dissolution 
of participatory councils
The STF issued an injunction suspending part 
of a presidential decree aimed at dismantling 
more than 50 participatory councils, which 
provide civil society an institutional venue to 
contribute to policymaking and to the over-
sight of policy implementation in areas rang-
ing from minority rights (e.g., rights of gay, 
indigenous, and disabled persons), health 
care, the environment, and public safety. The 
Supreme Court found that the principle of 
separation of powers prohibits the unilateral 
dissolution by the President of participatory 
councils which were created by laws enacted 
by Congress. Several justices also highlight-
ed that the indiscriminate dissolution of par-
ticipatory councils hampers social participa-
tion and control and, therefore, violates the 
democratic principle.
6. ADI 6.062 MC-Ref, Rapporteur Justice 
Luís Roberto Barroso, decided 08/01/2019: 
Indigenous land demarcation
The Supreme Court suspended the effects of 
a provisional measure by which President 
Jair Bolsonaro transferred the decision-mak-
ing power over indigenous land demarcation 
from Brazil’s National Indigenous Affairs 
Agency (FUNAI) to the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, led by representatives of farmers. The 
Court found that the provisional measure 
was unconstitutional, since Congress had 
rejected an identical provisional measure 
in the previous month and the Constitution 
expressly forbids the reissuance, within the 
same year, of a provisional measure that has 
been rejected.
Criminal Law Cases
1. Inq 4.435 AgR-quarto, decided 03/14/2018, 
Justice Rapporteur Marco Aurelio: Elector-
al courts’ jurisdiction over crimes connect-
ed to illegal campaign donations
The majority of the Supreme Court held that 
corruption investigations involving illegal 
campaign donations (in Portuguese, caixa 
2, i.e., slush funds) should be tried by the 
Electoral Justice due to its specialized na-
ture. The dissenting justices deemed that the 
Federal Justice should have jurisdiction to 
try such cases, since it is better equipped to 
conduct complex criminal proceedings at an 
appropriate speed. 
2. ADI 5.874, decided 05/09/2019, Majority 
Opinion by Justice Alexandre de Moraes: 
Presidential power to grant pardons
The Plenary of the STF upheld as constitu-
tional the Christmas pardon decree of 2017, 
signed by then-President Michel Temer. 
In 2018, Justice Rapporteur had suspend-
ed parts of the decree, which, for the first 
time, had extended the pardon to individuals 
convicted of corruption-related crimes. The 
majority of the Court found that the presi-
dential discretionary power to grant pardons 
was exercised within the limits imposed by 
the Constitution and that the merits of the 
administrative act were nonjusticiable. The 
dissenting justices argued that the inclusion 
of white-collar crimes within the scope of 
the Christmas pardon decree violated the 
principle of proportionality and was there-
fore unconstitutional.
3. HC 166.373, decided 10/02/2019, Majori-
ty Opinion by Justice Alexandre de Moraes: 
Procedural rights of defendants when co-de-
fendants enter plea bargain agreements
The STF held that defendants have the right 
to make closing arguments after hearing the 
closing arguments of co-defendants who 
have entered into plea bargains. While this 
procedural right was not provided for in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, the majority 
found that the right of defendants who did 
not enter plea bargain agreements to respond 
to accusations from plea bargain testimony 
in their closing arguments stems from due 
process rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. The Plenary ruling confirmed an earlier 
Second Panel decision, which overturned the 
conviction of a former president of Petro-
bras. This was the first time the Plenary of 
the Supreme Court overturned a Car Wash 
conviction on procedural grounds. The Su-
preme Court will still examine whether and 
under what circumstances the same grounds 
can be used to overturn other convictions. 
4. ADCs 43, 44 e 54, decided 11/07/2019, 
Justice Rapporteur Marco Aurelio: En-
forcement of criminal sentence after first 
appellate ruling
The Court’s Plenary, by a close vote of six to 
five, overturned Court precedent set in 2016 
(which became binding upon every court), 
which had held that defendants who had their 
prison sentence affirmed on appeal could 
serve time provisionally even if an appeal to 
a superior court was still pending. The ma-
jority of the Court ruled that the provision of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure that prevents 
anyone from being detained until an unap-
pealable criminal sentence is issued does not 
violate the Constitution. The previous under-
standing considered that appeals to superior 
courts do not suspend the enforcement of sen-
tences, since such courts are not allowed to 
revisit matters of fact and evidence. This read-
ing was also based on the pragmatic argument 
that the enforcement of criminal sentences 
after the first appellate ruling was necessary 
to ensure the credibility of the criminal jus-
tice system and close the impunity loophole, 
since the Brazilian criminal justice system is 
fraught with statutes of limitations and an ex-
cessive number of appeals.
Following the decision, former President Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva was released from cus-
tody, since, although his conviction had been 
upheld by an appellate court in 2018, his ap-
peal to superior courts was still pending.
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5. RE 1.055.941, decided 12/04/2019, Rap-
porteur Chief Justice Dias Toffoli: Sharing 
of confidential financial data by the IRS / 
COAF with law enforcement authorities in 
criminal probes
The Supreme Court upheld the sharing of 
confidential financial data by the Internal 
Revenue Service (Receita Federal) and the 
Council for Financial Activities Control 
(Conselho de Controle de Atividades Fi-
nanceiras, “COAF”) – the agency in charge 
of enforcing money laundering regulations 
– with prosecutors and other law enforce-
ment authorities without the need for prior 
judicial authorization. Observers praised the 
ruling for restoring the capacity of law en-
forcement authorities to fight corruption and 
money laundering in Brazil. The ruling al-
lowed the resumption of money laundering 
investigations, which had been paralyzed 
since July 2019, when the STF’s Chief Jus-
tice had granted an injunction to suspend all 
ongoing investigations based on confiden-
tial data shared by COAF after the agency 
launched money laundering investigations 
against President Bolsonaro’s son.
6. RHC 163.334, Rapporteur Justice Luís 
Roberto Barroso, decided 12/18/2019: Rec-
ognition of the repeated failure to remit state 
sales tax as a crime
The Supreme Court ruled that the repeated 
and willful failure to remit state sales tax 
(ICMS) payments charged to the consumer 
of goods or services is a crime. The Court 
found that such recurring conduct is equiv-
alent to tax misappropriation, which is con-
sidered criminal conduct under Brazilian 
Law 8,137/1990. However, it held that the 
taxpayer who only occasionally fails to pay 
the state sales tax is not subject to criminal-
ization. According to the majority, the deci-
sion will positively affect the states’ finances 
and promote free competition, since contu-
macious debtors derive undue competitive 
advantages and illicit profits from deliber-
ately failing to pay taxes.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Two relevant movements may be crucial for 
the future developments of Brazilian consti-
tutionalism. First, municipal elections will 
take place in the second semester of 2020, 
with an immediate impact on Congress. 
Municipal elections usually are an import-
ant predictor of the future federal and state 
elections, which will take place in 2022. As 
2020 is an electoral year, Congress may be 
more reluctant to pass structural reforms and 
thereby the odds are that it may act as an even 
stronger barrier to the government’s agenda. 
Moreover, depending on the election results, 
there may be a rearrangement of the govern-
ment’s support in Congress. In 2020, Justice 
Celso de Mello, a well-regarded judge who 
on several occasions has stressed the val-
ue of democracy, will be retiring. President 
Bolsonaro will then have the opportunity to 
appoint a new justice to the Supreme Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two nationwide elections took place in 
Bulgaria in 2019: for European Parliament 
in May and for municipal government in 
October. On both occasions, the ruling par-
ty Citizens for a European Development of 
Bulgaria (GERB) garnered sufficient sup-
port to retain its position as the leading po-
litical formation in the country, albeit by a 
small margin and facing severe opposition in 
the face of its major opponent, the Bulgari-
an Socialist Party (BSP). Against this back-
ground, the past year was marked by rising 
tensions among the highest echelons of State 
power. The confrontation between the gov-
ernment and the opposition on the occasion 
of the elections fueled the ongoing conflict 
between President Rumen Radev, initial-
ly backed by BSP, and the other branches 
of government. This conflict peaked at the 
end of 2019 in the context of the highly con-
troversial appointment of a new Prosecutor 
General (PG) – an omnipotent and de facto 
unaccountable institution, inherited from the 
1971 communist Constitution. Decade-long 
international pressure to reform this institu-
tion by introducing an effective mechanism 
for its accountability prompted a heated de-
bate between GERB, the President and the 
new PG about the need for constitutional 
reform in this regard. Following a critical 
report of the Venice Commission, the gov-
ernment proposed the introduction of an in-
dependent prosecutor’s office charged with 
investigating the PG, and eventually request-
ed the Bulgarian Constitutional Court (BCC) 
to deliver on the constitutionality of this 
measure. Before turning to this and the other 
main cases before the BCC in Part III, the 
following section will consider the most sig-
nificant constitutional controversies in 2019, 
which played out in the context of the ap-
pointment of a new Prosecutor General and 
the efforts to end the impunity of this office.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. The appointment of a new PG
In October, Bulgaria’s Supreme Judicial 
Council (SJC), the highest administrative 
body of the judiciary in the country, con-
firmed Ivan Geshev, who was the sole nom-
inee for the post of PG, in a 20 to 4 vote and 
requested the President of the Republic to 
appoint him, in accordance with the proce-
dure-regulated Art 129.2 of the Constitution. 
Geshev’s uncontested nomination for PG 
was met with months-long protests, which 
questioned the lack of competition for one 
of the most powerful posts in the country 
as well as the sole candidate’s integrity and 
independence. Succumbing to this pressure, 
President Radev exercised his prerogative to 
veto the appointment and returned it to the 
SJC for revision. He justified his decision 
with the lack of competition, which, in his 
view, could compromise the ‘prestige and 
legitimacy’ of the PG institution. The SJC, 
however, disregarded the presidential veto 
and repeated its initial vote. This move ce-
mented Geshev’s appointment, since Art 
129.2 binds the President to accept a repeat-
ed proposal from the Council and to inaugu-
rate the nominee within a reasonable time. 
Following this development, many expected 
that Radev would seize the BCC with a re-
quest for an interpretive decision defining 
the constitutional procedure in the case of 
a presidential veto. The main constitutional 
question in this regard was whether the SJC 
may disregard the President’s objection and 
simply reconfirm the challenged candidate, 
as it did in the present case, or whether the 
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nomination procedure or the post should 
be revised in the first place. Eventually, the 
President decided against seizing the BCC, 
arguing that the Constitution already pro-
vides the answer to the question. Indeed, in 
its decision No. 2/2002, the BCC had already 
decided that the SJC has ‘full operational 
independence’ that entitles it, inter alia, to 
reconfirm a nomination irrespective of the 
President’s disapproval in this regard, pursu-
ant to Art 129. 
Following a media request, an incumbent 
constitutional judge anonymously confirmed 
that the Court could speedily deliver a deci-
sion on this matter if seized by the President, 
alluding to a potential declaration of such a 
request as inadmissible ne bis in idem in light 
of the aforementioned decision. However, an 
inadmissibility declaration might have been 
avoided with a carefully worded request for 
the BCC to decide on whether an effective 
appointment by the SJC could take place only 
following a competition that involves more 
than one nominee. This requirement would 
not necessarily compromise the Council’s 
operational independence as it would not 
prevent the latter from (re-)appointing its pre-
ferred candidate. Such condition would, how-
ever, put the onus on the government, which 
has the de facto say as to who gets nominated, 
to ensure a competitive procedure – some-
thing it had not done in the present case. 
Without seizing the BCC, the President con-
curred with the decision of the SJC and Ge-
shev was inaugurated as PG for a mandate 
of seven years in November. Shortly thereaf-
ter, the Bulgarian Parliament appointed Ge-
shev’s predecessor and vocal supporter, So-
tir Tsatsarov, as head of the Commission for 
Combating Corruption and the Withdrawal 
of Illegally Acquired Property (KPKONPI) 
after prematurely dismissing its previous 
director. This maneuvering, which saw the 
tandem Geshev-Tsatsarov top the highest 
repressive offices in the country, raised con-
cerns that it was undertaken to cater to gov-
ernmental interests. These concerns echoed 
the allegations that the office of the PG has 
been using its powers, particularly its control 
over KPKONPI’s specialized criminal juris-
diction for high-level corruption, to target 
functionaries of high political or economic 
powers at odds with the agenda of the gov-
ernment and potential oligarchic structures 
linked to it. 
2. The impunity of the PG
The question of who heads the Bulgarian 
prosecution is especially relevant in light 
of the de facto impunity of the PG, which 
was the second constitutional issue at stake 
in 2019. The lack of accountability of this 
office is rooted in its institutional design, 
which is one of the features that the 1991 
Constitution inherited from the 1971 com-
munist basic law. The latter introduced a PG 
office in Bulgaria modelled after the Procu-
rator General of the USSR. According to Art 
126.2 of the current Constitution, the pros-
ecutorial system in Bulgaria is subjected to 
the de facto unfettered oversight and control 
of the PG, who sits on top of this system. 
This arrangement mirrors the so-called ver-
tical structure of the former Soviet prosecu-
tion. In 2017, the European Commission for 
Democracy through Law of the Council of 
Europe (CoE), known as the Venice Com-
mission, reported that the Bulgarian PG is 
‘essentially immune from criminal prosecu-
tion and […] virtually irremovable by means 
of impeachment for other misconduct’. The 
unaccountable powers of this office are ex-
acerbated though the significant role that it 
plays in the SJC, which, as seen above, is the 
body that effectively appoints the PG. 
The lack of accountability of the PG has been 
under intense international scrutiny since the 
Kolevi v. Bulgaria judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) from 2009 
(1108/02). This case was initiated in 2001 
by Nikolai Kolev, a high-ranking prosecutor 
implicated in a serious conflict with then-
PG Nikola Filchev, when the former chal-
lenged the lack of an effective remedy for 
an independent investigation of the latter’s 
office under Bulgarian law. After Kolev’s 
mysterious assassination in 2002 and Bul-
garia’s failure to investigate the accusations 
of Filchev’s potential involvement in it, the 
Strasbourg court declared that the office of 
the GP is de facto unaccountable ‘as a result 
of the hierarchical structure of the prose-
cution system and, apparently, its internal 
working methods’, according to which ‘no 
prosecutor would issue a decision bringing 
charges against the Chief Public Prosecutor’ 
(para. 205). 
Since this judgment, the structural impunity 
of the PG has been critically addressed on 
multiple occasions by several European bod-
ies, including the Venice Commission and 
the Council of Europe’s Committee of Min-
isters as well as the Commission of the Eu-
ropean Union. The latter’s Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism (CVM) has been 
monitoring Bulgaria’s piecemeal progress 
in the area of the rule of law, judicial inde-
pendence and combatting high-level corrup-
tion since Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in 
2007. All of these bodies have persistently 
reiterated the need for Bulgaria to introduce 
effective accountability mechanisms for 
keeping the PG’s powers in check, even if 
this would imply amending Art 126.2 of the 
Constitution. The Bulgarian government had 
remained oblivious to these demands until 
early 2019, when Minister of Justice Danail 
Kirilov proposed a controversial reform of 
all three top magistracy offices, i.e., the Pres-
idents of the Supreme Administrative Court 
and the Supreme Court of Cassation (the two 
highest appellate bodies in the country) as 
well as the PG.1 To this end, Kirov suggested 
a legislative amendment of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code and the Judicial System Act that 
would allow the SJC to authorise a criminal 
investigation, accompanied by the tempo-
rary suspension from duty of either of these 
three office-holders following a two-thirds 
majority vote of its 25 members. 
The inclusion of the Presidents of the two 
apex courts in this amendment puzzled na-
tional and international observers given that 
the requested reform concerned only the PG. 
The government’s questionable choice of 
means led to allegations that it primarily tar-
geted the President of the Supreme Court of 
1 Under the Bulgarian Constitution, the investigating magistracy is part of the judiciary and the structure of the prosecution corresponds to that of the courts, 
Art 128 and Art 126.1.
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Cassation, Lozan Panov, who has had con-
flicts with the government since 2018, rather 
than at ending the impunity of the PG. In an 
advisory opinion requested by the Ministry 
of Justice, the Venice Commission deemed 
the draft legislation incapable of effectively 
implementing the desired reform of the PG’s 
Office. On 9 December, the Commission 
urged the government to ‘abandon the idea 
of extending the suspension mechanism to 
the two chief judges’ (para 47) and focus on 
comprehensive reform, potentially including 
a constitutional amendment (paras 48, 70). 
It issued five concrete, and not mutually 
exclusive, recommendations on how such a 
reform could be achieved (para 68). These 
recommendations echoed the findings of an 
Interim Resolution, adopted by the Council 
of Europe’s Committee of Ministers on 5 
December, which addressed the execution of 
the Kolevi v Bulgaria judgment.
Following this advisory opinion, the Bulgari-
an government announced its intention to in-
troduce, by means of ordinary legislation, the 
office of an ‘independent prosecutor’ tasked 
with investigating the potential misconduct 
of the PG. Such an office, the establishment 
of which was one of the recommendations of 
the Venice Commission, would be appointed 
for a term of seven years from a two-thirds 
majority of the Prosecutorial College of the 
SJC. This appointment procedure, however, 
puts the actual independence of this office 
in question, given the de facto superiority 
of the PG within this college. Moreover, ac-
cording to the government’s proposal, this 
new institution would occupy a specially 
designated inspectorate within the Supreme 
Prosecutor’s Office of Cassation. This insti-
tution, however, is also subordinated to the 
oversight of the PG pursuant to Art 126.2. 
Therefore, while seemingly concurring with 
at least one of the recommendations of the 
Venice Commission, there remain serious 
doubts as to the willingness of the govern-
ment to effectively put an end to the impu-
nity of the PG. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In 2019, the Constitutional Court heard 15 
cases and delivered eight decisions. Four of 
these decisions concerned cases that were 
brought in 2018. Eight cases from 2019 are 
currently still pending before the CC.  
1. Case No. 15/2019: The constitutionality of 
an independent prosecutor’s office
In this case, the Council of Ministers (CoM) 
requested the BCC to provide a binding in-
terpretation of Art 126.2, which establishes 
the hierarchical structure of the prosecution 
system and subjects it to the ‘oversight’ and 
‘guidance’ of the PG at its pinnacle. This re-
quest was effectively aimed at establishing 
whether the introduction of the aforemen-
tioned office of an independent prosecutor 
would be constitutional or not. The CoM 
argued that only an organ that is part of the 
prosecution should be able to investigate 
the PG since any other arrangement would 
jeopardise the constitutionally protected in-
dependence of the judiciary and that of the 
prosecution as part thereof (Art 117.2 in 
conjunction with Art 128). Moreover, the 
Council claimed that an independent office 
charged with investigating the PG could be 
introduced without a constitutional amend-
ment since Art 126.2 does not establish an 
‘absolute monopoly’ of the PG and there-
fore does not prohibit another prosecutor 
from investigating his or her conduct with-
out conflict of interests. The request focuses 
exclusively on the constitutional text and its 
historical interpretation, arguing that the PG 
is not unaccountable by virtue of the institu-
tional design of his or her office de jure. 
This position of the government, albeit not 
surprising, is oblivious at best, and intention-
ally ignorant at worst, of the critique con-
cerning the de facto impunity of the PG due 
to the structural issues outlined in the previ-
ous section. Moreover, it is questionable to 
what extent an independent prosecutor’s of-
fice can be introduced without changing the 
Constitution, as intended by the government. 
In light of the BCC’s decision No. 3/2003, 
such reform might require the approval of a 
Grand National Assembly (GAS), which is 
elected following a cumbersome procedure 
after the dismissal of the current Parliament 
(see Article 161). In this decision, the Court 
argued for a broad interpretation of Art 158.3 
of the Constitution, which stipulates that any 
changes in the form of State structure or the 
form of government are to be undertaken 
by a GNA rather than a regular one. In the 
Court’s view, a broad definition of what con-
stitutes the form of State structure encom-
passes, inter alia, the judicial system, which, 
as seen, includes the prosecution. Therefore, 
in the present case, the Court might find that 
the reform proposed by the government falls 
under the scope of this broad definition and 
can thus be achieved only after reaching the 
high threshold of a two-thirds majority in a 
constituent GNA, pursuant to Art. 157. Such 
an outcome, however, is in light of a later 
decision (No. 8/2005), according to which 
not all structural and organisational changes 
within the judicial system necessarily con-
cern the form of State structure. Moreover, 
narrowing down the ambit of decision No. 
3/2003 should be possible with the argument 
that it simply lists the independence of the 
judiciary as one of the peremptory elements 
of State structure but does not explicitly de-
fine how these elements ought to be organ-
ised internally. 
Finally, it must be noted that a special inspec-
torate within the Supreme Prosecutor’s Of-
fice of Cassation already operated between 
2006 and 2013. The main function of this 
agency, which was introduced via ordinary 
legislation, was to investigate allegations of 
misconduct of ordinary prosecutors (not the 
PG). This inspectorate, however, was direct-
ly overseen by the PG and dismissed in early 
2013 by Geshev’s predecessor, Sotir Tsats-
rov, shortly after his inauguration. This is yet 
another instance which casts serious doubts 
on the effectiveness of the government’s idea 
for an independent prosecutor, regardless of 
whether it can be implemented by means 
2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 49
of ordinary or constitutional legislation. In 
light of the cited jurisprudence of the BCC, 
however, a comprehensive reform of Art 
126.2 would likely require a constitutional 
amendment or even a new Grand National 
Assembly. At the end of 2019, the President 
initiated consultations on a potential consti-
tutional reform in this regard, but both the 
government and the opposition have since 
rejected this possibility. 
2. Decision No. 2/2019 (case No. 2/2018): 
The Panov-amendment
In this case of abstract judicial review, the 
Supreme Court of Cassation (SCC) chal-
lenged the constitutionality of an amend-
ment in the Law on Judicial Power, which 
stipulates that the respective colleges of the 
Supreme Judicial Council may, and in cer-
tain circumstances are obliged to, temporar-
ily suspend from duty a judge, a prosecutor 
or an investigator who is facing criminal 
charges. This challenge was initiated by the 
President of the SCC, Lozan Panov, who has 
been implicated in an ongoing conflict with 
the government due to criticizing it for sys-
tematically undermining the independence 
of the judiciary and the rule of law. This con-
flict escalated at the end of 2018 when Pan-
ov, exercising his competence in Art 114.9 of 
the Law on the Judiciary, ordered an inquiry 
into alleged administrative malpractice by 
the Specialized Criminal Court of Appeal. 
Shortly thereafter, the Judicial College of 
the SJC launched an impeachment inquiry 
against Panov pursuant to Art 129.3.5 of the 
Constitution on the ground of him undermin-
ing the reputation of the judicial system and 
thus compromising its independence. 
These developments raised concerns that 
the legislation challenged in this case, nick-
named ‘the Panov-amendment’, was aimed 
at his immediate suspension from office in 
the case of a potential criminal investigation 
resulting from the process of his impeach-
ment. In its decision, the BCC found that the 
challenged provision pursues the legitimate 
aim of protecting the ‘specific authority’, 
i.e., the prestige of the judiciary (protected 
in Arts 117, 118 and 120.1 in conjunction 
with Art 4.1 of the Constitution), rather than 
the integrity of the criminal process. Not-
withstanding this legitimate aim, however, 
the Court decided that a provision that binds 
the SJC to suspend a magistrate deprives the 
Council of its discretionary power. This was 
seen as a violation of the principle of judicial 
independence, which the SJC is tasked with 
protecting by choosing whether to temporar-
ily suspend from duty magistrates implicat-
ed in criminal proceedings or not. Therefore, 
the challenge was partially successful and 
reinstated full discretionary powers of the 
SJC to decide whether to suspend an accused 
magistrate or not. Four of the 12 judges dis-
sented, arguing that the measure of grant-
ing to the SJC full discretion in this regard 
is disproportionate to the legitimate aim of 
protecting the judiciary, and stipulated that 
this should be possible only under a limited 
number of circumstances precisely defined 
by the legislator. Shortly after this decision, 
the SJC decided that Panov had not violat-
ed his duties, and ended the process of his 
impeachment. In October, however, 10 of 
the 14 members of the Council’s Judicial 
College informally requested Panov’s res-
ignation on the occasion of another conflict 
between him and the Executive. It remains 
to be seen whether this will lead to another 
impeachment procedure for the judge. 
3. Decision No. 8/2019 (case No. 4/2019): 
The constitutionality of GDPR 
In another case of abstract review, 55 MPs 
challenged a provision in the Personal Data 
Protection Act (PDPA), which introduced 
certain criteria for deciding whether journal-
ists have sufficiently protected personal data 
when accessing and disseminating infor-
mation in the public interest. This law was 
adopted in order to facilitate the implemen-
tation of the General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR) of the EU (Reg 2016/679). 
Several provisions of the Act were vetoed 
by President Radev but nevertheless pro-
mulgated after the Parliament exercised their 
prerogative to overrule the President’s veto 
(Art 101.3). This led the opposition MPs of 
the BSP, backed by the President, to seize 
the BCC, claiming that the concerned leg-
islation introduced too vague criteria, which 
restrict the access of journalists to publicly 
relevant information in violation of, inter 
alia, the freedom of expression and its de-
rivatives (Arts 39-41) as well as the corre-
sponding provisions in international and 
European human rights instruments. The 
deputies argued that the PDPA requires the 
balancing between two sets of equally pro-
tected principles – the freedom of speech on 
one side and the privacy of personal data on 
the other. They claimed, however, that the 
Act prioritizes the latter by stipulating that 
the protection of personal data is the norm 
while the freedom to access information is 
the exception, which requires justification 
under the aforementioned vague criteria. The 
legislator had therefore established a hierar-
chical relationship in favour of the privacy 
of personal data, which the claimants saw 
as disproportionate and even amounting to 
censorship, prohibited by the Constitution in 
Art 40.1. 
In an eight-to-four vote, the BCC decided 
that the challenged provision was uncon-
stitutional. It noted that the protection of 
personal data, unlike the freedom of speech 
and its derivative, is not explicitly protected 
under the human rights catalogue of the Bul-
garian Constitution. The Court also invoked 
international conventions, to which Bulgaria 
is a party, as well as the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU and the ECtHR, according to which 
these two sets of interests must be balanced 
very carefully and without automatically pri-
oritising one over the other. The BCC found 
that the criteria outlined by the PDPA were 
indeed too ambiguous and that they entrust 
upon the Commission for Data Protection 
‘unpredictable power to interpret [them] not 
necessarily in the public interest demanding 
pluralistic information about the policies and 
activities of the government’. In the judges’ 
view, this provision could, therefore, lead to 
hidden forms of censorship, such as self-cen-
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sorship by the media, and jeopardise the con-
stitutionally protected right to free dissemi-
nation of and access to information.
4. Further cases 
Two further successful constitutionality chal-
lenges concerned amendments in the Corpo-
rate Tax Act, which were passed in 2018 de-
spite a presidential veto. In the first decision 
(No. 7/2019), the Court struck down a pro-
vision that allowed senior Customs Agency 
employees to be fired with no prior notice 
by the agency’s director and without the op-
tion of a judicial appeal. The Court found 
that this provision’s ambiguity with regard 
to the criteria for dismissal could be misused 
to facilitate political interference in the work 
of the agency. The second challenged provi-
sion imposed a higher tax rate on properties 
in resort areas, targeting owners who avoid 
taxation by renting out their properties with-
out registering under the Tourism Act. The 
Court found that this provision would allow 
the Executive to amend taxation levels by 
exercising its competence to designate areas 
as resorts, thus violating the constitutionally 
protected prerogative of the Legislator of be-
ing the only body allowed to make changes 
in taxation (decision No. 4/2019). 
After another unsuccessful veto, President 
Radev also challenged a set of amendments 
to the State Property Act, aimed at facilitating 
the expropriation of land for major infrastruc-
ture projects of ‘nationally-significant’ inter-
est. The challenge was partially successful 
(decision No. 9/2019) since the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of most of these amend-
ments but invalidated the provision regulating 
the compensation for such expropriation for 
being too vague and therefore prone to incon-
sistent interpretation and application. 
The offices of the President and the Om-
budsperson brought another successful chal-
lenge (decision No. 3/2019) by independent-
ly attacking the same provision in the 2019 
Budget Act, which prevented civil servants 
from holding positions in the State admin-
istration once they have claimed their pen-
sion. The Court decided that that the govern-
ment’s aim to open public posts to ‘young 
highly-qualified candidates’ through such 
a mandatory retirement did not constitute a 
sufficiently ‘constitutionally-significant in-
terest’ and therefore found a violation of the 
rule of law and the social state provisions of 
the Constitution.
The last case under consideration concerns 
the Ombudsperson’s challenge of a provision 
in the Electoral Code regulating the compe-
tences of the Central Electoral Commission. 
It stipulates that only 18 of the exclusively 
enumerated 49 types of administrative acts, 
which the Commission may undertake when 
exercising its mandate to conduct and super-
vise nationwide elections, can be challenged 
before a court. The Ombudsperson argued 
that this effectively deprives individuals, 
whose constitutional rights might be affected 
by the types of acts that cannot be judicially 
reviewed, from their constitutionally guaran-
teed right to seek protection against such vi-
olation. The challenge failed since the Court 
did not reach the majority of seven votes 
required in Art 151.1 (decision No. 6/2019). 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
2020 promises to be eventful from a consti-
tutional perspective. The conflict among the 
top branches of the government reached new 
heights already in January after the newly 
inaugurated PG requested the BCC to inter-
pret what constitutes ‘high treason’ by the 
President, which Art 103 of the Constitu-
tion foresees as an exception to the immu-
nity of this office. Simultaneously, the PG 
publicly released potentially incriminating 
wiretaps against the President, alluding to 
high-level corruption and a forthcoming 
criminal investigation. This move, the legal-
ity of which was questioned on due process 
grounds, prompted Radev to lose confidence 
in the government. Another highly anticipat-
ed interpretive decision of the Court due in 
2020 concerns the aforementioned case No. 
15/20119 regarding the scope of Art 126.2 
and the constitutionality of the office of an 
‘independent prosecutor’. 2020 will also 
show whether the European Commission 
will cease monitoring Bulgaria under the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, as 
announced in its overall positive report on 
Bulgaria’s progress from last October (see 
Further Reading below), or whether it will 
require further reforms of the PG’s Office 
in light of the critical opinion of the Venice 
Commission. Another interesting develop-
ment to follow is whether Lozan Panov will 
survive another year as President of the SCC.
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I. INTRODUCTION
2019 saw Prime Minister Justin Trudeau 
complete his first term in office embroiled in 
several major political-turned-constitutional 
dossiers that caused the Liberal Party to lose 
its majority in the Commons at the fall gen-
eral election. Among them were the nation-
alized Trans Mountain Pipeline expansion 
project from Alberta to the Pacific Coast, the 
imposition of a nationwide carbon pricing 
system and the Prime Minister’s exercise of 
unlawful influence on his Attorney General 
in the prosecution of an international brib-
ery and corruption case of Libyan officials.1 
A month before the dissolution of Parlia-
ment, the government succeeded in filling a 
Supreme Court of Canada vacancy with the 
appointment of Justice Nicholas Kasirer, an 
appellate judge from Québec and a former 
civil law professor. 
Except in criminal procedure, the Supreme 
Court decided fewer constitutional cases in 
2019 than in previous years. The three se-
lected for this report deal with the following 
questions: (i) the right to vote of long-term 
non-resident citizens in federal elections; 
(ii) the concurrent application of provincial 
environmental protection laws and federal 
bankruptcy laws to spent oil and gas sites; 
and (iii) the availability of habeas corpus 
to federal immigration detainees. However, 
probably the most constitutionally significant 
development of the year originates from the 
enactment of An Act Respecting the Laicity 
of the State, in which the government of the 
province of Québec decided to invoke the fa-
mous ‘notwithstanding clause’ of the Canadi-
an Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The ensu-
ing legal challenges to the Laicity Act added 
to a number of highly politicized cases that 
have been working their way up to the Su-
preme Court (or are already pending), giving 
the nine justices opportunities to revisit and 
reshape important parts of the Constitution 
and Canadian policy in the near future. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The Return of the ‘Notwithstanding 
Clause(s)’
The result of a last-minute political com-
promise in 1981 between the federal gov-
ernment and some provinces as a condition 
for adopting a constitutional bill of rights, s. 
33 of the Canadian Charter allows the fed-
eral Parliament or a provincial legislature 
to include an override in an act stating ‘that 
the Act or a provision thereof shall operate 
notwithstanding’ the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed in ss. 2 or 7 to 15 of the Char-
ter. Except for the omnibus override law 
passed by the Québec provincial legislature2 
to protest the adoption of the Constitution 
Act 1982 without its consent, use of the 
notwithstanding clause has been rare. Only 
fewer than two dozen instances have been 
reported to date, mainly originating from 
Québec.3 However, after a hiatus of over a 
decade, resort to the notwithstanding clause 
(and equivalent clauses in provincial human 
rights legislation) seems to have picked up. 
CANADA
1 See Office of the Conflicts of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, Trudeau II Report (2019).
2 Act respecting the Constitution Act 1982.
3 See PW Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th edn Carswell, 2007), 39-2-39-4 (looseleaf edn).
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In 2018, Saskatchewan enacted an override 
provision.4 Later in the year, Ontario tabled a 
bill that also included an override.5 
On June 16, 2019, the Québec Legislature 
again used the notwithstanding clause (as 
well as the corresponding clause of the Qué-
bec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms) 
in passing the Laicity Act, the main purpose 
of which is to prohibit public sector em-
ployees ‘in a position of authority’,6 such as 
lawyers, police officers and school teachers, 
‘from wearing religious symbols in the exer-
cise of their functions’ (s. 6). The Act stems 
from a long-standing anxiety manifested in 
many parts of the population about the per-
ceived increasing place taken by non-Chris-
tian religions in the public space, and more 
generally, from a fear by many Québecers of 
French-Canadian ancestry of the perceived 
threat from ethno-cultural diversity to their 
identity and values.7 In 2008, a Québec gov-
ernmental commission had already recom-
mended that judges, Crown prosecutors and 
law enforcement officers be prohibited from 
wearing religious signs.8 In 2013-14, the mi-
nority government of the Parti Québécois, a 
secessionist party, attempted to enact the ban 
on religious symbols9 but was prevented from 
carrying the bill through the legislature after it 
called and lost a snap election. 
Shortly after its enactment, the Laicity Act be-
came the subject of four separate lawsuits by 
a labour union federation, an English public 
school board, a civic organization and civil 
rights groups. In Hak v Québec,10 a Québec 
Superior Court judge dismissed the appel-
lants’ application for a provisional stay of the 
ban on religious symbols and the requirement 
that public sector employees exercise their 
functions with their faces uncovered. On 
appeal, the appellants submitted a new argu-
ment, namely that the impugned provisions 
violated a rarely used gender equality clause 
in the Charter that is out of reach of the not-
withstanding clause. By a 2.1 majority deci-
sion, the Court of Appeal upheld the Superior 
Court decision.11 The appellants have now 
sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court 
on the stay application. When the laicity cas-
es finally proceed on the merits, they will be 
the first Charter challenges involving the not-
withstanding clause in more than 30 years. 
The courts’ anticipated interpretation of the 
notwithstanding clause could well have di-
rect bearing on yet another intended use of 
the clause in New Brunswick. Following an 
outbreak of measles in a high school during 
the spring of 2019, the province’s minori-
ty government introduced a bill that would 
require all children of school age to receive 
immunization for prescribed diseases. It later 
decided to insert a notwithstanding clause12 
in order to pre-empt Charter challenges by 
anti-vaccination groups and parents. 
The recent intended and actual uses of not-
withstanding clauses, along with a resur-
gence of minority governments across the 
country (federal, British Columbia, New 
Brunswick, Newfoundland, Prince Edward 
Island), can be interpreted as signs that Can-
ada has not escaped from the current global 
divisiveness and polarization, in many de-
mocracies over public issues. A similar trend 
can also be observed at the Supreme Court. 
From a low of 21% in 2014, the proportion 
of split decisions has steadily increased to 
a high of 52% in 2018.13 In fact, 2017 and 
2018 have seen the highest number of split 
decisions since at least the turn of the cen-
tury.14 The most significant 2019 Supreme 
Court constitutional cases reported below 
follow the same trend.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Frank v Canada (AG): Long-Term 
Non-Resident Citizens’ Right to Vote
Section 3 of the Canadian Charter states that 
‘Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote 
in an election of members of the House of 
Commons.’ In Frank, two Canadian citizens 
residing in the United States claimed that s. 
11(d) of the Canadian Elections Act, which 
rendered citizens abroad ineligible to vote 
in federal elections if they had been absent 
from the country for more than five years, 
violated their right to vote under the Charter. 
By the time the case reached the Supreme 
Court, the government had conceded that the 
five-year residency condition was a breach 
of s. 3. As a result, the debate focused solely 
on whether it was a justifiable limit under the 
savings clause of s. 1 of the Charter. After 
the appeal was heard but a few weeks before 
the Court announced its judgment, Parlia-
ment repealed s. 11 of the Act.15  
4 The School Choice Protection Act 2018, s 2.2. 
5 In September 2018, the Ontario government introduced Bill 31, Efficient Local Government Act, 2018, to circumvent the effect of a Superior Court judgment in 
which a provincial statute reducing the number of Toronto City wards and councillors from 47 to 25 was declared a violation of the candidates’ and voters’ Charter 
right to freedom of expression. The government decided not to enact the bill when, a week later, the Court of Appeal stayed the Superior Court decision, thus 
allowing the city elections to proceed under the 25-ward structure. 
6 Minister of Immigration, Diversity and Inclusion and Government House Leader, ‘Le projet de loi no 21 sur la laïcité de l’État est adopté – Une loi historique pour le 
Québec’ (Government of Québec, 17 June 2019) <https://perma.cc/2UR5-MRHE>
7 G Bouchard and C Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation (Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences 
2008) 18.
8  Ibid 271.
9 See Bill 60, Charter Affirming the Values of State Secularism and Religious Neutrality and of Equality between Women and Men, and Providing a Framework for 
Accommodation Requests (2013).
10 Hak v Québec (AG), 2019 QCCS 2989.
11 Hak v Québec (AG), 2019 QCCA 2145.
12 Bill 11, An Act Respecting Proof of Immunization (2019).
13 Supreme Court of Canada, 2018 Year in Review (2019), 15 <https://perma.cc/93VM-ZL3U> 
14 Ibid; Supreme Court of Canada, Statistics 2000-2010 (2011), 9 <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/csc-scc/JU7-3-2010-eng.pdf> 
15 Elections Modernization Act 2018, s 7.
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Delivering the majority judgment of the 
Court, Wagner CJ found that the govern-
ment had not established that the five-year 
requirement was a reasonable limit on Ca-
nadians’ right to vote. More specifically, in 
the view of the majority justices, the require-
ment failed both at the minimal impairment 
and proportionality stages of the s. 1 test. 
Absent any serious explanation on the part 
of the government, Wagner CJ considered 
the five-year limit to be overbroad and not 
carefully tailored to achieve Parliament’s 
objective of preserving the fairness of the 
Canadian electoral system and ensuring that 
voters maintain a sufficient connection with 
Canada. For the government, that connection 
was manifested in citizens’ commitment to 
the country and their subjection to Canadi-
an laws. Wagner CJ opined that, in itself, 
long-term residency was not determinative 
of the extent of a citizen’s commitment to 
Canada. Neither could residents’ subjection 
to Canadian laws be considered an appro-
priate measuring stick of a citizen’s connec-
tion, as diplomats, soldiers and other public 
sector employees posted abroad and their 
dependents accompanying them (as well as 
short-term non-resident citizens) should also 
be disenfranchised; however, these citizens 
living abroad are eligible voters under the 
law. Moreover, Wagner CJ gave little weight 
to the existence of residency requirements 
in electoral laws of other Westminster de-
mocracies, preferring the view that Canada 
was ‘an international leader’ in respect of 
universal enfranchisement. At the final pro-
portionality stage, Wagner CJ opined that 
‘any salutary effects of ensuring electoral 
fairness, as asserted by the government, are 
clearly outweighed by the deleterious effects 
of disenfranchising well over one million 
non-resident Canadians who are abroad for 
five years or more’ (para 77). According to 
Wagner CJ, the government had failed to 
demonstrate ‘how the fairness of the elec-
toral system is enhanced when long-term 
non-resident citizens are denied the right to 
vote’ (para 78). Therefore, the majority of 
the Court concluded that the five-year resi-
dency requirement was unconstitutional. 
In a concurring judgment, Rowe J argued that 
there was a rational connection between the 
residency requirement and electoral fairness 
as it was reasonable to believe that long-term 
non-residents are less connected to Canada 
and are less affected by Canadian laws than 
residents. However, he agreed with the ma-
jority justices that the government had failed 
to demonstrate that the salutary effects of the 
five-year requirement outweighed its deleteri-
ous effects of denying long-term non-resident 
citizens the right to vote. In reaching that con-
clusion, Rowe J gave weight to the fact that 
the electoral impact of that category of voters 
was negligible, as suggested by the number of 
international ballots cast in the 2011 election, 
which ranged between 0.05% to 0.2% of total 
registered electors in a constituency.
Côté and Brown JJ filed a lengthy dissent in 
which they argued that the Act’s impugned 
residency requirement struck an acceptable 
balance between citizens’ right to vote and 
the objective of ensuring that voters main-
tain ‘a relationship of some currency to their 
communities’. For the dissenting justices, 
support for the centrality of geographical 
representation and, more generally, the rea-
sonability of Parliament’s choice could be 
found in eligibility requirements based on 
residency in other Westminster democracies, 
in particular New Zealand, Australia and the 
UK. Moreover, the deleterious effects of the 
limit on the right to vote were tempered by 
the fact that long-term non-resident Cana-
dians could regain their right to vote imme-
diately upon their return to Canada. There-
fore, in the view of the dissenting justices, 
the temporary denial of the right to vote was 
outweighed by the Act’s ‘salutary effects of 
preserving the integrity of Canada’s geo-
graphically based electoral system and up-
holding a democratically enacted conception 
of the scope of the right to vote in Canada’ 
(para 172).
2. Orphan Well Association v Grant Thorn-
ton Ltd: Competing Application of Federal 
Bankruptcy Laws and Provincial Environ-
mental Protection Laws to the Disposal of 
Spent Oil and Gas Sites
Led by the province of Alberta, Canada has 
risen to become the world’s fifth largest 
producer of oil and gas. While the coun-
try’s economy has greatly benefited from 
these natural resources, their intensive ex-
ploitation has come at a significant cost to 
the environment. According to the govern-
ment of Alberta, an estimated 176,000 oil 
and gas wells were in operation on its ter-
ritory in 2019, but an equal number were 
inactive or permanently dismantled.16 In a 
November 2018 statement, the Alberta En-
ergy Regulator calculated that total liability 
cost to clean up all the decommissioned oil 
and gas sites in the province would amount 
to C$58.65B.17 Not all oil and gas sites that 
have ceased their activities have been safe-
ly closed and restored to their prior condi-
tion. As of 2019, there were approximately 
10,000 of these ‘orphan’ wells, pipelines and 
other sites across the province, which had no 
legally responsible party financially able to 
decommission them properly.18 When an oil 
and gas site turns orphan, the Regulator and 
its agent, the Orphan Well Association, are 
empowered under provincial law to enforce 
the end-of-life obligations of the company 
owners of the orphan sites. 
In 2015, Redwater Energy Corp, a publicly 
traded oil and gas company with its princi-
pal activities and assets in Alberta, went into 
receivership. At the time, the company was 
the owner of 127 oil and gas assets but only 
19 wells and facilities were still producing; 
the remaining ones had become inactive or 
spent. By the summer of 2015, the receiver 
for Redwater, Grant Thornton Ltd, had come 
to the conclusion that the cost of execut-
ing the end-of-life obligations for the spent 
wells would exceed the sale proceeds of the 
productive wells. Therefore, it informed the 
16 Government of Alberta, ‘Upstream oil and gas liability and orphan well inventory’ (2019) <https://perma.cc/2J67-MJGB> 
17 Alberta Energy Regulator, ‘Public Statement’ (1 November 2018) <https://perma.cc/3FDC-E2T2> 
18 Orphan Well Association, ‘Orphan Inventory’ (1 November 2019) <https://perma.cc/V34M-UQ3Z>
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Regulator that it was taking possession of 
the productive sites and renounced the rest 
of Redwater’s assets, including their associ-
ated end-of-life obligations. The Regulator 
countered by ordering the receiver (who was 
appointed trustee upon Redwater’s bank-
ruptcy) to fulfill all of the company’s end-
of-life obligations up to the value of the re-
maining assets in the Redwater estate. Grant 
Thornton opposed the Regulator’s order by 
invoking the federal Bankruptcy and Insol-
vency Act (BIA) and the doctrine of feder-
al paramountcy over provincial laws. More 
specifically, Grant Thornton argued that the 
provincial regulatory scheme, as applied in 
this case, conflicted with s. 16.06(4) of the 
BIA, which provides that ‘notwithstanding 
anything in any federal or provincial law’, 
the trustee is not personally liable for failure 
to comply with an order to remedy an envi-
ronmental condition or damage if the trustee 
disclaims any interest or right in the property 
affected by the condition or damage.
The outcome of the case hung on the in-
terpretation of s. 16.06(4) and the extent 
to which the Supreme Court justices could 
reconcile the federal rules with the provin-
cial regulatory scheme. In a 5.2 majority 
judgment, Wagner CJ found that there was 
no conflict between the provincial scheme 
and s. 16.06(4), which was concerned with 
limiting the personal liability of the trustee 
upon disclaimer of the assets. It did not al-
low the bankrupt estate to avoid liability for 
its end-of-life obligations vis-à-vis the dis-
claimed assets. Moreover, the majority of the 
Court stated that, in seeking to accomplish 
a public duty for the benefit of citizens, the 
Regulator could not be considered a creditor, 
and that the performance of the end-of-life 
obligations was too uncertain to be subject 
to adequate determination and valuation. 
Therefore, those obligations stood outside 
the priority scheme established by the BIA. 
In another lengthy dissent, Côté J (Moldav-
er J concurring) disagreed with the majority 
justices’ finding of absence of conflict be-
tween the BIA and the provincial scheme. 
In her view, the latter prevented the trustee 
from exercising its right to disclaim selected 
assets of the bankrupt estate and sell the es-
tate’s productive assets for the benefit of its 
creditors. Côté J also asserted that the Regu-
lator should be considered as a creditor with 
a provable claim in bankruptcy against Red-
water, namely the costs that will be incurred 
to remedy the environmental damage caused 
by Redwater. 
In the end, the constitutional significance of 
the case may be second to its practical conse-
quences. With sustained low oil prices on the 
international markets, the Canadian oil and 
gas industry will continue to have its share of 
struggles. For the first three quarters of 2019, 
the Office of the Superintendent of Bank-
ruptcy Canada has reported five more oil and 
gas company bankruptcies, including four in 
Alberta.19 It remains to be seen whether the 
Supreme Court’s ruling applying a ‘polluter 
pays’ principle will bring the industry to bear 
a greater share of the burden of cleaning up 
its spent sites or cause oil and gas companies 
and their creditors to adjust their business-
es in a way that will end up turning up even 
more orphan sites. 
3. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness) v Chhina: Federal Detain-
ee’s Right to File for Habeas Corpus in 
Provincial Superior Courts
The central place in Canada’s judiciary has 
traditionally been occupied by the provin-
cial superior courts, considered to be the 
descendants of the English central royal 
courts.20 Over time, Parliament granted 
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction on an 
increasing number of matters to federal 
statutory courts. Inevitably, the creation 
and expansion of a parallel federal judicial 
system alongside and partly overlapping 
provincial courts has generated an import-
ant volume of jurisdictional litigation. 
In Chhina, the appellant, a convicted crim-
inal, was detained by federal immigration 
authorities in a maximum security facility 
that kept inmates on lockdown 22½ hours a 
day. In accordance with the federal Immigra-
tion and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the 
Immigration and Refugee Board reviewed 
the detention on a monthly basis, each time 
maintaining it. Approximately six months 
into his detention, the appellant applied for 
habeas corpus – a right guaranteed by the 
Canadian Charter – in the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench rather than by way of judicial 
review in the Federal Court.21 The chambers 
judge declined jurisdiction to consider the 
application on the grounds that the IRPA has 
put in place ‘a complete, comprehensive and 
expert statutory scheme which provides for a 
review at least as broad as that available by 
way of habeas corpus and no less advanta-
geous’(para 2). The decision was overturned 
on appeal. By the time the case reached the 
Supreme Court, the detainee was deported to 
Pakistan. Nevertheless, the Court agreed to 
hear the appeal.
In her majority judgment, Karakatsanis J ruled 
that the IRPA ‘does not provide for review as 
broad and advantageous as habeas corpus 
where the applicant alleges their immigration 
detention is unlawful on the grounds that it is 
lengthy and of uncertain duration’ (para 59). In 
detention review under the IRPA, the govern-
ment need only make out a prima facie case 
for continued detention and is not required to 
explain or justify the length and duration of 
the detention. Then, on judicial review, the 
onus lies on the applicant to establish that the 
Immigration and Refugee Board’s decision is 
unreasonable. By contrast, in a habeas corpus 
application hearing, the onus is on the gov-
ernment to justify the legality of the detention 
in any respect (once the applicant has raised a 
legitimate ground). In Karakatsanis J’s view, 
the remedies available under the IRPA were 
also less advantageous than those available 
to an application for habeas corpus. Leave is 
required for judicial review of a detention de-
19 Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, ‘Business Bankruptcy and Business Proposal Statistics by the North American Industry Classification Sys-
tem by Province’ (January 1 to September 30, 2019) <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/h_br01011.html> 
20 WR Lederman, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary [2]’ (1956), 34 CBR 1139, 1160, 1165-68. 
21 Under the Federal Courts Act, the Federal Court has no authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus except ‘in relation to any member of the Canadian Forces 
serving outside Canada’ (s. 18(2)). 
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cision and, if the application is successful, the 
judge will generally return the parties before 
the Board for a rehearing. By contrast, ‘[t]he 
writ of habeas corpus is not a discretionary 
remedy; it issues as of right’ if the government 
has failed to justify the deprivation of liberty 
(paras 18, 65). Release of the applicant is then 
ordered immediately. 
In her dissenting judgment, Abella J argued 
that, properly interpreted, the IRPA scheme 
for the review of immigration detention al-
lows for at least the same substantive assess-
ment as undertaken on habeas corpus review 
and offers a remedy to detainees that is as ad-
vantageous as review by way of habeas cor-
pus. Whereas the detainee applying for ha-
beas corpus must raise a legitimate ground 
upon which to question the lawfulness of the 
detention, the IRPA provides that the govern-
ment bears the onus throughout of justifying 
the detention before the Board. The individ-
ual applying for habeas corpus who is able 
to show a legitimate ground would also meet 
the requirement for leave to apply for judi-
cial review before the Federal Court. More 
generally, Abella J underlined the fact that 
the IRPA scheme and its application must 
comply with the Charter.
In 2021, the Federal Courts will celebrate 
the fiftieth anniversary of their creation since 
succeeding their predecessor, the Exchequer 
Court of Canada. Despite the Federal Courts’ 
long-standing existence, Chhina illustrates a 
continuing preference of some parties (oth-
er than the federal government) to take pro-
ceedings before provincial superior courts 
instead of the Federal Court. Historical, legal 
and practical reasons, including the Federal 
Courts’ narrower jurisdiction compared to 
that of their provincial counterparts as well 
as counsel’s greater familiarity with provin-
cial courts, explain the legal community’s 
strong attachment to the provincial court 
system, especially for matters of individual 
rights and freedoms. In this regard, the place 
of Federal Courts in the Canadian judicial 
system differs from that of the US federal ju-
diciary, where, incidentally, its district judg-
es have authority to issue the ‘Great Writ of 
Liberty’. The provincial superior court’s re-
tention of the (near) sole jurisdiction to grant 
habeas corpus is another reminder of the 
generally accepted view that, in Canada, it 
is ‘the only court of general jurisdiction and 
as such is the centre of the judicial system’.22 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
There is no shortage of highly anticipated 
decisions that will be heard or decided in the 
coming months or year. Possibly at the top 
of the legal and political agenda is the March 
hearing of the constitutionality of the fed-
eral carbon tax system, which will give the 
Supreme Court a rare opportunity to revisit 
its four-decade-old landmark precedent on 
Parliament’s general power ‘to make Laws 
for the Peace, Order and good Government 
of Canada’. While the Court cleared a major 
roadblock for the C$4.5B Trans Mountain 
Pipeline project in January 2020 by unani-
mously ruling that it could not be subject 
to a discretionary provincial permit scheme 
on oil transportation,23 several related cases 
against the government are pending, in par-
ticular concerning the Crown’s duty to con-
sult with the Indigenous peoples whose rights 
are adversely affected by the project. At the 
lower court level, the challenges of Québec’s 
Laicity Act have the potential to break new 
constitutional ground in several areas in ad-
dition to the notwithstanding clause, includ-
ing Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
criminal law. In this respect, the Supreme 
Court may well have an early say on the out-
come of those cases in an upcoming decision 
on the constitutionality of a federal statute 
that prohibits communication of a person’s 
genetic test results without that person’s con-
sent.24 Finally, among the possible upcoming 
constitutional developments is a curious case 
about the validity of Parliament’s consent to 
(and, indirectly, the constitutionality in con-
ventional terms of) the changes to the rules 
of succession to the Crown enacted by the 
UK Parliament in 2013.25  
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I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this report is to present the polit-
ical, legislative, jurisprudential and doctrinal 
evolution of Cape Verdean (CV) Constitu-
tional Law in 2019. The state of the liberal 
democracy kept stable, at least according 
to major international indices1 and percep-
tions on the ground. Thus, no major political 
frictions are noticeable, with the exception 
of a continuous internal rift in the main op-
position party. Furthermore, the legislative 
agenda led to the approval of relevant acts, 
and the Constitutional Court of Cape Verde 
(CCCV) delivered important opinions and 
almost doubled the number of its decisions 
in comparison with 2018. Even at the doc-
trinal level, more scholarship works were 
published on political and constitutional 
matters.2 The conclusion is that there was not 
any substantive change to the constitutional 
system.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The year began with a political setback for 
the Cabinet when the President of the Re-
public (PR) refused to promulgate a legisla-
tive-degree for procedural reasons, namely 
because the temporal limit conceded by law 
was already expired when he received it.3 
However, Cabinet-presidential relations were 
smoother than the year before. Relations be-
tween political parties, especially in Parlia-
ment, were previously turbulent but improved 
considerably, though some controversies 
arose. One involved a Member of Parliament 
(MP) of the ruling Movimento para a Democ-
racia (MPD) who was understood to be mini-
mising the national role and status of the hero 
of independence, Amílcar Cabral – the found-
er of the current main opposition party Parti-
do Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde 
(PAICV) (formerly Partido Africano para 
a Independência da Guiné e de Cabo Verde 
[PAIGC]) – but even his party leaders kept 
their distance from the comment.4  Interest-
ingly enough, the sourest political dispute of 
the year was the leadership context in PAICV. 
Initially with two contestants, the incumbent 
and a challenger, the challenger announced 
his withdrawal from the race, accusing his ri-
val of manipulation of the party apparatus and 
abuse of power.5  
Notwithstanding the more distended gener-
al political climate, parliamentary opposi-
tion – composed by the center-left PAICV6 
and center Democratic-Christian União Ca-
CAPE
VERDE
1 The country is still classified as free by the Freedom House Report 2019 (available at <https://freedom-
house.org/report/freedom-world/2019/cape-verde>), scoring 90/100 and occupying thirtieth place in the 
Democracy Index 2019. A Year of Democratic Setbacks and Popular Protest (EIU 2019), 10.
2 See list in Section V. 
3 Inforpress, 08-01-2019, <https://www.inforpress.publ.cv/pr-justifies-the-return-of-legislative-acts-with-ex-
piry-of-legislative-authorization/?lang=en>
4 Inforpress, 01-05-2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/en/mpd-distances-itself-from-mp-emanuel-barbosas-
statements-about-amilcar-cabral/>
5 Inforpress, 07-12-2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/jose-sanches-desiste-de-candidatura-a-lideran-
ca-do-paicv/>
6 Inforpress, 26-11-2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/en/praia-paicv-elected-appoint-lack-of-security-and-
unemployment-as-two-major-problems-of-the-county/>
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bo-Verdiana Independente e Democrática 
(UCID)7 – was firm in criticising govern-
ment policies on employment, education, 
social protection, transportation and public 
security. Extra-parliamentary opposition 
was more acrimonious in its criticism. Parti-
do Popular (PP) targeted not only the ruling 
party but also the system itself and most of 
its main institutions.8 And the fringe Parti-
do do Trabalho e Solidariedade (PTS) con-
troversially issued a press communication 
about the introduction of the death penalty 
to Cape Verde and the use of the military to 
conduct targeted killing operations against 
drug traffickers who allegedly controlled the 
capital’s slums, to exterminate them as par-
asites and cancers.9 Those extreme measures 
were related to a sentiment of insecurity10 
that led to an apparent increase of homicides, 
including the assassination of a police officer 
during an operation in the main city of the 
archipelago, Praia,11 and a murder attempt 
against the mayor of the capital.12   
Other pertinent political developments that 
impacted the political system and/or gener-
ated heated debates were related to: a) the 
announcement by the Prime Minister (PM) 
that the Cabinet would promote the teach-
ing of morals and religion in public schools 
in order to implement the concordat signed 
with the Vatican,13 though allowing non-Ro-
man Catholic students to opt out;14 b) the use 
of public funds by the Cabinet to celebrate, 
through outdoors and spots, its own achieve-
ments;15 and c) the passing away in office of 
the Deputy Minister of the Prime Minister 
for Regional Integration.16  
At the general legislative level, despite hav-
ing failed to approve the most important 
bill that it submitted to Parliament in order 
to promote regionalisation in the country17 
– one of the main demands of part of the 
population of northern islands – the Cabi-
net managed to promote legislation relevant 
for constitutional law. Namely: a) one that 
amended the Execution of Criminal Policy 
Act;18 b) another that amended the Crimi-
nal Investigation Act.19 This after changes 
were introduced subsequent to a ruling of 
unconstitutionality by the CCCV related to 
an initial version of the bill that led to a pres-
idential veto;20 c) one related to pensions due 
to torture victims of the One-Party System;21 
and finally d) one concerning the creation 
of a special procedure in order to facilitate 
payment of just compensation for expropria-
tion of property possessed by private persons 
without a land title.22   
Relevant legislation and public policy in-
struments related to the materialisation of 
constitutional social rights and protection of 
vulnerable persons were approved or amend-
ed as well. For instance, in the following 
cases: the increase of the non-contributory 
pension;23 the programs of social reintegra-
tion of convicts,24 of immigration and inte-
gration of immigrants,25 and of the voluntary 
return of foreigners;26 the National Housing 
Policy;27  the subsidisation of housing for 
persons with disabilities;28 the Prevention, 
Habilitation, Rehabilitation and Participa-
tion of Persons with Disabilities Act;29 the 
amendment of the social tariff for electrici-
ty decree;30 the revision and increase of the 
fees payed to attorneys by the public legal 
aid program;31 and the diverse amendments 
to social security ordinances.32   
7 Inforpress, 27-03-2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/en/government-and-mpd-consider-that-country-is-undergoing-recognized-reforms-paicv-con-
tests-and-ucid-questions/>
8 Inforpress, 11-10-2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/en/cndhc-repudiates-and-is-astonished-with-the-statements-by-pp-president-who-considers-the-institution-
a-farce-and-lie/>; Inforpress, 09-06-2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/en/popular-party-criticizes-budget-for-the-president-of-the-republic/>
9 Mindelinsite, 11-09-2019, https://mindelinsite.cv/lider-do-pts-defende-medidas-radicais-para-combater-gangsterismo-na-praia-e-anuncia-candidatura-a-cmsv/>
10 Inforpress, 20-11-2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/en/government-committed-to-consensual-solutions-to-improve-security/>
11 Inforpress, 29-10-2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/en/praia-crime-national-police-officer-killed-in-tira-chapeu/
12 Garda World News Alerts, 29-07-2019, <https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/253416/cape-verde-official-in-praia-wounded-in-shooting-july-29>
13 See text in the Official Journal [OJ], I Series [I-S], n. 68, 18.12.2013.
14 Inforpress, 23-05-2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/en/prime-minister-confirms-moral-and-religion-teaching-in-public-schools-starting-next-year-2/> 
15 Inforpress, 03-06-2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/en/jorge-santos-refrains-from-commenting-on-alleged-government-political-propaganda/>
16 Inforpress, 22-10-2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/en/death-minister-autopsy-concludes-that-julio-herbert-died-of-acute-myocardial-infarction/>
17 Inforpress, 04-07-2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/en/parliament-article-seventh-of-the-regionalization-law-has-been-voted-down-twice/>
18 Law 52/IX/2019, of 10 April, OJ, I-S, n. 41, 10.04.2019, 718-723.
19 Law 56/IX/2019, of 15 July, OJ, I-S, n. 76, 15.07.2019, 1116-1125.
20 See III.1.
21 Law 67/IX/2019, of 6 September, OJ, I-S, n. 94, 06.09.2019, 1518.
22 Law-Decree 25/2019, of 13 June, OJ, I-S, n. 63, 13.06.2019, 968-969. 
23 Council of Ministers Resolution (CMR) 2/2019, of 9 January, OJ, I-S, n. 2, 09.01.2019, 35.   
24 Approved by the Cabinet’s Resolution 103/2019, of 9 August, OJ, I-S, n. 87, 09.08.2019, 1461-1473. 
25 CMR 3/2019, of 10 January, OJ, I-S, n. 3, 10.01.2019, 39-61.
26 Law-Decree N 46/2019, of 18 October, OJ, I-S, n. 108, 25.10.2019, 1724-1727.  
27 CMR 51/2019, of 23 April, OJ, I-S, n. 45, 23.04.2019, 792-796.
28 CMR 161/2019, of 12 December, OJ, I-S, n. 129, 30.10.2019, 2068-2097. 
29Law-Decree 21/2019, of 24 May, OJ, I-S, n. 57, 24.05.2019, 922-936. 
30 Law-Decree 22/2019, of 4 June, OJ, I-S, n. 60, 04.06.2019, 944-945.
31 Minister of Justice and Labour Ordinance 33/2019, of 16 September, OJ, I-S, n. 98, 19.09.2019, 1543-1544.  
32 See OJ, I-S, n. 69, 25.06.2019, 1019-1032. 
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Of all legal developments, arguably the most 
important and controversial was the enact-
ment of the Parity of Access to Public Office 
Act, which prescribes that any list of candida-
cies to national or local collegial organs has 
to include a minimum of 40% of candidates 
of any gender, leading to the rejection of all 
the lists that do not meet these standards.33 
Another significant legal development was 
the approval of the Control of Access to Al-
coholic Beverages Act, which, among other 
measures, limited access and consumption of 
alcohol in public places or at the workplace; 
established the possibility of public servants 
and workers being submitted to alcohol tests 
in office;34 and restricted advertising of alco-
holic beverages and activities of sponsorship 
by companies of the sector.
In regard to judicial and human rights protec-
tion developments, it is important to underline 
the appointment of a new Attorney-General 
(AG) to lead the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(PPO) by the PR after a proposal of the Cab-
inet35 and of judges and advocates of the Mil-
itary Court.36 However, it is also important 
to highlight the inaction of Parliament in the 
filling of vacant positions, namely regarding 
the reappointment of the Ombudsman, whose 
term expired in the beginning of 2019, or his 
replacement by a new one; and the election 
of the two substitute judges of the CCCV and 
of non-magistrate members of the Judicial 
Council and of the Public Prosecutors Coun-
cil (all terms expired in 2018). Also, a lack 
of adequate allocation of funds was grounds 
for concern for some important institutions, 
namely the Ombudsman’s Office37 and the 
Media Authority.38 
In addition, it is worth mentioning that the 
Parliament gave its consent to the ratifica-
tion of a number of important treaties, name-
ly the Pelindaba Treaty, which created an 
African Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone,39 and 
a Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade of To-
bacco Products.40        
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The year 2019 was particularly prolific for the 
CCCV due to its number of decisions, almost 
doubling the near 30 decisions in 2018. Nev-
ertheless, the majority were decisions on the 
admissibility of constitutional complaints (or 
amparo),41 which, with rare exception – Veiga 
et al. v. AG (R40/2019), with Associate Jus-
tice (AJ) Pina-Delgado dissenting42 and Chief 
Justice (CJ) Semedo writing for the majority – 
gathered the unanimous support of the Court. 
Additionally, constitutional complaint admis-
sibility proceedings produced other related 
kinds of decisions, namely: a) to allow plain-
tiffs to correct their petitions (R-14/2019; 
R-32/2019); b) to adopt provisional measures 
(Soares v. SC43); and c) to request clarification 
or to argue nullity of non-admissibility rulings 
(R-10, R-11 and R-19/201944). 
The announced clash between the CCCV 
and the Supreme Court (SC) gained new de-
velopments in 2019, when the SC showed 
resistance in executing an injunction re-
sulting from the Hills decision reported last 
year45 and symbolically counterattacked 
when a plaintiff seeking remedy in a habe-
as corpus proceeding identified the CCCV 
as the coercing entity.46 More formally, the 
Judge-President of the SC asked the legis-
lative authorities – in the annual ceremony 
to mark the beginning of the 2019-2020 
judicial term – to clarify the moment when 
SC decisions are deemed to be res judicata, 
especially in the framework of amparo pro-
ceedings.47  
 
The aftermath of the Hills decision led to 
other litigation, in the sequence of which 
the CCCV, at the request of the plaintiff, 
clarified the effects of already-reported 
R-27/201848 through R-5/2019,49 but for pro-
cedural reasons rejected the request of adop-
tion of provisional measures (R-6/201950). 
Subsequently, the appellant submitted a new 
amparo, reasoning that the SC violated his 
rights by not complying with the CCCV de-
cision in his favour. The request was admit-
ted, and the CCCV granted the provisional 
measure sought, ordering the SC to release 
33 Law 68/IX/2019, of 28 November, OJ, I-S, n. 118, 28.11.2019, 1916-1918. 
34 Law 51/IX/2019, of 8 April, OJ, I-S, n. 40, 08.04.2019, 692-703.
35 Presidential-Decree 24/2019, of 14 October, OJ, I-S, n. 105, 15.10.2019, 1698. 
36 Presidential-Decree 25/2019, of 12 November, OJ, I-S, n. 117, 20.10.2019, 1906. 
37 Inforpress, 5/12/2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/en/ombudsman-welcomes-governments-opening-to-revise-budget/>
38 Inforpress, 5/12/2019, <https://www.inforpress.cv/en/arc-considers-2020-budget-insufficient-to-meet-needs-in-an-election-year/>
39 National Assembly Resolution 123/IX/2019, of 15 May, OJ, I-S, n. 54, 15.05.2019, 875-887.
40 National Assembly Resolution 122/IX/2019, of 15 May, OJ, I-S, n. 54, 15.05.2019, 844-875. 
41 Baptista v. District Court of Paúl (DCP); Rodrigues v. Court of Appeals of Barlavento (CAB); Ferreira v. DCP; Graça v. Tax and Customs Court of Sotavento; Amado 
v. SC; Correia v. SC; Obire v. SC; Pereira et al. v. SC; Frederico v. SC; Monteiro v. SC; Silva v. CAB; Dias v. SC; Odo v. SC; Martins and Varela v. SC; Yannick v. 
SC;  Firmino v. SC; Mendes v. SC; Igwemadu v. SC; Oliveira and Lima v. SC; Alves and Alves v. SC; Pereira v. SC II; Teixeira v. SC; Yannick v. Court of Appeals of 
Sotavento; Yannick v. SC II.
42 OJ, I-S, n. 6, 14.01.2020, 121-131. 
43 Bellow III.2. 
44 OJ, I-S, n. 29, 14.03.2019, 519-521; 521-523; OJ, I-S, n. 46, 24.04.2019, 838-839.
45 GRCL 2018, 51. 
46 SC R11/2019 (not published, on file with author).
47 On file with author, 13. 
48 GRCL 2018, 51.
49 OJ, I-S, n. 28, 13.03.2019, 493-500.
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Mr. Hills, the plaintiff, from his pre-trial de-
tention, which was duly executed by the ap-
pellate judicial organ (R-9/201951). 
In addition to this follow-up, other minor 
opinions related to diverse proceedings of 
the jurisdiction of the CCCV were also re-
leased: a) appeals challenging the non-ad-
mission of concrete reviews of constitution-
ality request decisions taken by appellate 
courts (R-20/201952 and R-35/201953); and 
b) appeals challenging the application of 
fines for electoral infractions (R-48/2019 
and R-49/201954). They were all written by 
AJ Pina-Delgado for a unanimous bench. 
Major decisions
1. Advice 1/2019 (Referral by the PR on the 
Constitutionality of the Amendment Act to 
the Criminal Investigation Act) – Ex-Ante 
Review of Legislation55 
The PR understood that a precept of an 
Amendment Act to the Criminal Investiga-
tion Act that gave powers to public prose-
cutors to authorise undercover operations 
without the intervention of a judge was of 
dubious constitutionality. The CCCV, in a 
unanimous opinion written by AJ Pina-Del-
gado, concluded that such rule was incom-
patible with the Basic Law (BL). The reason 
was that it had the effect of sidelining the 
only independent power – the judge – that 
does not have a specific interest in the con-
duct of criminal investigations and has a 
mandate to guarantee the protection of rights 
of suspects and accused persons. In addition, 
it replaced that independent power with an 
entity – public prosecutors – who have some 
interest in the matter because they accuse in 
the name of the State. By doing so, accord-
ing to the CCCV, the challenged norm would 
debilitate the protection of basic rights and 
criminal procedural guarantees; namely, the 
rights to judicial protection, the general right 
to privacy and safeguards related to personal 
data protection, the privilege against self-in-
crimination, the right to life and the right to 
physical integrity. 
2. R-1/2019 (Soares v. SC, Request of 
Adoption of Provisional Measures) – 
Amparo56
  
The Soares case concerned a person accused 
of homicide and maintained in pre-trial de-
tention for a period longer than established 
by the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). 
Although the case is still pending on the 
merits, the CCCV – in an opinion written 
by AJ Pina-Delgado, with AJ Lima dissent-
ing – ordered the release of the petitioner 
during a preliminary ruling, after admitting 
the request of amparo. The case presented 
an excellent opportunity to develop an un-
derstanding of the CCCV regarding the legal 
requirements prescribed to adopt provisional 
measures. 
Affirmatively, the CCCV held that the adop-
tion of provisional measures in amparo pro-
ceedings depended upon a test to verify if 
the requirements of the law are present, es-
pecially the presence of ‘ponderous reasons’ 
to grant the relief sought, which evaluate the 
following: the importance of the right; the 
strong probability that the request will suc-
ceed on the merits; the existence of prece-
dents that support the plaintiff’s position; the 
anticipation of the duration of the amparo 
proceedings; the individual circumstance of 
the plaintiff; and the impact of the alleged 
violation on his personal, familiar and pro-
fessional life. 
3. R-27/2019 (Obire v. SC) – Amparo57     
The Obire opinion, written by AJ Pina-Del-
gado, related to the vexata quaestio of de-
fining the effects of SC decisions in cases 
where a civil or political rights holder sub-
mits a constitutional complaint to the CCCV. 
The CCCV had already signalled in previous 
opinions – particularly in provisional mea-
sure decisions – that it didn’t consider a de-
cision of an ordinary court to be res judicata 
(i.e., a settled matter), while the SC held the 
view that its opinions were.  
The CCCV grabbed the opportunity to stress 
and develop its initial findings: that as a re-
sult of the constitutional guarantee of pre-
sumption of innocence and of the right to 
amparo –which is also a subjective right ac-
cording to its case law – the submission of a 
complaint lodged by a plaintiff that continu-
ously appeals from ordinary court decisions, 
reacting consistently against its condemna-
tion and in due time, suspends the effect of 
a decision taken by an ordinary court in a 
criminal procedure up until the final deter-
mination is taken. 
 
The effect of those assumptions by the Court, 
as applied to the main issue of the case, was 
that the decision of an ordinary court is not 
sufficient to transform a pre-trial detention 
situation in a condemnation status. Thus, as 
far as the BL establishes a limit of 36 months 
for a pre-trial detention, this is still applica-
ble while the CCCV decision is still pending. 
4. R-29/2019 (Teixeira v. SC) – Concrete 
Review of Constitutionality58 
In this matter, the main issue was wheth-
er a suspension by a 2005 statute of a CCP 
norm – that imposes the holding of public 
50 OJ, I-S, n. 28, 13.03.2019, 500-503. 
51 OJ, I-S, n. 29, 14.03.2019, 511-518. 
52 OJ, I-S, n. 79, 22.07.2019, 1214-1223.
53 OJ, I-S, n. 110, 29.10.2019, 1813-1824.
54 OJ, I-S, n. 14, 04.02.2020, 322-329, 329-337. 
55 OJ, I-S, n. 44, 18.04.2019, 763-790. 
56 OJ, I-S, n. 11, 31.01.2019, 178-188. 
57 OJ, I-S, n. 100, 26.09.2019, 1596-1608. 
58 OJ, I-S, n. 100, 26.09.2019, 1618-1653.
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hearings in criminal matters in the SC – was 
unconstitutional. After analysing the prepa-
ratory works, especially the transcription of 
the Parliamentary debates, the CCCV – in an 
opinion written by AJ Pina Delgado, with AJ 
Lima partially dissenting – concluded that 
the promoters of the bill requested only a 
temporary suspension of the norm to create 
physical conditions at the SC due to the inex-
istence of traditional public hearings in apex 
courts, with the exception of habeas corpus 
proceedings. 
For that reason, according to the CCCV, the 
maintenance of that situation could not be 
justified by appealing to the constitutional 
clause that permits proportional restriction 
of civil rights because it lacked any purpose 
consistent with the BL, nor by arguing that 
the Constitution allows suspension of fun-
damental rights because there was no duly 
declared judicial emergency in the coun-
try and no constitutional state of exception 
could have lasted so long. Thus, it found that 
that norm violated the right to public hear-
ings in criminal matters and struck it down 
by declaring its unconstitutionality, despite 
restricting the effects of the ruling only to the 
present case and for the future.      
5. R-30/2019 (AGAM v. AG) – Amparo59      
In the unanimous Atlantic Global Asset 
Management (AGAM) ruling, written by AJ 
Pina-Delgado, the point of discussion was 
the powers of public prosecutors to order the 
freezing of bank accounts without judicial 
warrants. The CCCV understood that the in-
terpretation of the Money Laundering Act, 
according to which they had such powers, 
violated the right of the plaintiffs to judicial 
protection in any criminal proceeding that 
impacts its procedural guarantees, namely 
because public prosecutors are responsible 
for accusing suspects of crimes; therefore, 
they could not be seen as a proper and inde-
pendent entity to both promote and authorise 
such serious decisions that impact the assets 
of a company and eventually of persons 
(e.g., workers and members of their families) 
that depend on them without any overview 
or judicial appeal.      
6. R-31/201960 and R-38/201961 (BASTA v. 
NEC) – Electoral Appeal
These decisions, written by AJ Pina-Delga-
do, were adopted into the framework of the 
electoral jurisdiction of the CCCV after a 
candidacy to the municipal election of 2016 
challenged a fine that was imposed on it by 
the National Electoral Commission (NEC) 
for the infraction of not presenting its cam-
paign finance report. 
Their relevance results from two facts. First, 
the CCCV Act is very sparse in the regula-
tion of appeals directed against the applica-
tion of post-electoral fines by the NEC. So 
the CCCV had to define the applicable pro-
cedure by appealing first to the Administra-
tive Infractions General Act and subsequent-
ly to the CCP, which led to the utilisation of 
an open procedure marked by the holding of 
a public hearing to listen to the plaintiff, the 
representative of the administrative agency 
that applied the fine and the Public Prosecu-
tor’s Office. 
Secondly, because on the merits, the CCCV 
dealt for the first time with such post-elec-
toral challenges. In this sense, it started to 
develop an understanding – duly followed in 
two subsequent related rulings (R-39/2019 
and R-41/2019)62 – that it was a very im-
portant and commendable step that the NEC 
finally took to hold electoral candidacies ac-
countable for failures to obey such essential 
electoral norms for the protection of democ-
racy, good governance as the ones that reg-
ulate candidacies’ finances, but that, in this 
specific case, the amount of the fine was dis-
proportional. Thus, it opted for its decrease.  
7. R-50/2019 (Firmino v. SC) – Amparo63  
Another challenge to the interpretation of 
norms of the CCP was raised by Mr. Firmi-
no, who noted that an appellate court should 
have notified him personally – not just his 
attorney – of a ruling concerning an appeal 
lodged against his conviction by a district 
court. The attorney, without his knowledge, 
opted not to appeal further to the SC. Through 
R50/2019, written by AJ Pina-Delgado, the 
CCCV stressed the restrictive understanding 
of the SC. According to that understanding, 
when the legislator imposed an obligation to 
notify personally accused persons of crimi-
nal sentences, it only meant decisions of trial 
courts and not appeals courts. For the CCCV, 
this interpretation violated the right of an ac-
cused to defence in criminal trials and the 
right to appeal of the petitioner. In the sense 
that without having direct knowledge of the 
decision of an intermediary court concerning 
an appeal, the accused could not decide au-
tonomously to appeal to higher courts nor fill 
a constitutional appeal with the CCCV.  
8. Request for Recusal of an AJ64 
Finally, it is worth mentioning a decision of 
CJ Semedo. It concerned a request of AJ Pi-
na-Delgado to be authorised not to partici-
pate in the deliberation of a referral of MPs 
concerning the constitutionality of norms 
of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
signed between Cape Verde and the United 
States of America. This on the grounds that 
as a scholar and consultant, he had signed an 
advice request by the Minister of National 
Defence concerning an initial draft of that bi-
lateral treaty. The CJ refused the request, ar-
guing that the norms were not exactly equal; 
that constitutional deliberation is not static 
because it depends on balancing dynamic 
elements, especially in fields like security 
59 OJ, I-S, n. 110, 29.10.2019, 1766-1789. 
60 OJ, I-S, n. 110, 29.10.2019, 1789-1795. 
61 OJ, I-S, n. 6, 14.01.2020, 88-106. 
62 Id., 106-121, 131-136. 
63 OJ, I-S, n. 14, 04.02.2020, 347-357. 
64 See <https://www.tribunalconstitucional.cv/index.php/2019/06/06/presidente-do-tc-decide-pedido-de-escusa-de-intervencao-do-juiz-pina-delgado-no-proces-
so-sofa/>
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and national defence; and that the succes-
sive review of legislation proceedings was 
objective. Thus, a justice has no subjective 
interests that hamper his ability to judge such 
requests impartially. Otherwise, it complied 
with the public interest that all available jus-
tices could participate in the deliberation of 
such referrals, especially if they are special-
ists in that specific domain. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
For 2020, the decision concerning the SOFA 
referral, which is still pending at the CCCV, is 
expected in its first half. Moreover, it is prob-
able that minor parties will launch a challenge 
to the Gender Parity Law. In addition, major 
legislation was already announced, namely in 
the field of decentralisation and devolution 
of powers to municipalities;65 amendments to 
the Electoral Code, Criminal Code, the CCP 
and even to the BL are also expected or pos-
sible. Finally, it will be an electoral year with 
municipal polls, which will likely happen in 
the last quarter of the year.  
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I. INTRODUCTION
Our previous 2016, 2017, and 2018 reports 
primarily focused on summarizing selected 
decisions from the Chilean Constitution-
al Court (Tribunal Constitucional de Chile 
– henceforth the CC).1 In those reports, we 
described two trends: First, how the CC had 
increasingly become a politically conse-
quential tribunal by using its ex-ante judicial 
review powers to check the legislative bills 
approved by Congress – most of which were 
sponsored and even initiated by the Presi-
dent. Second, how the concrete judicial re-
view mechanism of the Chilean Constitution 
(the inaplicabilidad) is promoting relevant 
litigation on fundamental rights areas, such 
as the rights to due process and equality, 
turning the CC into a significant forum for 
solving rights disagreements. Even though 
the Chilean inaplicabilidad is far from be-
coming the powerful tool that other courts of 
the region use, such as the Colombian tute-
las, the concrete judicial review mechanism 
as exercised by the CC is also far from inca-
pable of protecting fundamental rights.
This report will be different than our pre-
vious accounts, as the year 2019 had polit-
ical events that were too important for the 
Chilean constitutional system to ignore. As 
we will explain later, massive protests took 
over the streets and changed the country’s 
political agenda. As a result, a bipartisan 
agreement was signed by most of the rele-
vant political parties, aimed at opening a 
possible Constitution-making process that, if 
it occurs, will replace the entire Constitution 
in two years’ time. Although we still need 
to engage with some of the most critical CC 
rulings, we cannot ignore the significant po-
litical events of 2019. 
Our report is divided into two parts. First, 
we will briefly summarize the main political 
events of 2019 and the roadmap that the bi-
partisan agreement of November 15 planned 
for the year 2020. We will be as descriptive 
as possible. Second, we will address the CC 
and its main judicial decisions. Since we 
need to be brief, we will ignore dissents and 
concurrences, with only one exception. In 
particular, although not exclusively, we will 
focus on the apparent conflict that the CC 
had with the Supreme Court. Until October 
2019, this conflict was probably the main 
constitutional discussion in Chile. Of course, 
everything changed in October.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Our 2018 account reported that Chile was 
not experiencing a crisis.2 We also stated 
that Chilean institutions were respected and 
stable and that the debates on constitutional 
change had been channeled through pre-es-
CHILE
1Iván Aróstica, Sergio Verdugo and Nicolás Enteiche, ‘Developments in Chilean Constitutional Law’, in Rich-
ard Albert and others (eds), 2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law (I·CONnect-Clough Center 2017); 
Iván Aróstica, Sergio Verdugo and Nicolás Enteiche, ‘Chile: The State of Liberal Democracy’, in Richard 
Albert and others (eds), 2017 Global Review of Constitutional Law (I·CONnect-Clough Center 2018); Iván 
Aróstica, Sergio Verdugo and Nicolás Enteiche, ‘Chile: The State of Liberal Democracy’, in Richard Albert 
and others (eds), 2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law (I·CONnect-Clough Center 2019).
2 Aróstica, Verdugo and Enteiche, ‘Chile: The State of Liberal Democracy’ (n 1) 53.
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tablished institutional channels. In other 
words, if a constitutional change was going 
to happen, the parties were going to use the 
amending procedure included in Chapter XV 
of the Constitution. For most, the events that 
initiated in October 2019 were unexpect-
ed. Public intellectuals and academics are 
still discussing the exact causes of the mas-
sive protests, the riots and social unrest. Of 
course, theories abound, but there is no aca-
demic consensus on the causes. Despite this, 
politicians need to push for quick, urgent and 
relevant solutions.
In October of 2019, groups of people took 
over the streets of downtown Santiago to 
protest the rise in cost of the Santiago metro 
ticket. A campaign for using the metro with-
out paying started to gain momentum. The 
protests grew, and social movements joined 
them. Violent groups attacked critical infra-
structures such as metro stations and other 
institutions such as banks, pharmacies, an 
electric company, hotels and even a hospital. 
President Piñera declared a state of emer-
gency and the armed forces took over the 
streets. Human rights institutions reported 
and denounced a significant number of hu-
man rights violations,3 and some even called 
for reforming the Chilean Police.4 The Pres-
ident’s popularity dropped to levels never 
before seen in Chile’s political polls.5 The 
polls also showed that the popularity of all 
the political parties, the Congress and other 
institutions dropped significantly.
After President Piñera finished the state of 
emergency, the protests grew even more. 
The demonstrations were not only about 
the rise of the metro ticket, of course. They 
included different demands – such as the 
need to get higher retirement pensions – but 
no unified petition included all of them. A 
protest of more than 1,200,000 people met 
in downtown Santiago in late October.6 No 
leaders were capable of centralizing all the 
demands and building an organic movement 
that could represent all the protesters. Later, 
groups of people complaining against a di-
verse range of policies, such as the tolls that 
private-run highways charge to drivers, also 
joined the protests. Eventually, the demand 
for a new Constitution gained momentum.
Although most of protesters were peaceful, 
violent organized groups also existed, and 
the levels of violence also grew. Eventually, 
President Piñera called the parties to achieve 
an agreement for peace, the new Constitu-
tion and the social agenda. It was the first 
time that an elected right-wing President 
called for a constitutional replacement. Fol-
lowing that call, on November 15, the parties 
with representation in Congress – except for 
the Communist Party and other movements 
– had a series of meetings and achieved a 
bipartisan agreement called “Agreement for 
the Social Peace and the New Constitution” 
(Acuerdo por la Paz Social y Nueva Consti-
tución).7  
The agreement included a timetable for the 
Constitution-making process: First, in April 
of 2020, there will be a referendum to de-
cide on whether Chileans agree to replace 
the Constitution and, if yes, whether they 
prefer to call for either an elected constituent 
assembly (the agreement called it “constitu-
tional convention”) or a mixed convention 
consisting of an organ composed of both 
sitting legislators and a group of elected cit-
izens. If the “yes” vote wins, then the elec-
tions for either the assembly or the mixed 
convention will take place in October 2020, 
along with local elections. Then, the Consti-
tution-making organ will function for nine 
months – the possibility of an extension of 
three months exists – and will need to ap-
prove the new constitutional text by a two-
thirds majority. The agreement implies that 
if the two-thirds majority is not achieved on 
specific issues, the 1980 Constitution will 
not operate as a default rule, but it does not 
solve the problem of what will happen with 
the themes that do not achieve the necessary 
supermajority support. After the new consti-
tutional text is approved by a two-thirds ma-
jority, the citizens will need to confirm the 
new Constitution in a referendum that will 
be mandatory for all voters.
The political agreement left many details 
open, such as the total number of delegates 
and the regulations of the campaigns, among 
many others. Thus, the parties appointed a 
bipartisan “technical committee” to work 
on a full text that could propose all the reg-
ulations needed to make the process feasi-
ble. The committee proposed to amend the 
current Constitution to add all the relevant 
regulations. After the committee finished its 
work and offered detailed rules, the parties 
modified the current Constitution and enact-
ed the new articles. Those articles formal-
ized the timetable that will allow the Con-
stitution-making process to take place. That 
way, the parties can try to achieve a balance 
between the need to signal institutional con-
tinuity and the necessity to respect the rule 
of law, and provide a strong signal that could 
serve as a way out of the crisis by allowing a 
constitutional replacement procedure.
On Tuesday, the 24th of December 2019, the 
constitutional reform establishing the pro-
cedure for total constitutional replacement 
was published in the Official Gazette.8 The 
reform included many detailed norms that 
we cannot explain in this brief report, in-
cluding rules limiting the power of the pos-
sible constitutional convention, establishing 
a procedure to solve conflicts and enacting 
electoral rules that resemble the ones that ex-
ist for electing the lower legislative chamber. 
Nevertheless, some important details were 
3 See, for example, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/chile [accessed 1/31/2020], and https://www.indh.cl/bb/wp-content/up-
loads/2020/01/Reporte-15-enero-2020.pdf [accessed 1/31/2020].
4 See https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/26/chile-police-reforms-needed-wake-protests [accessed 1/31/2020].
5 See https://www.cepchile.cl/cep/site/edic/base/port/encuestasCEP.html [accessed 1/31/2020], and https://www.cadem.cl/ [accessed 1/31/2020].
6 See https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-50190029 [accessed 1/31/2020].
7 See the agreement in the document signed by most of the parties’ leaders in https://www.senado.cl/senado/site/mm/20191114/asocfile/20191114134609/
pdf_acuerdo_por_la_paz_social_y_la_nueva_constitucion.pdf [accessed 1/31/2020].
8 Ley de Reforma Constitucional. Ley Núm. 21.200.
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not addressed. Indeed, the parties could not 
achieve agreement on whether the Consti-
tution-making organ should have reserved 
seats for indigenous peoples, whether it 
should have gender parity or a gender quo-
ta rule and whether there should be rules to 
help independent candidates to become more 
competitive. When we wrote these lines, the 
parties had not yet agreed on these items.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
According to the official statistics, in 2019, 
the CC received 2210 new cases.9 Among 
them, 2181 were concrete review cases (in-
aplicabilidad) compared to the 1663 cases 
that arrived in 2018, 916 in 2017 and 357 in 
2016. This confirms the trend that we iden-
tified in our previous reports regarding the 
importance this judicial review mechanism 
is gaining in Chile. Before the 2005 reform, 
Chile had a weak judicial review practice in 
the hands of the Supreme Court.10 The 2005 
constitutional reform pushed by President 
Ricardo Lagos transferred that power to the 
CC in the context of a larger set of modifica-
tions to the Constitution. Since then, the CC 
has used the inaplicabilidad power in ways 
that are historically novel in Chile.
In 2019, according to the CC’s website, it 
released 1610 judicial decisions and, as ex-
pected, a large majority of those decisions 
were inaplicabilidad rulings.11 Contrary to 
other years, the year 2019 had less ex-ante 
judicial review decisions triggered by parlia-
mentary minorities. The decline in ex-ante 
judicial review cases may have an explana-
tion: most cases that arrive from congres-
sional minorities challenge legislative bills 
sponsored by the President, and President 
Piñera lacks a majority in Congress. Unlike 
former President Bachelet, who had a sup-
porting coalition that gained a parliamentary 
majority, it seems that the opponents of Pres-
ident Piñera can build a majority to oppose 
the President’s bills without the need to chal-
lenge those bills in the CC.
At least three important developments re-
garding the CC should be noted. First, Chief 
Justice Aróstica’s term ended and the CC 
appointed a new chief justice: María Luisa 
Brahm. Justice Aróstica continues to serve 
at the CC, but Justice Brahm replaced him 
as chief justice. Justice Brahm is the second 
woman to become chief justice. She was 
originally appointed to the CC by President 
Piñera and, before serving as a justice, she 
was the President’s chief of staff during Se-
bastián Piñera’s first administration (2010-
2014).
The second development was the political 
discussion on whether the CC should be 
modified or not. As we said in the 2018 re-
port,12 a discussion on the CC’s powers and 
the justices’ appointment mechanisms exists. 
During 2019, that discussion was taken up 
by an academic and bipartisan committee 
composed of scholars and political advisors. 
The committee proposed a specific set of 
changes to the CC,13 including a proposal 
to reform the ex-ante judicial review mech-
anism and a revision to the appointment 
mechanisms. Regarding the concrete ex-post 
review mechanism (the inaplicabilidad), the 
committee’s proposal provides for a mecha-
nism that may help to prevent tensions be-
tween the CC and the Supreme Court. Leg-
islators have not yet used this proposal to 
write and submit a legislative bill that could 
be approved by Congress.
The third development that was relevant for 
the CC was the 2019 tension that arose be-
tween the Supreme Court and the CC. These 
sorts of tensions are not new in Chile,14 and 
they seem to be normal in constitutional sys-
tems that create a Kelsenian type of consti-
tutional court that is separated from the ju-
diciary, with two coexisting high courts.15 If 
two courts have constitutional authority, and 
none of them is superior to the other, then 
a competition between the two may rise. In 
2019, it was reported that tensions escalat-
ed due to a set of cases where the CC and 
the Supreme Court differed on the applica-
tion and interpretation of the Labor Code for 
public employees. While the CC believed 
that the public employees have their regula-
tory statute, the Supreme Court argued that 
the Labor Code was applicable to them. We 
explain the CC decisions in the next section.
A decision from the Supreme Court reviewed 
a claim formulated against a ruling of the 
CC.16 The relevant question was whether the 
9 See https://www.tribunalconstitucional.cl/estadisticas/estadisticas-ano-2019 [accessed 1/30/2020]. 
10 Gastón Gómez Bernales, ‘La Jurisdicción Constitucional: Funcionamiento de La Acción o Recurso de Inaplicabilidad, Crónica de Un Fracaso’ (1999), 4 Informes 
de Investigación (Universidad Diego Portales) 67.
11 When we wrote this report, the official statistics on the released decisions were not yet updated – they only included the decisions until August 2019. Thus, 
we are relying on the information given by the CC’s website search engine. See https://www.tribunalconstitucional.cl/sentencias/busqueda-avanzada [accessed 
1/30/2020].
12 Aróstica, Verdugo and Enteiche, ‘Chile: The State of Liberal Democracy’ (n 1) 53-54.
13 Grupo de Estudio de Reforma al Tribunal Constitucional, ‘25 Propuestas Para Un Tribunal Constitucional Del Siglo XXI’ <https://www.cepchile.cl/documentos/
Informe-Final-Grupo-Estudio-Reforma-al-TC.pdf>
14 José Francisco García and Sergio Verdugo, Activismo Judicial En Chile. ¿Hacia El Gobierno de Los Jueces? (Libertad y Desarrollo, 2013) 132-140; Gastón Gó-
mez Bernales, Las Sentencias Del Tribunal Constitucional y Sus Efectos Sobre La Jurisdicción Común (Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales, 2013).
15 There is literature explaining the tension between high courts. See, for example: Pedro Cruz Villalón, ‘Conflict between Tribunal Constitucional and Tribunal 
Supremo – A National Experience’, in Ingolf Pernice, Juliane Kokott and Cheryl Saunders (eds), The Future of the European Judicial System in a Comparative Per-
spective (Nomos, 2006); Leslie Turano, ‘Spain: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: The Struggle for Jurisdiction between the Tribunal Constitucional and the Tribunal 
Supremo’ (2006), 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 151; Lech Garlicki, ‘Constitutional Courts Versus Supreme Courts’ (2007), 5 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 44; Frank I. Michelman, ‘The Interplay of Constitutional and Ordinary Jurisdiction’, in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds), Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar, 2011); Víctor Ferreres Comella, ‘The Rise of Specialized Constitutional Courts’, in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds), Com-
parative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar, 2011); Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, ‘Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts: Political and Judicial Audiences’ 
(2011), 28 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 539.
16 The CC decision is STC 3853, and the Supreme Court’s ruling reviewing the claim against the CC ruling is SCS 21027-2019
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Supreme Court’s power in deciding acciones 
de protección – a sort of amparo (protective) 
procedure aimed at protecting constitutional 
rights – was constitutionally allowed to de-
clare that a CC ruling violated fundamental 
rights. The Supreme Court also reasoned that 
the autonomy of the CC should not be put 
into question and rejected the claim but, in a 
sort of dicta argument, it established that, as 
long as it does not modify the CC decision, 
the Supreme Court is allowed to declare that 
the actions of the CC violate fundamental 
rights. In other words, the acción de protec-
ción should not modify a judicial decision 
from the CC but it can “determine whether 
the challenged action incurred in a viola-
tion of the Constitution and the law” (c. 4).17 
The CC’s actions “carried out exceeding the 
powers given by law or the Constitution, can 
be controlled by the jurisdictional means of 
this constitutional procedure” [referring to 
the acción de protección] (c. 5).18
This apparent controversy ended up in a 
public statement enacted by the CC, and a 
response from the Supreme Court, in which 
both explained their powers. The CC claimed 
in a “public declaration” (which is not a for-
mal judicial decision) released on October 8 
of 2019 that it was “surprised” by the Su-
preme Court’s reasoning, and reaffirmed that 
(1) the CC is the only court that can declare 
whether a legal provision is applicable or 
not, (2) that the acción de protección should 
not be used to review the CC’s inaplicabi-
lidad decisions and (3) that the CC did not 
exceed the scope of its powers.19
The reason for the possible tension between 
the CC and the Supreme Court is that both 
courts may intervene in the same judicial 
process, although with diverse functions. 
The CC’s jurisdiction is limited to rule on 
whether the application of a specific legis-
lative provision is contrary to the Consti-
tution or not, without deciding on the case. 
Although the CC’s decisions are supposed 
to be binding for the judge or court that is 
deciding the controversy, the Supreme Court 
is typically the last instance in determining 
the final outcome of the case. Thus, while 
the CC is supposed to have the last word on 
what the Constitution means, the Supreme 
Court might have the final word on deciding 
the actual case.
In the remaining part of this section, the re-
port will illustrate three specific significant 
constitutional controversies.
1. The Labor Code and Public Employees 
Cases20
These cases connect with a case examined 
in the 2018 report,21 and with this report’s 
previous section, where we described the 
apparent tension between the CC and the 
Supreme Court. The cases referred to a rule 
of the Labor Code establishing that pub-
lic employees can benefit from the Code’s 
regulations only regarding matters that oth-
er statutes do not regulate (Article 1, Par. 3 
of the Labor Code). In other words, if other 
pieces of legislation regulated those matters, 
then the Labor Code cannot benefit public 
employees in those specific matters. Among 
the rules that the Labor Code establishes, 
employees can activate a particular legal 
procedure – included in Article 485 – if their 
employer infringes fundamental rights. The 
question, then, is whether public employees 
can enable the Article 485 procedure against 
the State. 
The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court 
had established that public employees could 
benefit from the Article 485 procedure. Nev-
ertheless, in 2017, the CC declared that the 
statute regulating the public sector – and not 
the Labor Code – should be applied to the 
case, granting the inaplicabilidad in favor of 
the State, i.e., a local government in that par-
ticular case (STC 3853).
In 2019, a significant set of related cases ar-
rived at the CC,22 and it consistently granted 
the petitions of inaplicabilidad presented by 
State institutions against public employees, 
consolidating its previous jurisprudential ap-
proach. The CC argued that the Constitution 
contains a provision that refers to the regu-
lation of the public sector (Article 38, Par. 1 
of the Constitution), which serves as a justi-
fication for the existence of a general statute 
regulating the rights of public employees. 
That statute, which needs to be an “organic 
law” requiring special legislative superma-
jority rules and the ex-ante control of the 
CC, does not refer to the Labor Code. Also, 
a legislative bill initiated by the President 
can only modify that statute and, if the re-
sult of the procedure is that the State should 
provide compensation to the employee, then 
there needs to be an explicit statute financing 
it so that the public budget can be organized 
to make those payments. Moreover, the legal 
system provides for a specific mechanism 
to denounce rights violations against public 
employees – those employees can denounce 
those rights violations to the Comptroller 
General of the Republic, so they should not 
use the Labor Code procedure. The CC has 
used all or some of these arguments in the 
cases it decided during 2019.
2. The Optometrists’ Case (STC 6597)
This section examines a decision that de-
clared the unconstitutionality of a specific 
legal provision with general effects. This 
kind of decision is rare in Chile, as most 
of the CC rulings exercise the power of 
17 Article 94 of the Chilean Constitution establishes that no legal claims or remedies are admissible against CC rulings. Only the CC can rectify the factual errors of 
its decisions.
18 Justice Sergio Muñoz’s concurrent opinion in that decision made the case stronger, arguing that the Supreme Court could review the decisions of the CC if the 
CC violated fundamental rights.
19 Tribunal Constitucional, ‘Declaración Pública’.
20 STC 5539, 5710, 5834, 5853, 5854, 5860, 5890, 5903, 5914, 5920, 5921, 5933, 5947, 5956, 5971, 5976, 5977, 5990, 6022, 6027, 6042, 6046, 6069, 6093, 6117, 
6118, 6134, 6154, 6174, 6175, 6187, 6190, 6196, 6203, 6213, 6231, 6314, 6436, 6463, 6491, 6497, 6511, 6531, 6548, 6569, 6583, 6591, 6745.
21 Aróstica, Verdugo and Enteiche, ‘Chile: The State of Liberal Democracy’ (n 1) 56.
22 We calculate that these cases represent four percent of all the inaplicabilidades received.
66 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
concrete review (inaplicabilidad).23 Nev-
ertheless, although scarce, declarations of 
unconstitutionality – regulated by Article 
93-7 – are stronger than inaplicabilidades, 
which are regulated by Article 93-6. While 
an inaplicabilidad ruling only produces le-
gal effects for the case in point and is not 
legally binding for other cases (see Article 
93-6 of the Chilean Constitution), the legal 
provisions that the CC declares unconstitu-
tional using its Article 93-7 power “will be 
understood repealed from the moment of the 
publication in the Official Gazette of the rul-
ing that accepts the complaint […].”24 The 
reason why Article 93-7 decisions are rarer 
than Article 93-6 rulings is that they require 
a supermajority vote of four-fifths of the jus-
tices to strike down a legal provision – eight 
out of ten justices – while the inaplicabilidad 
only requires a simple majority of six out of 
ten justices.25 
The provision declared unconstitutional was 
a rule included in the Chilean Health Code 
(Código Sanitario), which prevented medi-
cal consultations or medical eye technicians 
from giving consultation inside establish-
ments selling eyeglasses. The ban strongly 
affected optometrists and healthcare pro-
fessionals, as medical and technical consul-
tations were banned inside those facilities 
(Article 126, par. 2 of the Health Code). As 
we documented in the Chile 2018 report, the 
CC had already declared the inaplicabilidad 
of that rule in two cases (STC 3519 and STC 
3628).26 In them, the CC argued that the rule 
lacked justification, declaring that it violat-
ed equality by prohibiting the practicing of a 
profession. Later, the CC received two more 
claims of inaplicabilidad against the same 
rule (STC 5106 and STC 5176), and the CC 
followed the criterion established by the first 
two cases. 
On the ground of the previously cited rul-
ings, the CC decided to open a procedure to 
examine whether the challenged rule merited 
an Article 93-7 unconstitutionality declara-
tion. The CC held public hearings on July 4, 
2019, to hear the arguments of any interest-
ed third party. After hearing arguments from 
twenty-one people, on November 14, 2019, 
the CC achieved the required supermajority 
and declared the unconstitutionality of the 
challenged legal provision – Article 126 of 
the Código Sanitario, second par., final part 
(STC 6597). In addition to the arguments 
made in the previous rulings, the CC ar-
gued that the prohibition was unnecessary, 
as its purpose – the need to avoid conflicts 
of interest of the technicians that work for 
establishments selling – can be achieved by 
other means that already exist in the Código 
Sanitario and that are less harmful (c. 57). 
According to the CC, medical technicians 
and optometrists exercise a legally protect-
ed activity, and they hold the rights not to 
be discriminated against (Article 19-2) and 
freedom of work (Article 19-16). Moreover, 
the State has a constitutional duty to secure 
equal opportunities for everyone (c. 54).
3. The Exceptional Acquisition of a Rural 
Real Estate (STC 6613)
A mother and her son claimed to own the 
same property as the defendant. The possi-
bility of this duplicity exists in Chile regard-
ing small rural real estate, as there is more 
than one way to acquire it: the special proce-
dure of Decree-Law 2695 and the traditional 
Civil Code. Decree-Law 2695 provides for a 
less demanding process regarding the rules 
of publicity, deadlines for exercising actions 
and deadlines for claiming the acquisition of 
the real estate. In this case, the applicants to 
the CC reported having acquired the property 
in the manner established in the Civil Code, 
and the defendant via Decree-Law 2695. 
The applicants argued that Decree-Law 2695 
produced an unconstitutional result, and the 
CC partially accepted the petition by declar-
ing that parts of that norm should not apply 
to the case. The CC stated that the admin-
istrative authority was constrained to follow 
meager procedures that violated the constitu-
tional requirements of a fair and rational pro-
cedure. Thus, Decree-Law 2695 can violate 
the constitutional protection of private prop-
erty using a different mean than the expro-
priation process, which is the only way an 
owner can lose property without infringing 
the Constitution’s rules on the property right 
(Article 19-24). Although it is not certain 
that Decree-Law 2695 is unconstitutional in 
every case in an abstract way, it should be 
noted that, for the CC, Decree-Law 2695 is 
a “permanent threat” for the owners (c. 12).
This case is critical because it offers a di-
verse approach to the constitutional protec-
tion of property rights than the one advanced 
in previous property doctrines that the CC 
used in the past. Also, it is the first time that 
the CC declared the inaplicabilidad of this 
particular rule.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD TO 2020
This report described how the political par-
ties tried to channelize the 2019 crisis by 
designing a Constitution-making process 
aimed at replacing the 1980 Constitution. 
That process will begin in April of 2020, 
with a referendum that will decide whether 
Chile will initiate a constitutional replace-
ment. If yes, that plebiscite will also deter-
mine which kind of convention will exist, 
either an elected assembly or a mixed con-
vention composed of both sitting legislators 
and elected citizens. 
We expect the CC to continue operating and 
exercising its powers during 2020 within the 
constitutional framework. The decisions of 
inaplicabilidad and occasionally inconsti-
tucionalidad will probably be the CC’s pri-
mary task.
23 It is important to consider that the inaplicabilidad can be the first step that leads to the declaration of unconstitutionality. In fact, the Constitution requires that, 
before declaring the unconstitutionality of a legal provision, the CC must have declared the inaplicabilidad of that same provision in a previous case.
24 Aróstica, Verdugo and Enteiche, ‘Chile: The State of Liberal Democracy’ (n 1) 56.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Colombian political authorities faced several 
key constitutional challenges in 2019: How 
to deal with President Duque’s objections 
to the 2016 Peace Agreement achieved by 
former President Santos and the FARC guer-
rillas, which had been legally implemented 
during 2017 and 2018? How to solve the 
tensions between President Duque and the 
Congress, in which the Government lacks 
permanent majoritarian support? How to 
respond to novel limitations on the exercise 
of freedom on the Internet and in the public 
sphere? How to advance in reducing gender 
inequality and discrimination between na-
tionals and migrants (after the migration of 
at least 1.000.000 of Venezuelans)? Finally, 
how to maintain relationships through occa-
sional conflict between constitutional law 
and relevant subsystems of international law, 
such as international investment law and the 
inter-American human rights law?
In this report we will critically account for 
the way in which the Colombian Constitu-
tional Court addressed those issues in its 
2019 jurisprudence. However, beforehand, 
we will further illustrate the political context 
surrounding them.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
 
President Iván Duque took office on 7 Au-
gust 2018. As a candidate of the Democratic 
Center Party, he promised to undertake sev-
eral core amendments to the Peace Agree-
ment. He was elected by a majority that had 
rejected the Agreement in the 2016 Plebiscite 
for Peace. At that time, despite the popular 
vote, the Congress ratified the Agreement in 
the name of the People, and during 2017 and 
2018, the same Congress implemented it by 
means of constitutional amendments, laws, 
and legislative decrees. The Constitutional 
Court reviewed the constitutionality of the 
implementation norms and upheld most of 
them. 
This was the case concerning the Statutory 
Law for the Special Jurisdiction for Peace. 
Constitutional Amendment 1/2017 created 
the Jurisdiction, and granted it the power to 
investigate, prosecute, and impose sanctions 
on former combatants for human rights and 
international humanitarian law violations 
perpetrated during the internal armed con-
flict. A Statutory Law structured the Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace and regulated essential 
substantial and procedural matters concern-
ing its operation and relationships with other 
jurisdictions and branches of power. After 
the Congress approved the bill, the Consti-
tutional Court reviewed its constitutionali-
ty. By means of Judgment C-080/2018, the 
Court upheld practically all the sections of 
the bill.
Since 1821, all Colombian constitutions 
have empowered the President to object to 
legislative bills and refuse sanctioning them 
on two grounds: constitutional and political 
convenience. Sections 165, 166, and 167 of 
the 1991 Constitution currently regulate that 
power. After the constitutional review of the 
COLOMBIA
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bill, President Duque raised six objections 
to the Statutory Law of the Special Jurisdic-
tion. They referred to political convenience 
grounds: the lack of a clear obligation of 
former FARC members to compensate the 
victims; the lack of an empowerment to the 
Government to verify the list of recipients of 
special criminal law benefits; the lack of a 
precise demarcation between the powers of 
the Special Jurisdiction for Peace and the 
ordinary Criminal Jurisdiction; the existence 
of gaps possibly granting impunity to for-
mer combatants who had perpetrated crimes 
against humanity; the lack of a prohibition to 
the Special Jurisdiction for Peace to request 
and assess evidence before deciding on ex-
tradition requests for crimes committed by 
former combatants after the signature of the 
Peace Agreement; and the concession of the 
benefit of non-extradition to former combat-
ants as an exchange of confessing the truth, 
regardless of the gravity of their crimes. 
With a scarce majority, the Congress reject-
ed those objections and the President was 
forced to sanction the bill as it was upheld by 
the Constitutional Court.
This was not the only tension between the 
Government and the Congress. During his 
campaign, President Duque promised to 
break a historic practice of allocating pools 
of jobs in public administration and con-
tracts to persons linked to opposition and 
independent parties in exchange for parlia-
mentary support. As a response to a policy 
upholding that promise, opposition and inde-
pendent parties declined collaboration with 
processing governmental legislative initia-
tives. Hence, a much-needed amendment 
to the budget (the State Financing Act) and 
the Development Plan were approved by the 
Congress with unstable and weak majorities. 
Using an actio popularis, which grants any 
citizen standing to request that the Consti-
tutional Court review the constitutionality 
of any law, opposition leaders denounced 
the unconstitutionality of both laws. As ex-
plained below, in a decision with strong 
dissenting opinions by several justices, the 
Constitutional Court declared the unconsti-
tutionality of the State Financing Act on pro-
cedural grounds. 
The tension between the Government and 
opposition parties also expanded to public 
deliberation and to the streets. Opposition 
leaders have accused the Government of 
being negligent in protecting social leaders 
and former FARC members from constant 
attacks and homicides. Moreover, following 
the Chilean experience, since 21 November 
2019, opposition members, unions, and stu-
dents have carried out weekly protests de-
manding deep economic and social changes. 
In a handful of days, unrest proliferated in 
the streets. Several protesters, policemen, 
and citizens were killed or severely wound-
ed. The Constitutional Court played the role 
of arbitrator concerning some of those is-
sues. 
Furthermore, the Court has been pivotal in 
achieving a balance between constitutional 
law rules and principles on the one hand, 
and state obligations grounded in interna-
tional economic law, international invest-
ment law, and international human rights 
law on the other. According to Section 241 
of the 1991 Constitution, the Constitutional 
Court has the power and the duty to review 
the constitutionality of international treaties, 
signed by the President and ratified by the 
Congress, before they become binding. In 
2019, for the first time, the Court undertook 
a substantial review of bilateral investment 
agreements and free trade agreements to as-
sure that Colombian international economy 
commitments are compatible with essential 
constitutional principles, such as equality 
and due process.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Judgments on Individual Liberties
In 2019, the Constitutional Court issued two 
major rulings regarding freedom of expres-
sion in the context of the Internet. In judg-
ment SU 355/2019, the Court reviewed a 
constitutional complaint (tutela) by Kika Ni-
eto, a Christian YouTuber, who claimed that 
a journalist had violated her rights to good 
name and honor. On a well-known website, 
the journalist published a video with the ti-
tle “Kika Nieto hates gays and lesbians, 
even though she denies it.” The journalist 
expressed her views on some statements 
made by the petitioner when asked about 
the LGBTQ community. In a nutshell, the 
statements by the YouTuber highlighted that, 
according to the Bible, marriage should be 
between a man and a woman. At the same 
time, she invited Christians to love and not 
to judge gays and lesbians. The journal-
ist claimed that behind those statements 
the YouTuber was somehow hiding hatred 
against the LGBTQ community.
In its judgment, the Court upheld a two-lev-
el analysis: one related to the content of the 
video and another related to its title. On the 
first, it ruled out a possible violation of the 
rights of the petitioner. According to the 
Court, the opinions of the journalist were 
based on public statements by the YouTuber. 
Thus, in an exercise of her free speech, the 
journalist had made a personal assessment of 
those statements. The Court concluded that 
the Constitution protected that assessment 
as an instance of the freedom of speech. 
On the second, the Court stated that the ti-
tle of the video, and the description of the 
content, attributed certain beliefs and senti-
ments to the YouTuber that defaced what she 
said. Nevertheless, it discarded any possible 
violation. The title included the expression 
“even though she denies it,” which suggest-
ed that content was an interpretation made 
by the journalist, but not a definitive state-
ment about the plaintiff’s conduct. 
Bernal J and Pardo J dissented. They claimed 
that, without any justification, the journalist 
used abusive, slanderous, offensive, and 
denigrating expressions against the YouTu-
ber, only because of the religious views of 
the latter. According to the constitutional 
jurisprudence, the use of those expressions 
violates the right to good name and hon-
or. Furthermore, it violates the freedom of 
conscience and the religious freedom of the 
YouTuber, protected under Section 18 of the 
Constitution and under the American Con-
vention of Human Rights. 
Moreover, in judgment SU 420/2019, the 
Court decided four cases in which the pe-
titioners requested the removal of certain 
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content published on digital platforms, such 
as Facebook and YouTube, because they 
believed it violated their rights to intimacy, 
honor, and good name. In that judgment, the 
Court addressed two issues: (i) the limits to 
the wide scope of protection of freedom of 
speech; and (ii) whether digital platforms 
have the responsibility of informing address-
ees of their rights. The Court stated that judg-
es ought to undertake a strict proportionality 
analysis of the rights in conflict. In doing so, 
they ought to take into account criteria such 
as the level of impact of the message and 
the frequency of the questioned publication. 
Furthermore, the Court held that digital in-
termediaries are not responsible for content 
published by its users, yet they must remove 
the content when ordered by a judge. 
In addition, in judgment C-253/2019, the 
Constitutional Court reviewed the constitu-
tionality of two provisions included in Act 
1801/2016. In that ruling, the Court con-
cluded that the general prohibitions imposed 
on the consumption of alcohol and psycho-
active substances in public spaces, such as 
parks and other places open to the public, as 
established in the bill, were unconstitutional 
and infringed on the right to free develop-
ment of personality. The Court sustained that 
the provisions under review were unreason-
able and disproportionate. They were unrea-
sonable because the means – a general and 
extensive prohibition – was not necessary to 
achieve the goals sought by the legislator – 
a peaceful coexistence and the integrity of 
public space. They were disproportionate 
because the provisions granted comprehen-
sive protection to peace and public spaces by 
placing a full restriction upon free develop-
ment of personality. 
Bernal J dissented. Concerning reasonable-
ness, he claimed that the aims of peaceful 
coexistence and protection of the integrity 
of public space are constitutionally legiti-
mate. Hence, the legislator can adopt suit-
able measures to protect them. He also stated 
that, in the context of fighting against drug 
micro-trafficking, it is not generally dispro-
portionate for the Congress to prohibit drug 
consumption in streets and parks. 
2. Judgments on Equality
In judgment C-372/2019, the Court deter-
mined the scope of nonresident aliens’ right 
to equality vis-à-vis Colombian citizens with 
regards to organ donation. Section 10 of Act 
1805/2016 states that nonresident aliens can 
be recipients of organs donated by Colombi-
an citizens only if they are married and have 
lived for at least two years with the donor. 
Applicants argued that those requirements 
violated the right to equality of nonresident 
aliens because Colombian citizens were not 
subject to them.
The Constitutional Court dismissed the ap-
plicant’s arguments and upheld the legisla-
tive provision. The Court acknowledged that 
the provision accorded a less favorable treat-
ment to nonresident aliens in comparison to 
Colombian nationals. However, it found that 
such differential treatment was not discrimi-
natory because it was reasonable and propor-
tionate. It was reasonable because it pursued 
two legitimate aims: (i) giving Colombi-
an citizens a preferential access to organs, 
which are scarce goods; and (ii) preventing 
organ trafficking. Furthermore, the provision 
was proportionate because it only imposed a 
temporal limitation to access organ donation 
to nonresident aliens. 
Moreover, in judgment C-519/2019, the Court 
reviewed the constitutionality of Section 1 of 
Act 54/1989, according to which children 
ought to be registered under their father’s 
surname, in the first place, and their mother’s 
surname in the second place. Applicants ar-
gued that such provision was contrary to the 
principle of equality between men and wom-
en. The Court declared the unconstitutionality 
of the legislative provision. It noted that when 
handing down the family name, the child’s fa-
ther and mother were treated differently. Un-
like the father, and in spite of an agreement 
between the spouses, the mother was unable 
to obtain authorization to transmit her family 
name to the child in the first place. After run-
ning an equality test, the Court ruled that such 
differential treatment was discriminatory be-
cause it lacked a reasonable justification. The 
Court noted that Section 1 of Act 54/1989 de-
rived from a patriarchal understanding of the 
family and of the husband’s powers, which 
was no longer compatible with the constitu-
tional principle of equality between men and 
women. 
3. Judgments on Separation of Powers
In decision C-252 of 2019, the Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of the Colom-
bia-France bilateral investment treaty (BIT). 
Though the Court had previously reviewed 
13 BITs signed by Colombia and other coun-
tries, this was the first time in which the 
Court exercised substantial judicial review 
on this kind of treaty, and therefore, actively 
intervened on the powers of the President to 
conduct international relations. After hold-
ing a public hearing – which gathered the 
Colombian government officials, the French 
ambassador, arbitrators, and experts – the 
Court declared the treaty conditionally con-
stitutional. According to its ruling, several 
substantial provisions of the treaty would 
only be compatible with the Constitution 
in light of some specific interpretations. To 
enforce this decision, the Court ordered the 
Colombian President to advance negotia-
tions with the French government in order to 
adopt a joint interpretative declaration that 
would clarify the scope of several standards 
and adjust them to the Constitution. 
Drawing from doctrines displayed by the 
international investment arbitration tribu-
nals as well as recent developments in in-
ternational investment law, the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the treaty under the 
condition that “none of its substantive rights 
will result in more favorable unjustified 
treatment towards foreign investors with re-
spect to nationals.” Regarding the fair and 
equitable treatment clause, the Court stat-
ed that both parties ought to limit its scope 
and prevent overly broad readings. This will 
prevent arbitration tribunals from adding 
new obligations. Concerning the national 
treatment and most-favored-nation clauses, 
the Court ordered the definition of the ex-
pressions “like circumstances” – concerning 
granting privileges to investors in certain 
economic fields in comparison to investment 
regulation in other areas – and “treatment” to 
avoid vagueness and secure legal certainty. 
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Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the 
investors’ “legitimate expectations” could 
only be protected whenever they “(i) are de-
rived from specific and repeated acts carried 
out by the Contracting Party that induce the 
investor to make or maintain the investment 
in good faith and (ii) are affected by public 
policy’s abrupt and unexpected changes.” 
Finally, the Court concluded that the “nec-
essary and proportional” standard included 
in the indirect expropriation clause had to be 
compatible with the regulatory capacities of 
the national authorities.
In decision C-481 of 2019, the Court declared 
the State Financing Act unconstitutional. 
The recently elected President introduced 
this bill to the Congress as a vital instrument 
to increase the public national budget. Sev-
eral citizens and leaders of opposition and 
independent parties argued before the Court 
that the House of Representatives had vio-
lated the principle of deliberative democra-
cy during the Act’s approval process. They 
noted that the Senate did not publish the bill 
after its approval. Hence, members of the 
House of Representatives did not have ac-
cess to the bill, though they finally approved 
a proposition to pass “the bill approved by 
the Senate” on the following day. But the 
petitioners held that members of the House 
did not have access to the bill to research, 
discuss, and decide about it. This decision 
raised a significant public debate regarding 
the articulation of the new Government and 
the legislative branch. 
This case was about whether the House of 
Representatives eluded the debate of the bill 
by approving the one passed by the Senate, 
without even having access to it. The major-
ity concluded so, since the Senate did not 
publish the bill in the Gazette of the Con-
gress, which is the official instrument for it. 
Bernal J, Guerrero J, and Ortiz J dissent-
ed. Their opinions expressed that there was 
no violation of the deliberative democratic 
principle. According to this view, the mem-
bers of the House of Representatives did 
have access to the bill as long as (i) some of 
them explicitly declared so; (ii) the Senate 
published the bill on the official website of 
the Congress; and finally (iii) the sponsoring 
Senator of the bill delivered a presentation 
about it to the members of the House of Rep-
resentatives before they passed it. In light of 
this, the House did have access to the bill, 
so its decision did not violate the democratic 
principle. In this case, the Court was divided 
between a formalistic and a non-formalistic 
approach to the deliberative democratic prin-
ciple. 
4. Judgments on the Environment
In decision C-045/2019, the Constitutional 
Court declared sport hunting unconstitu-
tional. The Court avowed that environmen-
tal protection under the 1991 Constitution 
encloses a duty to protect animal life and, 
specifically, the prohibition of animal cru-
elty and abuse. Hence, limitation to this 
prohibition ought to be reasonable and pro-
portionate. In light of these considerations, 
the Court concluded that certain legislative 
provisions regulating sport hunting were not 
reasonable. They were unconstitutional be-
cause they did not contribute to achieving any 
legitimate constitutional goal. Sport hunting 
is not an expression of freedom of religion, is 
not meant to satisfy alimentary needs, is not 
practiced for medical and scientific experi-
mentation, and is not a fixed cultural tradition 
in Colombia. Despite public acceptance of 
this ruling, it is clear that the Court failed to 
consider that sport hunting is an effective con-
servation tool and that it does pursue at least 
one constitutional goal: it is an expression of 
personal autonomy.
In decision T-236/2017, the Court ruled on 
the use of glyphosate for aerial spraying of 
illicit crops. This judgment was preceded by 
the decision of the National Narcotic Coun-
cil (NNC) to suspend the official program for 
illicit crop eradication, which included oblig-
atory aerial spraying using glyphosate. The 
Court sustained the suspension of the program 
as a precautionary measure because the NNC 
did not provide enough scientific evidence to 
demonstrate the program’s harmlessness for 
human health and the environment. Howev-
er, the Court stated that the program could be 
resumed if the NNC complied with a specific 
standard: to exhibit objective and conclusive 
scientific evidence that glyphosate poses no 
harm to human health and to the environment.
With this background, in decision A-387/2019, 
the Constitutional Court upheld the orders 
handed down in judgment T-236/2017. Nev-
ertheless, the Court introduced essential mod-
erations to the order. The Government asked 
the Court to review this decision, claiming 
that it imposed an impossible standard. In 
the 2019 decision, the Court pointed out that 
this standard could not be construed as an ob-
ligation to exhibit “full scientific evidence” 
that glyphosate was “completely harmless.” 
Therefore, the Court ruled that NNC could 
reinstate the program after (i) evaluating “all 
scientific and technical information avail-
able” on glyphosate risks for human health 
and the environment; and (ii) balancing those 
risks with the Government’s anti-drug inter-
national and national commitments. At the 
end of 2019, the Department of Defense con-
firmed that the aerial spraying program will 
be resumed in 2020. 
5. Judgments on the Relationship between 
Constitutional Law and Inter-American 
Human Rights Law
In judgment C-111/2019, the Constitutional 
Court upheld the Procuraduría General de la 
Nación’s (PGN) power to sanction popularly 
elected officials. The PGN is a specific Co-
lombian institution empowered to supervise 
compliance to the law by public officials. The 
applicants claimed that the PGN’s power to 
sanction popularly elected officials was con-
trary to Section 23 of the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ACHR), which states 
that “[t]he law may regulate the exercise of 
the rights and opportunities referred to in the 
preceding paragraph [political rights] only on 
the basis of […] sentencing by a competent 
court in criminal proceedings.” In the Court’s 
view, Section 23 bars administrative authori-
ties from sanctioning popularly elected public 
officials. According to the claimants, the PGN 
is not a judicial institution. Hence, it should be 
deemed to be an administrative authority.
The Court noted that Section 23 of the ACHR 
lacks supra-constitutional binding force and 
cannot be understood in textual isolation. 
Rather, it must be systematically interpreted 
with other constitutional provisions, such as 
the ACHR as a whole and the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption. In light of the 
2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 71
above, the Court stressed that state parties to 
the ACHR have a wide margin of apprecia-
tion to determine the way in which there can 
be limitations to political rights. Accordingly, 
the Court concluded that the PGN’s power to 
sanction popularly elected public officials in 
administrative proceedings was compatible 
with the ACHR because: (i) the Colombi-
an Constitution explicitly grants such power 
to administrative authorities; (ii) the PGN 
must respect the right to a fair trial in such 
proceedings; and (iii) in any event, its deci-
sions are subject to judicial review. This deci-
sion is remarkable because it shows how the 
Constitutional Court construes human rights 
provisions and understands the relationship 
between constitutional and inter-American 
human rights law.
Finally, in Judgment SU 217/2019, the Con-
stitutional Court determined the scope of 
the right to appeal in criminal proceedings. 
The case concerned a criminal proceeding 
in which the petitioner was accused of docu-
ment forgery. In the first instance, the Judge 
of Neiva (a medium city in inner Colombia) 
rendered a verdict of acquittal. However, in 
the second instance, the Superior Tribunal of 
Neiva found the petitioner guilty and con-
victed him to four years of imprisonment. 
The Supreme Court of Justice ruled that such 
decision was not subject to appeal because 
the criminal procedural code did not grant 
the right to appeal decisions rendered in the 
second instance.
The Constitutional Court ruled that the 
Supreme Court of Justice violated the pe-
titioner’s right to appeal. The Court rec-
ognized that the criminal procedural code 
does not expressly provide for the right to 
appeal convictions rendered in the second 
instance. However, drawing from its previ-
ous decisions in judgments C-792/2014 and 
SU 215/2016, and several rulings of the In-
ter-American Court of Human Rights, the 
Court held that such right reasonably derived 
from Section 29 of the Constitution and 
Section 8.2(h) of the ACHR for two main 
reasons. First, the right to appeal cannot be 
narrowly construed. Neither the Constitu-
tion nor the ACHR limit the right’s scope to 
first instance decisions. Second, the Court 
stressed that the right to appeal was different 
and independent from the right to a double 
instance, and therefore interpreting that sec-
ond instance decisions could not be appealed 
would leave the right to appeal convictions 
rendered in them without effet utile. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
2020 is a critical year for the Court. First, 
a vacancy is occurring because Justice Luis 
Guillermo Guerrero completes his eight-
year tenure. Therefore, the Council of State 
is expected to nominate three candidates, 
among which the Senate shall elect the new 
justice. This appointment is crucial for the 
Court’s majority, either liberal or conserva-
tive. Second, the Court’s agenda includes 
controversial cases related to abortion, prior 
consultation to indigenous communities, and 
climate change. The first case reopens the 
debate about the constitutionality of both (i) 
establishing abortion as a criminal offence; 
and (ii) banning abortion under any circum-
stances. The second case (known as Linea 
Negra) is expected to define the scope of the 
right to prior consultation regarding mining 
and agricultural projects. The third case con-
cerns whether a legal obligation to purchase 
10% of the overall demand of energy from 
non-conventional renewable energy sources 
violates the freedom of contract of trade rep-
resentatives in this sector.
V. FURTHER READING
Gustavo Prieto, “The Colombian Con-
stitutional Court Judgment C-252/19: A 
new frontier for reform in international in-
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the Costa Rican Constitution-
al Court (Sala Constitucional, popularly 
known as Sala IV) commemorated its 30th 
anniversary with a series of videos and a new 
slogan, “The Sala Changed my Life.” While 
the publicity campaign celebrated, high-
lighted, and humanized the court’s impact on 
the lives of ordinary citizens in Costa Rica, 
other challenges were simultaneously being 
played out elsewhere. As this report notes, 
the court has received and resolved approx-
imately 400,000 cases since its creation, 
mainly amparos (writs of protection) involv-
ing almost every article of the Constitution. 
In 2019, the court decided 25,818 cases, a 
record number for a single year. At the same 
time, its continued high profile has increas-
ingly evoked political pushback against it. 
Politicians of all parties routinely use, as 
well as criticize, the court’s constitutional 
review powers and citizens are increasingly 
vocal in opposition to the appointment pro-
cedures of its magistrates due to the opacity 
and lack of clear objective standards used to 
select candidates.1  
Context and Background 
Since this is the first time Costa Rica has 
been included in the Global Review, we 
briefly provide some historical background 
to contextualize the report. Before the cre-
ation of the Constitutional Chamber of the 
Supreme Court in 1989, constitutional con-
trol belonged to the Supreme Court sitting 
en banc. The pre-reformed court resolved 
all habeas corpus cases, but amparo cases 
were referred to the Criminal Jurisdiction. A 
recent study revealed that the pre-reformed 
Supreme Court was ineffective and gener-
ally showed great deference to the elected 
branches of government. For example, from 
1918 to 1989, only 8% of the 13,500 habeas 
corpus cases were decided in favor or par-
tially in favor of the affected person.2 Sever-
al high-profile cases reveal that the Supreme 
Court was willing to legitimize the political 
prosecution of leftist leaders in the 1950s 
and other constitutional rights violations by 
the state. In the case of amparo claims, only 
6% were decided in favor of the claimant out 
of 350 resolutions from the Supreme Court 
in that same period.3   
The Constitutional Court was created in 
October 1989 as the fourth chamber (Sala)4 
of the Supreme Court, following a model 
of concentrated constitutional review that 
requires no previous judicial process to ac-
tivate. No other judges can decide consti-
tutionality questions, and its resolutions are 
erga omnes with retroactive effects5 and are 
binding on everyone except for the Sala IV 
itself. It receives all habeas corpus, amparos, 
COSTA RICA
1 Civil Society, media, and even the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur for Judicial Independence have 
demanded important changes in the mechanism used to elect Costa Rican Supreme Court magistrates, 
but to date neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has initiated the demanded reforms. <https://spcom-
mreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24699>
2 Sala Constitucional, Proyecto de Recopilación de Sentencias de Habeas Corpus 1918-1989 (actualizado 
Junio 2019) <https://habeascorpus19181989.poder-judicial.go.cr/index.php/estadistica>
3 Ley de Amparo [1950], No. 1161. This was eliminated with the new Constitutional Court. 
4 The three previous Salas are the specialized courts of cassation, being the upper level for appealing a 
judicial process. See more details in Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial [1993], art 55-57.  
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and constitutional review claims, acting as a 
court of the first instance. Its resolutions are 
unappealable within Costa Rica, but can be 
appealed to the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission, although this is very rare. 
Soon after its creation, the Sala IV became 
a well-utilized legal opportunity structure 
(LOS)6 with an open-access legal arena that 
allowed all inhabitants regardless of age, 
race, gender, citizenship, and income level 
to seek to reestablish or protect their funda-
mental rights through free, easy, quick access 
to constitutional justice without the need for 
lawyers. This stands in stark contrast to the 
pre-reformed Supreme Court. 
The current Constitutional Court enjoys con-
siderable financial and operational autono-
my. Its seven “proprietary” magistrates are 
elected by a supermajority (two-thirds) vote 
of the 57-member Congress as part of the 
Supreme Court’s 22 justices. Twelve substi-
tute (suplentes) magistrates serve as needed 
to replace any unavailable proprietary mag-
istrate. Law clerks (letrados) are assigned to 
work for specific magistrates and help pre-
pare drafts for each resolution. Sala IV mem-
bers elect their president every two years.  
During its first decade, the Sala IV re-
ceived an average of 9,000 cases per year, 
but over the last decade, its caseload more 
than doubled to an average of 20,000 cas-
es per year. The overwhelming majority of 
cases filed with the court are amparo claims 
(over 80% every year, and in the last four 
years, more than 90%). Amparo cases tend 
to be focused on three main topics:7 health, 
labor, and petition rights. In general, data 
from 2014 showed that a third of the issues 
were declared “Con Lugar” or “Con Lugar 
Parcial” in favor of the claimants. However, 
other studies show that results differ widely 
by topic and by time; amparos for medical 
treatment, for example, are the most likely to 
be successful.8  
The creation of the Constitutional Court has 
led to a judicialization of politics, where it 
has fallen to the court to resolve polarized 
issues that have proven difficult to negotiate 
solutions to in the political arena. Some no-
table cases include presidential reelection,9 
the North America Free Trade Agreement 
with Central America (NAFTA-CA),10 In Vi-
tro Fertilization,11 several new tax reforms, 
gender quotas for electoral participation, and 
same-sex marriage.12   
The Sala IV has guaranteed human rights in-
ternational obligations to which Costa Rica is 
a signatory, drawing on Article 7 of the Con-
stitution, which considers these international 
legal instruments to be superior to national 
legislation and the Constitution itself (prin-
ciple pro homine). Using this judicial reason-
ing, the court constructed several rights that 
are not explicitly stated in legislation or the 
Constitution, including health rights13 and 
water rights.14  The Sala IV interpretation in-
cludes the Inter-American Commission and 
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) jurispru-
dence and its consultative opinions as part of 
international law. In 2018, based on a consult 
from the IACHR, for example, the Constitu-
tional Court ruled that the ban on same-sex 
marriage was discriminatory and mandated 
the Congress to legislate a resolution within 
18 months. Because Congress failed to pass 
the necessary laws, same-sex marriage be-
came legal in May 2020 (Sala Constitucion-
al, Vote 2018-12782).  
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
In 2019, appointments to the Sala IV were a 
major issue. In 2018, two vacancies had been 
empty for more than a year despite Con-
gress’s legal obligation to elect replacement 
magistrates within 30 days of a vacancy. The 
time taken by Congress to fill vacancies on 
the court has increased dramatically since 
2000, in part due to the increasingly frag-
mented party system and the lack of majori-
ty parties in Congress that could elect mag-
istrates15 and in part as a result of deputies’ 
growing recognition of the importance of the 
court’s jurisprudence. 
Compounding the court vacancy problem is 
5 Ley de la Jurisdicción Constitucional [1989], No. 7135. For more historical references of the constitutional law in Costa Rica, see for example, Jaime Murillo Víquez, La 
Sala Constitucional (first edition, San José, C.R. Editorial Guayacan, 1994); Ernesto Jinesta L., “La Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Costa Rica,” in Eduardo 
Ferrer MacGregor (ed), Crónica de Tribunales Constitucionales en Latinoamérica (Marcial Pons Editorial, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2009), 543; Rubén Hernández Valle, 
“Reseña histórica sobre la creación de la Sala Constitucional” (Revista de la Sala Constitucional, ISSN 2215-5724, No.1, 2019); J.C. Rodríguez C., “La Sala Consti-
tucional y el equilibrio de poderes,” in Programa Estado de la Nación, Noveno Informe Estado de la Nación (San José, Costa Rica, 2002), 36.  
6 Wilson, B.M. & J.C. Rodríguez, 2006, “Legal Opportunity Structures and Social Movements: The Effects of Institutional Change on Costa Rican Politics,” Comparative 
Political Studies 39(3): 325-351.
7 Poder Judicial, Annual Statistics Report <https://www.poder-judicial.go.cr>
8 “Judicialización de la Salud,” in Programa Estado de la Nación, Primer Informe Estado de la Justicia (San José, Costa Rica, 2015), 308; and “El control constitucion-
al: patrones de votación de la Sala Constitucional,” in Programa Estado de la Nación, Segundo Informe Estado de la Justicia (San José, Costa Rica, 2017), 344.
9 Sala Constitucional, Voto 02771-2003 (Poder Judicial, 4 de abril 2003).
10 Sala Constitucional, Voto 9469-07 (Poder Judicial, 2007). 
11 Sala Constitucional, Voto 1323-96 (Poder Judicial, 1996).
12 Sala Constitucional, Voto 12782-2018 (Poder Judicial, 2018).
13 Bruce M. Wilson, “Costa Rica: health rights litigation: causes and consequences,” in Yamin and Gloppen (eds), Litigating health rights: can courts bring more justice 
to health? (Harvard University Press, 2011).
14 E. Villarreal and B. Wilson, 2021 El agua como derecho humano: Una lucha creciente en Costa Rica. Programa Estado de la Nación, San José, Costa Rica.
15 Between 1989 and 2013, the average length of time it took for Congress to appoint a new magistrate to the Constitutional Court was 64.7 days. In the period be-
tween 2014 and 2016, it took almost 260 days, and between 2017 and 2018 it took 440 days for Congress to fill a vacancy. “Capítulo 7, Nombramiento de Magistra-
dos,” in Programa Estado de la Nación, Tercer Informe Estado de la Justicia (San José, Costa Rica 2020) 343
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that the reelection process has become in-
creasingly difficult and contentious. Magis-
trates are elected to eight-year terms, which 
are automatically renewed unless two-thirds 
of the members of Congress vote not to re-
new the magistrate’s position on the court. In 
practice, no magistrate who sought a second 
eight-year term has been denied by Congress, 
making magistrates’ reelection virtually au-
tomatic. This stability has been regarded as 
a key principle for judicial independence of 
the Supreme Court. In 2019, during the re-
election process of Magistrate Paul Rueda, a 
deputy in the national Congress announced 
that he had corralled the necessary two-thirds 
of the deputies to prevent Rueda’s reelection. 
Some deputies justified their negative vote 
intention by pointing to several of Rueda’s 
judicial rulings with which they disagreed. 
In response, a media campaign was launched 
by civil society organizations and a small 
number of congresspeople, who argued that 
the attempt to block the reelection of mag-
istrate Rueda was a clear attempt to punish 
a Constitutional Court magistrate for doing 
his judicial reasoning and was a full frontal 
attack on Costa Rican judicial independence. 
Ultimately, the magistrate was reelected 
when the Congress failed to reach the min-
imum two-thirds vote required to deny him 
automatic reelection to another eight-year 
term on the Sala IV. The campaign to block 
Rueda’s reelection was a clear signal of fu-
ture battles over Sala IV nominations and the 
fragility of judicial independence, which will 
become more frequent due to a number of 
vacancies that will arise in the coming years 
because of retirements as well as the reelec-
tion of sitting magistrates seeking to extend 
their terms on the bench. 
The political fights over the appointment and 
reappointment of magistrates is a particular-
ly pressing issue since the court’s increasing-
ly divided votes amplifies the importance of 
any given magistrate’s vote. For example, 
for Sala IV votes concerning previous con-
stitutional reviews, a unanimous vote was 
recorded in only 46% of the cases.16 A 2017 
study of Constitutional Court magistrates’ 
voting patterns reveals that their votes were 
not divided along ideological lines but tend-
ed to coalesce thematically. For instance, 
three magistrates might vote in very simi-
lar ways on environmental issues but might 
have irreconcilable differences on questions 
of trade agreements, and vote very differ-
ently from one another. These thematic co-
alitions are very unstable and unpredictable 
over time due to retirements of sitting mag-
istrates and the election of new ones. Com-
pounding the predictability of voting blocs 
is the use of magistrados suplentes (supple-
mental magistrates), who hear cases when a 
sitting magistrate is indisposed due to health, 
holidays, or a conflict of interest.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Structural decision to correct wait-
ing lists for surgical appointments in the 
state-funded and run Social Security Insti-
tute (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, 
CCSS), Vote 55605-2019 
The judicialization of health rights has been a 
growing challenge for courts and health care 
providers across Latin America.17 In Costa 
Rica, health rights litigation is one of the 
most important and most frequently sought 
remedies at the Sala IV.18 Health rights cas-
es represent approximately one-third of all 
cases on the Sala IV annual docket. Signifi-
cantly, health rights litigants have historical-
ly been more successful than litigants in any 
other type of constitutional claim. An aver-
age of 30% of amparos are successful, but on 
average 58% of health rights claimants were 
successful between 2006 and 2013; some 
subcategories of health rights cases, such as 
cancer treatments, were even more success-
ful, 79%, during the same period.19 
A major cause of the massive caseload of 
health rights litigation is due to the inabil-
ity of the state-run and funded health care 
system, Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social 
(CCSS), to schedule treatments for people’s 
ailments. In response, patients increasingly 
harness the power of the Sala IV to demand 
shorter waiting times for their treatment, in-
cluding medical appointments for surgery. 
Claims are also frequently filed to gain ac-
cess to medications denied by the CCSS.
In September 2018, a 73-year-old woman, 
a patient in the CCSS, filed an amparo case 
with the Constitutional Court claiming a vio-
lation of her health rights: after her CCSS-af-
filiated doctor recommended surgery, a state-
owned hospital put her on a waiting list but 
failed to specify a probable date when the 
surgery would take place. After many years 
and thousands of health rights cases relat-
ed to waiting lists, the Sala IV selected this 
case to make a structural sentence to address 
the growing problem of delayed surgery ap-
pointments in the CCSS. 
In Costa Rica, constitutional magistrates use 
structural sentences to obligate government 
authorities to execute specific administrative 
decisions and implement policies or actions 
to correct causes of a current violation. These 
decisions are designed to impact the general 
population, not just the litigant. By using this 
type of sentence, the court asserts that it has the 
constitutional power to effectively co-manage 
alongside the public institution through com-
pulsory recommendations and a monitoring 
mechanism that it puts in place in its holding. 
Previously, the Constitutional Court utilized 
structural sentences for the CCSS to address 
issues of HIV/AIDS patients (1999), reacti-
vate an organ transplant program (1994), cre-
ate a universal vaccination program for pneu-
16 Ibid. 
17 See Ana Sojo, La judicialización del derecho a la salud: lecciones a extraer de Colombia para América Latina (Taller de Judicialización de la Salud, Cepal, Bogotá, 
2013).
18 Wilson, B.M., 2011, “The Causes and Consequences of Health Rights Litigation in Costa Rica,” in A. Yamin & S. Gloppen (eds), Litigating Health Rights: Can 
Courts Bring More Justice to Health? (Harvard University Press, pp132-154); O. Rodriguez, S. Morales, O.F. Norheim & B.M. Wilson, 2018, “Revisiting Health Rights 
Litigation and Access to Medications in Costa Rica: Preliminary evidence from the Cochrane Collaboration reforms,” Health and Human Rights: An International 
Journal, Vol. 20 (1): 79-91.
19 “Judicialización de la Salud,” in Programa Estado de la Nación, Primer Informe Estado de la Justicia (San José, Costa Rica, 2015), 308.
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mococci (2009), and develop a unique file for 
each patient across all CCSS facilities (2012). 
In 2013, the Sala IV issued a holding to re-
duce waiting lists; the 2019 decision, then, is 
the second time the Sala IV has attempted to 
resolve the waiting list issue through a struc-
tural judicial decision. 
In the current decision, the Sala IV took into 
consideration the increasing volume of sim-
ilarly litigated complaints over CCSS wait-
ing lists. The court mandated the CCSS to 
design an integrated system to reduce the 
waiting list for surgeries and specified the 
parameters that should guide its efforts to 
comply with the court’s decision. The CCSS 
was mandated to create standards for wait-
ing times according to the type of surgery, 
develop objective criteria that can be used to 
determine a patient’s position on the waiting 
list, solve infrastructure and human resource 
deficits, and create a timetable of adminis-
trative actions to fulfill these goals as well 
as other more minor requirements.20  The 
sentence gave the CCSS six months to de-
sign the system, and the court fixed a date 
for a public hearing to follow up the results. 
The Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoría de los 
Habitantes) was to follow up in situ these 
measures and report back to the court on the 
CCSS’s compliance with the holding.
In November 2019, during the public hear-
ing, the CCSS president and directors pre-
sented the plan and showed that waiting lists 
for surgeries had already been reduced by 
three months. Civil society organizations 
that were part of the hearings, though, argued 
that the official data hides serious delays in 
particular cases and that the efforts are too 
little and too late to be a realistic solution to 
the waiting list problem. The court will fol-
low up on the plan and the Ombudsman’s 
report in 2020.
2. Fiscal reform, ex ante and ex post con-
stitutional control (Votes 2018-19511 and 
hundreds of subsequent claims in 2019)
In 2017, Costa Rica’s public deficit reached 
6.2% of its GDP, and the state faced sig-
nificant difficulties meeting its obligations 
to pay even its ordinary expenses. In May 
2018, the new incoming government of Pres-
ident Carlos Alvarado (Partido Accion Ciu-
dadana, PAC) set this problem as the number 
one public policy priority to avoid an eco-
nomic crisis. The bill, “Law to Strengthen 
Public Finances,”21 popularly known as the 
“fiscal reform bill,” was sent to the Sala IV 
through ex ante control (consulta previa), a 
parliamentary procedure that requires a bill 
to be examined for its constitutionality by 
the Sala IV before Congress takes its final 
vote. Previously, in 2012, the Constitution-
al Court declared a newly promulgated tax 
reform law unconstitutional due to irregular 
proceedings during the legislative debate. 
After the declaration that that particular fiscal 
reform bill was unconstitutional, other bills 
were debated in Congress, but all failed to 
become law, further compounding the coun-
try’s fiscal instability. When the current bill 
was sent for constitutional review, one of the 
main discussions concerned the law’s consti-
tutional ability to regulate salaries and limit 
budget growth by imposing a unified renu-
meration standard for all public employees. 
Another controversy was that the Supreme 
Court voted that these laws affected judicial 
independence, and it was not previously con-
sulted in the court, resulting in a procedural 
violation, and it would need a supermajority. 
The Sala IV gave the go-ahead in favor of 
the fiscal reform, saying it did not affect ju-
diciary autonomy, which allowed Congress 
to pass the bill with a simple majority vote.
In 2018, public sector unions responded to 
this tax reform bill by carrying out one of 
the longest strikes in recent Costa Rican 
history. But despite this opposition, in De-
cember the bill became law. Immediately, 
the Sala IV started to receive claims against 
the implementation of the law via hundreds 
of amparos and several Constitutional Re-
views. To date, all amparos related to the law 
have been rejected by the court, which has 
determined that the claims do not meet the 
requirements to be adjudicated through the 
abbreviated constitutional process. Instead, 
the court argued that this type of claim for in-
dividual cases must be filed through normal 
jurisdiction courts. Claims for Constitution-
al Review, on the other hand, are still under 
consideration at the Sala IV. These will solve 
many questions about the coverage and im-
plications of the fiscal reform, in some in-
stitutions with constitutional autonomy from 
the Executive Branch, such as the state uni-
versity system, municipalities, the judicial 
branch, and some agencies that are seeking 
exceptions from the reform. 
3. New regulations for strikes, Vote 2019-
20596
In September 2019, Congress approved a 
bill introducing new regulations for strikes.22 
Before its final vote in Congress, the bill 
was sent to the Constitutional Court for an 
ex ante review. This bill was written in re-
sponse to one of the longest strikes in 2018 
against the fiscal reform. It received consid-
erable support in Congress due to the major 
disruptions the strikes caused, especially in 
the education and health sectors. 
A major goal of the new law is to prohibit 
strikes in what are deemed to be essential 
services, such as the security and health sec-
tors. Although education is not considered 
an essential service, it is considered one in 
which strike activity will be permissible, but 
with significant limits: strikes will not be al-
lowed to last more than 21 consecutive days 
or 10 intermittent days. More harmful to the 
unions’ interests, the bill allows salaries to 
be suspended on the first day of any strike 
20 Sala Constitucional, Press Note, <https://salaconstitucional.poder-judicial.go.cr/index.php/component/content/article/72-comunicados/405-sala-constitucion-
al-ordena-a-ccss-disenar-en-6-meses-sistema-para-reducir-listas-de-espera-en-hospitales?Itemid=437>
21 Asamblea Legislativa, Ley de Fortalecimiento de las Finanzas Públicas (Law No 9635, 2019). 
22 Asamblea Legislativa, Ley para brindar seguridad jurídica sobre la huelga y sus procedimientos (Law No 21907, 2019).
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and will limit strikes protesting public pol-
itics. Those strikes will only be permissible 
if the public policy directly affects the eco-
nomic and social interests of the workers in-
volved in the strike. Even those strikes can-
not exceed 48 hours and cannot be exercised 
repeatedly by the same group for the same 
reason. Finally, since it is the courts that de-
termine the legality of a strike, one clause of 
the bill includes language to force courts to 
make their decision within 72 hours from the 
time a claim arrives on their desk. 
Workers’ movements and the business sector 
were polarized regarding this bill. Unions, 
for example, considered it to be an attack 
on their right to strike, which they argue is 
an internationally protected right (such as in 
the ILO Convention No. 87, the Internation-
al Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and the American 
Convention on Human Rights). Business as-
sociations, on the other hand, publicly sup-
ported the bill and viewed it as a way of 
providing legal security for their businesses. 
In response to the bill, public sector workers 
staged a massive demonstration on Septem-
ber 3, 2019. On the opposite side, most pri-
vate sector organizations issued press releas-
es supporting the bill. This issue is seen as 
part of a wider confrontation in the country 
among the old and new economies, working 
standard flexibility, and employees’ acquired 
rights and other work benefits.
In November 2019, a Constitutional Court 
resolution held that a majority of the arti-
cles in the bill were constitutional except for 
two parts. First, the Sala IV held that that 
part of the bill requiring the dissolution of 
unions if their leaders committed criminal 
acts was unconstitutional. The court not-
ed that one person’s criminal responsibility 
could not be transferred to an entire union. 
The second area deemed unconstitutional 
was in response to what the court viewed as 
a procedural error made by deputies as the 
bill progressed through Congress. This was 
because a prior consultation regarding the 
public services that should be considered 
essential should have the approval of the Su-
preme Court of Justice.
The resolution is complex and indicates that 
it was a contentious issue inside the Sala 
Constitutional. As mentioned before, this 
vote has several separated votes and annota-
tions. The Sala IV magistrates did not unan-
imously support the whole of the judgment; 
some parts of the court’s reasoning were 
only by a simple majority (four magistrates). 
The lawmakers erased the two articles that 
were contested by the court, and the bill be-
came law on January 21, 2020, but the public 
unions announced their intention to take this 
resolution to the international level since it 
affects international labor law treaties signed 
by Costa Rica.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
First, with several magistrates nearing retire-
ment age and a current vacancy, the debate 
over how magistrates are elected will likely 
become even more contentious, which will 
likely lead to longer delays in the appoint-
ment process. Some in Congress appear keen 
to undermine judicial independence and 
elect magistrates friendly to their agenda. 
Second, a new Programa Estado de la Nación 
project is using automated text analysis tools 
to investigate various aspects of the entire 
archive of all the decisions made by the Sala 
IV. The project’s results will generate new in-
sights into the jurisprudence of the court, the 
voting behavior of magistrates, and a clearer 
understanding of how the court functions.
Finally, in parallel with the fiscal reform 
mentioned above, a new public employment 
bill designed to cut public expenses and re-
duce the growing fiscal deficit will be sent to 
Congress and subsequently become a major 
topic for the court in 2020.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This review discusses the key events in the 
constitutional order of the Republic of Cro-
atia that took place in 2019. The Freedom 
House Freedom in the World 2019 Report re-
gards Croatia as a free country and rates it 1.5 
/ 7 (‘1=Most Free, 7=Least Free’).1 Political 
rights protection is rated 1 and civil liberties 
2. In this light, nothing really changed with 
respect to the 2018 Report. Like in the year 
before, the electoral process was awarded 
the highest rating because the head of the 
Government and the national representatives 
were elected through free and fair elections. 
The 2019 Report states that civil and polit-
ical rights are generally respected, though 
corruption in the public sector is a serious 
problem. It also points out that the last couple 
of years have been marked by an increasing 
public concern about the presence of far-right 
groups and figures that espouse discrimina-
tory values. 
In 2019, the Constitutional Court received a 
total of 5,339 cases, of which 4,967 related 
to constitutional complaints for the protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution, and 135 to 
proposals for assessment of the conformity of 
an act with the Constitution.2 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Among other things, 2019 was noted for 
the unwillingness of the legislator to finally 
regulate certain areas with appropriate laws; 
specifically, the laws regulating referendum 
and abortion. No new referendum law was 
adopted nor was the existing one amended, 
despite the yearlong public, political and pro-
fessional awareness of the need for appropri-
ate referendum regulation, or more precisely, 
the need for defining matters which cannot be 
decided by a referendum (particularly if they 
could jeopardize the exercise of fundamental 
human rights) as well as the need for rede-
fining the conditions for calling a citizen-ini-
tiated referendum and for harmonizing local 
and national referendum organization rules. 
And further despite the recurring warnings of 
the Constitutional Court on the need for the 
Croatian Parliament to coordinate the Law 
on Referendum and Other Means of Direct 
Participation in Administration of State Pow-
ers and Local and Regional Self-Govern-
ment (hereinafter Law on Referendum)3 with 
the Constitution or the 2010 Constitutional 
Amendment. Although in 2019 there was 
no civil initiative that tested and could have 
abused the current constitutional referendum 
framework (which, unfortunately, occurred 
in some earlier civil initiatives, i.e., the 2018 
CROATIA
1 Freedom in the World 2019, available at: https://www.nhri.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ICON.pdf, 
accessed on 20 January 2020.
2 Received cases in the period from 1990 to 31 December 2019, available at:
https://www.usud.hr/sites/default/files/dokumenti/Pregled_primljenih_predmeta_u_razdoblju_od_1990._
do_30._prosinca_2019.pdf, accessed on 1 February 2020.
3 The Law on Referendum and Other Means of Direct Participation in Administration of State Powers and 
Local and Regional Self-Government, Official Gazette no. 33/96, 92/01, 44/06, 58/06, 69/07, 38/09, 100/16, 
73/17.
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citizens’ initiative requiring electoral reform 
and the 2018 citizens’ initiative requiring de-
nunciation of the Istanbul Convention), it is 
very likely that some initiative will soon test 
the exercise of direct democracy in Croatia.
As far as the law regulating abortion is con-
cerned (Law on Health Measures in Imple-
mentation of the Right to Freely Decide 
on Childbirth – adopted way back in 1978; 
hereinafter Abortion Law4), it should be not-
ed that the Croatian Parliament was bound, 
based on the order of the Constitutional Court 
provided in the ruling of 21 February 2017,5 
to adopt a new law pursuant to the ruling’s 
guidelines that highlighted the necessity of 
‘modernization’ of the 1978 law. The ruling 
also stated that the legislator should prescribe 
educational and preventive measures and in-
corporate them into the new law, so that the 
termination of pregnancy should be an excep-
tion and not a rule. Moreover, the Constitu-
tional Court instructed the Croatian Parlia-
ment to adopt the new law within two years 
of the ruling’s date. However, the legislator 
did not comply with the order, despite the fact 
that Constitutional Law in the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Croatia6 clearly sets 
forth in Article 31 that decisions and rulings 
of the Court are binding for all natural per-
sons and legal entities, and all authorities and 
local and regional self-government bodies are 
obliged to enforce them within the scope of 
their constitutional and legal competences. 
However, disobeying an order of the Court 
regarding a specified deadline is unfortunate-
ly more the rule than the exception, and does 
not imply any other sanction but political ac-
countability.
Bearing in mind the fact that the next parlia-
mentary election is scheduled for the pres-
ent year, it is to be expected that none of the 
above laws will be adopted in 2020.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Rights of migrants
Decision of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Croatia no: U-III-557/2019 of 
11 September 2019 
In its decision of 11 September 2019,7 the 
Constitutional Court accepted the constitu-
tional complaint of the applicant, a citizen of 
the Republic of Iraq, whose application for 
international protection was initially rejected 
as unlawful. The importance of this decision 
reflects the fact that the Constitutional Court 
held that the competent bodies, the Ministry 
of Interior and administrative courts, ‘did not 
act in a way compliant with the guarantees 
for the protection of rights, stated in Article 
23, paragraph 1 of the Constitution and Arti-
cle 3 of the Convention’ (point 5.14.). 
The Court accepted the complaint of the ap-
plicant, who suffered domestic violence and 
experienced abuse by male members of her 
family in her homeland. It also ordered the 
competent bodies to remedy the detected 
flaws and enable the applicant to demonstrate 
her situation and circumstances, for which 
she sought international protection. Such a 
decision represented a turning point in the 
case law of administrative courts, which in 
principle do not regard domestic violence as 
an eligible reason for approving international 
protection. Nevertheless, the Constitutional 
Court explicitly cited the absolute nature of 
the rights protected in Article 3 of the Con-
vention: ‘international protection is not grant-
ed only due to a danger from members of a 
repressive state apparatus but also due to a 
danger from individuals or groups who oper-
ate beyond that state apparatus’ (point 5.5.). 
It did not agree with the conclusions of the 
administrative courts, which claimed that the 
assertions of the applicant were not convinc-
ing enough. In that light, the Court assessed 
that the competent bodies did not take into 
consideration the well-known fact that phys-
ical, and particularly sexual violence or rape 
represents intensive traumatic experience 
with severe or devastating long-lasting con-
sequences for every victim, and thus is quali-
fied as abuse. Furthermore, the strong feeling 
of shame and fear as well as the omnipresent 
prejudices against the victims of such vio-
lence prevent them from reporting the per-
petrators and seeking aid. The Constitutional 
Court believed that if those circumstances 
were accompanied by the cultural context 
of the case and the applicant’s environment, 
then it was completely irrational to hold that 
the applicant could have communicated her 
traumas earlier. Moreover, she was supposed 
to convey her experience to two men. Ac-
cordingly, the competent courts should have 
evaluated her testimony in the context of all 
those facts (point 5.13.). 
2. Rights of national minorities
Decision of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Croatia no: U-II-1818/2016 of 2 
July 2019 – the procedure for assessment of 
the conformity of an act with the Constitution
In its decision of 2 July 2019,8 the Constitu-
tional Court accepted the 4-year-old appli-
cation for assessment of the conformity of 
an amendment of the Statute of the Town of 
Vukovar with the Constitution, which was 
submitted by the Parliamentary Committee 
on Human and National Minority Rights, and 
repealed parts of the 2015 Statutory Decision 
on the Amendment of the Statute of the Town 
of Vukovar. 
The Statute of the Town of Vukovar had been 
subject to assessment of the Constitutional 
Court before the above decision. Indeed, in 
its decision of 12 August 2014,9 the Consti-
tutional Court repealed Article 22 of the 2013 
Statutory Decision of the Vukovar Town 
4 Law on Health Measures in Implementation of the Right to Freely Decide on Childbirth, Official Gazette no. 614/78.
5 Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia no. U-I-60/1991 et al. of 21 February 2017, Official Gazette no. 25/17.
6 Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette no. 99/99., 29/02., 49/02. – consolidated text
7 The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, decision no: U-III-557/2019 of 11 September 2019, available at: https://sljeme.usud.hr/usud/praksaw.nsf/
fOdluka.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=C12570D30061CE54C125847400330C25, accessed on 22 October 2019.
8 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia no: U-II-1818/2016 of 2 July 2019, Official Gazette no. 78/2019.
9 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia no: U-II-6110/2013 of 12 August 2014, Official Gazette no. 104/14.
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Council, which stipulated that the territory 
of the Town of Vukovar shall be entirely ex-
empted from enforcement of the Act on the 
Use of the Language and Script of National 
Minorities and from Article 12 of the Con-
stitutional Act on the Rights of National Mi-
norities. On the same day, the Constitutional 
Court made a decision10 following an applica-
tion of the Croatian Parliament for assessment 
of the conformity of the referendum question 
proposed by Citizens’ Initiative ‘Stožer za 
obranu hrvatskog Vukovara’ (Headquarters 
for the Defence of Croatian Vukovar) with 
the Constitution, in which it laid down its 
viewpoints applicable to this concrete case, 
i.e., the Statutory Decision of the Vukovar 
Town Council, and bound the Vukovar Town 
Council to regulate, define and incorporate 
the individual right of members of national 
minorities to use their language and script in 
the Vukovar Town Statute itself within one 
year of delivery of this decision. It should be 
noted that the Vukovar Town Council did not 
regulate that right in the Statute but in a statu-
tory decision. Nevertheless, the Constitution-
al Court accepted the reasons of the Vukovar 
Town Council for making a separate statutory 
decision due to ‘special circumstances’ (point 
18). In the same decision, the Constitutional 
Court bound the Government of the Republic 
of Croatia to refer to the Parliament for con-
sideration, within one year, the amendment of 
the Act on the Use of the Language and Script 
of National Minorities, which is supposed to 
include a legal mechanism convenient for 
cases in which the representative bodies of 
local self-government units do not meet their 
liabilities as set out in the said Act. Although 
the Government referred the amendment to 
the Parliament for consideration on 10 July 
2015, it has not been put onto the agenda yet.
In its new decision, the Constitutional Court 
repealed Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Statu-
tory Decision, whereby the representatives of 
the Serbian national minority in the Vukovar 
Town Council had to submit a written appli-
cation for delivery of written material in the 
Serbian language and Cyrillic script. Now 
they can request it orally. The Constitution-
al Court held that the mandatory submission 
of the aforementioned written application by 
members of the Serbian national minority ac-
tually narrowed or restrained their rights and 
added that the exercise of rights of national 
minorities shall not be regulated in a trouble-
some way or shall not imply additional con-
ditions (point 24.2.).
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court re-
pealed Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Statu-
tory Decision, according to which the right 
of the representatives of the Serbian national 
minority in the Vukovar Town Council to be 
provided with written material in the Serbian 
language and Cyrillic script depends on the 
funds foreseen for this purpose in the budget 
of the Town of Vukovar. Such a standpoint 
was assumed taking account of Article 22 of 
the Act on the Use of the Language and Script 
of National Minorities, which stipulates that 
all financial resources needed for enforce-
ment of this Act and relating bylaws shall 
be ensured through the State Budget and the 
exercise of the rights of representatives shall 
not depend on funds in local self-government 
budgets (points 25.1. and 25.2.). 
To conclude, the Constitutional Court or-
dered the Vukovar Town Council to make a 
decision on the possibility, or more precisely, 
on the need to extend the scope of the guaran-
teed individual and collective rights of mem-
bers of the Serbian national minority living 
in the Town of Vukovar in October 2019 (in 
line with the Statutory Decision (point 29). 
In fact, even though it asserted that because 
of the historical-political situation in the 
Town of Vukovar (which is still affected by 
the consequences of the Greater Serbian ag-
gression at the beginning of the 1990s), the 
Town Council ‘is permitted’ to arrange the 
collective rights gradually and in a way that 
respects the needs of the Croatian majority, 
the Constitutional Court stressed that meeting 
the respective liabilities cannot be prolonged 
indefinitely. However, the Vukovar Town 
Council announced on 18 October 2019 that 
the necessary requirements for introduction 
of the special rights of the Serbian national 
minority with respect to the equal use of lan-
guages and scripts had still not been met. As 
a response, the Constitutional Court asked the 
Vukovar Town Council to respect the Con-
stitution and law, and all the stakeholders to 
open a dialogue with mutual respect to calm 
tensions. Surely, it will be interesting to see 
whether the Constitutional Court will autono-
mously initiate the procedure for assessment 
of the conformity of this regulation of the 
Vukovar Town Council with the Constitution.
3. Freedom of thought and expression 
Decision of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Croatia no: U-III-2944/2018 of 
26 June 2019
In this case, the Constitutional Court accept-
ed the constitutional complaint of the appli-
cant, who blatantly responded to a television 
appearance of a Croatian historian in the 
reader response section of a respected Croa-
tian daily newspaper.11 The applicant accused 
the historian of historical revisionism and 
claimed that he is nothing but ‘a notorious 
manipulator and ideologist of the Croatian 
version of fascism’, after which the latter 
filed a lawsuit before the competent munici-
pal court for compensation of non-pecuniary 
damage suffered due to violation of his right 
on personality. In the first instance judge-
ment, the claimant’s lawsuit was dismissed; 
the second instance judgement ordered the 
applicant to provide the claimant with the 
amount of 20,000 HRK (points 14 and 15). 
The applicant contested those judgements in 
a constitutional complaint.
In its decision, the Constitutional Court es-
tablished that the applicant’s objections touch 
upon violation of his freedom of thought and 
expression, stated in Article 38 paragraphs 1 
and 2 of the Constitution in relation to Arti-
cle 16, paragraph 2 of the Constitution, ac-
cording to which ‘any restriction of freedoms 
or rights shall be proportionate to the nature 
of the need for such restriction in each indi-
10 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia no: U-VIIR-4640/2014 of 12 August 2014, Official Gazette no. 104/14 and 130/14.
11 The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, decision no: U-III-2944/2018 of 26 June 2019, available at: https://sljeme.usud.hr/usud/praksaw.nsf/
fOdluka.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=C12570D30061CE54C125842A003E13F5, accessed on 10 October 2019.
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vidual case’ (point 19).12 The Constitutional 
Court held that ‘in circumstances in which a 
controversial utterance affects the reputation, 
honour, dignity or rights of other people, the 
“conflict” should be resolved by weighing the 
relevant factors relating to the following two 
protected values: on the one hand, the right 
to freedom of expression and on the other 
hand, the right to respect for the personal life 
of other people’ (point 20). Both rights shall 
be equally protected and the courts shall be 
focused on achieving ‘a fair balance between 
these rights’ in concrete cases (point 20).
Within the framework of this case, the Con-
stitutional Court was expected to handle the 
following four questions: ‘Does the concrete 
case deal with interference with the guaran-
tee of freedom of thought? Is the interference 
based on the law? Did it have a legitimate 
goal? Was it necessary in a democratic soci-
ety?’ (point 22). After having provided brief 
positive answers to the first three questions, 
the Constitutional Court concentrated on the 
fourth, which required the most comprehen-
sive elaboration.
When assessing whether the interference with 
freedom of expression was necessary in the 
concrete case, the Constitutional Court was 
guided by the criteria established through the 
case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (see Axel Springer AG v. Germany 
[Vv], no. 39954/08, judgement of 7 February 
2012; and Von Hannover v. Germany (br. 2) 
[Vv], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, judge-
ment of 7 February 2012). The Constitutional 
Court was supposed to provide an answer to 
the following questions: Does the case touch 
upon a discussion relevant for the public? To 
what extent can the person having suffered the 
damage be regarded as a public figure? What 
is the form of the posted comment and what 
are its consequences? How severe was the 
pronounced penalty? (point 28).
With respect to the criterion whether the ap-
plicant took part in a public discussion, the 
Constitutional Court held that in the concrete 
case, ‘it is not doubtful that the applicant want-
ed to participate in a public discussion about 
World War II, fascism in Croatia in the mid-
20th century and the way those events are per-
ceived in the public today and how they are 
articulated’ (point 30). The standpoint on this 
issue bears great relevance since it revolves 
around the possibility of restricting freedom 
of expression, and when it comes to a public 
discussion or political speech, this possibility 
is ‘considerably narrowed’ (point 30).
Similarly, regarding the criterion whether 
the claimant is a public figure or not, the 
Constitutional Court stated that ‘the thresh-
old of reasonable criticism is wider when it 
concerns politicians and public figures than 
when it is directed towards private parties 
since the former are willingly subject to pub-
lic judgements and therefore, they are ex-
pected to show a higher level of tolerance for 
the criticism of their words and acts’ (point 
31). The fact that the claimant is ‘a public-
ly, scholarly and politically exposed person’ 
had already been confirmed by the second 
instance court in its judgement (point 32).
In regard to the content of the controversial 
text, the Constitutional Court underlined 
that ‘the constitutional and conventional 
provisions on freedom of expression do not 
apply only to information or ideas that are 
benevolently accepted or deemed as non-of-
fensive or imply no reaction but also to those 
which are offensive, shocking or disturbing. 
This is entailed by pluralism, tolerance and 
openness which represent prerequisites for a 
democratic society’ (point 36). 
The Constitutional Court also pointed out 
that when establishing ‘a balance’ between 
freedom of expression and the protection of 
honour, dignity and reputation, it is neces-
sary to differentiate between facts and value 
judgements. This is particularly important 
for ‘the right of a person to prove his/her as-
sertions about facts and for greater freedom 
of expression when it comes to value judg-
ments’ (point 37). In terms of value judge-
ments, demonstration of their veracity is not 
required, though they should be based on 
some facts too (points 20 and 37). Taking ac-
count of the above criteria, the Constitution-
al Court concluded that the second instance 
decision did not prove ‘the pressing need for 
preferring the legal protection of the claim-
ant’s dignity, reputation and honour over the 
applicant’s freedom of thought and expres-
sion, particularly if such preference would 
imply damage compensation in the amount of 
20,000 HRK. The reasons behind the second 
instance judgement cannot be regarded as 
justified and sufficient for such interference 
with the applicant’s freedom of expression’ 
(point 40).
4. Freedom of thought and expression
Decision of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Croatia no. U-III-63/2017 of 26 
February 2019
In this case, the Constitutional Court consid-
ered whether the applicants faced violation 
of their right to freedom of thought and ex-
pression, guaranteed in Article 38, paragraphs 
1 and 2 of the Constitution, in relation to the 
right to lodge petitions and complaints, guar-
anteed in Article 46 of the Constitution.13 
Within the bankruptcy procedure, the appli-
cants were imposed a pecuniary penalty due 
12 See the consolidated text of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia as of 15 January 2014. Edited and translated by the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Croatia, available at: https://www.usud.hr/sites/default/files/dokumenti/The_consolidated_text_of_the_Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Croatia_as_of_15_Jan-
uary_2014.pdf, accessed on 1 February 2020. When preparing this part of this report, relating to the protection of freedom of thought and expression, the following 
material was very useful for us: The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, National Report, XVIIIth Congress of the Conference of European Constitutional 
Courts. Answers to the survey questions for the XVIIIth Congress of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts (Prague, 26-29 May 2020) ‘Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms: The Relationship of International, Supranational and National Catalogues in the 21st Century’, Zagreb, October 2019, pp. 13-16, avail-
able at: https://www.cecc2017-2020.org/fileadmin/Dokumenty/Pdf/Questionnaire/National_Reports/National/Croatia_-_Questionnaire_XVIII_Congress_of_CECC.
pdf, accessed 1 February 2020.
13 The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, decision no: U-III-63/2017 of 26 February 2019, available at: https://sljeme.usud.hr/usud/praksaw.nsf/fOdlu-
ka.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=C12570D30061CE54C12583AF003A095B, accessed on 10 October 2019. See also The Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Croatia, National Report, XVIIIth Congress of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts, loc. cit.
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to contempt of court. The assessment of the 
bankruptcy judge of contempt of court was 
based on the allegations stated in the petition 
submitted to the Supreme Court of the Repub-
lic of Croatia entitled ‘a complaint’ (point 19).
In a complaint, the applicants highlighted 
that ‘due to the unprofessional, illegal, im-
proper and inefficient performance of the 
judge’ in the concrete bankruptcy procedure 
and ‘for “adjustment” of the documentation 
for the higher court as well as for other pro-
ceedings arising from and in regard with this 
bankruptcy case’, they requested supervision 
over the judge’s work and examination of her 
responsibility. The appeal against the first in-
stance ruling was rejected by the High Com-
mercial Court.
In this case, the Constitutional Court also re-
ferred to the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights14 and emphasized that 
courts can be, like any other public institu-
tion, subject to criticism and control ‘(…) 
except in the event of severe harmful attacks, 
basically ill-founded – bearing in mind that 
judges represent fundamental institutions of 
the state and as such, they can be subject to 
a well-substantiated critique by an individual 
and not only to a theoretical and general one’ 
(point 16). Moreover, when they act in their 
official capacity, judges should be more toler-
ant in terms of criticism than ordinary people. 
The Constitutional Court also singled out the 
need for differentiating between criticism and 
insult. Unless the sole intention of some form 
of expression was to insult members of the 
court, sanctioning such conduct would not 
represent violation of Article 10 of the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. 
In its decision, the Constitutional Court 
claimed that imposing a pecuniary penalty 
on the applicants represents interference with 
freedom of expression, guaranteed in Article 
38 of the Constitution (point 19). Moreover, 
it established that such interference has no 
legal ground. The Constitutional Court em-
phasized that the first instance court based its 
decision on the Civil Procedure Act (Article 
110) despite the fact that the petition submit-
ted to the Supreme Court was not the peti-
tion submitted to the trial court. The petition 
was just a form of the exercise of the right 
to lodge petitions and complaints, guaranteed 
by the Constitution (Article 46) and the Judi-
ciary Act (Article 4, paragraph 3). Since that 
petition is not part of the civil procedure, it 
cannot be subject to Article 110 of the Civ-
il Procedure Act and thus the trial court was 
not empowered to punish the parties for the 
expressions used in the complaint submitted 
to the Supreme Court (point 20). Therefore, 
the Constitutional Court concluded that since 
the interference with freedom of expression 
had no legal grounds in the concrete case, the 
applicants did, through the respective con-
troversial decisions, face violation of their 
constitutional right to freedom of thought and 
expression in relation to their constitutional 
right to lodge petitions and complaints.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
There is no doubt that the first half of the 
year 2020 will be highly important for the 
Republic of Croatia, which took over the 
presidency of the Council of the European 
Union for the first time in its history. The 
Croatian presidency represents a challenge 
for the European Union itself since it over-
laps with the beginning of a new EU insti-
tutional and legislative cycle. The six-month 
presidency is based on four priority areas: ‘A 
Europe that is developing’, ‘A Europe that 
connects’, ‘A Europe that protects’ and ‘An 
influential Europe’.
The beginning of 2020 (18 February) will be 
marked by the inauguration of newly elected 
Croatian President Zoran Milanović. Since 
he is a member of the main opposition par-
ty (Social Democratic Party), it is very likely 
that relations between the Croatian Parlia-
ment and the Croatian President will be any-
thing but idyllic.
In the second half of 2020 (September), Cro-
atia will see a new parliamentary election. 
Bearing in mind that fact, necessary steps 
forward in terms of legislation are not to be 
expected. This primarily refers to adoption 
and/or amendment of a number of laws in 
various areas – electoral system, referendum, 
abortion, healthcare and social welfare.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Cyprus was declared in-
dependent and its Constitution came into 
existence on 16 August 1960. The Consti-
tution of Cyprus established a unitary yet 
bi-communal State that was based on the 
requirement of cooperation and coexistence 
between the two communities on the island: 
the Greek-Cypriot community and the Turk-
ish-Cypriot community. Following the col-
lapse of the political compromise between 
the two communities in 1964 and the with-
drawal of the Turkish-Cypriots from the or-
gans of the State, Cypriot constitutional law 
has evolved – and survived – through the ap-
plication of the law of necessity.
As discussed in the previous report, the year 
2018 ended on a relatively atypical note for 
constitutional law. The 2019 report features 
three recurring themes from the 2018 report. 
First, the constitutional lacuna regarding the 
issue of non-taken parliamentary seats con-
tinued to cause ambiguity and uncertainty 
until the very last days of 2019. Second, the 
constitutionality of cuts and reforms intro-
duced during the financial crisis continued 
to trouble Cypriot courts, and the issue has 
not yet been determined in a final manner. 
Finally, the impartiality and independence of 
the courts were heavily challenged follow-
ing allegations of conflict of interest among 
Supreme Court judges. These are topics that 
will be discussed in the present report. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. President v. House of Representatives: 
continuing the saga of the 56th parliamen-
tary seat
The 2018 report focused extensively on the 
two electoral petitions issued by the Supreme 
Court relating to the 56th parliamentary seat 
and the situation that arose following the 
2016 parliamentary elections.1 Specifically, 
in the aftermath of the 2016 parliamentary 
elections, one of the newly elected candidates 
chose not to take the seat, thus her term of 
office in the House of Representatives never 
commenced. The election of representatives, 
including the replacement of vacated seats, is 
regulated under Article 66(2) of the Consti-
tution and Article 35 of the Electoral Law, as 
amended.2 The term ‘vacated seat’, however, 
is understood as a seat that becomes vacant 
during a parliamentary term (i.e., after a rep-
resentative gives the necessary affirmation). 
What was not regulated by the Constitution 
and relevant (enabling) legislation was the is-
sue of ‘non-taken seats’, i.e., seats that cannot 
be regarded as vacated since they were never 
first occupied before the commencement of 
the parliamentary term.3  
In two electoral petitions from 2017 and 
2018, extensively analysed in the previous 
report, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
the notion of non-taken parliamentary seats 
CYPRUS
1 See Constantinos Kombos, ‘Cyprus’, in Richard Albert and others (eds), 2018 Global Review of Constitu-
tional Law (The I·CONnect-Clough Center 2018) 74-75.
2 Election of Members of the House of Representatives Law (72/1979).
3 This issue is now regulated by the Constitution, which has been amended accordingly; see below on the 
2019 constitutional amendments. See also, the Law concerning the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution 
(Law 128(I)/2019).
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is unknown to the Constitution. Moreover, it 
declined the possibility of granting the seat to 
a person who did not secure it through elec-
tion, as this would contravene the principle of 
popular sovereignty.4 As a response to these 
developments, the House of Representatives 
voted into legislation a new amendment to 
the Electoral Law that revised the procedure 
for filling a non-taken seat. According to the 
amendment, a seat vacated before the com-
mencement of the parliamentary term is to be 
granted to the same party’s runner-up. How-
ever, the President referred the amending law 
to the Supreme Court for a preventive review 
of its constitutionality prior to its official 
promulgation (Article 140 Constitution).
In its decision to this Reference,5 the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed its previous finding that the 
terms ‘vacated seat’ and ‘non-taken seat’ dif-
fer and that Article 66(2) of the Constitution 
refers only to the former. Most importantly, 
the Court relied on the principle of popular 
sovereignty to find the law unconstitutional. 
According to the Court, the principle of pop-
ular sovereignty is expressed by the direct 
election of the members of the Parliament by 
the people, by virtue of Articles 65 and 66 of 
the Constitution. The only exception to this 
is Article 66(2), providing for the filling of 
‘vacated seats’ by the next candidate from 
the same political party having obtained the 
highest number of votes in the elections.6 
Nevertheless, the issue of non-taken seats is 
not covered by Article 66(2), and by exten-
sion it cannot fall under the exception to the 
principle of popular sovereignty embodied 
in Article 66(2). Consequently, the contested 
amending law was found to be unconstitu-
tional, violating the principle of popular sov-
ereignty and Articles 31, 63, 64 65, 66 and 
71 of the Constitution. Finally, the law was 
found contrary to the principle of separation 
of powers, as the legislative power intervened 
in an unacceptable manner with the final de-
cision of the judicial power by essentially 
overturning the Supreme Court’s decision in 
the 2018 electoral petition.
2. Constitutional amendments
Following these events, the House of Rep-
resentatives proceeded to the only remain-
ing option in order to deal with this peculiar 
and constitutionally unregulated situation of 
a non-taken seat. Specifically, on 3 October 
2019, the House of Representatives proceed-
ed to the twelfth amendment of the Consti-
tution of Cyprus. The House of Representa-
tives amended Article 66 of the Constitution 
by introducing the notion of ‘renounced or 
non-taken parliamentary seat’. Moreover, 
through an addition to Article 71, the House 
introduced a new paragraph 2, which pro-
vides the following definition: ‘[a] parlia-
mentary seat shall be deemed to be renounced 
or non-taken if an elected candidate, before 
his or her nomination/proclamation,7 dies or 
refuses to exercise his or her right to give the 
necessary affirmation or, following his/her 
nomination/proclamation and prior to his/her 
affirmation by virtue of Article 69, declines 
or fails to assume his/her duties’.8 
This was not the only constitutional amend-
ment for 2019. On the contrary, the year 2019 
was marked by an unprecedented number of 
them. At this point, it should be noted that 
due to the unique nature and bi-communal 
character of the Cypriot Constitution, amend-
ments of non-basic articles can only be vot-
ed into legislation on the basis of a separate 
‘supermajority’ comprised of at least two-
thirds of the Greek-Cypriot representatives 
and at least two-thirds of the Turkish-Cypri-
ot representatives.9 The withdrawal of the 
Turkish-Cypriot community in 1964 from all 
constitutional posts, including the House of 
Representatives, meant that the amendment 
procedure was deemed legally impossible 
and politically dangerous. As a result, the 
House of Representatives, comprised only of 
Greek-Cypriot representatives, was reluctant 
to proceed to amendments. Such reluctance 
lasted for twenty-five years, when in 1989 
the House of Representatives passed the first 
constitutional amendment validated on the 
basis of the doctrine of necessity.10 Up until 
2016, nine other constitutional amendments 
had been introduced.11 
Beyond the amendment of Article 66, three 
other amendments were introduced in 2019. 
The eleventh constitutional amendment to 
the Cyprus Constitution was enacted on 19 
July 2019 with the addition of two new para-
graphs to Article 167 regarding the budget of 
the House of Representatives.12 In particular, 
the eleventh amendment provided for the 
economic autonomy and independence of 
the budget of the House of Representatives 
4 Andreas Michaelides a.o. v. Chief Returns Officer a.o., Electoral Petition 2/2016, 31 May 2017; Andreas Michaelides a.o. v. Chief Returns Officer a.o., Electoral 
Petition 1/2017, 30 April 2018.
5 President v. House of Representatives, Reference 4/2018, 19 March 2019.
6 Note that Article 66(2), read in conjunction with Article 35 of the Electoral Law, provides that parliamentary seats vacated during the parliamentary term are filled 
through the granting of the seat to the next candidate from the same political party having obtained the highest number of votes in the elections. There is no 
by-election for the nomination of a new representative.
7 That means when the returning officer announces the outcome and states that the candidate is duly elected on the basis of the certified election count.
8 Translation by the authors.
9 Article 182(3) of the Cypriot Constitution. For an analysis of the Cypriot paradigm of constitutional amendments, see Constantinos Kombos, Athena Herodotou, 
‘(Un-)Constitutional Amendments: The Cypriot Paradigm’ (2019) 25(3) European Public Law 305.
10 Law concerning the First Amendment of the Constitution (Law 95/1989). On the doctrine of necessity, see Constantinos Kombos, The Doctrine of Necessity in 
Constitutional Law (Sakkoulas, 2015); Criton C. Tornaritis, Cyprus and Its Constitutional and Other Problems (2nd, Nicosia, 1980).
11 Law concerning the Second Amendment of the Constitution (Law 106(I)/1996); Law concerning the Third Amendment of the Constitution (Law 115(I)/1996); Law 
concerning the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution (Law 104(Ι)/2002); Law concerning the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution (Law 127(I)/2006); Law concern-
ing the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution (Law 51(I)/2010); Law concerning the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution (Law 68(I)/2013); Law concerning the 
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution (Law 130(I)/2015); Law concerning the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution (Law 69(I)/2016); Law concerning the Tenth 
Amendment of the Constitution (Law 93(I)/2016).
12 Law concerning the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution (Law 100(I)/2019).
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as required by the principle of separation of 
powers and the paradigm of most European 
States for safeguarding independence in de-
cision making and in the exercise of powers 
and competences.13  
The thirteenth amendment imposed for the 
first time a limit to presidential terms of two 
consecutive terms.14 This amendment aimed 
at strengthening democratic institutions, 
renewing and modernizing public life and 
safeguarding against the creation of an es-
tablishment due to longevity of service in the 
highest public office.15 Finally, the fourteenth 
amendment extended the right of citizens to 
be nominated as members of the Parliament 
to the minimum age of 21 (from 25 years of 
age)16  in order to adapt to modern social real-
ity and perceptions.17 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. The right to property in the aftermath of 
the economic crisis
The 2018 report examined two decisions of 
the Administrative Court assessing the con-
stitutionality of cuts and reforms introduced 
to the salaries, pensions and allowances of 
employees and pensioners of the public and 
wider public sector.18 These cuts and re-
forms were imposed as austerity measures 
on the ground of public interest. It should 
be reminded that in the Avgousti case, the 
Administrative Court held that the right to 
property – safeguarded by Article 23 of the 
Constitution – does not enlist public interest 
as a legitimate ground for limiting the right 
to property. Moreover, it held that the Con-
stitution does not permit limitations for bud-
getary considerations, consolidation of public 
finances or streamlining pensions.
And while the appeal against the Avgousti 
decision was (and still is) pending, the Ad-
ministrative Court issued three other equally 
important decisions on austerity measures. 
In particular, on 29 March 2019, the Admin-
istrative Court issued three significant deci-
sions on the constitutionality of laws impos-
ing different forms of cuts and reforms to the 
salaries of employees of the public and wid-
er public sector, with potentially significant 
economic repercussions. 
In the first decision, Nicolaidi a.o. v. Repub-
lic,19 the Court was called to determine wheth-
er the 2012 legislative reductions in the sala-
ries of the applicants (employees of the public 
and wider public sector) were in violation 
of Article 23 of the Constitution.20 First, the 
Administrative Court found that salaries fell 
within the definition of ‘property’ of Article 23 
and, therefore, were constitutionally protect-
ed.21 Then, the Court examined the grounds 
on which the reductions were justified. Ac-
cording to the preamble of the contested legis-
lation, the reductions were deemed necessary 
in order to limit public spending, to overcome 
the difficult financial situation of the Republic 
and to avoid any further deterioration of the 
fiscal situation. These reasons were interpret-
ed by the Court as essentially amounting to 
grounds of public interest or public benefit. 
The Court noted, however, that Article 23(3) 
does not explicitly permit the limitation of the 
right to property on grounds of public interest 
or public benefit. Consequently, the limitation 
imposed on the right to property (in the form 
of reduction of salaries) was in violation of 
Article 23 and the contested provisions were 
unconstitutional.
In Koundourou a.o. v. Republic,22 the second 
decision issued on the same day, the Admin-
istrative Court examined the constitutional-
ity of the non-concession of the indexation 
increases and increases in salaries of the ap-
plicants (again employees of the public and 
wider public sector).23 These measures were 
also adopted on the grounds of public interest 
in order to prevent any further deterioration 
of public finances and to maintain public ser-
vice. The Administrative Court first affirmed 
that the indexation increases and increases 
in salaries were part of the employees’ gross 
salary and fell within the definition of ‘prop-
erty’ of Article 23. The Court, by adopting its 
reasoning in Nicolaidi, held that the non-con-
cession of indexation increases and increas-
es in salaries on grounds of public interest 
constituted an impermissible limitation and/
or deprivation of the right to property. There-
fore, the contested legislative provisions were 
also found unconstitutional.
Finally, in Filippou a.o. v. Republic24 the 
Court examined the constitutionality of cuts 
of the gross salary of employees of the public 
sector as a contribution to the Consolidated 
13 Ibid, preamble.
14 Law concerning the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution (Law 160(I)/2019).
15 Ibid, preamble.
16 Law concerning the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution (Law 161(I)/2019).
17 Ibid, preamble.
18 See Christodoulidou a.o. v. the Republic a.o., Joined Cases 441/2014 a.o., 12 November 2018 and Avgousti a.o. v. the Republic a.o., Joined Cases 898/2013 
a.o., 27 November 2018, analysed in Constantinos Kombos, ‘Cyprus’ in in Richard Albert and others (eds) 2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law (The I·CON-
nect-Clough Center 2018) 75-76.
19 Joint Cases Nos 98/2013 a.o. (29 March 2019).
20 Law concerning Reductions in Remunerations and Pensions of Officials, Employees and Pensioners of the Public and Wider Public Sector (168(I)/2012).
21 Note that the Administrative Court had already found in the Avgousti case that the provisions of the legislation regarding the imposition of reductions to pensions 
were unconstitutional, as ‘pensions’ were also considered to fall within the meaning of ‘property’ under Article 23 of the Constitution.
22 Joint Cases Nos 611/2012 a.o. (29 March 2019).
23 Non-Concession of Increases in Salaries and of Indexation Increases of Officers and Employees’ Salaries and of Pensioners’ Pensions of the Public and Wider 
Public Sector Law (192(I)/2011).
24 Joint Cases Nos 1713/2011 a.o. (29 March 2019).
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Fund of the Republic,25 with the aim of re-
straining the expenses of the public sector 
occupational pension scheme. The Adminis-
trative Court reaffirmed that the salary was 
a property right under Article 23 and held 
that the limitation to the right imposed by the 
contested legislation was essentially based 
on grounds of public interest, which are not 
permissible under the Constitution. Thus, the 
relevant provisions were deemed unconstitu-
tional.26 Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in 
all three cases, the Administrative Court reit-
erated that Article 23 of the Constitution af-
forded wider protection than Article 1 of the 
First Protocol to the ECHR since – contrary 
to the ECHR – Article 23(3) of the Constitu-
tion does not include the (rather general) pub-
lic interest or public benefit in the permissible 
grounds for limiting the right to property.27 
In conclusion, these three 2019 decisions of 
the Administrative Court reaffirmed that the 
adoption of legislation limiting the right to 
property of employees of the public and wid-
er public sector on the grounds of public ben-
efit or public interest as austerity measures 
was unconstitutional. Fearing the scenario of 
having to compensate employees with more 
than two billion euros, the Republic filed 
appeals against Nicolaidi, Koundourou and 
Filippou, in addition to the pending appeal 
against the 2018 Avgousti decision relating to 
cuts in pensions of pensioners of the public 
and wider public sector. Thus, the constitu-
tionality of these social protection cuts and 
reforms introduced through legislation more 
than eight years ago are still pending before 
the Supreme Court. 
2. Impartiality and independence of judi-
cial power
The year 2019 started off turbulently for the 
judicial branch following serious allegations 
concerning conflict of interest among Su-
preme Court judges as well as allegations 
of collusion between them and prominent 
law firms. An important development that 
unavoidably influenced the discussions was 
the 2018 decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) in Nicholas v. Cy-
prus.28 In Nicholas, the applicant had brought 
proceedings for wrongful dismissal and def-
amation against his former employer before 
Cypriot courts. However, his action was 
dismissed by both the district court and the 
Supreme Court. Subsequently, he discovered 
that the son of one of the Supreme Court 
judges who had decided on his case was mar-
ried to the daughter of the managing partner 
of the law firm representing the respondent 
and that the couple was working at this law 
firm. Therefore, he applied to the ECtHR, 
submitting that the proceedings before the 
Supreme Court had not been impartial and 
thus violated the right to a fair hearing (Arti-
cle 6(1) ECHR).
The Strasbourg Court reiterated that impar-
tiality denotes the absence of prejudice or 
bias, and that its existence or non-existence 
can be determined according to a subjec-
tive test (i.e., the personal conviction and 
behaviour of a particular judge) and an ob-
jective test (i.e., whether the composition of 
the tribunal offered sufficient guarantees to 
exclude any legitimate doubt in respect to its 
impartiality).29 The Court held that the Su-
preme Court judge and the managing partner 
of the law firm representing the respondent 
had a family tie through the marriage of their 
children.30 Thus, the objective test was not 
met, and the judge should have withdrawn 
from the case for personal reasons in accor-
dance with domestic law even without having 
been challenged by the applicant.31 
Moreover, the ECtHR noted that when a 
judge has blood ties with an employee of a 
law firm representing a party in any given 
proceedings, this does not automatically dis-
qualify the judge from hearing the case. The 
disqualification depends on the circumstanc-
es of every case and a number of factors, such 
as whether the judge’s relative was involved 
in the case, the position of the judge’s relative 
in the firm, the size and internal organisation-
al structure of the firm, the financial impor-
tance of the case for the law firm, any possi-
ble financial interest or benefit on the part of 
the relative, etc.32  
Finally, the Court did not fail to overlook 
the fact that ‘Cyprus is a small country, with 
smaller firms and a smaller number of judges 
than larger jurisdictions; therefore, this situa-
tion is likely to arise more often’.33 The Court 
thus noted in paragraph 63 of its judgement 
that ‘complaints alleging bias should not be 
capable of paralysing a defendant State’s 
legal system and that in small jurisdictions, 
excessively strict standards in respect of such 
motions could unduly hamper the administra-
tion of justice’.34 
Following the filing of the appeals against 
Avgousti, Nicolaidi, Koundourou and Filip-
25 Retirement Benefits for Employees in the Public and Wider Public Sector Law (113(I)/2011). This Law was amended, abolished and replaced with the Retirement 
Benefits of Employees in the Public and Wider Public Sector, including the Local Authorities Law (Provisions of General Implementation) (216(I)/2012).
26 See also the relevant case law in Spiridaki v. Republic, App No 830/2017 (28 June 20019), and Petridi v. Republic, App No 320/2015 (29 July 2019), which reaf-
firm Charalambous, Koutselini-Ioannidou, Avgousti and Nicolaidi.
27 This finding was first reached in the Koutselini-Ioannidou a.o. v Republic Joined cases nos. 740/11 and others, 7 October 2014, as obiter and did not receive 
proper attention.
28 Nicholas v. Cyprus, Application no. 63246/10, 9 January 2018.
29 Ibid, para. 49. See also, Morice v. France, Application no. 29369/10, 23 April 2015, para. 73.
30 Nicholas v. Cyprus, para. 60.
31 Ibid, para. 60.
32 Ibid, para. 62.
33Ibid, para. 63.
34 Ibid.
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pou, the appeals were brought before the full 
bench of the Supreme Court (thirteen judges) 
– rather than before the usual three-member 
Court of Appeals (comprised of Supreme 
Court judges) – due to the great constitutional 
importance of their final decisions. However, 
the appellants requested the disqualification 
of a number of Supreme Court judges for the 
following reasons: (a) six judges were spous-
es (or parents) of civil servants or retired civil 
servants; (b) six judges (three of whom are 
listed under (a)) appealed to the Administra-
tive Court seeking annulment of administra-
tive decisions to reduce their salaries, and; (c) 
the President of the Supreme Court had a ju-
dicial dispute with one of the appellants (the 
Cyprus Port Authority), the appeal to which 
was pending adjudication. In addition, anoth-
er judge had two children working in a law 
firm involved in the appeals, whereas another 
judge had filed a personal recourse, on irrele-
vant matters, with a lawyer appearing in one 
of these appeals.
Thus, prior to the examination of the appeals, 
the Supreme Court issued a decision on the 
matter of disqualification.35 Specifically, it 
recognized the duty of a judge to disqualify 
from hearing a case under certain circum-
stances in order to secure the objective and 
subjective impartiality of the Court. Howev-
er, due to the number of requests for disqual-
ification from the cases, it was deemed im-
possible to set up even a three-member Court 
of Appeals. Such extraordinary circumstanc-
es required the departure from the principle 
of disqualification and the application of the 
rule of necessity, which enables a judge, who 
is otherwise disqualified, to hear and decide a 
case where failure to do so may result in an 
injustice.36 This rule of necessity was identi-
fied as forming part of English common law 
and as being adopted by the USA and almost 
all Commonwealth states.37 With recourse to 
the Commentary on the Bangalore Principles 
of Judicial Conduct, the Court indicated that 
this doctrine of necessity applies ‘where there 
is no other judge reasonably available who is 
not similarly disqualified, or if an adjourn-
ment or mistrial will cause extremely severe 
hardship, or if a court cannot be constituted 
to hear and determine the matter in issue if 
the judge in question does not sit. Such cas-
es […] may arise from time to time in final 
courts that have few judges and important 
constitutional and appellate functions that 
cannot be delegated to other judges’.38 
The Supreme Court explicitly referred to 
paragraph 63 of Nicholas and reached the 
conclusion that all members of the plenary 
were affected to the extent that it would be 
impossible to establish a Court. Moreover, 
the Supreme Court stated that the appeals 
pending before them were of such great im-
portance that they should be judged by the 
plenary of the Supreme Court, with a full thir-
teen-member composition. In other words, 
the Court held that it was necessary for all 
judges to participate to the adjudication of 
such important matters despite any imped-
iments. Thus, the requests for disqualifica-
tions were rejected by the Court. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The final decisions to the appeals against Av-
gousti, Nicolaidi, Koundourou and Filippou 
are expected in early 2020. These decisions 
are highly anticipated due to the severe conse-
quences they may have on the national econ-
omy and the tens of thousands of employees 
and pensioners of the public and wider public 
sector in Cyprus. Furthermore, the reforms 
of the judicial system through the creation of 
new courts and procedures that were expect-
ed in 2019 are yet to be implemented. Thus, it 
is hoped that the plans to establish a Supreme 
Constitutional Court, an Appellate Court and 
a Commercial Court will eventually be real-
ized in 2020.
V. FURTHER READING
Constantinos Kombos, Athena Herodotou, 
‘(Un-)Constitutional Amendments: The Cy-
priot Paradigm’ (2019), 25(3) European Pub-
lic Law 305
35 Ministry of Finance a.o. v. Avgousti a.o., Appeals against Administrative Court decision no. 177/18, a.o., 16 July 2019.
36 This rule of necessity should not to be confused with the constitutional doctrine of necessity. It rather relates to the idea of a de facto organ having to take action, 
even if under normal circumstances it should not have, as there will otherwise emerge a gap in the exercise of entrusted powers since no other body can take over 
the matter. 
37 The Supreme Court referred to the following cases: Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Co, 10 Eng Rep. 301, 313; Evans v. Gore, 253 US 245 (1920); United States 
v. Will, 449 US 200 (1980); Teris R Ignacio v. Judges of the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 453, F.3d 1160; Ebner v. Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000), 
205 CLR 337; Cleanae Party Ltd and other v. ANZ Banking Group Ltd (2000), HCA 63, [2001] 2 LRC 369; Dickason v. Edwards (1910), 10 CLR 243, 259; Builders’ 
Registration Board of Queensland v. Rouber (1983), 58 ALJR 376, 385-6, 392; and Laws v. Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1991), LRC (Const) 848.
38 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct’ (September 2007) para. 100.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The developments in Czech Republic (CR) 
illustrate a broader phenomenon: erosion of 
liberal democracy and the rise of populism 
in politics. We thus have the CR captured by 
two men who dominate the political arena, 
President Miloš Zeman and Prime Minister 
(PM) Andrej Babiš. Zeman and Babiš formed 
a power structure that relies on parliamenta-
ry majority formed by populist and extremist 
parties. However, the stability of this power 
structure comes with severe drawbacks for 
the rule of law in the CR. Unfortunately, it 
enables both actors to follow their previous-
ly set behavioral patterns, by which we re-
fer to the continuation and in some respects 
even deepening of the disregard for constitu-
tional rules by President Zeman and growing 
conflicts of interest of PM Babiš. 
Given that political atmosphere, the 2019 
CR and state of its democracy can be well 
described with reference to the ‘boiling frog’ 
metaphor. The threats to democracy and rule 
of law are present on a long-term basis and 
their intensity is growing over time. Never-
theless, the majority of Czechs remain quite 
ambivalent towards these threats. The only 
question that remains is will the CR ‘hop off 
the pot’ or will it reach the breaking point 
towards illiberal democracy? The more the 
leaders of the executive power try to bend 
the Constitution, the more it puts the Con-
stitution-safeguarding institutions (mainly 
public prosecutors and courts) to test. For-
tunately, the institutions in the CR have so 
far been able to withstand the pressure, and 
power-hungry politicians were not able to 
undermine their foundations.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The most remarkable constitutional develop-
ment in the CR in 2019 was the impeach-
ment of President Miloš Zeman. The con-
stitutional charge1 against him was prepared 
by the Senate, which approved it by a quali-
fied three-fifths majority (48 out of 75 pres-
ent Senators). However, the constitutional 
charge was not approved by the Chamber 
of Deputies, as only 58 out of 200 Deputies 
supported the impeachment, and 120 votes 
were required to initiate the proceeding be-
fore the Constitutional Court (CC).
The constitutional charge claimed that Pres-
ident Zeman committed repeated violations 
of the Constitution, citing eight different 
delicts dating from 2013 to 2019. They 
can be divided into three main groups. The 
first consists of two delicts interfering with 
the accountability of the government to the 
Chamber of Deputies. The earlier was the 
appointment of Jiří Rusnok, who was not a 
member of the Parliament or of any politi-
cal party represented in the Parliament, for 
PM, even though there was clearly declared 
support by a majority of Deputies for another 
CZECH REPUBLIC
1 The text of the constitutional charge is publicly available (in Czech) at: https://www.zalobanaprezidenta.
cz/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/U%CC%81stavni%CC%81-z%CC%8Caloba-na-prezidenta-repub-
liky-pro-hrube%CC%81-porus%CC%8Ceni%CC%81-U%CC%81stavy_3.1_final-na-web.pdf
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PM. Moreover, the President kept the gov-
ernment in power even though it did not gain 
a vote of confidence for more than seven 
months (25 June 2013 to 29 January 2014). 
By enabling the ‘President’s government’, 
President Zeman shifted the Czech constitu-
tional system from a parliamentary to a pres-
idential model. The later delict in this group 
was the delay of appointing a new PM after 
the government assembled by Andrej Babiš 
in January 2018 did not get a vote of con-
fidence from the Chamber of Deputies. The 
government without accountability was thus 
in office until June 2018.
The second group of delicts includes three 
related to the personal composition of the 
government: in 2017, President Zeman’s in-
terpretation of PM Sobotka’s resignation as 
a mere change of the PM and not the rest of 
the government, and his refusal to dismiss 
Vice-Prime Minister Babiš. And in June 
2018, President Zeman refused to appoint 
Miroslav Poche as the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, without stating any relevant reason 
for this. Finally, on 31 May 2019, PM An-
drej Babiš asked the President to dismiss 
Antonín Staněk from the position of Minis-
ter of Culture and to appoint Michal Šmarda 
in his stead. According to the Constitution, 
the President is required to accept the request 
of the PM to dismiss another member of the 
government, and he cannot unreasonably de-
lay appointment of a new minister. However, 
after four weeks of inactivity, the President 
issued a statement demanding fulfillment of 
several conditions before dismissing Staněk. 
He finally dismissed Minister Staněk on 31 
July 2019 after continued pressure from the 
PM and other government members, and 
threats of starting a competence dispute 
at the CC. However, he refused to appoint 
Šmarda, and asked the PM to find another, 
more qualified candidate. Finally, Lubomír 
Zaorálek was appointed as Minister of Cul-
ture by the President on 27 August 2019.
The third group includes just one delict, but 
perhaps the most serious. On 29 May 2018, 
President Zeman attempted to influence the 
decision-making of the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court in a particular case where he 
was a party by telling the president of the 
Supreme Administrative Court, Josef Baxa, 
that if he influences the decision in favor of 
President Zeman, Zeman will appoint him 
president of the CC. Baxa declined this of-
fer as soon as it was made, saying that he 
has no influence over decision-making of 
other judges of the Supreme Administrative 
Court. He publicly described this situation in 
a newspaper interview later that year, and a 
similar experience was described by a judge 
of the CC, Vojtěch Šimíček, in relation to 
another case. The parliamentary inquiry 
into this issue did not lead to any concrete 
outcome besides stating that there was no 
breach of judicial independence, that repre-
sentatives of executive power should refrain 
from any similar acts in the future and that 
judges should immediately report any such 
activities to the president of the Court or ju-
dicial council. The last two delicts represent-
ed less serious acts in the area of internal or 
external policy and are not described here in 
detail for the sake of brevity.
Overall, the constitutional charge was well 
prepared and substantiated and raised many 
serious allegations, so substantively, there 
were enough arguments to start the im-
peachment trial before the CC. However, 
the process was stopped by the Chamber of 
Deputies, mainly due to votes from the PM’s 
party, ANO, their coalition partner the Social 
Democrats, the Communist Party and ex-
treme right Party of Direct Democracy. The 
rejection of the constitutional charge con-
firmed that its current model makes it a pure-
ly theoretical instrument, which, in combi-
nation with the level of fragmentation of the 
political scene in the CR, precludes its real 
application in practice.2 It can be well seen 
in comparison with the U.S. regulation of 
impeachment, which has less strict require-
ments for conviction (simple majority in the 
House of Representatives and two-thirds 
majority in the Senate) than the Czech regu-
lation requires for initiation of a trial before 
the CC.
We now come to the other dominant polit-
ical actor, PM Andrej Babiš. Mr Babiš is 
an oligarch, owner of media outlets and of 
one of the largest Czech companies, Agro-
fert, which benefits massively from public 
subsidies. Their amount has significantly 
increased since Mr. Babiš entered the gov-
ernment (in 2018 alone, Agrofert received at 
least €82 million in EU subsidies).3 Mean-
while, the PM persistently ignores rules pre-
venting conflicts of interest as he still ‘calls 
the shots’ in his enterprise. This provoked a 
reaction. Transparency International initiat-
ed several legal proceedings with the rele-
vant authorities. 
First, it initiated an administrative investiga-
tion at the national level. But, despite prom-
ising decisions of the Černošice Council 
(a small municipality where the PM lives), 
which repeatedly ruled that the PM is break-
ing conflict of interest rules by owning me-
dia outlets, the Regional Council for Central 
Bohemia – an appellate body – arrived at the 
opposite conclusion and halted the proceed-
ings. This weakly substantiated decision was 
not surprising because the Regional Council 
is governed by one of the most loyal mem-
bers of the PM’s party, Jaroslava Pokorná 
Jermanová.
Second, the European Commission audited 
the use of EU structural funds in the CR and 
determined that Babiš was in conflict of in-
terest because he remained the ultimate ben-
eficiary of Agrofert while he was involved 
in decisions affecting EU subsidies. Unless 
the national authorities implement the Com-
mission’s recommendations, the government 
will have to return up to €17.6 million in sub-
2 Maxim Tomoszek, ‘Impeachment in the U.S. Constitution and Practice – Implications for the Czech Constitution’ [2017], International and Comparative Law 
Review 145.
3 Jennifer Rankin, ‘EU leaders face legal action over Czech PM’s alleged conflict of interest’ (The Guardian, 31 October 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2019/oct/31/eu-leaders-face-legal-action-czech-pm-andrej-babis-alleged-conflict-of-interest> accessed 30 January 2020.
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sidies to the EU. Babiš reacted by describing 
the Commission’s opinion as ‘nonsense’ and 
ministers from ANO suppressed and down-
played the results of the audit, indicating that 
instead of pursuing the public interest, state 
authorities promoted the private interest of 
the PM.
These events have brought hundreds of 
thousands of Czechs to rallies against Babiš, 
making them the biggest protests since 1989. 
The organizer of these protests is a stu-
dent-driven association called ‘Million Mo-
ments for Democracy’, which in 2019 alone 
organized more than 1.500 events across the 
whole CR. Czech society is strongly divided 
on this issue; some admire the activities of 
this association while others do not and even 
spread fake news about it. The PM himself 
was spreading false information that the par-
ticipants were paid to protest. Consequent-
ly, one of the protesters has brought a civil 
action against Babiš, and the Court ruled 
that the PM lied and must apologize to the 
protesters. But the judgment is still not final 
because the PM appealed it. 
Besides that, the PM is involved in sever-
al other scandals. The most serious one is 
a four-year-long criminal investigation for 
subsidy fraud related to illegally obtain-
ing EU funding for building his residence, 
the so-called Stork Nest Farm. In this case, 
the European Anti-Fraud Office concluded 
that the rules for funding were breached. 
But again, investigation conducted by the 
national authorities fell behind. Neverthe-
less, it was unexpected that in September 
the Prague Prosecutor’s Office decided to 
halt the prosecution. The decision came out 
of the blue because all the known facts im-
plied that fraud had been committed. Later 
in the year, Attorney General Pavel Zeman 
annulled the decision and returned the case 
to the Prague Prosecutor’s Office for further 
proceedings. However, PM Babiš was able 
to prevent or mitigate the negative publicity 
through media that he owns, so according to 
public opinion polls, his party remains the 
most popular one by far.
In this situation, the government’s bill amend-
ing the law on public prosecutors raised se-
vere criticism because it could be abused by 
the government to ‘tame’ public prosecutors 
and halt the prosecution of the PM. Above all, 
Attorney General Pavel Zeman, supported by 
the Legislative Council of the government, 
stated that the proposed seven-year-long term 
in office for chief public prosecutors was not 
justified. On the contrary, a ten-year-long term 
was preferable because it corresponds to the 
term for the chiefs of apex courts. In addition, 
criticism was aimed at the composition of the 
committee selecting chief prosecutors. The 
decisive vote would have the Ministry of Jus-
tice appoint three out of five members of the 
committee. Moreover, according to Prague’s 
Supreme Prosecutor Lenka Bradáčová, it was 
unfortunate, and even unconstitutional, that 
one of the members appointed by the Ministry 
had to be a judge. Prosecutors came with the 
counter-proposal that they would appoint three 
members of the committee instead of two, but 
the Minister of Justice held her ground.
On top of that, Czech democracy is facing 
yet another challenge, the so-called hybrid 
threat of war that comes from countries like 
Russia and China. For these countries, the 
CR represents an ‘entrance gate’ to the EU. 
Thus it became a ‘playground’ for spreading 
their propaganda and misinformation for the 
sake of destabilization of the local political 
scene. A prominent example was a case in 
the Prague City District, which decided to 
put a little table in front of Marshall Koněv’s 
memorial stating he was not only a WW2 
hero but also a war criminal. Supporters of 
Russia started a big misinformation cam-
paign, leading to a decision to take the me-
morial down. 
Many Czech politicians don’t hesitate to 
spread propaganda and undermine the cred-
ibility of national institutions that way. For 
instance, President Zeman called the Nation-
al Cyber and Information Security Authority 
(NÚKIB) ‘amateurs’ for warning about the 
Huawei company being a threat to national 
security. The government removed the head 
of the NÚKIB supposedly for his inexperi-
ence and insufficient managing skills, but 
this explanation seems to be unsubstantiated. 
It is also worth mentioning the significant ac-
tivities in China of Homecredit, a huge com-
pany providing short-time loans. It gave a 
donation to the Charles University in Prague 
and was also negotiating financial support to 
the ‘China centre’ at the University. Howev-
er, it turned out that Homecredit paid for a 
course at the Faculty of Philosophy that was 
later recognised as merely propaganda, and 
the University was pushed by the academic 
community to sever its ties to Homecredit.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Judgment no. Pl. ÚS 45/17: Data Retention
In this case, the CC reviewed the regulation 
of data retention, specifically the preventive 
retention of traffic and location data from 
electronic communications by telecommu-
nication service providers, and their use by 
public authorities in order to protect security 
of the state as well as also provide oversight 
on the capital market. Such regulation was 
first adopted in 2008 as an implementation of 
the Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC). 
In 2011, the CC reviewed this legislation and 
said that indiscriminate preventive collection 
and storage of data interferes with the right 
to privacy in intensity, which requires strict 
review. After applying the strict test, the CC 
abolished the law, especially due to its broad 
nature, vagueness and lack of transparency 
(Pl. ÚS 24/10). In 2012, the Czech Parlia-
ment adopted new legislation, which react-
ed to the judgment of the CC and reduced 
the retention period to six months, explic-
itly listed the entities authorized to request 
the retained data and included the purpose 
for which they may request it. Still, it re-
quired operators to retain information for six 
months on each telephone connection, text 
message, Internet connection or email corre-
spondence. In 2014, the CJEU abolished the 
Data Retention Directive in the case Digital 
Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others (C-
293/12 and C-594/12) for breach of funda-
mental rights, especially privacy, stating that 
general and blanket data retention is no lon-
ger possible. However, the Czech legislation 
remained in force and was challenged again.
In this case, the applicants claimed that mon-
itoring, collecting and storing traffic and 
location data violated the right to privacy, 
since it was too broad and indiscriminate. 
However, the CC deemed data retention 
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compliant with the Constitution as long as 
its regulation upheld the requirements previ-
ously laid down by the CC and sufficiently 
preserved the right to privacy. Finally, the 
CC did not find grounds for repealing the 
data retention legislation, but it advised the 
legislature to consider the rapid develop-
ment of modern technology. The current reg-
ulation does not reflect recent technological 
developments and social trends of electronic 
communication. For example, data reten-
tion obligation does not apply to OTT ser-
vice providers like Facebook, WhatsApp or 
Skype. According to the dissenting opinion 
of Kateřina Šimáčková, the contested legis-
lation does not provide sufficient safeguards 
against abuse. In her view, metadata is not 
adequately protected and there is lack of 
control over operators and public authorities 
in relation to data collection and use. More-
over, the individuals are deprived of protec-
tion against such interference since they do 
not have control over the extent to which 
their data is used.
2. Judgment no. Pl. ÚS 5/19 of 1 October 
2019: Taxation of Church Restitution 
As we noted last year, the government of 
Andrej Babiš passed the confidence vote in 
the House of Deputies only because of sup-
port from the Communist Party. In return, 
the government has supported a communist 
bill proposing taxation of the financial com-
pensation churches received for property 
confiscated during the communist era, which 
cannot be restituted. The parliamentary ma-
jority passed the law despite it being prima 
facie unconstitutional and disregarding the 
expert opinions on the matter only because 
there was ‘social demand’. Unsurprisingly, 
the opposition immediately challenged the 
law before the CC. The CC’s judgment was 
highly anticipated and it was a true landmark 
case, not only for 2019 but for the CC’s juris-
prudence as a whole. 
First of all, the CC reiterated that church res-
titutions promote two aims: they seek redress 
for the wrongs of the ‘criminal, illegitimate 
and despicable’ communist regime as well 
as pave the way for future financial indepen-
dence of churches from the state. Moreover, 
the Act on Property Settlement (APS), which 
is a legal basis of the compensation, has rem-
edied a long-standing unconstitutional negli-
gence of the legislator (see Pl. ÚS 9/07). The 
CC appreciated that the state adopted APS 
with the intent of becoming a trustworthy 
partner for the churches and to compensate 
them for the confiscated property. The CC 
did not address the proportionality of the 
compensation itself because it had already 
considered it in detail in judgment no. Pl. ÚS 
10/13, where it stated that the amount of the 
compensation was a political decision and 
could not affect the constitutionality of the 
APS.
The CC then emphasized that the APS was 
the legal basis for the government to settle 
on the compensation agreements with in-
dividual churches, which require financial 
compensation to be paid in thirty annual in-
stallments. The CC concluded that the tax-
ation of these installments interferes in an 
impermissibly retroactive manner with the 
fundamental principles of rule of law, espe-
cially legal certainty and pacta sunt servan-
da. Moreover, the CC found that the law did 
not introduce taxation at all, but rather a de 
facto reduction of financial compensation, 
even though its amount was clearly deter-
mined by compensation agreements between 
the state and churches. By their conclusion, 
a legal entitlement and legitimate expecta-
tion of churches was established, thus the 
legislation also violated right to property. As 
a result of these findings, the CC struck the 
contested legislation down.
3. Judgment no. Pl. ÚS 39/17: ‘Black Holes’ 
in Judicial Review of Decisions Concerning 
Citizenship Applicants 
The Supreme Administrative Court chal-
lenged the provision of § 26 of law No. 
186/2013 Coll. on citizenship of the CR, 
which excludes judicial review of decisions 
based on § 22, para. 3 of the law on citizen-
ship, which, in cases of applicants for Czech 
citizenship who, based on confidential in-
formation from the police or intelligence 
services are considered to pose a threat to 
national security, allowed the state to dis-
miss their application without any further 
substantiation of the nature of the threat.
The key issue in this case was related to Art. 
36, para. 2 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms, which stipulates that 
judicial review cannot be excluded in cas-
es related to fundamental rights guaranteed 
by the Charter. However, the CC stated that 
there was no fundamental right to citizen-
ship, and therefore the law excluding such 
decisions from judicial review was compli-
ant with the Constitution. Four justices sub-
mitted quite persuasive dissenting opinions, 
stating that denying citizenship was closely 
related to fundamental rights, and as with 
many fundamental rights, the status of the 
individual determines the extent of protec-
tion. Also, the dissenting judges criticized 
the majority due to lack of recognition of the 
principle of separation of powers because 
the final decision on granting citizenship in a 
state governed by the rule of law should rest 
with the court and not police or intelligence 
services.
4. Judgment no. I. ÚS 4037/18 of 21 May 
2019: Freedom of Speech and Right of Jour-
nalist Not to Disclose Sources 
As we have said above, as the political pres-
sure on the democratic nature of the state 
grows, safeguards of democracy are put to 
the test. This can well be demonstrated by 
the case of a constitutional complaint of 
a prominent investigative journalist who 
published an article focused on the abuse 
of power by the current PM and his activi-
ties with regard to the Foreign Intelligence 
Service of the Czech Republic (FIS). Sub-
sequently, the complainant was repeatedly 
summoned by the FIS. He was always served 
shortly in advance so he offered his apolo-
gies and suggested an alternative date. The 
FIS never responded. Later, the complainant 
was summoned again and at the same time 
was served with the decision by which the 
FIS imposed a fine of 20 000 Czech Crowns 
(appr. €785) on him for perverting the course 
of criminal proceedings and for offensive 
behaviour. This decision was upheld by the 
High Court, but the fine was lowered to 3 
000 Czech Crowns (appr. €120). The com-
plainant contested both decisions in his con-
stitutional complaint, arguing that the FIS 
exerted pressure on him, acted abusively and 
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that the fine served as a means of extortion of 
obedience and intimidation. 
The CC dismissed the complaint, but its rea-
soning was somewhat contradictory. On one 
hand, the CC emphasised the importance of 
a free press and protection of journalists’ 
sources. In this regard, it found that neither 
the High Court nor the FIS took into account 
that the fine was imposed on the journalist 
and concerned his work. The CC concluded 
that prosecuting authorities should avoid any 
action that could indicate that journalists are 
treated in a different and stringent manner 
compared to other persons. Imposition of a 
fine in the middle of the amount rate stipu-
lated by law for a first minor offence could 
be perceived as an attempt to influence and 
intimidate the journalist even before the 
very first question was asked. It could thus 
lead to a violation of the right of journalists 
not to disclose their sources. With respect 
to the context given, mainly actions of the 
complainant (his repeated apologies and the 
willingness to present himself at the FIS), 
the decision of the FIS seemed to be dispro-
portionate. But on the other hand, the CC 
concluded that there was no need for its in-
tervention because the High Court reduced 
the fine substantially, so it remained within 
reasonable boundaries.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
What will the year 2020 bring us? We already 
know that on 30 January 2020, the Senate ap-
proved the President’s nominee for a vacancy 
at the CC, Pavel Šámal, the current president 
of the Supreme Court. Consequently, a new 
chief of the Supreme Court will be appoint-
ed. We also anticipate further escalation and 
(hopefully) the resolution of the long-lasting 
issue of the PM’s conflicts of interest. On the 
national level, the CC is going to put the law 
preventing conflicts of interest under review. 
On the EU level, negotiations on the EU’s 
next seven-year budget are coming up, and it 
is the PM who is going to lead them on behalf 
of the CR. Thus, the ‘million dollar question’ 
is, What will be the position of other EU lead-
ers? The answer will probably decide the po-
litical future of Andrej Babiš and his attitude 
towards the EU. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The parliamentary election in 2019 led to 
a change of government. The new govern-
ment has focused on strengthening the state. 
The most significant changes concerned the 
legal framework for acquiring and retaining 
citizenship. A new law gave the government 
the power to administratively revoke the citi-
zenship of individuals who are determined to 
have harmed the vital interests of Denmark 
as long as they will not be left stateless by 
the revocation. The regulation is primarily 
aimed at Danish citizens who have joined 
and fought for ISIS in Syria but does not re-
quire an actual commission of crimes. The 
legislation has been heavily criticized for 
transferring judicial power to the govern-
ment and for having a retroactive effect and 
has been challenged in court. A related new 
law prevents children born in areas of armed 
conflict from acquiring citizenship at birth. 
More than 95% of the members of the Par-
liament agreed to pass a new climate law, 
requiring both the current and future gov-
ernments to work towards the goal of a 70% 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions be-
fore 2030. The massive support for this law 
makes it unlikely to be changed after an elec-
tion and could therefore practically give it an 
almost constitutional role. It will certainly 
play a prominent role in Danish politics for 
years to come. 
For the first time since the Second World 
War, a Danish court found a ban of an orga-
nization, in this case a gang, to be constitu-
tional. The decision from the city court has 
been appealed, but if the decision is upheld, 
it is expected to lead to more attempts at ban-
ning violent organizations. 
Finally, an interest of the US and China in 
the self-ruling areas of Denmark, Greenland 
and the Faroe Islands has led to fears that 
Denmark will not be able to keep the realm 
united.  
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
A. A controversial election
The parliamentary election in June 2019 led 
to a change in government. Prime Minister 
Mette Frederiksen, from the Social Demo-
cratic Party, leads the new government. 
For the first time since 1990, a total of 13 par-
ties ran in the election (not counting parties 
in Greenland and the Faroe Islands). Four of 
these parties were not represented in the Par-
liament before the election. This development 
is due to a new system, established since the 
last election, which makes it possible for po-
litical parties to gather the signatures needed 
to participate in the elections through digital 
means. Earlier, political parties had to gather 
signatures physically, which required signifi-
cant efforts from volunteers. In the new sys-
tem, it became possible for the party ‘Klaus 
Riskær Pedersen’, named after its founder, to 
participate in the election despite being run by 
only one person. 
Most attention in the campaign was given to 
two newly formed right-wing parties. One 
of these, Nye Borgerlige (‘New Right’), 
demanded a stop to all grants of asylum in 
Denmark and deportation of all non-citizens 
who were convicted of committing a crime. 
None of the candidates for Prime Minister 
from other parties were willing to agree to 
this, since it would be against the Europe-
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an Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
However, Stram Kurs (“Hard Line”) had an 
even more controversial campaign, which 
primarily consisted of burning Qurans in the 
street while yelling slurs towards Muslims. 
The party demanded a ban on Islam, the de-
portation of Muslims and a stop to all im-
migration from non-Western countries. The 
election was a disappointment for most of 
the new parties. Only the New Right made it 
into the Parliament, but barely made it over 
the electoral threshold. 
Thus, while the new digital system has al-
lowed for more democratic involvement, it 
has also given extremists and fringe groups 
an easier route into the public eye. Both 
Klaus Riskær Pedersen and Hard Line have 
been accused of cheating the digital system 
while gathering signatures. Following the 
election, Hard Line was temporarily banned 
from gathering signatures for the next elec-
tion while an investigation into these claims 
is carried out. These events show some of the 
challenges of making constitutional mecha-
nisms digital. 
Other parties also had a disappointing elec-
tion. The established nationalist party, the 
Danish People’s Party, was more than halved 
and the libertarian party only barely made it 
into the Parliament, with their chairman not 
getting elected. 
B. The direction of Denmark following the 
election
The failure of the Danish People’s Party 
in the election is likely because the Social 
Democratic Party adopted a more nationalis-
tic approach. The new Prime Minister, Mette 
Frederiksen, has led her party in a direction 
focused on protecting Danish identity by es-
tablishing state mechanisms that some would 
say are controversial. Her following quote, 
which was used as a campaign slogan shortly 
after the election, confirms this observation: 
‘What drives me as Prime Minister is a de-
sire to take care of Denmark. For me to do 
that, we have to use elements that we have 
previously neither needed nor wanted to 
use.’ The statement concerned her proposal 
for a ‘massive increase in the surveillance’ in 
Denmark. The question is whether the new 
focus on a stronger state will weaken citi-
zens’ protections against the state. 
Similar to many other European countries, 
Denmark has had internal debates over what 
to do with those Danish citizens who trav-
elled to Syria to fight for ISIS (known as 
‘foreign fighters’) who are now hoping to re-
turn to Denmark. This led to several changes 
in Danish legislation.
The Parliament approved the government’s 
ability to administratively revoke Danish 
citizenship from anyone who has ‘acted in 
a manner which seriously harms the vital 
interests’ of Denmark as long as they either 
have double citizenship or are considered 
able to acquire citizenship in another coun-
try easily and will thus not be left stateless 
by the revocation. The legislation does not 
require that these suspected foreign fighters 
have committed any crimes, leaving it to 
the discretion of the government to decide 
who should lose their citizenship. The law 
has been criticized for transferring judicial 
power to the government. The law can also 
potentially have a retroactive effect by re-
voking the citizenship of an individual for 
actions carried out before the law was in 
force. The retroactive effect of the adminis-
trative sanction could bring the new rules in 
conflict with the ECHR. 
The government wanted to give the affected 
individuals, who are mostly in Syria with no 
proper communication channels to Denmark, 
only four weeks to challenge the government’s 
decision in court. Failure to do so within this 
time limit would result in the irrevocable loss 
of citizenship. The opposition managed to 
include a dispensation from this rule in the 
law. The legislation was approved by the Par-
liament only two days after having been of-
ficially proposed, which is highly unusual in 
Denmark, especially for legislation with such 
serious consequences for the rights of individ-
uals. However, the law has been time-limited 
and will automatically end during 2021. At 
least three people have lost their citizenship 
due to the law, and at least one individual has 
challenged the revocation in court, claiming 
that the law is unconstitutional. 
Another law was also proposed that prevents 
children of Danish citizens from automati-
cally acquiring citizenship if they are born 
in an area where a terrorist organization is 
engaged in armed conflict, and if applying 
this law would not make them stateless. The 
law also prevents suspected foreign fighters 
from getting consular assistance from Dan-
ish authorities. The Parliament approved this 
law in January 2020. 
Another example of the Prime Minister giv-
ing the state more power was found in her 
New Year’s speech, in which she declared that 
the government would increase the number of 
forced adoptions, thus removing more chil-
dren from their parents. The question is how 
far she can take it, given the fact that in Sep-
tember 2019, Norway was found in breach of 
ECHR due to an unjustified forced adoption. 
Mette Frederiksen has similarly chosen to 
centralize power in the internal bureaucracy 
of the state. For several years, across differ-
ent governments, the Ministry of Finance 
has been accused of having too much power 
within the state. Shortly after being elected, 
Mette Frederiksen targeted this by centraliz-
ing power around the Prime Minister instead. 
The most significant initiative was to give 
her advisor a special role, which to a large 
degree placed him as second in command 
under the Prime Minister in the government, 
and thus above most ministers in the inter-
nal hierarchy. However, since the advisor is 
not a minister, he is not bound by the same 
laws and cannot be made accountable by the 
Parliament. Such a role is not normal in the 
Danish constitutional tradition. The Prime 
Minister has been criticized for being too 
controlling of the other ministries by news-
papers among others, claiming that ministers 
are avoiding contact with the press because 
their communication has to be coordinated 
with the Prime Minister’s office. It certainly 
seems that the Prime Minister has decided to 
maintain much stronger control and manage-
ment over civil servants and the government 
than recent prime ministers.  
While the Prime Minister has certainly 
strengthened the state, and in some areas 
weakened citizens’ protection against the 
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state, she has also signalled a strong focus 
on social policy, especially in regards to 
children. This, together with her having to 
compromise with other left-wing parties to 
maintain a majority in the Parliament, has 
led to the new government overturning some 
of the more controversial policies of the old 
government. As mentioned in last year’s 
review, the social benefits for families who 
have been in Denmark for less than seven 
years have been criticized for being uncon-
stitutionally low. The new government tem-
porarily raised these benefits and is looking 
to do it permanently. Families with children 
will also be moved from a refugee center, 
which has been heavily criticized. Plans to 
move rejected asylum seekers to a deserted 
island was abandoned and Denmark will 
again receive UN resettlement refugees.  
C. Citizens’ initiative led to climate law
As mentioned in last year’s review, Den-
mark implemented a new digital tool for 
citizens’ initiatives in 2018. In 2019, this 
initiative was made permanent. One of the 
initiatives that gathered enough signatures to 
reach the Parliament proposed a new climate 
law. While this proposal itself was not im-
plemented, it inspired politicians to draft a 
climate law.
The new Danish Climate Law has major 
historical importance. The law obligates the 
current and future governments to reduce 
Danish greenhouse gas emissions by 70% by 
2030. Every year, a special council will as-
sess whether the current government is fol-
lowing this plan, and the Minister of Climate 
will have to present himself in the Parliament 
to be questioned on whether the government 
is doing enough. While the law is technically 
no more binding than any other law, it is of 
huge importance that it has been agreed on 
by eight out of ten parties and by more than 
95% of members of the Parliament. Because 
of this, it could in practical reality have al-
most constitutional status, since it is unlikely 
to be changed by future governments. 
D. Developments for the courts and the 
Ombudsman
The most important constitutional case in 
Danish courts in 2019 was the case, de-
scribed in last year’s review, in which Dan-
ish authorities tried to get an organization 
banned for the first time since the Second 
World War. The case concerned the gang 
‘Loyal to Familia’ (LTF), which was accused 
of being a central actor in recent shootings in 
Copenhagen. The Danish Constitution only 
allows for such a ban if the organization it-
self is found to employ violence to attain its 
aims. The fact that individual members of 
the organization have committed crimes is 
not in itself enough.  
However, due to a significant scandal involv-
ing Danish prosecutors, this case and other 
cases were postponed. Danish prosecutors 
rely heavily on communication data, which 
show where a defendant’s mobile phone has 
been at a specific time. However, during 
2019 it was revealed that this data was im-
precise, sometimes directly wrong. It is thus 
possible that people have been convicted 
based on wrongful information concerning 
their location, and therefore several cases 
might have to be reopened. It is similarly 
possible that criminals have walked free due 
to the data showing them not being at the 
scene of a crime. 
After the postponement, the case concerning 
LTF was decided by the city court in January 
2020. The court approved the ban. This was 
a historic decision in Danish constitutional 
law, but the case has been appealed to the 
Eastern High Court, and is likely to eventu-
ally be appealed to the Supreme Court due 
to its importance. Following the decision, 
both Danish police and politicians declared 
themselves willing to have more organiza-
tions prosecuted this way if the city court’s 
decision is upheld. 
The Danish Ombudsman stepped down 
during 2019 because he was appointed to the 
Supreme Court as a judge. The Parliament 
initially had difficulty in agreeing on a new 
Ombudsman, leading to them appointing a 
‘temporary Ombudsman’ for approximate-
ly one month. Eventually, however, they 
agreed on appointing Niels Fenger, a former 
law professor and High Court judge. 
E. External threats to the unity of Denmark
Finally, it should be mentioned that 2019 
brought a stern reminder of the external con-
stitutional threats to Denmark. The Kingdom 
of Denmark consists not only of the mainland 
in continental Europe. In the North Atlantic 
Ocean, both Greenland and the Faroe Islands 
are self-ruling territories of Denmark. 
Denmark made headlines worldwide in 2019 
when US President Donald Trump offered 
to buy Greenland. The Danish Prime Min-
ister described this suggestion as ‘absurd’, 
causing a diplomatic crisis with Trump, who 
cancelled an upcoming meeting in Denmark. 
However, the US is not the only country tak-
ing an interest in Denmark. Both Greenland 
and the Faroe Islands have caught China’s 
attention. Chinese companies have shown 
significant interest in investing in an airport, 
mines and infrastructure in Greenland, caus-
ing Denmark to actively work against such 
initiatives. The Faroe Islands also made 
headlines worldwide when it was made pub-
lic that China apparently threatened to cancel 
a trade deal if the Faroe Islands did not agree 
to let a Chinese company build their Inter-
net networks. Both territories are placed in 
important strategic areas, which could easi-
ly cause more confrontations between Den-
mark and the major countries in the world. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Supreme Court, 21 January 2019: Pros-
ecuting twice for the same crime was a 
breach of ECHR and the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union
On Facebook, a woman had shared surveil-
lance footage from a shop that showed a man 
exposing himself to her young daughter. Her 
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sharing this video was a breach of the Dan-
ish rules implementing GDPR. However, 
the prosecutors originally charged her based 
on a wrong provision in the law, which only 
regulated the shop owner, as the Data Con-
troller of the footage. Thus, in the first case 
against the woman, she was acquitted, since 
the provision did not regulate her. The pros-
ecutors then charged her based on another 
provision, which would have made it illegal 
for her to share the footage. However, the 
Supreme Court found that since this case 
concerned the exact same action for which 
she had already been prosecuted and acquit-
ted, it would be a breach of both the ECHR 
and the Charter of the European Union to 
prosecute her again. The Court noted that 
she was not acquitted in the first case simply 
due to formalities, but only after an actual 
examination of the merits in the case. The 
High Court had reached the opposite result 
of the Supreme Court, based on the fact that 
the original case had only looked at whether 
she was the Data Controller or not. Howev-
er, according to the Supreme Court, this was 
still an examination of the actual merits of 
the case, and thus prevented a new charge 
based on the same action. 
2. Supreme Court, 1 April 2019: No legal 
basis for wiretapping in cases concerning 
the ban of organizations
The police asked the courts for permission 
to wiretap phones of two individuals as well 
as retrieve their communication data. The 
individuals concerned were considered to be 
leading members of LTF, and the informa-
tion was to be used in the court case con-
cerning banning this organization (described 
above). The Constitution limits the possibil-
ities of infringing on the secrecy of postal 
and telephone matters, although to a very 
large degree Danish legislators can allow for 
such infringement through law. However, 
the Danish Procedural Code only allowed 
for such actions when there was reason to 
believe that ‘suspects’ were communicating 
through these phones, and when the infor-
mation was needed for an investigation into 
crimes punishable by at least six years. Since 
the case concerned a ban on the organization, 
the two individuals were not suspects in the 
case, and the case did not directly concern 
a crime. However, another provision in the 
Procedural Code stated that cases concern-
ing the ban of an organization were to be 
processed according to the same chapter in 
the law. The Supreme Court had to go back 
to the preparatory works to this provision 
from 1875 to interpret it. The Court found 
that these preparatory works did not give 
sufficient basis for derogating from the nor-
mal conditions for wiretapping. The Court 
also did not allow using an analogy of the 
rules. Thus, the request was denied.  
3. Supreme Court, 14 May 2019: Prevention 
of family reunification for three years was 
not a breach of ECHR
Danish law states that individuals granted 
refugee status based on the general situation 
in their home country, and not due to indi-
vidual persecution, are given temporary pro-
tection status. This especially applies to ref-
ugees from the civil war in Syria and similar 
events. Such individuals are prevented from 
applying for family reunification with their 
family members for the first three years of 
their stay in Denmark. The Danish Supreme 
Court approved this provision in 2017 in a 
case in which a Syrian refugee had been re-
fused family reunification with his wife. That 
case is currently pending at the Grand Cham-
ber of the ECHR. The 2019 case concerned 
three Syrian refugees who had not only 
been refused family reunification with their 
spouses but also with their children. The Su-
preme Court again approved the provision 
preventing family reunification. Following 
from their earlier decision, it found that mak-
ing a three-year rule for family reunification 
was within the margin of appreciation that 
states have in this area since the separation 
of the families is only temporary. The Court 
did note concerns for what is best for the 
children, including the fact that the families 
could not be reunited in Syria. However, it 
also noted that the children were together 
with their mothers, who were their primary 
caregivers since their fathers left Syria. The 
Court also noted that the children lived their 
whole lives in Syria and had no connection 
to Denmark, and that neither children nor 
mothers had any disabilities that required 
special consideration. The Court especially 
noted that the Syrian refugees only had tem-
porary status in Denmark, and thus were ex-
pected to return to Syria when the situation 
improved. Thus, it did not find it in the best 
interest of the children to transfer them to 
Denmark if they would then have to return 
to Syria shortly after. If the situation did not 
improve within three years, family reunifica-
tion could take place. The fact that one of the 
children would be older than 18 at the end of 
these three years, and would thus very likely 
be unable to get family reunification at that 
time, did not influence the Court’s decision. 
4. Western High Court, 24 October 2019: 
Preventing union members from terminat-
ing membership is not a breach of ECHR 
The Danish employment regulation is pri-
marily made through collective agreements 
between unions and employers, both in the 
public and private sector. Often these agree-
ments are entered into for three years at a 
time. During the following renegotiation of 
the collective agreement, the unions might 
order their members to strike and the em-
ployers might lock out union members, thus 
depriving them of their salary. In these situa-
tions, unions will give or lend money to their 
members. Thus, the system is dependent on 
strong unions and solidarity between mem-
bers. In 2006, Denmark was found by the 
ECHR to have breached the right to not be 
a member of an organization due to a regu-
lation that allowed employers and unions to 
agree that everyone working for the employ-
er had to join a specific union. In the 2019 
case, a union had experienced a lockout of 
some of its members and decided that the 
remaining members should pay an increased 
membership fee to cover the expenses of the 
lockout. The union had further decided that 
members paying this membership fee could 
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not leave the union until they had paid their 
share of the total expenses. This was in ac-
cordance with the union’s own internal rules. 
The case concerned ten members who had 
tried to leave the union, and who in reality 
were asked to pay four years’ membership 
fees before they could leave. The Court 
found that the members, who had voluntari-
ly joined the union and had been informed 
of these rules prior to the lockout, had not 
been deprived of their rights in the ECHR. 
It argued that the rules did not prevent the 
members from leaving the union, but simply 
set certain conditions for them to be allowed 
to leave (payment of their share of the ex-
penses).   
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Several important commissions are still on-
going, most of which were described in more 
detail in last year’s review. The Tibet Com-
mission was supposed to end its investigation 
in July 2020, but the work has been delayed 
and is unlikely to be concluded in 2020. The 
Tax Commission is also still ongoing. During 
2019, a new commission was set up. This 
commission will look into a decision made 
by Inger Støjberg, the now former Minister 
of Immigration and Integration, that separat-
ed married asylum seekers from their spouses 
when one of the spouses was below 18 years 
of age. The decision was found illegal by the 
Ombudsman and Danish courts have awarded 
compensation to some of the couples. A cen-
tral question is whether the Minister deliber-
ately made an illegal decision. This commis-
sion is not expected to conclude until 2021. 
Last year’s review mentioned that the former 
opposition, now in government, had consid-
ered establishing a commission to investigate 
Denmark’s participation in the war against 
Iraq. However, the new government has de-
cided against this. 
As described above, the case concerning LTF 
is still ongoing and can have important ram-
ifications if the High Court and/or Supreme 
Court also find that the organization can be 
banned. The case challenging the new possi-
bilities for revoking citizenship will also be 
interesting to follow. The case at the Grand 
Chamber of the ECHR regarding family re-
unification for refugees will also be import-
ant for Denmark. Another interesting case is 
also making its way through the Danish court 
system. Currently, the Danish state requires 
telephone companies to retain information 
about all their users, including the location of 
the phone, whom they call, etc. The Europe-
an Court of Justice declared this a breach of 
fundamental rights in a case against Sweden 
in 2016. The Danish government agrees that 
the Danish rules should be changed. How-
ever, more than three years after the decision 
by the ECJ, this has still not happened. The 
government is awaiting other cases current-
ly pending at the ECJ that are expected to be 
concluded during 2020. A court case initiated 
against the Danish state is similarly awaiting 
the results of these cases. 
Finally, in January 2020, it was announced 
that the Executive Director of Denmark’s 
National Human Rights Institution is step-
ping down. His replacement is expected in 
early 2020. 
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The Dominican Republic’s Constitutional 
Court (Tribunal Constitutional, hereinafter 
the ‘Constitutional Court’ or the ‘Court’) was 
created by the 2010 constitutional reform 
and started operating in January 2012. Arti-
cle 184 of the 2010 Dominican Constitution 
states that the Court shall ‘guarantee the su-
premacy of the Constitution, the defense of 
the constitutional order and the protection of 
fundamental rights’.1 The Court’s decisions 
are definitive and irrevocable, and constitute 
binding erga omnes precedents for all public 
powers and State bodies.2  
The Court’s composition features thirteen 
judges appointed by the National Magistracy 
Council (Consejo Nacional de la Magistra-
tura3), which is the constitutional body en-
trusted with appointing judges for all three of 
the so-called Dominican ‘High Courts’.4 The 
Court’s decisions require a qualified majori-
ty of nine out of the thirteen judges. Judges 
are appointed for a 9-year single term. How-
ever, the first judges were appointed with 
term limits ranging from 6, 9, and 12 years 
– to triennially stagger Court vacancies. The 
Court’s judges were partially renewed for the 
first time in December 2018. 
As will further be discussed throughout this 
report, some of the main constitutional de-
velopments that arose during 2019 were re-
lated to electoral questions in the run-up to 
the 2020 Dominican general elections. These 
electoral matters generated public and politi-
cal controversies, academic discussions, and 
constitutional precedents. 
Section II discusses some of the major con-
stitutional developments in 2019, including 
the renewal of four of the Court’s judges. 
Section III presents some of the main consti-
tutional cases decided by the Court, includ-
ing one case that annulled several articles of 
the Law of Political Parties and Associations 
in the run-up to the 2020 elections. Section 
IV looks at the upcoming vacancies that will 
lead to the Court’s first full renewal, and the 
2020 elections. Section V suggests further 
reading.
1 Article 184 of the 2010 Dominican Constitution. The article’s wording does not vary in the 2015 Dominican 
Constitution. Organic Law No. 137-11 (Ley Orgánica del Tribunal Constitucional y de los Procedimientos 
Constitucionales) created and regulates the Court. 
2 Ibid.
3 See articles 178-183 of the 2015 Dominican Constitution. The National Magistracy Council has eight 
members: (i) the president of the Republic, (ii) the president of the Senate, (iii) one senator from the majority 
opposition, (iv) the president of the Chamber of Representatives, (v) a member of the Chamber of Repre-
sentatives from the majority opposition, (vi) the president of the Supreme Court of Justice, (vii) a judge from 
the Supreme Court of Justice appointed by said court, and (viii) the Attorney General of the Republic. 
4 The other two ‘High Courts’ are the Supreme Court of Justice (La Suprema Corte de Justicia) and the 
Superior Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Electoral). The Constitutional Court is independent from the 
judiciary. 
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II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
2019 was a very important year for the Con-
stitutional Court. In 2018, the Court expe-
rienced its first four vacancies since its in-
ception. This meant that four of the Court’s 
thirteen judges were set to change, allowing 
for potential ideological shifts in both pro-
spective and posited precedents. 
In December 2018, the National Magistracy 
Council concluded the appointment of four 
new constitutional judges after a relatively 
transparent process that involved forty-seven 
preselected candidates who could be scruti-
nized by the public before the National Mag-
istracy Council made their final choices.
This transition was particularly challenging 
for the Court, given that a considerable num-
ber of pending judgments decided through-
out the year had to be vacated. These draft 
judgments had already been discussed by 
the plenary – including having received the 
input of the departing judges, or been pre-
pared by them – and were ready for a final 
decision. 
Not concluding this process with the depart-
ing judges meant that the judgments for these 
cases had to be reassigned to other judges, 
returning the cases to the deliberation or 
drafting stage and further delaying their res-
olution. This increased the Court’s backlog 
and congestion rate, as well as reduced the 
clearance rate for the year 2018 and added to 
the year 2019, as the new judges completed 
their onboarding and adapted to the Court’s 
work dynamic. 
A total of 319 of these additional judgments 
for 2018 were published during 2019, raising 
the final statistical count for sentences issued 
during the year 2019 to 943 judgments, up 
from the 624 which had been announced by 
year-end 2018.5 The Court’s yearly clearance 
rate rose close to 122%, meaning that the 
Court resolved part of the backlog with the 
participation of the departing judges. 
Finally, taking into account the Court’s de-
cision-making rules – where judgments re-
quire the agreement of nine out of the thir-
teen judges – the changeover of four judges 
implied the potential shift to the original 
Court’s ideological stance. 
Another major constitutional question dis-
cussed throughout 2019 concerned the pos-
sibility of the incumbent President, Danilo 
Medina Sánchez, to opt for an additional 
– and third – consecutive presidential term 
despite an explicit prohibition included in 
the 2015 constitutional reform that allowed 
him to opt for his second presidential term 
(2016-2020).6 This prohibition was drafted 
as the 20th transitional clause (hereinafter, 
‘Transitional Clause No. 20’) in the 2015 
Dominican Constitution. The text singles out 
and precludes President Medina by stating 
that: ‘In case that the president of the Re-
public corresponding to the constitutional 
term 2012-2016 is a candidate for the same 
position for the 2016-2020 constitutional 
presidential term, he shall be ineligible to 
present himself for the subsequent period, 
or any other term period, including for the 
vice-presidency of the Republic’. 
From a political economy perspective, Tran-
sitional Clause No. 20 could be construed as 
a way to tackle the dynamic or time inconsis-
tency associated with incumbent presidents’ 
incentives to continuously extend presiden-
tial term limits for their own benefit.7 Like 
Ulysses tying himself to the mast to enable 
himself to hear the sirens’ chants without 
heeding the temptation to jump into the sea, 
during the political negotiations that led to 
the 2015 constitutional reform, President 
Medina consented to the inclusion of Tran-
sitional Clause No. 20 as a pre-commitment 
and a signaling device that assured he would 
step down after his second term without at-
tempting another constitutional reform to try 
to retain the presidency.
Despite this bright-line constitutional rule, 
some academic commentators and political 
acolytes argued that Transitional Clause No. 
20 was unconstitutional and discriminato-
ry. A direct constitutionality review was 
brought before the Constitutional Court.8 
The Court swiftly declared it inadmissible. 
The final decision argued that the Court had 
no jurisdiction to strike down constitutional 
clauses by declaring them unconstitutional.9 
Despite this, in July 2019, President Medi-
na put an end to the political uncertainty by 
stating that he would not attempt to modify 
the Constitution to seek a third presidential 
term. However, the constitutionality of Tran-
sitional Clause No. 20 lingers, as President 
Medina is the only citizen – including all liv-
ing ex-presidents – with an expressed consti-
tutional prohibition that precludes him from 
ever aspiring to the highest office again.
Another set of high-profile constitutional 
questions discussed throughout 2019 per-
tained to certain aspects of Law No. 33-18 
on Political Parties, Movements, and Associ-
ations. After over a decade of discussion, the 
law was approved in late 2018, in the run-
up to the 2020 Dominican general elections 
and primaries during 2019. At least ten di-
rect actions of unconstitutionality have been 
raised against articles of Law No. 33-18. We 
discuss two of them below in addition to a 
third case affecting Law 157-13 on prefer-
ential voting. The Court has declared some 
articles as inconsistent with the Constitution, 
thus reshaping the rules that will apply for 
5 Cfr. Tribunal Constitucional de la República Dominicana, ‘Estadística de la Carga Procesal’, Trimestre octubre-diciembre de 2019, p. 14. See also Tribunal Consti-
tucional de la República Dominicana, ‘Estadística de la Carga Procesal’, Trimestre octubre-diciembre de 2018, p. 13 <https://www.tribunalconstitucional.gob.do/
transparencia/estad%C3%ADsticas-institucionales/> 
6 Marsteintredet L, ‘How the Dominican Republic successfully resisted presidential term extension’, Voices from the Field, ConstitutionNet <http://constitu-
tionnet.org/news/how-dominican-republic-successfully-resisted-presidential-term-extension>
7 See Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & James Melton, ‘On the Evasion of Executive Term Limits’, 52 William and Mary Law Review 1807, 2011.
8 Constitutional Court Case No. TC-01-2018-0003.
9 See Constitutional Court Judgment TC/0352/18.
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the 2020 elections, and may still rule on the 
presidential candidacy of former president 
Leonel Fernández, which critics argue vio-
lates Law No. 33-18. 
The constitutionality of other existing rules 
from said law has also been disputed. This 
includes Article 49.3 of Law No. 33-18, 
which attempts to ban party switching 
(transfuguismo) by including sore loser pro-
visions that prevent unsuccessful primary 
candidates from crossing the floor to other 
parties. The provision became more contro-
versial after the presidential primaries of the 
ruling Partido de la Liberación Dominicana 
(PLD) were decided by a difference of only 
26,696 votes in favor Gonzalo Castillo, the 
candidate supported by President Medina, 
over ex-President – and then-PLD president 
– Leonel Fernández. 
In October 2019, the results of the PLD pri-
maries led to Leonel Fernández quitting the 
party with many of his acolytes and setting 
up a political coalition comprised of sever-
al political parties that supported his presi-
dential bid, despite the sore loser provisions. 
Although the case was tried in the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal in November 2019, which 
declared that there was no constitutional 
impediment to the presidential candidacy 
of Leonel Fernández for his new party, this 
contentious issue is yet to be decided by the 
Constitutional Court and remains a source 
of political uncertainty in the run-up to the 
2020 Dominican elections.   
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Constitutional procedural law – 
TC/0345/19
In sentence TC/0345/19, the Court reexam-
ined the question of the legitimate proce-
dures to make direct claims of unconstitu-
tionality of the country’s legal norms. In the 
words of the President of the Court, Milton 
Ray Guevara, the sentence consolidates what 
he called ‘a citizen’s tribunal’. Article 185.1 
of the Constitution states that in addition to 
the President and one-third of the members 
of the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies, 
‘any person with legitimate and juridical-
ly protected interest can take direct actions 
of unconstitutionality of the country’s legal 
norms’. In previous sentences, the Court 
lacked a unifying understanding of the con-
cept of ‘legitimate and juridically protect-
ed interest’. Yet with the argument that the 
citizens should have the right to control the 
constitutionality of State action without any 
major complications or procedural obstacles, 
the Court finally ruled on the principle stat-
ing that the Constitution entails the citizens’ 
right to claim direct actions of unconstitu-
tionality. As such, the sentence is a landmark 
precedent, opening the Court to claimants by 
giving the latter the power of direct action of 
unconstitutionality. The judges argued that: 
‘(...) the direct action of unconstitutionality 
supposes a constitutional process (...) that 
gives citizens the real and effective opportu-
nity to present a constitutional action against 
the laws, decrees, resolutions, orders and 
other acts that may contradict the Political 
Charter [Constitution] before the Court to 
preserve the supremacy of the Constitution, 
constitutional order and to guarantee the re-
spect of fundamental rights’. 
With sentence TC/0345/19, a claimant’s ‘le-
gitimate and juridically protected interest’ 
will be presumed when she submits a direct 
action of unconstitutionality as long as the 
Court can verify that the person in question 
is a citizen with her rights intact. If the plain-
tiff is a legal person or entity, their ‘interest’ 
in making a direct action of unconstitution-
ality will be accepted with two conditions: 
i) that the plaintiff is a legally registered and 
existing entity with the procedural capacity 
to stand before the Court; and ii) that a rela-
tion between the entity or the owner of the 
entity and the legal norm in question can be 
proven. This decision, however, still leaves 
undefined what ‘legitimate interest’ means 
when the action of unconstitutionality re-
lates to administrative resolutions, which is 
a question the Court has not dealt with as 
yet. This fact did not go unnoticed by all 
the Court members, as two judges wrote a 
particular opinion on the matter. Despite the 
clear and relatively unrestricted rights in 
Article 185.1 of the Constitution, in earlier 
decisions, the Court has restricted the right 
of actions of unconstitutionality for legal 
entities to general legal norms with the sole 
exception of cases in which the unconstitu-
tionality of the administrative act was arbi-
trary and patently contrary to existing con-
stitutional provisions.   
 
2.   Constitutional interpretation – 
TC/0064/19
One of the novelties of the 2010 Constitution 
was its chapter on the principles of applica-
tion and interpretation of the Fundamental 
Rights and Guarantees (Chapter III, Art. 
74), which lays out the rules for interpret-
ing and regulating the fundamental rights 
of the Constitutional Charter. Of particular 
interest is Art. 74.4, which states that ‘The 
public powers [shall] interpret and apply the 
norms related to fundamental rights and their 
guarantees, in the sense most favorable to 
the person in possession of the same, [and] 
in the case of conflict between fundamental 
rights, they shall attempt to harmonize the 
assets and interests protected by this Consti-
tution’. The goal of this article was to guide 
or bind the Court in its future interpretation 
of the Constitution so that the Court would 
not deviate too much from the black letter of 
the Constitution, thus eroding fundamental 
rights over time. The relevance of the deci-
sion is not the case itself, a revision of a sen-
tence of judicial protection (amparo) involv-
ing the Dominican Association of Teachers 
(Asociación Dominicana de Profesores), but 
its interpretation of the Chapter on Funda-
mental Rights and Guarantees. In sentence 
TC/0064/19, the Court opts for what it called 
a ‘strict consideration’ of Article 74.4 when 
considering cases in which there are con-
flicts between different fundamental rights 
protected by the Constitution. The strict 
consideration means that in any given case 
treated by the Court where it has to decide 
on a conflict between rights protected by the 
Constitution, the ruling will not set a general 
precedent of a fixed hierarchy of rights. The 
Court argued that any precedent shall only 
be established for cases that are considered 
‘rigorously analogous’ to the case being 
ruled on. The consequence of which is that 
for cases involving a conflict of rights pro-
tected by the Constitution, the concrete case 
will be given an important consideration and 
weight by the Court when applying the in-
terpretive principles laid out in Article 74.4 
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of the Constitution. Although the Court can 
be criticized for creating legal uncertainty 
by this ruling, the decision avoids the trap 
of falling into the use of easy analogies to 
apply a precedent in the abstract. The latter 
is in line with the original intent of Chap-
ter III of the Constitution, namely avoiding 
the erosion of fundamental rights and de-
viation from the letter of the Constitution. 
Considering each case in the concrete rather 
than in the abstract based on an established 
hierarchy of rights set by precedents, solv-
ing a conflict between rights protected by 
the Constitution should also help the Court 
interpret the conflict of rights ‘in the sense 
most favorable to the person in possession of 
the same (…)’, as stated by the Constitution.
3.  Political parties and the electoral law – 
TC/0375/19, TC/0441/19, and TC/0214/19
We discuss here three judgments the Court 
decided in 2019 that are relevant to politi-
cal parties, and party and electoral laws af-
ter direct actions of unconstitutionality were 
brought forward by politicians and political 
parties against the aforementioned laws reg-
ulating political parties and elections (Law 
No. 157-13 on Preferential Voting and Law 
No. 33-18 on Political Parties and Associa-
tions). In particular, Law No. 33-18 on Po-
litical Parties was very controversial among 
political elites, having been discussed in 
Congress for more than ten years when it was 
finally passed. The most important of these 
sentences, however, is TC/0375/19 on the 
binding vote. This Court sentence declared 
ballot free-riding or the dragging vote (local-
ly known as voto de arrastre) introduced in 
Article 2 of the Law of Preferential Voting 
(Law No. 157-13) unconstitutional for con-
gressional elections, and this has direct con-
sequences for the 2020 national elections. 
Ballot dragging or free-riding meant that if 
you voted for one party’s candidate to the 
Chamber of Deputies, this vote also count-
ed as a vote for the same party’s candidate 
to the Senate, basically constituting a single 
ballot for both chambers of Congress (i.e., 
the deputy would drag the senator, or from 
another perspective, the senator would free-
ride on the deputy’s vote). Ballot dragging 
had been heavily discussed and criticised 
on its democratic merits, and the Central 
Electoral Board (Junta Central Electoral) 
ruled first on May 7, 2019 (JCE Resolution 
No. 08-2019) that the coupled voting would 
only be kept in six of the country’s thirty-two 
provinces.10 The Court argued that Law No. 
157-13 unreasonably restricted the citizen’s 
right to freely elect their candidates by not 
allowing voters to split their votes, and that 
Article 2 of the Law of Preferential Voting 
violates the general right to vote that is ex-
pressed in Article 208 of the Constitution, 
and the citizen’s right to elect candidates 
for all posts established in the Constitution 
(Article 22), and finally the citizen’s right to 
freely elect the Senator and Deputy they pre-
fer as established in the Constitution’s Arti-
cle 77. In particular, the Court pointed out 
that ballot dragging for the two chambers of 
Congress thwarted the voters’ right to a di-
rect connection between their vote and the 
chosen candidate (which would only be indi-
rect in the case of the candidate to the Senate 
in the stylized example used before). 
In sum, the Court argued that it would be un-
constitutional and incompatible with the vot-
ers’ right to freely exercise their suffrage not 
to allow voters to freely elect a candidate of 
one party for the Chamber of Deputies and at 
the same time vote for a preferred candidate 
of another party for the Senate. In the Court’s 
words, the law impeded the ‘citizens’ right 
to vote freely by imposing on the voter the 
candidate for Senate without the voter hav-
ing the possibility to express his or her will 
freely. This situation makes it clear that the 
voter cannot in any moment during the vot-
ing express his or her preference with respect 
to the choice of Senator, which means that 
the Senator will in effect be an imposition by 
the legal norm, and a restriction of the right 
to vote’. Finally, the Court argued that the 
legal provision in question also ‘(...) violates 
the principle of popular sovereignty’, and is 
contrary to the bicameral model of Congress 
where different ideologies should be repre-
sented and expressed. Therefore, Article 2 of 
the Law of Preferential Voting also violated, 
according to the Court, the system of checks 
and balances because the dragging ballot 
‘pointed towards the concentration and pre-
dominance of one political force or political 
tendency within the National Congress’.11 
In a country where the incumbent party, the 
PLD, has held the presidency since 2004 
and the majority in both chambers of Con-
gress since 2002, the latter message from the 
Court is important.
Law No. 33-18 on Political Parties and As-
sociations in part attempted to strengthen 
the system and party leadership vis-á-vis 
the candidates, representatives, and mem-
bers of the party by among other things in-
stalling barriers against turncoat candidates 
and representatives (transfuguismo). Sen-
tence TC/0441/19 was decided from a case 
brought before the Court by several minor 
parties that argued that the clauses in Law 
No. 33-18 on Political Parties of automatic 
expulsion of party members who criticize or 
make negative statements on candidates of 
their party were inconsistent with freedom 
of speech. The Court argued in this sentence 
that the automatic imposition of sanctions 
against party politicians (expulsion from the 
party) constituted a violation of the right to a 
public, oral, and fair trial in addition to vio-
lating due process. It did, however, point out 
that the party was entitled to sanction nega-
tive statements against candidates for popu-
lar election, but that any sanction would only 
be legal and valid if it were in accordance 
with the party’s bylaws, and the disciplinary 
10 For most of the country’s electoral history, voters only had one ballot for the presidential and congressional elections, meaning that split-ticket voting was 
impossible. Brea Franco J, ‘Dominican Republic’, in Nohlen D (ed), Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook, vol 1: North America, Central America, and 
the Caribbean (Oxford University Press, 2005).
11 Interestingly, since the action brought before the Court was restricted to the question of the dragging vote for the election of Congress, the Court did not 
consider the question of the dragging vote in local elections regulated by the same law (Law No. 157-13). Therefore, in the local elections for local deputies 
and mayors in February 2020, the dragging vote will be used in accordance with Law No. 157-13 and Organic Law No. 15-19 on the electoral regime so that 
a vote for a local deputy will bind the vote for mayor. 
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process observed all guarantees according to 
due process. 
Also, sentence TC/0214/19 related to Law 
33-18 on Political Parties and Associations. 
This case of direct unconstitutionality was 
brought before the Court by three individu-
als regarding Art. 45, par. III, which regulat-
ed which organ of the political parties had 
the right to decide which electoral register 
(padrón electoral) was to be used in the par-
ty primaries. The law stated that only the 
Central Committee, Executive Commission, 
Political Commission, National Commis-
sion, or the equivalent (i.e., executive bod-
ies) could decide which electoral register to 
use for internal elections. The Court argued 
that Art. 45, para. III violated the Constitu-
tion, and in particular political parties’ right 
to self-regulate their internal organizational 
affairs (Article 216). In its arguments, the 
Court emphasized that in comparative con-
stitutional law, the criterion of freedom of 
internal organization and self-determination 
for political parties implied that the State, 
through the law, should only interfere mini-
mally in the internal organization of political 
parties. Article 216 of the Constitution was 
there to safeguard this criterion of self-orga-
nization for political parties. The sentence 
further ratified the constitutional status of 
political parties and underlined the State’s 
obligation to protect the parties’ right to 
self-organize. 
 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The onset of the 2020 Dominican general 
elections are set to pose many constitutional 
controversies to the Superior Electoral Tri-
bunal, and subsequently, to the Constitution-
al Court. These elections will be one of the 
most complex in Dominican history, with 
over 17,500 candidates competing for 4,106 
positions. For the first time, municipal elec-
tions will be held separately from national 
elections, as local elections are scheduled for 
16 February 2020 while the congressional 
and presidential elections (first round) are 
scheduled for 17 May, with a potential presi-
dential runoff 28 June. 
The general elections will also have an im-
pact on the Court’s composition. In Decem-
ber 2020, four more vacancies will arise. 
Another five vacancies will occur in 2023 
– marking the departure of all of the original 
judges, the Court’s first full renovation. This 
means that the political party that presides 
during the 2020-2024 period has the potential 
to recompose the Court by spearheading the 
appointment of nine of its thirteen judges.  
V. FURTHER READING
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eficacia del precedente: especial referencia 
al ordenamiento jurídico dominicano’, in 
Moscoso Segarra A (ed), El precedente con-
stitucional y judicial: análisis crítico Hom-
enaje a Michele Taruffo (Impresora Soto 
Castillo, 2019)
Cruceta Almánzar JA, ‘El precedente con-
stitucional vigente’, in Moscoso Segarra A 
(ed), El precedente constitucional y judicial: 
análisis crítico Homenaje a Michele Taruffo 
(Impresora Soto Castillo, 2019)
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en el ordenamiento jurídico dominicano’ 
(2019), 2 Revista Dominicana de Derecho 
Constitucional 195
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carácter vinculante del precedente interam-
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I. INTRODUCTION
During 2019, Ecuador started a process of 
consolidating its institutions through the 
work carried out by the transitory Council 
for Public Participation and Social Control 
(CPPSC-t), aimed at achieving the ‘re-in-
stitutionalization of the country’. However, 
issues such as corruption, political division 
and an economic crisis looming have put 
into question the strength of rule of law and 
democratic institutions in the country. These 
efforts were interrupted by demonstrations in 
October, which were the first protests relat-
ed to deficient economic and social circum-
stances and sharp inequalities in the region, 
and were followed by protests with similar 
motivations in Colombia, Chile, Argentina, 
Panama, Venezuela, El Salvador and Boliv-
ia. In the midst of economic turmoil, serious 
structural problems and social discontent in 
several sectors, the redesign of constitution-
al institutions continued, first with the Ec-
uadorean justice system. In the framework 
of this endeavour, the appointment of new 
judges to the Constitutional Court was per-
haps the most outstanding element.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. The dusk of the Transitory Council for 
Public Participation and Social Control 
(CPPSC-t)
By the end of its term in March 2019, the 
CPPSC-t had opened 29 investigations for 
alleged acts of corruption in public contracts 
for the Pacific Refinery, the Manduriacu hy-
droelectric project and reconstruction of the 
coastal province of Manabi after the 2016 
earthquake.1 As we will see in the follow-
ing sections, during 2019, the prosecution of 
corruption among the highest ranking offi-
cials, ministers and former President Correa 
himself were very prominent and served as 
the yardstick against which prosecutors and 
judges were held accountable.
In 2018, we reported that the CPPSC-t had 
‘evaluated several state organs, such as the 
Ombudsman, the Public Defender, the Gen-
eral Comptroller, Contentious Electoral Tri-
bunal, the Attorney General, the Superinten-
dents, the Constitutional Court, and finally 
the Judicial Council’. In the first trimester of 
2019, the CPPSC-t wrapped up the remaining 
appointment procedures for the Ombudsman, 
the Attorney General and the National Public 
Defender, and it sent short lists of nominees 
for the Council of the Judiciary. In sum, the 
CPPSC-t removed 27 officials and appointed 
31 authorities in 12 public institutions.2 
Criticism regarding the legality of the 
CPPSC-t and its prudential choices contin-
ued during 2019. Perhaps the passing away 
of its chair, the renowned jurist and states-
man Julio Cesar Trujillo, epitomizes the 





2018-2019-v-3.pdf. Es importante aclarar que el CPCCSt no evaluó a la máxima autoridad de la Con-
traloría General del Estado, el cual es un organismo encargado del control de la utilización de los recursos 
estatales, y de las personas jurídicas de derecho privado que dispongan de recursos públicos.
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discharged its functions. On May 13, 2019, 
during a closing event by CPPSC-t, a group 
of protestors (allegedly supporters of the 
Correa regime) broke into the auditorium 
and made it impossible for it to continue. As 
a particularly unfortunate coincidence, the 
next day, Trujillo (88 years old) suffered a 
stroke and died within few days. Statesmen 
and jurists from every side of the aisle joined 
to pay tribute to Trujillo’s spotless and co-
herent public life.
 
The referendum that created the CPPSC-t 
clothed the procedures of revision and ap-
pointment with the colour of law. Yet, its 
persistent struggle to define the extent of its 
powers reminded its supporters and detrac-
tors that it was an extraordinary attempt to 
bring the rule of law and democratic insti-
tutions to the ordinary lives of Ecuadoreans. 
Only time will tell if this was a step towards 
consolidating the rule of law. Unfortunate-
ly, recent history in Ecuador is beset with 
failed attempts to reset from crises back (or 
forward) to the stability of the rule of law, 
and in the third section on the constitutional 
developments of 2019, there is already evi-
dence of the sort of challenges that the de-
cisions made during the transitional regime 
could continue to face.
2. Elections 
On March 24, 2019, Ecuadoreans elected 
provincial and municipal authorities, as well 
as the seven individuals who will become 
the new members of the CPPSC, which in 
turn replaced the transitory regime.3 The 
elections were uneventful, but it was note-
worthy that all members of the CPPSC were 
elected with fewer than 3 million votes from 
an electoral roll of approximately 13 million 
people,4 which undermined their legitimacy 
from the outset. One must understand this 
against the background of the ongoing call 
for a referendum to decide whether to elimi-
nate the CPPSC from the Constitution. 
The former chair of the CPPSC-t, Julio César 
Trujillo, led a non-governmental Committee 
for National Re-Institutionalization in order 
to undertake every effort necessary to con-
vene a referendum to get rid of the CPPSC 
from the constitutional design. The rationale 
behind this proposal was that the CPPSC 
could be easily co-opted again. After Trujil-
lo’s passing, Pablo Davila Jaramillo,5 took 
the banner and petitioned the Constitution-
al Court in May 2019 to adjudicate on the 
appropriate means for removing the CPPSC 
from the Constitution. Meanwhile, the elect-
ed members to the CPPSC-t were sworn into 
office on June 13, 2019.
3. The cracks of the transition regime 
At its beginning, the CPPSC informed that 
the decisions of the transitory Council re-
garding all the officials it removed and ap-
pointed would be reviewed, despite ruling 
No. 2-19-IC/19 of the Constitutional Court.
 
This position was both criticized and sup-
ported by different sectors of society. For 
example, a group of constitutional lawyers 
informed the CPPSC that there was no pro-
tection for the actions of the CPPSC-t, pro-
vided there were vices of nullity in the pro-
cess of designating each of the authorities. In 
contrast, the Minister of the Interior said that 
the CPPSC ‘cannot go back and bring down 
the process of democratic institutionalization 
that Ecuador has lived’.
Nevertheless, and despite the decision of the 
Constitutional Court, on July 10, 2019, the 
CPPSC approved the creation of a commis-
sion to review the decision of the CPPSC-t 
about the appointment of the Constitutional 
Court. This led to an investigation initiated 
by the Attorney General’s Office against the 
counsellors who approved this decision for 
the alleged crime of ‘breach of legitimate de-
cisions of competent authority’ in relation to 
Sentence No. 2-19-IC/19.
 
The vehemence of the rejection of the 
CPPSC’s plan to reverse the process of in-
stitutionalization brought the CPPSC to its 
knees, and on July 10, 2019, it revoked its 
decision. This, however, did not prevent the 
National Assembly from beginning a process 
of impeachment against CPPSC counsellors 
Jose Tuárez, Victoria Desintonio, Walter Go-
mez and Rosa Chalá for breach of duties, 
which ended with the dismissal of all the in-
terpellated counsellors on August 14, 2019, 
when the National Assembly, with 84 votes 
in favour, 32 refusals and 8 abstentions, ap-
proved the above-mentioned motion.6  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
On February 5, 2019, the Legislative ap-
pointed 9 new judges7 to the Constitutional 
Court, who had been nominated by an ad-
hoc selection committee appointed by the 
CPPSC-t. In spite of criticisms to the process 
of selection or to the elected judges, the pres-
ent composition of the Constitutional Court 
is regarded as far more transparent and inde-
pendent than its predecessors.8  
The Constitutional Court faced several chal-
lenges from its start. First, it had to strengthen 
3 According to the referendum held on February 4, 2018, CPCCS members after the transitory regime had to be elected by universal and secret suffrage. See 
https://www.elcomercio.com/uploads/files/2017/10/03/Anexo%20pregunta%202.pdf
4 Results: Rosa Chalá, 2 230 751 votes; Victoria Desintonio, 1 651 484 votes; Sofía Almeida, 1 716 231 votes; María Rivadeneira, 2 331 172 votes; Walter Gómez, 
854 483 votes; Christian Cruz, 772 667 votes; and, Carlos Tuárez 942 850 votes.
5 The request was submitted by Pablo Dávila, since Julio César Trujillo passed away on May 19, 2019.
6 https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ec/sites/default/files/2019-08-14-r034.pdf.pdf
7 For the names and profiles of the judges. See, https://www.corteconstitucional.gob.ec/index.php/quienes-somos/autoridades.html
8 Several judges of the previous composition of the Court have been strongly criticized, not only for their close relationships with the Executive but also because of 
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its image as the highest body for interpreta-
tion and constitutional justice. Second, it had 
to navigate through the illiberal (or post-liber-
al) ideology behind the Constitution of 2008 
(see our 2017 report). Third, the Court had to 
deal with a backlog of cases that accumulat-
ed not only during the months of vacancy but 
mainly because the previous Court carelessly 
halted cases for several years. From 2012 to 
July 19, 2018, the Court received 25,840 new 
cases, but only 15,326 had received an initial 
decision on their admissibility, about 14,000 
cases were pending a decision on their merits 
and the remaining 10,514 were left without 
any formal response.9  
In order to address the backlog of cases, the 
Constitutional Court implemented an elec-
tronic raffle of causes in order to distribute 
the workload evenly, efficiently and trans-
parently among the new judges. The Court 
also amended its internal rules of procedures 
(Reglamento de Sustanciación de Procesos 
de Competencia de la Corte Constitucional) 
in order to ease procedural loopholes. In its 
first year, the Constitutional Court resolved 
595 cases, which is approximately the same 
as the amount of cases decided by the previ-
ous Court in 10 years.10 
1. Referenda and constitutional amend-
ments to rid the Ecuadorean State of the 
CPPSC-t
As we have pointed out earlier, the elimi-
nation of the CPPSC from the Ecuadorean 
legal system caused great turbulence, which 
affected the Court in various aspects. First, 
the Court is a necessary institution in the 
process of constitutional change, as it has the 
competence to define the amendment pro-
cedure in case there is an initiative. In the 
Sentence No. 4-19-RC/19, the Constitutional 
Court determined that the appropriate way to 
eliminate CPPSC was constitutional reform 
through the National Assembly, which is the 
most rigid procedure among the three pos-
sible options offered by Articles 441-442 of 
the Ecuadorian Constitution.
Additionally, the Court determined that the 
redesign of the Legislative Function (in or-
der to be bicameral) and the separation of the 
Attorney General’s Office from the Judicial 
Function have to proceed as a partial reform. 
This procedure will include two debates in 
the plenary session of the National Assembly 
and then a subsequent referendum, in accor-
dance with the provisions of Article 442 of 
the Constitution.
Talking about the constitutional jurispru-
dence regarding the elimination of the 
CPPSC, one has to lay emphasis on Sentence 
No. 2-19-IC/19, which was already men-
tioned above in the section on constitutional 
developments. This sentence was not only 
one of the first pronouncements of the Court 
but it existentially affected the Court, as it 
was requested that the Court clarify whether 
or not the definitive CPPSC can review the 
decisions taken by the CPPSC-t; among oth-
ers, the dissolution of the very predecessor 
of the Court and the appointment of its own 
judges. The Court determined that no deci-
sions taken in the exercise of the extraordi-
nary powers granted to the transitory CPPSC 
shall be reviewed by the elected CPPSC. 
2. State as bearer of rights
The underlying case is about freedom of ex-
pression and the obligation of the media to 
verify the information that is to be circulated 
in public. The complaint, however, alleging 
the violation of the freedom of expression, 
was not filed by a natural person but by a 
certain office of the presidency. Therefore, 
Sentence No. 282-13-JP/19 first analysed 
the question of whether the State or its or-
gans could hold rights at all. The Sentence 
concluded that the State cannot hold funda-
mental rights, as they are inherent to human 
dignity – except for the case of nature as it is 
a subject of rights following the explicit rec-
ognition of the Constitution – and their clas-
sical role is to protect the citizens from the 
State. At the same time, the Sentence empha-
sized that this does not mean that the State 
could not have rights related to the guaran-
tees of due process. Consequently, the State 
can only initiate a constitutional complaint 
in its name if there is an alleged violation to 
procedural rights.
3. Constitutionality of the state of emergen-
cy during the protests
During the first half of October, a wave of 
massive protests hit Ecuador. Some say that 
the cause dates back as far as March 21, 
2019, when Ecuador announced an agree-
ment with the International Monetary Fund. 
The government sought a line of credit worth 
4.2 billion dollars in order to alleviate the 
fiscal deficit. In order to fulfill the IMF’s 
conditions for the loan, on October 1, 2019, 
President Lenin Moreno decreed several 
economic measures, among which the most 
sensitive was the elimination of the fuel sub-
sidy that had been in place for decades as an 
emblematic measure for the redistribution of 
oil revenue.
 
On October 2, different social movements, 
such as the Unitary Front of Workers, the In-
digenous People’s Confederation (CONAIE) 
and other unions and associations of public 
transportation called for a nationwide strike 
in order to reverse the elimination of the fuel 
subsidy. The intensity of the protests pro-
gressively increased throughout the week. 
Private businesses and public goods were 
looted, burnt or vandalized. The Comptrol-
ler’s Office and a TV station (Teleamazonas) 
were set on fire, the protesters attacked the 
police in street fights and units of the Red 
Cross and threatened to loot random neigh-
borhoods and houses.
 
The Executive decreed a state of emergency 
and later a curfew. The Constitutional Court 
declared the constitutionality of the state of 
emergency issued by the President, but – un-
like previous decisions – it defined certain 
9 https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/corte-constitucional-procesos-jueces-asamblea.html
10 Furthermore, other, intermediate decisions of the Court reached the thousands, following the statistics. See, Bulletin of Jurisprudence 2020, Constitutional Court 
of Ecuador, p.70-78.
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limitations that the State had to meet in order 
to maintain the constitutionality of the emer-
gency orders.11
 
Videos and images circulated in social me-
dia showing instances of abuse of force by 
the police as well as protesters using home-
made anti-riot shields and rocket launchers. 
The country was completely paralyzed for 
almost a week. In the last three days of pro-
tests, different groups of indigenous peoples 
occupied the National Institute for Culture, 
which became the seat of a sort of parliament 
of indigenous peoples (mainly those associ-
ated with CONAIE). In different places, po-
licemen were forcibly held and disarmed by 
indigenous peoples and protesters, who is-
sued different demands in exchange for their 
freedom. Some eight policemen were with-
held inside the National Institute for Culture 
by the indigenous people’s parliament.
The demonstrations finished on October 12 
in a negotiation sponsored by the Ecuador-
ean Conference of Catholic Bishops and 
the Resident Coordinator of the United Na-
tions. After days of violent protests, the gov-
ernment had to yield and reinstate the fuel 
subsidy. The week of violence had serious 
economic, political and social consequenc-
es. There were several people wounded and 
killed by the excessive response of public 
forces as well as countless policemen and 
military kidnapped, battered and burnt. The 
protests generated (or further aggravated) 
polarization among Ecuadoreans. They also 
negatively affected the credibility and legit-
imacy of the central government (especial-
ly its Ministers of Interior and Defense), as 
its answers to the crisis were insufficient or 
abusive and, in any case, overdue.
4. Presidential veto and separation of 
powers: Criminal reform about abortion in 
cases of rape
On December 17, 2019, the legislature dis-
cussed the reforms to the Criminal Code 
(Código Orgánico Integral Penal). Among 
the most contentious issues there was a pro-
posal to decriminalize abortion in cases of 
rape. After an intense legislative delibera-
tion, this provision was not adopted. Yet, in 
the final version of the bill that the legisla-
ture sent to the Executive, it mistakenly con-
tained a transitory provision that was meant 
to implement the provision on abortion had 
it been adopted.
The President rejected the bill on several 
grounds and tried to take advantage of the er-
ror in order to push the Constitutional Court 
to issue an opinion that would decriminalize 
abortion in cases of rape. The Constitutional 
Court ruled that it was just a drafting mis-
take by the legislature that did not warrant 
the President or the Court to have a say over 
the substance of the legislative decision.12  
5. Same sex marriage
Finally, the Constitutional Court decided to 
make a decision in the question of same sex 
marriage. In Sentences No. 11-18-CN/19 and 
10-18-CN/19, the Court recognized same sex 
marriage in Ecuador. Within Sentence No. 
11-18-CN/19, the Court interpreted Article 
67 of the Constitution of Ecuador (which de-
fined marriage as a union between a man and 
a women), arguing that under the provisions 
of the advisory opinion of the Inter-Amer-
ican Court of Human Rights No. OC-24/7, 
Ecuador has an international legal obligation 
to guarantee the right to marry to same sex 
couples too. On the other hand, Sentence No. 
10-18-CN/19 declared Article 81 of the Civil 
Code and Article 52 of the Law on Identi-
ty and Civil Data Management, which state 
that marriage shall only be between a man 
and a woman, unconstitutional as they al-
low discriminatory treatment against people 
of the same sex. The vote of the Court was 
not unanimous. In both decisions, four out 
of the nine judges argued that the appropri-
ate way to recognize equal marriage should 
be through a political procedure involving 
a constitutional reform that falls under the 
competence of the legislature.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
One could have mixed feelings about the 
year 2019 with regard to the consolidation 
and strengthening of institutions in Ecuador. 
On the one hand, there have been signs of 
hope on a legal and political level with re-
spect to building stronger institutions and a 
more responsive justice system; at the same 
time, on a social and economic level, we 
could see that the rule of law edifice can be 
fragile too, and everything can turn upside 
down in the course of a few days.
 
2020, therefore, is another test period for 
complying with the objectives of creating 
and maintaining transparent and account-
able institutions, such as the referendum that 
is to be organized about the elimination of 
the CPPSC. Furthermore, 2020 will also be 
about the assessment of the Constitutional 
Court. Entering into their second year, the 
new judges have the responsibility to seek 
broader acceptance and compliance with 
their decisions in society in order to consol-
idate the Court’s jurisprudence and to main-
tain its independence and impartiality. 
V. FURTHER READING
Ramiro Ávila Santamaria, La utopía del 
oprimido. Los derechos de la naturaleza y el 
buen vivir en el pensamiento crítico, el dere-
cho a la literatura (Akal/Inter Pares, 2019)
Pamela Juliana Aguirre Casto, El preceden-
te constitucional: La transformación de las 
fuentes del ordenamiento jurídico (Univer-
sidad Andina Simón Bolivar, Derecho y So-
ciedad 6. 2019)
Mauricio Maldonado Muñoz, La Democra-
cia a partir de Bobbio (Cevallos, 2019)
11 The Court declared that during the state of emergency, law enforcement officers had to respect and protect humanitarian organizations as well as journalists. The 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the adoption of the 2014 Constitution, 
the year 2019 was, undisputedly, the most 
significant year in the Egyptian constitu-
tional path. A constitutional amendment was 
adopted in a referendum through which 14 
articles were amended and 3 articles and a 
new seventh section were added. The con-
stitutional structure of the state and its con-
stitutional institutions were deeply changed, 
the function as well as the construction of 
the state’s authorities were reshaped, and the 
principle of the separation of powers was 
extremely jeopardized. As for the executive 
branch, the most significant changes were 
the increase of the presidential term from 4 
to 6 years and the widening of the scope of 
executive authority vis-à-vis the judiciary 
and the Parliament, with the latter’s structure 
changing with the addition of a new lower 
chamber, the House of Senates. The judicia-
ry lost some of its powers and jurisdictions. 
However, the most important reshaping of 
the judiciary was the amendment to the se-
lection procedure for the heads of the judicial 
bodies and entities and the establishment of a 
new council that governs the judicial system 
in the state.
Meanwhile, a number of new controversial 
laws were passed, a new General Prosecu-
tor was appointed, and a new head of the 
State Council was selected by the President 
according to the new process adopted in the 
Constitution after the amendments. An emer-
gency status was declared four consecutive 
times by four executive orders.
In a different context, some interesting judg-
ments were delivered whether from the Su-
preme Court or, more interestingly, from 
lower courts, touching on civil and constitu-
tional rights.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
A constitutional amendment was enacted in 
Egypt in 2019 upon a call from the Parlia-
ment. According to Article no. 226 of the 
Egyptian 2014 Constitution, an amendment 
request can only be submitted through one-
fifth of the members of the House of Rep-
resentatives, or the President. In all cases, 
the request has to be approved by a simple 
majority, and if approved, has to be debat-
ed1 article by article and approved2 by a two-
thirds majority of the House. Accordingly, 
an amendment draft was submitted, debated, 
and approved.  The President sent a letter to 
the National Elections Commission asking 
for a referendum. The Commission called for 
a referendum on the 17th of April by decision 
no. 26/2019.3 Being that it was the Commis-
sion and not the President who issued the de-
cision calling for the referendum, it created 
a constitutional issue. According to Article 
no. 157, it is the President who can call for 
the referendum, and according to Article no. 
-The Egyptian Parliament Approves Am ,,؟دالبلا رظتني اذام ..روتسدلا تاليدعت ىلع قفاوي رصم ناملرب‘  1
mending the Constitution, What Awaits Egypt?’.
.’The Egyptian Parliament, the Session of April 16, 2019 , 2019 ليربإ 16 ةسلج يرصملا باونلا سلجم 2
3 The Official Gazette, issue (15) repeated (c), April 17, 2019.
108 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
208, the Commission’s jurisdiction is limit-
ed to the supervision and management of the 
elections’ and referendums’ processes and 
procedures.
The referendum took place over four days, 
from Friday, the 19th of April, through Mon-
day, the 22nd. According to the second article 
of the Commission’s decision, the first three 
days were set for citizens overseas to vote, 
and the last three days were for the locals. 
The referendum included the amendment 
of 14 articles (102/1, 102/3, 140/1, 160/1, 
160/5, 185, 189/2, 190, 193/3, 200/1, 204/2, 
234, 243, and 244), the augmentation of three 
articles (150 bis, 241 bis, and 244 bis), and 
also included the addition of a new seven-ar-
ticled seventh section under the name of the 
House of Senates. Those articles were related 
to the Parliament, presidential authority, the 
judiciary system, and the military. Some of 
them were demonstrated in the last report in 
the same way they were amended, and some 
of them were amended differently in the final 
amendment draft, while a few of them were 
not tackled in the last report. We will focus 
on the latter two categories.
The presidential term was extended from 4 
to 6 years retroactively to the current Presi-
dent in office, who will enjoy the opportunity 
to be reelected for a third consecutive term 
as an exception from the constitutional rule 
that limits the consecutive terms to two. The 
President was given the authority to appoint 
a Vice President, who enjoys some of the 
authorities, powers, and jurisdictions of the 
Prime Minister before the amendment, espe-
cially acting in the place of the President in 
cases of temporary impediment.
As expected, presidential power over the 
judiciary was broadened including: a) the 
appointment of the Attorney General, b) the 
President was given the authority to chair the 
Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies, which 
is endowed with the power of supervising 
the judiciary system, including, inter alia, 
appointment of judges, promoting them, and 
the approval of the judiciary system’s annual 
fund, c) the concession of discretionary pow-
er to the government to refer bills of legisla-
tive character to the State Council to review 
instead of being a mandatory obligation, and 
d) the appointment of the president as well as 
the deputies of the president of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court.
Concerning the military and the Parliament, 
the topic is covered in the last report in the 
same way it was delivered to the referen-
dum except for narrowing the power of the 
President to choose the Minister of Armed 
Forces after 2022. The approval of the Su-
preme Council of Armed Forces is now a 
permanent condition for appointment in the 
given position.
On Tuesday, the 23rd of April 2019, the Na-
tional Elections Commission declared the 
approval of the draft of the amendments by 
decision no. 38/ 2019, with a majority of 
88.83% of the valid votes.4 
In a quick application to the amendments on 
Articles 185, 189, and 193 of the Constitu-
tion, on the day after these amendments were 
approved in the referendum, the Minister of 
Justice sent three law drafts to the heads of 
the Egyptian judicial authorities.5 The first 
two bills regulate the selection of the heads 
of the judicial bodies, including the public 
prosecution, the administrative prosecution, 
the court of cassation, the state council, the 
state lawsuits authority, the Supreme Con-
stitutional Court, and the military judiciary. 
The third bill establishes and regulates the 
Supreme Council of the Judicial Authorities. 
While the Parliament passed the first two 
bills on June 26, 2019, the third bill was still 
under consideration as of the date this review 
was written.
The first law number 77 of the year 2019 
unifies the selection of the head of all the ju-
dicial authorities, except for the public pros-
ecution and the supreme constitutional law. 
The selected method is that the President 
chooses the head of the relevant authority 
among the most seven senior deputies of it. 
This head is appointed for four years, or until 
he/she retires, and is allowed to be appointed 
only once. Regarding the public prosecution, 
the law stipulates that the chief public prose-
cutor is to be chosen by the President among 
three candidates nominated by the Supreme 
Judicial Council. These candidates should be 
among the deputies of the chief of the court 
of cassation, the chiefs of the appeal courts, 
and the assistant general prosecutors. The 
nominations should be sent to the President 
30 days before the end of the period of the 
last chief public prosecutor. In case nomina-
tions were not sent in on time or were out of 
the categories referred to earlier, the Presi-
dent has the right to choose the chief public 
prosecutor among these categories. Just like 
the other judicial bodies, the chief public 
prosecutor is to be appointed for four years 
or until he/she retires, and for only once 
during his/her service.6 
The second law number 78 of the year 2019 
modified the selection process of the head of 
the Supreme Constitutional Court. Accord-
ing to this law, the court chief is chosen by 
the President among the five most senior 
deputies of the court chief. The vice chief of 
the Court is also to be chosen by the Presi-
dent among two candidates; the general as-
sembly of the Court nominates one, and the 
chief of the Court nominates the second.7 
These amendments are the second wave of 
strengthening the power of the President 
versus the power of the judicial authorities 
in choosing their heads. The first wave took 
place back in 2017 through the debatable 
law of selecting the heads of judicial author-
ities – except for the chief public prosecutor 
and the chief of the Supreme Constitutional 
4 ‘The Official Gazette, issue (16) Repeated (f), April 23, 2019’.
5 Rana Mamdouh, ‘Concern Arises That Recent Constitutional Amendments Bring the Armed Forces into Egypt’s Judicial System’ (Constitutionnet, 2019) <http://
constitutionnet.org/news/concern-arises-recent-constitutional-amendments-bring-armed-forces-egypts-judicial-system> accessed 9 January 2020.
6 Law number 77 of year 2019, modifying law number 117 of year 1958 on the re-regulation of the administrative prosecution and disciplinary trials; law number 75 
of year 1963 of the state lawsuits authority; law number 25 of year 1966 of the military judicia. 2019 3.
7 Law number 78 of year 2019, modifying law number 48 of year 1979 of the Supreme Constitutional Court. 2019 6.
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Court. The 2019 laws not only included all 
the judicial authorities but also limited the 
interference of these bodies in their head 
selection to a greater extent than that of the 
2017 law. Both the laws of 2017 and 2019 
represent a distinct step backwards in terms 
of the interference of the presidency within 
this process.8
 
The new amendments were already applied 
through the appointment of the new chief 
public prosecutor Justice Hamada El Sawy,9 
and the new chief of the Supreme Constitu-
tional Court Justice Saied Marei.10 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Nasrallah v. Nasrallah & Nasrallah: 
Activation of Christians’ Inheritance Laws
On November 24, 2019, the seventh circuit 
of Helwan Family Court of Personal Mat-
ters – Guardianship delivered its verdict in 
case number 3743 of the year 2019. The case 
was initiated by Huda Nasrallah, a lawyer 
and member of the Egyptian Initiative for 
Personal Rights. In her claim, Huda asked 
for nullifying the declaration of death and 
inheritance issued in case number 2793 of 
the year 2018 from the inheritance circuit of 
the Helwan court. She argued that the men-
tioned declaration was legally void because 
it breached the principles of the Constitution 
and the law, and that the court that delivered 
it gave the parties what they did not ask for. 
The declaration distributed the inheritance of 
the dead person in accordance with the Is-
lamic Shariaa, which gives the brother twice 
the share of his sister from the same degree. 
However, the dead and his successors were 
from the same religion (Christian), Millia 
(Coptic), and sect (Orthodox), and there was 
no objection by the defendants regarding the 
application of the Christian Shariaa. These 
facts should entail the application of Arti-
cle 245 of the Coptic Orthodox regulation 
of the year 1938. The mentioned regulation 
gives the same share of inheritance for both 
males and females. The applicant also argued 
that the declaration violates Article 3 of the 
Egyptian Constitution, which gives Chris-
tians the right to apply the principles of the 
Christian Shariaa in their personal matters.11 
The court ruled in favour of the applicant, 
applying the articles of the Coptic Orthodox 
regulation and Egyptian Constitution re-
ferred to earlier.12 
This rule is an important victory for the ini-
tiatives advocating for the application of the 
Christian and Jewish Shariaa in matters of 
inheritance on Christians and Jews in Egypt. 
As mentioned earlier, this right is protected 
by Article 3 of the Egyptian Constitution. 
However, for years the Egyptian courts ap-
plied the principles of the Islamic Shariaa on 
non-Muslims in contradiction to the law of 
inheritance of the year 1943 modified by law 
number 25 of the year 1944. This law gives 
non-Muslims the right to apply the Shariaa 
of the dead’s religion if there is no objection 
by the survivors. However, the Egyptian 
courts used to ignore this law, depending 
on Article 875 of the Civil Code of the year 
1948, which considered inheritance as one of 
the reasons of property deferral and put the 
Islamic Shariaa as the applicable law for in-
heritance matters.
This tradition of Egyptian courts is not built 
on a solid legal basis because it deactivates 
two specific legal texts over one general text. 
Regardless of the Constitution, which did 
not have that protection before 2012, the first 
is the inheritance law and the second is the 
regulation of personal matters. Unfortunate-
ly, this tradition was supported by court of 
cassation rulings, which decided that Islamic 
Shariaa was to be applied in matters of in-
heritance on both Muslims and non-Muslims 
as part of the public order. The non-Muslims 
used to resort to non-legal ways to avoid this. 
Accordingly, they used to agree on distribut-
ing their inheritance according to their Sha-
riaa informally. This, of course, put the right 
of the Egyptian non-Muslim women in the 
hands of their male family members.13 
The tradition started to be broken by another 
relevant rule by the Cairo court of appeal in 
8 For more details about the sequencing of previous laws governing this process, see Eman Muhammad Rashwan, ‘Egypt: The State of Liberal Democracy’, in 
Richard Albert and others (eds), 2017 Global Review of Constitutional Law (2018) 83-85 <www.bc.edu/cloughcenter> 
9 ‘Sisi Names Hamada Al-Sawi New Attorney General after Sadek’ (Egypt Today, 2019) <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/74685/Sisi-names-Hamada-Al-Sa-
wi-new-attorney-general-after-Sadek> accessed 9 January 2020.
10 ‘President Sisi Appoints New Head of Egyptian Constitutional Court’ (Constitutionnet, 2019) <http://constitutionnet.org/news/president-sisi-ap-
points-new-head-egyptian-constitutional-court> accessed 9 January 2020.
 A Ruling Activating the Third Article ,ركذلاو يثنألا نيب ةاواسملاو ثرإلا يف ةيحيسملا ةعيرشلا ئدابم قيبطتب مكحلا رودص روتسدلا نم ةثلاثلا ةداملل ًاليعفت‘ 11
of the Constitution Applies the Christian Shariaa Principles That Equals the Female and the Male in Inheritance’ (The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, 
2019) <https://eipr.org/press/2020/01/ثرإلا-يف-ةيحيسملا-ةعيرشلا-ئدابم-قيبطتب-مكحلا-رودص-روتسدلا-نم-ةثلاثلا-ةداملل-ًاليعفت?fbclid=IwAR3VamskeHxS
UIOKfRdr3SdooKg1mtwWgfeqAE0wlmETlSF3wTZ4T18qLzY> accessed 13 January 2019; ‘ةيماحملا ةركذم صن مويلا ةيصخشلا قوقحلل ةيرصملا ةردابملا رشنت 
 The Egyptian Initiative for Personal ,اهدلاو ةافوب صاخلا ةثارولاو ةافولا داهشإ نالطبب ىوعدلا يف ،ةيصخشلا قوقحلل ةيرصملا ةردابملاب ةيماحملا ،هللا رصن ىده
Rights Publishes Today the Text of the La’ (The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, 2019) <https://eipr.org/press/2019/11/قوقحلل-ةيرصملا-ةردابملا-رشنت-
.accessed 13 January 2020 <ىوعدلا-يف-هللا-رصن-ىده-ةيماحملا-ةركذم-صن-مويلا-ةيصخشلا
 A Ruling Activating the Third Article ,ركذلاو يثنألا نيب ةاواسملاو ثرإلا يف ةيحيسملا ةعيرشلا ئدابم قيبطتب مكحلا رودص روتسدلا نم ةثلاثلا ةداملل ًاليعفت‘ 12
of the Constitution Applies the Christian Shariaa Principles That Equals the Female and the Male in Inheritance’ (n 11).
 The History of the Inheritance Distribution Regulation for Christians in the ,رياني ةروث ىتح يرصملا نوناقلا يف نييحيسملا دنع ثرإلا عيزوت ميظنت خيرات‘ 13
Egyptian Law until the January Revolution’ (The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, 2019) <https://eipr.org/publications/دنع-ثرإلا-عيزوت-ميظنت-خيرات-
.accessed 13 January 2020 <نييحيسملا
 نهتعيرش ئدابم ىلإ ماكتحالا يف تايرصملا تايحيسملا قحب بلاطت ةيصخشلا قوقحلل ةيرصملا ةردابملل ةديدج ةلمح ”ثرإلا يف تاملسم ...ةقاطبلا يف تايحيسم“‘ 14
 ,Christians in the National ID... Muslims in the Inheritance” A New Campaign for the Egy’ (The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights“ ,ثاريملا ةبصنأ عيزوت دنع
2019) <https://eipr.org/press/2019/07/ىلإ-ماكتحالا-يف-تايحيسملا-قحب-بلاطت-ثرإلا-يف-تاملسم-ةقاطبلا-يف-تايحيسم-ةلمح-قالطإ> accessed 13 January 
2020.
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the year 2016, applying the Coptic Orthodox 
regulation in matters of inheritance.14 This 
new ruling was another forward step after the 
2016 ruling and 2014 Constitution. Some ac-
tivists advocate for a unified law for personal 
matters of Christians in Egypt that abolishes 
any vagueness or conflict in the current laws.15 
2. Polytechnical Designers Association 
v. Minister of Social Solidarity & Others: 
Freedom of assembly, association, and 
expression
This case was originally filed by the Poly-
technical Designers Association against the 
Minister of Social Solidarity and the Gover-
nor of Cairo in front of the Court of Adminis-
trative Justice in late 2015. Claiming the ille-
gitimacy of the second defendant’s decision 
to dissolve the Association, the governor was 
delegated by the minister to make decisions 
according to Article 42 of Law 48 of the year 
2002 as well as Articles 92-96 of its imple-
menting regulation.
The second defendant, the Governor of Cai-
ro, issued decision no. 9031 of the year 2015 
to dissolve the association for violation of 
Article 42 and appointed a judicial liquidator 
to carry it out. The claimants filed the case, 
claiming the illegitimacy of the decision on 
the basis of the illegitimacy of its reason-
ing,16 and that the association did not commit 
a violation to the said article. At that stage 
of the judicial dispute, the claimants did not 
challenge the constitutionality of the said ar-
ticles but the court did.17  On July 30, 2017, 
the court ordered a stay of proceedings of 
case no. 19726 of the year 2015 and referred 
to the Supreme Constitutional Court to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the aforemen-
tioned articles. The constitutional case was 
delivered to the Court and recorded under no. 
84 of judicial year 39, on which the Court 
delivered its judgement on February 2, 2019.
The first controversial question answered by 
the Court was the existence or absence of a 
direct interest for the claimants to proceed the 
case. The problem was the enactment of law 
no. 70 of the year 2017,18 where the Court de-
cided in favor of the claimants on two bases: 
the first was the nature of the unconstitution-
ality judgement and the fact that it was related 
to the interpretation of the Constitution’s ar-
ticles, so that it was important and crucial to 
the state’s authorities to realize the limits that 
the constitutional article would put to it; the 
second was that the same limits would apply 
to the new law, so that the given judgement 
would form a judicial precedent applicable to 
the new law as it was related to the constitu-
tional article, not the legal provisions.
The Court renounced the government’s ar-
guments calling for the constitutionality of 
the disputed articles on the claims that it was 
related to social and national security, that 
the power vested in the minister was not dis-
cretionary because it was confined to a num-
ber of specific reasons, and that the decision 
must be reasoned and can be challenged in 
front of the State Council. The Court did 
an assessment of the prevailing interest and 
whether it was governmental scrutiny over 
the association’s activity or the protection 
of the right to assembly. It decided that the 
latter prevailed, and that the dissolution of 
associations is a type of power that cannot be 
abandoned to governmental conduct.
The article in question sets six cases in which 
the minister can decide to dissolve an associ-
ation, namely: a) misappropriating funds, b) 
external financing, c) committing violations 
to public order, d) joining foreign associa-
tions, entities, or organizations, e) adoption 
of prohibited purposes, and f) raising funds 
in violation of Article 17. If the government 
claimed the existence of one or more of the 
aforementioned cases, the minister had the 
power, after hearing the defense of the gener-
al assembly of the association and consulting 
the General Association’s Union, to dissolve 
the suspected association. But the latter had 
the right to file a case.
The Court did not underestimate the gravity 
nor the seriousness of the reasons set in the 
article. However, it deprived the government 
from the right to decide separately concern-
ing those cases. It attributed the protection 
of associations not only to the principle of 
freedom of assembly but also to the principle 
of freedom of expression, as it considered 
associations one of the important ways for 
people to express, defend, and organize their 
opinions in specific fields and aspects of 
life. Depriving people of those rights cannot 
stand on fragile bases of suspicious accusa-
tions that may be found inaccurate.
It was clear in the eyes of the Court that the 
article in question gravely violated Article 
no. 75 of the Egyptian 2014 Constitution: 
‘Citizens have the right to form non-govern-
mental organizations and institutions on a 
democratic basis, which shall acquire legal 
personality upon notification.
‘They shall be allowed to engage in activities 
freely. Administrative agencies shall not inter-
fere in the affairs of such organizations, dis-
solve them, their board of directors, or their 
board of trustees except by a judicial ruling.
‘The establishment or continuation of 
non-governmental organizations and insti-
tutions whose structure and activities are 
operated and conducted in secret, or which 
possess a military or quasi-military character 
are forbidden, as regulated by law’. 
 The History of the Inheritance Distribution Regulation for Christians in the ,رياني ةروث ىتح يرصملا نوناقلا يف نييحيسملا دنع ثرإلا عيزوت ميظنت خيرات‘ 15
Egyptian Law until the January Revolution’ (n 13).
16 According to the State Council Law, a governmental decision might only be challenged on one or more of five bases, namely: reasoning, violation to the 
law, purposes, violation to the required format, and jurisdiction.
17 A constitutional case has one of three possible ways to be heard in front of the Supreme Constitutional Court, one of which is according to Article no. 29 
of law no. 48 of year 1979, which states in cases where the question of constitutionality arises without an explicit plea from one or more of the parties of the 
dispute, the Court will order the stay of the proceeding and refer the case to the Supreme Constitutional Court.
18 That law replaced law no. 48 of year 2002, and entered into force on May 24, 2017.
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It also violates Article no. 92: 
‘Rights and freedoms of individual citizens 
may not be suspended or reduced.
‘No law that regulates the exercise of rights 
and freedoms may restrict them in such a 
way as infringes upon their essence and 
foundation’.
The final and most solid ground the Court 
relied on was stare decisis. It had previously 
delivered a judgement of unconstitutionality 
of the same article on June 2, 2018, in case 
no. 160 of judicial year 37.19 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
One thing that awaits Egypt in 2020 is pass-
ing the third law applying the 2019 consti-
tutional amendments related to judicial au-
thority. This law is the one establishing and 
regulating the Supreme Council of the Judi-
cial Authorities mentioned in Article 185 of 
the amended Constitution.20 
On another note, two battles from previous 
years continue. The first is the issuance of 
the municipalities law according to the 2014 
Constitution, which is a prerequisite for the 
municipalities’ elections.21 The second is the 
battle for Egyptian female law graduates to 
be appointed to all the judicial authorities, 
and the state council in specific.22 
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I. INTRODUCTION1
       
In terms of Constitutional law, 2019 was 
marked by the elections to the Estonian 
Parliament, the Riigikogu, held on 3 March. 
They had a decisive effect for the claims the 
Supreme Court had to deal with. Further-
more, their effects led into a year of con-
flicting constitutional views. The principal 
reason for this was the results of the coa-
lition negotiations that followed elections 
and prompted POLITICO Europe to the 
headline, ‘Estonia joins the far-right club’.2
 
2019 did not generate any constitutional 
amendments, but questions regarding their 
necessity gained public attention in the con-
text of two comprehensive legal reports. One 
of them was published in February under the 
auspices of the Minister of Justice, who had 
formed a body of 12 experts of constitutional 
law to analyze a possible necessary renew-
al of the Constitution. The other report was 
published at the end of 2018 by the Foun-
dation for State Reform (FSR), a think tank 
formed by 28 influential Estonian entrepre-
neurs and businessmen, to convince politi-
cal decision-makers of the need for state re-
form.3 It resulted, in the beginning of 2019 
(just before Riigikogu elections), in eight out 
of the ten political parties running for office 
to sign a joint memorandum declaring that 
state reform should become a priority for the 
next government. 
The following overview takes a closer 
look at the questions of state organization 
brought about by the integration of the far 
right into government, the main issues of 
the aforementioned constitutional reports 
and the key themes and most important de-
cisions of the Estonian State Court in 2019.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Elections to the Riigikogu were won by the 
Estonian Reform Party.4 The Reform Party’s 
leader was tasked by the Estonian president 
to form a government, but failed to receive 
the necessary mandate from the Riigikogu, 
as the parties that had come in second, third 
and fourth allied to form a government. 
That meant that the Conservative People’s 
Party of Estonia (EKRE), which garnered 
17.8 percent of the vote, became part of the 
government. Founded in 2012, EKRE had 
gained quick fame rallying against immi-
grants and same sex partnerships, claiming 
the country was actually run by a ‘deep 
state’ and accusing the media of bias. 
Being her constitutional duty, on April 24 
the President appointed the new coalition 
government. She later said she discussed 
the President’s scope of competence to do 
this with legal experts, coming to the con-
clusion that the head of state had the right 
to refuse the appointment of a minister only 
ESTONIA
1 All Internet sources indicated in this article were accessed on 31.01.2020.
2 Evan Gershkovic, ‘Estonia joins the far-right club’ (Politico, 30 April 2019) 
<https://www.politico.eu/article/estonia-tallinn-joins-the-far-right-club-martin-helme-mart-helme-kersti-
kaljulaid-populism/> 
3 ‘Riigikogu Toimetised’ (Riigikogu Kantselei, 2019)
<https://rito.riigikogu.ee/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/RiTo_39_veebi.pdf> Riigikogu elections 
4 2019 (Voting and election results ) <https://ep2019.valimised.ee/en/election-result/index.html>
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in the case where a member of government 
posed a danger to the constitutional order or 
national security.5 
At the swearing-in of the government mem-
bers before the Riigikogu, however, the 
President wore a pullover bearing the in-
scription ‘speech is free’.6 She later said she 
did this to encourage journalists.7 
In August, Minister of the Interior and 
EKRE leader Mart Helme unexpectedly 
tried to dismiss the director general of the 
Police Board, although this competence 
falls within that of the government alone. 
Thereupon, the President summoned the 
Prime Minister and told him that in her 
opinion, Mart Helme posed a danger to the 
rule of law and should be dismissed.8 While 
the President’s attitude received much pos-
itive response, others called into question 
the her understanding of the limits of her 
competence. According to the Estonian 
Constitution (EC),9 executive power in Es-
tonia is vested in the government, headed 
by its Prime Minister. The institution of the 
President of Estonia is modelled on those 
of Germany and Austria and assigns the 
head of state a primarily representative role. 
However, the President does have the duty 
to proclaim all laws passed by the Riigikogu 
and the right to veto them. The President is 
seen as an important balancing power and 
custodian of the Constitution. 
Integration of EKRE into government also 
had its impact on the coalition agreement.10 
One of EKRE’s aims that found its way into 
it is the implementation of referenda, with-
in the framework of which legislative proj-
ects can be initiated and adopted by binding 
referenda. However, as this aim requires 
the amendment of the EC, its realization 
during the current government term is un-
likely. The coalition agreement’s promise 
to conduct a referendum on the proposal to 
amend the Constitution to define marriage 
as a union between a man and a woman is 
another expression of EKRE’s priorities.
 
2019 did not bring about any constitutional 
amendments. Since its adoption in 1992, the 
current Constitution has been amended in 
total only five times. One reason for this can 
be found in its relatively complex amend-
ment procedure – it offers, inter alia, three 
procedural alternatives between which the 
Parliament must decide.11 Also, in political 
terms there has been (until recently at least) 
a relative consensus that as far as possible, 
the Constitution should remain unchanged. 
This can be seen as one reason why in 2019, 
27 years after the adoption of the Consti-
tution, only two comprehensive reports on 
its state were published, causing an active 
social debate on constitutional issues. 
According to the Minister of Justice, the 
current Constitution was functional and its 
fundamental principles did not require re-
newal.12 Therefore, the experts of the Min-
istry of Justice’s report were commissioned 
to work out solutions for single issues that 
had arisen after the adoption of the EC in 
1992.13 In contrast, the entrepreneurs’ anal-
ysis had started from the position that the 
state needed a ‘serious overhaul’.14 Never-
theless, various key points in the two reports 
overlapped. For instance, both proposed to 
change the allowable term of the President, 
currently five years and re-electable, to a 
single seven-year term to strengthen the 
head of the state’s political independence 
and give him/her sufficient time to imple-
ment his agenda. Both reports also suggest-
ed a reduction of the 101-member Riigik-
ogu by 10-20 parliamentarians to cut costs 
and confirm the Parliament’s will to reform. 
Beyond that, the entrepreneurs’ propos-
als saw a need to reform executive power 
and increase its effectiveness by, inter alia, 
strengthening the role of the Prime Minister 
in relation to the government’s ministers, 
ending the independence of ministries and 
placing them under a single ‘government 
office’, and reducing the number of officials 
by about 50 percent.
The report of the Ministry of Justice saw no 
need to restructure the state organisation. In 
order to strengthen democracy, it proposed 
i) a clause stating that amendments to the 
Basic Law must not contradict its basic 
principles, ii) a more precise formulation of 
the regulation of Estonia’s participation in 
the EU and iii)
the strengthening of opposition rights. In 
addition to a more precise alignment with 
international and EU regulations, it pro-
posed to complement the EC’s fundamental 
5 Marko Tooming, ‘President Kaljulaid: kinnitan valitsuse ametisse’ (ERR, 23 April, 2019) <https://www.err.ee/932735/president-kaljulaid-kinnitan-valitsuse-ame-
tisse> 
6 Mirjam Mäekivi, ‘Piltuudis: president kandis valitsuse vande andmisel sõnumiga dressipluusi’ (ERR, 29 April 2019) <https://www.err.ee/934721/piltuudis-presi-
dent-kandis-valitsuse-vande-andmisel-sonumiga-dressipluusi> 
7 Interview with the President of Estonia, Kuku Radio (Tallinn, Estonia, 6 January 2020) <https://www.president.ee/et/meediakajastus/intervjuud/15648-naedala-te-
gija-kersti-kaljulaid-misogueuensed-kuesimused-tulebki-vaelja-naerda-kuku/index.html>
8 ‘Kersti Kaljulaid: Elmar Vaherit ebaseaduslikult kukutada üritanud Martin Helme ei sobi ministriks’ (Õhtuleht, 19 August 2019)
<https://www.ohtuleht.ee/974137/video-ja-fotod-kersti-kaljulaid-elmar-vaherit-ebaseaduslikult-kukutada-uritanud-martin-helme-ei-sobi-ministriks> 
9 Chapter V of the Constitution of Estonia (1992) <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521052015001/consolide>. The Estonian State Gazette is published online 
exclusively at <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/>
10 ‘Basic principles of the Government coalition of the Estonian Centre Party, the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia, and Isamaa for 2019–2023’ <https://www.
valitsus.ee/sites/default/files/basic_principles_of_the_government_coalition_of_the_estonian_centre_party_the_conservative_peoples_party_of_estonia_and_isa-
maa.pdf> 
11 EC Chapter XV <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521052015001/consolide> 
12 Aili Vahtla, ‘Body of experts to examine Estonian Constitution for problems’ (ERR, 19 January 2017)
<https://news.err.ee/120409/body-of-experts-to-examine-estonian-constitution-for-problems> 
13 The constitutional experts’ proposals <https://www.just.ee/et/pohiseaduse-asjatundjate-kogu> 
14 The FSR’s ideas and proposals <https://www.riigiuuendus.ee> 
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rights by an explicit right to data protection.
In their joint memorandum of February, 
the political parties declared making state 
reform a priority without, however, defin-
ing its specific content and range. This aim 
also found its way into the coalition agree-
ment and its action plan. As with various 
plans for the consolidation of state admin-
istration, draft legislation on fundamental 
changes in the organization of the state has 
not been submitted to Parliament.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
The Estonian judicial system does not have 
a separate constitutional court. Instead, the 
Supreme Court of Estonia (SC) has a Con-
stitutional Review Chamber (CRC) compe-
tent to hear all petitions for constitutional 
review.15 In 2019, the CRC handled in to-
tal 45 different constitutional cases, 32 of 
which were election complaints.16 The rea-
son for this was Estonian parliamentary 
elections in March and elections to the Eu-
ropean Parliament in May. All of the elec-
toral appeals were rejected by the CRC.
Other major topics on which the CRC had 
to decide concerned social welfare, nature 
conservation, same sex partnerships and 
prisoner’s rights. The year also saw the 
President of Estonia using her veto right.
1. Substantial electoral complaints
1. RKPJKo 27 March 2019 5-19-17: Blanket 
ban on prisoners’ right to vote and stand as 
a candidate in parliamentary elections17 
In one of the most notable electoral appeals, 
the appellant, a prisoner sentenced to life 
imprisonment, filed an appeal against the 
electoral committee’s decision to reject his 
request to annul the results of the Riigikogu 
elections and call for extraordinary elec-
tions. The appellant argued that the elec-
tions had been unlawful and unconstitution-
al, as according to Estonian law, a blanket 
ban prohibits all prisoners from both voting 
and standing as candidates in elections. He 
found that that this was inconsistent with 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
which obligates the contracting parties to 
hold free elections; Article 40 of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, which states the right of both voting 
and standing as a candidate at municipal 
elections for all EU citizens; and the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) concerning similar judgments and 
decisions (Hirst vs. United Kingdom and 
others).
The CRC dismissed the case as inadmissi-
ble on procedural grounds. As the proce-
dural requirements for the appeal were not 
met, the Court did not examine a possible 
infringement of fundamental rights
The SC already in 2015 assessed the con-
stitutionality of the existing blanket voting 
ban for prisoners in another case.18 In this 
judgment, the SC en banc19 found the ban 
not to be unconstitutional in the specific 
case, since the crimes of the perpetrators 
were of such gravity that the Court con-
sidered the ban to be proportional also in 
case of an assumed discretionary decision. 
(It should be noted that such a discretionary 
decision is not provided for in current Es-
tonian law.)
By way of an obiter dictum, the SC did, 
however, confirm the ban to be inconsistent 
with the case law of the ECtHR and affirmed 
the need for respective legal amendments.
2. Other electoral complaints
Several electoral complaints concerned 
procedural issues of e-voting. Estonia, in 
fact, became the first country worldwide to 
allow e-voting in parliamentary elections 
in 2005. The CRC did not agree with any 
of the complaints, but stated that the proce-
dure for counting e-votes should be made 
more transparent and the rights of election 
observers in this regard clarified.20 
2. Cases concerning social welfare 
The almost 30 years since Estonia regained 
its independence have been marked by an 
increase in economic power, social prosper-
ity and the average age of the population. 
This again is accompanied by increased 
challenges and demands on the Estonian 
welfare state.
2.1 RKPJKo 9 December 2019 5-18-7:  
Regulation of social services21 
In the present case, the CRC, at the request 
of the Chancellor of Justice, declared sever-
al local regulations of the city of Narva on 
the provision of social services to be uncon-
stitutional. The Chancellor of Justice22 is an 
independent constitutional institution ap-
pointed for a seven-year term by the Riigik-
ogu. The Chancellor has two main duties: 
i) To analyze the conformity of Estonian 
legislation with the EC. If the Chancellor 
considers a regulation to violate the Con-
stitution, he or she can request the SC to 
declare it unconstitutional. ii) The Chancel-
lor has an ombudsman function, monitoring 
whether state agencies and officials adhere 
to people’s fundamental rights and the prin-
ciple of good governance.
The obligation to provide social services 
15 The Supreme Court of Estonia <https://www.riigikohus.ee/en/supreme-court-estonia> 
16 All of the judgments made by the Supreme Court of Estonia can be found on <https://www.riigikohus.ee/et/lahendid>
17 See ref 16.
18 RKÜK 1 July 2015, 3-4-1-2-15. The judgment in English: <https://www.riigikohus.ee/en/constitutional-judgment-3-4-1-2-15> 
19 The Supreme Court en banc, comprised of all justices of the Supreme Court, is the highest body of the Court. See ref 16.
20 PSJKo 18 June 2019 5-19-32.
21 See ref 16.
22 More information regarding the Chancellor of Justice <https://www.oiguskantsler.ee/en> 
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has long been a problematic area, as this 
duty is shared by state and local authori-
ties. This has previously led to various legal 
disputes over competences and has brought 
up the criticism that the provision of social 
services depends on the financial means of 
the respective municipality.23 
According to the Social Welfare Act,24 Esto-
nian local authorities must establish appro-
priate procedures for the provision of social 
welfare assistance. Respective regulations 
had been adopted by the city of Narva, but 
an analysis by the Chancellor of Justice 
found several of the given conditions to be 
unlawful. Depending on the financial means 
and circumstances of the person in need, the 
right to obtain social services was limited. 
For example, domestic social services were 
made available only to people who did not 
have the financial means to pay for it, al-
though such limitations weren’t foreseen by 
the legal regulations providing for the cor-
responding service.
Overall, the SC agreed that irrespective of 
the specific social aid provider, the legis-
lator is liable for providing social services 
to its citizens. This means also that the leg-
islator has to ensure sufficient funding and 
supervision of the services provided. As 
social aid is an essential public service, its 
provision cannot depend on the financial as-
sets of the local authority. 
2.2 RKPJKo 30 October 2019, 5-19-25: 
Parental benefits25  
Another noteworthy judgment regarded the 
unequal treatment of parents in the calcula-
tion of parental benefits. The specific case 
concerned the different calculation of the 
amount of parental benefit, which depend-
ed on whether the social security contribu-
tions had been paid by the employer or by 
the unemployment insurance fund and led 
in the case at hand to a difference of over 
600 euros per month at the expense of the 
unemployed. The SC found the respective 
regulation of the Family Benefits Act26 un-
constitutional.
3. Cases concerning nature conservation
The global trend towards nature con-
servation also left its mark on last year’s 
Estonian jurisdiction.  
3.1 RKPJKo 18 January 2019 5-18-04: Plan-
ning of a pulp mill in southern Estonia27 
 
In 2017, the Estonian government and the 
private company Est-For Invest OÜ had 
presented to the public the idea of Est-For 
building a pulp mill in southern Estonia. The 
plan was to build it near Emajõgi, one of Es-
tonia’s biggest rivers. Heated discussions re-
garding the environmental impact of the mill 
followed. The main arguments concerned 
noise, air and water pollution and forest pro-
tection. It was also argued that the govern-
ment’s support to build the mill infringed on 
the local municipality’s constitutional right 
to manage all local issues autonomously. 
The case resulted in the government discon-
tinuing the process of planning and strategic 
evaluation due to overriding public back-
lash.28 The SC, however, did not find that the 
actions of the government had been uncon-
stitutional by any means. 
3.2 Other cases concerning nature  
conservation 
Other decisions concerning nature pro-
tection were heard before the Administra-
tive Chamber of the SC and concerned, 
inter alia, the extension of a peat mining 
area29  and the application for a permit for 
limestone mining.30 The mentioned cases 
confirmed that in matters of environmental 
law, all conflicting interests must be given 
due consideration.
4. Same sex partnerships
In 2014, the Estonian Parliament passed the 
Registered Partnership Act,31 which allows 
different and same sex couples to register 
their partnership and form a legal union. It 
entered into force in 2016. However, the Ri-
igikogu has not yet adopted its implementa-
tion act due to political disparities between 
the members of Parliament and contradictory 
public opinion. The undone work of the leg-
islator has caused several legal problems that 
have been left for the courts to decide, the 
following judgments being therefore merely 
examples of two more important decisions.
4.1 RKÜKo 21 June 2019, 5-18-5: Same 
sex partnership and its connection with 
residence permit32 
 
An Estonian citizen had registered his part-
nership with a same sex Sri Lankan citizen. 
When the Sri Lankan partner tried to apply 
for a temporary residence permit in Estonia, 
it was denied. 
The SC en banc found in its decision that 
the Aliens Act is unconstitutional insofar 
as it does not grant a foreigner who has 
registered a partnership with an Estonian 
citizen the right of a temporary residence 
23 Vallo Olle, ‘Valdade ja linnade korraldatavate kohustuslike kohalike sotsiaalteenuste probleeme’ (2019), 1 Juridica 30 <https://www.juridica.ee/article_full.php?u-
ri=2019_1_valdade_ja_linnade_korraldatavate_kohustuslike_kohalike_sotsiaalteenuste_probleeme> 
24 Social Welfare Act (2015) <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/504042016001/consolide> 
25 See ref 16.
26 Family Benefits Act < https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/523092016001/consolide> 
27 See ref 16.
28 ‘Puidurafineerimistehase püstitamiseks ja selle toimimiseks vajaliku taristu rajamiseks riigi eriplaneeringu koostamise ja keskkonnamõju strateegilise hindamise 
lõpetamine’ (RT III, 14 November 2018) <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/314112018001>
29 RKHKo 30 May 2019 3-17-563, see ref 16.
30 RKHKo 9 October 2019 3-17-796, see ref 16.
31 Registered Partnership Act (2014) <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/527112014001/consolide>
32 See ref 16.
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permit. It referred to the practice of the 
ECtHR, according to which ECHR Article 
8, which protects family life, includes same 
sex marriages and relationships (Schalk and 
Kopf v. Austria (2010) 30141/04; Pajić v. 
Croatia (2016) 68453/13). From that, the 
SC concluded that durable and legal same 
sex partnerships fall under the protection of 
the family also in the sense of the EC. The 
Court ruled that not allowing a non-Esto-
nian partner of a same sex registered part-
nership with an Estonian citizen to obtain 
an Estonian temporary residence permit 
led to discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation. In his dissenting opinion, Villu 
Kõve, the chairman of the SC, argued that 
neither the literal nor the historical interpre-
tation of the EC allowed same sex partner-
ships to fall under the concept of ‘protection 
of the family’ provided by the EC. In his 
opinion, the regulation should have been 
declared unconstitutional based solely on 
the fact of unjustified unequal treatment.33 
4.2 RKPJKo 18 December 2019 5-19-42: Reg-
istered partnership and health insurance34
 In the case at hand, one partner of a regis-
tered partnership was the biological moth-
er of a child whom her female partner had 
adopted. Both women were therefore regis-
tered as parents. One of the parents stayed 
home with the child. Arguing that the So-
cial Tax Act allows to provide health insur-
ance to the home parent of married couples 
only, the Estonian Social Insurance Board35 
refused to provide health insurance for the 
home parent of the same sex couple. The 
SC found the Social Tax Act to be uncon-
stitutional to the extent it discriminates 
against registered partnerships, as there is 
no difference if the parent staying home 
with the child is married or in a legally reg-
istered partnership. 
5. Other significant fundamental rights 
cases
5.1 RKÜK 11 June 2019 5-18-8/19: Right of 
persons in custody to take part in long-term 
visits36 
In this case, the administrative court re-
quested for the Imprisonment Act to be de-
clared unconstitutional because it does not 
allow for persons in custody to take part in 
long-term visits with their spouse, parents, 
children or other relatives, a right provided 
for all other prisoners. 
The complainant argued that the bond be-
tween him and his family weakened beyond 
repair, as he had not been able to see his 
child and family over the duration of the ap-
proximately one year and five months that 
he spent in custody. The Chancellor of Jus-
tice found the aforementioned prohibition 
to be in conflict also with the case law of 
the ECtHR in similar questions (Varnas vs. 
Lithuania and others).
The SC had assessed the constitutionality of 
the norm in question already in various pre-
vious cases and found it not to be in conflict 
with the EC. In the case at hand, after con-
sideration by the SC en banc,37 the norm in 
question was declared unconstitutional and 
void as it breaches the right to privacy and 
family life set out in the EC. In all cases, 
the Court carried out a concrete review of 
the standards. However, it had considered 
the prohibition to be appropriate in the pre-
vious cases due to a possible danger to the 
criminal proceedings.
5.2 RKPJKo 17 December 2019 5-19-40: 
Prison smoking ban38
 
Since 2017, there has been an absolute 
smoking ban in Estonian prisons. In 2019, 
the Tartu Administrative Court declared the 
norm in question unconstitutional and re-
quested it to be reviewed by the CRC. 
The Chancellor of Justice considered the 
ban unconstitutional as it breached the fun-
damental rights to property and free self-re-
alisation. The CRC found the norm’s legal 
restriction to be proportional and consti-
tutional as it enhances the other prisoners’ 
right to health protection and safety, lessens 
fire hazards and eliminates cigarettes as il-
legal currency in prisons. According to the 
CRC, tobacco products are not an essential 
commodity and as such not indispensable. 
The Court also argued that the current pris-
on social care system offers counselling, 
substitution treatment and therapy to those 
prisoners who have a more severe nicotine 
dependency. 
5.3 RKPJKo 9 December 2019 5-19-38/15: 
The Estonian President’s veto on the bill 
of amendments to the Estonian Defence 
Forces Organisation Act39  
2019 saw the President use her veto pow-
er to not promulgate a bill that sought to 
amend the Estonian Defence Forces Or-
ganisation Act.40 The bill in question would 
have granted the defence forces – in urgent 
cases and within limited time and space – 
the right to covertly check personal data 
in the databases of public and private legal 
persons.41 The President was of the opinion 
that the defence forces should not obtain 
the right to covert data processing during 
peacetime and that the bill infringed on pri-
vacy rights. 
The CRC declared the bill unconstitutional, 
as it considered the procedural guarantees 
33 Dissenting opinion by Villu Kõve in case RKÜKo 21 June 2019, 5-18-5 <https://www.riigikohus.ee/et/lahendid?asjaNr=5-18-5/18>
34 See ref 16.
35 Republic of Estonia Social Insurance Board webpage <https://www.sotsiaalkindlustusamet.ee/en>
36 See ref 16.
37 See ref 19.
38,39 See ref 16.
40 Estonian Defence Forces Organisation Act <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/503062019005/consolide/current> 
41 Aili Vahtla, ‘Top court: Bill seeking to expand EDF surveillance rights unconstitutional’ (ERR, 19 December 2019)
<https://news.err.ee/1015626/top-court-bill-seeking-to-expand-edf-surveillance-rights-unconstitutional>
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concerning the assessment of the decision 
to not inform the individual of the surveil-
lance activities insufficient, but did not 
agree with the President’s other arguments. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
The year 2020 marks the EC’s 100th birthday, 
as the first Estonian Constitution was adopted 
in 1920. Therefore, constitutional law is in the 
(legal) spotlight in 2020 with various confer-
ences, contributions and projects.
For 2021, the coalition agreement foresees, 
concurrently with the elections of munici-
pal councils, a referendum on the proposal 
of a constitutional amendment to define mar-
riage as a union between a man and a wom-
an. With regard to the question of the divi-
sion of powers between the government and 
the President, it has to be noted that Estonian 
procedural law does not allow for proceed-
ings on a dispute between supreme federal 
bodies. Therefore, it cannot be expected that 
the political tensions between the constitu-
tional bodies will find a solution soon – ex-
cept if the government breaks apart before 
the next presidential election in 2021.
V. FURTHER READING
Ivo Pilving, ‘Parallele Anwendbarkeit 
von Grundrechtecharta der EU und natio-
nalen Grundrechten’ (2019) 28 JI <https://
www.jur idicainternat ional .eu/ index.
php?id=16028> 
Madis Ernits and others, ‘Estonia’ in: Anne-
li Albi, Samo Bardutzky, National Constitu-
tions in European and Global Governance: 
Democracy, Rights, the Rule of Law (1st ed, 
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I. INTRODUCTION
       
The first quarter of the constitutional year 
of 2019 in Finland was marked by the pres-
sure to complete a number of legislative 
projects due to the parliamentary elections 
in April. Out of the two most significant 
legislative proposals on the table – reform 
of the healthcare and social services system 
and reform of legislation related to civil and 
military intelligence1 – the latter was com-
pleted. The proposed legislation on civil and 
military intelligence and on the oversight of 
intelligence gathering was approved by the 
Parliament in March 2019. Instead, the re-
form of the healthcare and social services 
system could not be carried out within the 
parliamentary term of 2015-2019. This led 
to the resignation of the government only 
five weeks before the new parliamentary 
elections in April.
Since the formation of the new Government 
in May, there has yet to be any significant 
legislative proposal. From the perspective 
of fundamental rights and human rights, 
the new Government Programme2 can be 
described as promising, at least on paper, 
as it includes a host of explicit references 
to fundamental and human rights in multi-
ple contexts. According to the programme, 
the Government will examine, inter alia, the 
combined impact on legal protection of the 
numerous separate amendments made to 
the Aliens Act during the previous parlia-
mentary term.3
During the second half of 2019, Finland was 
in charge of the presidency of the Council of 
the European Union. Strengthening the rule 
of law was one of Finland’s key themes, and 
for that purpose it was promoting a compre-
hensive approach, meaning that the EU’s 
rule of law instruments would be regarded 
as mutually complementary. In particular, 
Finland actively promoted a proposal for a 
regulation on the protection of the Union’s 
budget in case of generalised deficiencies as 
regards the rule of law in the member states. 
The objective was to establish conditionali-
ty between receipt of EU funds and respect 
for the rule of law.4
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
In 2019, the Constitutional Law Commit-
tee of Parliament, the primary authority of 
constitutional interpretation and review of 
legislation in Finland, issued 56 opinions 
on legislative proposals or other matters, 
including proposals for EU measures, for 
their compatibility with the Constitution 
and international human rights obligations 
binding upon Finland.5  
FINLAND
1 Government Proposals 202/2017 and 203/2017.
2 Programme of Prime Minister Sanna Marin’s Government 10 December 2019 < http://urn.fi/
URN:ISBN:978-952-287-811-3> accessed 20 January 2020, pp 88-89.
3 The amendments to the Aliens Act are discussed in the 2016 report concerning Finland; see Laura 
Kirvesniemi, Milka Sormunen, and Tuomas Ojanen, ‘Developments in Finnish Constitutional Law: The Year 
2016 in Review’, in Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna, and Šimon Drugda (eds.), 2016 Global 
Review of Constitutional Law (Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy 2017).
4 See more on the theme: <https://eu2019.fi/en/backgrounders/rule-of-law> accessed 29 January 2020.
5 The Finnish system of constitutional review was discussed in more detail in the 2016 report on Finland, 
supra note 3.
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In-depth reform of the healthcare and 
social services system
 
The extensive reform of the healthcare and 
social services system was widely agreed to 
be absolutely necessary in order to improve 
equal access to services and to address fi-
nancial pressure related to rising expenses 
due to the aging population. The reform had 
been prepared for several years, and it was 
supposed to enter into force before the par-
liamentary elections of 2019. It would have 
transferred the responsibility to provide 
healthcare and social services from local 
municipalities to larger regional entities. 
Furthermore, private sector actors would 
have gained much more opportunities to 
provide healthcare and social services. In 
fact, the reform would have entailed de fac-
to privatization of healthcare and social ser-
vices to a considerable extent.6 
In 2017 and 2018, the Constitutional Law 
Committee had identified several consti-
tutional problems in its opinions on the 
compatibility of the proposed legislation 
with the Constitution.7 In February 2019, 
the Constitutional Law Committee gave its 
final opinion on the proposed legislation.8 
While the Constitutional Law Committee 
noted that the Government had tried to take 
into account the Committee’s previous con-
stitutional concerns in the legislative draft-
ing process, the Committee still identified a 
number of concerns about non-compliance 
with the Constitution. For example, a better 
explanation of customer plans, a re-exam-
ination of the timing of regional elections, 
clearer service requirements for private fa-
cilities, requirements for social and health-
care quality monitoring, the resolution of 
some data protection issues, and further 
clarification of regional funding and com-
pensation paid to municipalities were re-
quired. In addition, the Committee recom-
mended that the Social Affairs and Health 
Committee of the Parliament should recon-
sider notification of the so-called ‘freedom 
of choice’ model in accordance with Article 
107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) in order to ensure 
that the planned model would be compati-
ble with EU state aid law.
In March 2019, the Government announced 
that the reform could not be carried out be-
fore the parliamentary elections in April. 
The Government resigned due to its fail-
ure to accomplish its major policy goal and 
stayed on in a caretaker capacity until the 
elections. The new Government has taken 
over the restructuring of health and social 
services,9 but any details of the content of 
the renewed reform are yet to be given.
Proposed legislation on civil and military 
intelligence and on the oversight of intelli-
gence gathering 
 
The Parliament approved proposed legislation 
on civil and military intelligence and on the 
oversight of intelligence gathering in March 
2019. Previously, Section 10 of the Constitu-
tion of Finland on the secrecy of confidential 
communications had been amended accord-
ing to the urgent procedure for constitution-
al enactment (Section 73, paragraph 2 of the 
Constitution) for the purpose of allowing the 
constitutional basis for enacting the new leg-
islation,10 aimed at improving Finland’s ca-
pabilities to protect against serious threats to 
national security and more effective oversight 
of intelligence gathering.11 
Before the approval, in February 2019, the 
Parliament’s Administration Committee 
withdrew the proposed legislation from the 
agenda following the emergence of concerns 
that it had neglected to fully take into ac-
count the constitutional concerns of the Con-
stitutional Law Committee. The bills were 
sent back for the consideration of the Con-
stitutional Law Committee. Less than two 
weeks later, the Constitutional Law Commit-
tee issued two opinions12 in which it stated 
that the proposed legislation was in accor-
dance with the Constitution. The Committee 
did, however, propose certain modifications 
pertaining, inter alia, to the phrasing of the 
prohibition of discrimination.
The new civilian and military intelligence 
legislation entered into force on 1 June 
2019. Up until now, no information is avail-
able on whether the new legislation has 
been applied for the purpose of gathering 
intelligence on military or other such activ-
ities that pose a threat to national security. 
Report on the need for constitutional 
renewal 
In 2019, an assessment initiated by the Min-
istry of Justice on the need for constitution-
al renewal was completed. According to the 
report, no pressing need for the renewal of 
the constitutional system in general or of 
any particular sections of the Constitution 
exists. However, it was recommended in the 
report that the criteria of evident conflict in 
Section 106 of the Constitution ought to be 
removed.13 According to this section, if in 
a matter being tried by a court of law the 
application of an act would be in evident 
conflict with the Constitution , the court of 
law shall give primacy to the provision in 
6 See previous reports on Finland: Milka Sormunen, Laura Kirvesniemi, and Tuomas Ojanen, ‘Finland: The State of Liberal Democracy’, in Richard Albert, David 
Landau, Pietro Faraguna, and Šimon Drugda (eds.), 2017 Global Review of Constitutional Law (Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy 2018) 
and Milka Sormunen, Laura Kirvesniemi, and Tuomas Ojanen, ‘Finland’, in Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna, and Šimon Drugda (eds.), 2018 Global 
Review of Constitutional Law (Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy 2019).
7 Constitutional Law Committee Opinion 26/2017 and Constitutional Law Committee Opinion 15/2018.
8 Constitutional Law Committee Opinion 65/2018. 
9 Supra note 2, p 163-166.
10 See the 2018 report on Finland, supra note 6.
11 Ministry of the Interior, Press release, 26 April 2019 <https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/1410869/laki-siviilitiedustelusta-voimaan-kesakuun-al-
usta> accessed 29 January 2020.
12 Constitutional Law Committee Opinion 75/2018 and Constitutional Law Committee Opinion 76/2018.
13 Mikael Hidén. ‘Selvitys perustuslain toimivuudesta ja mahdollisista tarkistamistarpeista’ (Oikeusministeriön julkaisuja, Selvityksiä ja ohjeita 2019:22), available in 
Finnish <http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-259-760-1> accessed 29 January 2020.
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the Constitution.14 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The United Nations’ Human Rights Com-
mittee on the decisions of the Supreme 
Administrative Court on the the Sámi Par-
liament’s electoral roll 
In February 2019, the UN Human Rights 
Committee found in its decision15 that the 
decisions of the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Finland from 2011 and 2015 vio-
lated Article 25 of the UN Covenant on Civ-
il and Political Rights. In its decisions, the 
Supreme Administrative Court had allowed 
93 persons to enter in the Sámi Parliament’s 
electoral roll against the stand of the Sámi 
Parliament’s Election Committee and Ex-
ecutive Board. The Committee found that 
the Supreme Administrative Court had de-
parted from the consensual interpretation 
of the Sámi Parliament Act’s16 Section 3 by 
applying the so-called ‘overall evaluation’ 
instead of the objective criteria required 
by the Act. The Sámi Parliament Election 
Committee’s assessments and decision to 
not include 93 persons in the roll had been 
based on the objective criteria. According 
to the Committee, the decisions of the Su-
preme Administrative Court amounted to 
a violation of Article 25 both alone and in 
conjunction with Article 27 on the rights of 
minorities as interpreted in light of Article 1 
on the people’s right to self-determination. 
The Committee emphasized the State’s ob-
ligation to provide an effective and enforce-
able remedy when it has been determined 
that a violation has occurred.
In July 2019, the Supreme Administrative 
Court rejected the applications for annul-
ment by the Board of the Sámi Parliament.17 
In its application, the Board had insisted 
that the legally valid decisions awarded by 
the Supreme Administrative Court on inclu-
sion in the electoral roll of the Sámi Par-
liament should be annulled. The Supreme 
Administrative Court noted that out of the 
97 above-mentioned decisions, 33 had been 
based on objective criteria listed in Section 
3 of the Sámi Parliament Act and thus there 
were no grounds for annulment.18 As for the 
64 remaining decisions, while the Supreme 
Administrative Court did not question the 
opinions of the UN Human Rights Com-
mittee regarding the interpretation of pro-
visions concerning the rights of indigenous 
peoples, it found that there were no grounds 
for annulment of its earlier decisions. The 
Supreme Administrative Court argued that, 
in light of the practice in international law, 
it could not be considered to have applied 
the law erroneously at the time of the de-
cisions in question. The ambiguity with re-
gard to the interpretation of the law did not 
constitute grounds for annulling the court’s 
legally valid decision as prescribed by the 
Administrative Judicial Procedure Act.19 
In August 2019, the Supreme Administra-
tive Court decided that the Sámi Parlia-
ment’s Election Committee could not re-
move a person from the electoral roll based 
on self-correction.20 The inclusion in the 
electoral roll of the persons whom the Com-
mittee had removed had been based on the 
above-mentioned decisions by the Supreme 
Administrative Court. In September 2019, 
the Supreme Administrative Court found 
that an appellant, whose parents’ inclu-
sion in the electoral roll was based on the 
Court’s earlier decisions from 2015, had the 
right to be included in the electoral roll as 
per Section 3 of the Sámi Parliament Act.21 
N.A. v Finland: The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) on the return of an 
asylum seeker 
In November 2019, the Chamber of the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) 
gave a judgement concerning Finland in the 
case of the return of an asylum seeker to 
Iraq.22 The asylum seeker had sought inter-
national protection in Finland in 2015. The 
Finnish Immigration Service had rejected 
his application for asylum and residence 
permit. The Administrative Court upheld 
the decision, and the Supreme Administra-
tive Court did not grant leave to appeal in 
the case. The asylum seeker returned to Iraq 
voluntarily while the case was still pending 
before the Supreme Administrative Court. 
According to the application to the ECtHR, 
he died in Iraq after returning there.
The Government argued that the circum-
stances of the case did not engage the ju-
risdiction of Finland because the asylum 
seeker had left Finland voluntarily. Howev-
er, the ECtHR held that the asylum seeker 
would not have returned to Iraq if an en-
forceable expulsion decision had not been 
issued against him. Thus, his return had not 
been voluntary.
The ECtHR found a violation of Articles 2 
and 3 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (ECHR) by Finland when pro-
14 Supra note 5.
15 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2668/2015’ (1 Feb-
ruary 2019), UN Doc CCPR/C/124/D/2668/2015.
16 Government Bill 975/1995.
17 Out of the 97 decisions, the Supreme Administrative Court has published two decisions – Supreme Administrative Court 2019:89 and 2019:90 – as precedents. 
18 Supreme Administrative Court 2019:89.
19 Government Bill 586/1996. See the English summary of the case Supreme Administrative Court 2019:90 <https://www.kho.fi/en/index/decisions/summariesofse-
lectedprecedentsinenglish_0/2019/kho201990.html> accessed 20 January 2020.
20 Supreme Administrative Court 1.8.2019 T 3561.
21 Supreme Administrative Court 2019:123.
22 N.A. v Finland, App no. 25244/18 (ECtHR, 14 November 2019). See also Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Press release (14 January 2019) <https://valtioneuvosto.fi/
en/article/-/asset_publisher/european-court-of-human-rights-gives-judgment-concerning-finland-in-the-case-of-the-return-of-an-asylum-seeker-to-iraq> accessed 
29 January 2020.
2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 121
cessing the asylum application. According 
to the ECtHR, the quality of the assessment 
conducted by the Finnish authorities re-
garding the relevant facts and the risk had 
been insufficient in light of Articles 2 and 
3 of the ECHR. The authorities and domes-
tic courts were aware, or at least ought to 
have been aware, of the facts that indicated 
that the asylum seeker could be exposed to 
danger to life or to the risk of ill-treatment 
upon his return to Iraq. The ECtHR ordered 
the State to pay the applicant, the daughter 
of the deceased person, 20.000 euros in re-
spect of non-pecuniary damage and 4.500 
euros in respect of legal costs. 
The ECtHR judgement is not yet final, as the 
three-month period during which a party may 
request that the case be referred to the Grand 
Chamber of the Court has yet to expire.
Recommendations from the European Com-
mission against Racism and Intolerance 
In September 2019, the European Commis-
sion against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) 
published its fifth report on Finland.23 ECRI 
acknowledged the many measures that had 
already been made or were in progress in 
Finland. At the same time, it presented 20 
recommendations to combat racism and in-
tolerance concerning, inter alia, the mandate 
and resources of the Non-Discrimination 
Ombudsman, the Equality Ombudsman, and 
the National Non-Discrimination and Equal-
ity Tribunal. The recommendations also in-
cluded measures to combat hate speech and 
hate crimes, revising the provisions on fam-
ily reunifications of refugees and beneficia-
ries of subsidiary protection, providing suf-
ficient funding for National Roma Strategy, 
and increasing awareness of the Sámi culture 
among the majority population.
ECRI requested priority implementation for 
its recommendation concerning the amend-
ing of the Act on Legal Recognition of the 
Gender of Transsexuals24 by removing the 
requirement that persons seeking recogni-
tion in a gender other than that in which 
they were originally registered should be 
infertile or should undergo sterilization as a 
precondition for legal recognition.
Repatriation of the Finnish children in al-Hol 
In late 2019, Finland, among other coun-
tries, was considering potential courses 
of action regarding the repatriation of the 
children and women detained in the al-Hol 
camp in Syria. It was estimated that 10 
Finnish adults and 30 Finnish children were 
detained in the camp. The situation was in-
vestigated by various authorities under the 
direction of the Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs. The Chancellor of Justice gave a deci-
sion on the situation on 10 October 2019.25 
According to the Chancellor of Justice, Fin-
land’s international obligations obliged the 
authorities to assist children whenever pos-
sible. However, the Chancellor of Justice 
further noted that the authorities’ options to 
operate within the camp were limited. The 
decision left a certain amount of discretion 
to the Government as to any concrete ac-
tions to solve the situation. 
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs appointed a 
special representative to resolve the situation. 
In late December 2019, the Government an-
nounced26 that Finland would return the chil-
dren ‘as soon as possible’ but that there was 
no obligation to assist adults at the camp. A 
few days later, the Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs announced that two Finnish children 
from the camp were in the care of authorities 
and were to be repatriated to Finland.27 
There has been a rather heated domestic de-
bate over repatriation of the Finnish citizens 
in Al-hol. The actions of Finland’s Foreign 
Minister, Mr. Pekka Haavisto, have espe-
cially given rise to political debate, and in 
December 2019, the Chancellor of Justice’s 
office received 20 complaints about them. 
However, the Chancellor of Justice decid-
ed not to investigate these complaints as 
the Constitutional Law Committee of Par-
liament also began to consider the legal re-
sponsibility of the Minister after a petition 
by 10 MPs in accordance with Section 115 
of the Constitution regulating the initiation 
of a matter concerning the legal responsibil-
ity of a minister.
Supreme Court 2019:50: Child’s right to be 
heard in the restraining order process 
In the Supreme Court’s case 2019:50, a par-
ent had sought a restraining order against the 
other parent to protect the applicant and their 
two underage children. The District Court 
had issued a restraining order without identi-
fying the opinion of the children. The Court 
of Appeal had not granted a leave for contin-
ued consideration.28 Among other things, the 
Supreme Court had to consider whether the 
opinion of the children had been identified as 
required by Section 6.3 of the Constitution 
of Finland and Article 12 of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. The Supreme 
Court referred to General Comment 12 of 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
and held that the lower courts should have 
heard the children before deciding on the re-
straining order. The case was referred back 
to the Court of Appeal.
Supreme Administrative Court 2019:93: The 
23 Report on Finland (fifth monitoring cycle) (10 September 2019) CRI(2019)38 (ECRI). See also Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Press release (10 September 2019) 
<https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/recommendations-for-finland-from-the-european-commission-against-racism-and-intolerance> accessed 29 
January 2020.
24 Government Bill 563/2002.
25 Chancellor of Justice (10 October 2019) OKV/998/1/2019.
26 Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Press release (10 December 2019) <https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/finnish-authorities-preparing-to-re-
ceive-children-from-al-hol-camp> accessed 29 January 2020.
27 Ministry for Foreign affairs, Press release (21 December 2019) <https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/two-children-from-al-hol-camp-in-
the-care-of-finnish-authorities> accessed 29 January 2020.
28 On the need for a leave for continued consideration, see <https://oikeus.fi/tuomioistuimet/hovioikeudet/en/index/asiankasittely/leaveforcontinuedconsid-
eration.html> accessed 29 January 2020.
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risk of female genital mutilation as a ground 
for international protection 
In the Supreme Administrative Court’s case 
2019:93, a Somali woman and her underage 
daughter had applied for international pro-
tection. The Finnish Immigration Service 
had rejected the application and the Admin-
istrative Court had rejected the applicants’ 
appeal. In their appeal to the Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court, the applicants invoked 
as a new ground for international protection 
the fear of being subjected to female geni-
tal mutilation and reinfibulation if returned 
to Somalia. The Supreme Administrative 
Court stated that, as a rule, the applicant 
should have invoked all applicable grounds 
for international protection before filing an 
application. However, it further emphasized 
that the applicant was not necessarily aware 
of the nature of mutilation as a human rights 
violation. It could have also been difficult 
for the applicant to bring up the delicate 
issue. According to country information 
on Somalia, female genital mutilation was 
very common there. The underage daughter 
was in a particularly vulnerable position.
The Supreme Administrative Court referred 
to Section 22 of the Constitution of Finland, 
according to which the public authorities 
are obliged to guarantee the observance of 
basic rights and liberties and human rights, 
and to Finland’s international human rights 
obligations. These human rights obligations 
entailed the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and the Istanbul Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against 
women and domestic violence. The Court 
came to the conclusion that the Finnish Im-
migration Service should have considered 
ex officio the risk of being subjected to fe-
male genital mutilation if the applicant were 
returned to Somalia. The decisions of the 
Immigration Service and the Administrative 
Court were overturned and the case was re-
ferred back to the Immigration Service.
Parliamentary Ombudsman: Rights of placed 
children restricted without legal basis 
Unannounced visits to child welfare units 
by legal advisers of the Office of the Par-
liamentary Ombudsman29 revealed serious 
problems with the treatment of children 
placed outside their homes and with the de-
cision-making concerning restrictive mea-
sures. The Deputy-Ombudsman empha-
sized that the use of restrictive measures 
always required case-by-case decisions and 
assessment of whether legal requirements 
were met. Restrictive measures cannot be 
used as a means of punishment. Each child 
must be informed about their rights and of 
any decisions relating to their case and the 
content of such decisions. 
According to the Office of the Parliamenta-
ry Ombudsman, the number of complaints 
made personally by children increased sub-
stantially in 2019.30 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In 2020, the need for the reform of the 
healthcare and social services system still 
exists. The extensive preparatory work from 
the previous parliamentary term has been 
examined in order to launch preparations 
for a new reform.31 Also, a reform of the so-
cial security system is planned to be carried 
out during the current parliamentary term.32 
Both of these legislative projects include a 
number of constitutional questions which 
will require the attention of the Constitution-
al Law Committee once legislative proposals 
start pending before the Parliament. 
Already in February 2019, the Parliament 
approved a Government proposal for the 
enactment of an act to ban the use of coal 
to produce energy from 1 May 2029 on-
wards.33 The Constitutional Law Commit-
tee noted in its Opinion34 that the aims of 
the proposal were in accordance with Sec-
tion 20 of the Constitution on responsibility 
for the environment as well as with the Par-
is Agreement and with the EU’s environ-
mental policies and objectives. Moreover, 
any restrictions on other fundamental rights 
must be weighed against the responsibility 
for the environment. It seems very likely 
that Finland’s ambitious climate change tar-
get of zero net carbon emissions by the year 
2035 will raise new constitutional issues in 
the future.35 
The rise of populism in Finland continued 
in 2019. According to the most recent opin-
ion polls, the Finns Party – a Finnish right 
wing populist party36 – is currently the most 
popular party in Finland. While the current 
Government pursues various actions that 
seek to improve the level of human rights 
and environmental rights, as well as the 
quality of legal aid and protection of asy-
lum seekers, the possibility of increasing 
political polarization cannot be excluded.
29 Parliamentary Ombudsman (18.3.2019) EOAK/4099/2019 and (20.5.2019) EOAK/5377/2018. Press releases on the decisions available in English <https://www.
oikeusasiamies.fi/en_GB/-/lukuisia-ongelmia-rajoitustoimenpiteiden-paatoksenteossa> and <https://www.oikeusasiamies.fi/en_GB/-/sijoitettujen-lasten-oikeuk-
sia-rajoitettiin-lainvastaisella-tavalla> accessed 29 January 2020.
30 Parliamentary Ombudsman, Press release (24 October 2019) <https://www.oikeusasiamies.fi/en_GB/-/lukuisia-toimenpideratkaisuja-huostaanotettujen-last-
en-kanteluihin> accessed 29 January 2020.
31 See Sonja Manssila and Lotta Matsson, ‘Final report of the regional government, health and social services reform – Experiences of the preparatory work, les-
sons and conclusions’ (Ministry of Finance publications 2019:54) <http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-367-036-5> accessed 29 January 2020.
32 See supra note 2, pp 166-172.
33 Government Bill 416/2019.
34 Constitutional Law Committee 55/2018.
35 For Finland’s climate change target, see, e.g., <https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/finland_wants_to_be_carbon_neutral_by_2035_but_how_will_it_get_
there/10988493> accessed 30 January 2020. 
36 See, e.g., < https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/politics/17150-finns-party-is-one-of-largest-populist-parties-in-western-europe-says-researcher.
html> accessed 29 January 2020.
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FRANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the “Yellow Vests” move-
ment of social protest, the government initiat-
ed the Grand débat national, which aimed at 
meeting the claims for an increased involve-
ment of citizens in public decision-mak-
ing. It consisted of a three-month round of 
local consultations and online participation 
on four topics: taxes, public spending and 
public action; administrative organisation; 
ecological transition; and democracy and 
citizenship. The Conseil Économique, So-
cial et Environnemental – the third assembly 
with the National Assembly and the Senate – 
contributed to the diagnosis of the crisis and 
made innovative proposals.1 That is why the 
new version of President Macron’s planned 
constitutional amendment intends to change 
it to a Conseil de la Participation Citoyenne 
with enlarged powers. Most of the planned 
reform of parliamentary procedure has been 
abandoned due to Senate hostility. A reform 
of the National Assembly’s standing orders 
was adopted in order to give more rights to 
the Opposition and to speed up the passing 
of statutes.
The European elections in May were an im-
portant test for President Macron’s popular-
ity and ability to move his agenda forward. 
Even though his party lost to the far-right 
Rassemblement National, the defeat was by 
a smaller margin than usually expected for 
the incumbent majority. Except for the envi-
ronmentalists, the other parties were left in a 
considerably weakened position. As a result, 
the French political landscape was reshaped 
into a duopoly, which may foreshadow the 
next presidential battle in 2022.
At the same time, there was a significant 
evolution of the composition of the Conseil 
Constitutionnel, which welcomed three new 
members in March. All are men, with a polit-
ical background as well as legal and/or insti-
tutional expertise: a former prime minister, 
a senator and former minister, and a senator. 
Moreover, one of the ex officio members, 
former President Jacques Chirac, who did 
not sit on the Council anymore for health 
reasons, died at 86. Among the decisions this 
body rendered, special emphasis should be 
placed first on the decision about the first ac-
tivation of the mechanism of a joint Parlia-
ment- and citizen-initiated referendum (ref-
erendum d’initiative partagée) and second, 
on the decision about legislation regarding 
the right to protest.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The first major ruling was Decision No. 
2019-1 RIP, which was, as the number indi-
cates, the very first of its kind. One iconic 
demand of the Yellow Vests was the citi-
zen-initiated referendum, which is not pro-
vided for in the Constitution. Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 11, the President of the Republic may, 
upon recommendation of the Government or 
upon a joint motion of the two Houses, put 
to a referendum a bill which deals with the 
organisation of public authorities, or with 
1 Michel Badré, Dominique Gillier, Fractures et transitions : réconcilier la France. Avis du Conseil 
économique, social et environnemental (DILA, 2019).
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reforms relating to the economic, social, 
or environmental policy of the nation and 
to the public services contributing thereto, 
or which provides for authorisation to rati-
fy a treaty. Under strict conditions, which 
led one to believe that the procedure would 
never be activated, a referendum may also 
be held upon the initiative of one-fifth (i.e., 
185) of the Members of Parliament, support-
ed within nine months by one-tenth (i.e., 
4.7 million) of the voters registered on the 
electoral roll. This initiative takes the form 
of a Private Members’ Bill and may not be 
used to repeal a legislative provision that has 
been promulgated less than one year before. 
If the bill has not been considered by the 
two Houses within a period of six months, 
the President of the Republic must put it to 
a referendum. 
Unexpectedly, the procedure was activated 
on 10 April 2019. A coalition of 248 MPs, 
ranging from the far left to the right, gath-
ered to table a Private Members’ Bill aiming 
to recognise the “public utility” character of 
Aéroports de Paris, the company that man-
ages France’s most important airports. At the 
time, a Government Bill aimed at privatising 
this company was debated in Parliament. But 
strictly speaking, the relevant statute was not 
“adopted” until 11 April, let alone “promul-
gated” until 22 May. The initiative avowedly 
intended to block this reform. Was the use of 
Article 11 in such circumstances in line with 
the Constitution? For many people, given the 
spirit of the procedure, it was an illegitimate 
and unfair use of the joint parliament- and 
citizen-initiated referendum. The Council 
checked that the required number of MPs 
had presented the Private Members’ Bill, and 
that the latter’s content was within the scope 
of Article 11. Most importantly, it ruled that 
“When the Council’s saisine was registered, 
[the proposed bill] did not tend to repeal a 
legislative provision promulgated less than 
one year before.” Because the content of the 
bill was constitutional, even though it was 
but for a handful of days and even though its 
first use aimed to obstruct the Government’s 
action, the letter of the Constitution had been 
respected. The period for online collection of 
popular support began the following month. 
Chronology was crucial to this saga. A few 
days later, the constitutional judge was asked 
to review the statute that authorised the pri-
vatisation of ADP. In Decision No. 2019-781 
DC, it considered that there was no legal 
obstacle to this reform. Nevertheless, from a 
practical viewpoint, all governmental action 
to implement the privatisation was suspend-
ed until the end of the process that the Oppo-
sition had triggered – astutely or fraudulent-
ly, depending on the perspective.
The second most important ruling of 2019 
was Decision No. 2019-780 DC on the act 
aiming to strengthen and guarantee public 
order during demonstrations, often referred 
to as the “anti-rioters’ Act”.
During most of the demonstrations relat-
ed to the Yellow Vests movement, many 
acts of violence against police forces and 
destruction of public and private property 
were perpetrated. Some were committed by 
demonstrators themselves, but most of them 
were committed by agitators, also known in 
other countries as “black-blocks”. A bill was 
passed to prevent those acts of violence and, 
according its authors, to protect the right to 
peaceful protest. Nevertheless, more than 
sixty members of the National Assembly and 
of the Senate referred the bill to the Con-
stitutional Council. They were criticising 
some of its provisions, which, according to 
them, violated several constitutional rights. 
Moreover, the President of the Republic 
himself also referred the bill, requesting that 
the Constitutional Council rule on the con-
stitutionality of some of its provisions with 
respect to freedom of assembly, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of movement. This 
was a very unusual proceeding, which was 
used only once by his predecessor. It was 
meant to meet the criticisms this act of Par-
liament had prompted. 
The first debated provision allowed police 
officers, under certain conditions, to carry 
out visual controls and searches of bags as 
well as searches of vehicles in public areas 
at the location of a demonstration and in its 
immediate surroundings. The Constitution-
al Council ruled that there was a balanced 
conciliation between, on the one hand, free-
dom of movement and the right to collective 
expression of ideas and opinions and, on 
the other hand, the objective of investigat-
ing people who committed offences, which 
would seriously disturb the progress of a 
demonstration. Its decision was justified by 
the fact that the control of bags and vehicles 
could only be carried out to investigate and 
execute proceedings for the penal offence of 
participating in a demonstration or in a pub-
lic gathering while carrying a weapon. More-
over, these actions had to be authorised by 
a warrant from the prosecutor – who is pre-
sented as an independent magistrate – who 
must specify the location and time frame in 
relation to those of the planned demonstra-
tion. Lastly, the party could only be detained 
for the time necessary for searches and con-
trols to be carried out. Therefore, according 
to the Constitutional Council, this provision 
did not have the effect of restricting access to 
a demonstration or of impeding its progress. 
Consequently, it was declared constitutional. 
Another challenged provision intended to 
forbid demonstrators from voluntarily hid-
ing all or some part of their faces within or 
in the immediate surroundings of a demon-
stration during which or after which public 
order had been, or may have been, disturbed. 
Such offenders could be sentenced to one 
year in jail and a fine of € 15,000. The ap-
plicants denounced the vague nature of the 
defining elements of the offence and thus 
considered that it violated the principle ac-
cording to which offences and penalties must 
be clearly defined by law as well as the prin-
ciple of the proportionality of offences and 
penalties. The Constitutional Council con-
sidered that the legislator had first focused 
on the circumstance in which an individual 
intended to hide her identity in order to avoid 
any possible identification. Secondly, by re-
ferring to demonstrations during which or 
after which public order had been disturbed, 
the legislator had precisely pointed out the 
period during which the offence could be 
committed. As a result, it had clearly focused 
on situations where the risk for such distur-
bance was important. It also pointed out 
that the legislator had excluded the repres-
sion of face-hiding when this was done for 
a legitimate purpose. Therefore, the Council 
decided that the contested provision did not 
violate the principle that offences and penal-
ties must be clearly defined by law, nor the 
principle of the proportionality of penalties. 
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The last contested provision allowed the ad-
ministrative authority, under certain condi-
tions related to a threat of a specific gravity 
to public security, to prohibit a person from 
participating in a demonstration in a public 
space, and even, in some cases, anywhere 
on the national territory for a period of one 
month. The applicants contended that this 
provision went against the right to collective 
expression of ideas and opinions, freedom of 
movement, and freedom of assembly. They 
also pointed out that it was not necessary, 
since a person who has caused a disturbance 
in a demonstration can be imposed criminal 
penalties by the judicial authority and also 
prohibited from demonstrating. The appli-
cant senators especially insisted on the pos-
sibility of issuing a prohibition to demon-
strate on the entire territory for a renewable 
duration of a month and on the fact that the 
prohibition could be associated with an obli-
gation to respond, at the time of the demon-
stration, to summonses from any administra-
tive authority designed by the prefect. 
The Constitutional Council first considered 
whether these measures provided the admin-
istration with the power to deprive a person 
of her right to collective expression of ideas 
and opinions. According to its jurisprudence, 
this would only be acceptable if it were ap-
propriate, necessary, and proportionate. Yet, 
even if the threat of a specific gravity should 
be related to violent acts or actions, however 
far back in time, committed during demon-
strations in which there was serious bodily 
harm or material damage, the legislator did 
not impose that the party herself cause this 
serious bodily harm or significant material 
damage. Therefore, the administrative au-
thority would have had excessive discretion 
in considering the motives that were likely 
to justify the prohibition. Moreover, in some 
cases, the prohibition might be notified at 
any time, including during the demonstra-
tion, which would prevent any appeal in 
court against it. Lastly, in certain circum-
stances, the administrative authority could 
prohibit an individual from participating in 
any demonstration within the entire territory 
for a duration of one month. For those rea-
sons, the Constitutional Council considered 
that the legislator had violated the right to 
collective expression and ideas and opin-
ions in a manner that was not appropriate, 
necessary, and proportionate. Consequently, 
it declared the disputed provision unconsti-
tutional, thus developing the constitutional 
framework of what, in the social context of 
2019, proved to be one of the most important 
fundamental rights in France. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Decision No. 2019-761 QPC, 1st Febru-
ary 2019, Association Médecins du Monde 
et autres
Several provisions resulting from the law 
aiming to strengthen the fight against prosti-
tution and to help people working as prosti-
tutes were disputed. Among the many objec-
tions they raised, the applicants reproached 
these provisions for punishing all purchas-
es of sexual favors, including acts carried 
out freely by consenting adults in a private 
space. They also claimed that these provi-
sions led to a violation of privacy as well as 
the right to personal autonomy, and the right 
to sexual freedom that follows from it. 
However, the Constitutional Council de-
duced from (legislative) preparatory work 
that by choosing to punish persons purchas-
ing sexual favors, the legislator intended, by 
means of depriving procurement of its source 
of revenue, to fight against this activity and 
against human trafficking for sexual ex-
ploitation, and criminal activities founded on 
force and slavery. The legislator had ensured 
the dignity of human beings was respected, 
safeguarding the latter from these forms of 
servitude, and had pursued the constitutional 
objective of preserving public order and pre-
venting offences. The Constitutional Council 
thus found that the legislator had managed 
to strike a reasonable balance between, on 
the one hand, the constitutional objective of 
maintaining public order, preventing offenc-
es and safeguarding human dignity, and, on 
the other hand, personal freedom. 
2. Decision No. 2018-768 QPC, 21 March 
2019 M. Adama S.
Despite the criticisms against the constitu-
tionality of Article 388 of the Civil Code, 
and its formulation which derived from the 
law relating to the protection of children, 
the Constitutional Council held that, given 
the guarantees that limited the use of X-ray 
bone exams for age estimation purposes, the 
legislator had not violated the requirement of 
protection of the best interests of the child 
set out in Sections 10 and 11 of the Pream-
ble to the Constitution of 1946. The disputed 
X-rays were solely used to estimate a per-
son’s age and could not be carried out with-
out her consent. They did not involve any 
internal surgical operation on the body and 
did not involve any painful or invasive pro-
cedure, or one that infringed on the dignity 
of the individual. Consequently, they lacked 
the characteristics of the objections made 
concerning the principle of safeguarding the 
dignity of the individual, and the inviolabili-
ty of the human body.
3. Decision No. 2019-778 DC, 21 March 
2019, Loi de programmation et de réforme 
pour la justice
On March 21, 2019, the constitutional judge 
examined the constitutionality of the 2018-
2022 law relative to the reform of the French 
judicial system. Composed of 395 para-
graphs, the decision in question is the lon-
gest ever issued by the Constitutional Coun-
cil. The judge had the opportunity to declare 
the constitutionality of several legal provi-
sions, such as the possibility of reaching an 
amicable settlement in certain civil disputes, 
the abolition of the obligation to hold a con-
ciliation hearing in case of divorce without 
mutual consent, the establishment of a single 
national court for payment orders, the exper-
imental introduction of a criminal court com-
posed of professional judges, the creation of 
the national anti-terrorist prosecutor’s office, 
the use of the delegated legislation (ordon-
nances) in order to reform the juvenile jus-
tice system, the amalgamation of two kinds 
of first instance courts (tribunaux d’instance 
and tribunaux de grande instance) into a 
single judicial tribunal (tribunal judiciaire), 
and the experimental creation of specialised 
courts of appeal. 
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Moreover, for the first time, the Constitu-
tional Council deduced from Articles 6 and 
16 of the Declaration of 1789 the principle 
of the publicity of hearings before civil and 
administrative courts.
On the other hand, the constitutional judge 
did not hesitate to strike down nearly fif-
teen articles, most of them of a criminal 
law nature. In particular, the article aiming 
to entrust family allowance funds with the 
delivery of enforceable titles relating to the 
modification of the amount of a contribution 
to the education of children was found un-
constitutional. When the proceedings have 
taken place in camera for reasons relating 
to a risk of breach of privacy, third parties 
are automatically denied access to the entire 
judgment, and this provision was also con-
sidered to be in breach of the Constitution. 
The Council also quashed the modification 
of the conditions under which the judge can, 
in the context of an investigation or judicial 
inquiry, resort to the interception of corre-
spondence transmitted by electronic commu-
nications. Legal provisions authorising the 
use of special investigative techniques in the 
context of flagrante delicto or preliminary 
investigation of any crime, not just organ-
ised crime and delinquency, were found un-
constitutional as well. Finally, the provision 
of the Code of Penal Procedure allowing the 
public prosecutor to authorise police officers 
charged with executing the arrest warrant of 
a person to enter private premises between 6 
am and 9 pm was found contrary to the Con-
stitution.
4. Decision No. 2019-785 QPC, 24 May 
2019, M. Mario S.
The constitutional judge rejected the exis-
tence of a fundamental principle imposing 
on the legislator to provide a statute of lim-
itations for offences for which there is none, 
such as continuous crimes. The conditions 
for the recognition of such a constitutional 
principle not being met, the Council ques-
tioned the existence of another constitutional 
basis that required controlling the rules of 
prescription in criminal matters. The judge 
innovated and held for the first time that a 
new constitutional principle followed from 
the principle of the necessity of punishment, 
under Article 8 of the Declaration of 1789, 
and from the principle of the guarantee of 
human rights, established in Article 16 of 
the same Declaration. According to these 
principles, in criminal matters, it is up to the 
legislator to determine the rules relating to 
the statute of limitations, which would not 
be manifestly unsuitable depending on the 
nature and gravity of the offence.
5. Decision No. 2019-787 DC, 25 July 2019, 
Loi pour une école de la confiance
The Constitutional Council held that the 
existence of a difference in treatment be-
tween the municipalities, based on whether 
they funded nursery classes before the age 
of compulsory education was lowered from 
six to three, did not violate the principle of 
equality before the law and therefore com-
plied with the Constitution.
6. Decision No. 2019-790 DC, 1 August 
2019, Loi de transformation de la fonction 
publique
Although several provisions of the law rel-
ative to the reform of the administrative 
committees for social dialogue were criti-
cised regarding the constitutional principle 
of worker participation, the Constitutional 
Council held that the adjustments made to 
the conditions governing the right to strike 
were not disproportionate in light of the ob-
jective pursued by the legislator and did not 
violate any constitutional requirement.
7. Decision No. 2019-811 QPC, 25 October 
2019, Mme Fairouz H. et autres
Relying on two German precedents regard-
ing a similar issue, the applicants challenged 
the 5% votes cast threshold for the distribu-
tion of seats in the election of representatives 
to the European Parliament in France. They 
claimed that the objective of reaching a sta-
ble and consistent majority was not relevant, 
since the number of European representa-
tives elected in France would not, in itself, 
make it possible to form a majority within 
the European Parliament. Secondly, this 
threshold would have disproportionate con-
sequences in that it would prevent large po-
litical movements from being able to access 
the European Parliament and would deny a 
great number of voters any representation at 
the European level. It would result in a vio-
lation of the principles of equality in voting 
and diversity of ideas and opinions. 
The Constitutional Council explained that, 
on the one hand, the legislator intended to 
favour the representation of the main French 
political tendencies and opinions in the Eu-
ropean Parliament, and thus to reinforce 
their influence within it. On the other hand, 
the legislator intended to support the ad-
vent and consolidation of European political 
groups of significant size. In doing so, the 
legislator sought to avoid a fragmentation of 
representation that would impede the prop-
er functioning of the European Parliament. 
Therefore, the Council declared that, by set-
ting the threshold for access to allocation of 
seats in the European Parliament at 5% of 
votes cast, the legislator applied methods 
that did not impact equality in voting in a 
disproportionate manner, and that did not 
excessively infringe on the diversity of ideas 
and opinions.
8. Decision No. 2019-809 QPC, 11 Octo-
ber 2019 Union nationale des étudiants en 
droit, gestion, AES, sciences économiques, 
politiques et sociales et autres
In its decision, the Constitutional Council 
deduced that the constitutional requirement 
of free admission, as established in the Pre-
amble to the Constitution, applies to public 
higher education. However, this requirement 
does not preclude, at this level of education, 
low tuition fees from being levied, taking 
into account, when appropriate, the financial 
means of students.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
Like last year, at the end of 2019, the govern-
ment faced major social protests, this time 
against the reform of the pension system. 
Passing – or not – this reform in 2020 will 
be a major test for President Macron’s polit-
ical activism. His political strength will also 
be revealed by the local elections in March. 
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These elections moreover decisively condi-
tion the renewal of half of the senators, who 
are indirectly elected, in September. As a 
result, they will determine the prospect for 
overcoming the Senate’s current resistance 
to the constitutional amendment the Presi-
dent has been planning since he took over. 
Ironically, among the salient aspects of this 
project, there is a new regulation of the RIP 
that makes it easier to activate, but expressly 
excludes its use not only for a recently pro-
mulgated statute, but also … for a currently 
debated one. 
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 GAMBIA 
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2019 saw The Gambia move from 
setting up key institutions such as the Consti-
tutional Review Commission (CRC); Truth, 
Reconciliation, and Reparations Commis-
sion (TRRC); and National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) to actualising the key 
transitional justice standards required to re-
store the rule of law and democracy to the 
country. The year also saw the introduction 
of laws and policies that would arguably en-
sure that human rights are fully respected and 
protected. Looking back, most of the major 
constitutional developments in The Gambia 
were marked by ongoing transitional justice 
reforms taking place since 2017. 
This report will discuss in brief the constitu-
tional developments in relation to the CRC, 
major constitutional law cases, and, lastly, 
draw up some conclusions from 2019 and 
the way forward for The Gambia. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. Dealing with past human rights violations
After a year of public hearings, and as we 
enter into the second and possibly final year 
of hearings, it can no longer be ruled out that 
gross human rights violations were commit-
ted in The Gambia between July 1994 and 
January 2017 under former President Yahya 
Jammeh, and that those identified by the 
TRRC will face certain prosecution in the 
most serious form.
Meanwhile, the Government continues to 
demonstrate its commitment to the welfare of 
the victims by making an initial payment of 
50 million Gambian dalasis (approximately 
$100,000) to the TRRC Victims’ Trust Fund, 
part of which was used to provide overseas 
medical treatment for some victims.
2. Draft CRC Constitution
The Constitutional Review Commission of 
The Gambia, established under the Consti-
tutional Review Commission Act 2017, sub-
mitted its first draft Constitution in Novem-
ber 2019.1 The draft constitution contains 
20 chapters, three chapters less than what is 
in the 1997 Constitution, and a total of 315 
clauses. 
The Commission, under Section 21 of the CRC 
Act, is mandated to submit a draft Constitution 
and report to the President upon completion of 
its work. After delivering the draft, the Com-
mission was involved in public consultations 
which lasted for about a month. This gave the 
people and concerned stakeholders the oppor-
tunity to make comments and further submit 
their observations and contributions on the 
Draft Constitution to the Commission before it 
was finally submitted to the President.
The Draft Constitution brought in new devel-
opments when compared to the 1997 Constitu-
tion. It contained provisions on the following: 
1 See full Draft Constitution https://crc220.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CRC-DRAFT-CONSTITUTION.
pdf (accessed 20 December 2019).
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Term of office of President
Unlike the 1997 Constitution, the Draft Con-
stitution introduces a two-term limit for the 
President. Section 100(1) states “Subject to 
subsection (3), the President shall hold office 
for a term not exceeding five years.” Subsec-
tion (2) goes further to state that “No person 
shall hold office as President for more than 
two terms of five years each, whether or not 
the terms are consecutive.”
Immunity of President from legal 
proceedings
Section 103 of the Draft Constitution gives 
the President immunity from any legal pro-
ceedings during their tenure in office in their 
personal capacity or in relation to their per-
formance or function in office.2 The immu-
nity granted does not, however, extend to 
unofficial acts or omissions while in office.3 
The 1997 Constitution, on the other hand, 
restricts the courts from entertaining any 
action against the President in any civil pro-
ceedings in respect of any act done in their 
capacity as President after they have vacated 
the office.4 Also, a criminal court shall only 
have jurisdiction to sue a President after they 
have vacated the office in respect to acts or 
omissions alleged to have been perpetrated 
by them while holding office if the Nation-
al Assembly has resolved in a motion that is 
supported by not less than two-thirds of all 
the members that such proceedings are justi-
fied in the public interest.5  
Appointment of Vice President and  
Ministers 
In the Draft Constitution, the President is man-
dated to nominate and appoint a Vice Presi-
dent within thirty days of assuming office and 
Ministers of Government within sixty days, 
but subject to the confirmation of the National 
Assembly.6 Here we see a shift from the 1997 
Constitution, where the President appoints the 
Vice President and Ministers without confir-
mation from the National Assembly.7  
Inclusion of economic, social, and cultural 
rights (ESCRs)
Section 60 of the Draft Constitution guaran-
tees the economic, social, and cultural rights 
of every person in The Gambia. It states, inter 
alia, that every person has a right to the highest 
attainable standard of health, which includes 
the right to health care services, including 
reproductive health care; accessible and ade-
quate housing; and to reasonable standards of 
sanitation, etc. Subsection (2) buttresses that a 
person shall not be denied emergency medical 
treatment. In addition, there have been great 
strides on the right to education8 and the right 
to development, which gives every person the 
right to enjoy economic, social, cultural, and 
political development.9  
Section 31(5) of the Draft Constitution pro-
vides guidelines on the application of the 
ESCRs. It states, inter alia, that the right 
to education guaranteed under Section 55; 
economic, social, and cultural rights under 
Section 60; and the right to development un-
der Section 64 shall be implemented in the 
absence of resources by a court, tribunal, and 
other tribunal using the guidelines laid down 
in Section 31(5)(a)(b) and (c). 
The issue of secularism
In Hon. Kemesseng Jammeh v. the Attor-
ney General,10 the Supreme Court invali-
dated a substantial part of the Constitution 
Amendment Act,11 which aimed at amending 
several provisions of the Constitution. The 
procedural requirements for amending the 
Constitution as provided in Section 226 (7) 
were not followed. Nevertheless, one change 
stayed despite the Supreme Court judgement 
finding it unconstitutional. This was the in-
sertion of the word “secular” in Section 1 of 
the Constitution, which states “The Gambia 
is a Sovereign Secular Republic.” 
Upon the publication of the Draft Consti-
tution, the exclusion of the word “secular” 
sparked a major debate and has divided the 
country into two camps. The anti-secularism 
camp argues that inclusion of the term would 
mean acceptance of same-sex relations, in-
ability to practice Islam as it should, and de-
struction of mosques.12 On the other hand, the 
pro-secularism camp argue that the exclusion 
of the term would make The Gambia some-
what of an Islamic State with the majority of 
decisions being in favour of Muslims.13 This 
comes on the heels of former President Jam-
meh’s unilateral declaration of The Gambia as 
an “Islamic Republic” on 11 December 2015, 
which has since been rescinded.14 
2 Section 103 of the CRC Draft Constitution. 
3 Section 103(3) ibid. 
4 Section 69(3)(a) Constitution of The Gambia, 1997. 
5 Section 69(3)(b) of the Constitution of The Gambia, 1997.
6 Sections 108 and 113 of the CRC Draft Constitution. 
7 Section 70 of the Constitution of The Gambia, 1997. 
8 Section 55 of the CRC Draft Constitution. 
9 Ibid Section 64.
10 Hon. Kemesseng Jammeh v. the Attorney General (2001), Supreme Court, Civil Case No 4.
11 Act No. 6 of 2001.
12 Gainako, Gambia Supreme Islamic Council (GSIC) Response to the Draft Constitution, http://www.gainako.com/gambia-supreme-islamic-counsel-gsic-re-
sponse-to-the-draft-constitution/. (last accessed 5 February 2020). 
13 Foroyaa Newspaper, Christian Council Gives Position Paper in New Draft Constitution, December 11, 2019. Article available here: http://www.foroyaa.gm/chris-
tian-counsel-gives-position-paper-on-new-draft-constitution/ (accessed 5 February 2019). 
14 A Vines, ‘The Gambia: Africa’s new Islamic republic’, BBC, 26 January 2016 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35359593 (accessed 5 January 2020). 
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The CRC plans on submitting the final Draft 
Constitution not later than March 2020.15 
 
3. Continued debate on the validity of Sec-
tion 5 of the Public Order Act
Gambians continue to debate on the legality 
of Section 5 of the Public Order Act, which 
gives the Inspector General of Police dis-
cretionary powers to grant and deny permits 
to citizens who want to demonstrate and as-
semble in The Gambia. In 2017, the Supreme 
Court of The Gambia, in the case of Ousainou 
Darboe & 19 Others v. the Inspector General 
of Police and Others, ruled that the limita-
tions or restrictions under Section 5 of the 
Public Order Act on the exercise of the right 
to assemble and demonstrate are reasonable, 
constitutionally legitimate, and permissible 
under Section 25(4) of the Constitution, and 
that such limitations or restrictions are reason-
ably justifiable in any democratic society.16  
In August of 2016, the case was filed at the 
ECOWAS Court, asking for among other 
things a declaration that Section 5 of the 
Public Order Act of The Gambia was in vio-
lation of Article 11 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
The Constitution grants every person in The 
Gambia the freedom of speech, conscience, 
assembly, association, and movement, but 
they shall only be exercised subject to the 
laws of the country, which impose reason-
able restrictions on the exercise of rights and 
freedoms that are necessary in a democratic 
society and are required in the interest of the 
sovereignty and integrity of The Gambia. 
Whether or not the restriction of a right guar-
anteed by the Constitution should be decid-
ed on or left in the hands of the Inspector 
General of Police with discretionary powers 
continues be a major hindrance on the enjoy-
ment of Section 25 of the Constitution. 
4. Legislative reforms
In 2019, the government tabled for enact-
ment before the National Assembly much 
transformative legislation that included an 
Access to Information Bill, an Anti-Corrup-
tion Commission Bill, a Women’s Amend-
ment of Discriminatory Laws Bill, a Sexual 
Offences Amendment Bill, and a Mutual Le-
gal Assistance in Criminal Matters Bill.
5. Review of The Gambia’s human rights 
record by the Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR)
The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) pro-
vides a unique opportunity to assess states’ 
compliance with their international obliga-
tions.17 The Gambia went through its first 
and second reviews in February 2010 and 
October 2014, respectively. On 5 Novem-
ber 2019, The Gambia was reviewed for 
the third time during the 34th session of the 
Working Group.18
In its first complementary report to the Human 
Rights Council, the National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) made submissions to 
the Working Group on the UPR relating to 
human rights of specific categories of people, 
namely women, children, persons with dis-
abilities, LGBT, prisoners etc.19 The NHRC is 
a permanent, independent body with a man-
date to promote and protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in The Gambia, inves-
tigate human rights violations, and provide re-
dress and remedial actions to victims.20 Civil 
society also submitted complementary reports 
on issues around freedom of speech and as-
sembly and same-sex relations.
Quite a number of the recommendations 
from the UPR have constitutional implica-
tions, including the following.21 
Accepted Recommendations
• 127.18 Prioritize completion of the Con-
stitutional Review process, taking into ac-
count the need for inclusive consultations 
(Uganda)
On freedom of expression:
• 127.28 Bring national legal provisions into 
line with international standards on free-
dom of expression under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
inter alia, by repealing Section 173A of 
the Information and Communications 
Amendment Act (2013), and by amending 
Sections 25 (4) and 209 of the Constitution 
(Netherlands);
• 127.31 Pass legislation that promotes and 
guarantees freedom of expression, access 
to information, and media pluralism (Na-
mibia).
On the death penalty
• 127.91 Abolition of death penalty in the 
legal system (Spain);
• 127.92 Abolish of the death penalty 
(Timor-Leste);
15 Constitutional Review Commission Newsletter, December 2019-January 2020. Issue 7, Vol 7. Available here: https://crc220.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
CRC-NEWSLETTER-VOL-7-DEC-2019-JAN-2020.pdf. (accessed 5 February 2020). 
16 Civil Suit No. SC 003/2016. 
17 See UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘UN Human Rights Council: Universal Periodic Review’ https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pag-
es/uprmain.aspx (accessed 10 December 2019). 
18 Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, ‘National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 
16/21: Gambia’, A/HRC/WG.6/34/GMB/1 (22 August 2019).
19 National Human Rights Commission ‘Report on state of compliance with international minimum standards of human rights by The Gambia under the Universal 
Periodic Review mechanism, third cycle’ (2019). 
20 See G Sowe & S Nabaneh, ‘The Gambia: The state of liberal democracy’, in R Albert et al., The I·CONnect-Clough Center 2017 Global Review of Constitution-
al Law (2018) 97-101.
21 See Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Gambia’, A/
HRC/43/6 (19 December 2019).
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• 127.93 Continue to strengthen measures 
towards abolishing the death penalty in its 
national legislation (Argentina).
Noted Recommendations
• 128.1 Adopt comprehensive anti-discrim-
ination legislation, including on the basis 
of sexual orientation and gender identity, 
and repeal any discriminatory laws (Ice-
land); 
• 128.2 Amend legislation to decriminalize 
abortion in all circumstances as well as en-
sure that safe and legal abortion services 
and post-abortion care are available (Ice-
land); 
• 128.3 Review national laws, including 
the personal law and the Women’s Act of 
2010, with a view to removing all pro-
visions that are discriminatory towards 
women (Croatia); 
• 128.4 Review the personal law and the 
Women’s Act, with a view to removing the 
provisions that are discriminatory towards 
women with regard to marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, marital property, adoption, 
and burial (Honduras);
• 128.5 Amend discriminatory laws against 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and in-
tersex people (Myanmar); 
• 128.6 Repeal all legislation that criminal-
izes same-sex activities, including Crimi-
nal Code Article 144 (Netherlands).
While merely noting recommendations is a 
good step, it does not go so far as signify-
ing the state’s political commitment to the 
protection of human rights of sexual minori-
ties in the country and the full protection of 
women’s rights.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Ya Kumba Jaiteh v. Clerk of the National 
Assembly and Others: Removal of Nominat-
ed National Assembly Members
In Ya Kumba Jaiteh v. Clerk of the Nation-
al Assembly and Others,22 the plaintiff, Ya 
Kumba, challenged the revocation by the 
President of the Republic of her nomination 
to the National Assembly as invalid and 
sought various restraining orders against 
the defendant. 
The plaintiff sought the following orders 
from the Supreme Court: to restrain the 
Speaker of the National Assembly from ad-
ministering the oath of office onto the 3rd 
defendant, Foday Gassama, who had been 
nominated by the President to replace the 
plaintiff/applicant Ya Kumba Jaiteh in the 
National Assembly; to restrain the Clerk and 
the Speaker of the National Assembly from 
bestowing any right, privilege, or role on Fo-
day Gassama as a member of the National 
Assembly; and an order restraining Foday 
Gassama from representing himself in any 
way as a member of the National Assembly.
Without having to deal with the legality or il-
legality of the revocation, the Supreme Court 
ruled that orders applied for by the plaintiff 
should not be granted. Having considered 
the submission of both parties, the Court 
ruled that the plaintiff should not interfere 
with the process or execution by the 3rd re-
spondent of his duties. It also stated in its rul-
ing that the reasons for the dismissal of the 
application will be incorporated in the final 
judgement of the Court. 
2. Emil Touray & 6 Others (Represented by 
IHRDA) v. The Republic of The Gambia: 
Freedom of Expression, Association, and 
Speech
In 2018, the plaintiffs submitted a Com-
munication to the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Com-
mission).23 In it, the plaintiffs averred that 
the Public Order Act unlawfully restricted 
the scope of freedom of expression (Article 
9(2)); freedom of association (Article 10); 
and freedom of assembly (Article 11) as 
protected under the African Charter on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).24 
They requested the African Commission to 
seize the Communication and it was seized.25 
In 2019, the case was withdrawn before the 
African Commission and a new Communica-
tion was prepared to be submitted at the Af-
rican Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
alleging violations of Articles 1, 9(2), and 11 
of the African Charter and Articles 19(2) and 
21 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).26 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
2020 Prospects 
Constitutional reform processes started in 
2019 are expected to be completed in 2020, 
including the new Gambian Constitution. 
The constitutional reform process is envis-
aged to provide the country with a new con-
stitutional framework to deal with perennial 
ills such as dictatorship, repression, human 
rights violations, corruption and mismanage-
ment of state property, and poverty.
More legislation is also expected to be tabled 
in the course of this year, including compre-
hensive amendments to the Criminal Code 
and Criminal Procedure Code in order to 
sanitize the criminal justice system and bring 
it in line with modern criminal justice norms 
and practices.
22 S.C. No 001/2019.
23 Communication 705/18, Emil Touray v. Saikou Jammeh (Represented by IHRDA & Sagarr Jahateh) v Republic of The Gambia (2018). See also S Nabaneh 
& G Sowe, ‘The Gambia: The state of liberal democracy’, in R Albert, D Landau, P Faraguna & S Drugda, The I·CONnect-Clough Center 2018 Global Review of 
Constitutional Law (October 21, 2019), p. 107-111.
24 The Gambia ratified the African Charter on 8 June 1982. 
25 Communication 705/18 (n 21 above), para 12. 
26 Ratified on 22 March 1979. 
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On addressing human rights violations, 
the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations 
Commission (TRRC) is expected to submit 
its report and recommendations to the state 
in 2020, as the Act mandates that it shall op-
erate for a period of two years unless it is 
extended further by the President.
The Supreme Court is also expected to de-
liver a judgement on the Ya Kumba Jaiteh v. 
Clerk of the National Assembly & Others on 
whether or not her removal from the Nation-
al Assembly was constitutional or not.
The Gambia has a historic moment looming 
to adopt a transformative constitution, as 
South Africa did. Transformation of Gambi-
an society should include the dismantling of 
a plethora of sexist laws and institutions, re-
dressing their legacy,27 healing the divisions 
of the past, and building a new society com-
mitted to social justice and improvement in 
the quality of people’s lives.
The key question in 2020 is whether The 
Gambia is capable of giving itself a con-
stitution that will usher in a new society of 
democracy and good governance that will 
ensure social and economic justice and af-
firm the democratic values of human dignity, 
equality and freedom.
V. FURTHER READING
T Isbell & SM Jaw ‘The Gambia’s draft 
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Dispatch No. 338 (2020)
Video: Constitutional reform process in 
Gambia, Centre on Law & Social Transfor-
mation, Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI), 
University of Bergen, Norway, November 
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27 See S Nabaneh, ‘The Gambia’s Political Transition to Democracy: Is Abortion Reform Possible?’ (December 2019), 21(2) Health and Human Rights Jour-
nal, 167-179.
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Georgia
Malkhaz Nakashidze, Associate Professor, Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University
I. INTRODUCTION
This report provides a brief introduction to 
the Georgian constitutional system, includ-
ing constitutional amendments, civil pro-
test, local elections, the role of media and 
main challenges of the judiciary. It provides 
an overview of landmark judgments of 
the Georgian Constitutional court in 2019. 
The final section examines developments 
expected in 2020 related to parliamentary 
elections, court vacancies, Constitutional 
Court cases and other related events.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Appointment of Judges in the Supreme 
Court
One of the most important issues in 2019 
was the appointment of judges to the Su-
preme Court of Georgia. The constitutional 
amendments of 2018 call for the lifetime ap-
pointment of judges to the Supreme Court, 
and they are elected by the Parliament upon 
the nomination of the Council of Justice. The 
independence of the judiciary in Georgia has 
been a critical issue for years. Following the 
change of government in 2012, the Georgian 
Dream government initiated several reforms 
to ensure the independence of the judiciary, 
but there were questions about the judicial 
system raised by judges dealing with var-
ious high-profile cases during the previous 
government. The situation was exacerbat-
ed in December, when the Justice Council 
sent Parliament a list of candidates for the 
Supreme Court’s judiciary for approval, 
leading to widespread public and parliamen-
tary scrutiny. The main demand was to sus-
pend judges for life and release discredited 
judges from the judicial system. The ruling 
party suspended the process in response to 
criticism and adopted a law on the criteria 
and procedure for electing judges. After the 
law was passed, the process moved to Par-
liament, where public hearings of candidates 
were held throughout the year. The process 
revealed many shortcomings and showed 
that the majority of candidates did not even 
meet the minimum criteria of qualification 
and professional integrity. Nevertheless, the 
Georgian Parliament has appointed 14 can-
didates to the Supreme Court of Georgia for 
life. These appointments were made without 
the participation of the opposition and in the 
wake of protests by civil society organiza-
tions. The ruling party completed the Su-
preme Court of Georgia in a one-party man-
ner, which can be described as an attempt to 
influence the Court. 
Early and mid-term elections 
Early and mid-term local self-government 
elections were held in 2019 as well as a 
by-election for a Member of Parliament in 
the capital, Tbilisi. Mayors were elected in 
five municipalities, and by-elections were 
held in eight municipalities. These elections 
were important in terms of testing opposition 
forces ahead of the 2020 elections, though 
all candidates for the government won. Ob-
server organizations noted significant elec-
tion irregularities.
Anti-occupation protests 
2019 was marked by civil and political 
protest. The biggest protest started in June, 
when on the 19th, the 26th General Assem-
bly of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Orthodox Church (I.A.O.) opened in 
Tbilisi. Protests were sparked by the arrival 
of the Russian I.A.O. delegation to the ple-
nary hall of the Georgian Parliament, and the 
decision to let a Russian lawmaker, Sergei 
Gavrilov, temporarily sit in the chair of the 
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speaker. This act was considered very insult-
ing by Georgian opposition members and the 
public at large, as the Russian Federation has 
occupied 20% of the territory of Georgia and 
Georgia does not have diplomatic relations 
with Russia. The opposition MPs protested 
the appearance of the Russian MP in the Par-
liament.1 The government was forced to sus-
pend the assembly and remove the Russian 
MP from the building, but citizens started 
gathering there. Finally, tear gas and rubber 
bullets were used against the protesters, but 
to no avail, and several hundred people were 
injured as a result of the violent dispersal, in-
cluding police officers, journalists and peace-
ful protesters. Three rally participants lost 
their eyesight after being hit by rubber bullets. 
Later, protesters raised three demands: the 
resignation of the Interior Minister, the adop-
tion of proportional representation for the 
next parliamentary elections and the immedi-
ate release of detainees. On the second day, 
Irakli Kobakhidze resigned from the Speaker 
of Parliament position and on June 24, 2019, 
the Georgian Dream coalition announced that 
the 2020 parliamentary elections would be 
conducted through a proportional system un-
der a zero electoral threshold.
Rejection of the fully proportional electoral 
system 
The ruling party’s view of a switch to a pro-
portional electoral system was seen as a ma-
jor victory for protestors, and they hoped the 
legislation would actually lead to change. To 
change the Constitution of Georgia in one 
parliamentary session, the bill must achieve 
the support of three-fourths of the Mem-
bers of Parliament; in the absence of such 
support, the initiative would be considered 
by the next elected legislature. The initia-
tive put forward by both the opposition and 
the ruling party went through all the proce-
dures and was set for a vote in Parliament 
on November 14, 2019. Parliament did not 
support the opposition’s proposed bill, but 
expectations were high that the parliamenta-
ry majority would adopt a draft pledged by 
the ruling party in June. The poll found that 
101 lawmakers voted in favor of the amend-
ment and 3 opposed it. To pass the bill, 113 
votes were required, and Parliament rejected 
a proportional system.2 The parliamentary 
outcome drew widespread criticism from 
opposition parties, civic activists and NGOs; 
it was considered a failure by the ruling party 
in fulfilling its promise in June and that the 
ruling party’s chairman, Bidzina Ivanishvili, 
should take the blame for it. The majoritarian 
MPs, who were never active in Parliament, 
were opposed to the proportional electoral 
system, but their independence was ques-
tionable, and this decision could be encour-
aged by the ruling party leadership.  
The case of Rustavi 2 
In 2019, the European Court of Human 
Rights ruled on the Rustavi 2 case and found 
no violation of the European Convention.3 
The court ruled that one of the most oppo-
sition-minded TV companies, Rustavi 2, 
belongs to Kibar Khalvashi,4 a businessman 
closely linked to the government. Khalvashi 
claimed that the company belonged to him 
and was illegally seized under the previous 
government. Following the decision, some 
of the staff left the TV station, and some were 
dismissed. Nika Gvaramia, the company’s 
director, created a new television station, 
“Mtavari Arkhi,” and started broadcasting.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Ltd SC v. Parliament of Georgia  
(No. 1/1/655, 18 April 18 2019)
The subject of this case was the constitution-
ality of the law of Georgia on State Procure-
ment. According to the disputed norm, state 
procurement of postal and courier services 
by the procuring organization does not ap-
ply to the law. According to the claimant, 
the Parliament of Georgia, by the disputed 
norm, granted the Georgian Post Ltd exclu-
sive authority and effectively excluded the 
participation of other economic agents in the 
Georgian postal and courier services market, 
thereby violating free competition and free 
entrepreneurship. The Court held that, under 
the impugned rule, only one economic agent 
was granted preference, which created the 
legal precondition for a monopolist to place 
the said economic agent in the postal and 
courier services market. The Court consid-
ered that the measure provided for in the im-
pugned provision disproportionately restrict-
ed entrepreneurial freedom and declared the 
provision unconstitutional.5 
2. Tiflis 777 Ltd v. Parliament of Georgia 
(No. 1/2/1250, 18 April 2019)
The subject of this dispute was the constitu-
tionality of the law of Georgia on Insolvency 
Proceedings. The claimant party argued, un-
der the impugned norm, that there was a real 
threat of the State’s ownership of property, 
which was tantamount to confiscation of 
substantive property. Since property expro-
priation is a fundamentally different regime, 
the right to property is disputed by the disput-
ed norm. However, there is no public interest 
that would justify the restriction of property 
1 Scandal in Georgian Parliament: Russian MP Speaks from Parliamentary Speaker’s Chair, June 20, 2019, <https://jam-news.net/სკანდალი-საქართველოს-
პარ/?lang=ka> accessed January 20, 2020.
2 The plenary sitting of the Parliament voted on the bill on changes to the electoral code, November 15, 2019, <http://parliament.ge/ge/saparlamento-saqmianoba/
plenaruli-sxdomebi/plenaruli-sxdomebi_news/parlamentis-plenarul-sxdomaze-saarchevno-cvlilebastan-dakavshirebuli-kanonproeqtis-kenchisyra-gaimarta.page> 
accessed January 20, 2020.
3 Case of Rustavi 2 Broadcasting Company Ltd and others v. Georgia (Application No. 16812/17) Judgment, Strasbourg, 18 July 2019, <http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-194445> accessed January 20, 2020. 
4 Grand Chamber Panel’s Decision, ECHR 430 (2019), 10.12.2019, <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-6587761-8728186> accessed January 20, 
2020. 
5 Ltd SC v. Parliament of Georgia, Decision [2019], No. 1/1/655, <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/4544553?publication=0> accessed January 20, 
2020.
136 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
rights. The Court decided that the impugned 
norm was not compatible with any of the le-
gitimate aims pursued, there was no logical 
connection between the restrictive measure 
and the public interest, the challenged regu-
lation failed to meet the requirements of fair-
ness, disproportionately restricted the right 
to property and was unconstitutional.6 
3. Irakli Khvedelidze v. Parliament of  
Georgia (No. 1/3/1263, 18 April 2019)
The subject of this case was Article 273 
of the Code of Administrative Offenses 
of Georgia, according to which the reso-
lution of an administrative offense can be 
appealed within 10 days of its submission. 
In the claimant’s view, the 10-day deadline 
for appeal under the impugned norm was 
bound to be a moment of enactment and did 
not provide for the possibility of extending 
or suspending this term if the party failed to 
submit a reasoned resolution within the time 
limit prescribed by law. This would lead to a 
violation of the constitutional right to appeal 
a court decision. According to the claimant, 
due to the overcrowding of the judicial sys-
tem, in most cases, the court does not give 
a reasoned ruling within the time limit pre-
scribed by law. It was up to him to submit 
a well-reasoned appeal after acquaintance 
with the substantiated resolution within the 
time allowed by law. The Court ruled that 
the impugned provision was unconstitution-
al on the ground that in the event of failure 
to timely file a reasoned ruling on appeal, a 
person’s discretion would be unreasonably 
restricted. However, if the impugned order 
was immediately invalidated, the time limit 
for appealing the court’s decision would no 
longer exist. Accordingly, the party would 
have the opportunity to appeal the court’s 
decision at any time.7 
4. Remzi Sharadze v. Minister of Justice of 
Georgia (No. 2/2/867, 28 May 2019)
The constitutionality of the norms of the Or-
der of the Minister of Justice of Georgia on 
“Approval of Forms, Rules and Procedures 
of Forced Auctions” was the subject of this 
case. The dispute related to the collateral that 
was used in a loan agreement to force real 
estate to be sold. In the claimant’s view, the 
second repeated auction of the starting price 
of the property at zero lari created the oppor-
tunity for the sale of the expensive property 
to be carried out at a disproportionately low 
price. The impugned norm neglected the in-
terests of the owner, and such public order 
constituted an unjustified interference with 
property rights. The Court ruled that by setting 
an adequate value at the first and first repeat-
ed auction, the value of the property could be 
created which, on the one hand, would at least 
provide an equally effective system. It divid-
ed creditors’ rights, and on the other hand, 
made zero auctions a less restrictive means of 
the plaintiff’s right. The Court, therefore, held 
that the impugned provision was contrary to 
the Constitution of Georgia.8 
5. Giorgi Kartvelishvili v. Parliament of 
Georgia (No. 2/1/704, 28 May 2019)
The subject of this dispute was the consti-
tutionality of the words of the Code of Im-
prisonment: “A convicted person placed in 
a special risk-taking facility for long periods 
of imprisonment.” According to the claim-
ant, the use of the long-term visitation right 
under the impugned order was restricted to a 
convict at a special risk facility and a prison-
er under quarantine who had a disciplinary 
sanction and/or was subject to administra-
tive imprisonment. The Court noted that 
the offender’s contact with family members 
under the impugned measure was restricted 
because of the need for the security of the 
penitentiary institution, persons placed there 
and the interests of the general public. Such 
contact may increase the risk of items be-
ing banned from circulating in the facility. 
Communication between criminal groups 
may also be established (or easier). Accord-
ingly, the impugned norm was a fair balance 
between private and public interests and the 
norm complied with the requirements of the 
principle of proportionality and was not un-
constitutional.9 
6. Media Development Fund and Institute 
for Development of Freedom of Information 
v. Parliament of Georgia (No. 1/4/693,857, 
7 June 2019)
The subject of this case was the constitution-
ality of the General Administrative Code of 
Georgia and the Law of Georgia on Personal 
Data Protection. The claimant requested the 
Court to strike a verdict to enable a docu-
ment to be processed and to identify the per-
sons involved in the case, and later request-
ed a summary verdict, but the Court did not 
decide because it considered that the names 
of the parties involved would be disclosed 
data. As a result, the claimant failed to dis-
close the reasoning of the Court and failed to 
identify the persons involved in the proceed-
ings representing the State. The Court ruled 
that within the meaning of the constitutional 
order of value, given the importance of ac-
cess to judicial acts, any decision taken in 
the course of justice should be open unless 
there is a justified need to limit its access. 
The balance established by the impugned 
norms is the opposite, as the personal data 
contained in court acts are usually closed un-
less the person concerned proves that there 
is a growing interest in the act’s openness. In 
view of the above, the Court announced the 
disputed norms unconstitutional.10
6 Tiflis 777 Ltd v. Parliament of Georgia, Decision [2019], No. 1/2/1250, <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/4544515?publication=0> accessed Janu-
ary 20, 2020.
7 Irakli Khvedelidze v. Parliament of Georgia, Decision [2019], No. 1/3/1263, <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/4544474?publication=0> accessed January 
20, 2020.
8 Remzi Sharadze v. Minister of Justice of Georgia, Decision [2019], No. 2/2/867, <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/4575266?publication=0> ac-
cessed January 20, 2020.
9 Giorgi Kartvelishvili v. Parliament of Georgia, Decision [2019], No. 2/1/704, <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/4575283?publication=0> accessed 
January 20, 2020.
10 Media Development Fund and Institute for Development of Freedom of Information v. the Parliament of Georgia, Decision [2019], No. 1/4/693,857, <https://
matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/4586009?publication=0> accessed January 20, 2020. 
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7. Besik Katamadze, David Mzhavanadze 
and Ilia Malazonia v. Parliament of Geor-
gia (No. 1/5/1271, 4 July 2019)
The subject of the case was the constitution-
ality of the following words of the Code of 
Administrative Offenses of Georgia: “also 
posters, slogans, banners in places that 
are not properly allocated.” The claimants 
dropped a banner from the roof of one of 
the buildings in the city with the inscription 
“Deceptive Government.” All three activists 
were found guilty of administrative offenses 
because of this. The claimants also argued 
about the constitutionality of prohibiting 
the placement of a protest banner from their 
faction’s office in the city hall building. The 
Court ruled that the freedom of expression of 
a Sakrebulo member to place information on 
the façade of a council building without the 
consent of the local self-government could 
not outweigh the growing interest of the lo-
cal self-government in preventing its prop-
erty from being used illegally. The balance 
between private and public interests in the 
disputed norm was not unfair. Accordingly, 
the disputed norm in this section was not 
contrary to the Constitution of Georgia. The 
Court ruled as unconstitutional a regulation 
that excluded the temporary placement of 
posters, slogans and banners by a proprietor 
on a privately owned object within the scope 
of a spontaneous protest.11 
8. Levan Alapishvili, KS Alafishvili and 
Kavlashvili - Georgian Bar Association v. 
Government (No. 2/3/1279, 5 July 2019)
The subject of the case was the constitution-
ality of the Georgian Government’s Decree 
on Approval of the Service Fees, Rates and 
Payment Rates of the Legal Entity of Pub-
lic Law of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
Georgia. According to the impugned norm, 
the subscribers of “112” service fees are 
telephone subscribers and mobile subscrib-
ers, and the monthly fee is GEL 0.20 for 
individuals and GEL 0.50 for legal entities, 
organizations and institutions. The claimant 
alleged that the impugned norm violated 
constitutionally protected property rights. 
The constitutional lawsuit stated that the 
subscriber was subject to the “112” service 
charge regardless of their consent, without 
defining specific concurrent services. The 
Court ruled that the fee was constitutionally 
charged, and only the law can establish its 
rate. Parliament was entitled to delegate the 
authority to set the rate of the fee to another 
body if it established rate limits. In this case, 
the Parliament delegated the power to set the 
rate of “112” without setting the rate itself, 
which is not in accordance with the Consti-
tution of Georgia.12 
9. Alexander Mdzinarashvili v. Georgian 
National Communications Commission 
(No. 1/7/1275, 2 August 2019)
The subject of this case was the norms of 
the Regulations approved by the Resolution 
of the Georgian National Communications 
Commission on Approval of the Regulation 
on Provision of Electronic Communica-
tions Services and Protection of Consumers’ 
Rights. The claimant disputed regulation set 
standards that provide for the blocking of an 
Internet domain issuer’s site, as well as the 
user, for breaking the constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of expression. The claimant 
stated that the contentious regulation of free-
dom of expression was subject to the conten-
tious norms. The legislator did not delegate 
to the Georgian National Communications 
Commission the power of substantive regu-
lation of freedom of expression. The Court 
ruled that the Parliament of Georgia did 
not confer the power to restrict freedom of 
expression in the disputed issue with the 
Georgian National Communications Com-
mission, and even if delegated at the same 
time, such a will of the Parliament would be 
unconstitutional.13
10. The Public Defender of Georgia v. Par-
liament of Georgia (No. 1/6/770, 2 August 
2019)
The subject of this case was the constitution-
ality of the Code of Administrative Offenses 
of Georgia and the Criminal Code of Geor-
gia. The challenged provision stipulated that 
a small amount of illegal purchase or posses-
sion of drugs without a doctor’s prescription 
would be punishable by a fine, or in excep-
tional cases in the light of the circumstances 
and the nature of the offender’s use if that 
would be inadequate, by administrative de-
tention for 15 days. In the claimant’s view, 
the small amount of illicit manufacture, 
purchase, storage and/or use of narcotics 
did not pose any risks that could result in 
administrative imprisonment. According to 
the Court, the impugned sanctions served 
the legitimate interest of the State to regulate 
the illicit traffic of drugs and thereby protect 
public health. Finally, the Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of the disputed norms only 
in relation to drugs, which cause aggressive 
behavior in case of rapid withdrawal.14 
11. Badri Bezhanidze v. Parliament of 
Georgia (No. 2/4/1365, 20 September 2019)
The constitutionality of the provisions of the 
Law of Georgia on Amendments and Addi-
tions to the Criminal Code of Georgia was a 
matter of dispute in this case. The claimant 
had been convicted twice for premeditated 
murder before the enactment of the contest-
ed law, and both episodes were sentenced 
to one sentence. Notwithstanding the entry 
into force of the law, the conviction of the 
plaintiff in the general court was based on 
criminal law at the time of the offense, and 
11 Besik Katamadze, David Mzhavanadze and Ilia Malazonia v. the Parliament of Georgia, Decision [2019], No.1/5/1271, <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/
view/4610268?publication=0> accessed January 20, 2020. 
12 Levan Alapishvili, KS Alafishvili and Kavlashvili - Georgian Bar Association v. the Government, Decision [2019], No. 2/3/1279, <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/
view/4610285?publication=0> accessed January 20, 2020.
13 Alexander Mdzinarashvili v. Georgian National Communications Commission, Decision [2019], No. 1/7/1275, <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/4629943?-
publication=0> accessed January 20, 2020. 
14 The Public Defender of Georgia v. Parliament, Decision [2019], No.1/6/770, <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/4629913?publication=0> accessed 
January 20, 2020.
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the plaintiff’s action was qualified as repeat-
ed intentional homicide. The claimant was 
sentenced to life imprisonment as a punish-
ment. According to the claimant, if the crime 
committed by the claimant were assessed 
in the light of the amendments to the Code, 
his action would not qualify as a repeated 
offense because he was not a person previ-
ously convicted of the same act. This would 
lead to a relatively light sentence. The Court 
ruled that the impugned norm is discrimina-
tory and contrary to the requirements of the 
Georgian Constitution.15 
12. Zurab Svanidze v. Parliament of Geor-
gia (No. 2/5/879, 14 November 2019)
The subject of this case was the constitution-
ality of the Law of Georgia on Enforcement 
Proceedings. The constitutional claim stated 
that the debtors were ordered to pay a sum in 
favor of claimant Zurab Svanidze. The spe-
cific immovable property listed on the debt-
or’s name was registered to satisfy the cred-
itors, including the claimant. According to 
the claimant, the regulation provided by the 
impugned norm, according to which in case 
of unsuccessful completion of the auction 
in accordance with the established rule, the 
property is released from seizure in favor of 
the creditor implementing the forced sale and 
is returned to the debtor, prevented the Court 
from enforcing its decision. The Court ruled 
that there are other, less restrictive means of 
achieving the legitimate aim of saving admin-
istrative resources, and the limitation provid-
ed by the impugned provision was broader 
than objectively necessary to achieve the le-
gitimate aim. Accordingly, the disputed reg-
ulation did not meet the requirements of ne-
cessity, did not meet the requirements of the 
principle of proportionality and was contrary 
to the Constitution of Georgia.16 
13. Stereo + Ltd, Luke Severin, Lasha Zil-
pimian and Robert Khakhalev v. Minister of 
Justice (No. 2/6/1311, 17 December 2019)
The subject of this case was the constitution-
ality of the Law of Georgia on Enforcement 
Proceedings and the Rules of Order of the 
Minister of Justice of Georgia on Approval 
of Forms, Rules and Procedures for Con-
ducting Forced Auctions. The claimants 
were Stereo + Ltd, a licensed broadcasting 
company and its affiliates. The main purpose 
of the company is to operate in the field of 
broadcasting. According to the Court ruling, 
one of the partners of the claimant company 
was ordered to pay cash in favor of a com-
pany registered in an offshore zone and com-
menced enforcement proceedings, seizing a 
50% stake in the company and auctioning 
it for sale. The claimant explained that the 
impugned norms allow the alienation of a li-
censed company’s shares through the forced 
auction without the Commission’s prior no-
tice and consent. The Court decided that the 
challenged norms established an unfair bal-
ance of interests, violated the requirements 
of the constitutional principle of proportion-
ality and are thus contrary to the Constitution 
of Georgia.17 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The most significant political event in 2020 
will be the parliamentary election, which 
marks the second term of the ruling Geor-
gian Dream Party. The opposition is active-
ly fighting for a fully proportional electoral 
system and for winning elections. 2020 will 
also see more judges appointed to the Su-
preme Court of Georgia. And two new judg-
es will be appointed to the Constitutional 
Court, including a new chairman. In 2020, 
the Constitutional Court is also expected 
to rule on important cases, such as “Geor-
gia’s Democratic Initiative against the High 
Council of Justice of Georgia,” where the 
issue of the selection of judges is subject to 
dispute. Other cases: “Eduard Marikashvili 
and A.D.,” Democratic Initiative of Georgia 
v. Parliament of Georgia, Public Defender of 
Georgia v. Parliament of Georgia, and Nana 
Rekhviashvili Sepashvili Ia v. the Parliament 
and the Minister of Justice.
V. FURTHER READING
Richard Albert, Malkhaz Nakashidze, Tarik 
Olcay, “The Formalist Resistance to Un-
constitutional Constitutional Amendments, 
Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 70, Issue 3, April 
2019, 639-70
15 Badri Bezhanidze v. Parliament of Georgia, Decision [2019], No.2/4/1365, <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/4663376?publication=0> accessed 
January 20, 2020.
16 Zurab Svanidze v. Parliament of Georgia, Decision [2019], No. 2/5/879, <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/4706313?publication=0> accessed January 20, 2020.
17 Stereo + Ltd, Luke Severin, Lasha Zilpimian and Robert Khakhalev v. the Minister of Justice, Decision [2019], No. 2/6/1311, <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/
view/4739467> accessed January 20, 2020. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Just as German public law discourse is 
shifting towards historical reconstruction 
and re-evaluation1 of the early years of the 
Federal Republic and its Constitutional 
Court (FCC), the year 2019 produced a fair 
amount of novelty (see II). Some of the de-
cisions selected here present real innovation 
(FCC applies EU fundamental rights now); 
some take up the thread of recent significant 
jurisprudence and add a new wrinkle to it 
(including horizontal fundamental rights du-
ties, extraterritorial duty to protect). One of 
these quasi-innovative decisions even holds 
some share of regression (plain justification 
of banning veils in judicial office) – either 
seen from the stance of rights realization or 
considering the paucity of argument. Along-
side novelty, the past year saw the continui-
ty of right-wing populists taking their issues 
with multiple adversaries (including friendly 
fire from within2) to court, albeit mostly not 
to their avail (see also III.3).3 A legal journal 
(Kritische Justiz) has launched a section en-
tirely devoted to collecting those cases and 
assessing whether they serve right wing pop-
ulism’s rollback or further its ascent. A judg-
ment of the Saxonian Constitutional Court, 
stirring some controversy, would probably be 
listed in the latter category. It partly reinstated 
an electoral list of the right-wing party Alter-
native für Deutschland (AfD) after an elec-
toral commission cut most of the names from 
the list due to irregularities in the nomination 
process.4 The Länder Court, for the first time, 
recognized the need to provide redress before 
an election in exceptional cases to ensure the 
fairness of the voting process (since the exclu-
sive election scrutiny procedure is in fact only 
available after the election). 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS: EU CHARTER 
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
PROMOTED TO CONSTITUTION-
AL STANDARD OF REVIEW
FCC Decisions of 27 November 2019, 1 
BvR 16/13 - Right to Be Forgotten I, and 1 
BvR 276/17 - Right to Be Forgotten II 
Establishing an instant classic of FCC juris-
prudence, the Court recalibrated its stance 
towards European Union (EU) law in two 
sweeping decisions, both ruling for the first 
time on the digital right to be forgotten. In 
the first constitutional complaint (Right to 
Be Forgotten I), a person sought redress 
against the availability (e.g., through search 
engines) of decades old articles stored in a 
free online archive of a prominent news 
magazine, (still) identifying him as a con-
victed murderer by name. In accordance 
with conventional horizontal fundamental 
rights jurisprudence, the case came down 
to a balancing of the fundamental rights in-
volved. The Court stressed the factor of time 
(the right to be forgotten), which may force 
GERMANY
1 See Florian Meinel (ed.), Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bonner Republik (Mohr Siebeck, 2019).
2 Constitutional Court of Schleswig-Holstein, 29 August 2019, LVerfG 1/19 – the expulsion of one 
prominent member of the AfD Länder parliamentary group.
3 FCC, decisions of 17 September 2019, 2 BvQ 59/19 and 2 BvE 2/18; Constitutional Court of 
Baden-Württemberg, decision of 22 July 2019, 1 GR 1/19 und 1 GR 2/19.
4 Constitutional Court of Saxonia, decision of 16 August 2019, Vf. 76-IV-19; Vf. 81-IV-19.
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press organizations to restrict access to old 
articles. In this particular case, the right to be 
forgotten prevailed; the Court called on the 
lower court(s) to examine how to accommo-
date privacy interests while ensuring legiti-
mate access by the public.
The significant doctrinal development, 
though, concerned less the substance of the 
case than the expansion of the Court’s stan-
dard of review. In Right to Be Forgotten I, 
the expansion is modest: where EU law gives 
domestic law space for normative diversity 
(the media privilege in EU data protection 
law in the case at hand), the Basic Law (BL) 
rights remain the primary standard of re-
view. It used to be the exclusive standard in 
those configurations. EU CFR rights provide 
only a subsidiary standard, coming into play 
if the BL rights fail to ensure an adequate 
level of protection when measured against 
the higher-ranking EU law. In that case, the 
Court will pay heed to the backup EU stan-
dard by interpreting BL rights in light of the 
CFR; only in improbably extreme cases of 
BL inadequacy would the CFR serve as di-
rect standard of review.
Right to Be Forgotten II takes the impact of 
the EU CFR further. At the core of the dis-
pute was a request by an individual to de-list 
a search result by Google; the unwanted link 
led to an unfavorable interview with a TV sta-
tion. Again, the dispute was horizontal, again 
EU data protection law was applicable; yet, 
in contrast to the first judgment, the Court 
considered EU law fully harmonized, with no 
leeway for member states. Instead of waiving 
its jurisdiction – as it would have previously 
– the Court drew on the CFR as applicable 
law in constitutional complaint proceedings, 
and consequently applied the rights catalogue 
as standard of review (excluding, at the same 
time, BL rights). On the merits of the case, the 
balancing of the involved interests, including 
freedom of expression, by the broadcaster led 
to the rejection of the complaint. In variance 
to some European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
jurisprudence, privacy interests were not pre-
sumed to take precedence; and not enough 
time had passed to justify the interview as be-
ing forgotten.
The Court explained its innovation by point-
ing to the responsibility to ensure rights 
protection also in cases where EU law takes 
precedence, and, moreover, to a gap in legal 
protection due to individuals lacking direct 
access to the ECJ. As to the authorization to 
decide constitutional complaints, the Court 
read the standard “basic rights” in Art. 93.4a 
BL very broadly in order to be able to in-
clude EU fundamental rights. Despite its 
shaky reasoning, the judicial innovation will 
probably be accepted, likely for reasons oth-
er than doctrinal plausibility.
The previous jurisprudence negated the com-
petence of the FCC by default when EU law 
was controlling a case and, in contrast, ex-
cluded the authority of EU fundamental rights 
in cases allowing for margins of member 
state discretion.5 Due to this non-necessary 
self-commitment by the FCC, until the bomb-
shell in November 2019, the principal inter-
locutors of the ECJ had been the lower and 
specialized (in short: all other German) courts 
– the FCC addressed the ECJ only in extreme 
cases when it challenged ultra vires acts of 
the EU, including the latter court’s decisions 
(see, e.g., the Banking Union case, III.2), with 
only such cumbersome weapons as constitu-
tional core and identity at its disposal.
In response to this increasingly impractical 
partition of decisional authority – with the 
influence of EU law growing – and leaving 
other tenets of its approach vis-à-vis EU law 
untouched (i.e., Solange and successors), the 
FCC took control over quotidian EU fun-
damental rights business as well as over its 
own destiny within the power dynamics of 
the network of European human rights insti-
tutions. The Court empowered itself to judge 
questions of EU human rights law, and there-
fore to influence future directions of human 
rights – either by making its voice heard 
within the framework of formal dialogue 
with the ECJ or by setting precedents of its 
own and finding ways around a preliminary 
ruling, as in Right to Be Forgotten II.
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the newborn 
twin towers of FCC jurisprudence, a band of 
questions are still to be answered in future 
case law. For example, it will be highly in-
teresting to see how the Second Senate – the 
FCC’s other judicial body and main architect 
of the sovereigntist reading of the German 
Constitution (Solange) – will react to the 
tectonic shift put into effect by its sibling; in 
particular, how far the acceptance of the new 
standards goes. It is also not completely out 
of the question that new doctrine may spill 
over to other areas of EU law, beyond the 
CFR. Furthermore, the repercussions to the 
relationship between the FCC and the ECJ 
have to be watched. If nothing else, the FCC 
did not really hold back in expecting the 
Luxembourg Court to recognize and tolerate 
the variance in member state fundamental 
rights interpretation.
III. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL 
CASES
1. FCC, Decision of 5 November 2019, 1 
BvL 7/16: Welfare Cuts Induce Inherent 
Human Dignity Constraints 
The root of this case can be traced back to 
the beginning of the 21st century and the first 
federal Social Democrat-Green Coalition, 
which inherited the task to reform the ailing 
social system; the highly unpopular “Agenda 
2010” streamlined and cut back on welfare 
benefits, setting in motion the demise of the 
Social Democratic Party. The newly intro-
duced welfare benefit called “Hartz IV” in-
cluded a system of gradual sanctions to those 
benefits, which became the subject of one 
of the latest of prominent FCC judgments. 
These sanctions are imposed when recipients 
do not conform to certain requirements, e.g., 
do not show up to appointments, do not write 
applications, do not accept open positions 
offered to them.
Another source of the problematique of this 
case is the jurisprudence of the Court itself. 
The FCC based the duty to provide an ex-
istential minimum on the human dignity 
5 Decision of 24 April 2013, 1 BvR 1215/07, para. 88.
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clause in conjunction with the social state 
objective (Art. 1.1 and 20.1 BL). Moreover, 
according to the jurisprudence of the Court, 
the guarantee of human dignity is absolute, 
i.e., encroachments on it cannot under any cir-
cumstance – in contrast to all other rights – be 
justified. Taking into account this established 
jurisprudence, it was hard to imagine how 
substantial cuts to social benefits, which rep-
resent the minimum required by human dig-
nity, may be constitutional. Thus, the question 
before the Court was whether there could be 
a lawful minimum within a minimum, which 
essentially does not allow limitations. 
The Court apparently utilized both sources 
of the right to an existential minimum and 
eventually found a compromise between ab-
solute dignity and malleability of the social 
state clause (causing massive doctrinal head-
aches): although certain sanctions are not 
excluded by the human dignity clause, the 
Court quashed most of the harsh sanctions 
in place. The Constitution tolerates a benefit 
scheme which is only invoked as subsidiary 
assistance and which, consequently, expects 
recipients to play a part in restoring their 
ability to provide for themselves; therefore, 
proportional duties of cooperation may be 
enforced by proportionate sanctions, subject 
to strict scrutiny. In any event, any welfare 
cut must be tied to the legitimate purpose of 
overcoming the need to receive “Hartz IV” – 
only then may the implied dignity constraint 
be permitted under the BL.
2. FCC, Decision of 30 July 2019, 2 BvR 
1685 and 2631/14 – European Banking 
Union Case
Here, the FCC decided upon constitutional 
complaints in which the claimants put forward 
that their right to democracy as enshrined in 
Art. 38.1 1st sent. BL had been infringed by 
both the participation of the German Parlia-
ment (Bundestag) and government in the 
adoption of EU secondary law (regulations) 
governing the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) as well as by passing the act autho-
rizing the SSM. The German government and 
the Bundestag remained within the Integra-
tionsprogramm (EU integration agenda) es-
tablished by Art. 23.1 BL when participating 
in the adoption of the SSM and SRM regula-
tions, so the Court held.6 
While declaring some parts of the com-
plaints to be inadmissible, the Court ruled on 
the merits of the challenge against German 
participation in the adoption of the regula-
tions on the SRM and SSM. It found that the 
“constitutional identity” of the BL remained 
untouched by the regulations in question. 
Basically merging identity and ultra vires 
review when the “right to democracy” is 
invoked,6 the relevant test to be applied in 
that regard was one of a “manifest excess 
of competences”, and both regulations did 
not exceed the limits of Art. 127.6 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) in a manifest manner. The 
SSM regulation did not grant the European 
Central Bank full supervisory powers over 
all banks within the eurozone, instead, just 
over significant banks. While the compati-
bility of the competences conferred upon the 
Single Resolution Board (SRB) as an inde-
pendent agency by the SRM Regulation with 
the principle of limited conferral appeared 
problematic, it did not interfere with the con-
stitutional identity of the BL provided that 
the activities of the SRB remained within 
the limited competences assigned to it. The 
“identity core” of the democratic principle 
protected by Art. 23.1 3rd sent. and Art. 79.3 
BL, which mark the limits of integration, 
allows for the establishment of independent 
agencies provided this occurs only in excep-
tional circumstances. The democratic deficit 
inextricably linked to the operation of inde-
pendent agencies would be constitutionally 
acceptable if safety mechanisms ensuring 
democratic accountability were installed. 
This was the case with respect to the SRB, 
which was the FCC’s major finding. 
3. FCC, Decision of 27 August 2019, 1 
BvR 879/12: Horizontal Human Rights 
Obligations of a Private Hotel Banning a 
Right-Wing Politician 
The FCC has indirectly applied BL funda-
mental rights in horizontal cases almost 
since its inception, obligating state actors 
(i.e., courts) to take rights into consideration 
when applying open-textured legal norms 
to disputes between private actors. In recent 
years, more and more cases have come be-
fore the Court in which the question arose 
whether private actors occupying a dominant 
(market) position should have to be held to a 
more stringent fundamental rights standard, 
perhaps even without a normative anchor in 
statute law (while not being bound like the 
state). The recent leading case from 2018 
concerned the league-wide stadium ban of a 
soccer fan; the Court held that (flowing from 
the right to equality, Art. 3 BL) minimum 
standards of procedural fairness and reason-
ableness may arise in specific situations of 
asymmetric power relations, e.g., in public 
forums conducive to one’s self-realization.7  
In the case commented on here, a hotel 
withdrew a booking for the former head of 
an extremist right-wing political party af-
ter learning of his identity. Because a hotel 
stay cannot be viewed as highly essential to 
a good life and since alternative accommo-
dation was available, the Court could not 
identify a structural power advantage on 
the part of the hotel, and hence declined to 
confirm specific circumstances triggering 
the equality standard of Art. 3 BL. Even if 
that standard applied, the Court would not be 
convinced of a violation of the prohibition 
to treat another person differently on the ba-
sis of his or her political opinion (Art. 3.3 
BL, an additional equality protection). In the 
eyes of the FCC, the lower courts struck a 
fair balance between the recreational inter-
ests of the politician and the business inter-
ests of the hotel owner. Thus private actors 
are held to a less rigorous standard than the 
state (that, in those cases, could not resort to 
balancing since the ban on differential treat-
ment is strict). The future will tell how the 
Court will develop and apply the criterion 
of specific circumstances and equality stan-
6 See https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2019/bvg19-052.html
7 See para. 205 of the decision. 
8 Decision of 11 April 2018, 1 BvR 3080/09, para. 41.
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dards, especially in the digital sphere.8  
4. FCC, Decision of 17 September 2019, 2 
BvE 2/16 – Anti-IS Mission by the German 
Armed Forces: Denial of Judicial Review
The FCC ruled on an application (Organst-
reit) by Die Linke parliamentary faction, 
which claimed that German participation 
in the operations of the Global Coalition 
against Daesh infringed on the Parliament’s 
rights stemming from Art. 59.1 in conjunc-
tion with Art. 24.2 BL (requiring parlia-
mentary approval). In that course, the FCC 
addressed the legality of the military efforts 
of the Global Coalition on Syrian territory, 
which the involved states justified by refer-
ence to the right to collective self-defence as 
enshrined in Art. 51 UN Charter, while stress-
ing that the Organstreit does not allow for a 
general review of the “objective constitution-
ality of an organ’s specific actions”. The FCC 
employed a strategy of judicial self-restraint 
in terms of the compatibility of the Global 
Coalition’s endeavors in Syria and the partic-
ipation of Germany therein. The relevant test 
to be applied was – considering the margin of 
appreciation to be granted to the executive – 
that of “untenability”. In that regard, the FCC 
came to the conclusion that the interpretation 
of Art. 51 UN Charter regarding the exercise 
of the right to self-defence against non-state 
actors put forward by the intervening parties 
and shared by the German government would 
be untenably broad. In reaction to this deci-
sion, it is already being discussed whether to 
provide the FCC with jurisdiction to review 
military operations.
5. Higher Administrative Court of North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Decision of 19 March 
2019, 4 A 1361/15 - German US Drone 
Strike Hub: Abetment and Extraterritorial 
Duty to Protect
The US drone program and the question of 
its legality has reached German courts: in the 
case of Jaber v. Federal Republic of Germa-
ny, the claimants argued that Germany vio-
lated its positive obligation to protect human 
life stemming from Art. 2.2 1st sent. BL by 
not actively restraining the use of the US 
military base Ramstein as a relay station for 
steering the operation of drones in Yemen. In 
2015, the Administrative Court in Cologne 
held the application to be inadmissible (de-
cision of 27 May 2015, 3 K 5625/14). At the 
basis of this decision, the Court found that 
claimants were unsuccessful in substantiat-
ing the failure on the part of Germany to ful-
fill its duty to protect human life. However, 
the Higher Administrative Court held differ-
ently – which came as a (positive) surprise 
to many observers. The Higher Administra-
tive Court concurred with the finding of the 
lower court in terms of the protective pos-
itive dimension of fundamental rights even 
in cases in which state action has an external 
dimension and concerns individuals who are 
not within the sphere of effective control of 
Germany (while the action possibly violat-
ing their rights stems from German territo-
ry). It also accepted that in such cases, the 
executive was to be granted a wide margin 
of appreciation in terms of how to fulfill its 
protective duties. Nevertheless, the High-
er Administrative Court concluded that the 
German government’s actions were – as it 
stands – insufficient. The German govern-
ment was obliged to make sure that the drone 
strikes conducted by the US on Yemeni ter-
ritory involving the US military base Ram-
stein complied with international law and 
that if this appeared not to be the case, the 
German government had a duty to take some 
form of action to ensure compliance with in-
ternational law. 
6. Constitutional Court of Bavaria, 
Decision of 14 March 2019, Vf. 3-VII-18: 
Tentative Constitutional Conformity of 
Religious Garment Ban in the Judiciary
For several decades, legal conflicts emerged 
from the expectation of non-Christian faiths 
to accomodate. Recently, as testament to 
their members’ late societal advancement, 
the almost inevitable conflicts crossed the 
gates of public service. In order to ensure 
impartiality in judicial proceedings, the Ba-
varian State requires judges, prosecutors and 
legal trainees to refrain from wearing any re-
ligious symbol or garment in public when in 
official capacity.
 
The actio popularis (a recourse for indi-
vidual claimants only available in Bavaria) 
argued, unsuccessfully, that this new statute 
provision not only violates freedom of reli-
gion but also discriminates against women 
as it mostly affects women of Muslim faith. 
The Länder Constitutional Court rather suc-
cinctly confirmed the statute’s conformity 
with the Bavarian Constitution: the restric-
tion of religious freedom is legitimate con-
sidering the weight of judicial neutrality 
and the negative freedom of the parties not 
to be exposed to religious symbols worn by 
state officials. At the heart of the Court’s 
reasoning was its assumption that wearing 
religious symbols was per se sufficient to 
question the neutrality of state officials. At 
least for schoolteachers, the FCC requires a 
higher standard to cast neutrality in doubt – 
specific schools or school districts need to 
have experienced actual conflicts in order to 
justify prohibitions of religious symbols.9 It 
remains to be seen whether this distinction 
between education and judicial proceedings 
will hold, as a case of a Bavarian legal train-
ee is pending before the FCC.
Concomitantly, the Bavarian Constitutional 
Court briskly distinguished the delicate mat-
ter of crucifixes in courtrooms as the latter 
supposedly merely constitute an adminis-
trative matter and are thus not connected to 
the impartiality of individual state officials. 
Finally, it rejected the claim of gender dis-
crimination, again with a succinct reasoning, 
by referring to the creed-neutral conception 
of the ban. As no data exists with respect to 
gender-specific effects of the new law, the 
Court was confident to shrug away consid-
erations of substantive equality.
7. Climate Change Litigation Reaches 
German Administrative Courts as well as 
the FCC
9 See, foreshadowing, the decision of 22 May 2019, 1 BvQ 42/19 – provisional order to reinstate a Facebook account of a political party ahead of elections.
10 Decision of 27 January 2015, 1 BvR 471, 1181/10.
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The Administrative Court in Berlin (deci-
sion of 31 October 2019, VG 10 K 412.18) 
dismissed an application for a declaratory 
judgment brought by individual claimants as 
well as Greenpeace against the German gov-
ernment. The claimants argued that the gov-
ernment was obliged to implement measures 
ensuring the fulfillment of the goals set out 
in its climate change program 2020 – 40% 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions until 
2020 compared to 1990 – which was adopt-
ed by the Cabinet on 3 December 2014. The 
Court found that the claimants had no stand-
ing since they failed to substantiate that their 
fundamental rights – especially the right to 
property (Art. 14 BL) and right to life and 
physical integrity (Art. 2.2 1st sent. BL) – 
were infringed. The Cabinet decision entail-
ing the climate change program 2020 con-
stituted a non-binding instrument that could 
not be relied upon by the claimants. The 
individual claimants were, moreover, un-
successful in substantiating that the German 
government failed to comply with its posi-
tive obligations stemming from fundamental 
rights by adopting manifestly impractical 
measures falling below the constitutionally 
required minimum. Furthermore, the Court 
found that Greenpeace had no standing with-
in the proceeding at hand. It could not rely 
on Art. 3.3 of the Aarhus Convention to that 
respect.
Additionally, complaints were brought be-
fore the FCC by individual claimants and 
two associations (Solarenergie-Förderverein 
Deutschland e.V. (SFV), Bund für Umwelt 
und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND)) in 
2018. The claimants argued – partly simi-
lar to the arguments made in the previously 
mentioned case – that the German govern-
ment failed to comply with its positive ob-
ligations to protect their life, physical integ-
rity and property by implementing a policy 
which will not allow it to fulfill its climate 
protection goals 2020. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
While the FCC is to decide high-profile cas-
es on the ban on commercially assisted sui-
cide, extraterritorial surveillance, the CETA 
agreement and cuts to party financing of ex-
tremist right-wing political parties, 2020 is 
also be characterized by a changing of the 
guard at the helm of the Court. President 
Andreas Voßkuhle was mostly heralded for 
his composed authority, internally uniting 
his Senate (avoiding dissenters), externally 
defending judicial independence and ex-
plaining the workings of the Court in public, 
culminating in a primetime TV appearance. 
Once even considered for the presidency of 
the Federal Republic, Voßkuhle has returned 
to his position as a law professor. His suc-
cessor is be Stephan Harbarth, an attorney, 
and, up to his appointment as Vice-President 
in late 2018 a politician.10 Although his pro-
fessional background as an attorney makes 
him a rare figure at the Court, he is expected 
to mainly continue the trodden paths of his 
predecessor. 
V. FURTHER READING
Matthias Hong, Der Menschenwürdegehalt 
der Grundrechte – Abwägungsfeste Rechte – 
Todesstrafenverbot und Folterverbot (Mohr 
Siebeck, 2019)
Christian Bumke, “Die Entwicklung der 
Grundrechtsdogmatik in der deutschen 
Staatsrechtslehre unter dem Grundgesetz” 
(2019) 144 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 1
Oliver Lepsius, “Kontextualisierung als Auf-
gabe der Rechtswissenschaft” (2019) Juris-
tenzeitung 793
Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, “Parité-Ge-
setzgebung auf dem Prüfstand des Ver-
fassungsrechts” (2019) Juristenzeitung 525
Donald P. Kommers – A Memorial Collection 
(2019) 20 German Law Journal 514 et seq.
11 See a recent, non-unanimous conflict-of-interest decision by the FCC, 5 December 2019, 1 BvL 7/18, to not recuse Harbarth in a proceeding, challenging 
an act of Parliament, simply because he endorsed the law politically.
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Ghana
Maame AS Mensa-Bonsu, DPhil student, University of Oxford 
I. INTRODUCTION
2019 was a constitutionally eventful year. 
The Supreme Court composition was sub-
ject to important changes, as most of the 
long-serving judges retired and new fac-
es took up their seats; a referendum was 
planned and aborted due to public pressure; 
and a constitutional provision that has been 
dormant since it first appeared in a Ghana-
ian Constitution fifty years ago has ripened 
into full force. Many controversies related to 
this provision can be expected to follow in 
the coming years. 2019 saw the enjoyment 
of some rights further entrenched and oth-
ers unfortunately rolled back by Court deci-
sions. But even if the constitutional journey 
continues by trial and error, we look forward 
to the day when the Court will have a chance 
to revisit those matters and, based on the les-
sons of our experience, correct the errors. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The Supreme Court continued to see chang-
es in its composition as many of the Fourth 
Republic’s old guard attained the compulso-
ry retirement age. Justice Sophia Akuffo re-
tired in December from her position as Chief 
Justice. She was the second female Chief 
Justice in the country’s history. During her 
tenure, Justice Akuffo prioritized improving 
the infrastructure of the Judicial Service. A 
number of new courts were commissioned, 
and dilapidated courts were shut down. She 
initiated the much-needed renovation of 
the official accommodation offered judges 
transferred out of their home regions. The 
E-Justice Project, which was initiated by her 
predecessor, Justice Wood, was finally fully 
implemented. It has upgraded all court filing 
processes from manual to electronic. Despite 
a few hiccups in the early days, it is antici-
pated that the E-Justice Project will signifi-
cantly increase the efficiency of the justice 
system and thereby reduce the costs involved 
in prosecuting an action. Notable among Jus-
tice Akuffo’s administrative achievements 
is the initiative to create a full and accurate 
inventory of all the landed property owned 
by the Service. Less flattering to her record, 
she leaves legal education in the turbulent 
state she inherited it; as its regulatory body, 
the General Legal Council, which she head-
ed, appears to lack a clear strategy towards 
reforming legal training in light of Ghana’s 
new realities.
Justices Mariam Owusu, Avril Love-
lace-Johnson and Gertrude Torkornoo were 
elevated from the Court of Appeal to the Su-
preme Court. They replace Justices Akuffo, 
Adinyira and Akoto-Bamfo, who retired at 
various points in the year.
Article 266 of the 1992 Constitution pro-
vides that any freehold interest vested in a 
non-citizen became by operation of law a 
fifty-year lease beginning August 22, 1969, 
the reversionary interest then vesting in the 
Republic. The provision first appeared in the 
1969 Constitution and so its reappearance in 
the 1992 Constitution was necessary to pre-
vent chaos ensuing. Be that as it may, August 
21, 2019, marked fifty years since all such 
freeholds were converted. The state has not 
issued any clear guidance what the next steps 
are for those affected – i.e., alien freeholders 
and citizens who purchased such an interest 
from them. Given the primacy of land access 
to the economy, it is easy to foresee a pleth-
ora of lawsuits and no small amount of con-
fusion in the sector. It is hoped government 
will aver its mind on this thorny problem.
It will be recalled that we commented last 
year on how President Akufo-Addo appeared 
to make good on his campaign promise for 
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the District Chief Executive (DCE) to be 
elected and not appointed by him. However, 
in a strange and rather disappointing turn of 
events, the President announced a move to 
amend the Constitution to enable the DCE 
election to be contested on a partisan basis, 
and a referendum was scheduled for Decem-
ber 17, 2019. The announcement was wel-
comed with mixed feelings by the public, 
though both major political parties were en-
thusiastic about it. The almost non-existent 
engagement with the public on the exact 
question to be answered in the referendum 
turned the tide of public opinion forceful-
ly against the proposed referendum. While 
some anti-amendment activists campaigned 
for a no vote, others campaigned for voters 
to stay home, skewing the constitutionally 
mandated voter turnout thresholds required 
to amend the Constitution. Eventually, the 
disaffection was so great that the President 
called off the referendum barely a week be-
fore its scheduled date. It is submitted re-
spectfully that the referendum was in no way 
necessary to create democratically elected 
DCEs. It was only required for the President 
to initiate a convention whereby the districts 
voted their preferred candidate and he would 
defer to the electoral result in choosing his 
appointees. Amending the Constitution was 
hardly necessary and certainly undesirable. 
It would simply create a situation where 
competent members of the district who do 
not want to be affiliated with a party stand 
no chance of winning. It will also introduce 
the zero-sum tenor of national elections into 
provincial elections that should be about the 
small unit’s needs. The failure of the amend-
ment process was a welcomed outcome. This 
was the second referendum attempt in less 
than ten years to be defeated by public re-
sistance. The first was under the Mahama 
government and was an ambitious overhaul 
of over fifty provisions of the Constitution. 
The referendum was so firmly opposed that 
it never took place. 2019’s aborted referen-
dum was much narrower and had the support 
of both political parties but met such public 
resistance that the risk of an embarrassing 
defeat was too great to be ignored. Perhaps 
Ghanaians are not dissatisfied with the 1992 
Constitution, flaws notwithstanding.
Finally, it must be mentioned that the state 
has still not paid compensation for the large 
tract of land it compulsorily acquired in 
2018, yet it has begun developing parts of 
it under the one-district, one-factory promise 
on which it won the elections. It is worrying 
that, notwithstanding Article 20’s instruction 
that compensation must in such cases be 
‘prompt and adequate’, nothing further ap-
pears to have been done on this issue. Out 
of the blue, the landowners who lived on the 
tract were almost immediately made home-
less due to the acquisition. Over a year later, 
the state has not paid them their due. This is 
unacceptable. The state should be acting to 
protect and empower citizens, not impover-
ish and disregard them; otherwise there is no 
difference between a constitutional state and 
a military one.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Martin Kpebu v AG: Detention without 
charge
 
In December, Justice Akuffo delivered her 
valedictory judgment. She held that the 48-
hour period which a person can be detained 
without charge as per Article 14(3) of the 
1992 Constitution was a 48-calendar-hour 
period. The unanimous decision ended a po-
lice practice of arresting persons on Friday 
or the eve of a public holiday and holding 
them until the next working day – sometimes 
72 hours later. 
2. Bomfeh v AG: Religious equality
In a very disappointing judgment, the Su-
preme Court held that because the power to 
allocate public land is vested in the Presi-
dent, President Akuffo-Addo’s decision to 
allocate 6.5 hectares of public land for the 
construction of a National Cathedral was 
not incompatible with the religious equality 
guaranteed in the secular state created by the 
1992 Constitution. With respect, it is hard to 
see how the cathedral benefits the scores of 
Ghanaians who are not Christian and have 
no use for it. While electoral decisions in a 
democracy are made by majority choice, it 
does not follow that the elected government 
must then pursue majority interests. Ghana 
may be a majority Christian country, but it is 
precisely to prevent majorities from expend-
ing collective resources on their interests to 
the exclusion of minorities that constitution-
al rights exist. The Court has done Ghana 
in general and its minorities in particular a 
great disservice by this decision. 
3. Afoko v AG: Nolle prosequi as a discre-
tionary power 
In a 7-1 decision, the Supreme Court held 
that the AG’s power to issue a nolle prosequi 
was not subject to Article 296 of the Con-
stitution. This was yet another puzzling de-
cision from the Court. Article 296 requires 
a person vested with discretionary power 
to publish guidelines on when and how that 
discretionary power will be used. It fol-
lows inescapably then that if a power is a 
discretionary power, it is subject to Article 
296. The majority insisted that the filing of 
a nolle prosequi was an executive act, not a 
quasi-judicial one, and therefore did not fall 
within the purview of Article 296(c). With 
respect, that conclusion begs the question of 
whether it is or is not a discretionary power. 
Article 296(c) does not exclude any type of 
discretionary power from its application, so 
the type of discretionary power is irrelevant. 
The majority relied on Ransford France 
[2012] 1 SCGLR 705 in coming to their de-
cisions. It must be noted that when, in the 
February 2015 case of Mensah v EC (unre-
ported), the Electoral Commission relied on 
Ransford France to disqualify a candidate 
without explanation, the Court (in a panel 
comprising four of the judges who sat on 
Ransford France) ruled that the scheduled 
election itself was unconstitutional, and 
based the decision on the absence of a con-
stitutional instrument detailing how the EC 
planned to use its discretionary power to 
run the elections. Here, the Court was once 
again asserting that Article 296(c) was not 
applicable to all discretionary powers. Jus-
tice Pwamang deserves commendation for 
his lone but forceful dissent. His Lordship 
pointed out the point of Article 296(c) is to 
give certainty to all legal interaction with the 
state. The majority decision results in the ex-
act opposite. 
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4. Theophilus Donkor v AG: Termination 
of Board appointments on assumption of 
office by new President
In a very welcome decision, the Supreme 
Court struck down Section 14 of the Pres-
idential (Transition) Act 2012, (Act 845), 
which requires Chief Executives or Direc-
tors-General (howsoever described) of pub-
lic boards or corporations to cease to hold 
office upon the assumption of office by a 
new President. The offensive section ren-
dered all such offices vacant by operation of 
law and, during the time it took the President 
to find his own people to appoint, paralysed 
the institutions. It was a needless and purely 
rent-seeking section that created avenues for 
political appointments. The Attorney-Gen-
eral’s reasoning that the section allowed a 
President to pursue his mandate with a team 
that believes in his policies is most unmerito-
rious. Followed to its logical conclusion, one 
would expect all staff of the civil service to 
be terminated in the same way as well. 
5. Centre for Juvenile Justice v AG: Ac-
cess to courts as a constitutional right
In this case, the Supreme Court struck down 
paragraphs 1 (9) and 2(8) of the First Sched-
ule to the Revenue Administration Act 2016 
(Act 915) as unconstitutional. These para-
graphs required the possession of a TIN 
number in order to file a case before the 
courts. In a unanimous judgment, which 
happened also to be Justice Adinyira’s vale-
dictory judgment, the Court held that access 
to courts was a fundamental human right that 
did not depend on paying tax. The Court was 
undoubtedly right. The judicial review and 
human rights enforcement powers entrusted 
to the High Court and Supreme Court by Ar-
ticles 2 and 130 would be easily defeated if 
the access to courts was not zealously pro-
tected. All an abusive executive would need 
to do is to issue executive instruments that 
thwarted court access. It also seems most 
unfair to the taxpaying citizen to be unable 
to pursue a debt or breach only because the 
other party in a transaction is less law abid-
ing than she is.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In 2020, presidential and parliamentary 
elections will take place (the first elections 
to be held under the leadership of Ms. Jean 
Mensa as Electoral Commissioner). After a 
warm reception from the public on her ap-
pointment, Ms. Mensa’s tenure got off to a 
rocky start. Her decision to compile a new 
voter’s register was met with resistance that 
only grew in scope and audience as time pro-
gressed. She has suffered a dip in public con-
fidence in her impartiality that we hope she 
can recover from before the elections. 
President Akuffo-Addo will make his second 
appointment to the position of Chief Justice 
in the coming year. Justices Dotse and Anin 
Yeboah seem to the favourites for the slot. 
The Chief Justice is nominated by the Pres-
ident, and if so recommended by Parliament 
after vetting, is appointed by the President 
to serve until she/he attains the compulsory 
retirement age of 70. 
V. FURTHER READING
Mensa-Bonsu, MAS, ‘Interpreting article 
266: reflections on Verdose v Verdose-Kur-
anchie’ (2019), Vol 5 LUGLJ 142
Alengah C, ‘Of Stare Decisis, the Consti-
tution and the Superior Courts of Ghana: 
Making the Law Certain’ (2019), Vol 5 
LUGLJ 153
Nyarko MG, ‘The Right to Property and 
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Greece
Dr. Alkmene Fotiadou, Centre for European Constitutional Law 
I. INTRODUCTION
A constitutional revision marked 2019. 
Throughout the years of financial crisis, the 
long-awaited revision had triggered heat-
ed discussions that included issues ranging 
from the necessity of exercising constituent 
power and calls for radical reforms, even 
by circumventing the amending formula 
through the use of a constitutional referen-
dum, to scholarly discussion about correc-
tive interventions rendering the Constitution 
more functional. And yet the Constitution 
had remained formally unaltered for many 
years, at first because of a mandatory time 
lapse between revisions and then due to lack 
of consensus. 
What followed is an anti-climax; that is, a 
modest intervention by way of few amend-
ments that had matured enough to acquire 
the required consensus. This anti-climax is 
not necessarily a bad thing, especially fol-
lowing a severe crisis and deep political po-
larization. Still, due to the mandatory time 
lapse in between the initiation of revision 
processes, all formal change is now frozen 
for approximately another decade. The 2019 
constitutional revision could be character-
ized as a lost opportunity to use the lessons 
from the crisis and make important constitu-
tional reforms.
Constitutional jurisprudence is still in large 
part preoccupied with problems stemming 
from austerity measures. In the Greek con-
text, constitutionality review is diffused and 
fiscal measures are challenged both as part 
of strategic litigation and by individuals 
claiming their rights. Judges became reluc-
tant key players in economic matters with 
overreaching influence. The impact of judi-
cial decisions on the state budget has become 
an acute and sensitive problem in the context 
of diffuse constitutional review.
Aside from this area of jurisprudence, dilem-
mas suggestive of the ongoing, yet subtle, 
culture wars in modern liberal democracies 
find their way to the courts. The interpreta-
tion of freedom of conscience and religion 
creates multiple constitutional issues in the 
context where Greek Orthodoxy is charac-
terized by the Constitution as the prevailing 
religion of Greece. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
A minimal yet useful constitutional revision 
marked 2019.1 Throughout ten years of fi-
nancial crisis, the Constitution remained 
formally unaltered undergoing informal 
constitutional change. Formal revision be-
came procedurally possible in 2013 and yet, 
despite the strong calls for constitutional re-
forms, it only occurred in 2019, and no ma-
jor reforms took place. The amending for-
mula has two determining features: its ratio 
requires an exceptional degree of consensus 
expressed through the way the required ma-
jorities are laid down, and it provides for a 
five-year mandatory time lapse between the 
completion of a revision process and the ini-
tiation of a new one. An interesting feature 
of the 2019 revision was the absence of gen-
uine citizen involvement. In March 2017, an 
electronic deliberation process was initiated. 
This process, which is not provided for by 
the Constitution, went rather unnoticed and 
GREECE
1 See X. Contiades, ‘A first assessment of the constitutional revision’ (Syntagma Watch 25 November 
2019) < https://www.syntagmawatch.gr/trending-issues/enas-protos-apologismos-tis-syntagma-
tikis-anatheorissis/ > accessed 29 January 2020.
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citizens were not involved. Constitutional 
revision remained a game of inter-party con-
sensus. The result, due to the degree of con-
sensus necessary, was a minimal revision. 
This has blocked the possibility of introduc-
ing much debated proposed changes for an-
other decade.
Nine – out of forty-nine proposals put for-
ward – were approved by the Parliament: Ar-
ticle 21 on the protection of family, marriage, 
motherhood and youth where the clause that 
the State shall ensure a dignified standard 
of living for all citizens through a minimum 
guaranteed income system was added; Arti-
cle 32 para 2 on the election of the President 
of the Republic; Article 54 para 4 on the vote 
of expatriates; Article 62 on limiting parlia-
mentary immunity; Article 68 on the right of 
the parliamentary minorities to propose the 
establishment of investigative committees; 
Article 73 on popular legislative initiative; 
Article 86 on the statute of limitations with 
regard to ministerial immunity; Article 96 
para 5 on Military Courts; and Article 101 on 
the election of members of independent au-
thorities. Articles 112, 113, 114 par. 1, 2, 115 
par. 1, 2, 3, 4; and 119 para 1 were abolished.
The most useful amendments made to the 
Constitution appear to be those that have a 
corrective function: the President’s election 
is separated from the dissolution of Parlia-
ment; strict time limitations with regard to 
ministerial immunity are set; the MP’s im-
munity from prosecution for criminal offens-
es is abolished (as the Parliament is placed 
under the obligation to grant permission for 
their prosecution if the relevant request by 
the public prosecutor’s office concerns an 
offense not related to the performance of 
the MP’s duties or political activity); and the 
election of the members of independent au-
thorities now requires a three-fifths majority 
in the conference of Presidents instead of a 
four-fifths majority. 
The most important among these amend-
ments is the change in the way the President 
of the Republic is elected. This change was 
the result of consensus among almost all 
political parties. However, the choice that 
has been made, namely the possibility of a 
presidential election without a broader par-
liamentary consensus, could cast a shadow 
over the President’s prestige in the exercise 
of his role as a regulator of the political sys-
tem’s function. In Greece, the President of 
the Republic’s role is prima facie typical for 
the role of the head of State in parliamentary 
systems of government, i.e., the President’s 
functions are mainly symbolic. Nonetheless, 
there is more to it since the Constitution pro-
vides that the President regulate the function 
of the political system (Art. 30 para 1) and he 
has the competence to dissolve Parliament 
(Art. 41 para 1). 
The complexity of the system of presiden-
tial election before its amendment entailed 
the potential of crisis, as it allowed the pres-
idential election to be manipulated in order 
to result in the dissolution of Parliament. 
In other words, the ratio of the provision, 
which was to ensure an augmented consen-
sus for presidential election, could backfire, 
allowing the Parliament to be dissolved.2 
The amendment abolished the possibility 
that the presidential election could result in 
the dissolution of Parliament and early elec-
tions. More specifically, the Constitution 
provides that the President of the Republic 
is elected by Parliament for a term of five 
years. Re-election for a further term in office 
is permitted only once. Presidential election 
is conducted through vote by roll call in a 
special sitting called for this purpose by the 
Speaker at least one month before the expira-
tion of the tenure of the incumbent President. 
The President of the Republic is elected by 
a two-thirds majority of the total number of 
members of Parliament. In case this majority 
is not achieved, the ballot is repeated after 
five days and if that second ballot also fails 
to produce the required majority, the ballot 
is repeated again after five days requiring a 
three-fifths majority of the total number of 
members of Parliament. Before the amend-
ment, in case the third ballot also failed to 
produce the required majority, Parliament 
was dissolved and elections for a new Parlia-
ment were called. According to the revised 
provision, if the third ballot fails to produce 
the required majority, the vote is repeated af-
ter five days, requiring a majority of 151 out 
of 300 MPs and if this fails again, the Presi-
dent of the Republic is elected after five days 
by majority of the members present. 
Amendments that correspond to narratives 
of citizen involvement and human dignity 
that were intensified during the financial 
crisis were also made: the introduction of 
citizen legislative initiative according to 
which citizens will be able to submit up to 
two legislative proposals (on issues not re-
lated to fiscal and foreign policy or defence) 
for discussion in Parliament if they gather 
a minimum of 500.000 signatures, and the 
guarantee of a minimum income for families 
to ensure human dignity in living conditions 
for all citizens. Time will show if these in-
novations will work in practice. The voting 
rights of Greek citizens abroad became more 
relevant during the years of the crisis since 
a significant number of citizens migrated. 
Long overdue legislation was thus passed to 
give life to remote voting by expatriates, a 
constitutional provision that had remained 
inactive for a long time. The much debated 
restrictions introduced, which were deemed 
proper by the majority, would be constitu-
tional only in case a constitutional amend-
ment were passed. It is noteworthy that the 
restrictions on the right to remote voting 
were enshrined in Article 54, although it 
would be more appropriate to include them 
in Article 51 par 3 and 4. This was not possi-
ble, however, since the latter was not under 
revision, so any change would have to wait 
for about ten years. This trick is expressive 
of the overall impact on constitutional choic-
es of the five-year mandatory time lapse be-
tween revisions. 
This mandatory time lapse combined with 
the strict procedural limits set out by the 
Greek formal amendment rule render what 
is not amended equally important to what is 
amended. When consensus is reached only 
2 See Contiades and Fotiadou, ‘The Hellenic Republic’, in L.F.M. Besselink, P.P.T. Bovend’Eert, H. Broeksteeg, R. de Lange and W. Voermans (eds), Constitu-
tional Law of the EU Member States (Kluwer Law International, 2014) 703-771. 
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on a few articles, all other provisions are 
sheltered from change for almost a decade. 
Thus, much discussed crucial issues, such 
as the relationship between church and state 
and the constitutional dictate that higher ed-
ucation is public, will be frozen for a long 
time. It must be noted that this can also be 
the result of a conscious strategy: the pre-
vious government had stated that it deliber-
ately avoided revision in order to preserve 
the provision on higher education. Another 
change that was not made, attracting a lot of 
attention, was the non-adoption of the pro-
posed constitutional amendment adding to 
the prohibition of discrimination on the basis 
of nationality, race or language; religious or 
political beliefs; and gender, gender iden-
tity and sexual orientation. Although this 
prohibition is implied by the Constitution, 
enshrining it explicitly would enhance the 
protection of rights. Amnesty International 
expressed its disappointment, stressing that 
Greece is bound by international agreements 
to take action against discrimination.3 This 
kind of criticism brings forth the theoretical 
discussion on the novel forms of constitu-
tional imposition and the impact of global 
values and international agreements on how 
national constitutions change. 
As in all constitutional revisions, success can 
only be evaluated over time. What is certain is 
that following a severe financial crisis during 
which the Constitution was central in political 
discussions, while narratives expressed the 
need for radical constitutional reforms even 
through the exercise of constituent power, the 
2019 revision is indeed unimpressive. The fu-
ture will show what careful corrective inter-
ventions signify; that is, whether this minimal 
revision is a lost opportunity or a sign of con-
stitutional resilience.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
1. Council of State Decisions 1880 and 
1888/2019: insurance contributions of self- 
employed persons and salaried employees
In Decisions 1880 and 1888/2019, the plena-
ry session of the Council of State held on one 
hand that the integration of all existing social 
security funds into a new one, the Main In-
surance Fund (EFKA), was constitutionally 
permissible despite the heterogeneity of the 
insured persons, and on the other that the ap-
plication of uniform rules on contributions 
and benefits to both self-employed persons 
and salaried employees violates the principle 
of equality enshrined in Article 4 para 1 of 
the Constitution. The Court found unconsti-
tutional the decisions of the Deputy Minister 
of Labour regarding the determination of the 
basis for calculating the insurance contribu-
tions of self-employed persons. According 
to the Court, applying uniform rules with 
regard to contributions and benefits to cat-
egories of insured persons with substantially 
different conditions of employment and in-
come violates the constitutional principle of 
equality. According to the Court, dissimilar 
situations cannot be treated identically. 
2. Council of State Decision 1891/2019: 
Main Insurance Fund
In Decision 1891/2019, the plenary session 
of the Council of State ruled in favor of the 
State funding the Main Insurance Fund, 
stating that the government would contin-
ue under the new legislative regime to have 
the obligation to cover the Fund’s deficits. 
The Court also found constitutional the ba-
sis for recalculation of the main pensions, 
considering that the legislator sufficiently 
justified their choice. Nonetheless, the Court 
followed the rationale of previous case law 
and ruled that the recalculation of pensions 
was insufficiently justified due to the ab-
sence of a relevant actuarial study and was 
thus in violation of the constitutional princi-
ples of equality and proportionality. A very 
crucial point is that according to the Court, 
the effects of this decision will only be bind-
ing for the future. The Court thus attempts to 
contain the financial effect of the judgment 
since the budgetary cost of its implementa-
tion is immense in view of the system of dif-
fuse constitutional review, which means that 
a great number of pensioners litigate their 
rights in lower courts across Greece. 
 
3. Council of State Decisions 1749-
1752/2019: Christian Orthodox indoctrina-
tion in schools 
The Council of State in Decisions 1749-
1752/2019 (Plenary Session) annulled the 
ministerial decisions of the Minister of Ed-
ucation, Research and Religions, which set 
out the curricula of the religion module in el-
ementary and high schools. The Constitution 
recognizes Greek Orthodoxy as the ‘prevail-
ing religion’. This impacts the interpreta-
tion of Article 16 para 2 of the Constitution 
according to which education constitutes 
a basic mission for the State aimed at the 
moral, intellectual, professional and physi-
cal training of Greeks, the development of 
national and religious consciousness and the 
formation of students as free and responsible 
citizens. The Council of State found changes 
introduced to religious instruction in primary 
and middle schools unconstitutional because 
the curriculum included supplemental mate-
rials on the doctrines of various religions and 
encouraged interfaith dialogue. According to 
the Court, religious classes in Greek schools 
must be in the form of indoctrination in the 
Greek Orthodox faith, while students who 
cannot or wish not to participate due to rea-
sons of religious conscience may be exempt 
from the lesson. This is a plausible interpre-
tation of ‘prevailing religion’, which shows 
how important it would have been to include 
an interpretation of the term within the Con-
stitution during the recent revision, an option 
which was not adopted. This does not mean 
that the Court had no alternative. 
The alternative was expressed by the dis-
senting opinion expressed by many judges. 
Freedom of conscience and religion both in 
the Greek Constitution and in the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights allow, if 
not dictate, a different interpretation of the 
mission of the State to develop the religious 
consciousness of students. Still, the Court 
opted for the interpretation most in line with 
the views of the Greek Orthodox Church, 
which is quite problematic from the aspect 
of freedom of consciousness and religion. 
More specifically, with regard to the teach-
3 See https://www.amnesty.gr/news/articles/article/22769/anatheorisi-toy-syntagmatos-gia-enan-kosmo-horis-diakriseis accessed 26 January 2020.
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ing of the religious doctrine, the Court held 
that the aim of the modules is the develop-
ment of Orthodox Christian consciousness 
and that this lesson is addressed exclusively 
to Orthodox Christian students. In addition, 
heterodox, non-religious or atheist students 
have the right to be fully exempt from the 
subject by submitting a written statement. 
This statement may invoke just reasons of 
religious conscience. The State must, if there 
is a sufficient number of pupils, schedule an 
alternative module to cover the ‘free time’. In 
this case, however, the curricula at issue, as is 
apparent from their aims and content, did not 
seek to develop the religious consciousness 
of Orthodox students, since the primary and 
secondary education programs did not contain 
full teaching of the doctrines, moral values 
and traditions of the Orthodox Church dis-
tinct from other doctrines and religions, and 
the high school program did not offer such 
teaching. On the contrary, particular empha-
sis had been placed either on the presentation 
of elements in common with the teaching of 
other doctrines and religions (elementary-sec-
ondary school) or on the teaching of various 
ethical and social issues, which are either 
primarily subject to other subjects (elemen-
tary-secondary school) or are not connected 
to Orthodox Christian teaching (high school). 
Consequently, it was considered that the cur-
ricula in question violated Articles 16 para 2 
and 13 para 1 of the Constitution, Article 2 of 
the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR and 
the principle of equality. 
4. Council of State Decisions 1759-
1760/2019: Recording religion on second-
ary education diplomas and certificates
All diplomas issued by Greek schools in-
cluded the religious beliefs of the student. 
The Council of State (Plenary Session) 
found this practice in violation of religious 
freedom. According to the Court, Article 13 
of the Constitution guarantees freedom of 
religion, subject only to the restrictions pro-
vided for by the Constitution, and includes 
freedom of religious conscience and free-
dom of expression of religious beliefs, and 
establishes religious equality. Freedom of 
religious conscience includes, inter alia, the 
right of the individual not to disclose, either 
directly or indirectly, their religion or their 
religious beliefs, while no State authority or 
body is permitted to request to know a per-
son’s religious beliefs or to impose the dis-
closure of such beliefs. 
Consequently, recording religion in public 
documents, such as diplomas and certifi-
cates of studies in high school (or in iden-
tity cards issued by the police, as Decisions 
2280-2286/2001of the Council of State in 
Plenary Session had ruled), which is in prin-
ciple mandatory in the contested decisions, 
violates Article 13 of the Constitution. Re-
coding the religion in the above documents 
constitutes a violation of Article 13 of the 
Constitution, even if the student or their par-
ents consent or request it, or if the relevant 
field exists on the document but may remain 
blank. The reason for that is that religious 
freedom includes the right of everyone to 
freely express their religion or religious be-
liefs in general, but does not include the right 
of individuals to express such beliefs when 
they so wish in public documents, such as 
high school certificates, which are proof of 
student attendance, performance and com-
pletion of their educational stage (and are 
displayed before every public authority or 
individual to certify the studies and knowl-
edge of the holder throughout his life) and 
not evidence of irrelevant information, such 
as religious beliefs. 
The opposite interpretation would result in 
the infringement of the religious freedom of 
those Greeks who would not wish to express 
their religious beliefs in this way and would 
be forced to disclose them indirectly public-
ly, which would differentiate them against 
their will from those who disclose their be-
liefs. This would also negate the religious 
neutrality of the State with regard to the ex-
ercise of religious freedom. More than that, 
recording religion in degrees and certificates 
provides grounds for discrimination, either 
positive or negative, and therefore entails the 
risk of violating religious equality.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
As is always the case with formal consti-
tutional change, amendments are tested in 
practice. Additions and changes to the Con-
stitution will reveal their assets and possible 
unintended consequences through their ap-
plication. In the realm of jurisprudence, de-
velopments are expected with regard to the 
complex relation between constitutionality 
review, fiscal policy and economic gover-
nance. As the constitutionality of fiscal mea-
sures stemming from the bailout agreements 
continues to be litigated before courts, the fi-
nancial impact of jurisprudence on the state 
budget has become a crucial issue.
The question whether rulings finding pen-
sion cuts unconstitutional can set out time 
limits, so that they are applicable only in the 
future, is a complex issue with severe reper-
cussions. What is at stake involves on one 
hand the very essence of constitutionality 
control and on the other the impact of judi-
cial decisions on the state budget. Can a rul-
ing of unconstitutionality take effect only for 
the future? The problem becomes more acute 
in light of the slow administration of justice 
and the equally slow reflexes of the compe-
tent authorities in abiding by court rulings, 
which multiply the financial cost of abiding 
by rulings of unconstitutionality. The dif-
fuse system of judicial review is also rele-
vant, since at the same moment the Council 
of State decides on a constitutionality issue, 
a great number of cases are pending before 
lower courts. 
The Council of State (Decision 21/2019) ac-
cepted the Main Insurance Fund’s petition 
for a pilot judgment procedure so that the 
issues raised by its decisions that impact a 
wide circle of persons can be clarified. This 
judgment will decide the future of litigation 
in lower courts. It is noteworthy that approx-
imately 6.000 petitions are currently pend-
ing before the Administrative Court of First 
Instance in Athens alone, as pensioners seek 
retroactive payments citing Council of State 
rulings from 2015 that had found cuts uncon-
stitutional. 
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GREENLAND
I. INTRODUCTION  
Greenland is part of the Danish Realm 
together with the Faroe Islands. This review 
will introduce the Danish Constitutional 
framework of the Realm (Rigsfællesskabet), 
focusing on Greenland and the special home 
rule arrangement and Self-Government 
structure. This arrangement gives the 
people of Greenland far-reaching autonomy 
regarding their own affairs. 
Greenland is a self-governing region within 
the Kingdom of Denmark. The Greenlandic 
Inuits are the indigenous peoples and largest 
ethnic group in Greenland with an entire 
population of only 55,992 (Jan. 2019)1 89.7 
percent were born in Greenland, and 10.3 
percent were born outside the region. The 
area of Greenland is 2,166,086 km2 (the 
largest island in the world). Of this area, 81 
percent is covered with ice.
The legal foundation of Greenland is 
governed by the Danish Constitution of 1953, 
in which Article 1 states ‘This Constitution 
applies to all parts of the Danish Realm’ also 
including Greenland and thereby binding the 
Greenlandic and Danish authorities by the 
Danish Constitution and enabling the people 
of Greenland to invoke the rights conferred.2  
Furthermore, Greenland was given 
parliamentary representation in Article 28 
of the Danish Constitution. The Danish 
Parliament has 179 members, of which 
2 are elected in Greenland and 2 in the 
Faroe Islands. The mentioned articles were 
incorporated into the Constitution in 1953, 
and the Constitution has not been amended 
since then.3 Greenlandic autonomy is not 
based on the Constitution, but on legislation, 
originally the Home Rule Act form 19794 and 
now the current Self-Government Act from 
2009,5 both passed by the Danish Parliament 
with simple majority votes. Prior to the entry 
into force of the Self-Government Act, a 
guiding referendum was held in Greenland 
on 25 November 2008. Of the votes cast, 
75.5 percent were for and 23.6 percent were 
against the introduction of self-government.
Having been a part of the European 
Community since 1973 through Denmark’s 
membership, Greenland withdrew from 
the European Community in 1985 after a 
consultative referendum in 19826 in which 
the Greenlandic people voted to leave the 
Community. The new arrangement came 
1 See more Greenland in Figures 2019: pdf: http://www.stat.gl/publ/en/GF/2019/pdf/Greenland%20in%20
Figures%202019.pdf
2 See Commission (bet. 66/1953).
3 See more about the Danish Constitution in Krunke and Thorarensen: ‘The Nordic Constitutions – A Com-
parative and Contextual Study’, Concluding Thoughts.
4 Act no. 577 of 29 November 1978 on Greenland Home Rule.
5 Act no. 473 of 12 June 2009 on Greenland Self-Government.
6 On 23 February 1982, voter participation was 74.9%. To the question whether Greenland should stay in 
the EC, 47% voted yes and 53% voted no.
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into force on the 1 February 1985, stipulating 
the negotiated terms of Greenland’s exit 
and the OCT-status (overseas countries and 
territories).7 The main reason for leaving was 
disagreements about the Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP). Therefore, Greenland obtained 
special fishery arrangements with the EU and 
was included as one of the so-called Overseas 
Countries and Territories enjoying association 
arrangements (special relations) with the EC/
EU. The purpose of this association is ‘to 
promote the economic and social development 
of the countries and territories and to establish 
close economic relations between the OCTs 
and the Union as a whole’. Consequently, 
the EU-Greenland relationship remains a 
comprehensive partnership. 
The framework of the relationship between 
Denmark and Greenland relies on the division 
of competences according to the Self-
Government Act, in which it is recognized 
that the people of Greenland are pursuant 
to international law with the right of self-
determination. The Act is based on a wish 
to foster equality and mutual respect in the 
partnership between Denmark and Greenland.
Greenland has been provided with the 
competence to self-govern in a number of 
policy areas and could possibly transfer more 
policy areas. The Self-Government Act states 
that in the fields of responsibility taken over 
by Greenland, the Greenlandic authorities 
can exercise legislative and executive power. 
Furthermore, the courts of law established 
under the Self-Government authorities can 
exercise judicial power in Greenland in 
all fields of responsibility.8 Accordingly, 
legislative power shall lie with Inatsisartut 
(the Greenlandic Parliament), the executive 
power with Naalakkersuisut (the Greenlandic 
Government), and the judicial power with the 
courts of law.
The Self-Government authorities may 
determine that part of the fields of responsibility 
that are contained in List I, para b and List II, 
Nos. 15, 25, and 27 in the Schedule to this Act 
shall be transferred to them.9 This means that 
some areas can be taken over at sudden points 
in time set by the Self-Government authorities 
(List 1 of the Self-Government Act) while 
others can only be taken over at points in time 
set by the Self-Government authorities after 
negotiations with the Danish Government of 
the Realm (List 2 of the Act). Once a policy 
area is taken over, the Greenlandic Self-
Government gets not only the legislative and 
executive competence but also the financial 
responsibility for the expenditure related to 
the attendance of the field.10 Consequently, 
fields of responsibility that are taken over by 
the Greenland Self-Government authorities 
following Article 2-4 shall be financed by 
them, and there will be no increase of the 
Danish financial contribution to Greenland 
(bloktilskud). The Danish Government 
subsidy to the Self-Government authorities 
is fixed by law at DKK 3.8 billion annually,11 
but a parliamentary question from 2015 to the 
former Minister of Finance indicates the total 
subsidy is around DKK 500 million more if 
the areas that the Self-Government authorities 
can take over is included, making it 4.3 billion 
annually (2015).12 
Certain fields that are listed in Schedule II of 
the Act (including the police; administration 
of justice, including the establishment of 
courts of law; aliens) require a higher degree 
of preparation, so the time of assumption 
of these fields is decided by the Self-
Government authorities after negotiation 
with Danish authorities.13
The Self-Government Act contains a 
comprehensive set of rules and regulations 
governing foreign policy matters for 
Greenland. This area is of specific interest, and 
Chapter 4 of the Act is regulating it following 
the stipulation in the Danish Constitution on 
foreign policy as a governmental prerogative 
stated in Article 19. For important decisions 
in this field, the Government must have the 
consent of a simple majority of Parliament.14 
Thus, being part of the Danish Realm, the 
main responsibility for foreign affairs is on 
the Danish Government in conjunction with 
the Danish Parliament, and not in Greenland. 
Yet, Self-Government Act Article 12 allows 
the Greenlandic authorities to ‘negotiate and 
conclude international law agreements with 
foreign states and international organizations 
on behalf of the Kingdom of Denmark that 
relate exclusively to Greenland and fully cover 
areas taken over’. There is even a duty for the 
Danish Government to inform the Greenlandic 
Government before negotiating international 
agreements that are of particular importance to 
Greenland even if it is one Greenland cannot 
take over.15 It can sometimes be difficult to 
draw the line between areas that have been 
transferred to Greenland and competences, 
which remain with the Danish authorities. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. A New Constitution
The most important constitutional 
development was the mandate to draft 
a proposal of a subregional constitution 
for Greenland. According to the Self-
Government Act, ‘a decision on Greenland’s 
independence can be made by the 
Greenlandic people’. 
An agreement between the Danish 
Government and Naalakkersuisut regarding 
7 See Treaty amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities: http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=O-
J:L:1985:029:FULL&from=EN and R. Leander Nielsen ‘35 years after the “Grøxit”-referendum: Why the EU still plays an important role for Greenlandic diplomacy’: 
https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/fc7f9236-e302-420f-9ae0-dddd0337bdfc.pdf
8 See Article 1, Act no. 473 of 12 June 2009 on Greenland Self-Government.
9 See the lists here: http://www.stm.dk/multimedia/GR_Self-Government_UK.doc 
10 Article 6.
11 See more Greenland in Figures 2019.
12 https://www.ft.dk/samling/20161/almdel/fiu/spm/396/svar/1415520/1771500.pdf
13 http://www.stm.dk/_p_13090.html 
14 See the commentary on the Danish Constitution (2015) p. 55. 
15 Article 13.
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the introduction of independence for 
Greenland is to be concluded with the 
consent of Inatsisartut and be endorsed by 
a referendum in Greenland. Furthermore, 
the agreement is to be concluded with the 
consent of the Folketing following Article 19 
of the Danish Constitution. Independence for 
Greenland implies that Greenland assumes 
sovereignty over the Greenland territory.
At the end of March 2019, the first steps 
were taken in that direction, as the mandate 
of the Constitutional Commission was 
published.16 The Constitutional Commission 
was unilaterally (not including Denmark) 
given a mandate to prepare a proposal for 
Greenland’s Constitution in two stages: 
The first should be able to enter into force 
under the Danish constitutional framework. 
The second stage should only take effect 
when (or if) Greenland at some point will be 
independent. In addition, the Constitutional 
Commission was given a mandate to draft 
provisions that also allow Greenland to enter 
into intergovernmental cooperation, such as 
concluding a Free Association agreement 
with another state. 
Due to the unilateral nature of the mandate, it 
is foreseen that the proposal for a subregional 
constitution will be critiqued by the Danish 
Government and claimed unconstitutional.17 
The main criticism has been that the proposal 
was on a collision course with the Danish 
Constitution as has been found by the Danish 
Ministry of Justice on a similar proposal for 
the Faroe Islands.18   
2. Refugee Law
Another interesting development in 2019 
was in the area of refugee law: the first 
refugee in Greenland arrived in April 2019. 
In 2001, Greenland had already signed 
‘Order 150 of 23 February 2001 on the entry 
into force of the Aliens Act in Greenland’, 
which meant that asylum could be applied 
for in Greenland, but because the foreign 
policy area had not yet been taken over 
by the Self-Government, asylum cases in 
practice had to be dealt with in Denmark. A 
number of reservations in the administrative 
order meant that no one at that time had 
expected anyone to actually receive asylum 
in Greenland.19
3. Relations with the United States
In the fall of 2019, President Donald Trump 
presented the idea to acquire Greenland as 
a real estate purchase. The Greenlandic 
Foreign Affairs Ministry replied, ‘We’re 
open for business, not for sale’, and the 
Danish Prime Minister found any discussion 
of a sale ‘absurd’. The political position of 
a sale is different from a legal assessment, 
the question being whether it would be 
constitutional to sell a part of the realm 
within the constitutional framework. This 
would be possible if it were any other 
island in Denmark, but it could be argued 
that it would not be in accordance with 
International Law to sell Greenland without 
the consent of the Greenlandic people.20  
Also related to the US, the Danish/
Greenlandic relationship portrayed there was 
an interesting case of ‘fake news’ consisting 
of a letter allegedly send to a US governor, 
Tom Cotton, from the Greenlandic Foreign 
Affairs Ministry. In the letter, it appears that 
in the future, Greenland wanted to have the 
status of an organized alliance-free territory, 
and that the US was secretly supporting 
a fast-paced Greenland referendum on 
independence. The Greenlandic Foreign 
Affairs Minister, Ane Lone Bagger, 
explains that ‘the cost of funding the event 
(a referendum) and the related activities 
has exceeded the planned level’, and she is 
therefore asking for financial support from 
the US. The purpose of the counterfeit letter 
was clearly to pull Greenland and Denmark 
apart and create distrust between Denmark 
and the United States.
Yet, the relationship between the two (or 
three) countries has a long history and dates 
back to the North Atlantic Treaty between the 
Governments of the Kingdom of Denmark 
and the United States of America on the 
Defense of Greenland (1951),21 which is still 
in force. The Treaty sets out the rules and 
agreements for the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Denmark in order to promote 
stability and well-being in the North Atlantic 
Treaty area. The countries will unite their 
efforts for collective defense and for the 
preservation of peace and security and the 
development of their collective capacity 
to resist armed attack, and each will take 
such measures as necessary or appropriate 
to expeditiously carry out their respective 
and joint responsibilities in Greenland in 
accordance with NATO plans.
These two recent events can also be seen as 
examples of the growing political interest 
both regionally and internationally in the 
Arctic region. Greenland has been of strategic 
military importance ever since the Second 
World War. Negotiations between Denmark 
and the United States led to the Americans set 
up several air bases in Greenland. The largest 
base, Thule, was built in 1951 and played a 
crucial strategic role during the Cold War.22 
It is the US military’s northernmost outpost, 
about 750 miles inside the Arctic Circle, and 
the radar and listening station employs 600 
personnel and is still an important part of 
America’s global defence system.
16 https://naalakkersuisut.gl/da/Naalakkersuisut/Departementer/Finans/Selvstaendighed
17 https://www.ft.dk/samling/20161/forespoergsel/f22/beh1-101/forhandling.htm
18 Bárður Larsen and Kári á Rógvi, ‘Det færøske forfatningsudkast i forfatningsretlig belysning – Kritiske bemærkninger til Justitsministeriets notat af 2. juni 2010 om 
forslag til en færøsk forfatning’ and the Ministry of Justice in responsum of 2 june 2010: https://www.ft.dk/samling/20091/almdel/f%C3%A6u/bilag/31/861094/
index.htm
19 Read the full story of the first Greenlandic refugee: https://www.weekendavisen.dk/2019-26/samfund/groenlands-foerste-flygtning
20 See Ulfbeck, V., Møllmann, A. & Mortensen, B.O.G. (eds.), Responsibilities and Liabilities for Commercial Activity in the Arctic: The Example of Greenland, Rout-
ledge, 2016. 
21 See more: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/den001.asp 
22 Auchet, M (2011), ‘Greenland at the Crossroads: What Strategy for the Arctic?’ International Journal, 66(4), 957-970.
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III. Constitutional Cases
Thule Air Base has also played a significant 
role in a major constitutional case in a 
decision from the Danish Supreme Court 
on the legality of a decision regarding the 
forced movement of the inhabitants of Thule 
that was made and carried out in 1953. 
The Danish Supreme Court delivered 
the first Danish decision on Inuit land 
claims in November 2003. The applicants 
included a number of individuals who had 
been forcibly removed from their Northern 
Greenland settlement in 1953 to make way 
for the establishment and extension of 
Thule Air Base. Their relocation was not 
subject to any formal Danish Government 
decision. The individuals received no 
financial compensation for the loss of 
territories. In 1999, the High Court ruled 
in favor of the applicants and granted them 
financial compensation. The discretionary 
compensation of DKK 0.5 million was 
upheld,23 yet the land claims relating to 
the territories around Thule Air Base were 
dismissed. The judgment also stated that 
the Thule residents had no right to return 
to their old settlement because of the 1951 
Danish Defense Agreement with the United 
States. In addition, the agreement to build 
a US military base at Thule that led to the 
forced relocation of Greenlandic families 
was upheld by the Danish Supreme Court in 
its 2003 decision.24  
After the decision from the Danish Supreme 
Court, the Thule inhabitants tried to bring the 
case before the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg, but the complaint was 
rejected, since the European Convention 
on Human Rights was not applicable in 
Denmark when the forced relocation of the 
Inuits took place.25
In recent times, no major constitutional cases 
can be highlighted, but the judicial system 
of Greenland has undergone many reforms. 
Over the past 10 years, the reforms have 
been on centralizing and specializing. With 
the reform in 2013, the courts of Greenland 
that previously consisted of 18 district courts 
were limited to four, and the regional courts 
were only to decide criminal matters.26 Civil 
cases were referred to the Court of Greenland 
in first instance with no exemption and 
in second instance to the High Court of 
Greenland. The district court judges are not 
legally trained, but lay judges with a special 
education and thorough knowledge of 
Greenlandic society. The Court of Greenland 
therefore rules in complicated cases in the 
first instance and handles supervision and 
education of district judges.
The judges in the Court of Greenland and 
the High Court of Greenland are law school 
educated. Rulings issued by the district 
courts and the Court of Greenland may be 
brought before the High Court of Greenland. 
As the Greenlandic court system is still a part 
of the Danish court system, rulings issued by 
the High Court of Greenland may, with the 
permission of the Appeals Permission Board 
in Denmark, be brought before the Supreme 
Court in Copenhagen.27 
Going through the case law of the two 
Greenlandic instance courts in recent years, 
there are no constitutionally important cases. 
The cases handled have been primarily 
criminal in nature and reflect the social 
problems that exist in the region: violence, 
homicide and sexual assaults (including 
vast examples of assaults on minors). The 
civil cases consist of matrimonial and labor 
law cases. 
Reviewing the case law of the Danish 
Supreme Court in search of constitutional 
cases, the same picture emerges except 
for the Thule case from November 2003. 
Consequently, there has not been recent case 
law supporting constitutional developments, 
but there have been rumors that the refugee 
case mentioned above could develop into 
one with constitutional dimensions. It goes 
to the heart of the division of competences 
between the two countries in terms of 
responsibility and financial support of the 
transferred policy area. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In the Self-Government Act, the people 
of Greenland are recognized as a people 
under international law with a right to 
self-determination.28 Furthermore, the Act 
states that the Greenlandic language is 
the official language of Greenland.29 The 
Act also recognizes the right of Greenland 
to become independent, and gives the 
competence to decide on this matter to 
the Greenlandic people. The work of the 
Constitutional Commission can be seen as 
the next step in becoming independent. If 
the Greenlandic people decide to become 
independent, the Danish Government will 
enter into negotiations with the Greenlandic 
Government and an agreement must then 
be accepted by the Greenlandic people in a 
referendum.30 Independence would give full 
sovereignty over the Greenland territory.31 
The Danish Constitution does not have to 
be amended if an overseas territory such 
as Greenland becomes independent. Article 
23 See the case in the national weekly gazette (Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen) UfR..2004.382H. The primary claim for damages amounted to around DKK 235 million 
relating to the Thule Tribe’s loss owing to the lost and reduced hunting and fishing opportunities as a result of the establishment of the base and the relocation of 
the population from the settlement.
24 See more: ‘Den danske højesterets dom om tvangsflytningen af Thules befolkning’.
25 See Application no. 18584/04 by HINGITAQ 53 against Denmark.  
26 Danish Act. no 1388 of 23 December 2012.
27 See more: http://www.domstol.dk/OM/OTHERLANGUAGES/ENGLISH/THEDANISHJUDICIALSYSTEM/Pages/TheDanishjudicialsystem.aspx 
28 Self-Government Act, Article 1.
29 Self-Government Act, Article 20.
30 Self-Government Act, Article 21.
31 Ulfbeck, V., Møllmann, A. & Mortensen, B.O.G. (eds.), Responsibilities and Liabilities for Commercial Activity in the Arctic: The Example of Greenland, Rout-
ledge, 2016.
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19 of the Constitution acknowledges the 
possibility of the Government concluding 
treaties diminishing the territory of the 
Realm, and such treaties only require the 
acceptance of Parliament to be ratified.32  
Looking even more ahead, this could lead 
to major considerations if Greenland is 
to function as an independent country. 
Politically and financially, many problems 
can be foreseen. Bearing the size of the 
population in mind, limited personal income 
taxes and taxes on natural resources, fishing 
or other taxes would probably not be able 
to fill the gap from the missing subsidies 
from the Kingdom of Denmark, which today 
accrue for a substantial part of the total 
Greenlandic GDP. 
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GUATEMALA
I. INTRODUCTION  
In many ways, 2019 continued the 
political backlash against constitutional 
institutions seen in 2018. As discussed in 
last year’s report, 2018 was marked by 
Executive backlash against the International 
Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, 
which ended its mandate in 2019, and the 
Constitutional Court in Guatemala. 2019 
was not much different, and saw continued 
weakening of the role of the Constitutional 
Court not only by the Executive but also by 
new conservative groups. The Executive 
continued to disrespect the Constitutional 
Court’s decisions, even signing an 
international agreement without the approval 
of Congress as required by the Constitution 
and directed by the Court. However, 2019 
was also a year of change, as Guatemala held 
presidential and parliamentary elections and 
began the procedure to select new members 
of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. 
The Constitutional Court played a pivotal 
role in both the presidential election and the 
selection of new judges. However, in this, 
the Court faced public backlash, in particular 
from strong right-wing conservative groups. 
Part II of this report describes the three 
major events in Guatemala of constitutional 
relevance: first, the signing of the ‘third safe 
country’ agreement with the United States; 
second, the presidential election; and third, 
the selection of Supreme Court and Court 
of Appeals judges. The Constitutional Court 
played a central role in all of these events, and 
Part III discusses three of the most important 
cases decided by the Court in 2019. Part IV 
provides a view of how the future might look 
for Guatemala with a new presidency and 
Congress as well as a new judiciary.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The first major event of 2019 with 
constitutional significance was the signing 
of the ‘third safe country’ agreement (the 
Agreement) with the United States. This 
agreement sought to further the policy of the 
US government to halt the Central American 
migrant caravans, in which thousands of 
Central Americans fled their countries en 
masse, placing pressure on United States 
border officials and processes to allow 
them to stay.1 This agreement facilitated 
the relocation of Central Americans, as 
well as asylum seekers and migrants of 
other nationalities, from the United States 
to Guatemala while their migration claims 
were being processed.2 The constitutional 
relevance of this event is that it sparked a 
discussion on the Guatemalan Executive’s 
use of powers without check as well as on 
the legitimacy of signing agreements under 
United States influence.3  
1 Associated Press, ‘How does a Central American migrant caravan form?’ New York Post (19 April 2019). 
https://nypost.com/2019/04/19/how-does-a-central-american-migrant-caravan-form/, last accessed 27 
January 2019. 
2 Kirk Semple, ‘The U.S. and Guatemala Reached an Asylum Deal: Here’s What It Means’, New York Times 
(New York, 28 July 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/28/world/americas/guatemala-safe-third-asy-
lum.html, last accessed 27 January 2020.
3 Julian Borger, ‘Trump plans to cut Central America aid, blaming countries for migrant caravans’, The 
Guardian (London, 3 April 2019) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/03/trump-to-sanction-cen-
tral-american-nations-with-aid-cuts, last accessed 27 January 2020.
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Concerned about the potential implications 
of this type of agreement for Guatemala, a 
group of former ministers of foreign relations 
and ambassadors of Guatemala brought a 
constitutional challenge against the signing 
of this agreement by the Guatemalan 
Executive. Their argument was that the 
content of the agreement must be at least 
disclosed to Congress prior to its signature. 
This caused backlash by United States and 
Guatemalan officials.4 Despite an interim 
order issued by the Constitutional Court 
prohibiting it, the Guatemalan government 
proceeded to sign the agreement.5 The 
Guatemalan government justified non-
compliance with this interim order on 
the grounds that the agreement was for 
cooperation and therefore did not warrant 
the approval of Congress.6 At the time of 
this writing in early 2020, the Constitutional 
Court has still not given a final judgment 
on the matter, and Guatemala has started 
to receive hundreds of asylum seekers and 
migrants relocated from the United States.
The second major event in Guatemala 
in 2019 was the presidential election.7 It 
was particularly interesting because of the 
high involvement of the Constitutional 
Court in deciding on the validity of many 
frontrunners’ eligibility to run for election.8 
As such, the decisions of the Constitutional 
Court had a direct effect in determining 
the outcome of the presidential race. The 
Constitutional Court did not allow the 
second and third runners-up to stand for 
election for reasons that are discussed in 
Part III of this report. This led to Alejandro 
Giammattei, who was in fourth place, to 
collect more votes from right-wing groups 
and win the election.9 These judgments 
of the Constitutional Court began a wave 
of public backlash against it, particularly 
by right-wing groups, which continued to 
publicly attack the Constitutional Court 
for its alleged bias towards the left-wing 
frontrunner. The reputation of the Court 
deteriorated even further after the election. 
Moreover, several attempts to remove the 
judges of the Constitutional Court have 
been sought by Congress, the Executive and 
right-wing groups. Yet, these attempts have 
been rejected by the same Constitutional 
Court, granting protection to its own judges, 
causing even more backlash.10 
The third event that had a major influence on 
the Guatemalan constitutional system was 
the selection of Supreme Court and Court 
of Appeals judges. Under the Guatemalan 
Constitution, Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeals judges serve for a term of five years 
from the day they take office.11 Guatemala 
has an intricate system for selecting these 
judges, with many flaws.12 This system 
involves the creation of ‘postulation 
commissions’ (cómites de postulación), 
which rank the people who wish to pursue 
judicial appointment. These commissions 
are composed of members elected by 
universities and the Professional Association 
of Lawyers of Guatemala – Colegio de 
Abogados y Notario – and follow a process 
established by statute. In addition, a new 
Judicial Council – the Consejo de la Carrera 
Judicial – was created to review the work 
of judges wishing to further their career 
and rise up within the judicial hierarchy.13 
These commissions each give Congress a 
list of people who are qualified for judicial 
appointment, from which Congress later 
selects. In 2019, problems arose because 
many steps in this selection process 
were omitted. For starters, the Council 
never reviewed the judges nor created a 
procedure to do so. This led the postulation 
commissions to start to review candidates 
even without the Council’s review of judges. 
This in turn led to the filing of an injunction 
at the Constitutional Court challenging the 
selection process. The Constitutional Court 
resolved that the selection process should 
start over.  
This judgment again sparked criticism of 
the Constitutional Court by some right-
wing conservative groups. They argued that 
restarting the selection process would violate 
the constitutional term limits for judges. A 
group of constitutional litigants, called the 
Centro para la Defensa de la Constitución 
(Centre for the Defense of the Constitution), 
became vocal critics of the court’s decisions, 
which they have labelled as activist, presenting 
publications on how the Court has violated its 
4 Vivian Salama and Juan Montes, ‘Trump Wants to Punish Guatemala Over Failed “Safe Third Country” Deal’, The Wall Street Journal (New York, 23 July 2019) 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-says-he-will-punish-guatemala-for-not-reaching-safe-third-country-agreement-11563887818, last accessed 27 January 2020.
5 Sonia Pérez, ‘Guatemala court asked to block “safe 3rd country” with the US’, Associated Press (11 July 2019) https://apnews.com/a62ad68f1acb44d28c056b-
fada6e8b91, last accessed 15 January 2020.
6 Lauren Carasik, ‘Trump’s Safe Third Country Agreement with Guatemala Is a Lie’, Foreign Press (July 30, 2019) https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/30/trumps-safe-
third-country-agreement-with-guatemala-is-a-lie/, last accessed 27 January 2020.
7 Sofia Menchu, ‘Unpopularity contest to decide Guatemalan presidential election’, Reuters (7 August 2019) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guatemala-elec-
tion/unpopularity-contest-to-decide-guatemalan-presidential-election-idUSKCN1UX2DU, last accessed 27 January 2020.
8 Lucas Perelló, ‘In Guatemala, a presidential election in disarray’, Global Americans (6 June 2019) https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/06/in-guatemala-a-presi-
dential-election-in-disarray/, last accessed 25 January 2020.
9 Sandra Cuffe, ‘Guatemala elects right-wing president amid dismal turnout’, The Washington Post (12 August 2019) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gua-
temala-awaits-presidential-election-results/2019/08/11/f8d70034-bc3a-11e9-a8b0-7ed8a0d5dc5d_story.html, last accessed 27 January 2020.
10 Corte de Constitucionalidad de la República de Guatemala, Expedientes Acumulados 162-2019 y 176-2019, Resolución de 23 de enero de 2019.
11 Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, Article 215.
12 The Americas, ‘Buy any deans necessary. Letting academics pick magistrates has not worked in Guatemala’, The Economist. (London, 25 July 2019). https://
www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/07/25/letting-academics-pick-magistrates-has-not-worked-in-guatemala, last accessed 27 January 2020.
13 Decreto Número 32-2016, reformado por el Decreto Número 17-2017, Article 4.
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mandate and the Guatemalan Constitution.14  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In each of these three major events, the 
Constitutional Court played a pivotal role, 
issuing interim orders and judgments that 
determined Guatemalan political life.
1. Expedientes Acumulados 3829-2019, 
3849-2019 y 3881-2019, Resolución de 
14 de julio de 2019 (Third safe country 
case): Limits of executive power in foreign 
relations.
On 11 June 2019, a group of former 
Guatemalan ministers of foreign relations 
and ambassadors lodged a constitutional 
injunction against the President of 
Guatemala. This injunction was filed in order 
to prevent the Executive signing a ‘third safe 
country agreement’ with the United States. 
Guatemalan constitutional law allows the 
lodging of injunctions, called amparos, 
not only with the purpose of restoring the 
rights of individuals when violated by public 
authorities but also against the potential 
threat of their violation to avoid any action 
by public authorities.15  
The applicants argued that the signing of 
the ‘third safe country’ agreement with the 
United States would violate the rights of 
local citizens as well as asylum seekers and 
the principle of social justice, which is the 
basis of the economic and social regime of 
the Guatemalan state.16 
The President answered by asserting that 
the Constitution allowed him to sign such 
an agreement, and that individuals cannot 
obstruct the President in the fulfillment of his 
duties.17 In essence, the President argued that 
as this was a matter of international affairs, 
individuals did not have standing to file 
an injunction of this kind. The President’s 
counsel also argued that if the Constitutional 
Court were to grant the injunction, the Court 
would be acting outside the Constitution, 
because the Constitutional Court does not 
have jurisdiction over international affairs 
and can only rule over domestic matters.18 
The President’s counsel argued that if such 
ruling were given, the President would not be 
obliged to abide by it, since the Court would 
be acting illegally. In addition to these legal 
arguments, the President’s counsel argued 
that claims about the President’s intention 
to sign any such agreement were mere 
‘conjectures’ elaborated by local newspapers 
and without any solid evidence.19
In its ruling, the Constitutional Court 
emphasised that it was created by the 
Constitution in order to defend the 
constitutional order. The Court recalled that 
the amparo was created in order to defend 
individuals against any threat and that 
there is no exception for any act of public 
power.20 The Court proceeded to analyse the 
different types of treaties and international 
agreements that exist in international law and 
their implications in domestic law.21 In this 
analysis, the Court drew on the jurisprudence 
of the Colombian Constitutional Court, and 
particularly the rule that if treaties create 
new obligations on the state, they must be 
approved by Congress first.22 
After reviewing comparative law, 
the Constitutional Court analysed the 
implications of ‘third safe country’ 
agreements. The Court’s examination was 
informed by analyses of this type of treaty 
by the United Nations High Commissioner 
on Refugees, which determined that this type 
of international agreement does create new 
obligations for states, particularly on issues 
relating to the non-refoulement of asylum 
seekers and the standards of treatment owed 
to refugees in compliance with human rights 
standards.23 
The Constitutional Court determined that, 
because a ‘third safe country’ agreement 
would create new obligations for the state 
beyond mere cooperation, it needed to be 
approved by Congress.24 The Court noted 
that although the Guatemalan Constitution 
gives a high degree of autonomy to the 
Executive to coordinate foreign relations, 
any treaty that affects any domestic laws, 
imposes new restrictions on public power or 
burdens the state heavily must be approved 
by Congress. The Constitutional Court 
held that, in conformity with the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties of 1969 
(which has been ratified by the Guatemalan 
state), in this case there was a specific 
restriction on the Guatemalan Executive 
to ratify such a treaty.25 Finally, the Court 
delivered an interim order that the Executive 
not ratify a ‘third safe country’ agreement 
without the approval of Congress.26 
14 The Centre for the Defense of the Constitution published a document titled ‘The Constitutional Court: limits, functions and the responsibility of its judges’ criticiz-
ing publicly the Constitutional Court’s judgments on a variety of topics. For a discussion of the paper, see: Carlos Arturo Villagrán Sandoval, ‘Del funcionalismo al 
constructivismo en el análisis de jurisprudencia de la Corte de Constitucionalidad’ (Boletín Jurídico No. 4 de la Universidad Rafael Landívar, December 2019). 
15 Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, Article 265.
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Despite the order given by the Constitutional 
Court, on 26 July 2019, the Guatemalan 
Executive signed the ‘third safe country’ 
agreement with the United States. The 
Executive argued that this was not a ‘third 
safe country’ agreement but rather a 
cooperation agreement, and therefore it did 
not need Congress’s approval. Interestingly, 
the terms of the agreement provided that 
it would only come into force after ‘local 
constitutional procedures’ were satisfied. On 
10 August 2019, after reviewing the signed 
agreement, the Constitutional Court lifted 
the interim order and held that there was no 
longer a threat to rights. At the time of this 
writing, a decision on the merits of the case 
are still pending. 
2. Expediente 1584-2019, Apelación de 
Sentencia de Amparo, 13 de mayo de 2019 
(Zury Rios Case): Constitutional prohibi-
tions on presidential candidacy
The Guatemalan Constitution enumerates a 
list of people who are prohibited to hold the 
Office of President. Article 186 establishes 
that leaders of a ‘coup d’état, armed 
revolution or similar movement, who have 
altered the constitutional order, or those 
who as a consequence of such events have 
assumed the leadership of the government’ 
cannot run for President. That same article 
establishes that ‘relatives to the fourth degree 
of consanguinity and second of affinity of 
the President […] when the latter exercises 
the office of the President, and those of the 
persons referred to in the first paragraph 
of this Article’ – meaning those who came 
into power via a coup – cannot run for the 
presidency either. 
As mentioned in last’s year report, 
the Constitutional Court has produced 
conflicting interpretations of this prohibition 
over the years, particularly in regard to 
former President and coup leader Efraín Ríos 
Mont.27 This last election, Ríos’s daughter, 
Zury, ran for election, notwithstanding 
the fourth degree of consanguinity 
prohibition. Ultimately, her eligibility to 
run for presidential office came before the 
Constitutional Court. 
Zury Rios alleged that Article 186 violated 
her rights to run for the presidency, 
particularly those recognized at the Inter-
American level by the American Convention 
on Human Rights.28 She also argued that it 
violated the rights of the people to elect her 
as President. As such, she argued that the 
prohibition was unconstitutional under a 
human rights provision at both constitutional 
and international levels.29 It is to be noted 
that the Guatemalan Constitution, in Article 
46, establishes a ‘general principle that 
within matters of human rights, the treaties 
and agreements approved and ratified by 
Guatemala have preeminence over the 
internal law’.
In reviewing the case, the Constitutional 
Court did not follow a strict legalist or 
originalist view of the prohibition, as it had 
done previously. Instead, it reviewed the 
constitutional prohibition under the human 
rights jurisprudence developed by it and 
other supranational jurisdictions, such as the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.30 
After reviewing the American Declaration of 
Rights and Duties of Man, which establishes 
that the rights of individuals can be limited, 
and a series of Inter-American judgments, 
the Court concluded that the right to be 
elected can be limited. Drawing expressly 
on the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional 
Court held that the right to be elected can be 
limited by ‘historical, political, social and 
cultural necessities’ which can ‘vary from 
one society to the next’.31 The Constitutional 
Court examined the historical circumstances 
leading to the first insertion of this provision 
in the Guatemalan Constitution of 1927, and 
its continuance in later constitutions.32 After 
the examination of a series of constitutions 
and the violent history of Guatemala, the 
Court concluded that the prohibition was 
still a ‘reasonable’ response to the historical 
and social factors of Guatemalan society 
and politics.33
3. Expedientes Acumulados 4251-2019 y 
4862-2019, Resolución de 16 de septiembre 
de 2019 (Judicial Selection Case): Judicial 
requirements and limits
On 16 September 2019, the Constitutional 
Court delivered an interim order to require 
the recommencement of the selection 
process of judges for the Supreme Court 
and Court of Appeals. The applicants of 
this case, a group of NGOs and individuals, 
filed an injunction against the Postulation 
Commission, which had commenced the 
judges’ selection process a few weeks earlier. 
The applicants argued that the administrative 
procedure for the selection of judges for the 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals was 
not correctly followed, therefore violating 
the principle of legality and compromising 
the judicial independence of the courts for 
the next judicial term.34 
The selection process for Supreme Court 
and Court of Appeals judges is a complex 
one.35 Because the term for judges of the 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals is 
five years, judges wishing to advance in 
their career or get re-elected need to follow 
this process every five years. The selection 
process requires that the Judicial Council, 
an independent entity associated with the 
27 Carlos Arturo Villagrán Sandoval and Sara Larios, ‘Guatemala’ in Richard Albert et al, 2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law (I.CONnect’Clough Center, 
2019) 128.
28 Expediente 1584-2019, page 3.
29 Pages 4-6.





35 For a recent study of the Guatemalan process of judicial selection, including its challenges, see: José González et al, ‘Obstaculos a la Carrera Judicial en 
Guatemala’ (Impunity Watch, Policy Brief, October 2019).
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Supreme Court, review the performance of 
judges during the term they hold office.36 In 
the election process, the Council prepares a 
list of candidates who meet the requirements 
to apply for the judicial positions and who 
had the best performance during their time, 
and sends it to the Postulation Commission.37 
The Postulation Commission then opens 
the selection process to other applicants for 
these positions from outside the judiciary. 
The Postulation Commission prepares a list 
of the best qualified candidates, whether they 
are judges or people outside the judiciary, 
and sends it to Congress.38 The Postulation 
Commission is comprised of the deans of the 
law schools in Guatemala and representatives 
of the Professional Association of Lawyers.39 
Congress elects persons from this list to 
become the next Supreme Court and Court 
of Appeals judges.
In its decision, the Constitutional Court 
emphasised the importance of judicial 
independence in a democratic state. In doing 
so, it reviewed a series of international 
instruments, such as the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the Basic Principles on 
Judicial Independence and judgments of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.40 
The Court stated that judicial independence 
is a pillar of the rule of law in Guatemala, 
and that individuals have the right to access 
the Court in conditions favourable for them. 
Therefore, the process for the selection of 
judges is of the utmost importance and must 
comply with international standards.41 
The Constitutional Court then proceeded to 
detail the failures of the selection process. 
First, it found that the Judicial Council, the 
entity in charge of reviewing the work of 
judges in the performance of their duties, 
neglected to incorporate many judges who 
had the capacity to apply for the position of 
Supreme Court judge into a list that would 
be later sent to the Postulation Commission 
and Congress.42 Second, the Constitutional 
Court found that the Judicial Council did 
not review the performance of any judge, 
either of the Supreme Court or Court of 
Appeals, during this period, nor did it 
develop the standards and procedures by 
which the judges would be reviewed.43 
Therefore, the list that the Judicial Council 
sent to the Postulation Commission did 
not follow the process established by law, 
thus compromising the entire selection 
process. As a result, the Court ordered that 
the entire selection process begin again 
to comply with the law and international 
standards, and ordered the Judicial Council 
to perform revisions of the judges, thus 
elaborating the procedures by which the 
judges would be reviewed.44  
At the time of this writing, the selection 
process is still ongoing. However, this 
decision led right-wing groups to criticise 
the Court, stating that its order violated the 
Constitution because it requires that the 
current Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 
judges hold office beyond their five-year 
terms, as determined by the Constitution.  
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In 2020, a new Executive and Congress have 
taken office. While the judicial selection 
process is still ongoing, new judicial officers 
will join the higher courts in 2020. 
The effects of significant constitutional 
events of 2019 can be expected to play 
out in 2020. A decision on the merits of 
the ‘third safe country’ agreement is still 
pending. However, as the Constitutional 
Court has done in other high-impact cases 
with international implications, such as the 
Jerusalem embassy transfer and the CICIG 
termination cases, it seems likely that the 
Court will avoid or defer making a decision 
on the merits. This has previously been done 
by the Court in order to avoid future backlash 
by strong conservative groups.
A new right-wing Executive government 
has taken office. In its first actions, it has 
declared emergency powers and a new 
initiative of laws targeting gangs (maras) 
with potential adverse impacts on human 
rights. Although the new President has taken 
steps to restore the international reputation 
of Guatemala after the CICIG was expelled 
by the previous government, tendencies for 
abusive use of power and corruption remain 
a major concern. 
V. FURTHER READING
González, José, et al, Obstaculos a la Carrera 
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Policy Brief, October 2019).
Villagrán Sandoval, Carlos Arturo, ‘Del 
funcionalismo al constructivismo en el 
análisis de jurisprudencia de la Corte de 
Constitucionalidad’ (Boletín Jurídico 
No. 4 de la Universidad Rafael Landívar, 
December 2019).
36 Decreto Número 32-2016, Article 6.
37 Ibid. 
38 Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, Article 215.
39 Ibid. 
40 Expedientes Acumulados 4251-2019 y 4862-2019, pages 12-14.
41 Page 14.
42  Pages 14-16.
43 Pages 17-26.
44 Pages 27-29.
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Hong Kong
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HONG KONG
I. INTRODUCTION1  
Hong Kong is a Special Administrative 
Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) governed under a Basic Law 
adopted by the National People’s Congress 
of China (NPC) pursuant to the Chinese 
Constitution. The Basic Law provides for 
Hong Kong’s separate systems, including the 
Chief Executive (who represents the SAR 
before the Central Government and heads 
both the SAR and its executive authorities), 
the executive authorities (which are vested 
with executive power), the legislature (which 
is vested with legislative power) and the 
judiciary (which is vested with independent 
judicial power including that of final 
adjudication). The Basic Law also provides for 
the Central Government being responsible for 
foreign affairs and defence, for the Standing 
Committee of the NPC (SCNPC) having the 
power to declare a state of emergency in Hong 
Kong, and for the SCNPC having the power to 
interpret the Basic Law. Whilst the NPC may 
amend the Basic Law, such amendments shall 
not contravene the PRC’s established basic 
policies regarding Hong Kong recorded in the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration 1984. These 
basic policies express the PRC’s approach 
for territorial reunification of “One Country, 
Two Systems”. In 2019, civil unrest erupted 
in Hong Kong following the Government’s 
rushed introduction and attempted passage 
of amendments to extradition and mutual 
criminal legal assistance laws. Misjudgments 
of public opinion by both the Hong Kong 
and the Chinese Governments have led to 
intensification, escalation and continuation 
of the protests, divisive and often violent 
clampdown by the police, the exposure of 
shortcomings of almost all institutions of 
accountability and a massive challenge for the 
judiciary. This report discusses developments 
in four areas: 1) the 2019 Protests; 2) the 
constitutional relationship between the PRC 
and Hong Kong; 3) Hong Kong’s rule of law; 
and 4) the litigation of sexual minority rights.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS:
 
The anti-extradition law amendments 
movement in Hong Kong (“the 2019 
Protests”) began in June 2019. The 
chronology and the evolving narrative of 
the protests are relatively well documented 
by academics, news media and NGOs.2 This 
report seeks instead to underline some of the 
causes and implications of the 2019 Protests 
that are related to the “One Country, Two 
Systems” model as well as the maintenance 
of the rule of law in Hong Kong. 
The 2019 Protests arose from the Hong 
Kong Government’s proposed legislative 
amendments to address a perceived gap 
in Hong Kong’s criminal jurisdiction on 
homicide. The proposed amendments sought 
to remove the prohibition against rendition 
of fugitives to other parts of China (including 
Taiwan and Macao) in the extradition laws 
that had existed since the establishment 
of the Hong Kong SAR on 1 July 1997. 
The opposition to these facially technical 
1 The author thanks Cora Chan and Swati Jhaveri for their comments to the drafts of this report.
2 See, for examples, Martin Purbrick, ‘A Report of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests’ (2019) 50(4) Asian Affairs 
465; Johannes Chan, ‘Ten Days that Shocked the World: The Rendition Proposal in Hong Kong’ (2019) 49 
HKLJ 431; The New York Times <www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-arc.
html>; and Human Rights in China <www.hrichina.org/en/2019-hong-kong-protests-timeline> accessed 6 
February 2020. 
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amendments grew after the public became 
aware of their generality and implications. 
Opposition came from all sectors of the 
public, including the business sector and 
many residents with dealings on the Chinese 
mainland, who distrusted the Chinese legal 
and judicial authorities out of understanding 
their failings. The Hong Kong and Chinese 
Governments’ underestimation of this deep-
rooted suspicion of the Chinese criminal 
justice system led to the public protest of 
close to a million Hong Kong residents 
on 9 June 2019. The violent confrontation 
by the police against young protestors 
who surrounded the Legislative Council 
Complex on 12 June 2019 in a bid to stop 
the proceedings of the legislature marked the 
beginning of months of street battles, strikes 
and lynchings. After the formal withdrawal 
of the amendments in October 2019, police 
containment of protestors on two university 
campuses in November 2019 and the 
landslide successes in the District Council 
elections in November 2019 of candidates 
sympathetic to the protests, the intensity 
of the protests lessened significantly and 
disruptions to ordinary life in Hong Kong 
have diminished.
The 2019 Protests have fractured Hong Kong 
society into sides identified by political 
sympathies or visions, and produced a 
young and dangerous minority that have the 
knowhow and resolve to use destructive and 
lethal force to express their demands and 
anger. All institutions that had showcased 
Hong Kong’s high world ranking in the rule 
of law were shaken. The excessive use of 
force by the police on numerous occasions 
have been well documented, but no police 
officer has yet been held accountable. The 
police oversight body in Hong Kong has 
proven to be unsuitable for conducting an 
independent and competent investigation into 
systemic and individual police misconduct,3 
and even became the subject of a legal 
challenge over whether it had the statutory 
authority to conduct a “thematic study” of 
the policing on key dates of the protests.4 
Although the Chief Executive, Mrs. Carrie 
Lam, announced that she would appoint 
in February 2020 an “independent review 
panel” on “social causes” of the protests, she 
excluded policing matters from the terms of 
such a “review” and ruled out the format of a 
commission of inquiry with coercive powers 
to summon witnesses and compel production 
of documents. 
Both the Hong Kong Judiciary and the 
Department of Justice are being tested 
in their abilities to handle legal and 
prosecutorial matters arising out of the 
2019 Protests. The arrests by the police 
of over 7,000 persons during the protests 
meant a lengthy and consuming process of 
numerous prosecutions in a divided society 
under the direction of Chinese President Xi 
Jinping to “jointly get things done in Hong 
Kong” in order to “safeguard the rule of 
law and oppose violence”.5 As the Chief 
Executive also rejected calls for collective 
non-prosecution, release with warning and 
amnesty of the arrestees, it is expected that 
the capacities, impartiality and independence 
of the Hong Kong courts will be seriously 
tested in the coming years. In the meantime, 
there have been signs of loss of faith in the 
administration of justice, including incidents 
of petrol bombing of court entrances and the 
vilification of named judges.6
Lawfare was applied by both the Government 
and the opposition during the 2019 Protests. 
While the Government and some public 
authorities had sought the assistance of civil 
courts to enforce the law by injunctions 
against unnamed persons inciting violence, 
destroying property, obstructing public 
transportation and doxxing police officers 
and their family members7 (but with a patchy 
record of compliance and no prosecution of 
contempt thus far), opposition politicians 
judicially challenged the anti-masking law 
and the Chief Executive’s emergency power 
to enact it (the first case in the next section of 
this report), and arrestees and persons who 
allegedly suffered police brutality lodged 
proceedings to require the disclosure of the 
identity of the police officers that committed 
the said acts, or to stop police from gathering 
evidence by allegedly unlawful means.8 The 
first instance success of the opposition in 
challenging the anti-masking law led to a 
rebuke by the spokesman of the Legislative 
Affairs Commission of the SCNPC, 
suggesting that Hong Kong courts had no 
power to declare a Hong Kong legislation 
incompatible with the Basic Law, contrary to 
the understanding and practice of the Hong 
Kong courts since July 1997.9
Successful efforts to gain international 
recognition of the 2019 Protests affected 
3 Alvin Lum, ‘Hong Kong police watchdog does not have powers and resources to cope with scale of protests, say Independent Police Complaints Council’s expert 
advisers’, South China Morning Post (Hong Kong, 10 November 2019). These international policing experts eventually ‘stood aside’ from rendering assistance in 
December 2019. 
4 Lui Chi Hang Hendrick v. Independent Police Complaints Council [2019] HKCFI 3120 (20 December 2019). 
5 As to arrest figures, see John Lee, ‘LCQ4: Law enforcement procedures of Police’ (8 January 2020) <www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202001/08/P2020010800626.
htm>. As to the directing statements of President Xi, see ‘Speech by Luo Huining at the Spring Festival Reception’ (15 January 2020) <www.locpg.gov.cn/js-
dt/2020-01/15/c_1210440000.htm> accessed 6 February 2020
6 See Geoffrey Ma, ‘CJ’s speech at Ceremonial Opening of the Legal Year 2020’ (13 January 2020). <www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202001/13/
P2020011300622.htm> accessed 6 February 2020.
7 See, for examples, Secretary for Justice v. Persons Unlawfully and Wilfully Conducting Etc (2007/2019) [2019] HKCFI 2777 and Secretary for Justice v. 
Persons Unlawfully and Wilfully Conducting Etc (1957/2019) [2019] HKCFI 2773.
8 See K v Commissioner of Police [2019] HKCFI 3048 (17 December 2019); Ng Kang-chung, ‘Hong Kong protests: High Court test for warrants that let 
police search phones’, South China Morning Post (Hong Kong, 13 January 2020); Jasmine Siu, ‘Hong Kong court suspends police search warrant to access 
medical records of teen who claims she was gang-raped by officers’, South China Morning Post (Hong Kong, 28 November 2019).
9 Tony Cheung, et al., ‘“No other authority has right to make judgments”: China slams Hong Kong court’s ruling on anti-mask law as unconstitutional’, South 
China Morning Post (Hong Kong, 19 November 2019).
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China’s sovereign interests and policies on 
Hong Kong. The United States’ Hong Kong 
Human Rights and Democracy Act10  and 
Protect Hong Kong Act,11 the report of the 
United Kingdom House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Committee12 and the initiatives 
by countries including Canada and the 
Netherlands to consider using Magnitsky Act 
type sanctions against Hong Kong officials 
violating human rights all contributed to 
China’s concern that Hong Kong’s situation 
would be used by its adversaries to restrain 
her rise. And on top of that, the successful 
re-election of Tsai Ing-wen as the President 
of Taiwan in a campaign that equated “One 
Country, Two Systems” with authoritarian 
rule, using the 2019 Protests as an example, 
alarmed the Chinese Communist Party, 
whose avowed mission has always been the 
reunification of Taiwan peacefully under 
the “One Country, Two Systems” model. In 
the depths of this quagmire, the rhetoric of 
the Party to Hong Kong has been to look to 
the Macao SAR as the “poster boy” for this 
governing model: Macao has been viewed 
favourably by Beijing in many respects, 
including addressing Chinese national 
security concerns and the material needs of 
the population.13 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Kwok Wing Hang v. Chief Executive 
of the HKSAR: Judicial Review of the 
Emergency Statutory Power that Made the 
Anti-masking Law
On 4 October 2019, the Chief Executive in 
Council invoked a power under the Emergency 
Regulations Ordinance (ERO) to enact an anti-
masking law (i.e., the Prohibition on Facial 
Covering Regulation (PFCR)) on the ground 
that street violence had put Hong Kong “in a 
state of public danger” and the anti-masking 
law was needed to restore law, order and public 
peace. Twenty-four opposition members of 
the Legislative Council applied for judicial 
review against not only the PFCR but also 
the power in the ERO to make emergency 
regulations on the “public danger” ground. A 
division of the Court of First Instance of two 
(rather than the usual one) judges held on 18 
November 2019 that not only the PFCR but 
also the Chief Executive’s power in the ERO 
that made it were inconsistent with the Basic 
Law and declared the relevant provisions 
unconstitutional.14 Both the said division of the 
Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal 
refused to grant a temporary validity order or 
a temporary suspension of the declarations of 
unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeal heard 
the Chief Executive’s appeal in January 2020 
and has not handed down judgment at the time 
of finalization of this report. 
The anti-masking law litigation readily 
qualified as the most controversial court case 
in 2019 not only because of the underlying 
circumstances of civil unrest, the Hong 
Kong Government’s efforts to end violence 
and chaos and restore order following the 
instruction of the Central Authorities to all 
institutions of governance in Hong Kong 
(including the courts)15 and the litigation itself 
being one lodged by the political opposition 
against the Government but also because of the 
Court’s reasoning. In striking down the Chief 
Executive’s emergency regulation-making 
power on the “public danger” ground, the Court 
held that such power is incompatible with the 
“constitutional order” established by the Basic 
Law, under which the legislative power is 
vested with the Legislative Council. In holding 
that the PFCR was a disproportionate measure, 
the Court stated that most of its prohibitions 
and the related enforcement power exceeded 
what was reasonably necessary to achieve 
the aims of deterrence of law-breaking and 
facilitation of law enforcement, and failed to 
strike a reasonable balance between the societal 
benefits sought to be promoted and the inroads 
made into the protected rights of freedom of 
expression, freedom of assembly, procession 
and demonstration, and the right to privacy. 
The ERO is a piece of legislation previously in 
force in Hong Kong that had been endorsed by 
the colonial Hong Kong courts as intra vires 
on several occasions. The Court held that this 
law was incompatible with the Basic Law’s 
scheme of not permitting the Hong Kong 
SAR’s legislature to grant its primary law-
making power to any other body (including the 
Chief Executive), except for an authorization 
of subordinate legislation. It is worth noting 
that in doing so, the Court enforced one of the 
Basic Law’s features – namely, a particular 
aspect of the principle of separation of powers 
– as distinct from a specific provision’s 
stipulation or a protected right stemming from 
one or more provisions. In addition, by holding 
the PFCR as disproportionate for not satisfying 
the third step of “necessity” and the fourth step 
of “proportionality stricto sensu”, the Court 
brought rigor to the protection of fundamental 
rights in Hong Kong, bearing in mind that as 
our last year’s report and other cases in this 
report have shown, the Hong Kong courts were 
principally concerned with the second step of 
“rational connection” and had mysteriously 
assumed that satisfaction of the third step 
inevitably led to satisfaction of the fourth step.
2. Comilang v. Director of Immigration and 
ZN v. Secretary for Justice: System Coher-
ence over International Human Rights Law-
based Protection of Immigrants
In two judgments handed down in 2019, the 
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (HKCFA) 
determined how judicial protection of 
fundamental rights should be administered 
under Hong Kong’s constitutional 
framework under the Basic Law, particularly 
in relation to the International Covenant on 
10 Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act 2019 (US Public Law 116-76). 
11 Protect Hong Kong Act 2019 (US Public Law 116-77). 
12 Foreign Affairs Committee, China and the Rules-based International System (HC 2018-19, 612).  
13 Natalie Wong, ‘Citing Presiding Xi Jinping, Beijing’s Hong Kong envoy Luo Huining says lack of national security laws allows “sabotage”’, South China 
Morning Post (Hong Kong, 20 January 2020).
14 Kwok Wing Hang v. Chief Executive in Council [2019] HKCFI 2820 (18 November 2019).
15 Tony Cheung, ‘No country would tolerate “violent and destructive acts” of Hong Kong’s protesters, Chinese Vice-Premier Han Zheng says’, South China 
Morning Post (Hong Kong, 6 November 2019).
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Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
In the Comilang case,16 the (HKCFA) held 
that the Director of Immigration was not 
required by the Basic Law and the Hong 
Kong Bill of Rights (HKBOR) to take into 
account, when he makes a decision under 
immigration legislation on a person subject 
to immigration control, the enjoyment by 
that person (and/or that person’s family 
members living in Hong Kong and/or the 
family consisting of that person and her 
family members living in Hong Kong) of 
fundamental rights guaranteed under the 
Basic Law, the HKBOR, the ICCPR, the 
ICESCR or the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. 
In the ZN case,17 the HKCFA construed 
Article 4 of the HKBOR (which reproduces 
Article 8 of the ICCPR) as not prohibiting 
human trafficking generally or for the 
purposes of exploitation, servitude and 
forced or compulsory labour; and as 
imposing on the Hong Kong Government an 
investigative duty, though not an obligation 
to enact bespoke legislation to criminalize 
the activities prohibited by that article. 
The Comilang case determined the structure 
and limits of human rights protection under 
the Basic Law. The ZN case determined 
the approach for interpreting substantive 
provisions protective of human rights. Three 
considerations ran through these cases. 
The first was the HKCFA’s adherence to 
the “common law dualist principle” that an 
international treaty is not self-executing: 
unless and until its provisions are made part 
of Hong Kong domestic law by legislation, 
its provisions do not confer or impose any 
rights or obligations on individual citizens. 
The second was the HKCFA’s construction 
of Article 39 of the Basic Law, which 
provides, inter alia, that the provisions of 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR as applied to 
Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall 
be implemented through the laws of the SAR 
– according to this provision, the HKBOR 
was given constitutional status. The third 
was the HKCFA’s preference of “coherence” 
in the system of protection of fundamental 
rights under the Basic Law. 
The consequences were that 1) an exception 
in the HKBOR reflective of the immigration 
legislation reservation was allowed to operate 
at the constitutional level to preclude reliance 
on both Basic Law rights and HKBOR rights 
by family members of the person subject 
to immigration control, thus depriving the 
family unit, i.e., the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society, of protection of 
fundamental rights; 2) the ICESCR, which 
has no reservation in respect to the cognate 
right of the family, was disengaged for 
the twin reasons of there being no Hong 
Kong legislation implementing it and the 
cognate right being basically subject to the 
immigration legislation exception in the 
HKBOR regardless; and 3) a declaration 
made by China not applying the Palermo 
Protocol to Hong Kong carried the effect that 
its provisions may not be used as an aid to 
construe Article 4 of the HKBOR, lest that 
would amount to a “backdoor application” of 
the protocol. The HKCFA’s distancing from 
international human rights law was made 
explicit by its reluctance to agree and accept 
statements of the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee, the ICCPR’s treaty 
body, on the ICCPR provision (reproduced 
in the HKBOR) being construed, claiming 
that General Comment statements do not 
have a clear indication of reasoning and 
that concluding observations regarding a 
periodic report have no binding status, are 
prescriptive in nature and do not provide any 
reasoned analysis. 
3. Leung Chun Kwong v. Secretary for 
the Civil Service and MK v. Government 
of HKSAR: Same-sex Marriage – Foreign 
Recognition and Local Non-recognition
In the 2018 report, we covered the QT 
case, where the HKCFA applied the four-
step proportionality analysis common to 
many jurisdictions having constitutional 
protection of human rights, and rejected the 
Government’s justification of an immigration 
policy’s limitation of “spouse” to a person of 
the opposite sex in a monogamous marriage 
in line with Hong Kong’s marriage laws.18 
In the 2019 Leung Chun Kwong case, 
the Government sought to justify similar 
limitations on the meaning of “spouse” in 
civil service benefit regulations and tax 
legislation, arguing that the special status of 
marriage under Hong Kong’s marriage laws 
should be promoted and maintained, and thus 
Mr. Leung’s partner should not be regarded 
as his “spouse” under a same-sex marriage 
celebrated outside Hong Kong according to 
the laws of that jurisdiction. The HKCFA, 
again applying proportionality analysis, 
rejected the Government’s case,19 stating 
that the Government had failed to establish 
a rational connection between the legitimate 
aims of protection of the traditional family 
and the institution of marriage established 
under Hong Kong’s marriage laws on the 
one hand, and on the other, the restrictions 
in question, which had the effect of 
disentitling same-sex married couples. 
The HKCFA added that the Government 
could not logically argue that people would 
be encouraged to enter into opposite-sex 
marriage in Hong Kong because a same-sex 
spouse is denied benefits.
Also in 2019, several applications were 
made to challenge the constitutionality of 
Hong Kong’s marriage laws insofar as they 
define “marriage” in terms of a voluntary 
union for life of a man and a woman to the 
16 Comilang v. Director of Immigration [2019] HKCFA 10 (4 April 2019).
17 ZN v. Secretary for Justice [2019] HKCFA 53 (10 January 2020).
18 Director of Immigration v. QT [2018] HKCFA 28 (4 July 2018). 
19 Leung Chun Kwong v Secretary for the Civil Service [2019] HKCFA 19 (6 June 2019). The facts in this case are discussed in the 2018 report.
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exclusion of all others and do not provide a 
legal framework for recognition of same-sex 
relationships. The Court of First Instance 
hearing MK, the first of these cases, dismissed 
the application by a skillful construction 
of the Basic Law and the HKBOR that 
enabled the Court to avoid undertaking the 
proportionality analysis of the Government’s 
justification.20 In particular, the Court agreed 
with the Government’s submission that 
since the relevant provisions of the Basic 
Law and the HKBOR protective of marriage 
in fact specifically protect heterosexual 
monogamous marriage, they constituted a 
lex specialis that precluded other provisions 
of the Basic Law and the HKBOR, including 
the principle of equality, from operating to 
protect the right of marriage of same-sex 
couples. MK’s case is under appeal.
4. Chow Ting v. Teng Yu Yan Anne and Lau 
Wing Hong v Chan Yuen Man Amy: Candi-
date Disqualification without Natural Justice 
Invalidating Elections
Agnes Chow’s challenge to the 
disqualification of her nomination in a 
Legislative Council by-election, noted in the 
2018 report, was successful on the ground 
that the returning officer failed to afford her 
a reasonable opportunity to respond to the 
materials the officer proposed to rely on in 
decision-making. As a result, the Court of 
First Instance held that the disqualification 
was invalid, the by-election was voided and 
the person elected unseated.21 This victory 
was overshadowed by the Court’s acceptance 
of the reasoning of the coordinate court in 
Chan Ho Tin’s case, also noted in the 2018 
report, regarding the legality of the role of the 
returning officer to scrutinize substantively 
a candidate’s declaration that she intends to 
uphold the Basic Law and pledge allegiance 
to the Hong Kong SAR. While there was 
an appeal by the unseated members of the 
Legislative Council to the HKCFA, their 
arguments concerned only their unseating 
as the legal consequence of a successful 
election petition and did not touch upon the 
returning officer’s substantive role,22 and 
their appeals were in any event dismissed.23
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
2020 promises to be a year of change. The 
2019 novel coronavirus outbreak in China 
has brought multiple challenges upon Hong 
Kong’s presumably “separate systems”. The 
Legislative Council elections scheduled in 
September 2020 will be a contest in which 
the opposition forces will seek to capture 
a simple majority of seats in Hong Kong’s 
legislature, notwithstanding the structurally 
biased electoral system. Appeals of the first 
and third constitutional cases described above 
and of the “colocation case” described in 
the 2018 report will be heard by the Court 
of Appeal and/or the HKCFA. Last but 
not least, Carrie Lam, the Chief Executive 
(who is expected to stay in office under the 
tutelage of Luo Huining, the new Director 
of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s 
Government in the Hong Kong SAR24), will 
have opportunities to fill up to three vacancies 
in the HKCFA, including that of the Chief 
Justice.
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HUNGARY
I. INTRODUCTION  
After first taking power in the 2010 elections 
and subsequently winning a two-thirds major-
ity in the Parliament in both 2014 and 2018, 
and after adopting the new Fundamental Law 
in 2011, the Fidesz KDNP Party coalition 
carried out further constitutional and legal 
changes that allowed it to control the autono-
mous state institutions as well as the non-gov-
ernmental sphere. At the end of 2018, the ma-
jority of representatives in the EU Parliament 
voted to support a motion to open the door for 
the Article 7 TEU procedure against Hungary. 
It is worth mentioning that in January 2020, a 
new resolution adopted by the EU Parliament 
based on reports and statements by the Com-
mission, the UN, OSCE and the Council of 
Europe indicated that Hungary’s backsliding 
had progressed further since the initial trig-
gering of Article 7(1). The findings of our re-
view correlate with the findings of the EU. In 
Parts II and III, we examine steps taken by the 
Government in the construction of illiberal 
democracy and authoritarian rule. The Gov-
ernment majority’s pressure on the independ-
ence of the judiciary through the introduction 
of new elements into the legal system raises 
major concern, similar to the elevated govern-
mental influence on the fields of science, cul-
ture and education, e.g., through the reorgani-
sation of the most important science network, 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (1825), 
by detaching its 15 large research institutions. 
In 2019, constitutional adjudication did not 
have a role in restricting the two-thirds ma-
jority in Parliament to limit existing spheres 
of autonomy through legislative measures. A 
new amendment to the Constitution, the 8th 
since 2012, was adopted by the Parliament 
on 12 December to make it clear the estab-
lishment of the separate administrative court 
will be cancelled and therefore deleted from 
the Fundamental Law – under pressure from 
the EU and other international institutions 
dealing with the evaluation of the rule of law 
status of their member states.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The most important change of constitutional 
relevance in 2019 was the amendment to sev-
eral legal provisions in different acts related to 
courts and jurisprudence. As the provision for 
the independent and separate administrative 
court was deleted from the Fundamental Law, 
the independent and separate first instance ad-
ministrative courts were also abolished in the 
act on the ordinary courts. Labor law cases 
start at the county-level courts (Törvényszék) 
at the first instance and the administrative cas-
es start at dedicated county-level courts. After 
31 March 2020, when the administrative and 
labor courts will cease to exist, all judges may 
continue their work at the county-level courts 
but the appointments of the heads of the sep-
arate courts terminate automatically. Another 
important change introduced by the act is that 
the incompatibility between the appointment 
for being a judge and a constitutional justice is 
annulled. An ordinary judge, therefore, can be-
come a constitutional judge for the time of her 
mandate and then return to the general judicia-
ry. Furthermore, a judge at the Constitutional 
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Court may request reintegration to the gener-
al judiciary outside of the ordinary procedure 
and formal and substantive requirements.
The most important change is that the deci-
sions of the Kúria (Supreme Court) will be 
obligatory for all lower courts, which alters 
ordinary jurisprudence’s task and competence 
fundamentally. The system introduces a quasi 
precedent law system that has not been pres-
ent in Hungary either in ordinary or constitu-
tional jurisprudence. The new provisions also 
changed the function of the so-called ‘princi-
ple decisions’ that had served as a guide to uni-
fy decision-making of lower courts.
Partly backing up the necessity of this change 
was the argument that the Fundamental Law 
does not apply properly in ordinary case law 
the way the Fundamental Law prescribes it 
in Article 28, which reads: ‘In the course of 
the application of the law, courts shall inter-
pret the text of legal regulations primarily in 
accordance with their purposes and with the 
Fundamental Law. Primarily, the preamble of 
the legal regulation and the reasoning of the 
legal regulation or its amendment shall be tak-
en into account when the purposes of the legal 
regulations are established. When interpreting 
the Fundamental Law or legal regulations, it 
shall be presumed that they serve moral and 
economic purposes which are in accordance 
with common sense and the public good.’ Act 
CXXX of 2016 on the Civil Procedure pre-
scribed that if a court would like to deviate 
from the published decision of the Kúria, it 
must explain its decision. Furthermore, it was 
possible to submit a complaint for the unifica-
tion of the jurisprudence in a case to the Kúria 
that will decide it. If the Kúria does not accept 
the alteration of its decision, it annuls the deci-
sion of the lower court.
The independence of the judiciary was a heat-
ed topic in general in Hungary in 2019. The 
National Council of Judges asked for the re-
moval of the head of the National Judicial Of-
fice, who was finally appointed to be a consti-
tutional judge and left her office.
The municipal elections in October made a 
great change in the political landscape of Hun-
gary because joint opposition forces gained 
new mandates and won the majority of votes 
in Budapest with the new mayor. The neces-
sity of a complete constitutional revision of 
the Fundamental Law was introduced before 
the elections in 2019 by the Prime Minister, 
but after the elections it did not take place, and 
the possible drafts were not made public. After 
the relative success of the joint forces of the 
opposition parties in the country, the financial 
autonomy of the municipalities felt under fur-
ther smaller restriction and, in December, the 
disciplinary rules in the Parliament were tight-
ened with other smaller restrictions to the rules 
of procedures in Parliament.
Furthermore, on 2 July 2019, the Hungari-
an Parliament passed a law on the modifi-
cation of particular laws necessary for the 
transformation of the institutional system 
and financing of the research, development 
and innovation system. Consequently, the 
Loránd Eötvös Research Network Secretar-
iat was established and the 15 research cen-
ters of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
were separated from the Academia and in-
tegrated into this new institution. The main 
decision-making body of the Loránd Eötvös 
Research Network Secretariat is the Man-
aging Body headed by a president, who is 
appointed by the Prime Minister. The Prime 
Minister appoints all members of the Manag-
ing Body. The new law obliges the Academy 
to provide the infrastructure (placement and 
necessary appliances) for the new institution 
without compensation, which was subject to 
a constitutional complaint submitted by the 
president of the Hungarian Academy of Sci-
ences. According to the tempting summary 
of the employees of the research network: 
‘concerted attacks in the pro-government 
media accompanied the entire procedure.’ A 
recurring line of attack, echoed by the Gov-
ernment, was the inefficiency of research 
centres to secure funds or produce innova-
tion. The Academy attempted to question the 
connection between alleged inefficiencies 
and institutional settings and pointed out 
that Hungary, and the Academy especially, 
had been very successful in the region in se-
curing third party (especially EU research) 
funding. The Government failed to provide 
any meaningful answer to this.
The forced reorganisation of the newest 
sphere of autonomy, science outside univer-
sities that already fall under several restric-
tions, led to the initiation by one-fourth of 
the members of Parliament of the abstract re-
view procedure of Act LXVII of 2019 on the 
amendment of certain acts to transform the 
structure and financing of the research, de-
velopment and innovation system. The case 
is focused on the freedom and autonomy of 
science and the right to property, and the 
Constitutional Court will probably decide on 
it in 2020.
In sum, the number of cases that challenged 
standards of liberal constitutionalism in 
Hungary increased in 2019, and in many cas-
es, the Constitutional Court was in a position 
to take a stance in the debates over constitu-
tionalism but did not. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. 22/2019. (VII. 5.) CC decision: Introduction 
of administrative courts
The Hungarian court system has been unified 
since the democratic transition in 1989-90, 
after which the transition courts with general 
jurisdiction have also handled administra-
tive law cases. The new constitution-mak-
ing process in 2011 kept this system, but the 
Government has started to prepare for the 
introduction of administrative courts. They 
have referred to historical traditions and in-
ternational good practices, but background 
political motivations have been assumed. 
The plans were revived after several polit-
ically sensitive decisions by the courts that 
negatively affected the Government (e.g., in 
electoral or access to information cases).
Act CXXX on the administrative courts 
was adopted on 12 December 2018. It was 
criticized both in Hungary (mainly by legal 
scholars and civil society organisations) and 
abroad, including by the Venice Commis-
sion, the Commissioner for Human Rights of 
the Council of Europe, the UN Special Rap-
porteur on the independence of judges and 
lawyers, and the European Union.
In February, one-quarter of the Members of 
Parliament initiated a case at the Constitu-
tional Court for the annulment of the Act. 
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They contended, on the one hand, a viola-
tion of the rule of law because the prepara-
tory rules entered into force only one month 
after the promulgation of the Act and the 
Parliament left only one year to establish 
the whole new administrative court system. 
On the other hand, the petitioners claimed 
the violation of the separation of powers and 
judicial impartiality and independence. Ac-
cording to their position, the strong adminis-
trative power of the Minister of Justice was 
unconstitutional: she decides who can be a 
judge, as she selects the winner from the ap-
plicants to a judicial position; she appoints 
court leaders; and she decides budgetary 
questions.
As mentioned before, due to international 
political pressure, in May 2019, the Govern-
ment finally decided to suspend the intro-
duction of the administrative court system. 
This did not hinder the Constitutional Court 
in rejecting the petition challenging the con-
stitutionality of the Act on the administrative 
courts in July 2019, finding the regulation 
constitutional. The Court found that judicial 
independence did not include complete ad-
ministrative independence of the court sys-
tem. As long as the administrative activity 
of the Minister of Justice did not exercise a 
direct influence on the adjudicating activity, 
it did not violate the judicial independence 
and separation of powers. Justice Stumpf, in 
his concurring opinion, pointed out that there 
was no legitimate reason for the hurried 
procedure and that the Court should have 
carried out a more detailed process, further 
elaborating their answers to the constitution-
al questions.
In October 2019, the Minister of Justice an-
nounced that the Government had decided to 
abandon the idea of a separate administrative 
court system, and in December, the Consti-
tution was amended accordingly. (However, 
at the same time, other provisions were in-
troduced, mentioned in Part II, that restricted 
the judicial independence in another way.)
2. 15/2019. (IV. 17.) CC decision: Opposition 
parties blocking the vote in the Parliament
In recent years, the freedom of speech of 
members of Parliament from opposition par-
ties in Hungary has decreased significantly. 
In some of these cases (e.g., Karácsony and 
others v. Hungary), the European Court of 
Human Rights held that there was a viola-
tion of the freedom of speech of the MPs. 
These unfavourable cases did not hinder 
the willingness of the Government majority 
to restrict further members of Parliament, 
which, together with the restricted access to 
the Government-influenced public media, 
led to more radical steps by the opposition 
parties. One of the most critical situations 
occurred in December 2018, when the Par-
liament was deciding on the amendments of 
the Labour Code. The so-called ‘slavery act,’ 
which generated huge protests in Budapest, 
allowed employers to ask their workers to 
take on up to 400 hours’ overtime per year. 
The vote was on the same day as the vote on 
the harshly criticized act on administrative 
courts (see point 1).
To prevent the two-thirds majority from 
voting, the opposition parties physically 
blocked the Speaker’s podium in the cham-
ber and blew whistles for more than two 
hours. However, the temporary obstruction 
did not stop the Government majority from 
adopting the acts. The opposition parties 
challenged the acts on formal grounds before 
the Constitutional Court. They claimed that 
their adoption was unconstitutional because 
guarantees of the parliamentary procedure 
were not kept: the Speaker of the House and 
the acting chair did not preside over the sit-
ting of the Parliament from the podium; none 
of the parliamentary notaries in service at the 
time of the voting were members of the op-
position parties; and the voting system was 
conducted in a cardless mode of operation.
The Constitutional Court rejected the ar-
guments. According to the Court, the chal-
lenged conduct, which was not formally 
lawful, was not considered obstruction. It 
pointed out that it was the petitioners who 
blocked the way to the podium, so they could 
not base the unconstitutionality of the legis-
lative process on their irregular behavior. 
Nevertheless, the provisions of the Standing 
Orders did not prohibit chairing the sitting 
from a place other than the Speaker’s chair, 
provided that it otherwise complied with the 
rules of procedure. The podium is used for 
practical purposes. Concerning the notaries, 
the applicable provisions of the law did not 
exclude the way they were appointed. Fi-
nally, the applicable rules of procedure did 
not require carrying out machine voting in 
the operating mode with cards, and it was 
the responsibility of the MPs not to push the 
button of equipment that belongs to another 
MP. Therefore, none of the procedural irreg-
ularities violated the Constitution.
In this decision, the Constitutional Court fo-
cused on the merits instead of the review of 
the legislative process that, in the view of the 
Court, did not have constitutional relevance.
3. 3/2019. (III. 7.) CC decision: Criminal code 
on the facilitating of illegal immigration
 
Illegal immigration has been part of Gov-
ernment communication in recent years. The 
7th Amendment to the Fundamental Law 
also inserted the prohibition of illegal im-
migration into the constitutional text. As an 
executive act for this provision, the Govern-
ment submitted a legislative package called 
‘Stop Soros’. One of its elements was the 
amendment of the Criminal Code by estab-
lishing a crime of ‘facilitating illegal immi-
gration’. The provision banned individuals 
and organizations from providing any kind 
of assistance to undocumented immigrants. 
However, the legislation was drafted in such 
a vague way that, in theory, the Government 
could arrest someone who provided food to 
an undocumented migrant on the street or at-
tended a political rally in favor of their rights. 
(Another element of the package introduced 
a 25 percent tax on non-governmental organ-
isations deemed to be supporting or positive-
ly portraying migration.)
The regulation was criticized in Hungary 
by civil society organisations providing le-
gal and material help to immigrants, and re-
ceived criticism from international organisa-
tions, including the Venice Commission and 
the Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR), with both express-
ing serious concerns regarding this piece of 
legislation for its incompatibility with the 
freedoms of expression and association.
The civil society organization Amnesty In-
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ternational challenged the regulation in a 
constitutional complaint procedure, stating 
that the provisions violate the clarity of crim-
inal norms and the freedom of expression.
The Constitutional Court rejected the peti-
tion, holding that the regulation was clear 
and there was no proof that the terms in the 
provision were not interpretable in a consti-
tutional way. The freedom of expression was 
not violated, as the provision did not prevent 
the individuals and organisations from ex-
pressing their views on migration and did 
not restrict public debate. According to the 
decision, with the appropriate judicial inter-
pretation, the criminal offence of facilitating 
illegal immigration would not be considered 
realized if the aim of the activity were limit-
ed to the mitigation of the sufferings of those 
in need and the humanitarian treatment of 
such persons. To reinforce this, the Consti-
tutional Court set up a constitutional require-
ment that the new statutory definition shall 
not apply to the altruistic conducts that per-
form the obligation of helping the vulnerable 
and the poor.
The decision does not seem to have con-
vinced the European Commission, as it ini-
tiated an infringement procedure against 
Hungary, and the procedure is pending. Af-
ter having examined Hungary’s replies to 
a reasoned opinion, the Commission found 
that Hungary did not sufficiently address the 
concerns raised, particularly incompatibility 
with the EU’s asylum law.
4. 19/2019 (VI. 18.) CC decision: Criminal-
ization of homelessness
 
According to a new provision of the Funda-
mental Law, which was incorporated into the 
text by the 7th Amendment (2018), ‘using 
public space as a habitual dwelling shall be 
prohibited’. As a consequence, the Act on 
Misdemeanors declared habitual dwelling a 
petty offence. According to these rules, ha-
bitual dwelling does not lead to sanction if 
the concerned person stops this activity fol-
lowing a warning from the police or accepts 
the social services provided to homeless 
people. However, if the police warn a person 
for the third time within 90 days, a misde-
meanor proceeding must be started. In such 
a case, the person has to be detained and a 
court hearing has to take place within three 
days. The court can use warning, community 
service or confinement as a sanction.
 
Several misdemeanor proceedings were ini-
tiated against homeless people shortly after 
the new regulation entered in force. Some 
judges suspended court hearings and initi-
ated norm control before the Constitutional 
Court, claiming a violation of human dignity, 
the requirement of equal treatment and the 
principle of the rule of law. Amicus curiae 
letters were also filed by NGOs and former 
justices of the Constitutional Court.
 
In its controversial and heavily criticized de-
cision, the Court did not find the challenged 
piece of legislation unconstitutional, but it 
expressed constitutional requirements relat-
ed to the application of the law in the ruling. 
According to this statement, in the case of a 
habitual dwelling, sanctions can be imposed 
only if the homeless person had a verifiable 
possibility to access the social services pro-
vided to homeless people. Moreover, im-
posing the sanction has to be in accordance 
with the purpose of the regulation, namely, 
the involvement of homeless people into the 
system of supportive (social) services. On 
human dignity and freedom of autonomy 
considerations, the Court emphasized that 
the individual can exercise her rights as a 
member of the community. According to the 
Court, the new sanctions included in the Act 
on Misdemeanors do not sanction people 
based on their special living conditions, rath-
er the absence of their willingness to coop-
erate. In the Court’s consideration, the new 
regulation is applicable in the case of all in-
dividuals who do not cooperate with the state 
organs; therefore, it is not discriminatory.
 
5. 2/2019. (III. 5.) CC decision: Abstract in-
terpretation of the Fundamental Law and the 
right to asylum
 
This decision is also related to the 7th 
Amendment to the Fundamental Law (2018), 
in three aspects. First, the Amendment sup-
plemented the ‘European Union clause’ by 
stating that the exercise of competences 
by the institutions of the European Union 
shall comply with the fundamental rights 
and freedoms prescribed in the Fundamen-
tal Law and shall not limit the inalienable 
right of Hungary to determine its territorial 
unity, population, form of government and 
state structure. Second, it prescribed that 
the protection of the constitutional identity 
and Christian culture of Hungary shall be an 
obligation of every organ of the state. Third, 
it implemented a new condition for granting 
asylum: those persons shall not be entitled to 
asylum who arrived in the territory of Hun-
gary through any country where they were 
not persecuted or directly threatened with 
persecution.
 
The Government requested the abstract in-
terpretation of certain provisions of the Fun-
damental Law – especially that of the new 
provision related to asylum – in light of the 
7th Amendment. The motive behind this was 
the dispute between the Government and the 
European Commission on the compliance of 
the new Hungarian regulation on asylum (in-
cluding the 7th Amendment) with EU Law.
 
On the request of the Government, the Con-
stitutional Court examined the foundation 
of the applicability of EU Law in Hunga-
ry. The Court expressed that even EU Law 
is not part of the system of the sources of 
law in Hungary; its applicability is based 
on Article E) of the Fundamental Law (the 
‘EU clause’). Therefore, in the course of ap-
plication of EU Law in Hungary, the related 
(new) limits prescribed in the Fundamental 
Law shall be taken into consideration. The 
Court also expressed the requirement that 
the interpretation of the Fundamental Law 
shall not be derogated by an interpretation 
of another organ – a statement addressed 
implicitly to EU institutions. Regarding the 
new provision of the Fundamental Law on 
the right to asylum (not granting asylum to 
those who arrived in the territory of Hungary 
through a country where they were not per-
secuted), the Constitutional Court reached a 
controversial conclusion. Consequently, the 
right to asylum does not function as a funda-
mental subjective right as it stems from rel-
evant international treaties rather than being 
subject to regulation by statutes of the Hun-
garian state.
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IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Predicting future development is easy but 
difficult at the same time. There are sever-
al politically sensitive cases pending; the 
Court has been postponing most of them for 
years (e.g., cases mentioned in the ‘Looking 
Ahead’ part of our 2017 and 2018 reports). 
Even if the Court issues decisions in these 
cases, it will most likely choose less con-
frontational ways (e.g., rejecting the petition 
but declaring a constitutional requirement or 
constitutional omission). There is no upcom-
ing vacancy on the Court, but presently, all 
of the sitting judges have been elected by the 
same governmental majority. The changes 
in its power mentioned in Part II can even 
accelerate the process that we observed in 
the last decade: the Constitutional Court, in-
stead of being a guardian of the system of 
the separation of powers and protector of 
fundamental rights, increasingly becomes an 
insignificant arbitrator of conflict between 
state institutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Indian Constitution was amended for the 
103rd time in 2019, a sign of the enduring 
and active political engagement around con-
stitutional law and politics in India. How-
ever, 2019 was also significant for the im-
mense constitutional changes that took place 
outside the written text of the Constitution. 
Attempts to bypass constitutional procedures 
resulted in a number of challenges, flooding 
the Indian Supreme Court’s docket with tre-
mendously important questions regarding 
democracy, accountability, and represen-
tation. Despite this, the Court’s response 
was inconsistent, ruling rapidly on certain 
questions while dragging its feet on others. 
Following an emerging custom, Chief Jus-
tice Gogoi delivered a number of significant 
constitutional opinions in the weeks before 
his retirement in November, adding to the 
country’s rich and sometimes confusing con-
stitutional jurisprudence. 
The control of the Supreme Court’s docket 
rests almost entirely in the hands of its ad-
ministrative head, the Chief Justice of India. 
Supreme Court judges do not have fixed 
terms, although they have a retirement age 
threshold, and the process of appointing a 
Chief Justice is neither transparent nor pub-
lic. The resultant centralization of power in 
a single office that sees rapid turnover and 
no public scrutiny is part of why the Court’s 
decision-making process continues to be in-
consistent and opaque. This was acutely ev-
ident in 2019, when the Chief Justice heard 
and dismissed a sexual harassment complaint 
filed against himself by a Supreme Court 
staffer.1 Concerns about the functioning of 
the Indian Supreme Court were coupled with 
massive public protests regarding constitu-
tional changes to citizenship laws and the 
federal framework of India. A characteristic 
part of such protests was the public recitation 
of the Constitution’s Preamble; 2019, conse-
quently, was a year that saw challenges to 
the Constitution by the executive as well as 
affirmations of its significance by the public. 
This report briefly reviews significant con-
stitutional developments and cases in India 
in 2019.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
India amended its Constitution in 2019 to 
extend affirmative action to economically 
disadvantaged persons. India has already 
instituted such affirmative action in gov-
ernment employment and for governmental 
educational institutions for historically dis-
advantaged castes and tribes, and the 103rd 
Constitutional Amendment allows a quota of 
10% in government employment and edu-
cational institutes for ‘economically weaker 
sections’ of society.2 Despite the significance 
of this change, the amendment bill was not 
circulated in public for comments as required 
by the Pre-Legislative Consultative Policy of 
this government,3 and was introduced at the 
very last minute into the legislature’s list of 
1 Niha Masih, ‘A woman has accused India’s top judge of sexual harassment, engulfing the Supreme 
Court in turmoil’, Washington Post (2 May 2019) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/
a-woman-has-accused-indias-top-judge-of-sexual-harassment-engulfing-the-supreme-court-in-tur-
moil/2019/05/01/0ea2820e-6ab4-11e9-bbe7-1c798fb80536_story.html> (accessed 13 February 2020).
2 The Constitution (103rd Amendment Act) 2019 [India] <http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadDa-
ta/2019/195175.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2020). 
3 Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Legislative Department, ‘Pre-Legislative Consulta-
tive Policy’ (5 February 2014) <http://legislative.gov.in/documents/pre-legislative-consultation-policy> 
(accessed 13 February 2020).
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business, violating its rules of procedure and 
catching many legislators by surprise.4 The 
effective inability to oppose this legislation, 
by bucking parliamentary procedure, raisesd 
concerns about democratic accountability in 
India’s Parliament. Pre-legislative consulta-
tion policies are not legally binding, but con-
cerns about the manner of lawmaking have 
led to recent calls to amend legislative pro-
cedure to make them mandatory before bills 
are passed in Parliament.5 
Concerns about democratic accountability 
were also raised when the Indian Govern-
ment undertook a restructuring of India’s 
federal structure by circumventing consti-
tutional procedure. The highly-militarized 
state of Jammu and Kashmir in the north of 
India has been historically contested terri-
tory, with an ongoing record of border con-
flicts with Pakistan and China. Jammu and 
Kashmir’s terms of accession to the Indian 
republic in 1947 guaranteed it semi-autono-
my, an exceptional status under Article 370 
of the Constitution. This allowed Jammu and 
Kashmir to have significantly more indepen-
dence than other states in legislation and in-
ternal affairs,6 suspended the application of 
some Constitutional provisions in the state, 
and allowed its citizens certain privileges 
that were not granted to non-permanent resi-
dents of Jammu and Kashmir.7 Article 370(1)
(d) of the Indian Constitution allowed the 
President to apply Constitutional provisions 
to Jammu and Kashmir by an order, passed 
in consultation with Jammu and Kashmir’s 
constituent assembly. This constituent as-
sembly was dissolved in 1956; consequent-
ly, in August 2019, the President of India, 
foregoing any consultation with the people 
of Kashmir, issued an order that applied all 
constitutional provisions to the state, effec-
tively revoking its special status and allow-
ing consultation with the state’s legislative 
assembly and government instead.8 This is 
despite the fact that the Supreme Court of 
India in 2017 held that the dissolution of 
the erstwhile Constituent Assembly did not 
deactivate the requirements of Article 370.9 
Moreover, the legislature and government 
of Jammu and Kashmir have been dissolved 
since 2018, with the state since being gov-
erned by a governor appointed by the federal 
government. As a consequence, the Govern-
ment of India was able to divide the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir into two centrally-ad-
ministered territories to be governed directly 
by the federal government, completely obvi-
ating all public consultation by consulting its 
own appointee instead.10 Challenges to the 
reorganisation and removal of autonomy of 
Jammu and Kashmir were immediately filed 
at the Supreme Court of India and are cur-
rently being heard.11  
Jammu and Kashmir has a high level of mil-
itarization and unrest, and in anticipation of 
protests against the removal of autonomy and 
reorganisation, the Government of India im-
posed a complete communications blockade 
in the state, preventing all phone and Internet 
communication and prohibiting public gath-
erings. It utilized, in part, a colonial-era le-
gal provision to impose public restrictions.12 
A legal challenge to the indefinite blockade 
was filed in the Supreme Court, and while 
the Court refused to intervene directly pend-
ing the proceedings, it called upon the Gov-
ernment to make efforts to restore normalcy 
to Jammu and Kashmir as far as national se-
curity permitted.13 The Supreme Court also 
heard challenges in 2019 to orders placing 
leaders of the political opposition under in-
definite house arrest in Jammu and Kashmir. 
These leaders were detained under the Jam-
mu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, 
which allows the Government to detain per-
sons for up to two years without a trial.14 A 
petition for habeas corpus concerning one 
such detained political leader was dismissed 
by the Supreme Court, which directed the 
petitioner to challenge the detention before 
a board constituted under the Public Safety 
Act instead.15 
In addition to concerns about constitutional 
changes in the status of Jammu and Kash-
mir, India’s citizenship laws have also been 
the subject of widespread public protest, 
following an amendment to the Citizenship 
Act, 1955.16 This amendment allows the 
Indian Government to expedite citizenship 
4 Malavika Prasad, ‘Parliament passes 10% quota for general category poor: Govt bulldozing amendment in both Houses undermines Constitution’, First-
post (10 January 2019) <https://www.firstpost.com/india/parliament-passes-10-quota-for-general-category-poor-govt-bulldozing-amendment-in-both-hous-
es-is-betrayal-of-the-constitution-5867411.html> (accessed 13 February 2020).
5 Arun PS and Sushmita Patel, ‘Democratising Law-Making: The Tale of Pre-Legislative Consultative Policy’, Medianama (15 August 2019) <https://www.
medianama.com/2019/08/223-democratising-lawmaking-the-tale-of-pre-legislative-consultation-policy/> (accessed 13 February 2020).
6 Constitution of India 1950, Art 370. 
7 Constitution of India 1950, Art 35A.
8 Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Legislative Department, ‘The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 2019’ (5 August 2019) 
<http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/210049.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2019).
9 State Bank of India v Santosh Gupta (2017), 2 S.C.C. 538 paragraph 14, 15 (Supreme Court of India). 
10 Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, ‘Jammu and Kashmir (Reorganisation) Act 2019’ <http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/210407.
pdf> (accessed 13 February 2020).
11 Press Trust of India, ‘Article 370: Question of referring issue to 7-judge bench to be considered at later stage, says Supreme Court’, Economic Times 
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/article-370-question-of-referring-issue-to-7-judge-bench-to-be-considered-at-later-stage-
says-supreme-court/articleshow/72494859.cms> (accessed 13 February 2020).
12 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, Section 144.
13 Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India, W.P. (C), 1031 of 2019, Supreme Court of India, Order dated 16 September 2019 <https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecou
rt/2019/28817/28817_2019_1_304_16826_Order_16-Sep-2019.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2020).
14 Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act 1978 <http://jkhome.nic.in/psa0001.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2020). 
15 Vaiko v Union of India, W.P. (Crl), 256 of 2019.
16 The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 (12 December 2019, India) < http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/214646.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2019).
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to undocumented migrants from six reli-
gious groups, notably excluding Muslims. 
The Preamble of the Indian Constitution af-
firms India’s status as a ‘secular’ republic;17 
consequently, the introduction of a law that 
specifically discriminates on the basis of 
religion has been challenged with sixty pe-
titions filed against it in the Supreme Court 
of India.18 While some of these petitions 
have been filed by private individuals, they 
include a petition from the state of Kerala, 
which has invoked the Supreme Court’s ju-
risdiction as an arbiter of federal disputes to 
argue that the Citizenship Amendment Act is 
unconstitutional and discriminatory.19 These 
petitions are scheduled to be heard in 2020.20 
In addition to the changes to the Citizenship 
Act, the Indian Government has proposed 
the implementation of a National Register of 
Citizens (NRC), a database that is intended 
to constitute an official record of citizens of 
India, by re-examining the documentation of 
every citizen in the country.21 A significant 
federal conflict has emerged as a result, with 
eleven state governments (representing 56% 
of the Indian population) refusing to imple-
ment the NRC, citing the potential disenfran-
chisement of undocumented minorities and 
groups disadvantaged for reasons of caste, 
gender, sexuality, and religion.22 Legal opin-
ions on whether the states can refuse to im-
plement a federal law remain divided.23
The Indian Supreme Court in 2019 delivered 
a series of constitutionally significant judg-
ments concerning freedom of information, 
religious rights, and political crises concern-
ing the formation of state governments after 
elections.24 However, the Court’s rulings 
were all in the shadow of its response to a 
sexual harassment complaint against Chief 
Justice Ranjan Gogoi. The female staffer 
who raised the complaint was dismissed from 
service, after which the Chief Justice consti-
tuted and himself chaired a bench of three 
judges who considered and denied these al-
legations. The complainant was not present 
and was not heard during this process, and 
no judicial orders were passed; however, 
the Chief Justice publicly described the al-
legations as part of a conspiracy to destabi-
lise the Court.25 Following criticism of this 
process, the Chief Justice again constituted 
a bench of judges selected by himself, which 
directed an in-house committee to hear and 
reconsider the allegations against him and 
report them to his successor. The committee 
faced complaints regarding its procedure for 
hearing the challenge from the complainant 
and others; however, it eventually dismissed 
the allegations of sexual harassment as un-
founded and refused to publish or disclose its 
findings.26 After Chief Justice Gogoi’s retire-
ment, the complainant was reinstated to her 
position on the Supreme Court’s staff with 
full back wages.27 This incident, along with 
the summary dismissal of two court officials 
for tampering with a Supreme Court order in 
an ongoing case,28 presented significant con-
cerns regarding the Supreme Court’s admin-
istrative functioning. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. M. Siddiq v Mahant Suresh Das and oth-
ers29  religious freedom, property 
The Supreme Court brought to a close the 
decades-long conflict regarding the demo-
lition of a 16th century mosque called the 
Babri Masjid in the city of Ayodhya by riot-
ing members of Hindu groups in 1992. The 
mob that demolished the mosque claimed 
that it was built over a historic Hindu site, 
marking the birthplace of a deity. Under the 
Indian Constitution, religious groups have 
the right to manage, own, and administer 
their religious property;30 consequently, this 
case presented a conflict of group religious 
rights as well as conflicting claims regarding 
the ownership and title of the contested site, 
further complicated by the fact that more 
than one Hindu religious organization raised 
claims to the property. Overruling a previous 
High Court order that held the property to be 
jointly owned by the parties to the suit, the 
17 Constitution of India 1950, Preamble and Article 14. 
18 Anindita Sanyal, ‘Around 60 Petitions on Citizenship Law to Be Heard by Supreme Court Today’, NDTV (18 December 2019) <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/
caa-citizenship-amendment-act-around-60-petitions-on-citizenship-law-to-be-heard-by-supreme-court-to-2150459> (accessed 13 February 2019).
19 ‘State of Kerala Files Suit in SC Against Union Govt Challenging Citizenship Amendment Act’. LiveLaw 13 January 2020 <https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/
breaking-state-of-kerala-files-suit-in-sc-against-union-govt-challenging-citizenship-amendment-act-151600 > (accessed 13 February 2020). 
20 Indian Union of Muslim League and Others v Union of India, W.P. (C), 1470 of 2019, Supreme Court of India, Order dated 18 December 2019 <https://main.sci.
gov.in/supremecourt/2019/44931/44931_2019_1_38_19246_Order_18-Dec-2019.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2020).
21 The Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003 <http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-Act&Rules/notifications/citizenship_
rules2003.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2020).
22 Samyak Pandey, ‘11 State Governments, Representing 56% of India, have now taken a no-NRC stance’, The Print (24 December 2019) <https://theprint.in/
india/11-state-govts-representing-56-of-india-have-now-taken-a-no-nrc-stance/340213/> (accessed 13 February 2020).
23 Arpan Chaturvedi, ‘Can States Refuse to Implement NPR and NRC?’, Bloomberg Quint (31 December 2019) <https://www.bloombergquint.com/law-and-policy/
can-states-refuse-to-implement-npr-and-nrc> (accessed 13 February 2020). 
24 See Part II below.
25 Press Trust of India, ‘Supreme Court holds special hearing on sexual harassment allegations of former SC employee against CJI’, Business Standard (20 April 
2019) <https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/sc-holds-special-hearing-on-sexual-harassment-allegations-of-former-sc-employee-against-
cji-119042000215_1.html> (accessed 13 February 2020). 
26 Supreme Court of India, Notice dated 06.05.2019 <https://main.sci.gov.in/pdf/LU/notice_06052019.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2020). 
27 ‘Supreme Court employee who complained against former CJI reinstated’, The Hindu (23 January 2020) <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/su-
preme-court-employee-who-complained-against-former-cji-reinstated/article30636638.ece> (accessed 13 February 2020).
28 R. Balaji, ‘Supreme Court sacks 2 of its own over change in order on Ambani’, The Telegraph (14 February 2019) <https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/su-
preme-court-sacks-2-of-its-own-over-change-in-order-on-ambani/cid/1684489> (accessed 13 February 2020). 
29 (2019) S.C.C. Online 1440 [Supreme Court of India]. 
30 Constitution of India 1950, Art 26.
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Supreme Court released a unanimous, but 
puzzling judgment regarding the property. 
Examining historical evidence, the Court 
found that neither Muslim nor Hindu groups 
could show title to the property, but that the 
decision could be made by examining pos-
session.31 Examining two different parts of 
the property, the Court found a ‘preponder-
ance of probabilities’ suggested that Hindu 
groups had exclusive possession of one part 
of the property, while the Muslim groups 
failed to conclusively prove exclusive pos-
session of another.32 While the reason for 
applying two different standards of posses-
sion was not explained, the Court used this 
finding to grant the property as a whole to 
the Hindu groups, directing the federal gov-
ernment to constitute a trust to manage the 
property.33 Although it also found that the 
demolition of the mosque was, in fact, illegal 
and a ‘serious violation of the rule of law’,34 
the Court did not direct any further action 
as a consequence of this finding, and in-
stead directed the state government to grant 
the Muslim community an alternative plot 
of land to build a mosque, as it found that 
a ‘wrong committed must be remedied’.35 A 
number of petitions from both parties seek-
ing a review of this judgment were subse-
quently dismissed.
2. Central Public Information Officer v Sub-
hash Chandra Aggarwal:36 right to informa-
tion, accountability, judicial administration
A constitutional bench of five judges heard 
three appeals concerning the application of 
India’s Right to Information Act, 2005 to 
the institution of the Supreme Court itself. 
The respondent, Mr. Aggarwal, had filed 
three applications to the Court’s designated 
Public Information Officer (PIO) seeking 
details of correspondence from the Chief 
Justice concerning judicial appointments as 
well as information about the financial assets 
declared by Supreme Court judges. The PIO 
had rejected these applications on various 
grounds, arguing that the office of the Chief 
Justice was distinct from the Registry of the 
Supreme Court to claim that the information 
was unavailable to him. He also presented the 
claim that some of it was held by the Chief 
Justice in a fiduciary capacity and could not 
be disclosed. The respondent had preferred 
appeals to the Central Information Com-
mission, arguing that the PIO had erred and 
that procedures under the Right to Informa-
tion Act had not been followed. The appeals 
were allowed and were affirmed again by 
the Delhi High Court. The Supreme Court’s 
PIO then appealed to the Supreme Court it-
self, which ruled in favour of the respondent. 
In a move towards greater transparency, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the PIO could not 
refuse to grant information available with 
the Chief Justice, as the office of the Chief 
Justice and the Registry of the Court were 
part of the same institution and could not be 
treated as separate entities.37 Interpreting ex-
ceptions under the Right to Information Act, 
2005, the Court emphasized the need to bal-
ance protections to individual privacy with 
the public interest in transparency, directing 
the PIO to disclose to the petitioner the de-
tails of assets declared by judges. These were 
found to not be held in a fiduciary capacity 
by the Chief Justice. The remaining two ap-
plications were redirected to the PIO, who 
was ordered to re-examine the availability of 
the information, issue notice to the appellant, 
and follow the procedures under the Right to 
Information Act, 2005.    
3. Yashwant Sinha v. Central Bureau of In-
formation:38 right to information, account-
ability, freedom of the press 
Petitions filed at the Supreme Court chal-
lenging an intergovernmental agreement 
with France to acquire fighter jets from Das-
sault were dismissed in 2018, with the Su-
preme Court finding no credence to allega-
tions of corruption.39 The petitioners filed for 
a review in 2019, claiming that the original 
judgment had been obtained by suppressing 
relevant material that the Court should have 
considered. The information that the petition-
ers were relying on were documents alleged-
ly sourced from the Ministry of Defence 
and published in a national newspaper, The 
Hindu. The Government of India opposed 
this review, raising a preliminary objection 
that the Official Secrets Act, 1923 prohibited 
the disclosure of these documents, and that 
consequently they could not be relied upon 
by the petitioners. Although the review pe-
titions were ultimately dismissed on merits 
in November,40 the Supreme Court in a sig-
nificant order had dismissed the preliminary 
objections regarding the disclosure of docu-
ments under the Official Secrets Act, 1923.41 
In this April order, the Court reiterated the 
constitutional protections and precedent con-
cerning the freedom of the press, and found 
that the Official Secrets Act, 1923 did not ab-
solutely prevent the publication or disclosure 
of information if it was in the public interest 
for the purpose of the Right to Information 
Act, 2005 or the laws concerning evidence 
produced in court. This was a significant step 
towards greater transparency, particularly 
with reference to government contracts. 
31 (2019) S.C.C. Online 1440 [Supreme Court of India], Paragraph 1027.
32 (2019) S.C.C. Online 1440 [Supreme Court of India], paragraphs 1223.4, 1223.5, 1236.
33  (2019) S.C.C. Online 1440 [Supreme Court of India], paragraph 1243.
34 (2019) S.C.C. Online 1440 [Supreme Court of India], paragraph 1223.7. 
35 (2019) S.C.C. Online SC 1440 [Supreme Court of India], paragraph 1238. 
36 (2019) S.C.C. Online SC 1549 [Supreme Court of India]. 
37 (2019) S.C.C. Online SC 1549 [Supreme Court of India] paragraph 14. 
38 (2019) 6 S.C.C. 1 [Supreme Court of India]; Judgment dated 14 November 2019 [Supreme Court of India] <https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecou
rt/2019/58/58_2019_1_1502_18275_Judgement_14-Nov-2019.pdf> (accessed 13 February 2020).
39 Manohar Lal Sharma v Narendra Damordas Modi (2019), 3 S.C.C. 25 [Supreme Court of India]. 
40 Yashwant Sinha v Central Bureau of Investigation (2019), S.C.C. Online SC 1460 [Supreme Court of India].
41 Yashwant Sinha v Central Bureau of Investigation (2019), 6 S.C.C. 1 [Supreme Court of India].
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4. Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel v 
Satish Kumar Gupta42  and Swiss Ribbons v. 
Union of India:43 insolvency, banking
The Supreme Court in two significant de-
cisions ruled on the constitutionality of the 
newly-introduced Insolvency and Banking 
Code, 2016 (IBC), a statute that sought to 
resolve and update several conflicting finan-
cial regulations and laws. In Swiss Ribbons v 
Union of India, the Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the IBC, rejecting challenges to 
the Constitution of administrative authorities 
under the Code as well as claims that parts 
of the Code that classified creditors were 
‘manifestly arbitrary’ and therefore violated 
the constitutional right to equality.44 In doing 
so, the Court emphasized a high standard of 
judicial deference for economic legislation. 
Following this, in Committee of Creditors of 
Essar Steel v Satish Kumar Gupta, the Court 
heard challenges to a 2019 amendment to the 
IBC, which included a fixed time limit for 
the conclusion of insolvency proceedings. 
Despite its previous finding regarding judi-
cial deference and the emphasis on making 
insolvency proceedings a time-bound pro-
cess in Swiss Ribbons, the Court in Essar 
Steel invoked the doctrine of ‘manifest arbi-
trariness’ to reject this time limit, holding it 
to be discretionary instead of mandatory.45 In 
these decisions, the Court also directed that 
administrative tribunals constituted under 
the IBC must maintain independence from 
governing ministries to avoid conflicts of 
interest in cases where the Government is a 
party to disputes, and provided specific or-
ders regarding the sources of funding and 
administration of these tribunals.46 While 
Swiss Ribbons and Essar Steel provide much 
clarity on the functioning of the IBC, the di-
vergence on constitutional doctrine is an in-
evitable consequence of a poly-vocal Court 
that sits in multiple benches to rule on simi-
lar issues, often concurrently, and sometimes 
contradictorily.  
5. Kantaru Rajeevaru v Indian Young Law-
yers Association:47 religious freedom, judi-
cial review 
In 2018, the Supreme Court resolved a dis-
pute concerning access to the Sabarimala 
Temple, ruling that the rights of women to 
worship there took precedence over an ex-
clusionary religious practice that linked 
menstruation to beliefs regarding impurity 
to prohibit women between the ages of 12 
and 50 from entering the temple.48 A review 
petition was filed against this judgment, 
along with some new petitions. The Court, 
by a majority of three to two judges, chose 
to hear the review petitions along with the 
new petitions, a puzzling approach that it 
first implemented in 2018 when hearing 
petitions and reviews against its judgment 
upholding criminal prohibitions against sex-
ual intercourse for LGBTQ+ citizens.49 This 
judgment appears to indicate that the Court 
did not consider itself to be bound by rules 
governing the hearing of review petitions, 
as the Court acknowledged that Order XL-
VII in Part IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 
2013 was not complied with in hearing these 
petitions. The resulting ambiguity in judicial 
procedure and the availability of reviews 
will, no doubt, have consequences for the fi-
nality attached to Supreme Court judgments, 
as indicated by two dissenting judges.50 Sub-
stantively, the order did not overrule the pre-
vious judgment, but instead raised a number 
of related issues that may arise in future cas-
es pending the Court, calling for them to be 
referred to a larger bench for consideration. 
The dissenting judges have pointed out that 
these questions anticipated by the Court are 
not presently being adjudicated, and there-
fore cannot be referred for decisions to a 
larger bench.51 Regardless, the Court went 
on to refer these questions to a larger bench 
of nine judges, framing seven questions con-
cerning the interpretation of constitutional 
protections to religious rights for individuals 
and groups.52 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In 2020, the Supreme Court of India is ex-
pected to rule on a number of significant 
constitutional questions that were held over 
from 2019, including the legality of amend-
ments to India’s citizenship laws, which will 
allow the Government to discriminate on the 
grounds of religion, as well as the restruc-
turing of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, 
which was done without public consultation. 
The validity of long-standing Internet prohi-
bitions is pending before the Court, as well 
as petitioners concerning the detention of 
minors. The Court is also expected to hear a 
case challenging the Government’s introduc-
tion of a scheme of electoral bonds, which 
reduce transparency in political funding. 
It has been pending before the Court since 
2018 while the scheme continues to be im-
plemented. The reference to a larger bench 
for a decision on principles of religious free-
dom under the Indian Constitution is also 
pending from 2019. A key concern will be 
whether the Court chooses to hear and ad-
42 (2019) S.C.C. Online SC 1478 [Supreme Court of India]. 
43 (2019) 4 S.C.C. 17 [Supreme Court of India]. 
44 Constitution of India 1950, Art 14.
45 See Dhruva Gandhi and Sahil Raveen, ‘The Supreme Court’s IBC Judgment and the Continuing Problems with “Manifest Arbitrariness”’, Indian Constitutional 
Law and Philosophy (8 December 2019) < https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2019/12/08/guest-post-the-supreme-courts-ibc-judgment-and-the-continuing-
problems-with-manifest-arbitrariness/> (accessed 13 February 2020).
46 (2019) 4 S.C.C. 17 [Supreme Court of India], Paragraph 36.
47 (2019) S.C.C. Online SC 1461 [Supreme Court of India]. 
48 (2018) S.C.C. Online 1690.
49 (2019) S.C.C. Online SC 1461 para 1.
50 (2019) S.C.C. Online SC 1461, Para 14 (per Justice Nariman and Justice Chandrachud, dissenting). 
51 (2019) S.C.C. Online SC 1461, Para 11 (per Justice Nariman and Justice Chandrachud, dissenting).
52 (2020) S.C.C. Online SC 158.
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dress these concerns, or whether it will con-
tinue to hold one or several of these matters 
pending, effectively allowing Government 
action to remain unchecked.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This report offers an overview of the Indo-
nesian Constitutional Court’s case law in the 
term 2018/2019 (a term of the Constitution-
al Court begins in mid-August, and usually 
Court sessions continue until early August 
in the following year). The last term marked 
the full term under the leadership of Chief 
Justice Anwar Usman. Usman was sworn in 
as Chief Justice on April 2, 2018. The Chief 
Justice has a limited term of two and a half 
years, which means that Usman will be the 
Chief Justice until November 2020, and 
could be re-elected. He was appointed as an 
associate justice in 2011 and re-appointed in 
2016, which means that his second five-year 
term will finish in April 2021. So if Usman 
gets re-elected as Chief Justice, he will never 
complete his second term because the term 
of his appointment does not match the term 
of his chief justiceship.
The last term also marked the departure of 
Associate Justice I Dewa Gede Palguna, who 
finished his second term in office on January 
7, 2020. Justice Palguna was the last remain-
ing justice from the first-generation Court. 
He was appointed in August 2003 and fin-
ished his first term in 2008. But President 
Joko Widodo re-appointed Palguna as an as-
sociate justice in January 2015. On January 
7, 2020, President Jokowi appointed Daniel 
Yusmic, an academic from the medium-tier 
law school Atma Jaya Catholic University 
Jakarta, to succeed Justice Palguna. On the 
same day, Associate Justice Suhartoyo was 
re-appointed for his second term by the Su-
preme Court. The last term also marked the 
re-appointment of two associate justices by 
the House of Representatives (Dewan Per-
wakilan Rakyat – DPR), Aswanto, and Wa-
hiduddin Adams. 
This report offers a quick overview of the 
Court’s decisions for comparative judicial 
scholars who are interested in the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court’s case law. The primary 
focus of the report will be on statutory review, 
in which six cases are examined, mostly cen-
tered on the judicial review of electoral laws.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The Court’s docket in the last term was filled 
with simultaneous general election disputes, 
especially presidential election disputes. On 
April 17, 2019, Indonesia held the first si-
multaneous election for the President and 
vice president, members of the Regional 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan 
Daerah – DPD), members of the House of 
Representatives, and members of regional 
legislative bodies. It was reported that the 
Court received 334 cases on the general 
election dispute, which include 323 cases of 
a legislative election dispute, 10 cases of the 
dispute over the DPD election, and one pres-
idential election dispute.
The highlight of the simultaneous general 
election disputes was the presidential elec-
tion dispute, in which the losing presidential 
candidate, Prabowo Subianto, challenged 
the election result to the Court. On June 27, 
2019, the Court rejected Subianto’s petition 
to nullify the presidential election result. All 
nine justices rejected his petition in its en-
tirety, and the Court reaffirmed the victory of 
incumbent President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo 
and his running mate, the chairman of the 
Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), Maruf 
Amin, by 11% over the ticket of Prabowo 
Subianto and Sandiaga Uno.
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The simultaneous general election, which 
took place on April 17, 2019, was the man-
date of a Court decision in 2014.1 But it 
turned out to be one of the most trying in 
Indonesia’s history, with the death of more 
than 400 polling station workers. The Court 
immediately took heat as public anger was 
directed at the Court’s decision. Most ana-
lysts and media blamed the Constitutional 
Court for holding the presidential and leg-
islative elections simultaneously. As of the 
writing of this report, there have been two 
pending cases on the simultaneous general 
election. Several election monitoring groups 
are the petitioners in the first case,2 and in 
the second case, an NGO called the League 
for Election and Democracy (Perkumpulan 
Untuk Pemilu dan Demokrasi - Perludem) 
has fielded a judicial review.3 The petitioners 
have asked the Court to declare the simul-
taneous election unconstitutional. In other 
words, they want the Court to nullify its own 
decision, and they propose that the elections 
be held separately in 2024 as in past elec-
tions. Nobody knows how the Court will de-
cide the case, but there has been a downward 
trend of support for the Court’s decision, so 
there is a high probability it will nullify its 
own decision. As precedent, the Court nul-
lified its rulings last term in Pollster and 
Quick Count Results III without any persua-
sive legal reasoning. The Court is not strictly 
bound to the principle stare decisis because 
Indonesia adheres to the civil law tradition; 
nonetheless, the it is still obliged to have a 
compelling reason to nullify its rulings.  
But the main issue with the simultaneous 
general election was the logistical and tech-
nical issues surrounding it as opposed to its 
constitutionality. Before the general election 
on April 17, 2019, the chairman of the Elec-
tion Commission opposed the use of elec-
tronic voting, reasoning that the nation was 
not ready for it. But he has recently become 
open to the idea at the 2020 simultaneous 
regional election.4 Moreover, the then-Min-
ister of Home Affairs, Tjahjyo Kumolo, also 
entertained the idea of having electronic 
voting.5 Indeed, the work of polling station 
workers would have been made much more 
comfortable if Indonesia allowed electronic 
voting. Even without it, the Election Com-
mission should have at least allowed polling 
station workers to use computers to file re-
ports instead of having to file them manually. 
The relocation of the capital was another 
crucial constitutional development last year. 
As one of his election pledges, President 
Jokowi announced a plan to relocate Indo-
nesia’s capital from Jakarta to a new place 
on the island of Kalimantan. Jokowi for-
mally proposed the capital relocation in his 
speech in Parliament on August 16, 2019, to 
commemorate the 74th anniversary of Indo-
nesia’s independence. When he announced 
his plan, there was no formal legal basis for 
his decision. It was only after he delivered 
the speech that his administration began to 
prepare a bill. The Jokowi administration 
finished the bill in December 2019 and sub-
mitted it to the Parliament in January 2020. 
It was hoping that the Parliament would ap-
prove the bill by July 2020. While Jokowi 
has a compelling reason to relocate the cap-
ital due to chronic issues of flooding, traffic 
congestion, and pollution, as well as soaring 
property prices in the current capital, nobody 
seems to raise constitutional concern over 
the President’s decision. First, there are sev-
eral constitutional provisions related to the 
capital in the 1945 Constitution, and Jokowi 
and his team do not seem bothered by them. 
Second, Jakarta has been the capital of the 
republic since the struggle for independence, 
and arguably, it is part of the unwritten Con-
stitution that Jakarta is the capital of the re-
public. Third, while the capital relocation 
bill is still in discussion, the administration 
has rolled out the plan to relocate the capital. 
In other words, the Jokowi administration is 
relocating the capital without any legal basis. 
It remains to be seen when the administra-
tion will formally pass a statute for reloca-
tion, and whether there is a possibility that 
the statute will be challenged to the Indone-
sian Constitutional Court.
Another constitutional development in In-
donesia was the idea of a constitutional 
amendment. The ruling party PDI-P (Indo-
nesian Democratic Party of Struggle) pro-
posed a plan for a constitutional amendment. 
The PDI-P wanted to reinstate the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR) – which now 
acts as the joint session between the House 
of Representatives and Regional Represen-
tatives Council – as the highest governing 
body in the country. Under the New Order 
military regime’s Constitution, the MPR was 
the highest governing body with the authority 
to elect the President, but its members were 
mostly picked up by General Soeharto when 
he was President. The PDI-P has denied that 
it has any intention of entrenching the status 
quo, but merely wants to restore the author-
ity of the MPR to issue the defunct National 
State Planning Policy (Garis – Garis Be-
sar Haluan Negara – GBHN), which was a 
centralized economic plan model under the 
New Order military regime. President Joko-
wi has indicated his opposition to reinstating 
the GBHN, and he also bluntly expressed 
his dismay at the amendment proposal be-
cause it might have a hidden agenda to re-
store the authority of the MPR to appoint 
the President. No timetable has been set for 
the constitutional amendment; nevertheless, 
the PDI-P and its coalition supporters have 
a clear majority in the People’s Consultative 
Assembly, which means that they might not 
encounter any significant obstacle to passing 
the amendment. If the PDI-P and its coalition 
manage to roll back constitutional reform 
1 The Constitutional Court Decision No. 14/PUU-XI/2013 (hereinafter the Simultaneous general election I case).
2 The Constitutional Court Decision No. 37/PUU-XVII/2019 (hereinafter the Simultaneous general election II case). 
3 The Constitutional Court Decision No. 55/PUU/ XVI/2019 (hereinafter the Simultaneous general election III case). 
4 “KPU Buka Peluang Penerapan E-Voting di Pilkada 2020 Serentak,” (National Election Commission has opened the possibility to use electronic voting at the 
2020 Simultaneous general election), Tribunnews.com, July 18, 2019, https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2019/07/08/kpu-buka-peluang-penerapan-e-vot-
ing-di-pilkada-2020-serentak
5 “Indonesia Considers Electronic Voting After 550 Die of Exhaustion,” Bloomberg.com, May 7, 2019,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-07/indonesia-mulls-electronic-voting-after-550-die-of-exhaustion 
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by passing the amendment, there will be a 
serious constitutional issue of whether the 
amendment itself is constitutional.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
1. The Voting Registration Transfer Case 
(Decision No. 19/PUU-XVII/2019)
This case involved the interpretation of Law 
no. 17 of 2017 on the general election, espe-
cially Article 210, which provides that if for 
some reason a voter may not be able to cast 
his vote at the polling station where he/she 
originally has registered, then the voter may 
transfer his voting registration to a different 
polling station at least 30 days before voting 
day. Moreover, the voter must show his elec-
tronic ID and proof he/she was registered in 
the original polling station. The claimants 
are a group of university students who ar-
gued that the 30-day requirement for voter 
registration transfer is inhumane, as the pro-
vision does not anticipate emergencies that 
prompt a voter to travel to a different region 
during the week or days before voting day. 
The claimants asked the Court to declare that 
the transfer of voter registration be allowed 
at least seven days before voting day.
The Court held that the procedure of voter 
registration is the domain of the Executive 
and Legislative branches. Thus, lawmakers 
have the authority to choose any system of 
voter registration. The Court further held 
that Indonesian elections are based on the 
state-initiated “passive” registration system, 
in which electors are automatically regis-
tered by national or local authorities. This 
system, if well administered, is more likely 
to ensure that all eligible voters are regis-
tered. Therefore, the transfer of voter regis-
tration is an exception, and the Court ruled 
that the lawmakers have provided sufficient 
time for voters to transfer their voting regis-
tration. The Court rejected the petition in its 
entirety.
2. The Vote Counting Time and Electronic 
ID Case (Decision No. 20/PUU-XVII/2019)
In this case, the petitioners challenged two 
provisions of Law Number 7 of 2017 on 
the general election: Article 383 (2), which 
states that vote counting must be conducted 
and completed on voting day; and Article 
348 (9), which provides that the voters who 
are not registered may cast a vote by show-
ing their electronic ID.
On account of the vote-counting time, the 
petitioners argued that the provision would 
potentially affect the validity of the general 
election as many polling stations would not 
be able to complete vote counting on voting 
day. The Court considered the consequence 
of holding a simultaneous election that 
would increase the volume of ballots, which 
eventually would require extra time to count 
them. It then held that the extension of the 
vote-counting time could only be done as 
long as the counting process was carried out 
continuously until no later than 12 (twelve) 
hours from the end of voting day at polling 
stations. The Court further held that the 12 
extra hours of vote counting time was more 
than enough to resolve vote counting at poll-
ing stations. 
Concerning the issue of electronic IDs, the 
petitioners argued that many citizens have 
no electronic ID, and therefore the provision 
would deprive them of their right to vote. 
The Court acknowledged that there had been 
an ongoing issue in the administration of 
national identity, especially concerning the 
computerized national register that contains 
necessary information about Indonesian cit-
izens. Therefore, the Court acknowledged 
that not all voters have an electronic ID. 
Nevertheless, it reaffirmed the requirement 
to present an electronic ID as the minimum 
prerequisite for casting a vote at a polling 
station. The Court ruled that other types of 
IDs do not carry the same weight as electron-
ic IDs, and so they could not be used as alter-
nate IDs to cast a vote. Moreover, the use of 
non-electronic IDs had the potential to create 
fraud and manipulation.
The Court held that if a voter had not ob-
tained an electronic ID by voting day, then 
he/she could use the certificate of registra-
tion of the electronic ID from the Bureau of 
Population Affairs, and such certificate could 
be used as a substitute for the electronic ID.
3. The Pollster and Quick Count Results III 
Case (Decision No. 24/PUU/XVII/2019)
This case was related to the prohibition of 
announcing the results of a pooling survey in 
the week before election day, which is known 
as the “cooling-off period” (masa tenang), 
and the announcement of quick count results 
before two hours after the closing of polling 
stations in the Western time zone of Indone-
sia. The Court already issued two previous 
decisions that invalidated the prohibition on 
the announcement of polling surveys during 
the cooling-off period, and stated that quick 
count results must not be announced at least 
two hours before the closing of polling sta-
tions in the Western time zone.6 But lawmak-
ers keep reinstating the prohibitions in new 
electoral laws, and the latest one was in Law 
No. 17 of 2017 on general elections.7   
The claimants asked the Court to nullify the 
prohibitions and reaffirm its previous hold-
ings. The Court addressed a question to itself 
on whether to reaffirm or nullify its previous 
holdings. It opined that its decisions must be 
understood in the context of the “living Con-
stitution,” which means that the Constitution 
must be interpreted in the light of evolving 
thoughts and opinions in society. The Court 
considered that the 2017 general election 
law was designed in the context of a simul-
taneous election, which was different from 
the previous two electoral laws. The Court 
further considered that the re-introduction of 
6 The Constitutional Court Decision No. 09/PUUVII/2009 (the Pollster and Quick Count Results I case) and the Constitutional Court Decision No. 24/PUU-XII/2014 
(the Pollster and Quick Count Results II case). 
7 The Government initially included the provision in the Law No. 10/2008 on General Provision Law and later it re-enacted the provision in the Law No. 8 of 2012 on 
general election.  
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the prohibition for polling surveys and quick 
count results must be read under new cir-
cumstances, i.e., simultaneous election.
The Court held that the prohibition for the 
publication of polling results during the 
cooling-off period was related to the de-
sign of the electoral process in Indonesia, in 
which the cooling-off period was intended 
to restrict all campaign activities until elec-
tion day. The Court explained that based on 
the empirical evidence, some pollsters were 
affiliated with political parties or presiden-
tial candidates. Therefore, if pollsters were 
allowed to announce their survey results 
during the cooling-off period, it would be 
contrary to the nature of the cooling-off pe-
riod. In other words, the announcement of 
polling results during the cooling-off period 
was a manifestation of the campaign during 
the cooling-off period.
Concerning the prohibition to announce 
quick results in two hours after the closing of 
the polling stations, the Court held that such 
prohibition must not be read as an attempt 
to curtail the citizens’ rights to obtain infor-
mation. The Court held that the prohibition 
was intended only to delay the publication 
of quick count results for a more fundamen-
tal purpose – to protect electoral results. The 
Court explained that while the polling sta-
tions were closed in the Western time zone, 
people in the Central and Eastern time zones 
were still casting their votes. Therefore, the 
two hours’ prohibition was intended to pro-
tect those voters from any outer influence in 
casting their votes. The Court opined that 
the immediate quick count results would 
potentially influence the voters to cast their 
vote based on “psychological motivation” to 
be with the winner. The Court rejected the 
claimants’ petition in its entirety and nulli-
fied its holding. 
4. The Supreme Court’s Judicial Review 
Process Case (Decision No. 85/PUU/
XVI/2018)
The background of this case is jurisdictional 
cohabitation between the Constitutional 
Court and the Supreme Court to conduct 
judicial review. The Constitution equipped 
the Constitutional Court to review the con-
stitutionality of statutes, but the Supreme 
Court has the authority to review the consti-
tutionality of any regulation below statutes 
in the hierarchy of norm, i.e., governmental 
regulation, presidential regulation, etc. The 
petitioners challenged the constitutionality 
of Law No. 3 of 2009 on the Supreme Court, 
which provided that the Supreme Court will 
conduct a judicial review within 14 days of 
the submission of a petition. The petitioners 
argued that the 14-day period was too short 
because it did not give sufficient time for pe-
titioners to prepare arguments, and it also did 
not allow the government or lawmakers to 
present their arguments.
The Court held that it was in the authority 
of the lawmakers to assign a 14-day period 
for the Supreme Court to resolve the judicial 
review. If the petitioners expect the Supreme 
Court to conduct oral arguments by both par-
ties and to present expert witnesses, then the 
Supreme Court will need extra time to con-
duct the judicial review. The Court opined 
that such a request should be addressed to 
the lawmakers instead of the Court. The 
Court held that it was the domain of lawmak-
ers to change the law instead of the Court. 
The Court rejected the petition in its entirety.
5. The Pretrial Procedure II Case (Decision 
No. 66/PUU/XVI/2018)
This case involved the issue of pretrial pro-
ceeding under the Criminal Law procedure; 
the crux of the matter was the provision in 
the Criminal Procedure Law that stipulates 
that a judge must pass a judgment on a pre-
trial proceeding within a seven-day period 
(Article 82 § 1c). This case was related to 
the previous Court’s decision on the pretri-
al proceeding in Decision No. 102/PUU-
XIII/2015 (the Pretrial Procedure I case). In 
the Pretrial Procedure I case, the claimants 
challenged the constitutionality of Article 82 
§ 1d, which provided that in an event “a case 
has begun to be examined” in a district court, 
whereas the examination for pretrial review 
has not yet been completed, then the pretrial 
must be declared null and void. In the Pretri-
al Procedure I case, the Court held that the 
term “a case has begun to be examined” was 
unconstitutional and it must be interpreted 
that the pretrial was null and void when the 
first trial, which examines the merits of the 
case, started in the district court. In other 
words, the Court issued a new interpretation 
that the first trial, examining the merits of the 
case, will nullify the pretrial proceeding. 
The claimants in the Pretrial Procedure II 
case argued that the seven-day period had 
posed a new problem for the interpretation 
of the Court’s decision in the Pretrial Pro-
cedure I case. The claimants explained that 
there are many instances in which the pros-
ecutor might ask the panel of judges to de-
lay the pretrial proceeding for a certain pe-
riod, and such strategy was intended to buy 
time until the first trial is started. Such delay 
would cause the pretrial proceeding to be de-
clared null and void. The claimants asked the 
Court to declare that the district court must 
postpone the trial process until a judge ren-
ders a decision in the pretrial proceeding.
The Court opined that in an ideal world, 
there is no reason for a judge to delay a pre-
trial proceeding, and a district court judge 
should wait until the pretrial proceeding to 
be completed before starting the trial. But 
the Court considered that it is within the 
authority of the district court judges to de-
lay the pretrial or when to start a trial. The 
Constitutional Court held that it was beyond 
its authority to address the subject matter be-
cause it involved a matter of implementation 
of law instead of the constitutionality of law. 
The Court rejected the claimants’ petition 
entirely.
  
6. The Right to Obtain Recorded Informa-
tion Case (Decision No. 94/PUU/XVI/2018)
The case involved an interpretation of Law 
No. 36 of 1999 on telecommunications. The 
law provides that “for the purposes of crimi-
nal prosecution, the telecommunications ser-
vices operator may record the information 
transmitted and/or received by the telecom-
munication services operator and may pro-
vide the information,” based upon a written 
request from the Attorney General, the Chief 
of National Police, and an investigator for 
certain criminal offenses. The claimant ar-
gued that the article did not respect the rights 
of criminal suspects or defendants when a 
piece of recorded information was obtained, 
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and therefore the provision was contrary to 
the principle of due process.
The Court held that the rights for the pros-
ecutor and investigator to obtain a piece of 
recorded information must not be interpreted 
as a guarantee that the defendants will enjoy 
the same rights. The Court held that a defen-
dant was not a law enforcer, and therefore 
had no burden of proof to show. Thus, the 
Court rejected the petition in its entirety. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
When President Jokowi began his second 
term in office, his coalition held some 77 
percent of the parliamentary seats. With a 
parliamentary majority, especially after his 
archrival Prabowo Subianto joined the co-
alition, President Jokowi has solidified his 
“uncontested presidency.” As Jokowi has 
pushed many agendas to cement his legacy, 
the Constitutional Court hasn’t shown any 
desire to play the critical role of balancing 
the power of the presidency. In past years, 
the Court has become non-intervening, and, 
under the chairmanship of Anwar Usman, it 
has retreated further from the interventionist 
approach of the first- and second-generation 
Courts. 
Finally, at the end of April 2020, Associ-
ate Justice Manahan Sitompul will end his 
first five-year term. Justice Sitompul was 
appointed by the Supreme Court, and it re-
mains to be seen whether the Supreme Court 
will re-appoint him for a second term or we 
will see a new constitutional court justice in 
spring 2020.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2019 for Iranian jurisdiction, in 
a nutshell, was characterized by intense 
polarization, with a deterioration of recent 
critical developments within it. In 2019, 
the two fundamental characteristics of the 
Constitution, Islamic and Republican, rep-
resenting Shia-Islamic thoughts and the 
democratic tendencies of the structure, got 
closer to breaking points.1 
The most critical development was the reg-
ulation passed via the Supreme Council for 
Economic Coordination (SCEC), which is 
a partial legislation institution created by a 
religious head of state (Leader) decree in 
2018. The regulations passed by the SCEC 
aggravated the weakening of the Islam-
ic Consultative Assembly (ICA) in many 
ways. How these regulations were passed 
revealed a neglected democratic procedure 
laid out in the Constitution. They heated 
the arguments on the constitutionality of 
the SCEC on the one hand, and uncovered 
an established pattern of partial legislation 
on the other. This pattern shows the use of 
decree power in favor of partial legislation, 
which is gradually covering all legislation 
jurisdictions of the Parliament. The Parlia-
ment is also dismantling the authority of the 
people’s representatives. This is in line with 
the authoritarianism of the Shia-Islamic 
thoughts of the Constitution.
The year also experienced new appoint-
ments among the members of the judicial 
review body, the Guardian Council (GC), 
which is the correspondent body for a con-
stitutional court, though simultaneously has 
the most crucial role of being the electoral 
commission of the country. 
For the first time in its history, the Leader 
announced the General Policies of the Sys-
tem of Legislation (GPSL), which frames 
an official and desirable Islamic Legislation 
Model of the current Shia school in power.
The latest developments in 2019 contained 
two long-awaited pieces of legislation that 
were eventually passed and one critical bill 
that was finally considered unconstitution-
al. The first law passed concerned the acqui-
sition of Iranian nationality for children of 
Iranian women married to foreigners.2 The 
second law passed featured new provisions 
for the first time. It introduced the death 
penalty as a punishment for acid spraying 
and also protects the victims of this crime.
The bills considered unconstitutional were 
aimed at following the international rec-
ommendations of the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF),3 which is a global stan-
dard-setting body for Anti-Money Laun-
dering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism. Since the bills are now uncon-
stitutional, the FATF will put Iran under a 
high risk of being ranked on an internation-
al blacklist for investments.
1 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1979 (rev. 1989) < https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Iran_1989?lang=en> accessed 31 January 2019.
2 The Law amending the Law on Citizenship of Children of Marriage of Iranian Women <http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/
law/show/1322878> accessed 17 October 2019.
3 It is an intergovernmental body established in 1989 by the Ministers of its member jurisdictions <https://
www.fatf-gafi.org/> accessed 30 December 2019.
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II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The emergence of the SCEC, along with its 
regulations on gas price, is the most critical 
development of the year 2019. This partial 
legislative institution was established in 
2018; however, it had no significant regu-
lations passed so far. In an unprecedented 
overnight announcement on November 15, 
2019, the Government raised the gas price 
by 300% via unknown regulations passed 
by the SCEC. These regulations triggered 
a week of mobilizations and chaos in more 
than 100 Iranian cities.
For the past 41 years, gas prices in Iran have 
increased annually via the Parliament. Previ-
ously, the ICA passed all the regulations with 
a transparent due process. In those years, fi-
nal acts were processed through a constitu-
tional standard of legislation, openly delib-
erated and recorded. The deliberations were 
publicly accessed by radio and published in 
the Official Gazette (Articles 69 & 97). Ad-
ditionally, there was previously a mandatory 
waiting period of 15 days from the time a na-
tionwide law was published to when it could 
be enforced. 
The SCEC’s structure has been unclear, and 
it seems only to be involved with the nation’s 
economic issues that revolve around the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.4 The 
SCEC’s structure, expiration, members, and 
powers are neither listed nor provided for in 
the Constitution, and the primary evidentiary 
acknowledgement is the Leader’s reference 
to a group of officials presented in a public 
speech. Three other institutions similar to 
the SCEC have been established since 1979: 
the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council 
(SCRC) in 1984 and the Supreme Council of 
Cyberspace (SCC) in 2012, both established 
by the Leader’s decree; and the Supreme 
Council for National Security (SCNC) cre-
ated in 1989 via the 1989 amendment (Ar-
ticle 176). Unlike the SCRC and SCC, that 
only make their decisions public occasion-
ally, the records, minutes, deliberation, dis-
cussions, and enactments of the SCNC are 
neither accessible nor public and have never 
expired. These legislative bodies have less 
than 20 members combined, all appointed 
by the Leader; three fixed members are the 
incumbent heads of the branches of power, 
and the speaker is always the head of the 
Government.
Although on one side, the Constitution does 
not acknowledge adopting decree-laws by 
the Leader, the two experienced Leaders 
tried altering the structure of the Parliament 
provided in Article 71. It states that the ICA 
can establish laws on all matters, within the 
limits of its competence, laid down in the 
Constitution. On the other side, the Consti-
tution draws a disproportionate separation 
of powers, combined with a transcendental 
office, i.e., the powers of Government are 
vested in the three traditional branches, the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the executive. 
However, they are functioning under the 
supervision of the religious head of state, 
the Leader (Article 57). This distribution 
of power fully recognizes the absolute su-
premacy of the Leader, and consequently, 
any regulations passed through bodies like 
the SCEC are empirically considered above 
the enactments of the Parliament, since the 
GC declares the parliamentary enactments 
unconstitutional. In such cases, the GC inter-
prets the jurisdiction of the Parliament limit-
ed to no conflicts with the administration of 
the Leader’s decree. Therefore if a legisla-
tive act conflicted with the regulations of the 
SCEC and similar institutions, actions of the 
Parliament would be neither constitutional 
nor incompatible with Islam.5 
Another development of the year 2019 was 
the announcement of the General Policies of 
the System of Legislation (GPSL) in Sep-
tember.6 The office of the Leader, referring 
to paragraph 1 of Article 110, set a frame-
work for the legislature and its actions after 
his consultation with the Nation’s Exigency 
Council (NEC). All 17 paragraphs of the 
GPSL provided trans-branch frameworks for 
the legislative acts of the ICA, which lim-
its legislation jurisdiction and power. The 
Leader also decreed, “Policies should be 
communicated to the three powers, and they 
are required to schedule actions and report 
progress.”
Primarily, the GPSL follows the supervision 
of the Leader on the three branches of power 
of Articles 57 and 110. However, in a closer 
look concerning the number of partial legis-
lative institutions established and all the oth-
er decrees issued from the office of the Lead-
er, which are suppressing the three branches 
of power, the conclusion of authoritarianism 
is inevitable. Moreover, in contrast to the 
philosophy of separation of powers, the su-
pra-constitutional power that is experimen-
tally emerging from the Shia-Islamic feature 
of the structure of the Constitution tends to 
be more unlimited.
This GPSL requires the ICA to evaluate and 
refine the existing laws in case of incongruity 
with religious criteria and with the Constitu-
tion, and to create the necessary mechanism 
for guaranteeing the application of absolute 
and general Islamic criteria to all laws and 
regulations. The judges in this matter are 
only half of the GC members, the appointed 
fuqaha (clergy scholars) via the Leader.
The GPSL sets the office of the Leader at 
the forefront of any legislation. Its invisi-
ble infrastructure targets classifying laws; 
resolving conflicts; harmonizing laws in 
line with Islamic criteria; formulating hier-
archies, including general policies, statutes, 
regulations, bylaws, and guidelines; and set-
ting a timeframe for law enforcement. It is 
expected that the heads of the three branches 
of power will report the progress of the laws, 
both macro and micro, to the head of state.
GPSL will now limit the scope of ICA per-
formance and efficiency more than ever. The 
4 Kelsey Davenport, JCPOA at a Glance < https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance > accessed 25 November 2019.
5 Multiple Legislative Authorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran < http://www.shora-rc.ir/Portal/file/?10949/GP920612-031.pdf > accessed 3 May 2019.
6 <http://english.khamenei.ir/news/7071/Supreme-Leader-announces-General-Policies-of-the-System-of-Legislation> accessed 25 November 2019.
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closing paragraphs of the GPSL determine 
the priorities of legislation by giving promi-
nence to the unexecuted articles of the Con-
stitution, strategic plans, the general policies 
of the Islamic Republic, the five-year Plan 
of Development, and the Leader’s demands. 
In the last paragraph, the three branches of 
power are obliged to promote and institu-
tionalize the culture of observing, obeying, 
and respecting the law and turning it into a 
public demand.
Altogether, the pattern of reproduction of 
partial legislative bodies and the GPSL are 
complementing phenomenon. Such a phe-
nomenon might be seen as totalitarianism 
through a religious ideologic constitution. 
While it started gradually from the 1989 
constitutional amendment, it is now moving 
faster towards possible founding moments.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The structure of judicial review in Iranian 
jurisdiction is a priori monitoring; i.e., the 
Parliament cannot enact laws contrary to the 
principles of the Shia school of Islam or the 
Constitution. The GC, somewhat similar to a 
constitutional court, determines first wheth-
er acts of the Parliament are compatible with 
Islam; if a positive assessment, it reviews the 
constitutionality of the acts. 
In comparison to the structure of a consti-
tutional court, the GC does not follow any 
judicial procedure. Any acts passed by the 
ICA and with GC approval can be void only 
with a similar legislation process rather than 
a complaint to a constitutional court. Unlike 
a constitutional court, the GC is not a court 
that can nullify a law with a complaint, and 
it cannot order the modification of the law. 
Moreover, however rare, if the GC interprets 
that any law is against Islam or the Lead-
er’s decree, or even his taught thoughts, it 
declares that law void. The case of Sepanta 
Niknam, who is the first Zoroastrian to have 
served as a councilor in the city of Yazd, is 
an example of such an interpretation.
Furthermore, there is no direct individual 
access to the scrutiny of the GC. However, 
there is a similar constitutional body to the 
constitutional court, called the Court of Ad-
ministrative Justice (CAJ), created under the 
supervision of the head of the judiciary. The 
CAJ can only investigate complaints con-
cerning Government officials, organs, and 
their issued directives. It has no jurisdiction 
over laws.
In a strict sense, constitutional controversies 
in Iran are limited to the cases raised by the 
Parliament to the GC, and some additional 
matters under the jurisdiction of the GC. 
Among these, one could mention the su-
pervisory responsibility for the elections of 
the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the 
President of the Republic, the MPs, and the 
direct recourse to popular opinion and ref-
erenda.
1. Women’s Rights, Motorcycle License
The CAJ delivered a crucial ruling in May, 
following a lawsuit brought before it by a fe-
male citizen. She filed a case to force traffic 
police to issue a motorcycle license to her, as 
all men and women should be equal before 
the laws. She complained that traffic police 
had refused to issue her one.7 In the ruling, 
the CAJ mentioned driving for women has 
not been banned in any of the laws. The rul-
ing was widely interpreted as a decision in 
favor of all women having the right to apply 
for a motorcycle license. However, the traf-
fic police considered it a single decision in 
favor of the plaintiff and not extendable to 
the broader public. The police also appealed 
the ruling, confirming to enforce any final 
decision.
2. Significant Vacancies in Constitutional 
Bodies and Revealed Patterns
Many gradual essential changes happened in 
the high offices of the Constitution between 
2018 and 2019. These variations reveal a 
model of formal changes rather than sub-
stantive ones. They happened mostly in the 
offices whose members are appointed by the 
Leader, e.g., the head of the judiciary and the 
cleric scholars (Faqih)8 of the GC. 
The following uncovers a pattern and some 
features of the closed cycle: The cycle of 
shifts happens only among the loyal people 
of the Leader. The alterations have no empir-
ical requirements on the profession, efficien-
cy, or the people’s consent, and the age of the 
appointee. Only when one passes away will 
a new member join the cycle. The Head of 
the Judiciary is appointed from among those 
who served in the GC. After finishing the 
term in two periods of 5 years, they return 
to the GC to continue their service. There are 
no limits to renewing both offices with an-
other term of office.
Second, GC cleric scholars, called fuqaha 
in the Constitution, are subject to almost no 
changes until they pass away; their office re-
news countlessly. The only personal require-
ments for both offices is that they shall be a 
mujtahid, who is a Muslim scholar with spe-
cific requirements such as a strong knowl-
edge of the Quran, Sunna, and Arabic as 
well as a deep understanding of legal theory. 
This knowledge may allow the scholar to be 
considered fully qualified to practice ijtihad, 
the independent or original interpretation of 
problems not precisely covered by sources.9 
Most mujtahids are men well versed in judi-
ciary affairs who possess prudence and ad-
ministrative abilities. 
The third and fourth features of the pattern 
are the age limitation and model of respon-
7 Golnaz Esfandiari, In Iran, Court Rules in Favor of Female Motorcyclist, and It Gets Motors Running <https://www.rferl.org/a/in-iran-court-rules-in-favor-of-female-
motorcyclist-and-it-gets-motors-running/30093722.html> accessed 14 September 2019.
8 A Muslim theologian versed in the religious law of Islam.
9 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Noah Tesch, Ijtihād, Islamic Law < https://www.britannica.com/topic/ijtihad > accessed 27 December 2019.
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sibility before the people; GC faqih mem-
bers have no age limitation and hold no di-
rect press conferences, reporting only to the 
Leader annually.  
 
Fifth, the Constitution limits a term of office 
to five years for judiciary and six years for 
the GC; however, both have no limits on re-
appointment. The revealed model also shows 
the judiciary office gets a new face after two 
continuous terms while GC members renew 
their office with no limits.
Following are samples of the closed cycle 
of shifts that happens only among the loyal 
people of the Leader. The former chairman 
of the NEC, AKA Expediency Discernment 
Council, and a member of the GC (faqih), 
Saied Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, a 
Twelver Shia cleric, passed away in Decem-
ber 2019. Ayatollah Sadeq Amoli Larijani re-
placed his offices both in the GC and NEC. 
Larijani replaced him once before when, in 
2009, he was appointed head of the judicia-
ry. Both Larijani and Shahroudi have long 
served in the GC, which Larijani still does. 
He was replaced as the Head of the Judiciary 
by his vice chairman. 
On March 7, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ap-
pointed Ebrahim Raisi as the head of judi-
ciary power. Born in 1960, Raisi attended 
the seminary. He was the vice president of 
the judiciary with a long duration of service 
on the bench and became a prosecutor in the 
early 1980s. He was also a member of the 
Assembly of Experts, and simultaneously 
became the first vice chairman of its Man-
agement Committee. Raisi participated as a 
presidential candidate in the 2017 elections 
and gained 38% of the votes, but lost to in-
cumbent Hassan Rouhani, who got 57%. 
Another faqih member of the GC passed 
away in February, and a new member took his 
place. Ayatollah Mohammad Momen (1938-
2019), a Faqih and a very influential mem-
ber of the GC, was replaced by Alireza Arafi 
(1959), a Shia cleric, chairman of Al-Mustafa 
International University, Qom Friday prayer 
leader, and head of Iran’s Seminaries.
In summer 2019, when the previous mem-
bers’ office ended, three new jurists started 
their mandate in the GC. They are specialized 
in different areas of law, elected by the ICA 
from among the Muslim jurists nominated by 
the new head of the judicial power.10
3. Passing on the Maternal Nationality, 
Guardian Council Approved Granting Ma-
ternal Nationality 
After ten years of debates and struggles, 
the law allowing Iranian women married to 
foreigners to pass on nationality to their off-
spring was finally approved by the GC. The 
GC once refused the bill for not consider-
ing enough security measures. Initially, the 
ICA involved the Ministry of Information 
for checking security measures. After the 
GC rejected the act, the ICA modified it by 
adding the approval of the Islamic Revolu-
tion Guards Corps Intelligence Organization 
(IRGCIO) to check whether the naturaliza-
tion would create any security issues.
The law will mostly affect Iranian women 
married to Afghans, granting their children 
social rights. Some three million Afghans 
live in Iran, many of them married to Iranian 
women.
The ICA set provisions that nationality will 
not be granted automatically. It depends in 
each case on the approval of the IRGCIO 
and the Ministry of Information. In this re-
gard, people born in Iran with Iranian par-
ents can apply for citizenship when they are 
eighteen years old. Before, only the children 
of Iranian fathers could obtain nationality.
4. Death Penalty for Acid Sprayer, Protec-
tion for the Victims
Following the rise of cases of acid spraying 
crimes, the ICA passed a law that introduc-
es harsher punishments for those crimes and 
protects victims of them. The law introduces 
the death penalty in cases subject to the spe-
cific provisions of the Islamic Penal Code: 
the crime committed is corruption on earth 
and is punishable by execution. Such laws 
seek to deter criminal acts; they may also in-
crease the statistics of annual death penalties.
5. The Case of Compliance with Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF)
Iran has an ongoing case before the Finan-
cial Action Task Force (FATF), the global 
standard-setting body for Anti-Money Laun-
dering and Combating the Financing of Ter-
rorism (AML/CFT).11 The case was filed in 
June 2016, when the FATF welcomed Iran’s 
political commitment to address its strategic 
AML/CFT deficiencies and to seek techni-
cal assistance in the implementation of the 
Action Plan. Further, Iran established a re-
lated cash declaration regime in 2017 and 
amended its Counter-Terrorist Financing Act 
in 2018; in 2019, Iran also adopted amend-
ments to its Anti-Money Laundering Act. 
However, though the bills to ratify the Pal-
ermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions 
have passed the ICA, they have not been 
approved constitutionally by the GC and 
are not yet in force. Iran’s compliance with 
FATF rules is vital to attract investors, es-
pecially after the United States re-imposed 
sanctions on the country.
According to the constitutional provisions, 
when the GC considers a provision uncon-
stitutional or against Islamic criteria, but the 
ICA upholds the same provision, the issue is 
to be settled by the NEC.
The NEC was required to make a decision 
no earlier than three months and no later than 
one year from the transmission of the contro-
versy. The term expired on October 1, 2019. 
If the NEC does not deliver any opinion by 
the required term, the GC decision is con-
sidered final, and bills are therefore struck 
down as unconstitutional.
10 <https://www.shora-gc.ir/fa/members> accessed 27 August 2019.
11 It is an intergovernmental body established in 1989 by the Ministers of its member jurisdictions <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/> accessed 30 December 2019.
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Although FATF national supporters argue 
it could ease foreign trade with Europe and 
Asia, opponents say that passing FATF leg-
islation could hamper Iran’s support for its 
allies, such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
If Iran does not enact the Palermo and Ter-
rorist Financing Conventions in line with 
the FATF standards before February 2020, 
the FATF will fully lift the suspension of 
countermeasures, and call on its members, 
and urge all jurisdictions, to apply effective 
countermeasures in line with recommenda-
tion 191.
6. Non-Compete Vacancies, Disqualified 
Candidates, and the Open Case of Critiques
There are two highlights concerning the 
2020 elections: First, the current Speaker of 
the Parliament, Ali Larijani, who has held 
the office since 2008, declared he is not run-
ning in the parliamentary election. Second, 
there has been a large number of disqualified 
candidates among both the registered candi-
dates and current MPs.12 
Candidates running for parliamentary, pres-
idential, and the Assembly of Experts elec-
tions have to be declared qualified by the GC 
to be officially announced, per Article 99. 
With the lack of electoral laws and non-ex-
istence of a clear framework for people reg-
istering for candidacy, the GC declares most 
registered candidates disqualified. Addition-
ally, the GC provides no public minutes or 
details about the procedure of its determin-
ing someone as qualified or not. Among the 
476 men and women who sought candidacy 
to the presidency in 2009, the GC only ap-
proved four of them as qualified. It inter-
prets its duty of “approbation supervision” 
as giving jurisdiction over the legality of 
elections and the competences of candidates. 
Such interpretation gives this constitutional 
body the ability to influence elections in fa-
vor of the head of the state. He appoints six 
members of the GC directly, and the other 
six members indirectly. In related decisions, 
the GC did not approve the qualification of a 
large number of registrations for nomination 
and also rejected the eligibility of over 70 of 
the current MPs (290). Most of them shared 
a liberal democratic political view. Howev-
er, corruption accusations were pending on 
some of them.
Additionally, in some electoral regions for 
the Assembly of Experts, such as Qom, 
among 57 registrants for candidacy, 26 were 
declared disqualified while 21 received ap-
proval by the GC. However, after some can-
didates waived their electoral run, only two 
candidates were effectively on the ballot.13 In 
another region, Shiraz, among 37 registered 
candidates, only one was declared qualified. 
Consequently, the parliamentary election 
was founded on a pre-harmonized stream 
of candidates representing opponents of the 
current Government, the President, and his 
supporter parties. Most organized candi-
dates with the support of major active parties 
based their campaigns on the impeachment 
of the President regarding the unsuccessful 
Iran Nuclear Deal, economic failures, and 
general inefficiency. Following the polar-
ization between the Islamic and Republican 
features of the Constitution, the President as 
a republican symbol is under conflict with 
harmonized MPs that are prefigured by the 
GC’s authority to examine registrants’ qual-
ification for candidacy. The GC plays a role 
in favor of the Leader, who is a significant 
symbol of the Islamic of the Constitution. 
Upcoming elections face the pressure of a 
social media campaign to boycott them, pro-
testing against inefficiencies of the whole 
system of Government. This campaign 
might result in a meager turnout. If this is the 
case, however, constitutional fractures will 
re-open, raising the fundamental question 
regarding future developments between the 
alternatives of constitutional amendment or 
revolution. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The year 2020 is heading toward breaking 
points. First, a parliamentary election risks a 
meager turnout. Second, a harmonized Par-
liament in favor of oppositions of the incum-
bent President that support the inefficiency 
of the Government. These developments 
should be read within the general picture of 
increasing deficiencies of the whole system 
of the state, raising more sequential demon-
strations since 2017, demanding more rights, 
freedoms, and a democratic structure. A po-
larization is emerging between the theocratic 
(Islamic) and democratic (Republican) fea-
tures of the Constitution. The hybrid char-
acter of the Constitution pushes political 
powers in opposite directions. On one hand, 
there is a desire for change in the direction 
of modern rights and freedoms, while on the 
other, there is conservative support for the 
Islamic theocratic heritage. This tension will 
likely lead to more conflict in the future, and 
possibly new founding moments.
V. FURTHER READING
Bruce Ackerman, Revolutionary Constitu-
tions: Charismatic Leadership and the Rule 
of Law (Harvard, 2019)
Richard Albert, Menaka Guruswamy, Nish-
chal Basnyat (eds), Founding Moments in 
Constitutionalism (Hart, 2019)
12  The Electoral College Network, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Boundary Delimitation <http://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDCountry?country=IR> accessed 8 July 2019.
13 < https://www.isna.ir/news/98110100879/> accessed 25 January 2019.
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I. INTRODUCTION
After significant public controversy over 
constitutional questions in recent years, 
2019 was a comparatively low-key year in 
domestic Irish constitutional law and poli-
tics. While there were several developments 
of potential long-term consequence – such as 
the much-trailed establishment of a Judicial 
Council – these generally did not attract a 
great deal of public attention. This was ex-
emplified by the relative lack of comment 
(when compared with other recent referenda 
in recent years on Catholic-animated provi-
sions of the text like marriage equality and 
abortion) for the constitutional referendum 
held in 2019 to amend Ireland’s constitu-
tional provisions on divorce. The measure 
passed comfortably with minimal controver-
sy. This low-key approach was also evident 
in the Supreme Court’s decisions this year.
While the Court dealt with a number of 
academically interesting and potentially 
contentious cases, these were generally re-
solved by reference to their specific facts 
as the Court largely eschewed any emphat-
ic pronouncements on high-level principle. 
The long-awaited Kerins and O’Brien case, 
for example, provided useful guidance on 
the scope, extent and justiciability of par-
liamentary privilege at the level of broad 
principle – but held, at the same time, that 
those principles may be subject to a small 
but flexibly-defined exception where that 
is warranted by the countervailing constitu-
tional commitment to defend and vindicate 
the rights of the individual. 
Given the international attention devoted to 
recent experiments in Ireland, it is also worth 
noting that there was also further evidence 
of the Irish government’s ongoing interest 
in civic deliberative fora with the announce-
ment in June 2019 of a Citizens’ Assembly 
on Gender Equality, to begin in early 2020. 
What these assemblies mean for constitu-
tional politics and affected parties was also 
the subject of some discussion in the aca-
demic context with (anecdotal) evidence of 
a view amongst some domestic scholars that 
the picture is more complex than some prior 
accounts have allowed.
On the international level, a key issue of 
Irish concern was Brexit – although the pre-
cise implications for Ireland will not become 
clearer until 2020 and, perhaps, beyond.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
The most significant structural development 
in Irish constitutional law in 2019 was the 
enactment of the Judicial Council Act 2019. 
This establishes a Judicial Council in Ireland 
for the first time. The possibility of such a 
body was first discussed in the early 2000s 
when controversy involving a High and Su-
preme Court judge highlighted the absence 
under Irish law of a judicial code of conduct, 
or of any form of judicial sanction other than 
the removal of a judge from office.
Various proposals have been mooted since 
then, with the judiciary consistently calling 
for the introduction of some form of council 
in the last 10-15 years.
Discussions around a council acquired a po-
litical edge – and, from a judicial perspective, 
a more pressing urgency – in recent years as 
tensions emerged between the courts and the 
elected branches. This has been covered in 
previous reports but, in brief, the relationship 
between the branches were complicated post-
2011 by the then-government’s decision to 
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initiate a referendum permitting reductions in 
judicial salary. This took place despite the fact 
that the significant majority of judges had vol-
untarily foregone part of their pay in keeping 
with reductions applied to other civil servants; 
and fostered a sense amongst some observers 
that the government regarded the referen-
dum as an exercise in performative ‘radical’ 
or ‘anti-elite’ action. Regardless of the truth 
of this, there was a clear sense on the part of 
many judges that the relationship was poor; 
that government commentary around this and 
other matters was detrimental to the courts; 
and that the judiciary was disadvantaged by 
the convention that they did not speak on such 
matters. This led to the establishment of an as-
sociation of judges, and to continued calls for 
a Judicial Council.
These tensions more recently resurfaced when 
a reform of the judicial appointment system 
was proposed. In particular, regular attacks by 
an independent Minister in the government on 
the appointment system as (in his view) cor-
rupt, coupled with a refusal by that Minister to 
allow vacancies to be filled over an extended 
period, again made judicial-political relations 
more difficult.
The Judicial Council Act 2019 formalises for 
the first time a number of relevant functions, 
including the provision for the continuing ed-
ucation of judges through the Judicial Studies 
Committee, the creation of a judicial code of 
conduct, and the introduction of mechanisms 
for dealing with complaints. 
Reflecting current political and public debate 
around the perceived effects of judicial deci-
sion-making in the tort and criminal fields, the 
Council is also authorized to create guidelines 
for awards in personal injuries cases through 
the Personal Injuries Guidelines Commit-
tee and to develop Sentencing Guidelines 
through a Sentencing Guidelines Committee.
The functions of the Council are described in 
the legislation as including the promotion and 
maintenance of excellence in the exercise by 
judges of their judicial functions; high stan-
dards of conduct among judges, having regard 
to the principles of judicial conduct requiring 
judges to uphold and exemplify judicial in-
dependence, impartiality, integrity, propriety 
(including the appearance of propriety), com-
petence and diligence and to ensure quality 
of treatment to all persons before the courts; 
the effective and efficient use of resources 
made available to judges for the purpose of 
the exercise of their functions; the continuing 
education of judges; and of ensuring respect 
for the independence of the judiciary as well 
as public confidence in the judiciary and the 
administration of justice. 
The Judicial Council is also charged with 
establishing, maintaining and improving 
relations and communications with foreign 
judicial representative bodies and interna-
tional bodies representing judges, and with 
assisting the provision of support to judges 
generally. 
Several of these functions are committed to 
specific statutory committees.
For example, a Judicial Studies Committee 
is charged with facilitating the continuing 
training and education of judges with re-
gard to their functions. A Personal Injuries 
Guidelines Committee is required to draft 
personal injuries guidelines, and also to draft 
amendments to those guidelines. The Sen-
tencing Guidelines and Information Com-
mittee is required to prepare and submit to 
the Board draft sentencing guidelines. These 
guidelines may relate to sentencing general-
ly or to sentences in respect of a particular 
offence, a particular category of offence or 
a particular category of offender, and may 
specify a range of sentences that it is appro-
priate for a court to consider before impos-
ing sentence on an offender. In imposing a 
sentence, a court will be required by law to 
have regard to sentencing guidelines unless 
it is satisfied that to do so would be contrary 
to the interests of justice. If this is the case, 
the reasons must be stated by the court in its 
decision. This reflects an effort to balance 
the independence of the sentencing function 
of a trial court with the perceived need for 
consistency in criminal sentencing.
One of the most significant innovations is 
the establishment of a complaint and sanc-
tioning mechanism for the judiciary. The Ju-
dicial Conduct Committee is given the task 
of considering complaints against individual 
judges. It is open to the Committee to seek 
to have the complaints resolved by informal 
means or to have them made subject to a 
more formal investigation. The Committee is 
mandated to take such action as it considers 
necessary for the purposes of safeguarding 
the administration of justice.
Where an investigation is required, com-
plaints are referred to a panel of inquiry, 
which is to be appointed by the Judicial 
Conduct Committee. Upon completion of 
its investigation, the panel of inquiry must 
prepare and submit to the Judicial Conduct 
Committee a report in writing of the investi-
gation, including the findings of the panel of 
inquiry in relation to the complaint, and the 
panel of inquiry’s recommendations for rep-
rimanding the judge concerned and any rec-
ommendations the panel of inquiry considers 
necessary for the purposes of safeguarding 
the administration of justice. 
The Judicial Conduct Committee, after con-
sidering the report of the panel of inquiry and 
any submissions made by the complainant 
or the judge concerned, is then to make a 
determination of the complaint, including 
whether or not it has been substantiated, and 
where its determination requires the judge 
concerned to take any action, the Committee 
may require that judge to report to the Com-
mittee regarding his or her compliance with 
that requirement. 
In terms of other developments, a constitu-
tional amendment to facilitate the introduc-
tion of a more liberal divorce regime was 
passed by way of referendum in May 2019. 
Divorce had originally been prohibited by the 
1937 Constitution. This was relaxed to some 
degree in 1995 when a referendum passed 
(by an extremely narrow majority) to allow 
divorce, subject to certain conditions. One of 
these was that the parties had been separated 
for at least 4 of the preceding 5 years. The 
referendum was held primarily to remove 
these restrictions and to allow the Oireach-
tas to legislate on the issue in the future. The 
amendment also allowed the Oireachtas to 
recognise foreign divorces. The referendum 
passed comfortably, with 82% voting in fa-
vour on a national turnout of just over 50%. 
As a liberalising measure on an area of social 
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policy, the referendum is broadly in keeping 
with the trend of recent Irish referenda on 
social issues, such as those on abortion or 
marriage equality. However, the referendum 
notably attracted much less public or media 
attention than those votes, probably reflect-
ing expectations that it would pass easily.
Referenda were also originally proposed on 
the constitutional provision that ‘mothers 
shall not be obliged by economic necessity 
to engage in labour to the neglect of their du-
ties in the home’; and on permitting non-res-
idents to vote in presidential elections. These 
had both been amongst the recommenda-
tions of the Convention on the Constitution 
in 2015. Despite this, however, the first pro-
posal was sent back for further deliberation 
to the proposed Citizen Assembly on Gender 
Equality.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. P. v Judges of the Circuit Court: Rem-
edies for breach of constitutional rights – 
Retrospectively
The proceedings related to the prosecution 
of a teacher for alleged sexual offences com-
mitted against a boy in the school at which 
he taught. It was alleged that he invited the 
complainant to his house on a number of oc-
casions, gave him alcohol, showed him por-
nography and engaged in various sexual acts, 
including buggery and oral sex.
The legal issues arose in this instance because 
the offences were alleged to have occurred 
between 1978 and 1980 when the boy was 
between 15 and 17 years of age. The relevant 
offence at the time of the alleged incident was 
that of gross indecency. However, the pros-
ecution of the accused of the same offence 
in 2019 raised a number of potential issues 
(aside from those of delay, which typically 
arise in a prosecution for offences of a histor-
ical character).
First, the offence had been abolished in the 
early 1990s. Secondly, and more fundamen-
tally, the reason for the abolition was that 
the offence was one of universal application 
which had been introduced and applied in 
the 1880s to criminalise all forms of male 
homosexual conduct. This reflected not only 
a general liberalisation of social attitudes to 
homosexuality but also a specific legal and 
constitutional view that the offence represent-
ed a suspect interference with the constitu-
tional rights of adult homosexual males. The 
argument made by the accused in this case, 
therefore, was that – notwithstanding that the 
offence had existed and applied at the time of 
the incidents – a prosecution for the offence in 
2019 was unconstitutional.
The position was further complicated by the 
fact that the Irish Supreme Court had, by a 3-2 
majority, upheld the constitutionality of the 
offence in the Norris v AG decision in 1983. 
Yet, Irish law has also traditionally applied a 
doctrine under which unconstitutional acts are 
deemed to be void ab initio, i.e., as of the date 
of their enactment. It’s curious how this could 
apply when an earlier Supreme Court finding 
the same act to be constitutional had never 
previously been considered.
This meant that the Supreme Court was faced 
with an unusual (and conceptually challeng-
ing) scenario in which a person disputed the 
constitutionality of his prosecution for an 
offence which was generally agreed would 
have been unconstitutional if still on the stat-
ute books – but which was not only lawful 
at the time of the alleged incidents but was 
subsequently found to be constitutional by the 
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court judges approached the is-
sue in several different ways.
O’Donnell J (delivering the decision of the 
3-2 majority) held that the accused was pre-
cluded by the doctrine of jus tertii from chal-
lenging the prosecution on the basis of a gen-
eral argument that an offence which applied 
to consenting adult partners was unconsti-
tutional. In this instance, the claim was that 
prosecuting the accused’s allegedly consensu-
al relationship with a 16-year-old was uncon-
stitutional. This, in his view, was not contrary 
to the Constitution, where that conduct was at 
all times – and still remained – contrary to the 
criminal law.
The minority held that it would be unconsti-
tutional to allow the prosecution to continue. 
O’Malley J’s view (with which Clarke CJ 
agreed) was that the offence of gross inde-
cency as originally provided for was plainly 
unconstitutional when judged against con-
temporary constitutional values. Thus, any 
prosecution could only proceed in a constitu-
tional manner if it was possible to read in a 
qualifying criterion – such as an age of con-
sent – which would allow a distinction to be 
drawn between constitutional and unconstitu-
tional prosecutions. In her view, this could not 
be done for the two reasons that it would stray 
beyond the judicial function and because it 
would be retrospectively suspect in any event 
to seek to apply an age of consent using to-
day’s standards when there had been variation 
in the attitudes to an age of consent over time.
Strikingly, however, all of the judgments de-
livered expressed a degree of disquiet over the 
void ab initio doctrine. This doctrine has giv-
en rise to periodic issues in recent years (see, 
for example, A. v Governor of Arbor Hill) but 
has largely remained intact as an accepted 
constitutional principle. This decision strong-
ly suggests that this is unlikely to continue 
to be the case, and that the Supreme Court is 
moving towards a remedial approach which 
reflects the notion of the ‘living constitution’.
2. Kerins v McGuinness [2019] IESC 11; and 
O’Brien v RTE [2019] IESC 12: Parliamen-
tary privilege – Justiciability
These linked cases were heard sequentially 
by the Irish Supreme Court as, despite cer-
tain factual differences and variations in the 
claims made, they both centred on the ques-
tion of the extent to which the courts can or 
should review the conduct of internal parlia-
mentary procedures.
This had previously been considered in cases 
ranging from the treatment of parliamentary 
questions (held to be generally not reviewable 
in O’Malley v Ceann Comhairle) to the con-
duct of parliamentary inquiries into alleged 
wrongdoing by third parties (held in Maguire 
v Ardagh [2002] 1 I.R. 385 to be outside the 
Oireachtas’s inherent constitutional powers).
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Kerins v McGuinness involved a challenge 
by a non-parliamentarian to her treatment by 
the Oireachtas Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC). The applicant had been the subject 
of media commentary over her remuneration 
and expenses as CEO of a part-publicly fund-
ed charity. The applicant attended as request-
ed but later challenged her treatment as unfair 
and unlawful.
In O’Brien v. Clerk of Dáil Eireann, the 
plaintiff was named under privilege by a TD 
(member of the Dáil) as the person who had 
obtained an injunction preventing his being 
identified in a scheduled television broad-
cast about the handling of loans by the state 
vehicle established during the 2008-2010 
economic crisis to take over the bad debts of 
various Irish banks. Mr. O’Brien’s complaint 
to the relevant parliamentary committee was 
dismissed. He sought to review this.
The proceedings raised the same fundamental 
preliminary question: was there, as the Court 
characterised it in Kerins, an ‘absolute barri-
er’ to judicial review?
Relevant to this were several articles of the 
Irish Constitution. These, in brief, privilege 
freedom of debate and private papers of mem-
bers (15.10); reports, publications and ‘utter-
ances made in either House’ (15.12); and pro-
hibit members from being arrested or made 
‘amenable to any court’ … ‘in respect of any 
utterance in either House’.
In Kerins, the Court considered ‘the some-
times difficult line between rights of the cit-
izen and the privileges and immunities of the 
Oireachtas’. It began by observing that the 
courts had reviewed the legality of actions of 
the Houses or of their committees in previous 
cases. The question, therefore, was not wheth-
er there was an absolute barrier in all cases – 
but the more difficult one of where, if any, the 
limits to review lie.
In addressing this, the Court ultimately fa-
voured a contextual – some might say prag-
matic – approach. On the one hand, the arti-
cles indicate that ‘there must be a significant 
area of privilege and immunity’. On the other, 
citizens are entitled to have their rights vindi-
cated in their engagement with the Oireachtas. 
Key to the Court’s decision was its assertion 
that the primary responsibility for vindicat-
ing the rights of citizens engaging with these 
aspects of the legislature’s function was the 
Oireachtas itself. The significance of this was 
that it allowed the Court to approach the ques-
tion not as a zero-sum choice between consti-
tutional rights and parliamentary privilege but 
as a more familiar assessment of the constitu-
tional separation of powers.
A second finding, which followed on from 
this, was that the separation of powers prin-
ciple gave rise to a second distinct immunity 
from those specified in Article 15. This sug-
gests a broader potential for matters to be cov-
ered by parliamentary privilege. However, in 
its reliance on a principle which the courts 
have ample experience of policing, any im-
munity here is arguably more clearly subject 
to potential judicial scrutiny. 
How might this second immunity operate? 
The Kerins Court noted that the courts will 
exercise ‘prudence’ when asked to review an 
area that is primarily the responsibility of the 
other branches. Whether or not to intervene 
will depend on the circumstances of a given 
case. Here, given the PAC had already been 
found by the parliamentary authorities to have 
acted far outside its remit, there would be no 
breach of the separation of powers in a judi-
cial declaration that it had acted unlawfully.
Applying this approach in O’Brien, by con-
trast, the Court concluded that the conduct 
about which the plaintiff complained fell 
squarely within the privileges and immunities 
conferred by Article 15. While his challenge 
was to the decision of the authorities not to 
sanction the TD, Mr. O’Brien was, in effect, 
inviting a court to pronounce on the legal-
ity or appropriateness of utterances made in 
the House. For the Court to determine if the 
parliamentary authorities had acted lawfully 
could, indirectly, affect freedom of debate in 
the House and make a TD amenable to court 
for their utterances. This would infringe both 
the text of Article 15 and the broader separa-
tion of powers principle identified in Kerins.
While the decisions provide some clarity to 
the law in this area in Ireland, the contextual 
nature of the approach means there remains 
uncertainty about when parliamentary matters 
may be judicially reviewed. The decisions 
clarify that there is no absolute barrier to judi-
cial review. On the other hand, the judgments 
repeatedly emphasise the reluctance of the 
courts to intervene in such matters. It seems 
clear that, by highlighting the obligation on 
the Oireachtas as an institution to respect and 
vindicate rights, the courts expect (or hope) 
that this will obviate the necessity for them to 
be asked to intervene. Nonetheless, it is also 
clear that the Court (p)reserves its residual 
entitlement to intervene where it identifies 
a particularly serious threat to constitutional 
rights or principle, in which, at least, the Irish 
Court seems to share the instinct of its UK 
counterpart.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD  
January 2020 will see the start of the Citi-
zens’ Assembly on Gender Equality, the lat-
est in Ireland’s series of deliberative fora. As 
a topic with a lower profile in political dis-
course at present, it will be interesting to see 
to what extent the Assembly and its eventual 
recommendations attract public and political 
engagement.
A general election must be held in the first 
half of 2020. This will take place against 
the backdrop of successful economic per-
formance but also evidence of widespread 
public dissatisfaction with certain social is-
sues, most notably the provision of housing 
at a time when housing supply is limited and 
rents – in particular – have escalated expo-
nentially in recent years.
Finally, the question of what will occur at the 
end of the Brexit transition phase is likely to 
occupy much attention in the second half of 
2020 given the serious political and govern-
ment concerns in Ireland over what arrange-
ments will apply to Northern Ireland; and 
what these will mean for economic perfor-
mance, intra-island relations, the everyday 
lives of people on both sides of the border 
and, ultimately, the constitutional future of 
both jurisdictions.
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V. FURTHER READING
1. L. Black and P. Dunne (eds), Law and Gen-
der in Modern Ireland: Critique and Reform 
(2019, Hart/Bloomsbury): A comprehensive 
collection of essays critiquing the intersec-
tion of law and gender in Ireland. Given the 
extent to which many of these issues were 
regulated at a constitutional level in Ireland, 
this contains a significant amount of materi-
al and discussion of the Constitution’s text, 
caselaw and impact. The collection devotes 
a specific section to the symbolic and oth-
er effects of the Article 41. 2 provision on 
mothers, economic necessity and their “du-
ties in the home”.
2. T. Hickey, ‘The republican core of the case 
for judicial review’ (2019) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, 17 (1): This 
article makes the case for judicial review 
based on the idea of freedom as non-domi-
nation. It is a democratic case for the insti-
tution, rooted in Philip Pettit’s republican 
account of democracy as ‘equally shared 
popular control’.
3. E. Daly, ‘Translating popular sovereign-
ty as unfettered constitutional amendabil-
ity’ (2019) European Constitutional Law 
Review, 15(4), 619-643: Looking in part to 
the Irish conception of referendums as ‘sov-
ereign’ exercises, this articles presents an 
alternative account of sovereignty and con-
stitutional (un)amendability.
4. M. Enright & A. O’Donoghue, ‘The 
Northern/Irish feminist judgments project: 
experiments in feminist legal research’, in L 
Cahillane & J Schweppe (eds), Case Studies 
in Legal Research Methodologies: Reflec-
tions on Theory and Practice (2019, Clarus 
Press): An overview of the project and meth-
odologies of the Northern/Irish feminist 
judgments project, which covered many 
seminal cases in Irish constitutional law.
5. O. Doyle & T. Hickey, Constitution-
al Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Clarus 
Press, 2019): The second edition of this case-
book of materials and commentary on Irish 
constitutional law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The most important developments in con-
stitutional law in 2019 were not to be found 
in the jurisprudence of the Israeli Supreme 
Court but rather in constitutional politics. 
The first was the political deadlock resulting 
in recurring general elections, and the second 
was the unprecedented criminal indictment 
of a sitting Prime Minister, Benjamin Net-
anyahu, who is being charged with bribery, 
fraud and breach of trust for various actions 
he took while in office. These two combined 
to generate a constitutional crisis in Israel.
In this report, we elaborate on these two 
constitutional developments as well as sum-
marize the most important Supreme Court 
judgments of the previous year in the areas 
of emergency regulations, limitations on the 
right to be elected, non-discrimination in the 
private sphere and women’s exclusion from 
the public sphere. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS 
Israel faces an unprecedented constitutional 
crisis.1 For over a year, it has been in the mid-
dle of a political and constitutional deadlock. 
On 2 March 2020, for the first time in Isra-
el’s history, the third parliamentary election 
in 12 months took place. This round of elec-
tions arrived after the previous two rounds (9 
April 2019 and 17 September 2019) failed to 
successfully produce a sustainable govern-
ment, as none of the leading candidates were 
able to form a coalition. Throughout this pe-
riod, Benjamin Netanyahu has been and will 
remain a caretaker Prime Minister until the 
elections. 
This political saga is even more complicated 
by the fact that again for the first time, a pre-
siding Israeli Prime Minister has been indict-
ed and is facing multiple criminal charges 
involving offenses directly related to his 
position. Notwithstanding the indictment, 
Prime Minister Netanyahu refused to resign 
and was running for reelection. He has also 
asked the Knesset to grant him parliamenta-
ry immunity, a request he later revoked. 
These developments bring the Attorney Gen-
eral and Supreme Court to the center of the 
political crisis. The current situation raises 
many constitutional issues, and because this 
is a precedential scenario, it is unclear what 
Israeli constitutional law necessitates. Most 
importantly, different questions concern Ne-
tanyahu’s ability (practically and legally) to 
serve as a Prime Minister under indictment 
(the Attorney General has already opined 
that Netanyahu can remain in office as care-
taker Prime Minister until the elections). 
These questions are complicated against the 
backdrop of judicial impeachments of indict-
ed ministers and mayors. 
1 See the thorough review of Elena Chachko, ‘Netanyahu and the Anatomy of a Constitutional Crisis’, Law-
fare (January 17, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/netanyahu-and-anatomy-constitutional-crisis 
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As Prof. Yoav Dotan elaborated in a recent 
academic article,2 in the past three decades, 
the Israeli Supreme Court has ended the 
terms or prevented the appointment of min-
isters and other public officials based on 
‘good character’ and ‘public trust’ principles. 
For example, in the Eisenberg case,3 the Su-
preme Court held that Yossi Ginosar, a for-
mer senior member of the domestic security 
services who had been implicated in the cov-
er-up and killing of two terrorists after their 
capture (“Bus 300 Affair” or “The Shin Beit 
Affair”), cannot be appointed as the general 
manager of Ministry of Housing due to his 
past, although he had been pardoned before 
trial by the President. And so, considerations 
of the rule of law and ‘the principle of good 
character in public service’ may lead to the 
legal result that appointing a person who 
committed severe offences to a top executive 
position can be struck down as unreasonable. 
In the famous case of Deri,4 the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Prime Minister’s pow-
er to remove Cabinet ministers was dis-
cretionary, but there were circumstances 
which made the exercise of a discretionary 
power obligatory. Accordingly, the Court 
ordered Prime Minister Rabin to remove the 
then-Housing Minister Aryeh Deri from of-
fice after he was indicted for corruption: 
‘The offences attributed to Minister Deri are 
outstandingly serious, and failure to exercise 
power to remove him from office is unrea-
sonable to an extreme extent.… The damage 
to confidence in the Government as a result 
of the failure to remove from office a per-
son accused of the crime of corruption is far 
more serious than the damage to confidence 
as a result of failure to honour an undertak-
ing which is prohibited by law. As already 
explained, we are not dealing here with the 
question of confidence as a moral norm, but 
with the provisions of law which deal with 
the reasonableness of failure to exercise 
power.… the Prime Minister is required by 
law to exercise his power under section 21A 
of the Basic Law: The Government to termi-
nate the tenure of office of Minister Deri’.5  
Thus, the expressed written law does not nec-
essarily override the principle of good charac-
ter and the importance of public trust. Dotan 
notes that, ‘The Eisenberg and Deri cases 
were the earliest in a long series of cases in 
which the Court developed and applied the 
principle of good character in its supervision 
over appointments and removals of both poli-
ticians and high-ranking public officials’.6 
In a more recent decision – the Rochberg-
er case7 – the Supreme Court removed from 
office three mayors of prominent cities less 
than one month before municipal elections 
after the Attorney General announced that 
he intended to indict them for corruption. 
This case is very important as city mayors 
are elected in direct personal elections. The 
Court could not prevent them from running 
for office in the upcoming elections despite 
the indictments against them. Nonetheless, 
as the authority to remove mayors from of-
fice for conduct unbecoming is one of discre-
tion, which is subject to judicial review, the 
Court granted orders to immediately remove 
the mayors from their offices to preserve 
good character and the rule of law. 
Thus, to conclude this point, the Israeli Su-
preme Court has already ruled that ministers 
who have been indicted cannot remain in of-
fice. One may argue that if that is the rule 
for ministers, it should all the more so apply 
to a Prime Minister. Thus, according to the 
existing legal principles of ‘good character’, 
‘rule of law’ and ‘public trust’, it is plausi-
ble that the Supreme Court would rule that 
an indicted Prime Minister must step down. 
On the other hand, the above-mentioned de-
cisions concerning the removal of ministers 
and mayors were decided based on adminis-
trative law’s ‘reasonable’ principle that ap-
plies to the discretion of the Prime Minister 
as chief executive and city councils as ad-
ministrative authorities. It is unclear whether 
the same applies to the Prime Minister him-
self (not the least because the removal of the 
Prime Minister means the resignation of the 
entire government). A judicial impeachment 
of a sitting Prime Minister would be unprec-
edented. This has never happened and was 
unnecessary; when previous Prime Ministers 
were faced with indictments they resigned. 
Basic Law: The Government demands the 
removal of the Prime Minister only after he 
is convicted, and the conviction becomes fi-
nal, a process that may take years. 
There is another set of challenges. If Net-
anyahu wins the upcoming elections, can 
the President even assign a Knesset Member 
under indictment the mandate to form a gov-
ernment? According to Basic Law: The Gov-
ernment, ‘the President of the State shall, 
after consultation with representatives of 
party groups in the Knesset, assign the task 
of forming a Government to a Knesset Mem-
ber who has notified him that he is prepared 
to accept the task’…. Typically, the mandate 
to form a government is given to whoever 
receives the most recommendations from 
Knesset Members. Can the President take the 
indictment into consideration? On the one 
hand, the President’s exercise of discretion 
in granting the mandate to form a govern-
ment may be subject to judicial review. On 
the other hand, it is also questionable wheth-
er the discretion of the President can even be 
challenged before the Court, considering that 
according to Basic Law: The President, ‘The 
President of the State shall not be amenable 
2 Yoav Dotan, ‘Impeachment by Judicial Review: Israel’s Odd System of Checks and Balances’, 19(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2018), 705-744.
3 HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. The Minister of Building and Housing 47(2) PD 229 (1993).
4 HCJ 3094/93 The Movement for Quality in Government in Israel v. The State of Israel 47(5) PD 404 (1993). See an English translation of the decision at https://su-
premedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts%5C93%5C940%5C030%5CZ01&fileName=93030940_Z01.txt&type=4 
5 Ibid., at para. 20-21 to the judgment of President Meir Shamgar. 
6 Dotan, supra n 2, at 722 and reference therein. 
7 HCJ 4921/13 OMETZ – Citizens for Proper Government & Social Justice v. Rochberger (Oct. 14, 2013), Israel Supreme Court Database; an English translation 
is available at https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Ometz%20%E2%80%93%20Citizens%20for%20Proper%20Administration%20
and%20Social%20Justice%20in%20Israel%20v.%20Rochberger.pdf
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to any court or tribunal, and shall be immune 
from any legal act, in respect of anything 
connected with his functions or powers’. The 
High Court of Justice has thus far refrained 
from intervening in these questions.8 
Judicial involvement in these questions puts 
the Court in a very difficult position. If it 
intervenes and disapproves Netanyahu’s 
competence to serve as Prime Minister, this 
raises difficulties from a democratic point 
of view as it may thwart ‘people’s will’ and 
provide the Attorney General great power 
of impeachment through indictments. But 
if it approves Netanyahu’s competence, this 
would send a ‘negative message’ that corrup-
tion and breach of trust may be tolerated. 
As these issues may arrive at the Supreme 
Court eventually, we do not include our 
opinion on these matters in this report. Up-
dates on these events will be included in next 
year’s report.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1) HCJFH 10190/17 Commander of IDF Forc-
es in Judea and Samaria v. Allian (9.9.2019): 
burial of terrorists’ bodies for the purpose of 
negotiation
In an extended composition of nine Jus-
tices, it was ruled in a majority of 5-4 that 
the commander of the IDF in Judea and Sa-
maria is permitted to order temporary burial 
of terrorists’ bodies for negotiation, by virtue 
of Rule 133(3) of the Defense Regulations 
(Emergency) 1945.9 In this Additional Hear-
ing, the High Court of Justice reversed a pre-
vious ruling in this regard, which held that 
the military commander was not authorized 
to do so.10 The majority opinion interpreted 
the authority conferred on the military com-
mander in Rule 133(3) of the Defense Regu-
lations and stated that this regulation is part 
of the internal law that is valid in the State of 
Israel and the region of Judea and Samaria, 
which is intended, among other things, to 
ensure the protection of the state’s security. 
It was held that protecting the security of 
the state also meant an ongoing and deter-
mined strive to return home IDF soldiers, 
fallen soldiers and Israeli civilians held by 
terrorist organizations. Because of this, the 
interpretative conclusion is that the military 
commander has the authority to order the 
temporary burial of terrorists’ bodies for the 
purpose of negotiations with terrorist orga-
nizations. The Court held that the exercise 
of this authority entailed a degree of harm 
to the dignity of the dead terrorist and the 
dignity of his family, and that this authority 
must, therefore, be defined and exercised un-
der the appropriate restrictions and balances 
as specified, inter alia, in the opinion of the 
Attorney General of 2004.
It was further held that international law 
does not explicitly prohibit the possession 
of bodies in the context of armed conflict 
and that contrary to the position expressed 
by the majority in the judgment under the 
Additional Hearing, international law does 
not enshrine an approach whereby legal dif-
ficulty exists in this practice. The minority 
justices held that Rule 133(3) of the Defense 
Regulations does not authorize the military 
commander to order the provisional burial 
of terrorists’ bodies for negotiation purposes, 
and therefore, legislation is required for this 
purpose as provided in the judgment under 
the Additional Hearing. Justice D. Barak-
Erez, in a minority opinion, held an ‘interim 
position’, according to which a distinction 
must be made in the context of Gaza terror-
ists whose bodies can, according to her, be 
held for negotiation purposes without specif-
ic legislation, as opposed to terrorists’ bod-
ies that were Judea and Samaria residents or 
residents and citizens of the State of Israel, 
in light of the different status – accordingly 
the different applicable law – of these areas. 
2) EC1806/19 et al. Lieberman v. Cassif 
(18.7.2019): banning of political parties and 
candidates
An extended composition of nine Supreme 
Court Justices ruled on approval and appeals 
on Central Election Commission decisions 
on the disqualification of candidates and lists 
from the 21st Knesset elections. 
The Court accepted the majority opinion in 
an appeal in the case of candidate Dr. Mi-
chael Ben Ari of the ‘Otzma Yeudit’ Party 
and ruled that he was barred from partici-
pating in the 21st Knesset elections for the 
grounds of disqualification provided for in 
Article 7A(A)(2) of Basic Law: The Knes-
set, in the matter of inciting racism.11 The de-
cision in Ben Ari’s case was based on a very 
8 The Supreme Court has recently dismissed a case challenging Netanyahu’s competence to receive the mandate to form a government after the next elections. It 
ruled that the case was merely theoretical and not ripe for adjudication because there was no certainty that Netanyahu would in fact get the mandate to form a gov-
ernment after the elections. With that said, the Supreme Court also noted that the relevant constitutional questions are justiciable, in principle, so they may come 
up in future litigation. See, e.g., Isabel Kershner, ‘Israeli Supreme Court Removes an Obstacle for Netanyahu’, the New York Times (January 2, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/netanyahu-indictment-court.html 
9 For a historical and theoretical background to the Israeli law of emergencies and an overview of the work of Israeli courts in this area, see Amichai Cohen, ‘Emer-
gency Law in Israel - Current Status’ (February 25, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3359625 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3359625. On 
Israel’s military governance of Judea and Samaria, see recently Maayan Geva, ‘Military Lawyers Making Law: Israel’s Governance of the West Bank and Gaza’, 
44(3) Law and Social Inquiry (2019), 704-725.
10 HCJ 4466/16 Mohammed Allian et al. v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank (December 14, 2017). See Justice Uzi Vogelman, Yaniv Roznai, Ron 
Goldstein, Maya Gazit and Michael Herscovici, ‘Israel’, in Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda (eds.), 2017 Global Review of Constitu-
tional Law (I·CONnect-Clough Center, 2018), 151, 154.
11 Section 7A of Basic Law: The Knesset gives the Central Elections Commission the power to ban the participation of any party or candidate in the elections if the 
goals or actions of the party or candidate, expressly or by implication, include negation of the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; 
incitement to racism; or support for armed struggle by a hostile state or a terrorist organization against the State of Israel. See, e.g., Mazen Masri, ‘The Limits of 
Electoral Politics: Section 7A of Basic Law: The Knesset’, in Nadim N. Rouhana and Areej Sabbagh-Khoury (eds.), The Palestinians in Israel: Readings in History, 
Politics and Society Vol II (Arab Center for Applied Social Research, 2018), 130-138; Suzie Navot, ‘Fighting Terrorism in the Political Arena: The Banning of Political 
Parties’, 14(6) Party Politics (2008), 745-762.
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long line of significant evidence, including 
racist and humiliating statements that lasted 
for about two years until very close to the 21st 
Knesset elections. It was ruled that Ben Ari 
attributed negative characteristics to the Arab 
public in Israel. His remarks and considerable 
exposure have earned him, among other things, 
social networks reflecting the racist political 
program he advocates and which he intends to 
implement as a Member of the Knesset. Ma-
jority justices found that the explanations given 
by Ben Ari were unconvincing, and they paled 
in the face of the ferocity of racist statements 
he repeatedly made in his voice and widely 
preached at rallies he attended and on social 
networks. It was emphasized that Ben Ari has 
neither apologized for most of his remarks nor 
showed any remorse. He tried to give his com-
mentary in retrospect, but this was found to be 
unconvincing and as inconsistent with the nat-
ural context of what was said. 
Justice Solberg delivered a minority opinion, 
according to which, considering Ben Ari’s ex-
planations and the importance of the consti-
tutional right ‘to elect and be elected’ in our 
democratic system, he should not be prevent-
ed from participating in the Knesset elections.
 
In addition, the Court ruled not to prevent 
Adv. Itamar Ben Gvir, a candidate for ‘Ot-
zma Yeudit’, and Dr. Ofer Cassif, from 
‘Hadsh-Thahal’, from participating in the 
elections. It was held that the evidence pre-
sented to the Court was not at a high enough 
level of sufficiency to establish grounds for 
disqualification.
3) EA 5487/19 Segal v. Ben Gvir; EA 5506/19 
Otzma Yehudit v. Hareshima Hameshotefet 
(25.8.2019): banning of political parties and 
candidates
The Court unanimously accepted the ap-
peal regarding ‘Otzma Yehudit’ candidate 
Ben Zion Gopstein and accepted, in a ma-
jority opinion ruling, the appeal regarding 
‘Otzma Yeuhdit’ candidate Baruch Marzel. 
The Court ruled that both were barred from 
participating in 22nd Knesset elections on 
the grounds of disqualification provided for 
in Article 7A(A)(2) of the Basic Law: The 
Knesset, in the matter of inciting racism. 
The Court unanimously rejected the appeal 
regarding ‘Otzma Yehudit’ candidate Adv. 
Itamar Ben Gvir as well as the appeals re-
garding the non-disqualification of the ‘Ot-
zma Yehudit’ Party and the ‘Hareshima 
Hameshotefet’ to participate in the elections. 
The decision to unanimously accept the 
appeal filed in the case of Gopstein and to 
prevent his participation in the elections 
was made based on numerous evidence that 
cast a clear, unambiguous and candid image 
showing that in his many statements and ac-
tions, Gopstein systematically incited racism 
against the Arab public. The Court ruled 
that Gopstein’s statements revealed a new 
low point in racial discourse that we did not 
know before, and Gopstein even stated that 
he did not regret and did not show any re-
morse for any of it.
The appeals regarding Ben Gvir’s candidacy, 
‘Otzma Yehudit’, and the ‘Hareshima Hame-
shotefet’ were rejected because not enough 
evidence was found to substantiate the dis-
qualification requested in their case according 
to the strict criteria set out in the case law.
4) LCA 10011/17 Mei-Tal Engineering & 
Services Ltd. v. Salman (19.8.2019): non-dis-
crimination in housing sales
The principal question raised in the request 
for this appeal was whether the Prohibition 
of Discrimination Act on Products, Services 
and Entry into Entertainment Venues and 
Public Places (2000) (hereinafter: ‘The Pro-
hibition of Discrimination Act’) also applies 
to an apartment sale.
 
Justice Mazuz ruled that the Prohibition of 
Discrimination Act applies to the sale of 
apartments by those whose business is sup-
plying apartments. In his opinion, this deter-
mination is of the utmost public value and 
practical importance, given the need to send 
an unequivocal message of condemnation 
of discrimination and to provide effective 
legal tools to the victims of discrimination, 
through which they can claim their insult. 
Regarding the public value importance of 
this determination, Justice Mazuz empha-
sized the importance of the right to equali-
ty in Israeli law, the importance of the fight 
against discrimination and the importance of 
the Court’s role in uprooting it. Regarding 
the practical importance of this determina-
tion, he stressed the need for the existence 
of an effective, simple, fast and inexpensive 
enforcement mechanism prescribed by law 
for the fight against discrimination. Justice 
Mazuz based his position on the interpreta-
tion of the language of the law and its objec-
tive and subjective purposes, leading to the 
conclusion that the Prohibition of Discrim-
ination Act applies to the sale of residential 
apartments by anyone who is engaged in it.
 
Justice Stein held that the Discrimination 
Prohibition Act did not apply because, in the 
linguistic sense, a ‘product’ is a movable ob-
ject while an apartment is real estate. In ad-
dition, the legislature made clear in explan-
atory notes to the act that it does not engage 
in real estate. However, Justice Stein consid-
ered that a contractor company, acting in a 
joint entrepreneurship with the state, cannot 
discriminate in selling apartments built on 
state land. The discrimination suffered by 
the respondents was thus an act of wrong-
doing for which they were entitled to relief. 
Justice Handel concurred with Justices Ma-
zuz and Stein’s conclusion that the appeal 
should be dismissed, but refrained from 
ruling in principle on the applicability of 
the Prohibition of Discrimination Act to an 
apartment sale. According to him, anyone 
contracting with the state must accept the 
duty of non-discrimination in light of the 
special status of public land. 
5) CrimApp 5338/19 Moshe Abutball May-
or of Beit Shemesh v. Nili Philip (1.11.2018): 
women exclusion in the public sphere
In this case, the Court ruled that ‘chastity 
signs’, posted throughout the city of Beit 
Shemesh that contained abusive captions 
towards women were part of the harsh and 
12 On the general phenomenon, see, e.g., Michal L. Allon, ‘Gender Segregation, Effacement, and Suppression: Trends in the Status of Women in Israel’, 22(2) 
DOMES - Digest of Middle East Studies (2013), 276-291.
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improper phenomenon of the exclusion of 
women from the public sphere.12 The signs 
instructed women to dress according to cer-
tain dress codes and not to be found in cer-
tain places. They had the effect of expropri-
ating many of the female sector’s authority 
and making it private while exerting social 
pressure and compromising women’s auton-
omy and security. Therefore, in such cases, 
it was obligatory upon the local authority 
to remove the signs and even to act under 
existing law against those responsible for 
placing them. It was further stipulated that 
the actions of the local authority should be 
given the proper weight for the grave viola-
tion of human rights caused by the placing of 
the signs – a wrongful phenomenon, which 
severely impaired human dignity. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
There are big constitutional questions and 
controversies on the horizon, both in consti-
tutional law and constitutional politics. 
In terms of constitutional politics, the third 
round of elections was held on March 2, 
2020. These elections brought to the fore the 
question of whether a Knesset Member who 
is indicted for criminal charges may receive 
the mandate to form a government. 
As for constitutional law, on late 2020, an 
extended bench of 11 Justices of the Su-
preme Court will hear the various petitions 
submitted against the controversial Basic 
Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish 
People.13 The petitions concerning this basic 
law are not only important on their merits but 
also for the more general question of wheth-
er the Supreme Court has the authority to 
review basic laws that carry a constitutional 
status and whether the doctrine of ‘unconsti-
tutional constitutional amendments’ applies 
in Israel.14 
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the Italian Constitutional Court 
(hereafter ICC) ruled in continuity with its 
most recent case law and strengthened its 
institutional role by coordinating its powers 
and competences both with other constitu-
tional actors and with supranational insti-
tutions. The first dimension of this “insti-
tutional relationality” took center stage in 
2019: the ICC engaged the legislator in an 
intense “dialogue” by using the full spectrum 
of its decisional powers. Some quintessential 
examples will be illustrated below (Section 
II). However, the Court remained firm in the 
exercise of its most traditional role of safe-
guarding fundamental rights, particularly 
those of the weakest part of the population 
(as illustrated in some of the cases reported 
below in Section III).
Similarly, the Court persevered in its en-
gagement with public opinion, and further 
developed a dimension of “social relational-
ity.” This occurred through numerous events 
promoted by the ICC. Among these, the ICC 
continued its “journey” in public schools 
and prisons. This journey began in 2018; in 
2019, the Court organized ten “stops” in ten 
different prisons, where judges of the Court 
met detained persons and discussed with 
them the impact of the Constitution on their 
condition.1 This journey eventually resulted 
in a documentary, which was produced and 
broadcast on national television. 
Finally, yet importantly, Professor Marta 
Cartabia (coordinator of this group of au-
thors since the very first report in 2015,2 
strong supporter of the Global Review of 
Constitutional Law since its inception and 
co-president of the I·CONS Italian Chapter) 
was elected President of the Constitutional 
Court of Italy last December. She is the first 
woman to be elected President of the Court 
since 1956, when it was first operative. Her 
election is a significant symptom of trans-
formation not only of the Court but of Ital-
ian society if one only recalls that Professor 
Cartabia was, when appointed judge of the 
Constitutional Court in 2011, the third wom-
an to be named as such.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Major developments in the year 2019 may be 
divided into two macro-categories, where both 
a vertical relational approach and horizontal 
one emerge. As for the former, characterizing 
the ICC’s openness toward supranational law 
and case law, the main developments emerged 
through numerous decisions reported in Sec-
tion III of this report (e.g., judgment Nos. 24, 
112 and 117 of 2019). As for the horizontal di-
mension, the ICC engaged the legislator in an 
intense dialogue in 2019. At least two streams 
of its case law in this category are worthy of 
attention. First, the ICC tackled the issue of 
legislative omissions in the field of end-of-life 
choices. Second, the ICC clarified its role as an 
arbiter when the respect of parliamentary pro-
1 https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/jsp/consulta/vic/vic_home.do
2 http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/03/developments-in-italian-constitutional-law-the-year-2015-in-review/
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cedures was contested by means of conflicts of 
attributions promoted by political actors.
As for the first stream, with its judgment No. 
242 of 2019, the ICC made clear that assist-
ed suicide is not punishable under specific 
conditions. The judgment came one year af-
ter the ICC had stayed its proceedings, wait-
ing for the Italian Parliament to legislate on 
the matter3 – which it did not do. The con-
stitutional question was raised by the high-
ly controversial case of Fabiano Antoniani, 
known as DJ Fabo, who was left in severe 
and irreversible conditions after a car acci-
dent in 2014. He needed artificial support for 
nutrition and respiration and suffered from 
terrible pain and frequent convulsions and 
muscle spasms. At one point, he decided to 
opt for assisted suicide. The politician Mar-
co Cappato, a member of the radical party, 
drove him to Switzerland where, unlike in 
Italy, assisted suicide was legal under certain 
conditions. After the assisted suicide was 
carried out, Cappato turned himself in to the 
police in Italy. His self-reporting was aimed 
at opening a case for strategic litigation, with 
the objective of challenging the constitution-
ality of the criminal implication of his help-
ing carry out the assisted suicide. 
Cappato’s plan of strategic litigation suc-
ceeded, as he was charged with a punishable 
crime under Article 580 of the criminal code 
(“Helping someone to commit suicide, or 
to convince someone to commit suicide, is 
punishable with a sentence between 5 and 12 
years”) before a court in Milan submitted a 
question of constitutionality to the ICC. This 
provision was challenged on the ground of 
its constitutionality by the ordinary judge, 
who argued that this criminal regime violat-
ed the right to self-determination contained 
in Art. 2 and Art. 13 of the Italian Consti-
tution. With an unprecedented decision 
resembling the German Unvereinbarkeit-
serklärung, the ICC decided in October 2018 
to stay the proceedings for one year, waiting 
for the Parliament to provide a comprehen-
sive regulation on the matter – which it did 
not. After the year expired, the ICC took 
over the case again and struck down the con-
tested legislation as partly unconstitutional. 
With a detailed and complex reasoning, the 
Court made clear that – while assistance to 
suicide is legitimately punished in gener-
al – criminal indictment should be withheld 
when the assisted persons are in very specif-
ic conditions, i.e.: suffering from an irrevers-
ible pathology; under intolerable physical 
or psychological suffering; kept alive only 
through artificial life-support; and capable 
of making free and informed decisions, in-
cluding on access to palliative care, which 
must always be an effectively available alter-
native. However, the Court did not abandon 
its relational approach; in fact, it considered 
a new comprehensive intervention by the 
Parliament as indispensable, and also tried to 
extract conditions for the non-punishment of 
assisted suicide from the existing legislation.
What emerged from the second category of 
landmark constitutional developments that 
occurred in 2019 was that the ICC, in en-
gaging the legislator in an intense dialogue, 
saved wide margins of autonomy not only 
as far as the content of political choices is 
concerned, but also when disputes arise in 
respect to parliamentary procedures. The 
category consists of three decisions issued 
within the framework of constitutional con-
flicts of attributions.4 
In the first case,5 both a parliamentary group 
and a certain number of individual Senators 
objected to the use of a procedural mecha-
nism in the Senate whereby the government, 
at the last minute, rewrote the entire draft an-
nual budget law through a block amendment 
associated with the request of confidence 
vote (which prevented further amendments 
and forced Senators to immediately vote for, 
or against, the government amendment). For 
the first time in its case law, the ICC recog-
nized standing to individual MPs, at least 
theoretically, albeit only in relation to their 
specific and individual constitutional attri-
butions; in this case, the right to the time 
necessary to understand a legislative pro-
posal (amendment) before it is voted. The 
Court insisted on the specific circumstances 
enabling MPs to raise conflicts in two deci-
sions adopted later in the year6 by confirm-
ing in principle the possibility of individual 
MPs referring a conflict to the Court.
However, coming back to the conflict on 
draft budgetary legislation, the ICC recog-
nized that the Parliament enjoys a very broad 
margin of appreciation in the application of 
its own rules. Therefore, the Court’s power 
of review is limited to cases in which viola-
tions are evidently identifiable already with-
in a summary consideration. The Court held 
that, on the facts, this exacting test was not 
met in this case, although it reserved the right 
to review particularly manifest violations of 
the rights of MPs in the future. However, the 
opening of the Court has not yet found any 
concrete applications. On the contrary, as 
mentioned before, the Court further circum-
scribed the concrete circumstances under 
which single MPs could successfully refer a 
conflict on procedural violations, such as the 
ones disputed in this case.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Judgment No. 20 of 2019 – Fundamental 
rights and multilevel protection
 
In this case, the Court considered a question 
of constitutionality involving the balancing 
of two possibly conflicting rights: the right 
of citizens and the press to access possibly 
significant data and the right to privacy. In 
particular, the referral order questioned the 
constitutionality of a law that imposed a duty 
to publish a wide spectrum of fiscal data 
concerning managers working for public ad-
ministrations, irrespective of their position. 
3 See our 2018 report: Pietro Faraguna, Michele Massa, Diletta Tega, Marta Cartabia, ‘Italy’, in Richard Albert, David Landau, Ŝimon Drugda (eds.), The I·CON-
nect-Clough Center 2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law, 2019, p 168
4 For an analysis of this context, see Vittoria Barsotti and others, Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context (OUP USA 2016) 49.
5 Corte costituzionale, ordinanza 10 gennaio – 8 febbraio 2019, n. 17.
6 Corte costituzionale, ordinanza 4 dicembre – 18 dicembre 2019, n. 274; Corte costituzionale, ordinanza 4 dicembre – 18 dicembre 2019, n. 275.
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The duty was imposed also on their spouses 
and relatives up to the second degree.
The case is highly significant, as the Court 
confirmed and fine-tuned its recent case law 
on the order of priority when questions of 
compatibility arise both with the Constitu-
tion and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (CFR). The ICC 
specified that its ruling would be based on 
internal constitutional provisions and Euro-
pean law if applicable, according to which-
ever system is most appropriate to the spe-
cific case. It also stressed the importance of 
its constitutional interpretation of the funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the CFR, which 
allow it to be interpreted in harmony with 
national constitutional traditions. Ordinary 
courts may still refer preliminary questions 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU), but they must also take into account 
that a constitutional referral is the main way, 
provided for in the Italian Constitution, to 
strike down a law infringing on fundamental 
rights. Therefore, it is entirely correct to re-
fer questions to the ICC first, and eventually 
later to the CJEU.
As for the merits of the case at hand, the 
Court applied a proportionality test. It found 
the aim of the provision – namely grant-
ing widespread public oversight on the use 
of public funds and carrying out of public 
functions – legitimate in principle. Howev-
er, the Court found that the concrete balanc-
ing adopted by the contested legislation put 
disproportionate burdens on one side, where 
it imposed the duty to publish an extremely 
wide range of data on all public managers 
without distinction. The Court found that the 
indiscriminate application of duties to pub-
lish such an extensive quantity of data was 
inherently unreasonable. The balancing was 
unreasonable first because the duty generat-
ed an enormous quantity of data that private 
citizens did not have the tools to navigate. 
Therefore, the duty lowered the protection of 
one right without increasing the protection 
of another. Second, the contested legislation 
was unreasonable because it invited curious 
digging into the private lives of managers 
and their families, and failed to meet the re-
quirement of resorting to the least restrictive 
option. Finally, the ICC found that the indis-
criminate imposition of the contested duties 
to all public managers was unconstitutional.
2. Judgment No. 24 of 2019 – Vertical re-
lationality: ECtHR De Tommaso follow-up
This case dealt with numerous referral or-
ders concerning the application of certain 
personal preventive measures of seizure and 
confiscation. The decision is worthy of at-
tention, as it refers to an important stream of 
case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights7 and reflects once again the “vertical” 
dimension of the Constitutional Court’s re-
lational approach. The contested preventive 
measures applied to “any person who may be 
presumed, on the basis of factual findings, to 
be habitually involved in unlawful dealings,” 
and “any person who, owing to his or her 
conduct and lifestyle, may be presumed, on 
the basis of factual findings, to earn a living, 
either in full or in part, from the proceeds 
of unlawful activities.” The Court denied 
that the measures had the nature of sanc-
tions only for the fact that they were being 
imposed upon indications that suggest prior 
involvement in criminal activity. However, 
the it struck down the contested measures as 
unconstitutional only insofar as they applied 
to persons “who may be presumed, on the 
basis of factual findings, to be habitually in-
volved in unlawful dealings.” In the view of 
the Court, this wording was inherently im-
precise, in particular as for the conditions of 
“unlawful dealings” and “habitually”), and 
also in view of the relevant ECtHR case law. 
3. Judgment No. 40 of 2019 – Proportional-
ity in criminal sanctions
In this case, the Court struck down a legisla-
tive provision in the matter of criminalization 
of drug offenses that provided a minimum 
punishment of eight rather than six years in 
cases of serious offenses. In fact, the contest-
ed legislation distinguished between minor 
and serious offenses, with the latter carrying a 
minimum sentence of eight years, exactly two 
times the maximum sentence for the former 
(four years). In this case, the ICC revisited its 
numerous decisions in the same field, and re-
called the many occasions in which it warned 
the legislator to take relevant action, similar to 
the cases reported in Section II of this report. 
First, the ICC reaffirmed its authority to strike 
down unconstitutional criminal provisions 
– including sentences – if they are patently 
unreasonable and disproportionate. Second-
ly, it was also confirmed that, when such a 
provision is struck down, the ensuing void 
may be filled by the ICC itself extending a 
different provision if it already exists in the 
overall legal system and concerns analogous 
situations. In the view of the Court, after a 
close examination of pre-existing legislation, 
the six-year minimum recommended by the 
referral order was consistent with the overall 
legislative scheme. However, the Court made 
also clear that the legislator remains free to 
alter the six-year provision resulting from the 
Court’s decision.
In this case, the ICC embraced its traditional 
role of counter-majoritarian guardian by in-
sisting on the seriousness of the fundamental 
rights involved. The ICC noted that dispro-
portionate punishments undermine the con-
stitutionally mandated rehabilitative purpose 
of criminal punishment. Moreover, as many 
cases fall into a grey area on the borderline 
between serious and minor offenses, the very 
wide gap between the minimum punishment 
for serious and the maximum punishment for 
minor offenses inherently led to potentially 
unreasonable consequences. 
4. Judgment No. 99 of 2019 – Lack of alter-
natives to imprisonment for mentally ill in-
mates is unconstitutional
In this case, the Court struck down part of 
the 1975 law regulating the penitentiary sys-
tem, as long as the contested provisions did 
not provide for the application of specific 
7 de Tommaso v. Italy, 205 Eur. Ct. H.R (2017). 
9 Maria Theresa Rörig (ed.), ‘Le pronunce di incostituzionalità e di incompatibilità costituzionale nella giurisprudenza costituzionale tedesca e austriaca’, October 
2018, Comp. 242, in https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/convegni_seminari/242_incompatibilita_Germania_Austria.pdf
10 For an overview of the preceding episodes of this saga, see our 2016 and 2017 reports. 
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measures allowing for house arrest in the 
event of serious mental illness, when this 
condition supervened during enforcement of 
the sentence. The absence of any alternative 
to imprisonment for those who develop seri-
ous mental illness rather than a physical one 
while in detention resulted from successive, 
but partly incoherent, legislative reforms 
that abolished first civic and then forensic 
psychiatric hospitals. The abolition removed 
any alternative to imprisonment in the cases 
at hand and, according to the Constitutional 
Court, created a lack of effective protection 
of the fundamental right to health. When 
combined with the inevitable suffering aris-
ing from deprivation of liberty, this lack of 
alternatives could result in an additional and 
inhumane punishment liable to further dam-
age the health of the detainee, in violation 
of the ECHR. The Court struck down the 
contested provisions as unconstitutional and 
accepted the remedy identified in the refer-
ral order of the Court of Cassation, namely 
the application of the alternative measure of 
house arrest. However, the Constitutional 
Court made clear that courts are responsible 
to assess on a case-by-case basis whether a 
detainee suffering from supervening serious 
mental illness can serve his or her sentence 
in prison or needs to be treated in secure ac-
commodation elsewhere.
5. Judgment No. 112 of 2019 – Vertical re-
lationality in the matter of proportionality 
of sanctions 
In this case, the Court struck down various 
pieces of legislation providing for the man-
datory confiscation not only of the gains 
deriving from insider trading but also of the 
means and assets used in order to realize the 
gains. Although the sanction was admin-
istrative in nature, the Court recalled how 
certain guarantees, traditionally applied only 
to criminal sanctions, apply also to admin-
istrative ones. In particular, the ICC argued 
that the automatic confiscation of the means 
used to realize the gains was disproportion-
ate, holding that the contested sanctions did 
not comply with the constitutional require-
ments of proportionality of sanctions. Con-
sidering that the legislation already provided 
elsewhere for fines, which were moreover 
already severe, the additional penalty of au-
tomatic confiscation of the means used to 
realize the gains resulted in excessive pun-
ishment and was thus unconstitutional, and 
incompatible with both the ECHR and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union.
6. Order no. 117 of 2019 Vertical relationali-
ty: fundamental rights in between the Italian 
Constitution, the ECHR and the CFEU (with 
a new reference for preliminary ruling from 
the ICC to the CJEU) 
In this case, the Court submitted a new refer-
ral order to the CJEU. This is not unprece-
dented,8 although this is the first time the ICC 
questioned the CJEU not only on the interpre-
tation but also on the validity of a European 
provision. The case concerned the applica-
bility of the right to silence in proceedings 
that, although formally administrative, entail 
the imposition of sanctions of a substantially 
punitive nature. The referring Court of Cassa-
tion was of the view that the legislation could 
violate both constitutional and supranational 
parameters, as the legislation in question pun-
ished with extremely severe sanctions those 
who refuse to answer questions from a com-
petent administrative authority if it might re-
veal their liability for wrongdoing, punishable 
by administrative sanctions. The ICC recalled 
its latest stream of case law concerning the 
concurrence of domestic constitutional rem-
edies and supranational remedies when the 
violation of fundamental rights was at stake,9 
and eventually decided to submit a reference 
for a preliminary ruling. This decision was 
connected with the circumstance that the con-
tested legislation stemmed from obligations 
incumbent on Italy under, initially, Directive 
2003/6/EC and, subsequently, Regulation 
(EU) No. 596/2014. However, the wording 
of the relevant European obligations was am-
biguous. Therefore, the ICC asked the CJEU 
for an interpretation (and possible validity) of 
these obligations in light of Articles 47 and 
48 of the CFEU. The proceedings before the 
Court were stayed pending the outcome of the 
request for a preliminary ruling.
7. Judgment No. 221 of 2019 – Ban for fe-
male same-sex couples to access medically 
assisted procreation is not unconstitutional
In this case, the ICC was called once again 
to scrutinize the 2004 legislation providing 
for strict regulation of access to medical-
ly assisted reproduction (MAR), after the 
same ICC declared parts of this law uncon-
stitutional in 2014 and 2015. This time, the 
Court upheld the contested pieces of legis-
lation concerning the ban for same-sex fe-
male couples to access MAR. In fact, the 
contested legislation allows MAR only for 
different-sex couples (provided the partners 
are living, of potentially fertile age and mar-
ried or cohabiting). The exclusion of female 
same-sex couples was challenged by two 
referring courts on the basis of both consti-
tutional and international grounds. On both 
grounds, the Court held that the questions 
were unfounded. Stressing the plurality of 
constitutional interests involved, the Court 
held that the task of identifying a reasonable 
balance – taking into consideration the lean-
ings of society at a specific point in history 
– belongs, as a matter of priority, to the legis-
lator, in its role of interpreter of the national 
collectivity. In this line of reasoning, the ICC 
relied also on ECtHR case law, which held 
in a similar case that states have a wide mar-
gin of appreciation in areas where there is no 
general consensus at the European level, and 
also that states may legitimately limit the use 
of MAR procedures to the therapeutic pur-
pose of curing infertility. This was the main 
(legitimate) rationale of the contested legis-
lation. This circumstance distinguished this 
case from the case law evoked by the refer-
ring judges concerning two cases in which 
the ICC declared part of the same legislation 
unconstitutional, where the contested legis-
lation excluded from MAR couples affected 
by pathologies causing infertility or sterility. 
On the contrary, in this case infertility was 
not caused by any pathologies. The Court re-
8 The ICC submitted three references for preliminary rulings in the past: see Corte costituzionale, ordinanza 15 aprile 2008, n. 103; ordinanza 18 luglio 2013 n. 207; 
and ordinanza 26 gennaio 2017, n. 24.
9 Corte costituzionale, sentenza 14 dicembre 2017, n. 269; sentenza 21 febbraio 2019, n. 20; sentenza 21 marzo 2109, n. 63.
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fused to assign a constitutional value to the 
desire to have children with one’s partner. It 
distinguished from the cases allowing recog-
nition of adoptions by homosexual individu-
als of the minor biological children of their 
partners, and those allowing recognition of 
parenthood by same-sex couples achieved 
by MAR procedures obtained abroad, as in 
those cases the overarching interest to pro-
tect was the one of the children to have a 
family. On the contrary, this case concerned 
the interest of a couple to have children. 
8. Judgment No. 237 of 2019 – Recognition 
of “ foreign” parenthood of same-sex couples
This case concerned a different scenario if 
compared with the one originating the de-
cision above; in fact, a referral order ques-
tioned the constitutionality of a body of 
provisions that purportedly prevented a civil 
registry official from specifying two wom-
en, married under the law of a foreign state, 
as the parents of a child born as a result of 
MAR. Here as before, the ICC reaffirmed 
that the law in Italy excluding same-sex cou-
ples from MAR fell within the legislator’s 
margin of discretion. However, the Court did 
not decide on the merits of the referral or-
der, as it considered it inadmissible because 
it was not clear what the precise contested 
provision was. In fact, the referral order con-
tested a body of provisions without specify-
ing with enough clarity what was the subject 
of the question of constitutionality.
9. Judgment No. 253 of 2019 – Absolute pre-
clusion of bonus treatments for mafia in-
mates is unconstitutional
In this case, the Court struck down part of the 
1975 law regulating the penitentiary system 
as unconstitutional, insofar as the contested 
provisions precluded inmates serving a life 
sentence convicted of certain mafia-related 
crimes from eligibility for bonus periods of 
short release if they did not cooperate with 
judicial authorities. The Constitutional Court 
focused on the part of the provision that es-
tablished the following absolute presumption: 
non-cooperation with judicial authorities au-
tomatically meant that non-cooperative in-
mates maintained some links with organized 
crime and were therefore ineligible for bonus 
periods of short release under the penitentiary 
system. In the view of the Court, the absolute 
presumption violated Articles 3 (principle of 
equality) and 27(3) (principle of rehabilita-
tion of offenders) of the Constitution for three 
distinct but related reasons. First, the absolute 
presumption penalizes uncooperative inmates 
with the aim of serving investigative needs. 
However, investigative needs are unrelated 
to the crime committed by the uncooperative 
inmates, and this circumstance makes the 
contested provision irrational. Second, the 
contested preclusion erases any possible eval-
uation of the uncooperative inmate’s progress 
and moreover serves as a disincentive for him 
or her to make any progress. This combina-
tion violates the principle of rehabilitation of 
offenders. Last, the fact that the presumption 
still applies even though there are grounds for 
rebutting it based on the actual circumstances 
of the case makes it unreasonable. Therefore, 
the Court held the challenged provision to be 
unconstitutional insofar as it did not provide 
that inmates convicted of the mafia-related 
crimes specified in the article may be grant-
ed bonus periods of short release, even in the 
absence of cooperation with judicial authori-
ties, when information had been acquired that 
ruled out both current links with organized 
crime, terrorism or subversion and the danger 
of the restoration of such links. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
At the beginning of 2020, the Court approved 
some additional rules of procedure that al-
low the addition of experts and, notably, a 
peculiar type of amicus curiae. Now NGOs 
and public institutions may send a written 
opinion to the Court when a constitutional 
question impacts on general or public inter-
ests they are concerned with. They do not 
become formally parts of the proceedings, 
and their opinions will be admitted only if 
they are effectively helpful, considering the 
case and its complexity. Nonetheless, if used 
wisely, this new tool could have a significant 
impact on constitutional justice, particularly 
when the issues to be debated are not mere-
ly legal (e.g., require scientific, economic or 
statistical knowledge and expertise).
As usual, several relevant questions await 
decisions: e.g. (in January), on another ref-
erendum on the electoral law for the Parlia-
ment, and the rebuilding of a highway bridge 
(whose collapse killed 43 people), from 
which the corporation formerly responsible 
for it has been excluded through a special le-
gal provision.
Three judges, including President Cartabia, 
shall end their mandates in 2020. Therefore, 
one-fifth of the Court will be renewed (even 
more, if one considers the appointment of 
Judge Stefano Petitti occurred last year on 
December 10, 2019), with one judge to be 
appointed by the President of the Republic, 
one by the Court of Cassation and one by the 
Court of Auditors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2019 was key for Kazakhstan in 
terms of major political and legal develop-
ments directly related to the country’s con-
stitutional system. Because of changes in the 
State’s highest political leadership and its 
subsequent practices and reactions, it may be 
said that 2019 was a testing time for the con-
stitutional institutions established since the 
adoption of the 1995 Constitution.
The first half of the year was marked by 
Kazakhstan’s first President, Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, announcing his resignation in 
March after 29 years in office. The inter-
im post was filled by the Senate Chairman, 
Kasym-Jomart Tokayev, in accordance with 
the Constitution. Shortly thereafter, Toka-
yev announced early presidential elections 
and subsequently won in summer 2019. The 
elections were accompanied, for the first 
time in Kazakhstan, by massive protests in 
the capital.
This report describes the most significant 
constitutional developments in the country 
as well as the work carried out by the Con-
stitutional Council of Kazakhstan in 2019. It 
highlights the reaction of the Council to the 
changes in the State’s leadership, qualifying 
(partially) them from a constitutional legal 
point of view, and provides an overview of 
its normative resolutions and other decisions 
dealing with issues of constitutional signif-
icance. The report proposes, inter alia, that 
it would be more appropriate to refer to Ka-
zakhstan’s constitutional system as one of 
“flexible” constitutional control rather than 
true constitutional justice due to some of its 
determinative elements. The following years 
will show ever clearly whether this system 
can still live up to the progressive expecta-
tions of the authors of the 1995 Constitution, 
or not.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
While there were no major amendments in-
troduced to the Constitution in 2019 (which 
have been quite frequent over the last 24 
years, reaching a total of 72 by 2017) – ex-
cept for one renaming the capital of Kazakh-
stan from Astana to Nur-Sultan – other in-
stances occurred where specific provisions 
of the highest law of Kazakhstan were in-
voked. In short, they included requests from 
the Head of State addressed to the Constitu-
tional Council on the official interpretation 
of parts of concrete articles of the Consti-
tution dealing with the presidency (two in-
stances; see next section for thematic over-
view), and an all-new possibility for human 
rights organizations, scientific and other in-
stitutions as well as citizens specializing in 
issues addressed before the Council to send 
their conclusions and opinions to the Coun-
cil (see next section). Additionally, a new 
Constitutional Law was adopted introducing 
technical changes and additions to two oth-
er constitutional laws dealing with elections 
and an exclusive economic zone in the capi-
tal, Nur-Sultan.
The major events within the purview of this 
report as briefly noted in the introduction 
were the transfer of power by the first Presi-
dent of Kazakhstan and the presidential elec-
tions of June 2019. After serving for almost 
thirty years as President of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev announced on 19 
March 2019 that he was stepping down as 
Head of State and signed a decree to this ef-
fect ending his powers effective 20 March. 
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the Senate Speak-
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er, took over as the acting President for the 
remainder of Nazarbayev’s term. Despite the 
ex-President’s stepping down, he remains 
the Chairman of the Security Council, the 
leader of the Nur Otan political party, which 
dominates the Parliament, and continues 
holding his legal title as “Leader of the Na-
tion”. His resignation did not signal any im-
mediate major policy shifts for the country. 
The former President’s control of Kazakh-
stan’s Security Council (the lifelong right to 
head it had been found to be constitutional 
by the Constitutional Council back in 20181), 
which sets guidelines for foreign and securi-
ty policies, ensured that he remained essen-
tially in power as the main decision-maker.
These developments were followed by the 
announcement of early presidential elections 
made by the interim President (in accor-
dance with Art. 41, para. 3, of the Constitu-
tion), citing the need to eliminate a period of 
uncertainty and potential political instability 
before the initially scheduled elections in 
2020. Prior to that, Tokayev who had been 
replaced in his previous post as the Senate’s 
Chairman by Dariga Nazarbayeva (the first 
daughter of the ex-President), questioned the 
Constitutional Council about the interpre-
tation of the constitutional requirement for 
presidential candidates to have been residing 
in Kazakhstan for the last fifteen years in or-
der to be eligible for election. Upon receiv-
ing the Council’s positive affirmation that 
this requirement includes the time served 
outside of the country as a representative 
of diplomatic service to Kazakhstan (Toka-
yev had previously worked as Under Secre-
tary-General, Director-General of the United 
Nations Office for two years in 2011-2013), 
he proceeded to register as a candidate, nom-
inated on behalf of the leading Nur Otan Par-
ty. Tokayev subsequently won the elections 
against six other candidates with 71% of the 
popular vote and became the second Presi-
dent of Kazakhstan on 9 June 2019.
His first step as interim President was to re-
name the capital city of Kazakhstan after his 
predecessor, with the Parliament approving 
the renaming of Astana to Nur-Sultan the 
same day. It was done, again, after the re-
quired positive conclusion by the Constitu-
tional Council that the corresponding law on 
amending the Constitution with the change in 
the capital name was constitutional.2 These 
changes stood out because of their swiftness 
(all in a matter of three days), with the Min-
ister of Justice highlighting that despite its 
speedy nature, the legal and constitutional 
procedure in this case had been followed in 
strict accordance with the acting legislation.3
 
The speed that has been accompanying the 
changes in the content and form of the con-
stitutional law of Kazakhstan since 1998 
continues to amaze observers. It reaffirms the 
constant major problem that has been charac-
teristic of the constitutional system and prac-
tice of the country for years: the design of the 
Constitutional Council. Conceived as a qua-
si-judicial body based on the French model, 
it appears to be merely a political instrument 
often used for a legal formalization of consti-
tutional deviations, and sometimes even for 
replacing the constitutional norms per se by 
its normative resolutions.4 This undermines 
the stability of the constitutional framework, 
the central core of which, the Constitution it-
self, being viewed as a progressive legal and 
political act, at least in a big part of its major 
aspects (human rights and freedoms above 
all, principle of separation of powers, a true 
separation of the institutions of investigation, 
court and prosecution, etc.). As the events 
of 2019 demonstrated, this recurring prob-
lem continued to contribute to the persistent 
disinclination of both lawyers and non-law-
yers in the country to view the Constitution 
as nothing more than a symbolic document 
easily subject to political manipulation. They 
reaffirmed that the existing constitutional 
system in Kazakhstan represents a system of 
non-rigid constitutional control rather than a 
truly independent framework with its own au-
tonomous self-sufficient mechanism of con-
stitutional justice.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
It would be difficult to refer to the below 
instances of decision-making activity of the 
Constitutional Council as cases ad litteram 
given the fact that in Kazakhstan there is no 
judicial mechanism, in the strict meaning 
of the word, directly vested with the power 
to hear and decide constitutional disputes, 
and especially considering the absence of 
any possibility for ordinary individuals and 
citizens to directly petition the Council.5 
However, these instances illustrate concrete 
situations significant from the point of view 
of constitutional law that marked the year 
2019; they have shown once again how im-
portant it is that developments in the political 
system be checked against their constitution-
1 Normative Resolution #4 of the Constitutional Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On checking the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On the Security Coun-
cil of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ and the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On Amending and Adding to Some Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
on the Activities of the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ on their conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan”, 28 June 2018.
2 A later development in 2019 was that President Tokayev granted Nazarbayev broader powers regarding personnel matters. According to his decree signed on 9 
October 2019, the Head of State will coordinate with the Chairman of the Security Council the appointment of all ministers, except for the Heads of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Also, from now on he will have to coordinate with Nazarbayev 
the appointment of Akims (Governors) of regions, cities of republican significance and the capital.
3 See Weekly Newspaper Наша Версия [Our Version], “Минюст Казахстана признал законным переименование Астаны в Нурсултан” [“The Ministry of Justice 
of Kazakhstan Recognized the Renaming of Astana to Nursultan as Legal”], issue #3, 27 January 2020, available at https://versia.ru/minyust-kazaxstana-priznal-za-
konnym-pereimenovanie-astany-v-nursultan
4 See Arman Shaykenov, “С правом переписки: краткая история изменений казахстанской конституции” [“With the Right to Re-Draft: A Brief History of 
Amendments to the Kazakhstani Constitution”], published online 10 December 2018, available at https://expertonline.kz/a15790/ 
5 In accordance with Article 20 of the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “On Constitutional Council” of 1995, only the following actors may initiate 
constitutional proceedings: President, Chairman of the Senate and Chairman of the Majilis (Lower Chamber) of the Parliament, a group of parliamentarian deputies 
(constituting no less than one-fifth of the total number of deputies of the whole Parliament), Prime-Minister, courts as well as state bodies and officials whose acts 
are being subjected to constitutional scrutiny.
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ality by an appropriate body of constitution-
al supervision and in a proper manner. They 
further demonstrate whether or not the State 
body mandated to ensure the supremacy of 
the Constitution throughout the whole terri-
tory of the country has performed its task at 
such a key time. In fact, no petition question-
ing the constitutionality of the results of the 
presidential elections was filed in 2019 by 
any institution or body authorized to do so 
by law in the name of any of the presidential 
candidates who lost the elections.
1. Normative Resolution #1 of 15 February 
2019: Grounds for President’s early termi-
nation of office
In this decision, the Constitutional Council 
was acting upon the official request of the 
ex-President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who 
had asked whether the list of grounds for 
early termination of presidential powers es-
tablished in Article 42, para. 3 of the Consti-
tution was exhaustive. This provision states 
that “the powers of the President of the Re-
public are terminated from the moment the 
newly elected President of the Republic 
takes office, as well as in the event of early 
dismissal or removal of the President from 
office or his demise. All former Presidents 
of the Republic, except for those dismissed 
from office, have the title of the ex-Presi-
dent of the Republic of Kazakhstan.” After 
considering the various aspects of the status 
of the President as per the Constitution, the 
Council briefly analyzed each of the early 
termination grounds existing in the consti-
tutional law and concluded that the current 
enumeration of those grounds does not rep-
resent a full list. In particular, it does not ex-
plicitly provide for and at the same time does 
not prohibit the early termination of the Head 
of State’s powers on the basis of his personal 
will, for example in the form of resignation 
due to personal or other reasons. The Coun-
cil considered that the right of the Head of 
State to prematurely terminate his powers on 
personal grounds (i.e., the right to resign) is 
an integral element of the presidential form 
of government and the constitutional status 
of the President of Kazakhstan. Freedom of 
expression is inherent in the President of the 
Republic, both as a person and as a citizen 
of Kazakhstan. Hence, the current list was 
not exhaustive and the President was fully 
entitled to terminate his office early out of 
his own volition, which was thus a self-suffi-
cient basis for such termination. The Council 
therefore essentially endorsed the planned 
move of the ex-President to step down.
2. Conclusion #2 of 20 March 2019: Consti-
tutionality of renaming the capital
This decision of the Constitutional Council 
came as a result of the first open request of 
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev addressed to the 
constitutional body in his capacity as interim 
President. It had to deal with the first pro-
posed legislative project of Tokayev under 
such capacity, namely, the Law “On Introduc-
ing Amendments to the Constitution of Ka-
zakhstan”, and its constitutionality. The Law 
set forth a new edition of Art. 2, para. 3 of the 
Constitution in the following way: “The law 
shall determine the administrative-territorial 
division of the Republic and the status of its 
capital. The capital of Kazakhstan is the city 
of Nur-Sultan.” The previous formulation of 
this provision had featured “Astana” instead 
of “Nur-Sultan”. The Council highlighted that 
the historical mission of Nursultan Nazarba-
yev as the Founder of the new independent 
State of Kazakhstan was constitutionally jus-
tified. It did so by noting that amendments and 
additions to the Constitution of the Republic 
are submitted, according to Art. 91, para. 3 of 
the Constitution, either to a republican refer-
endum or to the Parliament of the Republic. 
The Council agreed that compliance with 
constitutional requirements was achieved, 
and since no referendum on the matter was 
called for, the choice for procedure was clear-
ly the second option. 
To reach this conclusion, the Council referred 
to its own previous normative resolution in 
2017, referring to another amendment where 
it stressed that the “list of specially protected 
constitutional values was expanded”. That 
list now apparently included the “fundamen-
tal principles of the Republic established by 
the Founder of independent Kazakhstan”. 
According to the Council, the Founder (“El-
basy”, or “The Leader of the Nation”) en-
sured Kazakhstan’s unity, protection of the 
Constitution, human and civil rights and 
freedoms, and, thanks to his constitutional 
status and personal qualities, he had made 
a decisive contribution to the formation and 
development of sovereign Kazakhstan. The 
amendments to the Constitution of the Re-
public of Kazakhstan regarding the renaming 
of the capital of the Republic from “Astana” 
to “Nur-Sultan” are thus associated with the 
recognition of the historical role and perpet-
uation of the merits of the First President of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan to the people of 
Kazakhstan. They do not affect the indepen-
dence of the State, the territorial integrity of 
the Republic and its form of government as 
well as the fundamental principles of the Re-
public, laid down by Elbasy, and do not con-
tradict the requirements of Art. 91, para. 3 
of the Constitution. Therefore, the proposed 
Law “On Introducing Amendments to the 
Constitution of Kazakhstan” was recognized 
by the Council as constitutional. The Council 
did not address the question of what possible 
repercussions or consequences the capital’s 
renaming could or would entail from, e.g., a 
financial perspective, or what public opinion 
would be on the matter.
3. Normative Resolution #3 of 11 April 2019: 
Amendments to the regulations of the Con-
stitutional Council
A seemingly rather technical document,6 
Resolution #3 was more than just a formal-
ity; it introduced a novelty in Kazakhstani 
constitutional law that may signify a poten-
tially effective opportunity for interested ac-
tors to positively contribute to the normative 
outcomes of the workings of the system of 
constitutional control in the future. It is espe-
cially so that for the time being, there is no 
other way for civil society to affect directly 
or to have access to these processes given the 
existing procedural regulation of the Coun-
6 It was issued in the form of a normative resolution, a type of legal act that is an integral part of acting law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, according to Art. 32 of 
the Constitutional Law “On Constitutional Council”.
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cil. The novelty is that for the first time, the 
Council provided a possibility for human 
rights organizations, scientific and other in-
stitutions as well as citizens specializing in 
issues addressed before the Council to send 
their conclusions and opinions to it. Conclu-
sions that are based on legal analysis of the 
issue, deal with the matter of relevance for 
the Council and facilitate a proper consider-
ation of the request that initiated the consti-
tutional proceedings may be included in the 
materials of the proceedings and published 
using the online resource of the Constitu-
tional Council. It is unfortunately not clear 
who was the author of the initial petition for 
this particular decision of the Council; that is 
not indicated in the text. The need for speedy 
procedures in the constitutional practice of 
the country has again been illustrated by this 
decision; another provision establishes that 
“due to a particular importance and urgency 
of the appeal (petition), the Constitutional 
Council may decide to consider it in an ex-
pedited manner.”
4. Annual Address of 20 June 2019: Status of 
constitutional legality in Kazakhstan
This particular decision of the Constitutional 
Council had as its basis a specific provision 
in the Constitution that obliges the Parlia-
ment to hear annual addresses of the Council 
about the state of constitutional legality in the 
country.7 It is important because it not only 
showed examples of constitutional work car-
ried out in the country, at least for a part of 
the reported period, but also indicated some 
serious shortcomings in this work related to 
the absence of a follow-up of the Council’s 
previous decisions on the side of State bod-
ies. Also, it includes several suggestions by 
the Council on key issues of law and practice 
(e.g., criminal law and procedure) albeit for-
mulated rather generally. In the address, the 
Council noted that the period that had passed 
since the announcement of the previous an-
nual address to the Parliament (including the 
first half of 2019) was marked by historical 
events significant for Kazakhstani statehood 
and constitutional identity. According to 
the Council, there was a smooth process of 
transferring supreme power in Kazakhstan. 
It recounted the main events of constitu-
tional significance that are dealt with in this 
report (presidential stepdown and elections, 
renaming the capital) and proceeded to state 
that all these events took place in strict ac-
cordance with the requirements of the Con-
stitution and the Constitutional Law of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan “On Elections in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan”.
Thus, according to the Council, the continu-
ity and commitment of society and the State 
to the course of faithfully following the letter 
and the spirit of the Constitution declared by 
the Elbasy at the dawn of independence were 
reaffirmed. Moreover, it noted that the trans-
fer of power took place in a calm, non-con-
flict context, which is a powerful factor in 
ensuring internal stability and strengthening 
the international image of Kazakhstan.
 
As noted by the Council, over the reported 
period, the country continued to work on the 
consistent promotion of constitutionalism, 
improving the effectiveness of the provisions 
and norms of the Constitution in the field of 
State building, guaranteeing the rights and 
freedoms of man and citizen. After explaining 
its normative interpretative work (see cases 
above), the Council discussed the work in 
the beginning of 2019 directed at following 
up and implementing its previous decisions 
(normative resolutions), such as, for example, 
introducing a new article into the Law “On 
Executive Proceedings and the Status of Bai-
liffs”, which now regulates in detail the order 
of using the forced delivery of a person to the 
interrogating officer, investigator, prosecutor 
or the court in case of failure to appear upon 
their call without good reason.
The Council reported on the legislative and 
interpretative work carried out during the 
years prior to 2019, upon which it proposed 
measures to improve the existing legislation 
in the country in several substantive areas. 
First, it noted that an analysis of the criminal 
procedural law shows that it lacks rules ob-
ligating criminal prosecution authorities to 
assist the victim in criminal cases of private 
prosecution to clarify the circumstances of 
the criminal offense in the absence of infor-
mation about the prosecuted person. Further-
more, the Constitutional Council believed 
that the establishment of the procedure in 
which the initiation of criminal cases of pri-
vate prosecution and criminal prosecution of 
them is assigned to the victims themselves 
does not exempt the State (represented by 
its authorized bodies) from fulfilling its con-
stitutional duties to ensure adequate protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of citizens, 
including judicial protection, as well as the 
rule of law and order in the country. In addi-
tion, the constitutional provision on the invi-
olability of personal dignity obliges the State 
to establish legal guarantees for the protec-
tion of this intangible good, not only during 
a person’s life but also after their death. In 
this regard, in order to properly protect the 
constitutional rights and freedoms of crime 
victims, it is advisable to amend the Crim-
inal Procedural Code accordingly. Regretta-
bly, it did not propose any concrete wordings 
or formulations to the law. 
Similar general suggestions were made as to 
the necessity of taking additional legislative 
measures in order to protect the institutions 
of motherhood and childhood as well as to 
pay serious attention to the modernization of 
the unified system of State patronage of the 
institution of marriage and family, mother-
hood, fatherhood and childhood. Important-
ly, the Council highlighted that it was nec-
essary to make wider use of the possibilities 
for courts to access the Constitutional Coun-
cil. There is no clear mechanism for notify-
ing the courts about the Council’s admission 
of requests made by other courts. Recently, 
the dynamics of such requests could not be 
called positive. The reasons to blame for this 
would be not only a low level of judicial ac-
tivity but also (some unclear) organizational 
problems.
7 Art. 63, para. 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. In accordance with Art. 32, para. 3 Constitutional Law “On Constitutional Council”, addresses of 
the Council represent one of the three forms of its decisions that it uses in its work.
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IV. LOOKING AHEAD
It appears logical to suggest that the next 
big question would be whether the main 
constitutional body of the country “gains 
confidence”, despite all the peculiarities in 
its legal setup, in exercising its authority to 
provide proper control for ensuring consti-
tutional legality, especially when it comes to 
the highest political actors. This will be par-
ticularly relevant in light of a potential need 
for constitutional review of possible new 
acts by the President in 20208 and beyond. 
Another challenge exists in ensuring that the 
Council’s earlier decisions that weren’t im-
plemented by the responsible state bodies in 
2019 are complied with and their recommen-
dations followed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional change was the dominant 
theme of constitutional discussion in 2019. 
While some proposals focused on saving 
resources, and some on providing more re-
sources to the devolved governments, most 
debate concerned possible changes in the en-
tire system of government (from presidential 
to parliamentary or semi-presidential) and 
whether this change would facilitate national 
unity and peaceful elections. 
Cases worth analysis were few. This paper 
focuses on some interesting applications of 
human rights provisions and on the crimi-
nal justice system – some offering improve-
ment, others disappointing. Bringing that 
system into conformity with the Constitution 
is a matter of some urgency, but the cases 
are bringing improvements at the margins. 
Expansion of economic, social and cultural 
rights remained disappointingly limited. The 
problem of corruption, and efforts to con-
trol it, remained at centre-stage with many 
arrests, but no prominent convictions. This 
“fight” yielded associated crises in terms of 
executive-judiciary relations, and in individ-
ual counties where senior officers were un-
der investigation. True leadership and vision 
in advancing constitutionalism were still 
sadly lacking. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The main constitutional focus was on pro-
posals for constitutional change. One of these 
reached a resolution: an effort by a political 
party to use the popular initiative procedure 
for amendment. The Thirdway Alliance in-
troduced the Punguza Mizigo (Relieve the 
Burden) proposals, focused on reducing the 
number of public offices as well as trying 
to expedite the corruption-related findings 
of the Auditor General through the courts. 
The Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission examined the signatures and 
pronounced that there were more than the 
one million threshold required to start the 
process. However, the initiative failed at the 
next hurdle of getting 24 legislatures out of 
the 47 counties to approve it. Only one ap-
proved the proposal. It was clearly a political 
affair; in fact, the only county to approve it 
was the home of the Deputy President. Oth-
erwise, the alliance of President Uhuru Ken-
yatta and Raila Odinga (see below) opposed 
it, and counties fell in line.1  
However, in our opinion, the initiative was 
largely misguided. First, we are not con-
vinced that “a constitutional amendment” 
(Article 277) covers such a large slew of 
amendments. Many proposals were poor-
ly thought through, notably to reduce MPs 
to two for each county (so that Lamu, for 
example, with 69,793 registered voters in 
2017, would have the same number of MPs 
as Nairobi (2,251,921 registered voters). 
Providing that the Auditor-General’s reports 
must be automatically adopted, and lead to 
prosecutions, would give too much power to 
this office and detract from the role of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions. Providing 
that all corruption trials must end in 30 days 
was simply unrealistic. Minimum funding to 
counties would have been raised from at least 
15 percent of national revenue to at least 35 
1 The bill can be downloaded from the Party website at https://thirdwayalliance.com/download/8_3_PUN-
GUZA_MIZIGO_Amendment_Bill_2019_2.pdf
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percent. There was no suggestion to transfer 
any of the hefty national budget items to the 
counties, such as the police, courts, educa-
tion, airports, universities or major roads.
The “UhuRaila” alliance alternative was 
the “BBI”, the year’s catchphrase: Building 
Bridges Initiative. This emerged from the 
handshake between the two outlined in the 
2018 Global Review piece. A presidential 
task force was assigned to respond to nine is-
sues outlined by the two handshakers. These 
included violent elections, a non-inclusive 
system of government, ethnic antagonism, 
the viability of the system of devolution 
based in 47 counties and corruption. 
The task force reported in October 2019.2 
It made a large number of proposals, very 
many amounting to little more than saying 
we should follow the law and Constitution. 
Nine or ten would require amendment to the 
Constitution (of which a few need a refer-
endum). Almost all attention was focused on 
the system of government – particularly be-
cause this was the way Odinga had painted 
the endeavour. However, the task force did 
not propose a true parliamentary system, but 
would have added a Prime Minister (sim-
ilar to the Tanzanian or Ugandan model, 
but required to have the support of the par-
liamentary majority) to the President, plus 
a couple of deputy PMs. The second-place 
candidate in the presidential election would 
be ex officio in Parliament and Leader of the 
Opposition. The task force described this as 
a “autochthonous, home-grown executive 
structure that responds to our political real-
ities, sought by Kenyans [and] broad-based 
and inclusive”. They also wanted the coun-
ties to get 35-50 percent of the national rev-
enue. They hinted, but did not recommend, 
an Odinga favourite: an intermediate level 
of government to legislate and coordinate 
regional law and policy.
The extension of term limits – for the Pres-
ident and governors – was also proposed. 
And both Punguza Mizigo and BBI favoured 
more development resources at the lowest 
elected level of government: the wards from 
which county assembly members come. 
The tension between the judiciary and oth-
er branches of government continued. The 
President simply failed to perform the rou-
tine function of appointing 41 judges to su-
perior courts. His excuses were that negative 
National Intelligence Service reports (an ex-
planation greeted with incredulity on the part 
of those familiar with the judiciary), possible 
corruption and ethnic balance issues.3 An 
earlier case had held that the President was 
obliged to appoint judges chosen by the Judi-
cial Service Commission.4 A new challenge 
to the President’s reluctance is in court. Lack 
of person-power meant that regionally based 
Court of Appeal benches had to be with-
drawn into Nairobi. Budgetary cuts have 
also been a challenge to the judiciary. The 
Treasury eventually restored the budget after 
what one report called a “passionate rant” by 
the Chief Justice.5 
The “war on corruption” waged by the Pres-
ident, police and Director of Public Pros-
ecution continued with many arrests but 
few convictions. The right to bail under the 
Constitution (Article 49(1)(h)) continued to 
create tensions between the judiciary and 
prosecution, but eventually magistrates, up-
held by the High Court, began to include as a 
condition of bail for senior accused the pro-
hibition on attending their offices. This was 
welcomed, but towards the end of the year, 
a peculiar crisis occurred when the Gover-
nor of Nairobi was arrested and charged with 
corruption (one of three to be charged). He 
had no deputy governor (his running mate 
having resigned early, citing an inability to 
work with the governor). Queries remained: 
What exactly was the governor prevented 
from doing? Who could stand in for him? 
The county assembly speaker could step in 
but only if the governor position was actu-
ally vacant (Article 182(4)). Could the gov-
ernor nominate a new deputy, according to 
law, for approval by the County Assembly, 
despite the bail conditions? By year-end, 
these were unresolved, but court decisions 
were awaited.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
A) Human Rights 
1. Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) 
v Attorney-General – 2019 eKLR Right to 
life; abortion; High Court6 
The assumed facts were that the second peti-
tioner, a girl of 14 at the time, had been com-
pelled to have sexual relations, became preg-
nant and, unable to procure a legal abortion, 
resorted to other means, with serious conse-
quences to her health – and indeed her death 
before the case concluded. Her claim was 
based on the withdrawal of guidelines for 
safe abortion by the Ministry of Health, de-
spite the Constitution (Article 26) saying that 
abortion is forbidden “unless, in the opinion 
of a trained health professional, there is need 
for emergency treatment, or the life or health 
of the mother is in danger, or if permitted 
by any other written law”. The action suc-
ceeded, based on violations of constitutional 
rights to the highest attainable standard of 
health, non-discrimination, information, to 
benefit from scientific progress and consum-
er rights, constituted by withdrawal of the 
guidelines. The Court indicated that preg-
nancy resulting from rape and defilement 
(intercourse with an underage person) could 
be terminated if the necessary opinion of a 
medical professional existed. 
Formally, the Court said that the Constitution 
means what it says (including that abortion is 
2 It can be downloaded from https://d2s5ggbxczybtf.cloudfront.net/bbireport.pdf
3 See for examples https://www.pd.co.ke/news/national/why-uhuru-has-yet-to-appoint-41-new-judges-7539/ 
4 Law Society of Kenya v Attorney General & 2 others [2016] eKLR http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/122387/ (a five-judge High Court bench including two of 
the three judges hinted by the President to be the subjects of NIS reports).  
5 See https://www.kenyans.co.ke/news/46107-uhuru-forced-backdown-fight-maraga
6 Muchelule,  Mumbi Ngugi,  Odunga, Achode and Mativo JJ. http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/175490/
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generally forbidden). However, its assertion 
that it was sometimes possible, including 
in cases of rape, and that there ought to be 
guidelines on when and how it was possible, 
was considered important.
2. EG & 7 others v Attorney General – 
Decriminalisation of homosexual activity; 
privacy; discrimination; High Court7 
This was the other big “moral” issue of the 
year, but the result was very different. The 
petition was for a ruling against the criminal-
isation of male homosexual activity: “having 
carnal knowledge of any person against the 
order of nature”. The challenge was mounted 
in terms of the right to health and of freedom 
from discrimination, vagueness of the Penal 
Code provision and breach of other rights 
such as to privacy.
All were rejected. The provisions did not 
discriminate against gay men (a finding that 
ignores the prohibition on indirect discrim-
ination). The core of the Court’s reasoning 
on other rights was Article 45 on the impor-
tance and protection of the family and that 
“every adult has a right to marry a person of 
the opposite sex, based on the free consent of 
the parties”. To decriminalise gay sex would 
be the thin end of the wedge was essentially 
the Court’s assumption, especially because 
the Marriage Act recognises long-term het-
erosexual cohabitation as equivalent to mar-
riage. Other rights like privacy had to be read 
in the light of this provision that encapsulat-
ed Kenyan social values (deemed hostile to 
gay sex).
3. Non-Governmental Organizations 
Co-Ordination Board v EG & 5 Others – 
[2019] eKLR Right of association; discrimi-
nation; sexual orientation; Court of Appeal8 
The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court 
decision that an organisation ought to be able 
to register, and do so using a name indicating 
its objectives. Justice Nambuye dissented on 
the ground that to fall into one of the cate-
gories of beneficiaries of the non-discrimi-
nation provision of the Constitution (Article 
27) implied in the use of the word “includ-
ing”, a group must not be based on illegali-
ty (like sex against the order of nature) and 
must show that it is “vulnerable”. Justice 
Musinga, like the Court in the decriminali-
sation case (case 2 here), rested a good deal 
of his argument on Article 45’s protection of 
the family.
Justice Waki said that “the time has come 
for the peoples’ representatives in Parlia-
ment, the Executive, County Assemblies, 
Religious Organizations, the media and the 
general populace, to engage in honest and 
open discussions over these human beings 
[LGBTI community]”.
4. CKC & Another (Suing through their mother 
and next friend JWN) v ANC – [2019] eKLR 
Equality; Islamic law; inapplicability of equal-
ity to cases in Kadhi court; unmarried parents; 
succession; Court of Appeal9 
The case involved “whether the appellants, 
children born of a Muslim father and a 
non-Muslim mother who were not formally 
married, can inherit the estate of their de-
ceased father”. The Kadhi Court and High 
Court had assumed that the property of a 
Muslim devolved on death according to the 
Shari’a, and that the non-Muslim children 
of the deceased had no right under Shari’a 
to inherit from their Muslim father. This 
involved discrimination on the grounds of 
illegitimacy and religion, but the right to 
equality does not apply “to the extent strictly 
necessary for the application of Muslim law 
before the Kadhis’ courts, to persons who 
profess the Muslim religion, in matters re-
lating to … inheritance” (Article 24(4)). The 
Court of Appeal, however, held that this did 
not apply because the sons were not Muslim. 
It emphasised the centrality of human rights 
to the Constitution, and its obligation to in-
terpret the Constitution in the way that most 
favours rights. The dispute therefore should 
have been dealt with in the High Court and 
under the Law of Succession Act. Many is-
sues remain to be sorted out; suppose for ex-
ample a deceased Muslim has both Muslim 
and non-Muslim offspring. Might not equal-
ity mean the Shari’a basis of succession 
should apply to all? Suppose some offspring 
were female? 
5. British American Tobacco Kenya, PLC v 
Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Health 
– [2019] eKLR Tobacco control regulations; 
participation; restriction on industry contact 
with government officials; what is “tax”? Su-
preme Court10 
The Supreme Court upheld lower courts in 
rejecting the challenge to tobacco control 
regulations. It elaborated on the nature of 
public participation, an important value of 
the Constitution that almost achieves the sta-
tus of a right, before proceeding to hold that 
participation in this case had been adequate. 
Provisions that limit tobacco industry inter-
action with public officials are not unconsti-
tutional because they satisfy Article 24 on 
limitation of rights (including rejecting the 
submission that it was inappropriate to con-
sider the health effects of tobacco). Similar-
ly, provisions about revealing manufacturing 
information are a justified limit on rights of 
privacy. A curious aspect of the decision is 
the finding that a requirement to make pay-
ments (called “solatium”) into a fund for 
research, public information and campaigns 
was not a “tax” because it was not national 
revenue. This seems unnecessary (because 
the parent act provided for the fund). It also 
raises the possibility of evasion of constitu-
tional rules on approval of taxes, and limits 
on the taxing power of counties in the de-
volved system of government. 
7 Aburili, Mwita, Mativo JJ; http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/173946/ 
8 Waki, Koome, and Makhandia Justices of Appeal, Nambuye and Musinga, JJA dissenting.
9 Karanja, Musinga and M’Inoti JJ. 
10 Maraga CJ; Mwilu Deputy CJ, Ojwang, Wanjala and Njoki, Supreme Court Justices, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/185959/
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6. Orange Democratic Movement Party 
(ODM) v Independent Electoral and Bound-
aries Commission – [2019] eKLR Access to 
information vis-à-vis privacy; High Court11 
This involved the balance between access to 
information and privacy rights. The infor-
mation was the names and identity card or 
passport numbers of voters. The petitioner 
had asked for this information to be made 
public, online, for a by-election. The High 
Court held that to deny the information was a 
violation of the right of access to information 
(Article 35), the state had failed to establish 
that this was justified and the infringement 
of privacy was justified by the need for free 
and fair elections. 
7. J W M (alias P) v Board of Management 
[Particulars Withheld] High School – [2019] 
eKLR Rights to religion and education; 
school uniform rules; High Court12  
The petitioner was excluded from school be-
cause she wore dreadlocks. Her claim was 
that she did this as a religious observance 
being a Rastafarian. Satisfied that this was a 
genuine religious choice, the Court held that 
her rights to freedom of religion and to edu-
cation had been violated. It said that “Where 
genuinely held religious beliefs clash with 
school rules, both sides must strike a bal-
ance between religion and education for 
the good of the learner and the institution. 
School rules must appreciate genuinely held 
religious beliefs and should not be applied 
as though they are superior to the text of the 
Constitution”. There have been other cases 
about tension between school rules and reli-
gious conviction. The school in this case did 
not seem to have made a strong case about 
the reason for the uniformity of hair styles.
B) Humanising (or not) the Criminal 
Justice System
8. Aloise Onyango Odhiambo v Attorney 
General – [2019] eKLR Prisoners’ rights; 
forced labour; High Court13 
The petitioners were serving life sentences 
(some commuted from death) and challenged 
various aspects of their situation. There are 
few Kenyan cases on prisoners’ rights, but 
this one is disappointing, perhaps because 
the petitioners represented themselves. 
Thus, though the Court held that the peti-
tioners were entitled to amenities like soap 
on the basis of the constitutional guarantee 
of respect for dignity, it could not order that 
they be supplied in the absence of any bud-
getary allocation. Again, the Court held that 
not every prisoner was entitled to participate 
in work (and these had not shown that they 
were in the category of those who were en-
titled), and that prison work did not amount 
to forced labour (perhaps not “labour” at all 
but rehabilitation). The case was a missed 
opportunity to deliberate on the conditions 
of prisoners. 
9. Sammy Musembi Mbugua v Attorney 
General – [2019] eKLR Prisoners’ rights; 
equality; eligibility for remission; High 
Court14
The petitioners had been convicted of rob-
bery with violence and ultimately sentenced 
to fixed terms. Under the Prisons Act, pris-
oners undergoing such sentences were not 
entitled to remission. This was held to be 
discriminatory and declared unconstitution-
al. A disappointing aspect of this case is the 
Court’s acceptance that life prisoners are not 
entitled to remission (because it is not possi-
ble to calculate one-third of their sentence).15 
This leaves them alone without the possibil-
ity of remission – in other words, assumed 
to be incapable of rehabilitation despite the 
fact that the need for prisons to be places of 
rehabilitation was featured in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in 2017 on the unconstitu-
tionality of the mandatory death penalty. 
A number of cases have dealt with the ques-
tions of detaining people at the pleasure of 
the President, notably persons found unfit to 
plead “guilty but insane” or child offenders. 
These provisions have been held unconsti-
tutional, but the position remains a bit con-
fused. In 2019, the courts decided the fol-
lowing case. 
10. Republic v E N W – [2019] eKLR “Guilty 
but insane”, appropriate sentence; High 
Court16
The judge disagreed with a previous case 
holding unconsititutional a provision that a 
person found guilty but insane was to be de-
tained at the President’s pleasure. However, 
she imposed a fixed term of imprisonment 
(assuming the case would then go on to the 
President for application of the ‘perogative’ 
of mercy). Neither case produces a just result 
for those who in other jurisdictions would be 
held “Not guilty on the ground of insanity”. 
Fortunately, in late 2019 a Task Force was 
established to consider mental illness includ-
ing the legal framework. 
 
C) Frame of Government
The procedures and spirit of the 2010 Con-
stitution have by no means been internalized 
by the government. A good deal of litigation 
is directed towards ensuring that the Consti-
tution is both understood and implemented. 
11 Justice J A Makau, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/184474
12 Justice Chacha Mwita, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/180467/
13 Justice Mwita, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/184839/ 
14 Justice Odunga, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/180115/ 
15 The Court is clear that the declaration of unconstitutionality relates only to the fixed term; thus the KenyaLaw website errs when it says “Paragraph 46(1)(ii) de-
clared Unconstitutional” because that applies to life sentences also (note to s. 46), http://kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=CAP.%2090 
16 Justice Lesiit, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/179034/
212 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
11. National Gender and Equality Commis-
sion v Majority Leader, County Assembly 
of Nakuru – [2019] eKLR List members of 
county assemblies; discrimination; nature 
of constituencies; High Court17 
The legislative bodies include both members 
elected for single-member geographical dis-
tricts (constituencies, counties or wards – at 
county level) and others drawn from party 
lists to represent special groups. There are 
four in each county assembly drawn from 
persons with a disability, youth or a mar-
ginalized group, plus enough to ensure that 
overall no more than two-thirds of the assem-
bly are of the same gender. The role of these 
members (often misleadingly called “nomi-
nated”) is generally considered unclear, and 
they, especially the women, are frequently 
referred to in a derogatory fashion. 
A Nakuru assembly resolution had the ef-
fect of excluding women list members from 
the position of chair or deputy of assembly 
committees (reducing the women-held lead-
ership roles in committees from 35 percent 
to 10 percent). The High Court held that this 
was discriminatory, despite the language of 
the resolution being gender-neutral (Article 
27(4) on indirect discrimination would have 
been sufficient to resolve this). It rejected the 
submission that other remedies should have 
been exhausted (since the petitioner Com-
mission could not have gone to the Political 
Parties Dispute Resolution Tribunal yet was 
an eminently appropriate petitioner). It also 
rejected a submission that its assumption of 
jurisdiction would trespass on the “venerat-
ed principle of Separation of Powers”: while 
showing due deference, it could intervene 
if the decision of another branch of govern-
ment violated a “rationality test”. 
The national Salaries and Remuneration 
Commission ordered that list members in all 
legislatures were not to get mileage allow-
ances because they did not have constitu-
encies. The Court again found for the peti-
tioner: “Nominated MCAs represent special 
interests, especially vulnerable, minority 
and historically marginalized groups such as 
women, the youth, Persons with Disabilities 
and racial minorities. These populations tend 
to be dispersed throughout the various coun-
ties.”
12. Law Society of Kenya v Attorney General 
– [2019] eKLR Legislative process; miscella-
neous amendment statutes; independence of 
legal profession; Court of Appeal18
The petitioner/appellant sought to have leg-
islation making various changes to law af-
fecting the legal profession declared uncon-
stitutional. The changes had been made by 
a Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) 
Act (long title: “An Act of Parliament to 
make minor amendments to Statute Law”). 
The Court of Appeal agreed that the particu-
lar changes were not minor, and there had not 
been adequate public participation (required 
by Constitution Article 118(b)) – or at least 
the judge had erred in holding that it was for 
the petitioner to establish the lack of partici-
pation. Lack of public participation is a com-
mon feature of legislating by Miscellaneous 
Amendments Act. The court also seems to 
have concurred with the appellant that the 
substance of some of the amendments was 
objectionable as reducing the independence 
of the profession.
13. Katiba Institute v Attorney General & 3 
Others; Kenya National Commission on Hu-
man Rights (Interested Party) – [2019] eKLR 
Failure to constitute accountability body re-
quired by Constitution as read with statute; 
High Court19  
The petition complained that the govern-
ment and the National Intelligence Service 
had failed to set up a Complaints Board as 
required by statute. The High Court accepted 
that establishing the Board was something 
to be done in accordance with Constitution 
Article 239(5): “The national security or-
gans are subordinate to civilian authority”. 
It ordered the relevant bodies to establish 
the Board, which must comply with consti-
tutional principles. Interestingly, after the 
case had been started, those authorities had 
begun the process of creating the Board, but 
the judges commented sardonically that “my 
deduction is that [certain letters] are merely 
but a thin veneer put up by the Respondents, 
after being compelled no less, in an attempt 
to put on a show that there is indeed an on-
going process for constituting the Board. 
This Court is not convinced in the least”. 
The respondents were given 180 days from 
mid-December 2019. Unusually for a public 
interest case, costs were awarded against the 
respondents. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
Constitutional developments in 2020 prom-
ise to be in continuity with 2019. The Build-
ing Bridges Initiative will absorb a good 
deal of time and money on the part of the 
government. It may well lead to the recom-
mendation of a full-fledged parliamentary 
system or a semi-presidential one. Its archi-
tects envisage a people’s initiative and per-
haps referendum. That will almost certainly 
be challenged on the basis of the objections 
aired in Section II above. 
The relations between the judiciary and exec-
utive and legislature are unlikely to improve 
a great deal. The activities of the judiciary 
will continue to be hampered as long as the 
President declines to appoint and promote 
judges. At the beginning of the year, a mem-
ber of the Supreme Court will retire and, as 
the Deputy Chief Justice will be embroiled 
in a criminal case, the Court may find it hard 
to ensure a quorum. 
As the 2022 elections draw closer, the worst 
type of politics will undoubtedly dominate. 
Concern about constitutionalism will be ab-
sent.
17 Justice Joel Ngugi, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/178745/
18 Justices of Appeal Waki, Musinga and Kiage, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/181561/
19 http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/186822/ (Justice Nyakundi).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Just as in past years, the dominant issue in 
Luxembourg was the questions of whether 
and how the Constitution, one of the oldest 
constitutional documents in Europe still in 
force, should be subject to an in-depth and 
complete overhaul in order to modernize its 
language and to adapt its text to political reality 
and international standards, in particular the 
standards of protection of human rights. 
While this long-lasting discussion came to 
an end in 2019 in a somewhat unexpected 
manner we shall discuss below, the transition 
of the constitutional text into a “living 
instrument” will certainly continue to occupy 
all institutions, notably the Parliament,1 the 
Government and the Council of State2 in the 
coming years. 
Furthermore, the year 2019 was marked by 
some significant decisions of the Constitutional 
Court. Generally speaking, these decisions 
reflected the intention of the constitutional 
judges not only to determine more actively 
the interpretation and understanding of the 
constitutional text but also to shape the 
interactions between constitutional law and 
other fields of law, in particular administrative 
and international law.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Even though much work and commitment 
has been invested in the general 
constitutional amendment procedure over 
the past years, the reasons for its end are 
numerous. It is worth recalling that since 
2005, the Parliament, and in particular its 
Constitutional Review Commission (CRC), 
has worked on the project to generally 
amend the Constitution in order to adapt it 
to the needs of a modern democracy. On 21 
April 2009, the CRC introduced a revision 
proposal3 that has been amended six times by 
the same CRC and served as a basis for three 
governments’ position statements, issued 
respectively in 2011, 2015 and 2018. The 
Council of State delivered no less than four 
opinions on this subject (June 2012, March 
and December 2017, March 2018). Its fifth 
opinion is expected to be adopted in the 
beginning of 2020, on explicit request of the 
Parliament. This opinion will probably be 
the last and closing “preparatory document” 
of this enormous project. Moreover, the 
Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 
provided its legal advice twice, in October 
2012 and March 2019, to help Luxembourg 
bring its Constitution into line with European 
1 The Parliament in Luxembourg is the Chamber of Deputies (Chambre des députés), as the Luxembourg 
parliamentary system is unicameral.
2 According to Article 83bis of the Constitution, the Council of State is called to give its opinion on all pro-
posed legislative acts (including constitutional amendment acts) and regulatory acts. The Council of State 
examines in particular the compatibility of the proposed acts with sources of higher law such as Internation-
al and European Law, the Constitution as well as general principles of law.
3 Proposition de révision portant modification et nouvel ordonnancement de la Constitution of April 21, 
2009, renamed in 2015 Proposition de révision portant instauration d’une nouvelle Constitution, doc. parl. 
no. 6030. For further details, see Jörg Gerkrath, ‘Some Remarks on the Pending Constitutional Change in 
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg’, European Public Law, 19 (2003) 449.
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standards in the fields of democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law.4  
In June 2018, the CRC adopted a “final” 
report taking into account numerous official 
opinions and position statements, as well 
as propositions made in the context of a 
remarkable citizen’s participation initiative, 
which led to a public parliamentary 
discussion in 2016. This report was also 
the result of a consensus between the major 
political parties. An information campaign 
was meant to be launched in autumn 2019, 
to be followed by a binding referendum. 
However, just before the summer break 
2019, the conservative Christian Social 
Party (CSV), which had obtained a relative 
majority in 2018 but had to remain in the 
opposition because of the continuation of 
the coalition government between liberals, 
socialists and the green party, expressed its 
reluctance with respect to the final report 
and its disagreement on several points. 
Besides, the question whether to submit 
the new Constitution to a referendum 
remains controversial.5 As no constitutional 
amendment can be passed without votes 
from the CSV, the CRC decided to suspend 
the information campaign and to put an end 
to the ambitious project of a general overhaul 
of the current Constitution. 
The CRC nevertheless reiterated, on the same 
day, its willingness to continue the revision 
of the constitutional text over the coming 
years. Some 30 points have been identified 
on which a large cross-party consensus 
exists. The focus will be first on the courts 
and the judiciary in general. This approach is 
in line with two proposals of legislative acts 
(lois) that were initiated in 2018 and 2019, 
respectively. 
The proposal of 20186 followed up on a 
suggestion to create a “National Council of 
Judiciary” (CNJ) previously made by the 
Ministry of Justice in 2011 in the context 
of the general amendment procedure.7 The 
Ministry considered, in fact, that there was no 
need to wait for a constitutional amendment, 
as the CNJ-Act would not be contrary to 
the current Constitution. The newly created 
CNJ would be responsible for ensuring 
independence of judicial authorities as well 
as proper administration of the judiciary.
The proposal of 2019 seemed to be an 
immediate reaction to the failure of the 
general constitutional amendment procedure. 
In March, the Parliament proposed to amend 
Article 95ter of the Constitution relative to 
the Constitutional Court.8 The purpose of 
this proposal was twofold. First, it aimed 
at introducing the possibility of substitute 
judges sitting when necessary. In fact, as 
the Court is currently composed of nine 
judges who are, at the same time, judges of 
the highest courts in Luxembourg (double 
mandate), it is sometimes difficult to set up a 
body of decision in a particular case. Due to 
the principle of impartiality, no judge should 
indeed sit twice in the same case. 
Secondly, the proposal aimed at strengthening 
the effects of the rulings of the Constitutional 
Court. At present, these effects are limited to 
the dispute that gave rise to the preliminary 
procedure. As other courts are entitled to 
refrain from introducing a question in similar 
cases, the rulings of the constitutional judge 
enjoy relative authority. Legislative Acts 
that the Court declared non-compatible 
with the Constitution do, however, remain 
in force. Parliament has full discretion 
whether to withdraw or to amend those acts. 
It hardly comes as a surprise that several 
acts that have been declared inconsistent 
with the Constitution are still in force. 
This is considered unacceptable, and the 
constitutional amendment proposal intends 
to give general and absolute effect to the 
rulings of the Court. In order to mitigate 
judgments that would entail excessively 
severe consequences, the Court shall have 
the competence to defer the absolute effect of 
its ruling for a maximum of twelve months. 
In July, the proposal was split: the first part 
regarding substitute judges was adopted in 
December 2019;9 the second part, concerning 
the effects of the Court’s judgments, is 
expected to be adopted in 2020.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The Cour Constitutionnelle10 rendered 8 
judgments (arrêts) in 2019 compared to 
11 in 2018 and 4 in 2017. The low number 
of verdicts resulted from its very limited 
competence. The only way to bring a case 
before it is for ordinary courts and tribunals 
to submit a preliminary question on the 
constitutionality of a legal norm. The vast 
majority of cases concerned respecting 
the principle of equality laid down in 
Article 10bis of the Constitution. Hence, 5 
out of the 8 cases decided by the Court in 
2019 concerned this principle alone or in 
conjunction with another constitutional 
provision. 
Two cases were declared inadmissible 
(143/19 and 151/19), either because the 
referring judge modified the wording of the 
preliminary questions without giving the 
parties a chance to discuss this (151/19), or 
the submitted question was considered by 
the Constitutional Court to be “irrelevant” 
(143/19). One case was stayed because the 
Court decided to ask a preliminary question 
4 The ‘preparatory documents’ are all available at www.chd.lu (doc. parl. no. 6030).
5 See Carola Sauer Rappe, ‘Luxembourg’, I Connect Report 2017 (2018) 183.
6 Projet de loi portant organisation du Conseil suprême de la justice of June 22, 2018, doc. parl. no. 7323.
7 See Prise de position du Gouvernement, doc. parl. no. 6030/5, 44, and the pre-law proposal of the Ministry of Justice, Dossier de presse of February 27, 2013, 
available at www.mj.public.lu/actualites/2013/02/Cour_supreme/Dossier_de_presse_reforme_Justice.pdf
8 Proposition de révision de l’article 95ter de la Constitution, February 27, 2019, doc. parl. no. 7414.
9 Loi (Act) of 6 December 2019 portant révision de l’article 95ter de la Constitution, Mémorial A 831, December 10, 2019.
10 The Constitutional Court of Luxembourg was established in 1997 by the Loi (Act) of 27 July 1997 portant organisation de la Cour Constitutionnelle, Memorial A 
58, August 13, 1997 1724.
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of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(146/19). In the five remaining cases, the 
Court concluded that the referred legal norms 
were not conforming to the Constitution.
1. Judgment from May 28, 2019 in case 
146/19 
A question was brought to the Constitutional 
Court by the tribunal administratif in 
a procedure regarding the exchange of 
information on request in tax matters. 
The referring tribunal explicitly asked 
whether “the principles of the rule of 
law and the principle of legality emerge 
from the constitutional provisions” and 
more particularly from Article 95 of the 
Constitution, which states that “The courts 
and tribunals shall apply general and local 
by-laws and regulations only to the extent 
that they are in conformity with the law”. If 
so, the tribunal further asked whether Article 
6(1) of the Loi (Act of Parliament) of 25 
November 2014, laying down the procedure 
applicable to the exchange of information 
on request in tax matters, is consistent with 
the principle of the rule of law and the 
principle of legality insofar as it enshrines 
a legal prohibition to introduce an action 
for judicial review of a foreign request for 
exchange of information, or of the decision 
of a correlative injunction emanating from 
the Luxembourg authorities.
As Article 8(1) of the founding Act of the 
Constitutional Court of 27 July 1997 states 
clearly that the referring judge “shall indicate 
precisely the legislative and constitutional 
provisions” to which the preliminary 
question relates, the wording of the submitted 
question raised an issue of admissibility, 
considering that neither the principle of the 
rule of law nor the principle of legality is laid 
down as such in the Constitution.
Abandoning its more timid stance from 
earlier judgments,11 the Court found this 
time that “it is immaterial whether the 
national court refrains from designating the 
article of the Constitution which is liable to 
be infringed by a legal rule, provided that it 
clearly indicates the legal rule contained in 
one or more provisions of the Constitution”. 
Thus it declared the question admissible.
Furthermore the Court ruled that the 
fundamental principle of the rule of law 
is inherent in Articles 1 and 51(1) of the 
Constitution, according to which “the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg is a democratic State 
(…) placed under the rule of parliamentary 
democracy” and that the principle of legality 
and Article 95 of the Constitution constitute 
an emanation of the fundamental principle of 
the rule of law in which they participate.12 This 
finding, suitable in the result, still raises some 
questions regarding the line of argumentation. 
Though the principles of democracy and 
the rule of law must coexist in a liberal 
democracy, it is indeed not fully convincing 
to deduce the second from the first.13
Once the question for a preliminary ruling 
being declared was admissible, the Court 
had to consider it from the point of view 
of the right to access to a judge and the 
principle of an effective remedy deriving 
therefrom. Mentioning explicitly “Articles 6 
and 13 of the ECHR concerning access to the 
courts and effective remedies, corresponding 
to those of Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights”, the Court reminded 
that the question referred by the tribunal 
administratif “bears definite similarities” 
with a preliminary ruling question referred 
to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union by the Administrative Court (Cour 
administrative),14 and decided to stay the 
proceedings until the Court of Justice 
delivered its ruling.
 
Thus, even though case 146/19 is not yet 
finally settled, it is testimony to a “new era” 
of constitutional case law in Luxembourg. 
If confirmed by future judgments, this era 
is characterised by two main elements: 
the willingness of the Court to construe 
the Constitution more actively in a 
comprehensive manner, and its openness to 
“supranational” sources of constitutional law 
and principles.
2. Judgment from July 5, 2019 in case 147/19 
 
The judgment in case 147/19 is a typical 
illustration of the way the Court deals with 
questions raised under the principle of 
equality enshrined in Article 10bis of the 
Constitution providing that “Luxembourgers 
are equal before the law”. The Court 
holds indeed in its stable case law that, at 
a first stage, “the implementation of the 
constitutional rule of equality presupposes 
that the categories of persons between whom 
discrimination is alleged are in comparable 
situations with regard to the legal provision 
under criticism”. In this case, the two 
situations are those of an adopted person 
whose author, the spouse of the adopter, 
is deceased, and that of an adopted person 
whose author is still alive.
In this case, the Court found that the aim 
sought by paragraph 4 of Article 359 of the 
Civil Code is to maintain the filiation link 
existing between the spouse of the adopter 
and the adopted person and, therefore, to 
allow the latter to keep the name he or she 
holds of his or her biological parent, and 
considered that this link is not affected by the 
death of the latter. Thus the Court decided 
that both situations are comparable.
In a second stage, the Court regularly 
reminded “that the legislator may, without 
violating the constitutional principle of 
11 See notably the judgments in case 2/98 of November 13, 1998, and in case 37/06 of November 17, 2006, where the Court declared that “it is not empowered to 
substitute any other constitutional rule for that specified by the referring court”.
12 Cp. Judgment 57/10 of October 1, 2010, where the Constitutional Court had already recognized the general principle of separation of powers, which isn’t explic-
itly mentioned in the Constitution either. 
13 Cp. Luc Heuschling, ‘Pourquoi la Cour constitutionnelle devrait s’intéresser à l’histoire, ou audaces apparentes et réelles de l’arrêt no 146 (2019) relatif à « l’État 
de droit »’ [2019] JTL 97 and Patrick Kinsch, Observations’ [2019] JTL 111.
14 Judgment of March 14, 2019, No 41487C.
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equality, subject certain categories of 
persons to different legal regimes, provided 
that the difference instituted results from 
objective disparities and is rationally 
justified, adequate and proportionate to its 
purpose”. This wording has been retained by 
the Chambre des deputés (Parliament) for a 
future amendment of Article 10bis.
As a result, the Court finally considered that 
by granting, according to the interpretation 
of the referring court, the adopted person, 
who is the child of the adopter’s living 
spouse, the right to keep his or her name 
without providing for the same right for the 
adopted person whose author is deceased, 
the provision under consideration “creates 
a difference in treatment between adopted 
persons to the detriment of the latter”.
As this difference in treatment does not 
result from an objective disparity and is not 
rationally justified, adequate or proportionate 
to its aim, the Court held consequently in 
relation to the preliminary question referred 
that Article 359(4) of the Civil Code does 
not comply with Article 10bis(1) of the 
Constitution.
3. Judgment from July 5, 2019 in case 148/19 
Case 148/19 raised, once again, the question 
of the division of competences between 
the legislator and the executive power 
adopting grand-ducal regulations, this time 
in the medical profession field.15 Article 
11, paragraph 6, subparagraph 1 of the 
Constitution provides indeed: “Freedom of 
trade and industry, the exercise of the liberal 
profession and agricultural work shall be 
guaranteed, subject to such restrictions as may 
be established by a Loi (Legislative Act)”. 
Article 32, paragraph 3 of the Constitution 
provides furthermore: “In matters reserved 
to the law by the Constitution, the Grand 
Duke may make regulations and orders only 
by virtue of a specific legal provision which 
lays down the purpose of the implementing 
measures and, where appropriate, the 
conditions to which they are subject”. Thus, 
the respective domains of the law (legislative 
act) and the regulation are clearly delimited.
Article 19 of the Loi of 29 April 1983, at 
stage in the present case, provides that a 
Grand-Ducal regulation “shall lay down a 
list of equipment and apparatus which may 
not be held or used by doctors and dentists 
for the needs of their medical practice, as 
well as a list of equipment and apparatus 
which may only be held or used by specialist 
doctors for the needs of their specialties”. 
The request for the acquisition of magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) equipment 
emanating from a medical radiologist had 
been refused authorisation by a decision 
of the Minister of Health on 27 December 
2017 based on the Grand-Ducal regulation 
of 17 June 1993, which sets out the list of 
equipment and appliances that cannot be 
acquired by doctors and dentists for the 
needs of their medical practice.
Considering that in accordance with Article 
11, paragraph 6, subparagraph 1 of the 
Constitution, restrictions on the exercise 
of the liberal profession of doctor “are a 
matter reserved for the law” and that the 
establishment of a list of equipment and 
appliances which may not be acquired 
by doctors and dentists for the needs of 
their medical practice constitutes such a 
restriction, the Court held consequently 
that, in relation to the preliminary question 
referred, Article 19 of the Loi of 29 April 
1983 was not in conformity with Articles 
11(6) and 32(3) of the Constitution.
In addition to that finding, the Court also 
underlined the requirement to respect the 
supplementary condition for a Loi to be in 
conformity with Article 32, paragraph 3 of 
the Constitution. As in a previous judgment 
from 2018,16 the Court required indeed that 
the Loi give an “indication as to the purpose 
of the implementing regulation”.
4. Judgment from November 15, 2019 in 
case 150/19
The preliminary question in this case was 
raised by the tribunal administratif in a 
judgment of 5 April 2019. On 28 July 2017, 
X, a teacher, had lodged a request before that 
tribunal seeking the annulment of a decision 
of the Minister for National Education, 
Children and Youth of 2 May 2017 refusing 
to recalculate his salary following the 
annulment by the tribunal administratif of a 
Grand-Ducal Regulation of 25 August 2015. 
The main point at issue before the tribunal 
administratif concerned the effects and scope 
of the aforementioned judicial decision to 
annul the Grand-Ducal Regulation of 25 
August 2015. In this context, the tribunal 
referred the following question to the 
Constitutional Court for a preliminary 
ruling: “Are the provisions of Article 7, 
paragraph (3) of the amended Loi (Act) 
of 7 November 1996 on the organization 
of the administrative courts, which, in its 
second sentence, provides that ‘annulment 
is absolute from the day on which it has the 
force of res judicata’, in conformity with 
Article 95 of the Constitution?”.
Article 95 of the Constitution states indeed 
that “The courts and tribunals shall apply 
general and local by-laws (arrêtés) and 
regulations only to the extent that they are 
in conformity with the lois (legislative Acts) 
(…)”. Consequently, the Constitution Court 
construed Article 95 of the Constitution as 
calling “on the courts, without distinction in 
time, to refrain from applying such by-laws 
and regulations that are contrary to lois”.
Coming to the second sentence of Article 
7(3) of the amended Act of 7 November 1996 
on the organisation of administrative courts, 
which provides that the final annulment of 
an administrative act of a regulatory nature 
by the administrative courts “is absolute in 
nature and has erga omnes effects for the 
future”, the Court underlined that, “in so 
providing, the legislature has opted for an ex 
15 Cp. Paul Schmit, ‘Le pouvoir réglementaire du Grand-Duc dans le miroir de la Cour constitutionnelle. Sommes-nous à l’abri de surprises?’ [2019] RLDP 63.
16 Cp. Judgment 141/18 of December 7, 2018, in the field of the definition of tasks of secondary education teachers.
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nunc effect of decisions to annul a regulatory 
administrative act, implicitly but necessarily 
excluding the retroactive nature of the erga 
omnes effects of the annulment”. According 
to this interpretation, the modulation in 
time of the effects of the annulment of an 
administrative act of a regulatory nature 
implied, according to the Court, “that 
such an act, although deemed unlawful, 
continues to be applicable from the date of 
its coming into effect until the date on which 
its annulment has become final and that the 
courts are therefore bound to apply it for 
the period prior to its annulment despite its 
recognised contravention of the loi”. 
Such a general and unconditional limitation 
in time of the effects of the annulment of 
an administrative act of a regulatory nature 
thus runs counter to the prohibition laid 
down in Article 95 of the Constitution, 
since neither that article nor any other 
constitutional provision provides for the 
possibility of derogating from it. The Court 
finally rejected the argument based on the 
infringement of legal certainty raised by the 
Government. According to its judgment, 
such an infringement resulting necessarily 
from the retroactive effect of the annulment 
of an administrative act of a regulatory nature 
cannot be used as a basis for derogation from 
the prohibition laid down in Article 95 of 
the Constitution. The Court therefore held 
that, in relation to the question referred for 
a preliminary ruling, the second sentence of 
Article 7(3) of the Law of 7 November 1996 
was not in conformity with Article 95 of the 
Constitution “in that it limits, generally and 
unconditionally in time, the effects of the 
definitive annulment of an administrative act 
of a regulatory nature”.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The upcoming constitutional revisions 
are likely to have a major impact on the 
functioning of the Constitutional Court in 
at least two respects (as mentioned above 
in Section II). One is the introduction of a 
system allowing for substitute judges to 
be called to sit in the Court when regular 
members are not available. The other one 
concerns the legal effects of the Court’s 
judgments. If the revision passes, provisions 
declared unconstitutional will cease to 
have legal effects on the day following 
the publication of the judgment (or later if 
decided otherwise by the Court, but in any 
case no more than twelve months after the 
publication of the judgment). This should 
ultimately impact the nature of the control 
performed by the Constitutional Court.
 
In addition, the Constitutional Court is 
expected to deliver a preliminary ruling on a 
question referred to it by the Administrative 
Court.17 This should allow the Constitutional 
Court to follow up on its 2019 case law 
on the rule of law and the principle of 
legality. The case concerns a dispute over 
the implementation of certain provisions of 
Luxembourgish tax legislation which have 
retroactive effects. The Administrative Court 
has questioned the constitutionality of the 
retroactive effects in light of the rule of law 
and the principle of legality, and it has asked 
the Constitutional Court to clarify whether 
the principles of legal certainty, protection of 
legitimate expectations and non-retroactivity 
of the law have constitutional value.18  
V. FURTHER READING
Fatima Chaouche, Jörg Gerkrath, Janine 
Silga, Julia Sinnig, Catherine Warin (dir.), 
Droit luxembourgeois et européen de l’asile, 
Pasicrisie luxembourgeoise, Luxembourg, 
2019, 410
Collectif, ‘Constitution’ in [2019] Forum für 
Politik, Gesellschaft und Kultur, no. 399, 
Luxembourg, 70
Carola Sauer, Contrôle juridictionnel des 
lois au Luxembourg, Larcier, Brussels, 2019, 
432
Paul Schmit, ‘L’art de s’esquiver. Regard 
critique sur les amendements proposés au 
projet de nouvelle Constitution à la suite de 
l’avis de la Commission de Venise’ [2019] 
RLDP 93
Fatima Chaouche, Legitimate expectations 
in Luxembourg tax law. The case of 
administrative circulars and tax rulings, 
Larcier, Brussels, 2019, 552
17 The Administrative Court is Luxembourg’s supreme administrative court, i.e., it rules on appeals against judgments of the tribunal administratif.
18 Administrative Court, November 26, 2019, no. 42582C.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Following landmark general elections in 
2018, when a new political coalition came 
into power to form the federal government 
for the first time since Malaysia’s indepen-
dence, 2019 was the critical year in which 
their capacity to govern and bring about key 
constitutional reform was tested. The new 
Pakatan Harapan (Pact of Hope) coalition 
government saw many of its lofty reform 
promises scuttled by pressure from vested 
interest groups which, at times, inflamed eth-
noreligious sentiments to block changes that 
would consolidate democracy in the country. 
Only one constitutional amendment, and 
precious few legislative initiatives, success-
fully materialized over the year. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The Elusiveness of Constitutional Amendment 
The difficulty of securing constitutional re-
form in a situation where the ruling coalition 
does not command the requisite two-thirds 
parliamentary majority to effect such amend-
ments was highlighted on two occasions. In 
March, the government attempted to amend 
Article 1(2) of the Federal Constitution to 
‘restore the constitutional position’ of Sabah 
and Sarawak, Malaysia’s two states on the 
island of Borneo. Historically and ethnical-
ly distinct from the rest of the country, these 
states have considerable grievances – openly 
acknowledged as legitimate by the present 
ruling coalition – stemming from underde-
velopment and neglect since helping to form 
Malaysia in 1963. 
In truth, it was always arguable whether the 
government’s proposed amendment, which 
sought merely to place Sabah and Sarawak in 
a separate category within the constitutional 
provision enumerating the States of the Fed-
eration, would have amounted to anything 
more than window-dressing in the face of the 
very real concerns currently facing these two 
states. However, in the hyper-charged atmo-
sphere of contemporary Malaysian politics, 
even this token measure swiftly escalated 
into a test of the ruling coalition’s ability to 
stamp its mark on the country’s constitution-
al architecture. In an event unprecedented 
in Malaysian history, the proposed amend-
ment failed at the first hurdle when it could 
not muster the required two-thirds majority 
support in the Lower House of Parliament. 
Ironically, an independent bloc of lawmak-
ers from Sarawak joined with the federal 
opposition to block the bill, highlighting the 
inability of the present government to secure 
constitutional amendments without biparti-
san support.
In July, the federal government mounted 
another effort, this time to reduce the con-
stitutional age of eligibility to vote in par-
liamentary and state-level elections from 21 
years to 18. This was in fulfillment of a spe-
cific promise that the now-ruling coalition 
had made in its electoral manifesto, but this 
time, the government was able to entice sup-
port from opposition parties by acquiescing 
to their demand for automatic registration 
of voters upon reaching the age of 18. With 
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both the ruling and opposition coalitions fan-
cying their chances of appealing to young-
er voters, the Constitution was successfully 
amended, with cross-party support providing 
near unanimity in Malaysia’s bicameral Par-
liament. This was the first successful consti-
tutional amendment in Malaysia since 2008, 
from which time no single party or coalition 
commanded the necessary two-thirds major-
ity in both Houses of Parliament. 
These episodes demonstrate the realization 
of the constitutional design of a rigid Con-
stitution in a country where political parties 
no longer have supermajorities and therefore 
need bipartisan support to amend the Con-
stitution. The ability of any government to 
make fundamental changes to the constitu-
tional system thus depends very much on 
its ability to build consensus. One persistent 
challenge for reformers in Malaysia has 
always been whether they can overcome 
ethnic and religious divisions to build con-
sensus on the requirements of good consti-
tutional governance and the protection of 
individual rights.
Malaysia Backtracked on Ratification of 
Rome Statute 
Soon after resuming the post of Prime Min-
ister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad made a land-
mark speech to the UN General Assembly in 
which he pledged that the new government 
would ‘ratify all remaining core UN instru-
ments related to the protection of human 
rights’.1 Accordingly, Malaysia attempted 
to ratify the International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination (ICERD) in 2018, but pressure from 
right-wing groups ostensibly intent on pre-
serving the dominance of Malaysia’s ethnic 
Malay majority rapidly frustrated this plan.2 
In March, Malaysia signed the Instrument 
of Accession to the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC), joining 
the majority of the international community 
in acknowledging the ICC’s jurisdiction to 
punish genocide, crimes against humanity, 
crimes of aggression, and war crimes. Soon 
afterwards, however, the crown prince of the 
southern state of Johor (Malaysia has nine 
royal houses, each with their State within 
the federation) tweeted that this accession 
could threaten the sovereignty of the Malay 
Rulers, the status of Malays (the majority 
ethnic group in Malaysia), and the position 
of Islam (the constitutional ‘religion of the 
Federation’).3 Public disquiet built up rap-
idly, fanned by the political opposition and 
aggravated by a perception that Malaysia’s 
hereditary monarchs (who, despite being 
notionally constitutional monarchs, retain 
significant influence over national affairs 
in practice) had not been properly consulted 
prior to the accession. Whether or not such 
fears had any basis in reality, concerns were 
expressed that accession would allow the 
ICC, a foreign court, to potentially acquire 
criminal jurisdiction over the Malay mon-
archs in the future by virtue of their (largely 
ceremonial) positions of command within 
the armed forces. 
The escalating pressure soon became too 
much, and barely a month after the accession, 
the government was forced to announce its 
withdrawal from the Rome Statute public-
ly. Ministers within the federal government 
cited fears of a ‘deep state’ and even a coup 
d’etat as justifying the decision to withdraw, 
a worrying revelation in a country that has 
never experienced a coup or a military junta 
in its modern history.4  
This episode clearly illustrated the formi-
dable forces that can be quite easily stirred 
up to frustrate any reform initiatives per-
ceived as threatening the current balance 
of power in Malaysia. The powerful nexus 
between the so-called ‘3Rs’ of Malaysian 
politics – royalty, race, and religion – was 
amply leveraged by the political opposition, 
who cast the issue of accession as threat-
ening the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers, 
and quickly linked it to the Rulers’ position 
as ‘protectors’ of the Malay community and 
heads of the Islamic faith. In truth, it was 
always doubtful whether accession to the 
Rome Statute had any such implications at 
all;5 yet factual discourse took a backseat as 
ethnocentric identity politics carried the day. 
The elected government’s climb-down will 
have only emboldened anti-reform elements 
to use the same stratagem in future political 
and constitutional contestations.
Greater Diversity on Apex Court
In a landmark development, in May, Tengku 
Maimun Tuan Mat became the first woman 
to be appointed Chief Justice of the Feder-
al Court. Previously, the position – which 
heads Malaysia’s apex court – was held 
by Richard Malanjum, the first indigenous 
non-Muslim to hold the position, from July 
2018 to April 2019.
Subsequently, history was made again in 
November when Rohana Yusof became the 
first woman President of the Court of Ap-
peal, Malaysia’s second-highest court. With 
the elevation of another three lady justices to 
the Federal Court in December, Malaysia’s 
apex court – which also includes the Chief 
1 [Speech text] Dr Mahathir at 73rd UN General Assembly (New Straits Times, 29 September 2018) <https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2018/09/415941/
speech-text-dr-mahathir-73rd-un-general-assembly> accessed 7 February 2020.
2 See Andrew Harding et al., ‘Malaysia’, in Richard Albert et al. (eds.), I·CONnect-Clough Center 2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law (Clough Center for the 
Study of Constitutional Democracy, 18 October 2019) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471638> accessed 7 February 2020.
3 Ahmad Farhan, ‘Rome Statute: Was Malaysia Hasty?’ (The ASEAN Post, 9 April 2019) <https://theaseanpost.com/article/rome-statute-was-malaysia-hasty> 
accessed 7 February 2020.
4 See e.g., ‘Malaysia withdrew from Rome Statute for fear of coup d’etat: Minister’ (Channel News Asia, 8 April 2019) <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/
asia/malaysia-withdraws-rome-statute-for-fear-of-a-coup-d-etat-11423324> accessed 7 February 2020; Zurairi AR, ‘Foreign minister: Withdrawal of Rome Statute 
due to risk of “coup d’etat” triggered by “deep state”’ (Malay Mail Online, 7 April 2019) <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2019/04/07/foreign-minister-
withdrawal-of-rome-statute-due-to-risk-of-coup-detat-trigg/1740575> accessed 7 February 2020.
5 See e.g., Shad Saleem Faruqi, ‘Treaty on ICC No Threat to Royals’ (The Star, 28 March 2019) <https://www.thestar.com.my/opinion/columnists/reflecting-on-the-
law/2019/03/28/treaty-on-icc-no-threat-to-royals/> accessed 7 February 2020.
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Justice and the President of the Court of Ap-
peal – now has a record number of six fe-
male judges, or just below half of the Court’s 
13-person strength. 
These developments are the latest outcome 
of a trend towards greater diversity in the 
composition of Malaysia’s judiciary since 
the advent of the Judicial Appointments 
Commission in 2009. It signals a commit-
ment to presenting a changed image across 
the branches of government in the context 
of a judiciary that frequently grapples with 
issues of considerable importance to women 
and ethnic minorities. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. TR Sandah & Ors v Director of Forest, 
Sarawak & Anor:6 Native customary rights 
and the spirit of the Malaysia Agreement 
1963
An attempt to revisit a controversial apex 
court decision regarding the extent of native 
customary rights enjoyed by indigenous tribes 
over land in Malaysia’s sprawling state of Sar-
awak raised issues of tremendous importance 
going to the spirit of the Malaysia Agreement, 
the instrument by which the contemporary 
federation was created in 1963.
In 2016, the Federal Court had delivered a 
controversial judgment restricting the ex-
tent to which the Iban, a native community 
of Sarawak, could claim native custom-
ary rights (NCR) over uncultivated forest 
land.7 The natives who lost that case now 
attempted to invoke the inherent jurisdiction 
of the Federal Court to review the decision 
on several grounds, chiefly that there had 
been coram failure because one of the five 
judges on the panel had retired by the time 
of judgment, two judges delivered the ma-
jority judgment, one dissented, and the fifth 
judge agreed briefly with the majority based 
on separate reasons that were later shown to 
be manifestly unsustainable. In the present 
case, a fresh panel of the Federal Court, by 
a 2-1 majority, declined to review the earlier 
decision, citing the need to maintain the fi-
nality of litigation and preferring to focus on 
the outcome ordered by the majority in the 
earlier case rather than the reasoning for it.
Of considerable constitutional significance, 
however, was the challenge to the earlier 
judgment based on the fact that the Federal 
Court panel therein did not contain a judge 
with ‘Borneo judicial experience’, contrary 
to paragraph 26(4) of the Inter-Governmental 
Committee Report of 1962 read with Article 
VIII of the Malaysia Agreement 1963. The 
principle emanating from paragraph 26(4) – 
that ‘normally at least one of the Judges of 
the Supreme Court should be a Judge with 
Bornean judicial experience when the Court 
is hearing a case arising in a Borneo State’ – 
was never expressly incorporated into either 
the Federal Constitution or into legislation. 
This was (and remains) contrary to Article 
VIII, which commits the Governments of 
Malaya, North Borneo, and Sarawak to ‘take 
such legislative, executive or other action as 
may be required to implement’ the relevant 
principle. 
While the two majority judges in the present 
case rejected this argument based on the pos-
itivist stance that what is not expressly leg-
islated is not law, the dissenting judge (the 
Chief Judge of Sabah and Sarawak, David 
Wong) held that the provisions of the Courts 
of Judicature Act 1964 (CJA), which stipu-
late the composition of the Federal Court, 
must be interpreted in conformity with Ma-
laysia’s obligations under international law 
– in this case, the obligation to give effect 
to the provisions of the Malaysia Agreement, 
which has the status of an international trea-
ty. The learned judge held that the Agree-
ment, as a ‘pre-constitutional document’ 
comparable to the Federalist Papers in the 
United States, could be taken into account in 
interpreting the obligations of the judiciary 
under the current Federal Constitution. He 
also highlighted the ‘quasi-constitutional’ 
status of the CJA, which expressly prevails 
over any written law it may conflict with 
except for the Federal Constitution. On the 
main point in dispute, the dissenting judge 
also held that there had been manifest coram 
failure and that the earlier judgment should 
be set aside.
TR Sandah is significant for several reasons. 
First, it highlights the problematic structure 
of Malaysia’s judiciary insofar as parity 
among the founding regions of the federa-
tion is concerned. Although Malaysia has 
two separate High Courts in Malaya (West 
Malaysia) and the Borneo States, as well as 
separate Bar associations for the two, at the 
appellate level there is a single Court of Ap-
peal and a Federal Court for the entire coun-
try. As TR Sandah highlighted, judges from 
Sabah and Sarawak are underrepresented on 
the panels of these top courts, even in cas-
es emanating from these states, whose laws 
differ extensively from those of West Malay-
sia. Second, this case drew further attention 
to the uncertain status of the 1963 Malaysia 
Agreement, in particular its unfulfilled prom-
ises, which impacts negatively on Sabah and 
Sarawak. As the Agreement does not techni-
cally have the force of law according to TR 
Sandah, it cannot be legally enforced despite 
its fundamental role in establishing the pres-
ent federation. Third, it is disheartening that 
a case on NCR in Borneo was first decided 
– against the native community – by a pan-
el of Federal Court judges without Borneo 
judicial experience (i.e., by West Malaysian 
judges), and then affirmed by a majority of 
West Malaysian judges, with the Chief Judge 
of Sabah and Sarawak dissenting. In light of 
this case, a fundamental reconsideration of 
how cases from the Borneo states are decid-
ed before the appellate courts in Malaysia 
may soon be necessary. 
2. Tony Pua Kiam Wee v Government of Ma-
laysia:8 Liability of the Prime Minister for 
misfeasance in public office
As the corruption cases linked to the in-
ternational scandal surrounding govern-
6 [2019] 6 MLJ 141 (Federal Court).
7 Director of Forest, Sarawak v TR Sandah Ak Tabau & Ors, [2017] 2 MLJ 281 (Federal Court).
8 [2019] 12 MLJ 1 (Federal Court).
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ment-linked investment company 1Malaysia 
Development Berhad (1MDB) continued to 
unfold before the criminal courts, the civil 
courts achieved a landmark in terms of es-
tablishing the legal accountability of gov-
ernment by ruling that a Prime Minister can 
be held liable in the tort of misfeasance in 
public office.
The Federal Court so held in allowing an ap-
peal by a Member of Parliament who sued 
former Prime Minister Najib Razak for that 
tort, which was originally developed by the 
English courts on the idea that based on the 
rule of law, administrative power may be 
exercised only for the public good and not 
for ulterior and improper purposes.9 The al-
legations against Najib Razak were that he 
abused his powers and positions for personal 
gain and that he provided wrong and mis-
leading replies to questions in Parliament 
about the matter.
Earlier, the High Court and the Court of Ap-
peal had interpreted the constitutional and 
legal framework, particularly Article 132(3)
(a) of the Federal Constitution and Section 3 
of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, to 
reach the astonishing conclusion that a Prime 
Minister is not a ‘public officer’, and cannot, 
therefore, be liable for misfeasance in pub-
lic office. This painted a dystopian scenario 
whereby ordinary bureaucrats could theoret-
ically be held liable in tort whereas the min-
isters (and the Prime Minister), who directed 
them in the first place, could not.  
The Federal Court ably corrected the situa-
tion by pointing out that these interpretative 
provisions applied to written law; in partic-
ular, statutes enacted in and for post-inde-
pendence Malaysia, and they could not be 
superimposed on a common law tort emanat-
ing from England without due regard for the 
principles and purposes underlying that tort. 
As the entire point of the tort was to hold 
public officials who exercise public power 
accountable for any abuse of that power, it 
was congruent with common sense that the 
Prime Minister, who holds the most power-
ful office in the constitutional framework, 
could also be liable for it. 
While this decision did not find the former 
Prime Minister liable – it determined only 
the preliminary point of whether he was 
a ‘public officer’ – it is a welcome step in 
terms of securing the legal accountability 
of government. By enabling private law to 
march in step with public law in securing 
governmental accountability, this decision 
fortifies the rule of law in Malaysia.
3. JRI Resources v Kuwait Finance House 
(President of Association of Islamic Bank-
ing Institutions Malaysia & Anor, Interven-
ers):10 Non-reviewable power of the Syariah 
Advisory Council 
Islamic banking continues to be a signifi-
cant part of Malaysia’s services sector, but 
its operation raises fundamental questions of 
constitutional importance as to how a reli-
giously guided concept can be operational-
ized through essentially secular regulatory 
and judicial systems. This interaction adds to 
the ongoing discourse around the nature of 
the Malaysian state and the true position of 
Islam within the constitutional framework.
At issue in JRI Resources was the power and 
competence of Malaysia’s secular commer-
cial courts to rule on principles of Islamic 
banking, which are founded in the tenets of 
Islam. The Central Bank of Malaysia Act 
2009 provides for a Syariah Advisory Coun-
cil (SAC), to which reference must be made 
if any disputed Syariah matter within Islam-
ic banking arises in proceedings before the 
courts. Furthermore, the ruling of the SAC is 
expressed to be not only final but also bind-
ing on the court hearing the dispute. This 
scheme raised concerns as to whether Parlia-
ment could, by statute, direct the High Court 
to accept the ruling of an executive body (the 
SAC) as binding, and whether this infringes 
‘the judicial power of the Federation’, con-
stitutionally vested in the judicial branch, as 
well as the separation of powers housed gen-
erally within the Federal Constitution.
A full bench of nine justices was convened, 
under a new policy instituted by former 
Chief Justice Richard Malanjum whereby 
cases raising constitutional issues of fun-
damental importance before the Federal 
Court would be heard and decided by a full 
bench. By a 7-2 majority, the Federal Court 
affirmed the constitutionality of this arrange-
ment, holding that the SAC’s role was mere-
ly to ‘ascertain’ the Islamic law applicable 
to disputes before the courts and that it was 
constitutional for Parliament to legislate on 
this matter since this was within the list of 
legislative competences prescribed by the 
Federal Constitution. Furthermore, the ma-
jority held that the SAC’s role was merely 
to determine the relevant points of Syariah, 
or Islamic law, applicable to the case and not 
to decide the outcome of the dispute, which 
would be a transgression into the judicial 
power of the courts. 
The then-Chief Justice and the Chief Judge 
of Sabah and Sarawak dissented, highlight-
ing that the interpretation of Syariah given 
by the SAC could often be (and indeed was, 
in the present case) determinative of the en-
tire dispute and therefore the adjudicatory 
power of the courts had been reassigned to 
the SAC. The statutory scheme elevated the 
level of SAC rulings beyond that of expert 
evidence, which a court can independently 
evaluate and weigh as between the parties. 
Instead, the Court is now statutorily com-
pelled to accept the SAC’s ruling as that of 
the Court itself, and this infringed the consti-
tutional principle that judicial power shall be 
vested solely in the judicial branch.  
JRI Resources raises interesting issues at the 
confluence of constitutionalism, commer-
cial imperatives, and religiously inspired 
law. Undoubtedly, allowing non-religiously 
trained judges in a secular-based judicial 
system to accept or reject scholarly rulings 
on Islamic banking could lead to inconsistent 
9 Jones v Swansea City Council [1990], 1 WLR 54, 85F (Court of Appeal, England); see also Three Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and Company of 
the Bank of England, (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 (House of Lords). 
10 [2019] 3 MLJ 561 (Federal Court).
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interpretation of the law and undermine this 
burgeoning sector of the economy. Never-
theless, it is a valid question whether remov-
ing the determination of issues forming the 
entire substratum of the dispute to a separate 
body without the safeguards of judicial inde-
pendence and then compelling the courts to 
accept this body’s rulings as binding is com-
patible with the separation of powers which 
is integral to constitutionalism. 
4. Other developments in the courts
Malaysia’s apex court has conclusively de-
clined to pronounce on the constitutionality 
of the controversial appointment of the then-
Chief Justice and President of the Court of 
Appeal in 2017. In finally dismissing an ap-
plication by the current Prime Minister (af-
ter having denied similar applications by the 
Malaysian Bar Council and several political 
parties), the Federal Court reiterated that the 
constitutional questions posed to it had be-
come ‘academic’ since the two senior judges 
in question had since resigned their posts fol-
lowing the change of government in 2018.11  
As the temperature of ethnocentric politics 
increased, a lawyer affiliated with right-
wing nationalist organizations challenged 
the constitutional status of government-aid-
ed ‘vernacular primary schools’, which use 
Mandarin or Tamil (instead of Malay, the 
national language) as their main medium of 
instruction and are popular among Malay-
sian parents, especially those from ethnic 
minorities. In Mohd Khairul Azam bin Abdul 
Aziz v Minister of Education & Anor,12 the 
Federal Court dismissed the action on essen-
tially technical grounds, holding that Parlia-
ment undoubtedly had the power under the 
Federal Constitution to provide for the sus-
tenance of such ‘vernacular schools’, albeit 
that the complainant could challenge the cur-
rent scheme as being inconsistent with the 
national language provisions of the Federal 
Constitution by way of ordinary proceedings 
in the future, should he wish to do so.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
There are important insights that can be 
drawn from the stalled constitutional reform 
in Malaysia. Phenomenal electoral wins 
are not so easily translated into democratic 
consolidation, even with a reform-mind-
ed government. Entrenched interests and 
bureaucratic culture can coalesce to resist 
constitutional changes. In the meantime, a 
restless public may turn on the new govern-
ment when it fails to deliver on its promis-
es to deliver economic prosperity and good 
governance, which appears to be the case 
in Malaysia as the ruling coalition lost four 
by-elections across the country in 2019. 
There may be greater political instability 
as state-level elections are due in Sarawak, 
Malaysia’s largest, resource-rich state, by 
September 2021 at the latest. It is possible, if 
not likely, that these elections will be called 
ahead of schedule if opportune circumstanc-
es manifest (Malaysia has no equivalent of 
the UK’s Fixed Term Parliaments Act). The 
Election Commission has been allocated 
funds to conduct this election in its budget 
for 2020, intensifying speculation around an 
early poll. If this takes place, it will be an 
important mid-term referendum on the new 
federal government’s performance (a region-
al bloc of independents currently governs 
Sarawak). 
The increasing politicization of race and reli-
gion, and the predilection of certain elements 
to harp on these issues for political mileage, 
bodes ill for Malaysia. The current govern-
ment appears trapped between a reluctance 
to crack down hard on hate speech (which 
would undermine its reformist credentials) 
and a hemorrhaging of support as extremists 
on all sides play up dangerous sentiments 
to shore up political power at its expense. 
Too many parties within and outside the 
government appear to have no compunction 
about using ethnocentric identity politics to 
achieve their narrow aims, even at the risk 
of further fragmenting the nation. One may, 
therefore, see the struggle for constitution-
al change in Malaysia as one over the very 
identity of the nation. 
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MEXICO
I. INTRODUCTION
2019 was the first full year of Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador’s government (which began 
on December 1, 2018). It was characterized 
by a number of constitutional and legislative 
reforms he implemented in order to carry out 
what he defined as the “Fourth Transforma-
tion” (better known as “4T”, in reference to its 
name in Spanish Cuarta Transformación). This 
expression refers to the vision the President has 
about his government as a new “revolutionary” 
– but peaceful – moment of change, suppos-
edly placed at the same level of importance as 
three other key moments in Mexican history: 
the Independence (meaning the armed move-
ment that gained the country’s freedom from 
300 years of Spanish domination, which took 
place between 1810 and 1821); the Reforma-
tion (consisting of the conflict between liberals 
and conservatives from 1858 to 1861, leading 
to the approval of the “Laws of Reformation”, 
of which the establishment of a separation be-
tween Church and State stands out); and the 
Revolution (that is, the armed conflict against 
the regime of Porfirio Díaz between 1910 and 
1917, which led to the promulgation of the 
1917 Constitution that continues to govern 
Mexico). Like these historical events, Presi-
dent López Obrador expects his government to 
bring a profound change to the country based 
on the principles of universality, progress, and 
well-being. 
This report describes a few constitutional re-
forms implemented in 2019, and shows how 
some of the above-mentioned legislative re-
forms have been interpreted by the judicial 
branch in the first year of the new government.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
One of the most discussed and controversial 
constitutional reforms approved in 2019 was 
the one introducing the National Guard, a civ-
il police institution composed of members of 
the Federal, Military, and Naval Police that 
will be responsible for guaranteeing public 
security. It was published in the Official Ga-
zette of the Federation on March 26, 2019, 
and amends, adds, and repeals various provi-
sions of Articles 10, 16, 21, 31, 35, 36, 73, 76, 
78, and 89 of the Mexican Constitution. 
The constitutional reform was integrated by 
a legislative package that entered into force 
in May 2019: three new laws (the National 
Guard Law, the National Law on the Use of 
Force, and the National Law of the Detention 
Registry) and a law reforming the General 
Law of the National Public Security System. 
According to the constitutional reform, the 
National Guard is a police institution civil 
in nature and the training and performance 
of its members will be governed by a police 
doctrine founded on service to society, disci-
pline, respect for human rights and the rule 
of law, and superior leadership as well as on 
gender perspective.
However, according to the Second Transito-
ry Provision, the National Guard will be con-
stituted of elements of the Federal Police, the 
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Military Police, and the Naval Police. The 
purpose of the National Guard is to reduce 
the high crime rates in the country, and its 
functions (as established in Article 9 of the 
National Guard Law) can be summarized as 
follows: to safeguard the integrity of citizens; 
to guarantee, maintain, and restore public 
order and social peace; to prevent the com-
mission of crimes throughout the country’s 
territory, and to conduct the necessary inves-
tigations for that purpose; to perform veri-
fication tasks for the prevention of admin-
istrative infractions; to receive complaints, 
verify their veracity, and inform the Public 
Ministry; to perform intelligence operations 
through covert and simulated user opera-
tions on the Internet; to intervene personal 
telecommunications with the authorization 
of a judge; to conduct, under the direction 
of the Public Ministry, the investigation of 
crimes; to execute arrest warrants and detain 
persons under the provisions of Article 16 of 
the Mexican Constitution; to provide assis-
tance to victims and witnesses of crimes; and 
to collaborate with other federal authorities 
in monitoring, verification, and inspection 
functions and in joint operations. 
The reform has been heavily criticized by the 
political opposition and human rights organi-
zations due to the serious violations of human 
rights against the Mexican population that 
occurred during different military operations 
across the country when the military and po-
lice forces were responsible for public security. 
A few weeks before the approval of this con-
stitutional reform was debated in Parliament, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
issued its decision in the Alvarado Espinoza 
and others vs. Mexico case (November 28, 
2018). This is a paradigmatic ruling against 
the Mexican Army, since the Court held that 
the Mexican State was responsible for the 
forced disappearance of civilians by military 
forces in the context of the so-called “war 
against the Narco”. The Court’s judgment 
addressed the negative effects originated 
by the participation of military personnel 
in public security functions, underlining the 
high degree of impunity for acts of the Mex-
ican military forces and emphasizing the 
need to demilitarize the strategies to combat 
organized crime and to adapt the internal 
constitutional framework in order to allow 
a state approach that defends the security of 
its citizens in accordance with international 
standards.
Another very important pillar of the “Fourth 
Transformation” government was the consti-
tutional reform on popular consultation and 
the revocation of mandate, published in the 
Official Gazette of the Federation on De-
cember 20, 2019. The reform amends Arti-
cles 35, 36, 41, 73, 81, 83, 99, 116, and 122 
of the Mexican Constitution. With respect to 
popular consultations, the reform recognized 
the right of citizens to vote in popular consul-
tations on issues of national and regional im-
portance. Issues concerning human rights, the 
permanence and continuity of the positions 
of popularly elected public servants, electoral 
matters, the financial system, income, expen-
diture, and budget as well as infrastructure 
works in progress, national security and orga-
nization, and operation and discipline of the 
armed forces may not be subject to popular 
consultation. The popular consultation must 
be requested by at least 2 percent of the cit-
izens registered in the nominal list of voters, 
equivalent to 1.8 million persons.
The part of the reform that establishes the re-
vocation of mandate provides citizens with 
a legal instrument for deciding whether, at 
the end of the first half of their mandate, the 
President of the Republic, or a governor, or 
a mayor may or may not remain in office. 
Contrary to the original proposal, neither the 
President of the Republic nor Congress can 
request such revocation, which is a right that 
only citizens can enforce through the Na-
tional Electoral Institute. With this constitu-
tional reform, the President of the Republic 
may be removed by means of free, direct, 
and secret voting in a revocation consulta-
tion, provided that at least 40 percent of the 
voters registered in the nominal list partici-
pate. The revocation may be requested only 
once during a government’s mandate, and 
the request needs to have the signatures of 3 
percent of the citizens registered at that mo-
ment in the nominal list (that is, around 2.7 
million voters currently). In addition, the re-
sults may only be challenged before the Su-
perior Chamber of the Electoral Court of the 
Judicial Power of the Federation. According 
to a transitional provision, a consultation 
to revoke the mandate of President López 
would only be possible until March 2022, 
cancelling any possibility of pairing it with 
the midterm federal elections as originally 
proposed by the President. 
Finally, the constitutional reform including 
the principle of gender equality in public of-
fice (published in the Official Gazette of the 
Federation on June 6, 2019) must be men-
tioned. On one hand, this reform has been 
widely welcomed for what it represents in 
the context of gender struggle, but on the 
other hand, it has been strongly criticized for 
its omissions and inadequacies.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Declaratoria General de Inconstituciona-
lidad 6/2017: The first decision on a “new” 
process
The Supreme Court issued its very first deci-
sion in a new procedure, the so-called “Gen-
eral Declaration of Unconstitutionality”. It 
is a new constitutional control procedure in-
troduced by the 2011 constitutional amend-
ment to the Mexican Amparo procedure. 
Even though it had been in force for eight 
years, no substantive decision was issued un-
til February 2019. The procedure allows the 
Supreme Court to repeal with erga omnes 
effects a normative provision that has been 
declared unconstitutional through the Ampa-
ro (a procedure which only may render inter 
partes effects). 
The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court 
(specialized in administrative and labor law) 
declared in a series of Amparos en Revisión 
the unconstitutionality of Article 298-B, frac-
tion IV of the Federal Law on Telecommu-
nications and Broadcasting. The regulation 
provided a high fine which did not respect 
the constitutional principle of proportion-
ality of taxes. The main discussion in the 
Supreme Court was whether or not the pre-
vious unconstitutionality analyzed in Ampa-
ro could be analyzed again in the general 
declaration of unconstitutionality or if the 
procedure constituted only a formal verifi-
cation of the requirements, thereby negating 
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reopening a substantive debate. The Court 
concluded that the discussion of the case was 
not a mere formality and, therefore, justices 
may vote against the declaration even if the 
formal requirements had been met.
2. Amparo directo en revisión 1182/2018: 
The right to effective legal assistance
An individual was convicted of kidnapping. 
Through the Amparo procedure, he claimed 
that his lawyer had not provided effective le-
gal assistance because he had withdrawn rel-
evant evidence to prove his innocence. The 
Circuit Court dismissed the allegations, stat-
ing that Supreme Court case law was clear 
regarding the fact that the right of defense 
only implied that it should be provided by 
a licensed attorney. Taking this into consid-
eration, it was not permissible for federal 
courts to assess the defensive strategy adopt-
ed by the lawyer.
In a relevant decision, the Supreme Court 
changed its consolidated case law. It observed 
that the European Court of Human Rights and 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(among other courts and tribunals) had stated 
that the right to defense should not be under-
stood as a mere formality but as an effective 
right. In view of the above-mentioned consid-
erations, the right to an effective defense im-
plies that, regardless of the private or public 
nature of the attorney, federal courts should 
analyze the effectiveness of the defense un-
der the following elements: a) that the defi-
ciencies of the defense are not attributable to 
the will of the accused; b) that the defense 
strategy is not responsible for the mistakes of 
the defense; and c) that the deficiencies had a 
substantive impact on the resolution. 
3. Amparo en revisión 1368/2015: Unconsti-
tutionality of the interdiction figure
An individual obtained the judicial declara-
tion of interdiction of her two minor children. 
The civil judge granted the interdiction peti-
tion and appointed members of the family as 
tutors and curators. After the mother passed 
away, one of the children filed successive 
petitions demanding judicial recognition of 
his capability to make decisions, which were 
successively denied. Afterwards, the person 
filed an Amparo, claiming the unconstitu-
tionality of the articles that regulated the in-
terdiction procedure.
The Supreme Court granted the Amparo to 
the applicant. The ruling stated that the state 
of interdiction was not compatible with the 
rights granted by the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. That is, 
the interdiction state fosters stereotypes as it 
conceives the persons as objects of care and 
thus not subject to rights. Far from achiev-
ing inclusion, the appealed regulation de-
prives the rights of persons with disabilities 
of autonomy. The decision was relevant as 
it modified the previous Court’s position on 
the Amparo en Revisión 159/2013, where the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the provision (although conditioning its 
constitutionality to a problematic interpreta-
tion in conformity with the Constitution that 
materially added normative content to the 
article). 
4. Acciones de inconstitucionalidad 
105/2018 and 108/2018: Unconstitutionality 
of the Federal Salaries Act
In 2009, under Felipe Calderon’s presidency, 
the Mexican Constitution was amended to es-
tablish that no federal officer shall have a sal-
ary higher than that of the President. Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador became President in 
the 2018 election by a landslide, employing an 
“Austerity” proposal. López Obrador constant-
ly argued that the salaries of concrete federal 
officers, judges, and other federal employees 
were simply too high and unacceptable in 
view of the general state of poverty in Mexico. 
López Obrador’s majority passed a bill (Ley 
Federal de Remuneraciones) which enforced 
the constitutional provision by setting a base 
to federal salaries and by adding to the Fed-
eral Criminal Codes crimes regarding the au-
thorization or even receipt of payments which 
contravene legal provisions. This was to be the 
first great constitutional assessment of López 
Obrador’s policy. The action of unconstitution-
ality was controversial from the very beginning 
as Justice Pérez Dayán, being in charge of the 
procedural aspects of the actions, decided un-
precedentedly to “suspend” the application of 
the law until the emission of the ruling.
 
Given the fact that the Mexican Constitution 
requires a qualified 8/11 vote majority to de-
cree the unconstitutionality of laws, the Su-
preme Court, in a very tight decision, failed 
to invalidate the full act. Seven justices con-
sidered the law to be unconstitutional in toto, 
but the argumentation had to be dismissed by 
lack of a majority. Instead, a bare eight-vote 
majority managed to declare the unconstitu-
tionality of several parts of Articles 5 and 6 
of the act, which constituted key provisions. 
The Supreme Court stated that the act al-
lowed the discretional establishment of sal-
aries. It also declared the unconstitutionality 
of the new regulated crimes because they 
were broadly configured and did not de-
scribe precisely the criminalized conducts. 
It must be noted that Justice González Al-
cántara (nominated by López Obrador and 
confirmed by his senatorial majority) formed 
part of the majority that invalidated the rele-
vant portions of the act.
5. Amparo en revision 805/2018: Legislative 
omissions 
A civil association filed an Amparo suit ar-
guing that there was an omission by the 
federal Congress and President to fulfill the 
obligations of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination. The plaintiffs argued that Article 4 
of the convention forced Mexico to criminal-
ize hate speech on racial grounds. A district 
judge initially granted the Amparo, and the 
authorities appealed the decision before the 
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court denied the appeal and 
thus confirmed the initial ruling. In an ex-
tensive analysis, it was stated that the ob-
ligations derived from the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination were not fulfilled by the 
national legal framework and confirmed the 
obligation of the federal Congress to legis-
late. This criterion is important as it again 
confirms the shift in doctrine by the Supreme 
Court that made possible civil associations 
to question legislative omissions initiated in 
the Amparo en Revisión 1359/2015. 
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6. Contradicción de tesis 318/2018: Labor 
protection for pregnant women
The Supreme Court solved a contradiction 
of criteria between circuit courts. The legal 
question to consider was whether or not a 
signed statement was enough to prove that 
a pregnant woman had freely and sponta-
neously resigned from her job in procedures 
regarding unjustified dismissal.
The Supreme Court stated that given the “pri-
macy of reality” principle derived from Arti-
cle 17 of the Constitution, certain situations 
permit the inference that it is more probable 
that the pregnant woman was a victim of an 
unjustified dismissal rather than a resignation 
by free will. Furthermore, it stated that even 
though Mexico had not ratified the Maternity 
Protection Convention (Convention 183 from 
the International Labor Organization), it was 
binding to Mexico as an international stan-
dard of protection of working women. Under 
such conditions, the proof standard is higher 
for the employer to prove that there was a free 
will resignation. That proof standard cannot 
be fulfilled solely by the signed resignation of 
the woman, which per se falls under a situa-
tion of vulnerability.
7. Amparo directo en revisión 4865/2018: 
Swastika cross tattoo
The First Chamber of the Supreme Court 
ruled that a swastika cross tattoo in an em-
ployee’s skin (below the ear) is a form of 
hate speech and that it consequently cannot 
be part of the freedom of expression protect-
ed by the Constitution. After an employee 
was hired by a company to work as a billing 
boss, many working colleagues complained 
about his tattoo since they self-claimed to be 
Jews and the owner of the company was also 
part of the Jewish community.
The tattoo’s bearer was first told to erase or 
to hide the swastika cross. He did not fol-
low this advice and was fired. The employee 
argued that he was fired based on an illegit-
imate reason and that he was thus discrimi-
nated against by the company. He sued the 
company and claimed for moral damages.
The Court decided that the exhibition of 
such a tattoo is not protected under any com-
prehension of the freedom of expression. A 
swastika cross in a democratic context has a 
negative meaning for human rights, equali-
ty, security, and human dignity. It, therefore, 
represents a form of racist and antisemitic 
hate speech not allowed by the Constitution. 
Furthermore, it was intended that the swas-
tika cross tattoo be tolerated by a Jewish 
working community and labor management 
in a private environment. The Supreme Court 
concluded that the dismissal was not illegal 
since there was no constitutional obligation 
of tolerating the tattoo. Consequently, there 
was no right to compensation for alleged 
moral damages.
8. Amparo en revisión 331/2019: Uncon-
stitutionality of the mother’s preference in 
child custody
The Civil Code for the Federal District 
(Mexico City) provided that in a divorce 
lawsuit context, the provisional custody for 
children under 12 years of age must be au-
tomatically granted to the mother. The First 
Chamber of the Supreme Court declared that 
rule unconstitutional.
It is first relevant to note that this new prece-
dent overruled the one that considered it pos-
sible to embrace an interpretation in confor-
mity with the Constitution. The First Chamber 
stated that it was impossible to maintain the 
precedent because the legal rule discriminates 
based on gender, which is a constitutional 
special clause of non-discrimination.
The decision based its conclusion on two 
fundamental reasons. The first is that the 
Civil Code affects the principle of the best 
interest of the child. Judges must have the 
option to decide which parent is in the best 
position to satisfy the needs and care of the 
child. The second argument is that the said 
rule was based on a traditional stereotype of 
gender. The legal presumption that the moth-
er will always have a better role as custodian 
does not allow the elimination of traditional 
conceptions of the female role in a family 
framework.
9. Amparo directo 6/2018: Recognition of 
indigenous special jurisdiction
An indigenous community located in the 
state of Oaxaca (San Cristóbal Suchixtlahua-
ca, Coixtlahuaca) filed a lawsuit against the 
public ministry and a local criminal judge 
for interfering in an indigenous dispute. For 
the first time in its constitutional case law, 
the First Chamber of the Supreme Court rec-
ognized a special jurisdiction in matters of 
indigenous peoples. The case was related to 
damages caused by cattle in prohibited areas 
of the community property.
The indigenous jurisdiction prevailed over 
the ordinary criminal jurisdiction for judging 
behaviors carried out in the indigenous com-
munity. The Chamber stated that it is possi-
ble to identify this jurisdiction when the facts 
take place within an indigenous territory and 
when indigenous authorities have applied 
traditional customs and cultural habits, espe-
cially when they are not contrary to human 
rights enshrined in the Constitution or Inter-
national Human Rights Law.
In this case, the indigenous authorities con-
demned an individual based on its customs 
and traditions. Such jurisdiction was ac-
cepted by the accused from the beginning 
of the trial. Later, when he learned that the 
judgment was against him, he sought the 
state’s criminal authority to revoke the de-
cision. That claim was not granted by the 
Court. Instead, it ordered that the final de-
cision was the one established in the indig-
enous judgment. The Court added that this 
decision was in line with a historical debt of 
the Mexican state to the indigenous people 
on their long way to achieving true autono-
my and self-government, both protected by 
the Mexican Constitution and international 
human rights treaties.
10. Amparo en revision 353/2019: Refugee 
status in Mexican territory
In this case, the Second Chamber of the Su-
preme Court analyzed the constitutionality 
of the 30-day legal period in which foreign-
ers must prove their refugee status before 
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Mexican authorities. Article 11 of the Mex-
ican Constitution establishes that every per-
son has the right to seek and obtain asylum. 
It also provides that refugee status must be 
determined by international treaties and con-
sider the exceptions and norms derived from 
Mexican legislation.
The Chamber first concluded that the dead-
line in which every foreign person must 
prove their refugee condition fulfills the pro-
portionality principle requirements: the pro-
vision is suitable, it is necessary for a dem-
ocratic society, and it is not disproportionate 
in front of the purposes of the legal measure. 
The legal provision is reasonable when a for-
eigner does not have a material impossibility 
to probe his/her status.
Second, the Court stated that there could be 
exceptions to this rule. It may be possible to 
demand an official refugee declaration even 
when there is a situation that makes it phys-
ically impossible, namely, extraordinary 
causes not attributable to his/her person. 
However, in this respect, conclusive proof is 
not required but only minimal evidence that 
reveals the special condition of the asylum 
candidate.
11. Amparo en revisión 57/2019: Therapeu-
tic use of cannabis in children with epilepsy
A doctor prescribed cannabidiol oil (CBD) 
for a child with epilepsy associated with 
West syndrome. Due to the nature of his ep-
ilepsy, the child generated tolerance to the 
substance. Then, it was recommended to re-
place it with a preparation with tetrahydro-
cannabinol (THC) to improve his health.
On June 20, 2017, amendments to the Gen-
eral Health Law entered into force. One of 
these legal provisions ordered the Ministry 
of Health to harmonize its regulations to said 
legal mandate within 180 days of its publi-
cation. The Ministry did not obey the legal 
mandate. The child’s legal lawyer sued the 
Ministry of Health for its lack of action. A 
federal judge rejected the claim because he 
considered the omission to issue legislation 
was not reviewable by the federal judiciary. 
The child’s attorney appealed the decision 
before the Supreme Court.
The Second Chamber of the Supreme Court 
granted the Amparo, considering that the 
lack of compliance by the Ministry of Health 
represented a regulatory omission that af-
fected the fundamental rights of people, es-
pecially in this case, the right of children to 
access better levels of public health services.
The Chamber concluded that the principle 
of the best interest of the child, concerning 
the right to health, does not only imply re-
specting his right to a fair trial or medical 
service but also guarantees a specific eco-
nomic resource and the implementation of 
public policies to improve health services 
and, therefore, the well-being and integral 
development of children. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
2020 may be a decisive year for the Supreme 
Court, in which it celebrates its 25-year anni-
versary as a Constitutional Court. After Chief 
Justice Arturo Zaldívar jointly presented with 
President López Obrador a plan to amend the 
legal and constitutional framework of the ju-
dicial branch, the next years will tell the fu-
ture of the federal judiciary. Among the pro-
posals, it is relevant to mention a restriction of 
the ordinary-legal jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court in order to strengthen its role as a Con-
stitutional Court. Also relevant is the proposal 
on the opening of judicial charges to members 
of civil society without judicial record.
The independence of the Supreme Court 
will also be an important question. President 
López Obrador has already proposed three of 
the eleven justices of the Court, all approved 
by the Senate (Justices González Alcántara, 
Esquivel Mossa, and Ríos-Farjat). It is highly 
expected that the Court will analyze the con-
stitutionality of key reforms and public poli-
cies carried out by the recently elected Gov-
ernment. Inter alia, it is worth mentioning the 
public salary measures, popular referendums 
related to new public infrastructure, the per-
formance of the above-mentioned Nation-
al Guard, state laws passed by Morena (the 
President’s political party), and restrictions of 
social security benefits allegedly necessary to 
address the corruption problem in Mexico.
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M O N T E N E G R O
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2019, Montenegro kept on its path to EU 
membership. Compared to other states in the 
region, Montenegro is considered to be a 
leader in the accession negotiations process, 
with 32 negotiation Chapters opened and 3 
provisionally closed.1 This smallest Balkan 
State is a member of the UN, NATO, WTO, 
OSCE, CoE, and the CEFTA. Although mem-
bership negotiations have been an ongoing 
process since June 2012, the country is still 
slow in achieving full compliance with EU 
standards. Namely, according to the Progress 
Reports the European Commission publishes 
each year, Montenegro has achieved limited 
progress or is moderately prepared to be-
come an EU member state. Media freedom, 
judicial reform, the fight against corruption 
and organized crime, clientelism, and trans-
parency remain major challenges. According 
to the latest Economist White Paper, Mon-
tenegro is a hybrid regime democracy.2 As 
one party has been dominating the political 
arena for three decades, electoral reforms 
are nowhere in sight. Most of the opposi-
tion parties are boycotting Parliament. The 
overall public distrust in the authorities af-
ter the “Envelope” affair3 brought thousands 
of protesters onto the streets asking for the 
resignation of the government and President 
Đukanović. At the same time, the State Pros-
ecutor’s office did not meet the expectations 
of protestors, taking a long time to act upon 
the evidence presented in the media and 
creating what we can perceive as a judicial 
charade. As a result, overall distrust in the 
authorities remained, implying that state ca-
pacity to deal with deeply rooted corruption 
is weak. Amid such circumstances, the end 
of 2019 marked the passing of the controver-
sial Law on Religious Freedoms, which was 
adopted by Parliament in the middle of the 
night, resulting in 18 members of Parliament 
being detained or arrested.4 
According to the Constitution (Art. 11(6)), 
the Constitutional Court is the guardian and 
protector of constitutionality and legality 
and is usually regarded as the highest court 
in the judicial system. In reality, and accord-
ing to the Constitution, that role belongs to 
the Supreme Court. This creates a power im-
balance, which I will address later below.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Between WWII and October 2007, Montene-
gro adopted five Constitutions. The Constitu-
tional Court in Montenegro was established 
in 1963. Its Constitutional legal framework 
relied on the heritage of Yugoslavian law. 
Though, originally, Yugoslavian states have 
been influenced by Austrian codification and 
the scholarship of Hans Kelsen, Montene-
1 ‘Montenegro Progress Report’ (European Commission, 2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-en-
largement/sites/near/files/20190529-montenegro-report.pdf>
2 ‘Global Democracy Has Another Bad Year’, The Economist <https://www.economist.com/graphic-de-
tail/2020/01/22/global-democracy-has-another-bad-year?fbclid=IwAR12dLvEwtm-yPe8qALCDP3P6o-
Tu_g6IMtAMIWRY-ZKHoZky4s2t1QzhUqk> accessed 30 January 2020.
3 ‘“Envelope” Affair Raises Suspicion over Montenegrin Party Funds’ (Balkan Insight, 25 January 
2019) <https://balkaninsight.com/2019/01/25/envelope-affair-raises-suspicion-over-montenegrin-par-
ty-funds-01-24-2019/> accessed 30 January 2020.
4 ‘Montenegrin Parliament Adopts Religion Law Amid Furious Protests’ (Balkan Insight, 27 December 2019) 
<https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/27/montenegrin-parliament-adopts-religion-law-amid-furious-pro-
tests/> accessed 30 January 2020.
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gro’s Constitutions operated throughout the 
period of the socialist self-management sys-
tem, ideology of the Communist party, and 
unitary power system that influenced the de-
velopment of its constitutional legal frame-
work. Constitutional complaints found their 
roots in the 1963 Constitution as the right to 
“initiative for the review for the protection 
of rights and freedoms”. However, the 1974 
Constitution does not recognize such a com-
petence for the Constitutional Court. This 
institute was brought back with the Consti-
tution of Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 and 
remained there until the new Constitution of 
the independent state was adopted. In that 
period, the Constitution provided a compre-
hensive list of human rights and freedoms 
protected in a market economy. With the 
renewal of independence, the new Constitu-
tion was adopted. In its preamble, Montene-
gro commits to European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration. Since then, the national legal 
system has been influenced by the harmoni-
zation process with the acquis communau-
taire. The new Constitution establishes the 
Constitutional Court as a judicial authority 
separated from other authorities. Its main 
purpose is the protection of constitutionality 
and legality, constitutional order, and safe-
guarding human rights and freedoms. For 
the first time, the direct protection of human 
rights was established.
As a result of the EU accession process, the 
need to provide for an effective system of 
checks and balances, and the requirement to 
reform the judiciary, Constitutional Amend-
ments I to XVI were adopted in 2013. The 
election and appointment of judges is con-
ferred to the Judicial Council. Since then there 
have been no major Constitutional changes, 
but major constitutional controversies.  
Article 39(2) of the Law on Constitutional 
Court determines that the Court shall decide 
in each case no later than 18 months from the 
date proceedings were initiated. Apart from 
providing a time limit, the Law in question 
does not give an answer to what happens 
when the eighteen-month deadline expires, 
or when proceedings take too long.5 In Sep-
tember 2018, the Supreme Court, the highest 
regular court in the country, ascribed to itself 
the competence to protect the constitutional-
ly guaranteed right to a trial within a reason-
able time, including in cases of constitution-
al complaints. The party in the decision filed 
a suit for just satisfaction due to the long du-
ration of the court proceeding, which is an 
ordinary competence of the Supreme Court. 
However, it claimed that the Court failed to 
make a decision within the eighteen-month 
deadline. The Supreme Court established 
that the Constitutional Court violated the 
right to a trial within a reasonable time and 
ordered the Government of Montenegro to 
compensate the claimant.6 Their reasoning 
was also based on the fact that two constitu-
tional complaint proceedings had lasted five 
years, nine months, and twenty-two days, 
compared to the two proceedings before the 
Supreme Court, which lasted only one month 
and twenty-six days. This created a conflict 
between judicial authorities. The Constitu-
tional Court refused to transfer any case files 
to the Supreme Court in its proceedings in 
the aftermath of the Decision from Septem-
ber 2018. Essentially, this led the Supreme 
Court to declare it will no longer have the 
competence to decide in cases where a party 
claims the Constitutional Court has exceed-
ed the deadline to adopt a decision. 
Analysis7 shows that there is a tendency in 
the Supreme Court to decline the reasons 
for the revision given by the Constitution-
al Court, which the Supreme Court should 
do pursuant to Article 77(2) of the Law on 
Courts. When the Constitutional Court re-
peals an individual act and remands a case 
back to the authority, the latter ‘shall respect 
the legal reasoning of the Constitutional 
Court stated in the decision and shall decide 
in the repeated proceedings within a reason-
able time’. A study suggests the meaning 
of this provision is problematic in theory 
and practice. The Supreme Court generally 
comes to the same conclusion as it did in the 
repealed decision. In addition, not only does 
it not accept the argumentation and reason-
ing of the Constitutional Court, it provides 
for new explanations and adds them to the 
original decision. The issue in question is re-
lated to the understanding of what the word 
‘respect’ in Article 77(2) refers to. Does it 
mean that in the revision procedure it must 
decide in accordance with the reasons of the 
Constitutional Court? Or that it should take 
these reasons into account but does not have 
to make a new decision based on them?
As if trust in Montenegro’s judiciary is not 
shaky enough, just before finalizing this re-
port, the Constitutional Court did something 
that sparked major controversy. At the gen-
eral session of the Court, a new presiding 
judge was elected, as the mandate of the 
current President of the Court is expiring. 
According to the Constitution, judges elect 
the President of the Court amongst them-
selves every three years.8 One can be elected 
president only once. According to the latest 
decision, the new presiding judge is Desanka 
Lopicic, who was previously a president of 
the Court. According to a press release, the 
judges could not agree on a new president. 
But the Law and the Rulebook do not recog-
nize such action. According to the procedure 
defined in Articles 13 and 22 of the Law and 
Article 12 of the Rulebook, the session for 
the appointment of the president is chaired 
by the oldest judge. If none of the judges 
get a majority of the vote, the duties of the 
president shall be conferred to the deputy 
president. Where the Court does not have a 
deputy president to assume the office, then 
the office of President of the Court shall be 
exercised by the oldest judge. The Decision 
published on the Court’s website is all but le-
gal. Namely, in its attempt to provide sound 
legal reasoning, the Court creatively found 
5 Bosa Nenadic, ‘Analiza Rada Ustavnog Suda Crne Gore Usmjerena Na Pravnu Sigurnost i Pravo Na Konacnu Odluku’ (Council of Europe, 2019) 27.
6 Tpz 26/2018 [2018] Supreme Court of Montenegro Tpz.br.26/2018 1.
7 Mihajlo Dika and Ivana Martinovic, ‘Analiza uticaja odluka Ustavnog suda Crne Gore na aistem redovnih sudova sa posebnim osvrtom na odnos Ustavnog i 
Vrhovnog suda Crne Gore’ (Council of Europe, 2018) 49-54.
8 Amendments I to XVI to the Constitution of Montenegro, 2013 s XVI. 
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that Article 22 of the Law is not applicable, 
as it refers to the expiration of the office of 
the president but not to its mandate. Linguis-
tically that might be the correct reading, but 
it is obvious what the intention of the legis-
lator was: to make sure that the office of the 
president will never be vacant. Thus, legisla-
tors adopted the solution in which the oldest 
judge will assume the office by the power 
of Law. Furthermore, in paragraph 10, the 
judges decided to introduce the function of 
presiding judge based on the practice of the 
Court (this has never happened before) and 
comparative case law. This creative man-
ner of interpretation of Montenegro’s legal 
framework raises a classic question for the 
future: who will guard the guardians?
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The 2007 Constitution confers new respon-
sibilities upon the Constitutional Court. The 
biggest development concerns the Court’s 
role in the protection of human rights and 
freedoms by introducing constitutional 
complaints. Upon exhausting all legal rem-
edies before the regular courts, the final in-
stance to adjudicate on matters of constitu-
tional and human rights, as well as any other 
right provided for by international treaty 
that Montenegro is party to, is the Consti-
tutional Court. This subsequently increased 
the number of cases before it. Today, al-
most 90 percent of all cases are constitu-
tional complaints. According to the report 
for 2018 (the 2019 report was not published 
at the time of the submission of this report), 
the Court recorded 120% more cases than 
the year before,9 with constitutional com-
plaints cases overshadowing the rest. The 
most dominant are those on the right to 
fair trial (Article 32 of the Constitution and 
Article 6 of the ECHR), which amount to 
75 percent, followed by the right to liber-
ty and security (Articles 29 and 30 of the 
Constitution and Article 5 of the ECHR). 
The number of cases in 2018 increased to 
2,291 (2017: 1,039) and the Court resolved 
1,203. The number of cases pending at the 
end of 2018 was 2,492. This too supports 
my claim that the Court lacks the capacity 
to deal with the increasing number of cases. 
1. U-I br. 2/19 – Constitutionality and legali-
ty of the Law on Constitutional Court 
According to Article 39(2) of the Law on 
Constitutional Court, the ‘Court shall de-
cide in each case no later than 18 months of 
the date of initiating the proceeding before 
the court, unless otherwise provided’. Mo-
tions for the assessment of conformity with 
this provision were put on the agenda of the 
Court early in January 2019; however, the 
judge rapporteur withdrew it. It was peculiar 
that there were many motions pending be-
fore the Court, yet this one appeared without 
delay. On July 18, 2019, at the general ses-
sion of the Court, the Decision which annuls 
the stated provision was adopted. Based on 
their interpretation of Article 32 of the Con-
stitution and Article 13 of the ECHR, the 
judges decided that the deadline given by 
the Law was not effective and contrary to its 
purpose. It is wrong to assume that the Court 
will provide for decisions of good quality. 
Rather they are pushed to fulfill quantitative 
goals. Their judicial reasoning seems fair, 
and it was backed up by the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). But their analysis was flawed in 
its method, as the Court failed to compare 
the facts of their own reality with the rele-
vant facts of the cases used to support their 
claim. I believe analogical reasoning would 
have provided a better understanding of their 
motivations. The comparable jurisdictions 
in many of the cases in question were the 
German or Italian Constitutional Courts, and 
even the French Conseil Constitutionnel. For 
example, the Court quotes the ECtHR and 
its Süβmann judgment in which the ECtHR 
considered the length of a proceeding before 
the German Constitutional Court. In its de-
cision, the ECtHR found that the period of 
three years, four months, and three weeks 
was reasonable considering the complexity 
of the case.10 And yet there are several hun-
dreds of cases pending before the Court for 
more than three years. Recall that Monte-
negro is a unitary state with a rather simple 
judicial hierarchy compared to the massive 
judicial authority of the states listed above. 
We can agree that not all these cases are the 
same and that many have important impli-
cations for society; thus, responsibility in 
adjudication differs and might demand more 
time. The deadline of eighteen months was 
not respected in many cases, and while that 
fact could have been used as inspiration to 
amend the Law with a new provision based 
on precise statistical data from the Court 
itself, it was solely based on its own work 
and merits. The Constitutional Court has 
approached the issue differently. The Court 
is displeased that such a provision is given 
in the form of an imperative legal norm,11 
and one could understand the judges being 
offended by its patronizing tone. It seems to 
me that they failed to comprehend that ‘the 
legal rules are simply formulae describing 
uniformities of judicial decision’.12  
If we allow for the proceedings not to have 
any deadlines, and with the backlog of the 
Court as it is, the citizens will ultimately be 
left to hope for a miracle. The most appropri-
ate course would have been for the Court to 
amend this provision by breaking down the 
list of different motions and activities it has 
within its competence with new provision-
al deadlines applicable to themselves. And 
finally, the Constitutional Court has almost 
the same number of cases as the Supreme 
Court with only seven judges compared to 
the Supreme Court’s nineteen. In addition, it 
is heavily understaffed, and new, skilled peo-
ple would be a game changer for the Court.
2. U-I br. 34/18, U-III br.1970/18 i U-III br. 
1987/18 – Constitutionality and legality of 
Criminal Procedure Code  
Proceedings before regular courts were ini-
9 ‘Annual Report of the Constitutional Court for 2018’. 
10 Süβmann v Germany [1996] European Court of Human Rights 20024/92 [62].
11 Ukidanje zakonskog roka (n 10) para 7.2.1.4.1.
12 Felix S Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functionalist Approach’ (1935), 35 Columbia Law Review 809, 848.
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tiated against two members of Parliament in 
2018 without prior lifting of their immunity 
as guaranteed by the Constitution (Article 
86). One of them was detained. The other 
avoided arrest by staying in the Parliament 
building. Earlier that year, both MPs refused 
to disclose certain information while testify-
ing before the Court. By doing so, the High-
er Court in Podgorica and Court of Appeal 
sentenced them to prison. According to their 
claim, they did not refuse to testify but did 
refuse to disclose certain information, such 
as the identity of the national security agent 
who provided information on an alleged 
bribe by the Chief Special Prosecutor. 
However, the Constitutional Court did not 
decide on the merits of the constitutional 
complaint filed by the MPs or the constitu-
tionality of the provision on which the de-
tention was based. Instead, in line with Ar-
ticle 55 of the Law on Constitutional Court, 
it initiated constitutional review of Article 
119 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. By 
doing so, the Court temporarily suspended 
detention orders pending their final decision. 
This was a rather creative maneuver to avoid 
political implications and scrutiny. Having 
taken this path in September 2019, the Court 
declared that the provision was unconstitu-
tional as it was not compatible with the con-
stitutional principle of the rule of law. This 
rather vague reading was backed up by the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
Why is this case important? First, ECtHR 
jurisprudence does not negate the right of 
each country to establish procedural rules 
in criminal justice. Some states do not have 
provisions like the one in question; others 
like Croatia do. This provision is not uncon-
stitutional, but the manner in which it was 
applied is. The MPs did not refuse to testi-
fy but refused to disclose the identity of a 
source. In that respect, there is a provision 
in the same law (Article 108) referring to 
the right not to disclose the professional 
secrets of journalists, doctors, or lawyers. 
The Court could have been creative and ap-
plied the same logic to the MPs. As to the 
reason they did not disclose the information, 
the MPs stated they there suspicious of the 
impartiality of the Higher Court as well as 
the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Second, 
the issue of the imprisonment of MPs before 
their immunity was lifted was not answered. 
The decision in question is just a cosmetic 
one, and the Court did not have the courage 
or capacity to decide on the constitutional 
complaints. It thus avoided confronting the 
regular judiciary.
3. U-III br. 1874/19 Constitutional com-
plaint – Prohibition of extradition of a Turk-
ish citizen 
Turkish citizen Harun Ayvaz filed a time-
ly and admissible constitutional complaint 
against the decision of the Higher Court, later 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal, to extradite 
him to Turkey. His claim was that, given the 
Turkish state’s crusade against members of the 
alleged terrorist organization Gulen, his rights 
under Articles 3, 6, 8, and 13 of the ECHR 
would be violated.
A three-member panel of the Constitution-
al Court noticed that the Higher Court judge 
held that the general conditions for extradition 
had not been met, and in accordance with in-
ternational standards and human rights juris-
prudence, Mr. Ayvaz should remain in Mon-
tenegro. Subsequent Court proceedings held 
differently. 
The Court established that there were clear in-
dications that the life of the applicant would 
be in danger. It also took into consideration the 
accounts of different international and non-
state human rights organization reports on the 
various violations of the rights of detainees ac-
cused of being part of the Gulen organization. 
In the almost twenty-five-page-long decision, 
the Court elaborated on its understanding of 
the relevant ECHR jurisprudence, applied 
the findings of reports and resolutions of the 
relevant EU authorities, and applied them ad 
literam, concluding that there was a valid and 
legitimate concern about the life of the appli-
cant should he be extradited to Turkey under 
the circumstances. Namely, those in which 
Turkish security forces were involved in tor-
ture as well as serious, massive, and systemat-
ic human rights violations. 
This decision is historic and very important 
for Montenegrin constitutional heritage, as it 
is the first decision in which the Court annuls 
an extradition decision pursuant to Article 3 of 
the ECHR. In addition, by doing, so the Court 
respected the international principle of non-re-
foulement. 
4. U-III br. 245/17, 254/17, 265/17, 268/17 i 
287/17 – Constitutional complaints for vio-
lation of a right to a trial within a reason-
able time 
Four men, members of an organized criminal 
group, were sentenced to thirty years in pris-
on for the murder of a senior police official 
in 2005 and the bombing of a hotel complex. 
In their complaints, they claimed that the 
regular courts violated their right to a trial 
within a reasonable time, as the final verdict 
of the Supreme Court was issued in 2016. 
In its fifty-page decision, the Court over-
turned this verdict, finding that the case was 
remanded to the court of first instance three 
times for retrial, which resulted in a delay. 
According to the Court, this kind of behavior 
is what the ECtHR, in its jurisprudence, re-
fers to as ‘unjustified activity by the courts’. 
In addition, the Court found the overall delay 
was unjustified, as the Supreme Court took 
eleven months to reach a decision and was 
not taking any additional or new procedur-
al activities or adducing new evidence, but 
rather forming its judgment based on the 
proceedings before the lower courts. 
This prompted the Court to evaluate the 
complaints and take into consideration that 
the delay was mostly the courts’ fault, that 
there were frequent revocations of judg-
ments, multiple changes of the judge in 
charge, and that there was unjustified delay 
in the preparation of expert witness findings. 
The Court did not find that the complainants 
or their defense team contributed to the de-
lay of the proceedings. In addition, during 
this entire time, they remained in detention, 
meaning that the courts are obliged to act 
with extreme urgency. The Court established 
that such a long delay was excessive and it 
derogated from the complainants’ right to a 
trial within a reasonable time as one of the 
elements of a right to a fair trial under the 
Constitution and ECHR. This decision is 
important for two reasons: first, it is again 
a test for the Supreme Court to see if it will 
take this decision into consideration in new 
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proceedings; and second, a few months prior 
to this decision, the ECtHR found that Mon-
tenegro had violated Article 3 of the ECHR 
due to the conditions in which an applicant 
was detained and to violations of his free-
dom of personality for lack of justification 
of his five-year, five-month detention.13 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
Besides a possible lack of public trust, as 
they just appointed a presiding judge ille-
gally that could increase questions about the 
Court’s independence from the Executive 
branch, the reluctance or even defiance of 
the Supreme Court to adjudicate on the basis 
of the legal reasoning of the Constitutional 
Court will remain an issue in 2020. This year 
will be challenging as we are waiting for 
several important decisions from the Court: 
on the constitutionality and legality of the 
Law on electronic communication14 as well 
as the constitutionality of the newly adopted 
Law on religious freedoms;15 challenges to 
the legal principle adopted by the Supreme 
Court, according to which regular courts are 
not to adjudicate in cases where the Parlia-
ment makes appointments to state council 
bodies;16 and the constitutionality of the lat-
est amendments to the Law on state symbols 
and statehood day. 
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N E PA L
I. INTRODUCTION
The implementation and operationalisation 
of the 2015 Constitution continued to be the 
primary focus of constitutional law in Nepal 
in 2019. The new Constitution was adopted 
by the country’s Constituent Assembly in 
2015 after a protracted decade of Constitu-
tion-making, which was put into motion by 
the 2006 peace settlement that brought the 
Maoist insurgency to an end. After two and 
a half centuries of highly centralised rule, 
which perpetuated the exclusion of large 
segments of Nepali society, the new Consti-
tution promises a more equal and inclusive 
naya (new) Nepal. The federal restructur-
ing of the state is central to this vision: de-
volving political power from elite-captured 
Kathmandu institutions to facilitate balanced 
development, a greater appreciation for re-
ligious and ethnic diversity, and an increase 
in peoples’ participation in governance, es-
pecially of historically marginalised groups. 
While the transition to federalism remains a 
significant constitutional challenge and a mat-
ter of enormous political contestation, devolu-
tion appears to be conferring new forms of le-
gitimacy on government. Moreover, in 2019, 
the post-conflict transitional justice process, 
which lingers as a critical yet unfulfilled con-
stitutional concern, continued to languish. As 
the year progressed, concerns emerged re-
garding the federal government’s attempts to 
stymie criticism and constrain civic engage-
ment. Further, after years of inactivity, the 
Constitutional Bench restarted hearing cases. 
However, the system of constitutional adjudi-
cation continues to function poorly.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Federalism
Political disruption and manoeuvring char-
acterised the period between the promulga-
tion of the Constitution in September 2015 
and elections in 2017. In 2016, unsuccess-
ful attempts, including the January 2016 
amendment to the Constitution, to appease 
the Madhes-based parties, which had walked 
out of the Constituent Assembly and turned 
to street protest in the final months of Con-
stitution-making, engulfed political and con-
stitutional discourse; little to no focus was 
given to structurally implementing the new 
Constitution. 2017 was a year of elections. 
From May to December, in five phases, 
more than 35,000 representatives were elect-
ed to public office across the three tiers of 
government. 2018 was thus the first year of 
establishment: at the subnational level the 
primary focus was forming new governance 
institutions – under the heavy direction (of-
ten unwelcome by the local and provincial 
elected representatives) of the federal gov-
ernment; at the federal level, the Parliament 
began the considerable task of bringing the 
country’s legal frameworks into conformity 
with the new Constitution. 
The gradual institutionalisation of the new 
federal structure continued throughout 2019 
with many of the same transitional chal-
lenges facing the federation. Of these, the 
most critical was the continuing failure of 
the federal government to deploy a coherent 
transition management plan to guide the dy-
namic period of federal transformation and 
ensure the delivery of critical public goods 
and services at the subnational level. This 
has resulted from and is compounded by 
the strong resistance within federal institu-
tions to devolve power as well as the highly 
centralised nature of major political parties. 
Without administrative structures and mech-
anisms to implement public service process-
es and programs, including functions within 
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their exclusive jurisdiction, provinces have 
had to struggle to avoid becoming bottle-
necks. In many instances, under the express 
direction of the federal ministries to await 
federal framework legislation to be promul-
gated – which in many key policy domains, 
such as policing, has yet to occur – provin-
cial legislatures have been unable to enact 
the legislation critical for provincial and 
municipal government. To date, the general 
ineffectiveness in transitioning governmen-
tal responsibility for the delivery of critical 
public goods and services has weakened the 
foundations for federalism in Nepal.1 
Identity, inclusion, and conflict
The historical marginalisation of significant 
segments of Nepali society – across many 
axes (ethnic, caste, language, geography, 
etc.) – has resulted in stark inequalities and 
driven civil conflict, most notably the Maoist 
insurgency (1996-2006). Addressing identi-
ty-based grievances is a stated concern of the 
ongoing democratic federal transition. 
Even though it was approved by 90% of 
members within the Constituent Assembly, 
political unrest accompanied the promul-
gation of the 2015 Constitution. Protests 
among large sections of the Madhesi, Tharu, 
and Janajati communities, both leading up to 
and after the adoption of the new Constitu-
tion, resulted in violent clashes with security 
forces and at least 50 deaths. The issues that 
gave rise to the unrest remain relevant: in 
2019, the Madhes-based parties continued to 
seek to work through the parliamentary pro-
cess to address grievances, continuing to de-
mand constitutional amendments regarding 
the recognition of all ethnic languages; the 
guarantee of indiscriminate and gender-neu-
tral naturalised citizenship; the representa-
tion of provinces in the National Assembly 
(the second chamber of the federal Parlia-
ment) based on population; and the redraw-
ing of federal subunit boundaries. However, 
by and large, their concerns remained un-
der-discussed in national political discourse 
and the Pahad-Madhes (hill-plains) political 
fault line remains fragile. In particular, the 
relationship between the federal government 
and government in Province Two, which en-
compasses much of the eastern Tarai/Mad-
hes and is the only province to have a party 
in government different from the ruling Ne-
pal Communist Party (NCP) at the centre, 
has been tense, and the two have come into 
conflict on numerous occasions. Notwith-
standing these concerns, early observations 
indicate that the devolution of administrative 
and political power and increased inclusion 
of marginalised and underrepresented groups 
in the new subnational political spaces have 
conferred new forms of legitimacy on gov-
ernment, in particular local government.2 
In 2019, the splinter Maoist group led by 
Netra Bikram Chand (‘Biplab’), which chal-
lenges the validity of the new constitutional 
order and seeks to ‘complete the revolution’ 
that it considers was abandoned when the 
Maoists joined democratic politics in 2006, 
continued to pursue political violence, in-
cluding a series of bomb blasts in Kath-
mandu. While the group retains credibility 
among small segments of society, especial-
ly in the traditional Maoist strongholds, its 
present influence on constitutional poli-
tics remains peripheral. More positively, in 
March, secessionist leader CK Raut, another 
prominent voice contesting the Constitution, 
signed an agreement with the government in 
which he agreed to give up his demands for 
an independent Madhes and pledged to con-
tinue to advance his political agenda within 
the bounds of the Constitution.
Transitional Justice
After more than a decade since the end of 
the Maoist conflict, the transitional justice 
process has made little progress. While more 
than 63,000 cases have been registered with 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) and the Commission of Investigation 
on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP), 
neither commission has concluded even one 
investigation. In February 2019, both com-
missions had their tenure extended, and after 
remaining idle for ten months without com-
missioners, an agreement was reached in 
January 2020 between the NCP and Nepali 
Congress on the appointment of new leader-
ship to the commissions. 
Lawyers and activists remain concerned that 
the transitional justice process has been de-
signed to ensure that powerful perpetrators 
of human rights violations remain immune 
from prosecution. Indeed, despite being 
struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015, 
the provisions in the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Act 2014, which leave open the 
possibility of amnesty for human rights vio-
lators, remain unamended; other provisions 
ordered by the Court to be integrated into the 
act have yet to be incorporated. Moreover, 
the delays mean that individuals implicated 
in war-era human rights violations continue 
to be able to obtain high constitutional office 
without being subjected to the transitional 
justice process and its attendant consequenc-
es. Significant progress in transitional justice 
in the near future seems unlikely.3 
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Shrinking political space
In 2019, concerns emerged regarding the 
federal government’s attempts to stymie 
criticism and constrain civic engagement. 
Indeed, the general environment became in-
creasingly hostile for journalists and those 
critical of the NCP. Several bills tabled in the 
federal Parliament (yet to be enacted as of 
January 2020) have the potential to curtail 
free expression and undermine the indepen-
dence of the National Human Rights Com-
mission. Vaguely worded language in the 
Information Technology Management Bill, 
for example, would criminalise social media 
posts that are deemed to contain ‘improper’ 
content. Given the increasing utilisation of 
imprecise provisions in existing laws to de-
tain and fine journalists and other prominent 
individuals, fears that the new provisions 
will be used to restrict freedom of expression 
seem well founded. In an encouraging sign 
for free speech, however, the content of bills, 
and the lack of public consultation through-
out the legislative process, have been met 
with strong criticism and opposition from 
civil society groups and the media.
There are also concerns regarding moves to 
restrict the NGO sector. The federal Cabinet, 
for example, has authorised the Ministry of 
Home Affairs to draft new laws to regulate 
social organisations, and the new Nation-
al Integrity Policy seeks to prevent INGOs 
from sending reports to their international 
headquarters without first receiving the fed-
eral government’s permission.4 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The 2015 Constitution establishes a Con-
stitutional Bench within the Supreme Court 
of Nepal, which is tasked with interpreting 
the Constitution and adjudicating intergov-
ernmental disputes (Article 137). While the 
Bench was formally constituted in 2015, in-
ternal politics have prevented it from prop-
erly functioning, and throughout much of 
2016 to 2018 it remained virtually inactive. 
Indeed, the post-2015 era has been a turbu-
lent period for the judiciary. In 2017, the 
federal Parliament unsuccessfully attempted 
to impeach Chief Justice Sushila Karki, and 
the rejection of Deepak Raj Joshee’s nomi-
nation for the position of Chief Justice by the 
Parliamentary Hearing Committee in August 
2018 led to a five-month period in which the 
Court was without a leader. Controversy re-
garding judicial nominations and impeach-
ments continued in 2019.  
However, the appointment of Cholendra 
Rana as Chief Justice in January 2019 – the 
fifth person to head the judicial branch in 
less than four years – and the enlargement 
in August of the pool of judges from which 
the Constitutional Bench can be constitut-
ed meant that in the second half of 2019, 
the Bench restarted hearing constitutional 
disputes. Nonetheless, delays continue and 
legacy cases relating to the 2007 Interim 
Constitution consume much of the Bench’s 
attention. There is general agreement among 
legal experts for the need to reform the sys-
tem of constitutional adjudication and per-
haps even disband the Constitutional Bench 
entirely. While the cases were few in number 
in 2019, the Court did engage several matters 
of constitutional import, as discussed below.5 
1.  Advocates for the Nation v Office of the 
Prime Minister and Council of Ministers:6 
Secularism
Hinduism’s position within the state – until 
2006, Nepal was constitutionally a Hindu 
kingdom – and its relationship to different 
visions of nationalism have long been the 
subject of political and legal contestation. 
For many minority ethnic and religious com-
munities, secularism has been associated 
with their emancipation from historical mar-
ginalisation.
 
The 2015 Constitution confirms the Nepali 
state as ‘secular,’ defining this secularism as 
meaning ‘religious, cultural freedoms, in-
cluding protection of religion, culture hand-
ed down from the time immemorial’ (Article 
4). While Article 26 protects the freedom 
to profess, practice, and protect religion 
according to personal conviction, this right 
does not extend to certain conduct, including 
that which seeks to, ‘convert another person 
from one religion to another’; this conduct 
‘shall be punishable by law’ (Article 26(3)).
In Advocates for the Nation, through public 
interest litigation, the petitioners challenged 
the constitutional validity of Article 158 of 
the Criminal (Code) Act 2017 (the Code), 
which criminalises proselytization and 
states, among other things, that ‘no person 
shall convert anyone from one religion to an-
other or make an attempt to or abet such con-
version of people’ (Article 158(1)). Violation 
of the article is punishable by imprisonment 
for up to five years and a fine up to 50,000 
Nepali Rupees (Article 158(3)). 
The petitioners appealed to the fundamental 
rights enumerated in the Constitution, includ-
ing to freedom of religion, as well as inter-
national law, arguing that not only does the 
Code restrict an individual’s ability to express 
and practice their religion, values, and beliefs, 
but Article 158 is based on a false definition 
of religious preaching, which presumes that 
preaching and conversion are necessarily co-
ercive and nefarious activities. The result of 
the law, they argued, is serious harm to the 
religious beliefs and feelings and autonomy 
of both individuals and communities.
In a rather plain application of the constitu-
tional text, the Court held that Article 158 of 
the Code was promulgated to enact the laws 
of punishment described in Article 26(3) of 
the Constitution. In the Court’s opinion, ‘re-
ligious secularism and freedom mean that 
every individual and community can follow 
4 For further discussion, see Bhrikuti Rai, ‘Curtailing Civil Liberties in Nepal, One Legislation at a Time’, The Kathmandu Post (Kathmandu, 30 December 
2019) <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2019/12/30/curtailing-civil-liberties-in-nepal-one-legislation-at-a-time> accessed 29 January 2020.
5 A copy of the Nepali text of all of the judgements discussed in this section as well as simple English translations can be found at <https://tinyurl.com/
NepalSC2019>. The authors thank Shreya Paudel for her assistance with the translations.
6 Writ No: 075-WC-0063 (date of ruling: 12 July 2019).
2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 237
and practice norms as per their belief. They 
do not imply freedom to convert another in-
dividual from their religion or interfere with 
another religion [and its beliefs, practices, 
and activities].’ The Court concluded that 
the petitioners had been unable to substan-
tiate how Article 158 curtailed constitutional 
freedoms.
In the judgement, the Court did not engage 
in any conceptual, historical, or compara-
tive analysis to elucidate what secularism 
means in Nepal. Thus, the judgement pro-
vides only limited clarity on the tension 
between the freedom to choose a religion 
and the constraint on propagating religion, 
which is apparent in the Constitution’s fram-
ing of secularism and freedom of religion. 
Significantly, the Court did not engage the 
definitional question raised regarding the 
propagation of religion. The petitioners had, 
in the alternative, requested that the Court 
order the Government of Nepal to convene 
a multi-religious team of experts to develop 
standards to identify the conditions under 
which Article 158 applies. However, as the 
Court felt that the petitioners had been un-
able to substantiate how Article 158 imping-
es on an individual’s religious autonomy and 
freedom, it found it unnecessary to address 
this request. It thus remains unclear when the 
practice and preaching of religious values 
and beliefs will be considered acts of coer-
cive religious conversion – and thus illegal 
– and when such activities may be engaged 
in lawfully.7 
 
2. Advocate Lokendra Bahadur Oli v Pro-
vincial Assembly of Province Two:8 Local 
Elected Officials’ Salaries
The local facilities case is the first case in 
which the Constitutional Bench invalidated 
laws enacted by the provincial governments. 
Six of the seven provinces (all but Province 
One), which have the constitutional mandate 
to establish the legal frameworks in which 
local governments operate, enacted legisla-
tion (collectively referred to here as the ‘Fa-
cilities Acts’) to provide ‘facilities’ – both 
monetary and non-monetary – to local elect-
ed office bearers. 
The petitioner challenged the six Facilities 
Acts, arguing that the legislation had no con-
stitutional basis and should thus be declared 
void. While the Constitution stipulates that 
both remuneration and facilities should be 
provided to members of the federal Parlia-
ment (Article 108) and the speaker and dep-
uty speaker within the provinces (Article 
196), the provisions relating to local units 
(Article 220(8) and Article 227) only refer 
to facilities and do not mention remunera-
tion. The petitioner claimed that the bene-
fits provided to local representatives by the 
Facilities Acts, which comprised a monthly 
stipend, in fact constituted remuneration and 
were thus unconstitutional.
The Court concluded that the Facilities Acts 
did provide remuneration to the elected offi-
cials – the mere fact that the Acts called the 
payments facilities did not mean that they 
were so. In considering the constitutionality of 
the legislation, the Court was of the view that 
the Constitution’s text demonstrated the clear 
intent of the drafters to provide only facilities 
and not remuneration to local office-bearers. 
Construing Articles 220(8) and 227 broadly to 
enable local representatives to receive remu-
neration, it held, would constitute a ‘fraud on 
Constitution.’ The Court thus concluded that 
the Facilities Acts were inconsistent with the 
Constitution and declared them void from the 
date of the judgement. 
If the Court continues to construe express 
omissions in the Constitution’s text as ex-
press prohibitions, then the Constitution’s 
ability to adapt to changing circumstances 
and forces unseen by its drafters in the future 
will be highly limited. Moreover, the prac-
tical effect of the judgement is that around 
30,000 local officials, who are often engaged 
full time in their elected roles, are now unre-
munerated. While the judgement led to calls 
for a constitutional amendment, it seems 
more likely that the six affected provinces 
will enact laws modelled off Province One’s 
unchallenged legislative scheme. This pro-
vides local representatives generous meet-
ing allowances and other job-related bene-
fits, which equal the remuneration given to 
elected officials in the other six provinces 
and which in effect function as remunera-
tion. The judgement is thus likely to encour-
age the creation of artificial expenditure by 
elected officials to generate their salaries.
3. Ministry of Industry, Tourism, and the 
Environment, Province Two v Office of the 
Prime Minister and Council of Ministers:9 
Federal Division of Powers
The Sagarnath Forestry Development Proj-
ect (SFDP) case, brought by the government 
of Province Two against the federal govern-
ment, is the first case in which a province 
has challenged federal government action 
and in which the Constitutional Bench has 
been asked to consider the federal division 
of power. 
Province Two claims that SFDP, a plantation 
project located within the province, is under 
its jurisdiction. Through a federal Cabinet 
decision in June, which Province Two chal-
lenged as ultra vires, the federal government 
purported to dissolve the SFDP’s manage-
ment committee and merge the project with 
the Timber Corporation of Nepal Ltd, a whol-
ly-owned entity of the federal government.
Schedule 6 states that the ‘use of forests and 
waters and management of environment 
within the province’ is under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of provincial governments and 
legislatures. Province Two thus argued that, 
as SFDP was a national forest project, it 
alone had exclusive power to make decisions 
7 For further discussion of freedom of religion, see: International Commission of Jurists, Challenges to Freedom of Religion or Belief in Nepal: A Briefing Paper 
(July 2018) <www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Nepal-Freedom-of-religion-brief-Advocacy-Analysis-brief-2018-ENG.pdf> accessed 29 January 2020.
8 Writ No: 076-WC-0002 (date of ruling: 18 October 2019).
9 Writ No: 076-WC-0001 (date of ruling: 11 December 2019).
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regarding its governance. In reply, the feder-
al government argued that in the absence of 
provincial laws – the Province Two legisla-
ture had yet to enact any forest-related laws 
– it retained authority to regulate with regard 
to matters that the Constitution delineated as 
exclusive to the provinces.  
In August, the Constitutional Bench issued 
a temporary stay order, which was contin-
ued in December, to prevent the federal 
government from implementing the Cabinet 
resolutions regarding SFDP. While the Con-
stitutional Bench has yet to deliver its final 
judgement, the interim order indicates the 
Bench’s intent to support the exclusive juris-
diction of the provinces. The way in which 
the Bench goes about engaging the issues in 
its forthcoming judgement will be important 
for establishing the trajectory of the Court’s 
division of powers jurisprudence. 
4. Advocate Pravin Subedi v Office of the 
Prime Minister and Council of Ministers:10 
Freedom of Expression
This case is another in which the Supreme 
Court has yet to deliver its final judgement. 
Nonetheless, through the interim order is-
sued in July, the Court indicated its intent to 
support freedom of expression, which given 
many commentator’s wider pessimism re-
garding the curtailment of political rights, 
may be increasingly important.
The petitioners challenged an order of the 
Kathmandu District Court, following a pe-
tition made by Nepal Police, to ban the 
popular online game PlayerUnknown’s Bat-
tlegrounds (PUBG). The ban was publicly 
justified on the grounds that it was addictive 
and hampering the studies and mental health 
of young people. 
The petitioners contended that the ban was 
contrary to the constitutional protection 
of free expression (Article 17(2)(a)) and 
constituted an unreasonable curtailment of 
citizens’ rights to access the Internet. In ad-
dition, they argued that upholding the ban 
would invite further government restriction 
on the Internet in the future.
In short order, the Court observed that con-
sidering freedom of expression, press free-
dom, and other fundamental rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution, restrictive bans 
must be ‘just, fair, and reasonable’ and that 
government authority must be wielded in 
ways that are ‘rational and wise.’ In this case, 
the Court found that the Kathmandu District 
Court ruling did not clearly state the rational-
ity for the ban, and therefore it should not be 
put into effect.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The institutionalisation of the new constitu-
tional order will remain the principal focus 
of the coming year. Significant pieces of leg-
islation remain to be put in place at all three 
tiers of the federation – both framework and 
sectoral laws. The legislative process will 
continue to be heavily driven by Kathmandu, 
which is likely to generate conflict between 
the federal and subnational governments. 
While speculation regarding constitutional 
amendment continues, if/when and on what 
terms this will occur remain uncertain. 
Relationships between the country’s 761 
governments will become increasingly im-
portant, especially as provincial and local 
governments become more firmly estab-
lished. The ways in which the political par-
ties continue to go about moulding them-
selves to (or resisting) the new polycentric 
federation will have a significant impact on 
intergovernmental relations and will thus be 
important to watch. 
Moreover, the constitutional institutions 
designed to support and supervise intergov-
ernmental relations – the Inter-Provincial 
Council, the National Natural Resource and 
Fiscal Commission, and the Constitutional 
Bench – will likely play an increasingly sa-
lient role in the federation. With its caseload 
only expected to increase, 2020 could see the 
Constitutional Bench decide many important 
constitutional questions of foundational im-
portance to the federation (the forthcoming 
judgement on the Sagarnath Forestry De-
velopment Project is one such anticipated 
judgement). However, if the Bench contin-
ues to function poorly, momentum to reform 
to the system of constitutional adjudication 
is likely to gather. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The most important event in New Zealand 
in 2019 took place on March 15, when a gun 
attack on two mosques by a lone far-right ex-
tremist murdered 51 people and injured an-
other 49. This terrorist incident was the first 
to take place in New Zealand since operatives 
from the French intelligence services sank a 
Greenpeace vessel, the Rainbow Warrior, 
in Auckland Harbour in 1985. The mosque 
attacks having disabused the country of its 
assumption that “terrorism represents more 
of a latent threat than a lived reality”,1 leg-
islative steps were quickly taken to address 
the danger posed by both readily available 
military-style weapons and individuals who 
may have participated in terrorist entities 
overseas. In addition, the government has 
announced a range of reviews of New Zea-
land’s law on “hate speech” regulation and 
general terrorism-related laws.
The other area in which some notable con-
stitutional activity took place was in relation 
to the country’s electoral laws. As one of the 
last remaining bastions of parliamentary sov-
ereignty, without a written higher law consti-
tution or judicial power to invalidate legisla-
tion, New Zealand’s electoral processes play a 
foundational role in establishing the legitima-
cy of governing authority. In 2019, the coun-
try’s Parliament passed legislation to enable 
the voters to directly decide two socially con-
troversial matters: whether to permit medical-
ly assisted dying, and whether to legalise the 
personal use of cannabis. In addition, a num-
ber of changes to electoral laws were made by 
the governing coalition against the wishes of 
the current minority parties.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
The March terrorist attack had a profound 
effect on a New Zealand society unused to 
political violence, especially on this scale. It 
also focused attention on the ready availabil-
ity in New Zealand of military-style semi-au-
tomatic weapons as well as raised questions 
about the sufficiency of current laws relating 
to terrorist activity and “hate speech”. The 
day after the shootings, the Prime Minister 
announced that “our gun laws will change”,2 
with legislation to prohibit ownership of most 
forms of semi-automatic firearms and related 
parts introduced into Parliament two weeks 
later. Following a severely truncated legisla-
tive process, the Arms (Prohibited Firearms, 
Magazines, and Parts) Amendment Act 2019 
was enacted into law on 11 April, less than a 
month after the events that prompted it.
This legislation’s rapid passage into law 
demonstrates the ongoing importance of 
parliamentary supremacy in New Zealand’s 
constitutional arrangements and limited 
mechanisms for challenging that institution’s 
decisions, particularly on an issue that attracts 
widespread political consensus. The par-
liamentary vote on the amending Act was a 
near-unanimous 119-1, with representatives 
across the political spectrum agreeing on the 
NEW ZEALAND
1 Andrew Geddis and Elana Geddis, “Addressing terrorism in New Zealand’s low threat environment”, 
in Ian Cram (ed.), Extremism, Free Speech and Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy (Routledge, Oxford, 
2019) 190, 190.
2 Damien Cave and Matt Stevens, “New Zealand’s Gun Laws Draw Scrutiny After Mosque Shootings”, 
New York Times (15 March 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/world/asia/new-zealand-gun-
laws.html
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measure’s necessity. And a post-enactment at-
tempt to have the legislation reviewed by the 
High Court on both substantive and procedur-
al grounds was summarily dismissed, with 
the Court ruling that even considering the 
merits of the case would breach comity.3 On 
the question of what sort of weaponry citizens 
ought to be permitted to possess, the judiciary 
had no interest in questioning the unified de-
cision of the country’s elected representatives.
However, there has been less political agree-
ment on other responses to the Christchurch 
attacks. In mid-October, the government in-
troduced into Parliament the Terrorism Sup-
pression (Control Orders) Bill, designed to 
create a system of civil control orders for 
individuals returning to New Zealand after 
involvement with terrorist organisations over-
seas. Despite this legislation imposing poten-
tially severe restrictions on individuals’ liber-
ty, it also was expedited through the House; 
the public only was given three working days 
in which to make submissions to the parlia-
mentary committee considering it. And al-
though the opposition voted against the Bill’s 
enactment, they did so on the basis that it did 
not contain stringent enough controls.
Future responses to the Christchurch attacks 
also look likely to provoke significant polit-
ical disagreements. In April, the Minister of 
Justice announced a review by government 
officials of how New Zealand regulates “hate 
speech”, which has yet to be reported. How-
ever, opposition parties already have indicat-
ed that they see little need to change the coun-
try’s law in a way that may further constrain 
freedom of expression. And a Royal Commis-
sion of Inquiry into the Christchurch attacks 
is due to report its conclusions in April of 
2020. The government has indicated that this 
report may form the basis for amending New 
Zealand’s Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, 
which has been criticised by the country’s So-
licitor General for being “unnecessarily com-
plex, incoherent and … almost impossible to 
apply …”.4  
The other notable constitutional develop-
ments in 2019 took place in the field of elec-
toral law. Electoral law-making by elected 
representatives is a fraught activity in all 
places. In New Zealand, however, it perhaps 
is even more fraught given the foundational 
role the “democratic mandate” plays in its 
constitutional arrangements. Absent a written, 
higher-law constitution and with Parliament 
retaining sovereign status over the nation’s 
laws, the periodic distribution of public power 
on the basis of election results is perhaps the 
key constraint on political actors. The rules 
that govern the election process, and how 
those rules are decided, thus become extreme-
ly important matters.
The first issue of note was a spate of espe-
cially severe partisan wrangling over two 
electoral amendment bills. Although claims 
of a “convention” that electoral law reform in 
New Zealand should occur in a non-partisan 
fashion are overblown,5 the usual process-
es of law-making in this area were not fol-
lowed. An Electoral (Amendment) Bill that, 
inter alia, would make it easier to register to 
vote and cast early votes was introduced into 
Parliament before its Justice Committee had 
concluded its standard inquiry into the 2017 
general election and made recommendations 
for reforms. And in November, the Elector-
al Amendment Act 2019, which lowered the 
amount that foreign donors may give to po-
litical parties and candidates, was introduced, 
debated, and enacted into law in but a single 
day. Opposition parties criticised the legisla-
tive process used for both measures. 
The second issue of note in this area was the 
decision to allow the general public to decide 
two matters directly at the 2020 general elec-
tion. When enacting the End of Life Choice 
Act 2019, which will permit terminally ill in-
dividuals to obtain their doctor’s assistance to 
end their lives, members of Parliament chose 
to make its coming into force conditional on a 
majority referendum vote at the next election. 
And the government also has chosen to ask 
the public directly whether personal posses-
sion of cannabis, along with regulated forms 
of supply, should be legalised. These referen-
dum votes on “moral” issues are the first since 
New Zealand abandoned regular votes on the 
issue of liquor licensing in the 1980s.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Kim v Minister of Justice [2019] NZCA 
209: Extradition to the PRC
The New Zealand Court of Appeal’s judg-
ment in Kim v Minister of Justice6 in June 
2019 was significant for three key reasons. 
First, because of its impact: in quashing a de-
cision to extradite a Korean citizen and New 
Zealand permanent resident to the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) to face a charge of 
murder, the Court of Appeal may have pre-
vented the extradition of anyone to PRC in 
the future. Secondly, because of its timing: 
in June 2019, matters involving the PRC and 
extradition were gaining particular currency. 
Not only was the judgment delivered just as 
the turmoil in Hong Kong was beginning to 
unfold – protests in response to a proposal 
that would allow extradition of its residents 
to mainland PRC – but a month after the 
Court’s decision, a Swedish court also re-
fused extradition of a PRC national on simi-
lar grounds to the New Zealand Court of Ap-
peal.7 Finally, and far less newsworthy, the 
decision marked a milestone in New Zealand 
administrative law: full acceptance and ap-
plication by the Court of Appeal of variable 
standards of review. 
3 The Kiwi Party Inc v Attorney-General [2019] NZHC 1163. 
4 Andrew Geddis and Elana Geddis, “Addressing terrorism in New Zealand’s low threat environment”, in Ian Cram (ed.), Extremism, Free Speech and Counter-Ter-
rorism Law and Policy (Routledge, Oxford, 2019) 190, 195.
5 Henry Cooke, “Nick Smith dips his toes in very dangerous waters with electoral law spat”, stuff.co.nz (23 June, 2019) <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/poli-
tics/113646931/fights-about-electoral-law-are-a-very-dangerous-game>
6 Kim v Minister of Justice [2019] NZCA 209.
7 Reuters, “Sweden rejects China’s request to extradite former official” (9 July 2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sweden-extradition-china/sweden-re-
jects-chinas-request-to-extradite-former-official-idUSKCN1U40RI>
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At the heart of the case was the desire by the 
PRC to try Kyung Yup Kim in a Shanghai 
court for murder. It has been seeking his 
extradition from New Zealand since 2012.8 
The Minister of Justice first agreed to sur-
render Mr Kim to the PRC in 2015, but Mr 
Kim successfully challenged that decision in 
the High Court on the basis that the Minis-
ter had failed to properly assure herself that 
his rights would be respected by the PRC as 
required by s 30 of the Extradition Act 1999 
(NZ).9 Subsequently, the Minister sought ad-
ditional advice on those matters identified by 
the Court from a professor of law in Hong 
Kong, information from the New Zealand 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and his officials, 
and confirmation from Chinese officials 
about when New Zealand officials would 
have access to recordings of police question-
ing Mr Kim. After reconsidering the matter 
in light of all this new material, the Minister 
once again concluded that Mr Kim could re-
ceive a fair trial in the PRC consistent with 
New Zealand’s human rights obligations and 
agreed to his surrender. 
Mr Kim’s challenge to the Minister’s second 
decision was rejected by the High Court,10 
but in 2019 was unanimously accepted by 
the Court of Appeal. Remarkably, the Court 
of Appeal held that the Minister’s decision 
remained flawed in spite of the further infor-
mation received because problems with the 
PRC’s criminal justice system were so deep-
ly rooted as to be inimical to basic principles 
of justice. The impact of that reasoning may 
well make it impossible for any Minister to 
ever be satisfied that a person will receive 
a fair trial in that country. And if that is the 
case, no reasonable Minister can exercise his 
or her discretion under the Extradition Act 
1999 to agree to surrender a person for extra-
dition to the PRC. Needless to say, the deci-
sion represented quite a damning analysis of 
the PRC’s criminal procedure practices and 
legal system with ramifications beyond the 
judicial sphere. 
In addition to the political and diplomatic 
impact of the Court of Appeal’s decision, 
Kim also represents the first Court of Appeal 
decision to unequivocally accept and apply 
variable intensity of review in administrative 
law proceedings. Unfortunately, it declined 
to go further and engage in the sort of ab-
stract analysis that would have provided 
(much needed) guidance to lower courts as 
to how to determine and apply such variable 
standards of review. It thus provided a tan-
talising but ultimately frustrating suggestion 
of a significant development in the judicial 
approach to reviewing ministerial decisions, 
and many questions about variable intensity 
or standards of review remain unanswered in 
this jurisdiction. At the very least, however, 
the Court of Appeal’s decision in Kim had 
important ramifications for New Zealand’s 
diplomatic relationship with the PRC (which 
is now New Zealand’s largest trading part-
ner). This is perhaps why the Crown chose 
to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, 
which granted leave to appeal on 20 Septem-
ber 2019.11 It will be difficult for that Court 
to shirk providing direct analysis about ex-
tradition to the PRC and variable standards 
of review, and so is a decision public lawyers 
in New Zealand await with bated breath.
2. Arps v New Zealand Police [2019] NZCA 
592: Punishment of hate crimes 
As noted, the impacts of the Christchurch 
terror attack continue to reverberate both in 
New Zealand and globally. The alleged at-
tacker is in custody presently awaiting trial 
for multiple charges of murder and attempt-
ed murder as well as New Zealand’s first 
charge of “engaging in a terrorist act” under 
s 6A of Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. The 
original trial date was set for 4 May 2020, 
but on 12 September 2019 it was shifted to 
2 June 2020 so as to avoid coinciding with 
the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. A Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into the attack was 
commenced on 10 April 2019, and it will 
present its findings on 30 April 2020.
Adjacent to these major developments, the 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Arps was also 
significant. The case centred on the actions 
of Philip Arps, who distributed to approxi-
mately 30 of his associates video footage 
showing the alleged attacker’s livestream of 
the attack. That livestream caused significant 
controversy globally, and eventually caused 
Facebook – which hosted the livestream 
video – to review its livestreaming policy 
and practices.12 Mr Arps also arranged for 
modifications to the video footage to include 
an image of rifle “crosshairs” and a “kill-
count”. He was charged with two counts 
of supplying or distributing objectionable 
material contrary to s 124(1) of the Films, 
Videos, and Publications Classification Act 
1999, plead guilty to both charges, and was 
sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment on 
18 June 2019.13 An appeal to the High Court 
against that sentence was dismissed on 21 
August 2019.14 
In a further appeal to the Court of Appeal, Mr 
Arps argued that his sentence was manifestly 
excessive on the grounds that (amongst other 
things) the courts below erred by failing to 
take into account s 14 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), which 
affirms the right of everyone in New Zea-
land “to freedom of expression, including 
the freedom to seek, receive, and impart in-
8 For a full discussion of the background to the case, see M Douglas, “The Extradition Relationship Between New Zealand and China: Kim v Minister of Justice”, 
[2017] N.Z. Crim. L Rev. 123.
9 Kim v Minister of Justice [2016] NZHC 1490, [2016] 3 NZLR 425.
10 Kim v Minister of Justice [2017] NZHC 2109, [2017] 3 NZLR 823.
11 Minister of Justice v Kim [2019] NZSC 100.
12 Julia Carrie Wong, “Facebook finally responds to New Zealand on Christchurch attack”, The Guardian, 29 March 2019 < https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2019/mar/29/facebook-new-zealand-christchurch-attack-response>
13 R v Arps [2019] NZDC 11547.
14 Arps v Police [2019] NZHC 2113.
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formation and opinions of any kind in any 
form”. When deciding to imprison Mr Arps, 
the sentencing judge had invoked s 9(1)(h) 
of the Sentencing Act 2002, which identifies 
motivation from hate as an aggravating fac-
tor. Mr Arps argued that as he was engaging 
in protected speech when he was distribut-
ing the footage, this factor ought not to have 
been considered as it conflicted with s 14 of 
the NZBORA. This rather interesting sub-
mission was necessary because perhaps the 
core argument – the interaction between hate 
speech, freedom of expression, and censor-
ship legislation and, thus, whether his ac-
tions ought to have been considered criminal 
in nature – was not at issue: Mr Arps’s guilty 
plea meant the appeal was based purely on 
sentence.15 
The Court of Appeal accepted that Mr Arps 
was engaging in protected speech:16 
While right thinking members of soci-
ety regard Mr Arps’s opinions as being 
utterly repugnant, they are nevertheless 
opinions that fall within the wide ambit 
of s 14 of the NZBORA precisely be-
cause they are “opinions of any kind”. 
We are therefore satisfied Mr Arps was 
imparting information and his opinion 
when he distributed the video footage. 
His case therefore engages s 14 of the 
NZBORA.
However, the Court went on to hold that al-
though s 9(1)(h) of the Sentencing Act may 
have limited Mr Arps’s freedom of expres-
sion under s 14 of the NZBORA, it consti-
tuted a justified limitation of that right. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal 
engaged in perhaps the most straightforward 
and clear application of the Hansen frame-
work to date.17 Hansen assists a court in nav-
igating the notoriously complex operative 
provisions in the NZBORA when confronted 
by primary legislation that conflicts with an 
NZBORA protected right. Following that 
framework, the Court held that s 9(1)(h) of 
the Sentencing Act served a sufficiently im-
portant purpose,18 was rationally connected 
to that purpose,19 did not infringe s 14 of the 
NZBORA more than necessary,20 and was 
overall a proportionate response from Par-
liament in seeking to achieve that purpose.21 
Therefore, as s 9(1)(h) of the Sentencing Act 
is a justified limitation under s 5 of the NZ-
BORA, invoking it was not inconsistent with 
Mr Arps’s freedom of expression as guaran-
teed by s 14 of the NZBORA.
There will be many more developments to 
come from the tragic and distressing Christ-
church terror attack. Arps represents a sub-
sidiary, but interesting development on the 
hate speech that followed the attack and 
demonstrated a nimbleness on the part of the 
Court of Appeal to deal with the complex in-
teraction between that speech and the speak-
er’s freedom of expression.
3. The Stage 2 Report on the National Fresh-
water and Geothermal Resources Claims 
(Wai 2358): Indigenous rights to water
The third “case” for discussion is not a court 
judgment. Rather, it is a report by the Waitan-
gi Tribunal, which is a standing commission 
of inquiry established under the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1974. This Tribunal may make 
recommendations on claims brought by New 
Zealand’s indigenous Māori relating to legis-
lation, policies, actions, or omissions of the 
New Zealand government that are alleged to 
breach the promises made in the Treaty of 
Waitangi, a compact signed in 1840 between 
the chiefs of various Māori “tribes” and the 
British Crown. While the Tribunal’s reports 
and recommendations have no binding legal 
force, they are considered to be a highly in-
fluential form of “soft law” given the Tribu-
nal’s standing and the societal importance of 
the subject matter in question.
The Stage 2 Report on the National Fresh-
water and Geothermal Resources Claims 
responds to claims by Māori that current le-
gal regulation of New Zealand’s freshwater 
and geothermal resources fails to honour the 
Treaty’s guarantee of “te tino rangatiratanga” 
(the exercise of chieftainship) over lands, 
villages, and “taonga katoa” (all treasured 
things). The Tribunal’s broad finding was:22 
... that [current laws] are not consistent 
with Treaty principles, including the 
principle of equity. Māori have been 
prejudiced by the ongoing omission to 
recognise their proprietary rights, barri-
ers that have prevented their participa-
tion in the first-in, first-served alloca-
tion system, and the lack of partnership 
in allocation decision-making. Econom-
ic opportunities have been foreclosed 
by the barriers to their access to water. 
In addition to recommendations that the 
government enact amending legislation to 
remedy existing inequities, the Tribunal also 
noted that merely changing the legal status 
accorded to Māori interests in water was in-
sufficient. Rather;23  
The Crown’s guarantees to Māori in the 
Treaty, including the guarantee of tino 
rangatiratanga, require the use of part-
nership mechanisms for the joint gov-
15 Arps v New Zealand Police [2019] NZCA 592 at [38].
16 Arps v New Zealand Police [2019] NZCA 592 at [41].
17 R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7; [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [104]. 
18 Arps v New Zealand Police [2019] NZCA 592 at [48]. The Court held that “[t]he purpose of s 9(1)(h) of the Sentencing Act is to require courts sentencing a defen-
dant to treat as an aggravating factor of the offending that it was wholly or in part motivated by the defendant’s hostility towards the victim because of, amongst 
other factors, the victim’s religion.”
19 Arps v New Zealand Police [2019] NZCA 592 at [49].
20 Arps v New Zealand Police [2019] NZCA 592 at [50].
21 Arps v New Zealand Police [2019] NZCA 592 at [51].
22 The Stage 2 Report on the National Freshwater and Geothermal Resources Claims (Wai 2358), 115.
23 The Stage 2 Report on the National Freshwater and Geothermal Resources Claims (Wai 2358), 101.
2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 243
ernance and management of freshwater 
taonga. 
Under this model, most often, the approach 
to the management of water bodies would re-
quire a co-governance/co-management part-
nership between Māori and the relevant local 
government authority. This is referred to as 
“the Treaty standard for freshwater manage-
ment”.  It would only be in some instances 
that this “standard” will need to be departed 
from, where Māori interests in a water body 
are so pressing that they require Māori gov-
ernance of that taonga. 
The importance of the Tribunal’s report is 
that it provides a rallying point for Māori 
claims in future water management poli-
cy-making processes. As demands on this re-
source increasingly comes to outstrip supply, 
the government faces intense pressure to cre-
ate a new allocation mechanism that balanc-
es multiple competing interests. And unless 
Māori aspirations can be satisfied within this 
mechanism, there is every chance that a case 
will be brought before the courts seeking a 
declaration that customary property rights in 
this resource have never been extinguished. 
The Waitangi Tribunal already has indicated 
its view that: 
Māori had rights and interests in their 
water bodies for which the closest En-
glish equivalent in 1840 was legal 
ownership. Those rights were then con-
firmed, guaranteed, and protected by 
the Treaty of Waitangi, save to the ex-
tent that the Treaty bargain provided for 
some sharing of the waters with incom-
ing settlers. The nature and extent of the 
proprietary right was the exclusive right 
of [tribes] to control access to and use 
of the water while it was in their rohe 
[traditional areas]. 
The prospect of a binding High Court ruling 
that such ownership rights to an essential 
resource continue to exist in New Zealand’s 
common law would create a major rule of 
law problem for the New Zealand govern-
ment when it comes to allocating that re-
source. As such, negotiating a settlement of 
Māori claims outside of the judicial process 
is very much in its interests, with the Tribu-
nal’s report forming a key part of such ne-
gotiations. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
A general parliamentary election must be 
held before November 21, 2020, which in 
New Zealand’s Westminster constitutional 
arrangements also will decide the makeup 
of the country’s executive government. At 
that election, the voters will directly decide 
whether to legalise aid in dying and personal 
cannabis possession. Before the vote takes 
place, however, the government will have to 
consider the report of the Royal Commission 
on the Christchurch attacks and decide what 
legislative response it merits. Decisions also 
will have to be made on a model for water 
use and allocation, with the Waitangi Tribu-
nal’s report potentially being central to this 
process. And the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Ministry of Justice v Kim may have very 
important ramifications for New Zealand’s 
relationship with China, its extradition laws 
generally, and the shape of administrative 
law for years to come.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Election was the most defining event in the 
year under review. Unfortunately, pre- and 
post-election violence and threat of vio-
lence, intimidation of election observer 
groups, and allegations of extensive elec-
toral malfeasance cast a shadow of doubt on 
the credibility of the entire process and its 
outcome. Without understating the culpabil-
ity of the other political actors, the ferocious 
pursuit of victory at all cost by the ruling All 
Progressives Congress (APC) at the pres-
idential polls and at governorship polls in 
many states were clear pointers to electoral 
authoritarianism.1 Local and international 
observer groups, the independent press, and 
civil society groups scored the elections be-
low democratic standards. While freedom of 
choice devoid of intimidation and induce-
ments is essential to democratic elections, 
the 2019 general elections witnessed several 
forms of electoral fraud, including blatant 
vote buying.2 Judicial refusal of redress by 
“technical” interpretations of electoral rules 
effectively gave legal protection to electoral 
authoritarianism. The entire process from the 
electoral code to voting were actively ma-
nipulated. The absence of electronic trans-
mission of election results and the relegation 
of the smart card reader (SCR) machine to 
a mere accreditation device effectively ex-
cluded use of technology to curb fraud. A 
wholly manual process allowed for the ma-
nipulation of the elections.
Judicial independence is a strong mechanism 
for consolidating democracy. Since indepen-
dence, Nigeria has suffered from a less than 
independent judiciary due to authoritarian 
regimes.3 Given this, judicial autonomy is 
a paramount factor in measuring Nigeria’s 
democracy. In 2019, Judicial independence 
was undermined by acts of intimidation by 
the Executive, including, prominently, the 
dismissal of the Chief Justice of Nigeria and 
routine disobedience of Court orders.
The National Assembly also has been con-
siderably weakened through external inter-
ference in the selection of its leadership, thus 
constraining its capacity to contain executive 
abuse. These developments point to the rel-
egation of mechanisms of vertical (election) 
and horizontal (check/balance) accountabil-
ity. The new challenge posed by weak ac-
countability mechanisms is not just how to 
curtail the “growing gap between electoral 
and liberal democracy”4 but how to halt a to-
tal reversal of democracy.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
Electoral Legitimacy
One of the three milestones in the consol-
idation of democracy is transparent elec-
tion.5 Election provides the opportunity for 
vertical accountability of incumbents to the 
electorates. More than anything else, the 
1 Morse explains that “in electoral authoritarian regimes incumbents hold elections that do not live up to 
democratic standards of freedom and fairness and therefore facilitate repeated incumbent victory”: Yona-
than L. Morse, “The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism,” World Politics 64(1) (2012) 161-198, 162.
2 See A. Steve Amaramiro, et. al., “An Appraisal of Electoral Malpractice and Violence as an Albatross in 
Nigeria’s Democratic Consolidation”, Beijing Law Review 10 (2019) 77-97.
3 See K. Post, The New States of West Africa (Penguin Books, 1968), 94-99; B. O. Nwabueze, Presidential-
ism in Commonwealth Africa (C. Hurst & Co., 1974) 255-297.
4 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (John Hopkins University Press, 1999) 10.
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elections of 2019 were a defining moment 
in the country’s democratic practice. The 
general elections were held on 23 Febru-
ary (presidential and National Assembly), 9 
March (governorship and state legislature), 
and 23 March for supplementary polls in 
areas where elections were declared incon-
clusive. President Mohammadu Buhari of 
the APC won the presidential election with 
15,191,847 votes, representing 55.6 percent 
of the total valid votes. His closest challeng-
er, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar of 
the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) had 
11,262,978 votes (41.2 percent of the total). 
Buhari received the constitutional minimum 
votes of 25 percent in 32 states, well over 
the 24-state and Federal Capital Territory 
(FCT) constitutional threshold. The APC 
had majority votes in 19 states compared to 
the PDP’s 17 states and the FCT. Mr. Atiku 
filed a petition at the presidential election 
tribunal (a special five-member panel of the 
Court of Appeal) challenging the validity of 
the election results and claimed to have won 
the election based on parallel collated results 
allegedly from the electronically transmit-
ted results of the polls. The election tribunal 
and the Supreme Court dismissed his claim 
partly on the ground that the existence of the 
alleged electronically transmitted results was 
not established nor indeed the existence of 
an Independent National Electoral Commis-
sion (INEC) server that may have stored the 
said data.
However, voting and result collation were 
fraught with irregularities. For instance, 
there were high incidences of cancellation 
of polling unit votes with only general ex-
planations and, according to EU Observer 
Mission reports, the results announced by 
state returning officers during the collation 
of presidential results showed a discrepancy 
of an additional 1.66 million registered vot-
ers above the total figures published by the 
INEC on 14 January 2019.6 The INEC at-
tributed this to arithmetic errors during low-
er-level collation, but this does not appear 
entirely satisfactory. Political violence was 
rife, with more than a dozen deaths reported. 
There were also local newspaper reports of 
the use of military personnel to intimidate 
voters and opposition supporters in the oil-
rich states of Rivers and Bayelsa.7 In the 
former, conflict between unidentified securi-
ty agencies and armed thugs led to delayed 
and eventual suspension of result collation. 
In Benue (north-central), a PDP-controlled 
state, independent reports had it that four 
polling officials were kidnapped on their 
way to collation centers. In some other states, 
opposition party agents and independent ob-
servers were barred from collation centers. 
Foreign observers (IRI/NDI) noted issues at 
collation centers in Adamawa, Benue, La-
gos, Nasarawa, and in Rivers, where INEC 
officials abandoned a collation center due to 
threats and rumours of violence.8 The ease 
with which these attacks happened, some-
times involving uniformed men, suggests 
that relevant authorities were complicit. This 
lends credence to electoral authoritarianism.
On 16 November 2019, off-cycle governor-
ship elections were held in two states: Kogi 
in the north-central and Bayelsa. The pattern 
of brazen voter inducement/intimidation, vi-
olence (pre- and election day), and manip-
ulations already established at the general 
elections was repeated, sometimes involving 
security personnel and armed thugs.9 Elec-
tion officials were attacked and abducted10 
just as voters were chased out of voting cen-
tres with tear gas fired from police helicop-
ters ostensibly to “stop those fighting and 
snatching ballot boxes.”11 The ruling APC 
won both states, breaching for the first time 
the firewall of the Niger Delta stronghold 
of the PDP. The Bayelsa and Kogi elections 
were perhaps the most violent elections since 
the return to democracy in 1999.12  
On the whole, the 2019 elections failed to 
meet the minimum standards expected of a 
democracy.
Weakened Legislature
One of the marks of an effective legislature is 
an independent leadership selection process. 
With a majority (62 of 109 senators) short 
of two-thirds after the 9 February polls, the 
ruling party dictated that the legislators-elect 
should occupy the leadership positions of the 
two chambers of the National Assembly. The 
5 Robert A. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (Yale University Press, 1966) xi.
6 European Union Election Observation Mission, Nigeria 2019 Final Report, 38: <https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/nigeria_2019_eu_eom_final_report-web.
pdf> accessed 24/1/2019. See also IRI/NDI, Nigeria International Election Observation Mission Final Report: <https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/nigeria_elec-
tion_report_updated.pdf> accessed 24/1/2020. However, one observer group that undertook parallel vote tabulation (PVT), YIAGA AFRICA, reported that, based on 
reports from 1,491 polling units, which are 98.4 percent of sampled polling units, “For both APC and PDP the official results fall within the PVT estimated ranges”: 
<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/02/yiaha-africa-verifies-election-results/> accessed 30/01/2020.
7 Emmanuel Obe, “How Nigerian Army overran Rivers State,” March 25, 2019: <https://tell.ng/how-nigerian-army-overran-rivers-state/> accessed 27/1/2020; 
“Elections 2019: Armed men in military uniform kill government house photographer, PDP Ward Chairman in Bayelsa,” February 23, 2019: <http://pointblanknews.
com/pbn/exclusive/elections-2019armed-men-in-military-uniform-kill-govt-house-photographer-pdp-ward-chairman-in-bayelsa/> accessed 27/1/2020.
8 European Union & IRI/NDI (n. 6).
9 See “Sporadic violence greets Bayelsa, Kogi governorship elections,” November 16, 2019: <https://punchng.com/sporadic-violence-greets-bayelsa-ko-
gi-gov-elections/> accessed 25/1/2020; “Violence, intimidation, vote buying mar Bayelsa, Kogi Polls,” November 17, 2019: <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.
php/2019/11/17/violence-intimidation-vote-buying-mar-bayelsa-kogi-polls/> accessed 25/1/2020.
10 See Friday Olokor, “30 missing ad hoc staff safe – INEC,” November 17, 2019: <https://punchng.com/kogi-election-missing-30-ad-hoc-staff-safe-inec/> ac-
cessed 25/1/2020.
11 Muideen Olaniyi, “Helicopter dropping teargas in Kogi was for preventive purpose – Police IGP,” November 19, 2019: <https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/helicop-
ter-dropping-teargas-in-kogi-was-for-preventive-purpose-police-ig.html> accessed 25/1/2020.
12 See “Bayelsa, Kogi: Election as warfare,” November 28, 2019: <https://tribuneonlineng.com/bayelsa-kogi-election-as-warfare/> accessed 25/1/2020.
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leadership vote confirmed those nominees as 
leaders. The new legislative leadership rat-
ified all executive appointments previously 
turned down by the 8th Senate (2015-2019) 
with very little or no consideration. Senate 
President Ahmed Lawan stated that every sin-
gle approval requested by the President would 
be given expeditious consideration.13  For the 
first time in the sixteen years of the current 
democratic experiment, ministerial nominees 
were pampered through a sham screening ex-
ercise.14 Horizontal accountability was weak-
ened with the apparent “conquest” of the judi-
ciary and the legislature by the executive just 
as vertical accountability was weakened as a 
result of the poor electoral processes.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Atiku Ababukar v Mohammadu Buhari: 
Electoral Legitimacy
After the declaration of incumbent Presi-
dent Buhari as the winner of the 23 February 
election, Atiku Abubakar filed a petition be-
fore the Presidential Election Tribunal on 18 
March 2019 challenging the results declared 
by the INEC. Mr. Atiku mainly alleged 
manipulation of result sheets, over-voting, 
wrongful recording of results, and intimi-
dation of voters in 11 “focal states” in the 
northeast and northwest sections of the 
country. In its ruling on 11 September 2019, 
the tribunal dismissed all allegations on 
the ground that they were criminal in na-
ture and required proof beyond reasonable 
doubt. Attempts to rely on the SCR to prove 
non-accreditation of voters and subsequent 
over-voting were rejected on the authority of 
an earlier Supreme Court’s decision that the 
use of the SCR has no statutory backing out-
side INEC guidelines.15 The opinion that the 
SCR remains unusable until it is provided for 
in the Electoral Act is self-rebutting because 
other guidelines of the INEC have been up-
held or not queried; for instance, the consis-
tent controversial declaration of elections as 
inconclusive because the margin of victory 
was less than the number of registered vot-
ers in areas where elections weren’t held 
for reasons ranging from logistic failures to 
security challenges, or where elections were 
cancelled.16 The Electoral Act (Amendment) 
Bill vetoed by the President four times had 
mandated electronic documentation using 
the SCR. Non-incorporation of the SCR into 
the electoral law made the INEC adopt its 
use as a verification and confirmation mech-
anism of the manual process to enhance 
credibility.17 During its voter education, the 
INEC explained that the SCR was capable 
of transmitting results from the voting point 
to an e-collation officer at its headquarters 
in Abuja (which suggests the existence of a 
server). However, it announced before the 
election that there would be no electronic 
transmission of results. Under the circum-
stances, the tribunal held that the petitioner 
was unable to establish the electronic trans-
mission of the election results. It upheld the 
declaration by the INEC of the winner of the 
election.18 A further appeal by Atiku to the 
Supreme Court on 24 September was dis-
missed on 30 October, 2019.
While the apex court was reclusive in the 
governorship and presidential elections, it 
voided party candidate selection process-
es that violated the INEC’s guidelines. The 
INEC had rejected the APC candidates in 
Rivers for the governorship position and in 
Zamfara for state/federal legislative seats, 
including the governorship position. The 
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the 
INEC on the two states,19 and for the latter 
state ordered the replacement of the APC 
governor and legislators (already winners at 
the general elections) with candidates of the 
PDP (runners-up) as duly elected.20 
Earlier in the year, the Supreme Court ruled 
in favour of the APC and its candidates in 
the southwest states of Ekiti and Osun in 
the 2018 elections, which were widely re-
ported to be below international standards.21 
While the INEC declared the APC candidate 
in Osun the winner, the election tribunal 
upturned the declaration by nullifying the 
supplementary elections and announced the 
candidate of the PDP as duly elected. How-
ever, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court in split decisions reversed the tribu-
nal decision nullifying the supplementary 
election and further ruled the entire tribunal 
decision incompetent because Justice Peter 
Obiora, who read the lead judgment, was not 
at the tribunal hearing on 6 February 2019 
when a major argument on non-compliance 
with the electoral law was made.22 Two jus-
tices of the apex court, Akaas and Galinje, 
opined in their dissents that the illegality of 
the supplementary polls was an overriding 
13 Seun Opejobi, “We will honour all Buhari’s request(s) – Senate President, Ahmed Lawan,” November 22, 2019: <https://dailypost.ng/2019/11/22/we-will-honour-
all-buharis-request-senate-president-ahmed-lawan/> accessed 26/1/2020.
14 See Tonnie Iredia, “Ministerial Screening: Meaning and Purpose,” August 4, 2019: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/08/ministerial-screening-mean-
ing-and-purpose/> accessed 27/1/2020.
15 Wike v Peterside (2016) 7 NWLR (pt. 1512) 452, 522, 574.
16 S. Ukhuegbe and G. O. Arishe, “Nigeria” (2018) Global Review of Constitutional Law 214-218 at 215-216.
17 Independent National Electoral Commission, Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Elections, para. 10.
18 See “Buhari vs Atiku: Tribunal Ruling on 2019 Election”: <https://punchng.com/live-updates-buhari-vs-atiku-tribunal-ruling-on-2019-election/> accessed 
25/01/2019.
19 Ade Adesomoju, “Supreme Court upholds disqualification of APC candidates in Rivers,” February 13, 2019: <https://punchng.com/supreme-court-upholds-dis-
qualification-of-apc-candidates-in-rivers/> accessed 26/1/2020.
20 Ade Adesomoju, “Supreme Court nullifies APC candidates’ elections, declares PDP winner of Zamfara polls,” May 24, 2019.
21 See “Fayemi duly won Ekiti governorship polls, Supreme Court rules,” May 24, 2019: <https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2019/05/24/fayemi-duly-won-ekiti-gov-
ernorship-poll-supreme-court-rules/> accessed 25/1/2020.
22 Evelyn Okakwu, “Supreme Court affirms Gboyega Oyetola’s election as Osun governor,” July 5, 2019: <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/head-
lines/338994-breaking-supreme-court-affirms-gboyega-oyetolas-election-as-osun-governor.html> accessed 25/1/2020.
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consideration. Akaas held that: “The INEC 
is supposed to be an umpire, not a partisan 
group. For the INEC to have pronounced 
the election inconclusive showed that it had 
something up its sleeves. And it achieved 
that through the rerun.”23 On the absence of 
Justice Obiora on 6 February, Justice Galin-
je, while admitting that such absence should 
result in the nullification of judgment, drew 
attention to the lack of proof of the judge’s 
absence, saying “the only way to affirm 
that was by producing the original court re-
cords.”24 The discontent expressed in the mi-
nority decisions are important wake-up calls 
to the INEC and the judiciary to look beyond 
technicality in dispensing justice.
It is in fact worrisome that the presidential 
election verdicts at both courts were without 
dissent or even a condemnation of the wide-
ly reported incidences of violence and other 
electoral misconduct.25 The continuous vali-
dation of faulty elections is a sharp departure 
from the pattern established by the Court of 
Appeal and affirmed by the Supreme Court 
in a line of cases.26
2. Hon. Justice Walter Onnoghen v FRN: 
Judicial Independence
The independence of the judiciary is not only 
relevant to consolidation but also a key in-
dicator of democracy. Given long years of 
military authoritarian rule, the autonomy of 
the judiciary is central to Nigeria’s democ-
racy. Authoritarianism is bad for the judicia-
ry because of the possibility of curtailment 
should the “leader become displeased.”27 Ju-
dicial independence means that judges be the 
“authors of their own opinions”28 and their 
decisions enforced in practice.29 Judicial in-
dependence in this sense connotes judicial 
power.30 
The United Nations’ Basic Principles on Ju-
dicial Independence and the International 
Bar Association (IBA) Minimum Standards 
of Judicial Independence postulate key indi-
cators of judicial independence, one of which 
is guaranteed term of office with regulations 
on appointment, discipline, and removal 
from office. There is a clear endorsement of 
this principle in Nigeria’s constitution in or-
der to protect judges from undue influence 
and retribution.31 
On 14 January 2019, the Chief Justice of Ni-
geria (CJN), Walter Onnoghen, was charged 
in the Code Conduct Tribunal (CCT) for 
incomplete assets declaration in 2016. The 
Court of Appeal (Abuja) gave an interim or-
der to halt the CJN’s trial at the CCT but sub-
sequently reversed itself.32 Simultaneously, 
the National Judicial Council was investi-
gating the same allegations against the CJN 
following the Attorney General’s petition.33 
On 23 January 2019, an ex parte order was 
issued by the CCT for the suspension of the 
CJN and called for the most senior justice 
at the Supreme Court to replace him in an 
acting capacity.34 In the first place, the sec-
ond arm of the ex parte order was superflu-
ous because by the tenor of the constitution, 
the most senior justice acts whenever there 
is a vacancy.35 The intriguing aspect of the 
suspension order was that it was granted the 
day after the CCT had adjourned the hearing 
to 28 January 2019,36 apparently to await the 
Court of Appeal ruling (24 January) on an 
23 Dennis Erezi, “Supreme Court Justices accuse INEC of rigging Osun governorship election,” July 5, 2019: <https://guardian.ng/news/supreme-court-justices-ac-
cuse-inec-of-rigging-osun-governorship-election/> accessed 25/1/2019.
24 Ibid.
25 Contra Buhari v INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (pt. 1120) 246, where President Yar’Adua won at the apex court on a split 4-3 decision.
26  See Buhari v Obasanjo (2005) 2 NWLR (pt. 910) 241, 487-488, 60; Buhari v INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (pt. 1120) 246, 359, 427-428.
27 P. H. Solomon, “Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes” (2007) 60(1) World Politics Review 122-145.
28 L. A. Kornhauser, “Is Judicial Independence a Useful Concept?” in S. B. Burbank and Barry Friedman (eds.), Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Inter-
disciplinary Approach (Sage Publications Inc, 2002) 42-55.
29 J. Ríos-Figueroa and J. K. Staton, “Unpacking the Rule of Law: A Review of Judicial Independence Measures,” April 26, 2009, 14: <http://people.bu.edu/jgerring/
Conference/MeasuringDemocracy/documents/RiosStaton2009.pdf> accessed 12/10/2018.
30 See I. C. Pats-Acholonu, “Nigeria: Disobedience of Court Orders, Form of Intimidation,” All Africa (17 April 2006): <https://allafrica.com/stories/200604180578.
html> accessed 14/10/2018; E. Okakwu, “Special Report: How Buhari’s Administration serially disobeys Court Orders,” Premium Times (11 June, 2017): <https://
www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/233665-special-report-how-buhari-administration-serially-disobeys-court-orders.html> accessed 14/10/2018; G. 
Obike, “Ministry orders dredgers to disregard Appeal Court’s Ruling,” The Nation (August 8, 2017): <http://thenationonlineng.net/ministry-orders-dredgers-disre-
gard-appeal-courts-ruling/> accessed 14/10/2018.
31 Ss. 291(1)(2); 292(1).
32 Evelyn Okakwu, “Code of Conduct sets date for Continuation of Onnoghen’s Trial,” January 31, 2019: < https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-
news/309122-code-of-conduct-tribunal-sets-date-for-continuation-of-onnoghens-trial.html> accessed 07/02/2019.
33 David Iriekpen and Alex Enumah, “NJC gives Onnoghen, Muhammad Seven Days to Respond to Petitions,” January 30, 2019: < https://www.thisdaylive.
com/index.php/2019/01/30/njc-gives-onnoghen-muhammad-seven-days-to-respond-to-petitions/> accessed 07/02/2019.
34 Wale Odunsi, “CJN Onnoghen: See the full CCT Order Buhari acted on,” January 25, 2019: <http://dailypost.ng/2019/01/25/cjn-onnoghen-see-full-cct-
order-buhari-acted/> accessed 08/02/2019.
35 S. 231(4).
36 Kamarudeen Ogundele, “CCT Rejects Court Orders Stopping Onnoghen’s Trial,” January 23, 2019: <https://punchng.com/cct-rejects-court-orders-stop-
ping-onnoghens-trial/> accessed 08/02/2019.
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application for stay of proceedings. Indeed, 
on 24 January, the Court of Appeal gave an 
interim order halting the continuation of the 
trial.37 The order was of little effect, however, 
because Onnoghen was suspended from of-
fice a day earlier. It is also worrisome that an 
order ex parte was granted without putting 
the CJN on notice, even though he had coun-
sel on record. These happenings, together 
with the expression of dissatisfaction on the 
leadership of Justice Onnoghen by President 
Buhari38 during the swearing-in of Justice 
Tanko Mohammad as acting CJN, lend cre-
dence to the allegation that the suspension 
order was contrived through the agency of 
the chairman of the CCT. The political in-
terference, presumably from the executive 
branch, in the trial of the CJN is a serious 
threat to the independence of the judiciary. 
The NJC later found Onnoghen culpable, af-
ter which he tendered his resignation. Tanko 
Mohammad has since assumed a substantive 
role following formal appointment. Just like 
the CCT, the NJC’s decision may not have 
been independent of external influence.
3. Dasuki v FRN & Sowore v FRN: Respect 
for Judicial Orders
Where there is no real assurance of compli-
ance with court orders by the political branch-
es, judicial reticence may set in. Sambo Da-
suki was held in detention from 2015 despite 
meeting bail conditions set by the courts.39 
Omoyele Sowore, presidential candidate of 
the African Action Congress (AAC) in the 
2019 election and online news publisher, was 
arrested on 3 August by the Department of 
State Services (DSS) ahead of a planned na-
tionwide protest tagged “Revolution Now” 
and charged with treason. Two court orders 
for Sowore’s release on bail were initially 
ignored by the detaining authority. However, 
under a threat of contempt of court, the DSS 
released Mr. Sowore on 5 December, only to 
re-arrest him illegally on 6 December with-
in the premises of the court.40 Due to much 
protest from civil society and the general 
public as well as international pressure, he 
was released 24 December 2019 along with 
Mr. Dasuki.41 The agency’s recalcitrance af-
ter judicial release on bail clearly breaches 
judicial independence. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
An interesting case to watch for is the quest 
by the PDP to have the Supreme Court re-
verse its 14 January 2020 post-election rul-
ing that replaced the sitting governor of Imo 
State, Emeka Ihedioha of the PDP, who was 
declared winner in February 2019 by the 
INEC, with Hope Uzodinma of the APC.42 
There are sixteen justices at the Supreme 
Court at the moment, five short of the consti-
tutional maximum. In January 2019, Justice 
Awani Abba-Aji, formerly one of the senior 
Justices of the Court of Appeal, was appoint-
ed to the Supreme Court. This appointment 
puts the number of female justices of the 
Supreme Court at four, or a quarter of the 
bench. Four other Court of Appeal justices 
were recommended to President Buhari by 
the National Judicial Council in October 
2019 for appointment into the apex court, 
but no action has been taken.43 
There are two anticipated mandatory re-
tirements (by age) at the Supreme Court in 
2020: Justices Amiru Sanusi and Paul Galin-
je. Similarly, the first female president of 
the Court of Appeal, Zainab Adamu Bulka-
chuwa, will retire mandatorily on 6 March 
2020 at seventy. According to the established 
practice, it is expected that her successor will 
be the most senior member of the Court.
V. FURTHER READING
Gabriel O. Arishe and Bright E. Enorensee-
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Awolowo University Law J
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37 Halimah Yahaya, “Appeal Court Stops CCT from Proceeding with Onnoghen’s Trial,” January 24, 2019: <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/head-
lines/307638-breaking-appeal-court-stops-cct-from-proceeding-with-onnoghens-trial.html> accessed 08/02/2019.
38 According to President Buhari: “It is no secret that this government is dissatisfied with the alarming rate in which the Supreme Court of Nigeria under the over-
sight of Justice Walter Onnoghen has serially set free persons accused of the most dire acts of corruption, often on mere technicalities, and after quite a number of 
them have been convicted by the trial and appellate courts”: Leon Usigbe, “Based on CCT Order, Buhari Suspends Onnoghen as CJN,” January 25, 2019: <https://
www.tribuneonlineng.com/186549/> accessed 08/02/2019.
39 See S. Ukhuegbe and G. O. Arishe, “Nigeria: The State of Liberal Democracy” (2017) Global Review of Constitutional Law 204-208 at 207, where the continued 
detention of Sambo Dasuki and Sheikh Elzakzaky were reviewed.
40 Ade Adesomoju, “Drama as DSS operatives storm Abuja court to rearrest Sowore,” December 6, 2019: <https://punchng.com/drama-as-dss-operatives-storm-
abuja-court-to-rearrest-sowore/> accessed 26/1/2020.
41 Dennis Erezi, “DSS releases Omoyele Sowore,” December 24, 2019: <https://guardian.ng/news/dss-releases-omoyele-sowore/> accessed 26/1/2020; Azimazi 
John Momoh, et al., “Why Buhari made u-turn, released Dasuki, Sowore,” December 25, 2019: <https://guardian.ng/news/why-buhari-made-u-turn-released-da-
suki-sowore/> accessed 26/1/2020.
42 Chuks Okocha, “Ihedioha: PDP files request for case review to Supreme Court this week,” January 26, 2020: <https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.
php/2020/01/26/ihedioha-pdp-files-request-for-case-review-to-scourt-this-week/> accessed 26/1/2020.
43 Alex Enumah, “NJC recommends appointment of four new justices of the Supreme Court, probes eight judges,” October 25, 2019: <https://www.thisdaylive.
com/index.php/2019/10/25/njc-recommends-appointment-of-four-new-supreme-court-justices-probes-eight-judges/> accessed 26/1/2020.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 2019 was marked by polarization 
along party lines and the country’s historic 
name change to the Republic of North Mace-
donia. In 2019, the government also continued 
its attempts to combat high-level corruption 
arising from controversies occurring in 2015. 
In that year, Zoran Zaev, of the Social Demo-
cratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), accused 
then-Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, of the 
nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolution-
ary Organization-Democratic Party for Mace-
donian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE),1 
of wiretapping thousands of people includ-
ing politicians and journalists. At that time, 
protests erupted in the country and Gruevski 
resigned. President Ivanov, under an interim 
government, provided amnesty to top officials 
involved in the wiretapping scandal.2 After 
this, a new government was slow in forming.3 
Ultimately, Zaev formed a government coa-
lition, supported by a coalition of Albanian 
parties, in Маy 2017. 
As a result of the wiretapping scandal, a Spe-
cial Prosecutor’s Office was created to com-
bat high-level corruption. However, in 2019, 
the government chose to close this office due 
to the indictment of its top prosecutor. The 
closing of the Special Prosecutor’s Office was 
controversial, as there were other options to 
continue its legal mandate. The Special Pros-
ecutor’s pending cases were transferred to the 
Basic Prosecutor’s Office for Corruption and 
Organized Crime. 
Also in 2019, the country passed new laws 
providing additional language rights for the 
Albanian minority and several judicial re-
forms. North Macedonia’s Constitutional 
Court heard few cases on the merits, but did 
not resolve important cases arising from the 
2017 storming of Parliament, wiretapping and 
urban planning.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
On January 12, 2019, constitutional amend-
ments, requiring two-thirds support in Par-
liament, changed the name of the state to the 
Republic of North Macedonia.4 The name 
change was aimed at overriding Greece’s 
twenty-seven years of objections to Macedo-
nians’ aspirations of becoming a NATO mem-
ber state and obtaining a date to start negoti-
ations for EU membership. The start date for 
the country’s EU membership negotiations 
was stymied by France’s President Emanuel 
Macron in November 2019 and cut short the 
government of Prime Minister Zoran Zaev, 
who had supported the name change. As a re-
sult, early elections will be held in April 2020.
1 In 2018, Gruevski was sentenced to two years in prison for receiving a reward for unlawful influence pur-
suant to Article 359(2) of the Criminal Code, but fled to Hungary where he received asylum.
2 Ivanov provided amnesty to two former prime ministers as well as the current Prime Minister, Zoran Zaev, 
the former Minister of Interior, the former Director of the Secret Police and three prosecutors from the Spe-
cial Prosecutor’s Office in 2016. 
3 After Gruevski resigned, VMRO-DPMNE had the most seats held by a single party in Parliament, and for 
this reason, Ivanov provided this political group with the mandate to govern. However, it was unable to 
gather the needed majority to elect a government.
4 Official Gazette no. 6/19.
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Continued controversies arising from the 
2015 wiretapping scandals and their resolu-
tion resulted in further institutional changes 
and constitutional law decisions (reviewed 
below) in 2019. By way of background, in 
2015, publicly released wiretapped conversa-
tions of high state officials raised suspicions 
about high-level government corruption and 
abuse of official positions. Due to the wire-
tapping revelations, the major political parties 
agreed to adopt the Law on the Special Pros-
ecutor’s Office to fight high-level corruption 
among politicians, judges, civil servants and 
businessmen.5 The first named Special Prose-
cutor was Katica Janeva, whose position was 
equal to that of the State Public Prosecutor.6
 
The above law regulating special prosecution 
contains a five-year sunset clause. Its Article 
22 stipulates that the indictments must be 
submitted within eighteen months from the 
day the cases and materials are remitted to 
the Special Prosecutor. On January 30, 2019, 
the Supreme Court issued a general legal 
opinion stating that after the expiration of the 
eighteenth-month deadline, which occurred 
on June 30, 2017, the Special Prosecutor no 
longer had jurisdiction to submit indictments, 
conduct investigations or undertake pre-in-
vestigative measures.7 This opinion raised 
public concerns that a number of perpetrators 
of high-level corruption and abuse of official 
position might escape justice. 
At the time of creating the Special Prosecu-
tor’s Office, prosecutors raised concerns that 
this autonomous office was in contravention 
of the Constitution.8 The Constitution envis-
ages a single organisation – the Prosecutor’s 
Office. Аccording to the former Minister of 
Justice, although the constitutionality of the 
law was challenged four years ago, the Con-
stitutional Court has not yet examined the 
initiative.9 The constitutionality of the special 
prosecutor, however, may be a moot issue be-
cause in 2019, the Basic Public Prosecutor for 
Prosecution of Organized Crime and Corrup-
tion indicted Special Prosecutor Janeva for il-
legal trading in influence and abuse of official 
position. Following the indictment, high-level 
corruption cases under her jurisdiction were 
transferred to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
leaving the Special Prosecutor’s Office with 
nothing to do. Some of the prosecutors from 
this office were transferred and some have re-
mained without pay. To date, the government 
is still working on the viability of a Special 
Prosecutor’s Office, but it remains uncertain, 
due in part to the country’s delayed starting 
talks for EU membership.
In 2019, the Parliament passed several import-
ant amendments and laws aimed at strength-
ening courts and fortifying minority rights. 
Reforms related to the Law on Courts and the 
Law on Judicial Council of North Macedonia 
were adopted in 2019. 
Amendments to the Law on Courts and to the 
Law on Judicial Council, approved in 2019, 
“improved the system of appointment and 
promotion and introduced qualitative crite-
ria in the professional evaluation of judges, 
in line with the Venice Commission’s rec-
ommendations.”10 The Venice Commission 
provided commentary on the Law on Judi-
cial Council over many years and in general 
approved this newest version. It provides for 
a more transparent manner for electing the 
President and Deputy of the Judicial Council, 
and procedures for disciplining judges and ap-
peals. The Venice Commission noted, howev-
er, that supermajority voting rules within the 
Council may make it hard for this collegial 
body to reach decisions and suggested some 
changes to the process for promoting judges 
and screening disciplinary complaints.11  
The Law on the Use of Languages came into 
force in 2019 and replaced the Language Law 
of 2008. The new law implies that Albanian is 
one of the official languages of North Mace-
donia. This piece of legislation was seen as 
essential by Albanian parties to fulfill the 
country’s obligations under the Ohrid Frame-
work Agreement, which ended the country’s 
civil conflict in 2001, and due to the fact that 
more than 20% of the country’s citizens are 
Albanian according to the 2002 census.12 The 
new law requires that Albanian be used in all 
official documents and communications by 
national and local governments. The initiative 
to examine the constitutionality of this law 
has been pending before the Constitutional 
Court. Meanwhile, the Venice Commission 
of the Council of Europe provided its opinion 
about it.13 While not examining the issues of 
constitutionality pending before the Consti-
5 Law on the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Prosecution of Criminal Offenses in Connection with and Discovered in the Course of Illegal Wiretapping, Official Ga-
zette 159/15. 
6 Ibid.
7 Akademika, ‘Supreme Court: After the expiration of 18-month deadline, Special Prosecution is no longer authorised prosecutor for [undertaking] pre-investigative 
and investigative measures (Skopje, 30 January 2019) <https://akademik.mk/vrhoven-sud-po-istekot-na-rokot-od-18-mesetsi-sjo-ne-e-ovlasten-tuzhitel-za-predis-
trazhni-i-istrazhni-dejstvija/>
8 Pravdiko, ‘Prosecutors against Katica Janeva: The Special Prosecution is Unconstitutional’, (Skopje, 14 October 2015) < https://www.pravdiko.mk/obvinitelstva-
ta-kontra-katitsa-janeva-spetsijalnoto-obvinitelstvo-e-neustavno>
9 Mihajlo Manevski, ‘Dilapidated Constitutional Court’, Republika on line (Skopje, 11 December 2019) <https://republika.mk/kolumni/urnisan-ustaven-sud>
10 Venice Commission (2019). ‘Commission Staff Working Document, North Macedonia 2019 Report’. Accompanying the document ‘Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2019’, Communication on 
EU Enlargement Policy, Brussels, 29.5.2019 SWD (2019).
11 Venice Commission (2019). ‘North Macedonia Opinion on the Draft Law on the Judicial Council’, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 118th Plenary 
Session (Venice, 15-16 March 2019).
12 Attempts to organize a new census for 2011 were abruptly terminated.
13 Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on the Law on the Use of Languages’, CDL-AD(2019)03, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 121st Plenary Session 
(Venice, 6-7 December 2019).
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tutional Court, the Venice Commission, inter 
alia, criticised this law for its ambiguity, high-
lighting the lack of an explicit constitutional 
basis for the use of non-majority languages 
in court proceedings and warning about dif-
ficulties in the law’s implementation that may 
affect the right to a fair trial. The Venice Com-
mission was also critical of the country’s fail-
ure to allow for a broad and comprehensive 
public debate with all linguistic groups.14  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
CASES
The Constitutional Court has competence, in-
ter alia, to examine the initiatives for consti-
tutionality and legality of laws and secondary 
legislation, and to hear requests for protection 
of freedom of expression, association and be-
lief, and protection from discrimination. Cit-
izens, associations and political actors may 
refer cases to the Court. Decisions on the con-
stitutionality and legality of pieces of legisla-
tion have erga omnes effects, while decisions 
on requests for protection of certain rights 
have inter partes effects.
In 2019, the Constitutional Court reviewed 
122 decisions, but 90% of these were found 
inadmissible. Of the remaining 12 decisions, 
the Court found a constitutional violation in 9 
of them.15 While the effectiveness of the Con-
stitutional Court cannot be measured solely 
on the number of cases heard on the merits, 
the high number of inadmissible cases may 
indicate a need for increasing it. This part 
summarizes six of the most important deci-
sions issued by the North Macedonian Con-
stitutional Court in 2019.
1. Decision U no. 100/2019: Amnesty for 
2017 Parliament Storming 
Оn 27 Аpril 2017, protestors stormed the Par-
liament in an attempt to prevent the election 
of the parliamentary speaker Таlat Xhaferi 
from the Albanian Party DUI. The reason be-
hind this was to stop the adoption and publi-
cation of the Law on the Use of Languages, 
substantially expanding the use of Albanian 
at the national and local level.16 Due to the 
inaction of the police, several members of 
Parliament (MPs) were injured. In 2018, the 
Parliament passed the Amnesty Law, which 
granted amnesty to those involved in the at-
tack. Among those amnestied were MPs from 
the opposition who later voted for the Consti-
tutional amendments to change the name of 
the State.
The law stipulated exceptions under which 
amnesty would not be granted. The former 
Minister of Internal Affairs and Director of 
Public Safety, who was convicted of terrorist 
endangerment of the constitutional order and 
security of the country and sentenced to 18 
years of imprisonment, was not granted am-
nesty on the bases of the exceptions stipulated 
in the law. He complained to the Constitu-
tional Court that the impugned Amnesty Law 
was discriminatory, infringed upon his consti-
tutional rights and freedoms and violated the 
rule of law. The Constitutional Court declared 
his Request to Examine the Constitutionality 
of the Law on Amnesty inadmissible, inter 
alia, on the ground that it had been the Par-
liament’s prerogative to decide who will be 
amnestied and under what conditions. The 
impugned Amnesty Law had precisely deter-
mined the scope and the limits of the amnesty. 
Had the Constitutional Court decided other-
wise and nullified the impugned law, the in-
vestigative and criminal proceedings against 
all amnestied persons would have continued.
2. Decision U no. 57/2019: Lawyers of the 
Accused for the Parliament Storming Fined 
for Contempt of Court
Thirty-three persons were accused of the Ter-
rorist Endangering of the Constitutional Order 
and Security of the Country in relation to the 
2017 parliamentary storming. In the course of 
the trial, when a protected witness had to be 
cross-interrogated, the lawyers of the accused 
protested, complaining that they did not have 
adequate working conditions. The court fined 
the lawyers 1000 euro each for contempt of 
court. On appeal it was reduced to 500 euros. 
Two of the fined lawyers complained to the 
Constitutional Court that the fines interfered 
with their constitutional freedom of expres-
sion. Relying on a decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Constitutional 
Court found a violation of the lawyers’ free-
dom of expression. In particular, it held that 
although the interference with their freedom 
of expression was according to the law and 
for a legitimate aim – to conduct a criminal 
trial within a reasonable time – it was dispro-
portionate and not necessary in a democratic 
society. In a dissenting opinion, two judges 
stated that no one had the right to complain 
about a constitutional violation when the very 
reason for the complaint came from one’s il-
legal activities, or a failure to observe the law. 
It remains to be seen whether this decision 
creates some type of precedent for attorneys 
fined for contempt of court in the course of 
court proceedings, allowing them to suc-
cessfully make claims for violations of their 
freedom of expression. Alternatively, it may 
remain a single decision in the context of a 
complex criminal case, which symbolizes so-
cial polarization along party lines and the dif-
ficulties of democracy a la Macedoine. 
3. Decisions U nos. 115/2018 and 96/2018: 
Referendum relating to the Change of the 
Name of the State
 
The Constitutional Court rejected two initia-
tives on the examination of the constitution-
ality and legality of a number of secondary 
legislative acts adopted by the State Electoral 
Commission (SEC). The impugned second-
ary legislation regulated the public referen-
dum, called in relation to changing the name 
of the State in order to ease the way towards 
Euro-Atlantic integration. 
14 Ibid, pp. 10, 11, 16, 17, 20-25.
15 Constitutional Court, ‘Decisions’ (Skopje, 2019) <ustavensud.mk>
16 The Law on Use of Languages was never signed by former President Ivanov as a precondition for its publication in the Official Gazette. The Law was published 
upon the approval of parliamentary speaker Xhaferi.
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The applicant complained that the secondary 
legislation was not published in the Official 
Gazette, which was one of the requirements 
for it to enter into force. The Constitutional 
Court established that the impugned second-
ary legislation was published on the SEC’s 
website. Further, the initiative was submitted 
late in the sense that it had been lodged with 
the Constitutional Court 25 days after the ref-
erendum had taken place and after the publi-
cation of the results indicating that the refer-
endum to change the name had failed.
The Constitutional Court failed clearly to 
explain why it considered that the impugned 
secondary legislation (on a very controversial 
topic) could enter into force without being 
promulgated in the Official Gazette. It did not 
provide any legal basis in this regard. It also 
failed to examine when the impugned second-
ary legislation was placed on the SEC site in 
order to offer more arguments in support of its 
reasoning that publication on the website was 
sufficient. Such a decision may, hypothetical-
ly speaking, offer an excuse for other state 
bodies seeking to avoid posting secondary 
legislation in the Official Gazette, and instead 
allow them to post it on its website any time 
they choose. Such a practice would be incom-
patible with the principle of public access to 
legislation and democratic law-making. 
4. Decision U no. 83/2018: Challenge to the 
Wiretapping Law17 
The applicant challenged the constitutionality 
of Article 17 of the Wiretapping Law of 2018 
and complained about a violation of the right 
to privacy guaranteed by the Constitution and 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights. He complained that Article 17 
enabled the procurement and use of special 
technology. These technologies enable secret 
police to covertly listen to the telephone con-
versations of persons within a specific radius. 
Use of such wiretapping technology, claimed 
the complainant, allowed the wiretapping of 
an indeterminate number of persons for an in-
definite time period. In particular, for the use 
of classical wiretapping technology, the secret 
police had to request a telecommunication ser-
vice provider to enable the wiretapping based 
on a court warrant, which would specify the 
exact person and the duration of the wiretap-
ping. The use of the new technology made this 
needless, making wiretapping much easier and 
a court warrant practically unnecessary. The 
complainant alleged that such technology had 
already been procured, which posed a risk to 
individuals’ right to privacy.
The Constitutional Court rejected the initia-
tive to examine the constitutionality of Arti-
cle 17 of the above law. It held that the Law 
on Wiretapping, when read in its entirety, 
was based on the Constitution, relevant in-
ternational instruments and required a court 
warrant for wiretapping. The use of special 
wiretapping/surveillance equipment did not 
infringe upon the Constitution. The relevant 
laws specified that only a suspect of a serious 
crime, named in the court warrant, could be 
wiretapped. The suspect’s conversations un-
related to the criminal offense for which the 
wiretapping was ordered were inadmissible in 
the criminal procedure.
The decision not to examine the potential 
broad violations of the right to privacy on 
the merits indicates that the Constitutional 
Court was uneasy with examining this matter 
involving the powers of the secret police. It 
used the international instruments guarantee-
ing the right to privacy and the need to fight 
against organized crime to justify its decision. 
The Court failed to seize this opportunity to 
contribute to a greater protection of the con-
stitutional right to privacy, especially fol-
lowing a public release of the conversations, 
secretly recorded without a court warrant. 
Even more, the country is plagued with the 
continuous release of secretly recorded con-
versations on YouTube about various alleged 
corruption scandals in the country. The source 
of these recordings, apparently obtained with-
out a warrant, are unknown, The Constitu-
tional Court connected the examination of the 
above initiative solely with the admissibility 
of evidence in the criminal procedure while 
failing to examine the possible violations 
of individuals’ right to privacy on a broader 
scale. According to the Constitution, individ-
uals who are not suspected of serious criminal 
offenses have the right to speak on the phone 
without their conversations being listened to 
and recorded by unauthorized and unknown 
persons, which opens up a possibility for their 
abuse. 
5. Decision U no. 80/2019-1: Abrogation of 
2015 Decision on the Detailed Urban Plan of 
the Municipality of Karpos
The constitutionality and legality of the deci-
sion in 2015 on the Detailed Urban Plan of 
the Municipality of Karpos, a part of Skopje, 
was challenged as being incompatible with 
the constitutional protection of the rule of 
law, regional planning and protection of the 
environment. The impugned decision was 
also alleged incompatible with the legal re-
quirement to make public a justified decision 
for not carrying out an environmental impact 
assessment of the detailed urban plan.
The Constitutional Court found that the re-
quirement to make public the impugned de-
cision was not observed by the municipality, 
which infringed upon the right to appeal it, 
and violated the government’s fundamental 
obligation to uphold the rule of law. Although 
the decision was declared unconstitutional, 
the Constitutional Court did not nullify it and 
it had already taken effect prior to the Court’s 
findings. The Court’s decision seems to be 
in contravention to the Constitution and the 
stipulated legal procedure depriving citizens 
of their constitutional right to a legal reme-
dy. Taking into consideration the high level of 
pollution in Skopje, it seems that the Consti-
tutional Court did little to protect the citizens 
from the arbitrariness of the municipal deci-
sion on an important health matter involving 
the city’s pollution. 
6. Request to examine the Law on Presiden-
tial Pardon
A request to examine the constitutionality of 
Article 11-a of the Law on Presidential Par-
don was lodged with the Constitutional Court. 
This article represents the legal basis for the 
17 Official Gazette no. 71/2018.
2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 253
President’s retracted pardons in 2016, men-
tioned in the introduction.18 The Constitution-
al Court declared the initiative admissible and 
adjourned to await an authentic interpretation 
of this article by the Parliament.19 Should the 
Constitutional Court nullify the article, pres-
idential pardons will become valid again, 
meaning that top former officials may escape 
criminal liability for alleged cases of corrup-
tion and abuse of power. Such a ruling would 
undoubtedly shrink what is left of public con-
fidence in the country’s institutions and the 
rule of law. 
 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Looking ahead, North Macedonia should ex-
pect a Constitutional Court decision regarding 
the Law on the Use of Languages, early elec-
tions in 2020 and the adoption of a new Law 
on Public Prosecution. The latter draft law is 
in a deadlock despite the push from the EU 
countries for its final adoption and implemen-
tation in order to end the endemic impunity 
for cases of high-level corruption and abuse 
of position. 
There is also a debate about introducing a 
process for citizens to file a constitutional 
complaint before the Constitutional Court for 
protection of all fundamental rights set out in 
the Constitution. However, when looking at 
the small percentage of cases that the Con-
stitutional Court finds admissible, delays in 
the examination of important cases and the 
impact of its decisions, one cannot escape the 
impression that the Constitutional Court will 
first have to undergo a comprehensive reform 
before being able to effectively and adequate-
ly protect citizens’ constitutional civil and po-
litical rights.
V. FURTHER READING
OSCE, First Interim Report on the Activities 
and the Cases under the Competence of the 
Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) (Report, 
OSCE Mission to Skopje, 2018)
OSCE, Second Interim Report on the Activi-
ties and the Cases under the Competence of 
the Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) (Re-
port, OSCE Mission to Skopje, 2019)
18 Amending and supplementing the Law on Pardon, Official Gazette no. 99/16.
19 Constitutional Court, Announcement (Skopje, 2 December 2019) <http://ustavensud.mk/?p=18462>
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I. INTRODUCTION 
2019 was a turbulent year for the Norwegian 
legal system: a social welfare scandal shook 
the country, and an unprecedented number of 
cases concerning Norwegian child welfare 
services were decided and pending before 
the European Court of Human Rights. Addi-
tionally, the Parliamentary Oversight Com-
mittee on Intelligence and Security Services 
issued a special report to Parliament where 
it disclosed that the Police Security Service 
had collected considerable amounts of infor-
mation about airline passengers in an unlaw-
ful manner for years.1
With reverberations still palpable in 2020, 
the question arises: how will cases like these 
affect Norwegians’ traditionally very high 
trust in public authorities? An annual survey 
by the Norwegian Courts Administration 
showed that the number of people with “very 
high confidence” in the courts decreased 
from 37% in 2018 to 27%.2 Still, the level of 
general confidence is high, and considerably 
higher than the average within the OECD.3 
The effects of 2019’s turbulence should not 
be overly concerning, as the Norwegian legal 
system is in general highly well functioning.4 
There is, however, reason to follow closely 
the general level of trust in the coming years 
of handling these challenges.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The case legally defining Norway in 2019 
was what has become known as “the NAV 
scandal”.5 It is relevant to this review as it 
illustrates how the higher ranked EU norms 
function constitutionally in defining the 
scope of permitted national practice. In Oc-
tober, the Norwegian Labour and Welfare 
Administration (NAV) announced it had 
administered some social benefits cases con-
trary to EEA law dating back at least to 2012. 
In brief, NAV refused to grant sick pay, work 
assessment allowance, and attendance allow-
ance to persons travelling abroad. At least 75 
persons receiving such benefits while stay-
ing abroad were wrongfully convicted of 
fraud, and probably thousands were either 
denied benefits they were entitled to or had 
to refund allegedly ill-gotten money.
The NAV’s practice was based on the So-
cial Security Act, which explicitly requires 
recipients of such social benefits to stay in 
1 Dokument 7:2 (2019-2020).
2 See <https://www.domstol.no/nyheter/fortsatt-stor-tiltro-til-domstolene-men-lavere-enn-i-2018/> ac-
cessed 16 January 2020.
3 OECD, ‘Government at a Glance 2019. Country Fact Sheet: Norway’, available at <https://www.oecd.org/
gov/gov-at-a-glance-2019-norway.pdf> accessed 16 January 2020.
4 For instance, Norway ranks number two on the 2019 Rule of Law Index. See World Justice Project, Rule of 
Law Index 2019, available at <https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/ROLI-2019-Re-
duced.pdf> accessed 16 January 2020.
5 For an analysis of the case, see Hans Petter Graver, ‘The Impossibility of Upholding the Rule of Law 
When You Don’t Know the Rules of the Law’, Verfassungsblog, 14 November 2019, available at <https://
verfassungsblog.de/the-impossibility-of-upholding-the-rule-of-law-when-you-dont-know-the-rules-of-the-
law/> accessed 12 January 2020.
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Norway.6 According to Regulation (EC) 
No 883/2004 on the coordination of social 
security systems, however, insured persons 
“residing or staying” in an EEA state are en-
titled to cash benefits in accordance with na-
tional legislation. This EU regulation is part 
of EEA law,7 incorporated into Norwegian 
law in 2012 with a primacy clause.8 Accord-
ing to a memorandum from 2018, the NAV 
held that “staying” does not cover short-term 
travels, such as vacations. In its new assess-
ment from 2019, it made a volte-face on this 
interpretation.
The gravity of the case is indisputable: peo-
ple – often in a disadvantaged position – have 
been punished without law in breach of fun-
damental constitutional and human rights. 
Further, people have suffered the hardship 
of not receiving their entitled benefits or 
having to refund money. What is less clear 
is the share of responsibility attributable to 
different actors – and what lessons are to be 
drawn. The scrutiny process is ongoing due 
to the complexity of the case, and the space 
here only allows for a few brief consider-
ations below.
The question of the quality of the legislative 
process goes to both Parliament and the Gov-
ernment, the latter having the main responsi-
bility for drafting proposals. When the leg-
islator does not amend material provisions 
to reflect binding international norms but 
implements them by stowing them away in 
a regulation adding a supremacy clause as a 
“safeguard”, the task of ensuring compliance 
is delegated in toto to law-appliers. Thus, the 
NAV case triggers a general question over 
appropriate techniques of implementing in-
ternational law. A second question relates to 
how the NAV and Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs have handled the case. Since 
June 2017, the Social Insurance Court has 
quashed several cases on the ground that the 
NAV has not considered EEA directives, and 
the NAV did not appeal any of these to ob-
tain legal clarity. It is certainly questionable 
whether relevant authorities have acted with 
the sufficient promptness required by the 
rule of law to prevent the scandal.9 Third, 
as has already been evident from public de-
bate, the spotlight is on the legal communi-
ty as a whole: how could it be that neither 
prosecutors, attorneys, nor legal academics 
sensed that something might be wrong – that 
not even the ordinary courts acquitted those 
prosecuted for fraud (“iura novit curia”!)? 
One commentator has pointed to an alleged 
hostility among Norwegian politicians and 
lawyers towards EEA law.10 The overarching 
challenges are probably more complex, in-
volving not the least a general lack of knowl-
edge about and a perception of EU law and 
methodology as something of a “foreign” 
and complicated oddity with many Norwe-
gian lawyers.
The other high-profile 2019 issue concerns 
the Norwegian child welfare services. In 
2019, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) decided four child welfare cases 
against Norway and found a violation in all 
of them. The Grand Chamber decided one.11 
Moreover, the Court communicated 25 new 
applications to the Government. Adding 
three more cases communicated in previous 
years and three judgements from 2017 and 
2018, the total number of child welfare cas-
es over a few years is 35. In a Norwegian 
context, this influx is unprecedented and tru-
ly remarkable. To give a bigger picture, the 
Court has issued 52 judgements involving 
Norway in total.
The child welfare cases concern different 
issues and are often tied very closely to the 
factual circumstances. Two main structural 
challenges have nevertheless stood out thus 
far. First, it seems the Norwegian system has 
not adopted to a sufficient degree the ap-
proach that, in the language of the ECtHR, 
“a care order should be regarded as a tempo-
rary measure, to be discontinued as soon as 
circumstances permit, and that any measures 
implementing temporary care should be con-
sistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the 
natural parents and the child”.12 In some of 
the cases, the authorities seem to have aban-
doned a “reunification mindset” at an early 
stage of the proceedings without providing 
sufficient grounds for this, something that 
has, for instance, resulted in very limited 
contact rights.13 Second, whereas the Court 
has accepted the (formal) procedural frame-
work of the decision-making process in sev-
eral cases,14 it has now increasingly turned its 
focus to the (actual) quality of those process-
6 Lov-1997-02-28-19, Articles 8-9, 9-4 and 11-3.
7 Norway is not a member of the European Union but is closely associated through the European Economic Agreement (EEA). In practice, a considerable amount of 
EU Directives and Regulations are incorporated into Norwegian law and given precedence, cf. the EEA Act (Lov-1992-11-27-109). 
8 Regulation on the Incorporation of the Social Security Regulations of the EEA Agreement (FOR-2012-06-22-585).
9 For instance, the Director of Public Prosecutions was only briefed in October 2019. News reports have shown that a person was sentenced for fraud as late as 
September 2019.
10 See Carl Baudenbacher (former President of the EFTA Court), ‘“Room for Manoeuvre” is the Real Reason for Norway’s EEA Scandal’, Verfassungsblog, 21 
November 2019, available at <https://verfassungsblog.de/room-for-manoeuvre-is-the-real-reason-for-norways-eea-scandal/> accessed 12 January 2020. The 
analysis is convincingly rejected by Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen, ‘The Rule of Law in a European Economic Area with National “Room for Manoeuvre”’, Ver-
fassungsblog, 29 November 2019, available at <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-rule-of-law-in-a-european-economic-area-with-national-room-for-manoeuvre/> 
accessed 12 January 2020.
11 Strand Lobben and Others v Norway, App no 37283/13 (10 September 2019). The other cases are: K.O. and V.M. v Norway, App no 64808/16 (19 Novem-
ber 2019); Abdi Ibrahim v Norway, App no 15379/16 (17 December 2019); and A.S. v Norway, App no 60371/15 (17 December 2019).
12 See, e.g., Strand Lobben and Others, para. 208. 
13 See in particular K.O. and V.M., para. 68-69, and A.S., para. 62-63.
14 See, e.g., K.O. and V.M., para. 62; Jansen v Norway, App no 2822/16 (6 September 2018), para. 99; and Mohamed Hasan v Norway, App no 27496/15 (26 
April 2018), para. 152.
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es.15 The cases serve as an important remind-
er that national authorities and courts must 
base their decisions on a broad, in-depth, 
and genuine consideration of the facts of the 
case, especially when authorizing extremely 
intrusive measures. 
The Supreme Court will decide three child 
welfare cases in the Grand Chamber in Feb-
ruary 2020. We expect them to provide fur-
ther guidance to lower instances – as well as 
the legislative branch currently working on 
a new Children’s Welfare Act – on how to 
implement the guidelines from Strasbourg.
As to legislative developments in 2019, 
Parliament codified the principle of the in-
dependence of the prosecution authority in 
the Criminal Procedure Code – a principle 
thitherto but a customary rule. Also, a legis-
lative commission proposed an Act on Spe-
cial Measures in Extraordinary Crises.16 This 
proposal authorizes the Government to issue 
temporary regulations that complements, 
supplements, or derogates from ordinary 
legislation when extraordinary crises – e.g., 
serious natural disasters or terrorist attacks – 
occur in times of peace. The proposal does 
not mandate derogations from the Constitu-
tion or human rights, and it includes several 
material and procedural safeguards, but has 
still been criticized.17
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. HR-2019-1226-A: Retention of a DNA 
Profile
In June, the Supreme Court considered 
whether a decision to retain the DNA profile 
of a person convicted of tax fraud was a dis-
proportionate interference with his private life 
under Article 8 of the ECHR.18 Under Nor-
wegian law, the main criterion for registra-
tion of DNA profiles of convicted persons in 
the police register is the gravity of the crime 
committed. The nature of the crime – whether 
drug offences, violence, sexual assault, etc. 
– is irrelevant. This gave rise to the most in-
teresting aspect of the case, to wit: given that 
DNA evidence plays a limited role in the in-
vestigation of tax fraud cases, was the reten-
tion in this specific case proportionate?
The Court broadly assessed a number of rel-
evant principles from an extensive analysis 
of case law from the ECtHR. These princi-
ples, pertaining, inter alia, to the scope of the 
competence to retain DNA, the gravity of the 
crime, safeguards against abuse, the right of 
removal and removal routines, the storage of 
the profiles, the access to the data and con-
fidentiality, the intensity of the interference, 
and so on, were then applied to the facts of 
the case in a scrupulous manner. 
As to the question of how the nature of the 
crime affects the proportionality assessment, 
a majority of four judges interpreted the 
ECtHR’s case law to hold that the nature of 
the crime might be a relevant factor, but that 
“nothing suggests that the ‘DNA relevance’ 
of the offence alone should be decisive”.19 In 
the application of this principle, the majority 
acknowledged the limited “DNA relevance” 
in tax fraud cases, but considered this as one 
amongst several considerations. Moreover, 
the majority referred to statistics indicating 
that persons convicted of economic crime 
are more likely to commit new offences – in-
cluding “DNA relevant crimes” – than previ-
ously unpunished persons.
One judge dissented, expressing doubts as 
to whether the retention was sufficiently 
relevant and necessary for its purpose. This 
judge also emphasized the function creep 
resulting from a Supreme Court order from 
2018, where the Appeals Selection Commit-
tee ruled that one could obtain DNA profiles 
from the police register in civil cases con-
cerning clarification of paternity.20 
An application of the case is lodged with the 
ECtHR. If admitted, the Court’s approach 
will be interesting to follow. The Supreme 
Court rather meticulously assessed princi-
ples emanating from Strasbourg and referred 
to considerations of proportionality under-
taken in the legislative process – two ele-
ments that will normally trigger subsidiarity 
considerations at the ECtHR.21 The margin 
of appreciation is, however, limited in cas-
es like this,22 and the crux of the matter is 
a principled legal issue that the ECtHR has 
not dealt with before. This latter point could 
possibly prompt reflections as to whether 
Norway should ratify Protocol No. 16 to 
the Convention. This protocol, which en-
tered into force in 2018, establishes a sys-
tem where the highest courts and tribunals 
of member states may request advisory opin-
ions from Strasbourg before deciding a case. 
With this tool, the Court would have had the 
opportunity to clarify the principled question 
before deciding the case.23 
2. The Fosen Case: Norway and the EFTA 
Court
15 See in particular A.S., para. 62 ff., K.O. and V.M., para. 69-70 and Strand Lobben and Others, para. 220 and 222-225.
16 NOU 2019: 13.
17 Both the Norwegian Bar Association and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Norway have raised concerns over its implications for the protection of the 
rule of law.
18 The judgement is available in English translation at the Supreme Court’s website: <https://www.domstol.no/en/Enkelt-domstol/supremecourt/translated-rulings/
rulings-2019/retention-of-dna-profile/> accessed 18 January 2020.
19 Para. 70.
20 HR-2018-2241-U, discussed by the dissenting judge in para. 122 f. (cfr. para. 101-102 for the majority’s considerations).
21 See, e.g., Robert Spano, ‘The Future of the European Court of Human Rights – Subsidiarity, Process-Based Review and the Rule of Law’ (2018), 18 Human 
Rights Law Review 473, 487 ff. DOI: <https://www.doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngy015>
22 As noted by the Supreme Court itself, see para. 59.
23 It is not clear why Norway has not done this. The question of ratification has been under consideration in the Department of Justice since 2018. 
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In EEA matters, however, a system with advi-
sory opinions is in place – Norwegian courts 
may request the EFTA Court to give an ad-
visory opinion in cases involving the EEA 
Agreement.24 The system differs from the 
one established within the EU in that there is 
no obligation for the Supreme Court to bring 
such matters before the EFTA Court and the 
latter’s opinions are not binding.25 At least 
historically, the Supreme Court has been re-
luctant to ask the EFTA Court for advisory 
opinions, leading to what some scholars have 
coined a “troubled relationship” between the 
courts.26 In 2019, the relationship developed 
in a peculiar manner with the Fosen case.27 
The case concerned a company that claimed 
damages following the cancellation of a ten-
der procedure. In 2016, the Court of Appeal 
asked the EFTA Court for an advisory opin-
ion on the liability conditions under the rele-
vant EU legislation on public procurement.28 
The EFTA Court stated in 2017, that “[a] 
simple breach of public procurement law 
is in itself sufficient to trigger […] liabili-
ty…”.29 This interpretation surprised several 
commentators who argued that it was wrong. 
The case was appealed to the Supreme 
Court, who in 2018 asked for a new opinion, 
seeking “clarification and amplification, or 
possibly a reconsideration” from the EFTA 
Court. In 2019, the latter – now, it should be 
noted, with a new composition and a new 
president – reversed its position and held that 
the minimum standard for liability must be 
a “sufficiently serious breach” of the public 
procurement law.30 
This case is illustrative of the diverging 
views on the appropriate relationship be-
tween Norwegian courts and the EFTA 
Court. Carl Baudenbacher, ex-president 
of the EFTA Court and a staunch critic of 
Norway in many instances, alleged that the 
composition of the EFTA Court in Fosen II 
was “manipulated” and that the opinion was 
even invalid.31 A Norwegian law professor 
who launched the idea of a second referral 
from the Supreme Court argued, on the other 
hand, that it would be more constructive and 
fair to ask the Luxembourg court to clarify 
its views instead of just disregarding it, as 
did the Court of Appeal.32 
3. HR-2019-2038-A: Children’s Right to 
Privacy
May parents’ social media posting of sensitive 
personal information concerning their children 
constitute a punishable violation of the latter’s 
privacy? The question was raised before the 
Supreme Court in a case decided on 5 Novem-
ber. A mother was prosecuted for breach of pri-
vacy under Article 267 of the Penal Code for 
having posted videos and pictures of her sev-
en-year-old daughter in vulnerable situations, 
as well as intimate information about her, in an 
open Facebook group. Child welfare services 
had placed the daughter in foster care, and her 
mother struggled to have her back home.
The Court clarified, first, that a potential con-
sent from the child to publishing information 
of this kind would be legally irrelevant. It 
pointed to the young age of the girl and more 
generally – thus applicable for more mature 
children – the need to protect children from 
parental pressure and forced situations. Sec-
ond, the Court held that it did not fall within 
the scope of parental responsibility to consent 
on behalf of the child – which would render 
children without protection from their parents 
in situations like this.
The Court balanced the mother’s right to 
freedom of expression and the child’s right to 
privacy as protected by the Constitution and 
the ECHR. It noted certain parallels with the 
ECtHR’s judgement in Krone Verlag GmbH v 
Austria,33 which concerned the dissemination 
in the press of intimate details about a young 
boy, but distinguished the case at hand, as the 
publishing was not linked to a matter of pub-
lic concern. Hence, the mother’s freedom of 
speech could not override the child’s interest 
in not having private and sensitive informa-
tion made public. 
This case demonstrates how incautious ex-
posure of children on social media may com-
promise their privacy. There are compelling 
reasons why society should protect children 
from such exposure. However, parents who 
have their children taken into public care are 
often in a situation of extreme despair. Their 
struggle to reunite with their children might 
be legitimate regardless of whether the child 
welfare services’ decision is well founded or 
not. The Court acknowledged this, but point-
ed out that the mother could have carried out 
her struggle without exposing private and sen-
sitive information about her young daughter.34
24 Article 34 of the EFTA Surveillance and Court Agreement.
25 Compare Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). See, however, for a different view, Carl Baudenbacher, ‘The EFTA Court: 
Structure and Tasks’ in Baudenbacher (ed.), The Handbook of EEA Law (Springer, 2016) 156-162.
26 Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen and Christian Franklin, ‘On Pragmatism and Principles: The EEA Agreement 20 years on’ (2015), 52 Common Market Law Review 
629, 671 f. As noted by the authors, the trend seems to have turned at least somewhat in recent years.
27 HR-2019-1801-A.
28 Article 2 (1) (c) of the Remedy Directive (Directive 89/665/EEC), cfr. also Directive 2004/18/EC.
29 Case E-16/16, para. 82.
30 Case E-7/18, para. 20.
31 Carl Baudenbacher, ‘Fosen and NAV – “room for manoeuvre”’, Anbud365 13 November 2019, available at <https://www.anbud365.no/internasjonalt/eu/fosen-
and-nav-room-for-manoeuvre/>. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision to ask for a new opinion, Baudenbacher also claimed that such a referral ‘would be the end 
of the rule of law’, cfr. Kjetil Kolsrud, ‘Baudenbacher langer ut mot norsk professor’, Rett24 30 May 2018, available at >https://rett24.no/articles/baudenbacher-
langer-ut-mot-norsk-professor>. Both links accessed 15 January 2020.
32 Professor Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen, see Kolsrud (2018) (n31).
33 App no 33497/07 (17 January 2012).
34 Para. 31.
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4. The Tidal Case: Digital Enforcement Ju-
risdiction
Another “digital case” from 2019 was the 
Tidal case, decided 28 March.35 The disputed 
issue was whether Norwegian police offi-
cers searching the data terminals of a Nor-
wegian company – Tidal Music AS – could 
download digital material that was stored on 
servers in other countries. Tidal claimed that 
such search and seizure violated the princi-
ple of exclusive territorial enforcement juris-
diction under international law. It is illustra-
tive of the practical relevance of the case that 
the material included emails on a Google ac-
count stored in “the cloud”.
The Court noted that no treaty regulates the 
issue and found – based on a brief review 
of case law from other countries and inter-
national reports – no relevant international 
customary law.36 Given this legal terra in-
cognita, the Court formulated the following 
question: “Is the relevant search an interfer-
ence with another state’s exclusive enforce-
ment jurisdiction in a way that violates the 
sovereignty of that state?” It then added that 
“[t]he ultimate assessment must be specific 
and adjusted to the situation calling for the 
relevant measure”.37  
The Court concluded that the search and 
seizure did not violate the sovereignty of 
other states. Its main argument was that the 
coercive measures were directed against a 
Norwegian company with an office in Nor-
way. The police had not intruded into the 
servers but used access credentials handed 
over by the company based on a court de-
cision. Moreover, the search only involved 
access to information that the company itself 
had stored, and the data would remain un-
changed on the server abroad.38 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
In 2020, the NAV scandal follow-up will 
proceed, and an independent investigation 
committee is supposed to deliver its report 
in June. The controversies over child welfare 
services will also continue. Most likely, more 
cases will be decided in Strasbourg, and the 
outcome of the Supreme Court Grand Cham-
ber assessment of the three child welfare 
cases in February will hopefully clarify what 
adjustments administrative and adjudicative 
bodies need to undertake. 
We also expect important reports in 2020: the 
Election Act Commission, appointed to draft 
a new Election Act, is to deliver its report by 
the end of May. A few months later, the sec-
ond report of the Court Commission on the 
organization and independence of the courts 
will be published. The Legal Aid Commis-
sion will also deliver its report on a reform of 
the legal aid scheme in spring 2020. 
V. FURTHER READING
Gunnar Grendstad, William R. Shaffer, Jørn 
Øyrehagen Sunde, and Eric N. Waltenburg, 
Proactive and Powerful: Law Clerks and 
the Institutionalization of the Norwegian Su-
preme Court (Eleven International Publish-
ing, 2019)
Malcolm Langford and Beate Kathrine 
Berge, ‘Norway’s Constitution in a Com-
parative Perspective’ (2019), Vol. 6 No. 3 
Oslo Law Review 198. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.18261/ISSN.2387-3299-2019-03-02 
35 HR-2019-610-A. The judgement is available in English translation at the Supreme Court’s website: <https://www.domstol.no/en/Enkelt-domstol/supremecourt/
translated-rulings/rulings-2019/search-at-tidal-music-as/> accessed 18 January 2020.
36 The Supreme Court referred to a 2012 Supreme Court judgement from Denmark, a Swedish Official Report from 2017, case law reviews by expert groups of the 
Council of Europe from 2012 and 2016 and by a working group under the EU Commission from 2018 as well as the ‘Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Operations’ from 2017, para. 49-56.
37 Para 61-62.
38 The decision was criticized in a law journal editorial for being contrary to the principle of sovereignty under international law, see Jon Petter Rui, ‘Høyesterett i 
«skyen»’ (2019), No. 5 Lov og Rett 261. DOI: https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.1504-3061-2019-05-01. This view has been countered by Jørgen S. Skjold, ‘Suverenitet, 
jurisdiksjon og beslag i informasjon på server i utlandet’ (2019), No. 10 Lov og Rett 617. DOI: https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.1504-3061-2019-10-03
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PALESTINE
INTRODUCTION
This review briefly introduces Palestinian 
constitutional changes that occurred in 2019, 
building on last year’s review of 2018. It 
refracts significant developments through a 
liberal and democratizing lens and draws on 
Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) rulings 
to provide new insight into key constitution-
al developments. 
These developments are mainly connected to 
the SCC ruling of 22 December 2018, which 
was previously discussed in the 2018 Pales-
tine report.1 In applying it, the Palestinian 
President announced the dissolution of the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and 
refrained from calling for new elections. 
This ruling is perhaps the SCC’s most con-
troversial and significant to date because it 
resulted in the dissolution of one of the pil-
lars of Palestinian democracy (albeit one that 
had not functioned for more than a decade). 
A further note of controversy is elicited by 
the fact that dissolution and the actions that 
should immediately follow it are not directly 
referenced in the 2003 Basic Law (BL).
The President is still using Article 43 to is-
sue decrees that have the power of laws.2 
Thus, this report will tackle the statutory 
developments relying on the constitutional 
gap the President uses to do so, especially 
after the formation of the 18th government 
in 2019. Then the report will move towards 
the changes within the judiciary after Decree 
Laws 16/2019 and 17/2019 that respectively 
made clear intervention within judiciary in-
dependence by creating a Transitional High 
Judicial Council. 
2019 also witnessed an active move towards 
advancing the discussion forward regard-
ing the 2016 Palestinian Constitution – the 
latest effort to create a constitution for the 
State of Palestine. Within this constitutional 
dialogue, the need for elections and the pro-
cess for them will be introduced. In addition, 
a discussion over the status of international 
treaties will also be analyzed. Finally, the de-
cision made by the SCC relating to the two 
decree laws of 2019 will be addressed to test 
if the Court’s position was indeed helpful in 
securing separation of powers or whether it 
undermined this principle further.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
A. Statutory Developments
Since 2007, Palestine has been ruled by 
decree. The amended BL means that the 
1 Y Khamis and A Khalil, ‘Palestine’, in R Albert, D Landau, P Faraguna and S Drugda (eds.), 2018 Global 
Review of Constitutional Law, I•CONnect and the Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy 
at Boston College, 2019, 224-228.
 2 Article 43 of the Basic Law states: ‘The President of the National Authority shall have the right, in cases 
of necessity that cannot be delayed, and when the Legislative Council is not in session, to issue decrees 
that have the power of law. These decrees shall be presented to the Legislative Council in the first session 
convened after their issuance; otherwise they will cease to have the power of law. If these decrees are 
presented to the Legislative Council, as mentioned above, but are not approved by the latter, then they shall 
cease to have the power of law.’
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President can, in instances of necessity and 
subject to the meeting of other conditions, is-
sue decrees that have the force of laws. The 
absence of a functioning PLC has reinforced 
the emergence of different governing entities 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Major statutory amendments that were in-
troduced in 2019 in the form of decree laws 
will now be discussed. It should be first rec-
ognized that the President does not use de-
cree laws as a substitute for the PLC’s law 
making power only; it is actually a substitute 
for the chamber’s oversight role, as shown 
by the fact that the President issues decree 
laws that bestow confidence on the govern-
ment he formed! Decree Law 12/2019 was 
most recently used to express confidence in 
the government of Mohammad Shtayeh, the 
current Prime Minister. In normal circum-
stances, this would instead be provided by 
the sitting PLC. The existing form of gov-
ernance, in contrast, is sustained by the ab-
sence of the PLC and presidential continuity. 
Decree Law 7/2019 is the second amend-
ment to Law 3/2006, which established the 
Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC). De-
cree Law 19/2017, which concerns the du-
ration of a judge’s mandate, was the first 
amendment made to SCC law. Under the 
original law, he/she would remain in office 
until reaching the pensionable age of 70. The 
amendment then instituted a six-year non-re-
newable commission. From 2017 onwards, 
three new judges were/will be added to the 
Court’s assembly on a biannual basis (2017, 
2019 and 2021). In 2022, the mandate of 
the first group of judges, who have been in 
office since 2016, will expire. The other ap-
pointed judges will then continue with their 
work, which is mainly focused on the consti-
tutional review of laws and bylaws. 
The limitation of the mandate of SCC judges 
can be considered a positive step towards the 
development of an independent judiciary be-
cause it produces judges who are less depen-
dent on the executive. The SCC first appoint-
ed judges and then proceeded to create the 
Court’s General Assembly, which nominates 
future judges through a majority vote. After 
the outcome of this vote is confirmed, the 
president of the Court will then submit the 
names to the President for his/her approval. 
Although the Court is inevitably subject to 
the influence of the executive (not least in its 
very establishment), there are certain proce-
dures in SCC law that permit independence, 
and they need to be nurtured and cultivated. 
The President also issued Decree Laws 
16/2019 and 17/2019, which directly af-
fected the judiciary. Decree Law 16/2019 
reduced judges’ pension age from 70 to 60, 
which meant that many judges (mainly from 
the high court) were no longer eligible for 
their roles. Decree Law 17/2019 dissolved 
the High Judicial Council (HJC), and nom-
inated nine judges to the new transitional 
HJC (THJC), which had a one-year mandate 
that could only be extended by six months. 
Both of these laws were controversial be-
cause they were argued to further enhance 
executive control over the judiciary rather 
than reform the justice system. The SCC re-
viewed both decrees before abolishing De-
cree Law 16/2019 and maintaining 17/2019. 
In 2019, decree laws were also used to ratify 
treaties. This trend was first observed in the 
preceding year, when laws of this kind were 
mostly used to ratify bilateral treaties and 
treaties related to the Arab League. Exam-
ples included the Arab Convention against 
Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances (Decree Law 5/2019) 
and a temporary commercial agreement with 
the UK and Northern Ireland (Decree Law 
6/2016). 
The BL does not refer to the place of inter-
national treaties in the Palestinian constitu-
tional system, nor does it suggest how trea-
ties should be ratified. The SCC attempted 
to address this gap in constitutional law by 
issuing two rulings in 2017 and 2018. This 
meant that the entry of treaties into force be-
came more complex – treaties are required to 
be published in the Palestine Official Gazette 
and go through the same processes required 
for the ‘making’ of any law. Associated 
complications have prevented core human 
rights from being ratified and humanitarian 
treaties from becoming published in the Offi-
cial Gazette, with the consequence that their 
enforcement in the Palestinian legal system 
remains open to question. 
Few decree law amendments have helped 
to clarify Palestinian human rights obliga-
tions. Decree Law 21/2019, for example, 
establishes 18 as the minimum marriage age 
for all religious denominations in Palestine, 
although it does permit some exceptions. It 
refers to all personal status laws that apply to 
Muslims (e.g., Law 61/1976, which applies 
in the West Bank; and Family Law 1954, 
order 303, which applies in the Gaza Strip) 
that will be enforced by Sharia courts. It also 
refers to Christian personal status laws that 
apply to all recognized Christian denomina-
tions, which will be enforced by Christian 
religious courts. 
Decree Law 22/2019, which enables a single 
‘guardian’ woman to open a bank account 
on behalf of a minor, is a further example 
of change. Palestinian law was previously 
discriminatory in this regard as it only rec-
ognized the right of single male ‘guardians’ 
to do this. Palestine also now honors obliga-
tions that were established by the agreement 
between the PLO and the Holy See. Decree 
Law 10/2019, for example, establishes that 
‘found’ orphan babies can be registered as 
Christian if the parent leaves certain signs 
that indicate his/her wishes (see Article 13). 
Although it was previously theoretically 
possible that a ‘lost’ baby could be registered 
as Christian, the convolutions of the regis-
tration process made this very unlikely. All 
baby orphans that were previously found 
were therefore designated as Muslim, irre-
spective of surrounding signs. 
The President suspended Social Security 
(Decree) Law 19/2016 by issuing Decree 
Law 4/2019. The suspended decree law re-
lates to a fundamental economic right that is 
entrenched in the BL, and its passage caused 
popular unrest as thousands descended on 
the streets to protest against it. Organized 
sit-ins and other forms of passive resistance 
threatened to push the whole political and le-
gal system to the point of collapse.
B. Constitutional Developments
The previous report described how, in De-
cember 2018, the SCC officially authorized 
the dissolution of the PLC and invited the 
President to call legislative elections with-
in six months. Fatah/PA and Hamas nego-
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3 S Ramahi, ‘Are Palestinian elections going to be held?’, Middle East Monitor, December 2019. Accessed January 24, 2020. https://www.memopublishers.com/
images/uploads/documents/201912_Are_Palestinian_elections_likely_to_held.pdf
4 RA Jalal, ‘Abbas mulls option of postponing Palestinian elections’, Al-monitor, January 15, 2020. Accessed January 24, 2020. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2020/01/palestinian-elections-cancel-abbas-israel-request-jerusalem.html#ixzz6C9flIOVJ
5 RA Jalal, ‘Abbas mulls option of postponing Palestinian elections’, Al-monitor, January 15, 2020. Accessed January 24, 2020. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2020/01/palestinian-elections-cancel-abbas-israel-request-jerusalem.html#ixzz6C9flIOVJ
6 B White, ‘Are Palestinian elections on the horizon?’, Al Jazeera News, December 15, 2019. Accessed January 24, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2019/12/palestinian-elections-horizon-191211182354352.html
7In this decision, ‘domestic legislation’ refers to ordinary legislation. Constitutional Interpretation 5/2017 of 12 March 2018 clarifies the status of international 
conventions in domestic legislation by observing they are inferior to the (PLO) Declaration of Independence and the Basic Law and superior to various pieces of 
ordinary domestic legislation.
8 The reports are available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?SessionID=1171&Lang=en
9 See, for example, the shadow report by Al-Haq: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/PSE/INT_CEDAW_NGO_PSE_31670_E.pdf
tiations that followed the dissolution of the 
council also entertained the possibility that 
presidential elections might be held. It was 
agreed that the legislative election could pre-
cede presidential elections, although it was 
understood that this would be within a time-
frame established by the same presidential 
decree. Both Hamas and Fatah made it clear 
that their support for elections would depend 
on the meeting of certain key conditions.3 
At the time of this writing, no ‘election’ de-
cree has been issued. East Jerusalem is one 
of the main outstanding obstacles – on 10 
December 2019, President Abbas informed 
the Israeli government of his wish to hold 
elections and requested that Palestinian East 
Jerusalemites be permitted to participate, as 
they had in 1996 and 2005/6.4 
Israel’s reluctance in this regard creates a 
clear problem for Fatah and Hamas. If the 
elections went ahead without East Jerusale-
mite participation, it could be construed as 
a de facto renunciation of the Palestinian 
claim to this part of the city.5 Mr. Abbas’s 
reluctance to push this question has called 
his commitment into question,6 although his 
reticence was perhaps welcomed by an inter-
national community that is reluctant to pres-
surize Israel on this and other points.
The debate over the implementation of the 
international Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) also highlights a number 
of important issues. On 1 April 2014, the 
State of Palestine acceded to CEDAW with-
out expressing any reservations. The subse-
quent publication of Decree Law 21/2019, 
which established an age limit for marriage 
(18 years of age), gave rise to heated de-
bates. During a public event in Hebron, the 
National Liberation ‘party’ (a fundamentalist 
Salafi group) and some tribal family repre-
sentatives voiced their objections to the de-
cree and called on the National Authority to 
act in accordance with Sharia. 
The decree law was consistent with inter-
national human rights treaties, and here it is 
instructive to recall the SCC ruling in Case 
4/2017. The Court observed:
International conventions take prece-
dence and acquire superior force to do-
mestic legislation, especially after it is 
ratified and published; and it has to go 
through the formal procedures of any 
domestic law that applies to individu-
als and authorities, being attentive to 
the contours of national, religious and 
cultural identity of the Palestinian Arab 
people.7 
This ruling affected the implementation of 
CEDAW by clarifying that ratification alone 
would not impose a binding obligation on 
the domestic legal system. Such an obliga-
tion would only exist after publication in the 
Official Gazette. The ruling also suggests 
that courts will not be obliged to apply pro-
visions that contradict Sharia, and which are 
therefore contrary to Palestinian religious 
identity, even after publication. 
The State of Palestine, in acting in accor-
dance with its obligations, submitted its of-
ficial report to the Committee on the Elim-
ination of Discrimination against Women 
on 10 March 2017. The report, which was 
prepared by a government committee after 
consultation with civil society institutions, 
focused on the administrative, judicial and 
legislative implications of CEDAW provi-
sions, and also situated CEDAW in the wid-
er context of Israel’s continued violations of 
international law. The report was accompa-
nied by various shadow reports which were 
prepared by eight human rights and civil so-
ciety organizations, who worked both indi-
vidually and collectively.8 These shadow re-
ports recognize the need to enforce CEDAW 
provisions in the domestic legal system, and 
place particular emphasis on publication in 
the Official Gazette.9 The official report was 
submitted to the CEDAW committee on 11 
July 2018; in its concluding observations 
(which were published on 25 July 2018), the 
committee expressed its concern that ‘the 
Convention has not been published in the Of-
ficial Gazette in order to make it applicable 
in the State party’. 
The BL, which was intended to be replaced 
by the ‘Constitution of the State of Palestine’ 
(Article 115), does not provide clear answers 
to most of the constitutional issues and am-
biguities that were raised. Although efforts 
to draft a constitution preceded the United 
Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) 2012 
recognition of Palestine as a non-member 
state, UNGA recognition gave a renewed im-
petus to Palestinian constitutional endeavors, 
as was shown when the Palestinian Nation-
al Council (PNC), the legislative arm of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), ap-
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pointed a new ‘Constitutional Committee’.10 
The latest draft Constitution was completed 
in 2016 and it has since been circulated to a 
limited circle of civil society organizations 
with the aim of promoting targeted sectoral 
discussions with human rights, women’s and 
youth organizations. 
In 2019, women’s organizations sought to 
mobilize popular energies behind an entire-
ly ‘new’ constitution by enhancing wom-
en’s political participation. They ultimately 
agreed that a ‘quota’ of women’s leadership 
was necessary in order to achieve proper 
political representation and have sought to 
achieve this by influencing the future draft-
ing of the 2016 Constitution. The increased 
participation of women has produced the rat-
ification of engendered articles and growing 
pressure on the SCC to incorporate a gen-
der-sensitive interpretative method into its 
rulings. At the time of the writing, however, 
the Constitution is still in the process of de-
velopment.11 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
On 27 July 2019, appellants (16 judges) sub-
mitted a direct complaint to the SCC that 
claimed Decree Laws 16/2019 and 17/2019 
(published in issue No. 20 of the Official 
Gazette, 16 July 2019) were unconstitution-
al and should be retracted. The SCC subse-
quently declared 16/2019 to be unconstitu-
tional on formal and substantive grounds – in 
the first respect, it observed that the BL (Ar-
ticle 100) establishes a mandatory obligation 
to consult with the HJC on amendments af-
fecting the judiciary (this did not take place); 
in the second, it cited Articles 97, 98 and 99 
of the BL, which uphold the independence 
of the judiciary and individual judges. The 
Court observed that Article 3 of Decree Law 
16/2019, which holds that a judge’s service 
should be terminated when he/she reaches 
the age of sixty, is tantamount to dismissal 
from the judicial function, and noted that this 
contradicts the provisions of Article 99/2 of 
the 2003 BL and its amendments. Article 15 
of this document also clearly establishes that 
punishment should be personal, and that such 
general forced retirement would amount to a 
collective punishment. 
The rights to a fair trial and defense are also 
are enshrined in Article 14 of the BL and are 
also core principles in international human 
rights law. While the Court observed that 
the protection of the judiciary does not mean 
individual members cannot be punished or 
dismissed, it noted any such measure should 
be subject to Judiciary Law 1/2002, which 
protects members of the judiciary from the 
unwarranted interference of the executive 
and the legislative. The Court also referred 
to Article 43 of the BL, which concerns the 
President’s use of legislative powers. Its rul-
ing suggested that it held the view that un-
usual legislative powers should only be used 
in the circumstances listed in the BL. One 
way to interpret this is to consider the SCC 
attempting to indirectly limit the President’s 
use/s of decree law.
This claim would have been considerably 
strengthened if the Court had upheld the 
appellant’s claims vis-à-vis Decree Law 
17/2019. The importance of this debate is 
further underlined by the fact that the THJC, 
in accordance with its mandate, is now work-
ing on a new law that will substantially affect 
the Judicial Authority Law. However, the 
Court actually ruled it is constitutional. In 
doing so, it observed that the judicial council 
is an administrative institution that does not 
interfere in the judiciary’s work. The Court 
cited Articles 39 and 41 of Judicial Authority 
Law 1/2002, which clearly support this in-
terpretation of the council’s function. On this 
basis, the Court claimed that its decision did 
not conflict with the principle of judicial in-
dependence. The executive’s nomination of 
the THJC did not therefore overstep bound-
aries that are essential to the rule of law. 
The decree could, nonetheless, under a dif-
ferent interpretation, have been viewed as 
violating judicial independence. This claim 
could conceivably have been upheld in pro-
cedural (the formation of the THJC) and ob-
jective (the functioning of the TJHC) terms. 
Both are addressed in Articles 97, 98, 99 and 
100 of the BL, which clearly establish that 
the judiciary must remain independent of the 
executive. 
The question of if Decree Law 17/2019 un-
dermines the BL can be primarily grasped by 
referring to the BL’s Article 2,12 which enables 
the THJC to prepare legislation that could af-
fect laws relating to the judiciary. This prob-
lem arises because the THJC has been created 
by the executive and will presumably rely 
on it to ensure its continued existence. This 
brings the independence of the judiciary from 
the executive into clear question and suggests 
an overreach of executive influence.
Article 2 (paragraph 3) also refers to the 
THJC’s right to make recommendations to 
the President on the delegation, early re-
tirement and dismissal of judges. It cites 
the Judicial Authority Law but fails to ac-
knowledge that it does not actually contain 
an early retirement option. This suggests that 
Decree Law 17/2019 is not only concerned 
with establishing an administrative body 
that governs the judiciary but also seeks to 
amend the Judicial Authority Law. For ex-
ample, the stipulation that an individual can 
be removed (if the THJC is of the view that 
might harm the prestige and status of the ju-
diciary or negatively affect public trust in the 
judiciary) is clearly an amendment to the law 
that directly affects the independence of the 
judiciary. On this basis, we believe the Court 
should have declared the decree law to be 
unconstitutional. 
10 The Constitutional Committee is made up of a small group of elected relevant experts who are responsible for amending and drafting the Constitution, and a 
larger general committee tasked with ratifying the Constitution. 
11 S Alsarghali, ‘Palestine and the State of Exception: A Forced Marriage?’, in “States of Exception or Exceptional States: Law, Politics and Giorgio Agamben in the 
Middle East” (Simon Mabon, Sanaa Alsarghali and Adel Rushaid, eds) (I.B. Tauris, London 2020).
12 See paragraph four in particular.
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The SCC decisions on the two decree laws 
were supposed to reinstate all judges who 
had been forced into ‘early’ retirement (60 
rather than 70) and maintain the THJC and 
its powers. The SCC publicly announced its 
decision on 15 September 2019. On the same 
day, two presidential decrees were issued on 
the recommendation of the THJC. They an-
nounced the early retirement of 19 judges, 11 
of whom were the appellants who originally 
contested the constitutionality of the two de-
cree laws. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The controversial nature of the SCC’s rulings 
becomes fully apparent when the Court’s in-
terventions are considered in the wider con-
text of the current crisis and unprecedented 
conflict and polarization within the Palestin-
ian political system. While the establishment 
and continuation of the THJC could conceiv-
ably be justified with reference to the short-
comings of its predecessor, revisions to the 
age, qualification and quality of judges need 
to be considered more broadly, not least be-
cause they have serious implications for the 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in Palestine. The PLC’s dissolution 
and the lack of pressure in support of elections 
has increased the system’s dependence on the 
executive and the President in particular. 
While Palestine is currently experiencing a 
‘double’ transition to statehood and democ-
racy, both outcomes are, however, current-
ly obstructed by the Israeli occupation and 
the vicissitudes and uncertainties of internal 
Palestinian politics. In a number of respects, 
Palestine has entered a state of exception, 
and the concentration of presidential powers 
makes it difficult to see when it will end. The 
(re)establishment of a legislative body does, 
however, logically precede a government 
that is held to account and a Palestinian de-
mocracy that achieves its full potential. 
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2019 was characterized by the aftermath of 
the corruption scandals that shook Peru in 
2018. It was also a crucial year in the on-
going fight between the executive and the 
legislative state power. This fight culminat-
ed in the closure of the Parliament through 
President Vizcarra and was brought before 
the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional 
Court itself was in the spotlight as well be-
cause the appointment of its new members 
did not go smoothly. A major achievement 
in returning to normality in the judiciary was 
the installation of the new Junta Nacional de 
Justicia (National Board of Justice), which 
worked on the second attempt.
It is important to note that the tough political 
conflict between the Parliament and the Pres-
ident was canalized by constitutional rules. 
Therefore, despite political difficulties, 2019 
can also be seen as a good year for democra-
cy. The dissolution of Congress proved that 
it was possible to solve a severe political 
crisis by constitutional means (without go-
ing back to the proven remedy for solving 
political crises in the past, the coup d´état). 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
2019 was a troubled year for Peru. Poli-
tics were still dominated by the Odebrecht 
corruption scandal (former President Alan 
García committed suicide; after the disso-
lution of Congress, some members of Par-
liament left the country because Odebrecht 
announced he would reveal the names of 
allegedly corrupt parliamentarians) and 
also by the aftermath of the “White Collars 
of Callao” and “Case of the Audios CNM” 
corruption scandals that had shaken the ju-
diciary, undermining the trust of citizens in 
judicial power. 
Following the crisis of the judiciary, the Con-
sejo Nacional de Magistratura, the institution 
that decides on the selection of judges, which 
was already suspended in 2018, was formally 
dissolved in 2019. This was the result of re-
forms of the Peruvian Constitution proposed 
by President Martin Vizcarra in July 2018, 
which were approved with the referendum 
in December 2018. In February 2019, the or-
ganic law Ley No 30916 - Ley Orgánica de 
la Junta Nacional de Justicia was enacted. 
Since the first call for members of the Junta 
Nacional de Justicia failed because there were 
not enough competent people applying, on 30 
December 2019, members of the board were 
finally elected. The process of selection was 
criticized due to the unequal treatment of one 
of the candidates. Meanwhile, a substitute 
member was sworn in. Among other functions 
of the new Junta Nacional de Justicia are the 
appointment of judges and public prosecutors 
and their evaluation.
Various constitutional questions were raised 
by the closure of Congress. As in 2018, prob-
lems arose out of a proposed vote of con-
fidence. In June 2019, President Vizcarra 
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proposed to change the Constitution again 
and implement, among others, the following 
changes: reform parliamentary immunity, 
promote citizen participation in the internal 
decision-making of parties (internal democ-
racy), new rules on the registration of parties 
(less signatures than before), rules for party 
financing and the limitation of the right to 
run for a public office if a person has been 
convicted of an intentional crime if a prison 
sentence of more than four years is foreseen. 
The president of the Cabinet announced that 
if members of Parliament refused to accept 
the reforms, he would call for another vote of 
confidence. Since this would be the second 
motion of confidence, the President would 
have – if it was denied – the option to dissolute 
Congress (based on Article 134 of the Consti-
tution). Nothing happened, but in his speech 
to the nation on Independence Day (July 28), 
President Martin Vizcarra announced new 
constitutional reforms (early elections in 2020 
instead of 2021, among others).
Then, a few weeks later, in September, the 
president of the Cabinet wanted to introduce 
an amendment to the law to the Constitution-
al Court regarding the selection of justices to 
the Court. Although a motion of confidence 
has priority over other matters, the major-
ity bloc in Congress refused to discuss the 
motion. Yet, the Prime Minister managed to 
attend the debate (after an attempt to prevent 
him from entering the building) and pro-
posed the motion of confidence.
At the same time, the majority bloc in Con-
gress wanted to elect six new justices (out of 
seven members) to the Constitutional Court. 
Whereas the election of judges would have 
been scheduled after the discussion on the mo-
tion of confidence, the majority bloc in Parlia-
ment refused to discuss it and – in violation 
of the relevant provisions – proceeded to the 
election of the Constitutional Court. Whereas 
one candidate, the cousin of the president of 
Congress, managed to obtain the necessary 
votes to be elected, the second candidate did 
not. Further votes were not held.
Following this, President Vizcarra closed 
Congress based on Article 134 of the Peru-
vian Constitution, according to which Con-
gress can be dissolved after two votes of 
confidence have been denied. The President 
argued that since members of Parliament re-
fused to discuss the motion of no confidence 
and proceeded to the election of the new 
judges, confidence had been refused. People 
welcomed the closure of Congress, which 
has very low rates of approval – an alarming 
sign for democracy.
New elections were announced for January 
2020. Although President Vizcarra had the 
backing of the police and military forces, 
the former president of the Congress ordered 
that President Vizcarra should be dismissed. 
Moreover, he sent a letter to the Organiza-
tion of the American States (OAS) for sup-
port. But the OAS welcomed new elections 
and recommended approaching the Consti-
tutional Court for settlement of the conflict. 
On the question of linking constitution-
al amendments to the question of confi-
dence, the Venice Commission issued an 
opinion (Opinion No. 964/2019, CDL-
AD(2019)022) after a visit to Peru. It tried 
not to take sides in the conflict between 
the executive and the legislative power but 
pointed out that the recently implemented 
changes to electoral laws would be difficult 
to apply quickly. It further pointed out the 
importance of transparent elections, in line 
with international standards and best prac-
tices (Venice Commission, p. 6). Similarly 
to the OAS, the Venice Commission empha-
sized that “[s]ince the Constitution does not 
include any express limitations on the power 
for the executive to introduce a question of 
confidence or to use it in a ministerial ini-
tiative, neither as concerns the frequency of 
exercising this power nor the subject matter 
to which it is linked, the issue of whether 
a constitutional amendment introduced in 
Congress by the executive could be linked 
to a question of confidence can only be clar-
ified by a decision of the Constitutional Tri-
bunal of Peru.” (p. 10). 
In that light, the importance of the selection 
of judges to the Constitutional Court cannot 
be overstated. Moreover, the events of 2019 
again show the problematic situation of a 
President with very little backing in Parlia-
ment, created by the Peruvian Constitution. 
Yet this situation also involves other con-
siderations, such as how certain politicians 
act – the leader of the majority party, Keiko 
Fujimori, was only recently released from 
preventive detention. 
(Note: Keiko Fujimori was placed into pretri-
al detention on January 28, 2020; see below.)
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Pedro Carlos Olaechea Álvarez-Calderón 
vs Executive Power (Expediente 0006-2019-
CC/TC Auto 1): Conflict of competences 
This case deals with the question of wheth-
er the Constitutional Court was competent 
to decide on the constitutionality of the dis-
solution of Congress with Supreme Decree 
165-2019-PCM. The case was brought to 
the Court by Pedro Carlos Olaechea Álva-
rez-Calderón, former president of the Con-
gress, and the Constitutional Court had to 
decide first whether Olaechea had the legit-
imation to bring the case to the Court since 
the relevant norms required the plenum of 
Congress to back such a demand. The Court 
decided that the principle of pro actione (as 
laid down in Article III of the Preliminary 
Title of the Code of Constitutional Proce-
dure) had to be applied, adapting the formal 
requirements in order to guarantee the pri-
macy of the Constitution.
At the core of the decision lies the question 
of whether the executive branch is compe-
tent to put forward motions of confidence 
with regard to competences which are ex-
clusive of Congress. Such competences 
reflect the approval of constitutional re-
forms (Art. 206, Peruvian Constitution) and 
the selection and election of judges of the 
Constitutional Court (Art. 201, Peruvian 
Constitution). Furthermore, the questions 
arose whether a motion of confidence can 
be decided in a tacit or factual manner, and 
the way the motion has to be debated (with 
regard to the possibility of self-regulation 
of Congress). 
The Constitutional Court accepted that there 
was a conflict of competence since one con-
stitutional organ had allegedly interfered 
with the competence sphere of another con-
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stitutional organ. It laid down that it was for 
the development of the democratic system 
that the Constitutional Court had to decide 
on the matter and that the controversy on 
the dissolution of Congress was one of the 
most important and urgent constitutional 
conflicts mentioned in Art. 202, para. 3 of 
the Peruvian Constitution. Therefore, the 
Constitutional Court accepted the deman-
da competencial. However, the Court also 
pointed out that accepting the claim did not 
mean to anticipate a decision. It was only in 
January 2020 that the Constitutional Court 
decided the matter. Together with solving 
the conflict of competences, Olaechea had 
also requested a provisional measure to 
nullify the closing of Congress, which was 
refused by the Constitutional Court. It ruled 
that there had not been enough evidence 
that the closure of Congress was an uncon-
stitutional decision of the President.
Some authors argue that the decision of the 
Constitutional Court (to deny the provision-
al measure and to accept deciding on the 
conflict of competences) was ambiguous 
since both cases relied on a July 25th de-
cision on the plenary of Congress. On that 
day, Congress adopted an agreement that al-
lowed the president of the Congress to call 
on the Constitutional Court regarding the 
scope of a motion of confidence. The ambi-
guity is seen in the fact that on the one hand, 
Olaechea as the president of Congress is 
(according to the Constitutional Court) able 
to file a complaint regarding a conflict of 
competences based on the decision of July 
25th; on the other hand, that same decision, 
according to the Constitutional Court, does 
not allow Olaechea to bring the provisional 
measure to the Court because it seems that 
the authorization of the decision targets a 
different topic. According to the Court, this 
ambiguity was solved by the application of 
the mentioned principle of pro actione. 
Note: The competence conflict was decided 
on January 14, 2020, and will be covered in 
next year’s report. 
2. Keiko Sofia Fujimori Higuchi (Sachie 
Marcela Fujimori Higuchi in her represen-
tation) vs The Second Criminal Specialized 
Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima (Ex-
pediente 02534-2019-PHC/TC) 
On October 31, 2018, Keiko Fujimori was 
placed into pretrial detention due to an inves-
tigation of asset laundering (in aggravating 
circumstances). On January 3, 2019, that de-
cision was confirmed by an ordinary justice. 
On March 8, 2019, Sachie Fujimori Higuchi 
(her sister) filed a writ of habeas corpus on 
her behalf before the Constitutional Court, 
which had to analyze the following points:  
A. To declare admissible or not the pro-
ceedings, taking into consideration a 
pending ruling in a similar matter before 
the ordinary courts (recurso de casacion). 
The Constitutional Court considered that 
in principle, applications like this should 
be dismissed; nonetheless, it considered 
that they could be admitted exceptional-
ly when the issue had been decided by 
the ordinary courts and had turned final 
(firmeza sobrevenida), and the proceed-
ing before the Constitutional Court was 
still open. In that line, the tribunal point-
ed out that on September 12, 2019, the 
Supreme Court of Justice had answered 
the request of cassation filed by Keiko 
Fujimori and, therefore, it considered it-
self competent to decide the case.
B. Considerations on the right to person-
al liberty and pretrial detentions as an 
ultima ratio. The Constitutional Court 
stressed the fact that all judges must 
protect the right of individuals to be pre-
sumed innocent by issuing reasoned and 
proportional judgments that connect the 
theory of the case with the evidence pro-
vided by the public prosecutors.  
C. The delay of the ordinary justice to pro-
cess Keiko Fujimori’s request of an ap-
peal. The Constitutional Court considered 
that the delay led to a breach of her funda-
mental rights. It ordered that in the future, 
the judge of the first instance should apply 
measures guaranteeing the fundamental 
rights of defendants. Moreover, the Court 
decided to inform the Internal Control 
Body of the Judiciary (Control Interno de 
la Magistratura) about these conclusions 
so they could proceed with the necessary 
investigations.
D. On the right of defense (specifically, 
regarding the time to prepare the defense 
and provide evidence). The Constitution-
al Court considered that the judge of the 
first instance had not given Keiko Fuji-
mori’s defense reasonable time to ana-
lyze the indictment made by the public 
prosecutor. It stressed that the right to 
prepare a defense and evidence could 
be impaired by violations of due process 
of law or when the time given to that 
effect was extremely short. As before, 
the Court decided to notify the Internal 
Control Body of the Judiciary about its 
conclusions.
E. On the impairment of the right to ob-
tain a reasoned judgment. In a lengthy 
consideration, the Constitutional Court 
stressed the fact that the evidence of the 
case did not show a strong link between 
Keiko Fujimori and a criminal organi-
zation (as alleged by the Prosecutor’s 
Office). According to the Constitutional 
Court, due diligence required contrasting 
the evidence of the case with new cases in 
order to obtain certainty or plausibility of 
the existence of a criminal organization. 
The Court noted that the evidence did not 
link Keiko Fujimori to grave suspicions 
of the commitment of the alleged crime. 
According to the Court, the judge of the 
first instance based his decision on mere 
presumptions that made him determine 
the existence of those grave suspicions. 
The Court also examined the declaration 
of other witnesses. It concluded that the 
judge’s motivation lacked an inner rea-
soned argumentation because after ad-
mitting those declarations in their entire-
ty, he then proceeded to discard sections 
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of them insofar as they could lead him to 
different conclusions. 
In regards to that same right, but consider-
ing the decision of the judge of the second 
instance, the Court concluded that the argu-
mentation of the judge of the second instance 
was unconstitutional. In the Court’s view, 
the way the second instance’s judge deduced 
that Keiko Fujimori knew about the origin 
of the money could only lead to the conclu-
sion that pretrial detention could be imposed 
without a minimal verification of the de-
fendant’s participation in the alleged crime. 
This situation led to a violation of the right to 
be presumed innocent. As a result, the Court 
declared the right to obtain a reasoned judg-
ment infringed. Moreover, the Court consid-
ered that the judge also infringed that right 
by supporting grave suspicions in facts that 
had not been correctly assessed; namely, the 
fact that Fujimori knew about the circulation 
of money coming from Brazil and the fact 
that her political party (Fuerza Popular 2011) 
was financed illegally. Moreover, the fact 
that she was part of a criminal organization 
and that she was aware of the illicit origin of 
the assets, among other points. 
The Court also questioned the cassation de-
cision adopted by the Supreme Court that re-
duced the pretrial detention of Fujimori from 
36 to 18 months. The Constitutional Court re-
called that the Supreme Court was convinced 
that Fujimori was at no risk of absconding 
but that she could hinder the process of col-
lecting further evidence. According to the 
Constitutional Court, the Prosecutor’s Office 
had collected abundant evidence during Fu-
jimori’s detention and therefore there was no 
reason for not releasing her at that moment. 
It also considered that the cassation lacked 
a congruent reasoning, insofar as it did not 
include a ruling over all the points presented 
by the plaintiff. 
Some of the judges of the Constitutional 
Court issued their individual opinions. They 
each pointed out that the judgment went too 
far and invaded the exclusive competences 
of the judiciary, specifically by assessing and 
evaluating criminal evidence and by assess-
ing and evaluating the facts of the criminal 
case. Alleged political pressure, requests of 
the judiciary directed at the Constitutional 
Court to clarify its judgment and new pro-
ceedings against Keiko Fujimori in order to 
remand her in pretrial detention are the back-
ground and the outcome of this controversial 
judgment.
Note: On January 28, 2020, pursuant a court 
order, Keiko Fujimori was placed again into 
pretrial detention for a period of 15 months. 
This will be covered in next year’s report. 
3. Constitutional complaint of Erick Américo 
Iriarte Ahón against the resolution of page 
71 of 24 August 2016, issued by the Superi-
or Court of Justice of Lima (Primera Civil), 
(Expediente N 00442-2017-PA/TC): Twitter 
account of a (former) president of the Cabinet 
and right to access public information
The case was referred to the Constitutional 
Court in 2019, but its roots lie further back.
This case dates back to 2015, when a citi-
zen was blocked from following the person-
al Twitter account of former president of the 
Cabinet Cateriano Bellido, arguing (among 
others) his right to access public information 
was violated. Whereas the First Civil Divi-
sion of the Superior Court of Justice of Lima 
did not deem it necessary to proceed with 
the claim (since Cateriano Bellido is not the 
president of the Cabinet any more), the Con-
stitutional Court decided the case. One of 
the claimant’s arguments was that the right 
of access to public information was violat-
ed. The Constitutional Court could not find a 
violation regarding this. It argued that a per-
sonal Twitter account is not an official way 
of transmitting public information (the Cabi-
net has its own Twitter account), and just be-
cause a citizen holds public office does not 
take away his right to block someone from 
his Twitter account. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
2020 is a promising year for Peru: First, the 
Constitutional Court already decided on the 
conflict of competences regarding the disso-
lution of Congress. Second, parliamentary 
elections, which can be considered clean and 
democratic, were held at the end of January. 
Therefore, restoration of the political equi-
librium and the reestablishment of democrat-
ic control between state powers seems to be 
within reach.
V. FURTHER READING
César Landa Arroyo, ‘Is the Dissolution 
of the Peruvian Congress a Constitutional 




For further developments, see César Landa 
Arroyo, <https://www.enfoquederecho.com/
author/landa/>
Maria Bertel, ‘Democratization through De-
centralization. Why Electoral Laws Matter’ 
(2019), 52 World Comparative Law 7. 
4 Ley que regula el gasto de publicidad del estado peruano, Ley Nº 30793.
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POLAND I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2019 was exceedingly important in 
the Polish political calendar due to the Euro-
pean and parliamentary elections that consti-
tuted the hope that the democratic opposition 
would gain an advantage over the ruling Law 
and Justice party (PiS). Nevertheless, PiS 
still enjoyed strong popularity. The results of 
the first chamber (Sejm) parliamentary elec-
tions allowed PiS to remain in power. A new 
situation, however, was created in the Sen-
ate, where opposition parties, together with 
non-allied senators, were able to secure the 
majority. The weaker position of Poland’s 
second chamber in fulfilling the legislative 
function does not let PiS opponents block 
controversial bills, but may slow down the 
unprecedented legislative hurry, which was 
characteristic of the previous parliamentary 
term of office. The Senate also participates 
in many appointment decisions, including, 
inter alia, the Ombudsman and the President 
of the Supreme Chamber of Control. It is 
believed that debates and various events an-
nounced by the newly elected speaker, Pro-
fessor Tomasz Grodzki, may contribute to 
wider public awareness of potential threats 
contained in proposed legislative solutions.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
Last year was marked by unprecedented 
measures leading to the destruction of ju-
dicial independence on the one hand, by 
applying legal provisions introduced to the 
legal system in 2017-2018, and on the other 
hand by using previously existing provisions 
concerning the disciplinary accountability of 
judges in an abusive manner. Also, through-
out the year, disciplinary prosecutors ap-
pointed by the Minister of Justice launched 
dozens of investigations concerning adjudi-
cation decisions. This kind of political action 
aimed at intimidating judges was possible 
only due to the capture of the institution of 
disciplinary prosecutors. Before the reform, 
it was the independent National Council of 
the Judiciary (NCJ) that appointed the gen-
eral disciplinary prosecutor and its deputies. 
Under the new rules, the Minister of Justice 
has also been empowered to indicate who 
from among the courts of appeal judges 
should play the role of disciplinary judges 
at the first instance, while the disciplinary 
courts’ presidents are now appointed by the 
head of the new Disciplinary Chamber (DC) 
of the Supreme Court (SC). 
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From the beginning, this institutional struc-
ture seemed to be well thought out in order 
to tame judges who dared to contest the ‘re-
form’. The most spectacular actions violat-
ing the constitutional principle of judicial 
independence included various disciplinary 
charges slapped against judges1 for their 
critical statements about the current policies 
regarding the administration of justice, the 
composition of the new NCJ,2 and the sta-
tus of the DC. In some cases, judges were 
held accountable for the content of their 
judicial decisions.3 A widely commented 
example of judge intimidation consisted of 
launching disciplinary proceedings against 
Justice Paweł Juszczyszyn from Olsztyn, 
who demanded that the Chancellery of the 
Sejm hand over the list of signatures of those 
giving their support to candidates of the new 
NCJ. The list of signatures remained secret 
despite the ruling of the Supreme Administra-
tive Court (SAC), which ordered to disclose 
them. Apart from this accusation of com-
mitting a disciplinary offence, Juszczyszyn, 
only several hours after making his deci-
sion, was called off from his secondment to 
a court of a higher instance. The initiative 
of Justice Juszczyszyn was a follow-up of 
the judgement of the CJEU in joined cases 
C–585/18, C–624/18, and C–625/184 con-
cerning the controversies around the status 
of the DC. This chamber is comprised of 
judges whose legal status can be questioned 
as they undergo the nominating procedure 
conducted by the newly elected NCJ. On 
19 November 2019, the CJEU ruled that the 
Polish SC, as the referring court in these cas-
es, should assess whether the DC was in fact 
independent. In its judgement, the CJEU set 
out criteria for this assessment, also quoting 
its previous case law. 
In December 2019, a new bill was submitted 
to the Parliament from the initiative of the 
ruling party that was supposed to intensify 
disciplinary sanctions against judges. The 
new law was an attempt to block the imple-
mentation of the above-mentioned CJEU 
judgement. The law was widely criticized by 
the democratic opposition, judges, and repre-
sentatives of other legal professions as well 
as by constitutional law scholars. A deep con-
cern was also expressed by Věra Jourová, the 
European Commission’s Vice-President. She 
turned to the Polish President, Prime Minis-
ter, and Parliament to suspend work on this 
bill until further consultations were conduct-
ed. Her effort did not bring about any results, 
and public protests against the bill were ig-
nored. Then, at the end of 2019, the statute 
was passed by the Sejm and put forward 
to the Senate. According to this new law, a 
judge could be held accountable not only, as 
previously, for obvious and gross violation 
of the provisions of law and for breach of 
the authority of the judicial offices but also 
for acts or omissions that may prevent or sig-
nificantly impede the functioning of the jus-
tice system; actions questioning the status of 
a judge, including the effectiveness of their 
appointment, as well as for actions question-
ing ‘constitutional empowerment’ of a con-
stitutional organ of the state; and actions for 
any public activities ‘incompatible with the 
principles of the independence of courts and 
judges’. Only in the last moment, a provision 
on the accountability for not applying a law 
due to its non-conformity with the Constitu-
tion and with an international agreement was 
abandoned. Despite its removal, the new law 
continues to contradict the fundamental val-
ues of the European Union’s (EU) legal or-
der by violating judicial independence. The 
new law’s direct aim remains the same: to 
eliminate the possibility of implementing 
CJEU judgement so the state of affairs creat-
ed by PiS will solidify.
Two of the most constitutionally important 
events of 2019 were the European and par-
liamentary elections. As mentioned above, 
PiS was able to win both of these elections. 
As a result, an interesting issue arose involv-
ing a relatively high number of filled elec-
toral complaints (279) directed at the new 
Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs 
Chamber of the SC. To some extent, the 
complaints were politically motivated. PiS 
representatives declared their dissatisfaction 
with the electoral results to the Senate, sug-
gesting the need for a repeated vote count. 
This approach seemed to challenge the basic 
aim of the institution of the electoral protest. 
The SC declined to count the votes again, 
took into account only summited documents, 
and eventually rejected all objections. Final-
ly, on 23 December 2019, the SC proclaimed 
the election results valid. 
Many controversies were caused by an elec-
toral complaint concerning the Senate elec-
tions in one of the electoral districts where 
PiS registered a new candidate to the Sen-
ate – Marek Komorowski – in place of the 
deceased Kornel Morawiecki (father of 
the Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki). 
There were legal doubts related to the way by 
which a date for announcing a new candidate 
was determined. On the basis of Article 265a 
of the Electoral Code, an announcement of a 
candidate’s death shall be made not later than 
15 days prior to the election date. In this case, 
the 15th day prior to the election date fell on 
a Saturday; however, Morawiecki died on 
Monday, or in other words, on the 13th day 
prior to the elections. Nevertheless, the State 
1 Rule of Law, ‘Judges under fire: 43 judges already targeted by disciplinary officer and prosecutors’ (10 January 2020) <https://ruleoflaw.pl/judges-un-
der-fire-43-judges-already-targeted-by-disciplinary-officer-and-prosecutors/> accessed 31.01.2020.
2 Judicial members of the NCJ were previously elected by bodies of judicial self-government, but currently the first chamber of Parliament (the Sejm) elects them 
from amongst candidates supported by either 25 judges or 2000 citizens, who must confirm each candidature by their signature. The new method of being elected 
to the NCJ is perceived by the majority of academia as an apparent constitutional infringement of Article 187 (1) of the Polish Constitution. However, the politically 
captured CT ruled on 25 March 2019 that the new procedure is in conformity with the Constitution (see ‘Constitutional Cases’).
3 Justice Alina Czubieniak was reprimanded for her ruling revoking a previous decision on pre-trial detention of a man with intellectual disabilities who allegedly 
harassed a 9-year-old girl, but was deprived of the right to legal aid at the prosecutor’s hearing. Eventually, the disciplinary proceeding was launched only because 
the DC ruled she was guilty, although they decided not to impose any punishing means.
4 InfoCuria ‘Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber)’ (19 November 2019) <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=220770&text=&dir=&do-
clang=EN&part=1&occ=first&mode=DOC&pageIndex=0&cid=611315> accessed 31.01.2020.
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Electoral Commission (SEC) accepted a new 
candidate, taking into account Article 9 § 2 
of the Electoral Code, which provides that 
‘if the end of the time limit for performing an 
activity stated in this code falls on Saturday 
or on a public holiday, the time limit expires 
on the first business day after that day’. Ac-
cording to a number of analysts, this kind of 
interpretation was oversimplified and incor-
rect. In order to conclude that the end of the 
time limit for performing an activity falls on 
a Saturday or a public holiday, as referred to 
in the above-mentioned provision, the time 
limit should be ‘opened’. This is because this 
provision introduces an extension of the lim-
it. Therefore, in the discussed case, the death 
of a candidate should have initiated this time 
limit. This argument was accepted neither by 
the SEC nor by the SC, which considered the 
complaint.
The year 2019 was also significant because 
the reformed composition of the SEC en-
tered into force.5 The reform abolished the 
judicial character of the commission, which 
was widely criticised by constitutional 
scholars as well as by the Venice Commis-
sion. Presently, the SEC is composed of nine 
members: seven appointed by the Sejm; one 
is a judge of the Constitutional Tribunal 
(CT) appointed by the president of the CT; 
and one is a judge of the SAC appointed by 
the president of the SAC.6 On 20 December 
2019, the Sejm elected seven new members 
of the SEC, three appointed by PiS, two by 
the Civic Coalition, one by the Left, and one 
by the PSL-Kukiz’15. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Judgement of the Constitutional Tribu-
nal of 25 March 2019 (K 12/18) – Election 
of judges to the NCJ by the Sejm (OTK ZU 
A/2019, item 17)’
The CT ruled that the election of judges to 
the NCJ by the Sejm (on the grounds of the 
8 December 2017 amendment to the Act on 
the NCJ) is in conformity with the Constitu-
tion. At the same time, the CT decided that 
Article 44, para. 1a of the Act on the NCJ 
is inconsistent with Article 184 of the Con-
stitution. This statutory provision regulated a 
right of appeal to the SAC against the NCJ’s 
resolutions in individual cases concerning an 
appointment of SC judges. This provision 
constituted an exception to the general rule 
that the NCJ’s resolutions can be questioned 
before the SC.
Such a controversial decision by the CT was 
justified rather abruptly and superficially. 
The CT applied a strict textual interpretation 
of Article 187, para. 1 (2) of the Constitution 
by emphasising its wording, according to 
which 15 judges are ‘chosen from amongst 
judges’, but not necessarily by judges. In this 
way, the CT ignored the practice of electing 
this group of NCJ members by bodies of the 
judicial self-government that was established 
at the very beginning of the NCJ’s existence 
(1989). The CT’s juxtaposition of the said 
provision with Article 187, para. 1 (1) and 
(3) of the Constitution – both strictly spec-
ifying who nominates the respective mem-
bers – does not justify the conclusion about 
legislative freedom in this respect. Taking 
into account the constitutional function of 
the NCJ (i.e., safeguarding the independence 
of the courts and judges), the election of 23 
out of 25 members of this State body by the 
political organ raises reasonable doubts. Un-
fortunately, the CT ignored these doubts, 
notwithstanding very few vague remarks, 
such as the one stating that the constitutional 
requirements regarding courts and tribunals 
are not applicable to the NCJ since this or-
gan is not included in the Constitution as an 
organ of judicial power.
In regards to the SAC’s appeals against the 
NCJ’s resolutions, the CT reasoned that the 
criteria of assigning cases in the adminis-
trative courts were not fulfilled in this case, 
and that issues regarding the same category 
should not be considered by courts of differ-
ent types. However, in the aftermath of the 
CT’s ruling, the Parliament amended the Act 
on the NCJ, excluding any appeals in this re-
gard to any sort of court, trying at the same 
time to force ex lege discontinuation of the 
appeal proceedings already in progress be-
fore the SAC.7 This meant that candidates 
to the SC whose candidatures had not been 
included in the NCJ’s motions submitted to 
the President became deprived of their con-
stitutional right to a trial.
Regardless of the poor quality of reasoning 
given by the CT, the discussed judgement 
provides a striking example of how the rul-
ing party uses the captured CT as a tool to 
achieve political goals. One cannot forget 
the fact that the judgement was decided with 
the participation of Justyn Piskorski (who 
was even the judge rapporteur in this case), 
a person illegally elected to the CT in 2017 
following the death of one of the three so-
called ‘double-judges’ unduly elected for the 
vacancies already filled by the Sejm for the 
precedent term of office.8  
2. Judgement of the Supreme Administra-
tive Court of 28 June 2019 – Disclosure of 
the lists of the NCJ candidates’ supporters (I 
OSK 4282/18)
In this case, the SAC dismissed the cassation 
appeal through which the head of the Chan-
cellery of the Sejm challenged the previous 
judgement of the Voivodship Administrative 
Court (VAC) in Warsaw. Thus, the SAC fi-
nally acknowledged that the lists of the NCJ 
candidates’ supporters amongst judges (see 
note 2) should be disclosed. Therefore, the 
constitutional right to obtain public infor-
mation found judicial protection, despite the 
huge efforts of the ruling party to conceal 
these lists from the public. During the course 
of the NCJ election proceedings, a citizen 
applied for the disclosure of the lists of the 
5 Article 157 § 2 amended by Article 5 (59) (a) of the Act of 11 January 2018 (‘Journal of Laws of 2018’, item 130), which amended this Act as of 12 November 2019. 
6 Before the amendment, the SEC was composed solely of judges (i.e., 3 judges of the CT, 3 judges of the SC and 3 judges of the SAC).
7 See the 26 April 2019 amendment to the Act on the NCJ and to the Act – the Law on the System of Administrative Courts. 
8 About the illegal election of the 3 judges in 2015, see T.T. Koncewicz, M. Zubik, M. Konopacka, K. Staśkiewicz, ‘Developments in Polish Constitutional Law’, in 
R. Albert, D. Landau, P. Faraguna, S. Drugda (eds.), The I·CONnect-Clough Center 2016 Global Review of Constitutional Law (Clough Center 2017) 166.
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candidates’ supporters. The head of the Se-
jm’s Chancellery refused to disclose the lists, 
claiming that Article 11c of the Act on the 
NCJ – a provision passed by the Sejm in or-
der to make the lists non-transparent – does 
not allow it. According to this provision, the 
Marshal (Speaker) of the Sejm shall immedi-
ately hand in the candidates’ applications to 
deputies and make them public ‘except for 
attachments’. These ‘attachments’ included 
the lists of supporters. The Chancellery of 
the Sejm argued that the above-mentioned 
provision excluded the disclosure of the lists 
and constituted an exception in the rules es-
tablished in the Act on Access to Public In-
formation. The VAC overruled the decision 
of the Head of the Chancellery of the Sejm, 
stating that only lists of ordinary citizens are 
not subject to access (due to the protection 
of privacy), while the names of judges who 
supported candidates should be accessible. 
Later, the SAC adjudicated that Article 11c 
does not provide for different rules and a di-
verse mode of access to public information 
in comparison to the universal legal stan-
dard. The only significance thereof involves 
the specific duties of the Marshal (Speak-
er) of the Sejm in the election proceedings 
regarding the NCJ’s composition. Hence, 
Article 11c pertains to another kind of pro-
ceeding than the one on the access to public 
information.
Following the SAC’s ruling, the president of 
the Personal Data Protection Office issued 
an interim order preventing the Sejm’s Chan-
cellery from disclosing the judges’ personal 
data included on the lists of support. Taking 
into account this approach, the Chancellery 
decided not to subordinate to the judicial 
decision, although after the SAC ruling, the 
VAC judgement became final. The abandon-
ment of the lists’ disclosure proves the lack 
of transparency in the 2018 NCJ elections, 
and is widely perceived as an attempt to hide 
ties of its members to the Ministry of Justice. 
On the other hand, the disregarding of the 
Court’s final decision by an administrative 
body provides an example of a flagrant dis-
play of the Polish rule of law crisis.
3. Judgement of the Supreme Court of 5 De-
cember 2019 – Status of the NCJ and the Dis-
ciplinary Chamber (DC) of the SC (III PO 
7/18)
The SC ruled that the newly established DC 
of the SC – the crucial component of the so-
called judiciary reform forced through Par-
liament – does not fulfill both the constitu-
tional and the EU law standard of the right 
to a fair trial.
The legal background of this case involved 
two statutes: the Act amending the Act on the 
NCJ and the new Act on the SC. The first one 
established the election of 15 judges to the 
NCJ by the Sejm (instead of being elected 
by judges). The Act on the SC, in turn, inter 
alia, reorganised the division of the SC (in-
cluding the creation of the DC) and reduced 
the age of SC judges’ retirement from 70 
to 65 years – this is also the case for SAC 
judges.9 A judge who reached the age of 65 
years had to retire unless they declared the 
will of further incumbency and received the 
President of the Republic’s assent. The Pres-
ident of the Republic was entitled to seek 
an opinion of the NCJ in this respect. The 
above-mentioned changes applied also to 
the incumbents of the SC/SAC seats of that 
time. The requirement to apply for a consent 
of the executive organ regarding the possi-
bility of further incumbency of judges raised 
serious doubts in terms of the conformity of 
such regulations with the principles of the 
separation of powers, irremovability, and the 
independence of judges.
On 1 January 2019, the 21 November 2018 
amendment to the Act on the SC entered into 
force. It enabled the retired SC and SAC 
judges, who had been appointed before the 
2017 Act on the SC came into force, to return 
to their duties. The decisive role in amending 
the 2017 Act on the SC was played by the 
preliminary order of the CJEU vice-presi-
dent in October 2018, issued with regard to 
treaty infringement proceedings initiated by 
the European Commission. The vice-presi-
dent’s order obliged Poland to cancel the le-
gal effects of the 2017 Act regarding retire-
ment pursuant to the new rules by the judges 
appointed before this Act entered into force.
In the judgement of 5 December 2019, the 
SC took into account the already discussed 
CJEU judgement of 19 November 2019. Al-
though the CJEU did not answer the ques-
tions submitted in case no. C–585/18 (unlike 
in the remaining two joint cases), the SC 
pointed out the universally binding charac-
ter of the CJEU’s interpretation of EU law. 
Notwithstanding the applicant’s return to du-
ties, because of his legal interest, the SC did 
not discontinue the proceedings. It ruled that 
the DC is not a court in light of Article 47 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU, Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and Article 45 of the Polish 
Constitution. The Labour and Social Insur-
ance Chamber (which had the jurisdiction 
in this matter before the creation of the DC) 
refused to put forward the applicant’s appeal 
to the DC and decided to rule on the appeal 
by itself, striking down the NCJ’s resolution.
According to the SC, the lack of NCJ inde-
pendence from the legislative and executive 
powers may be demonstrated by, inter alia, 
the shortening of the constitutional term of 
office of the former NCJ members and en-
trusting the Sejm with the competence to 
elect NCJ judicial members. It must be em-
phasized that presently 23 out of 25 mem-
bers of the NCJ are nominated by the legisla-
tive and executive powers. Many reasonable 
doubts were also caused by the circumstanc-
es of the 2018 election proceedings; for 
example, keeping the candidates’ support-
er lists secret and the fact that amongst the 
elected members of the NCJ are judges sec-
onded to the Ministry of Justice.
The assessment of the NCJ provided by 
the SC was based on the aggregation of the 
above-mentioned and further circumstances. 
Taken separately, none of these played a de-
cisive role. A similar method has been used 
in order to assess the status of the DC. As 
far as the status of the latter is concerned, 
the SC argued, inter alia, that this chamber 
9 According to Article 49 of the Act of 25 July 2002 – the Law on the System of Administrative Courts – in matters not regulated within this Act, provisions regarding 
the SC shall apply as appropriate.
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was created from scratch, and has an adju-
dicative monopoly in some category of cases 
concerning SC judges. The SC also argued 
that the DC is composed exclusively of judg-
es appointed on the motion of the new – not 
independent – NCJ.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
The criticism concerning the many measures 
adopted in violation of the rule of law is con-
sistently ignored by the ruling party, which 
still counts on huge electoral support. This 
means that one cannot be very optimistic 
that the political and legal situation in Poland 
will significantly change in the near future. 
The organs and institutions constitutional-
ly aimed at securing the legal and political 
checks and balances lose their inherent role 
in this respect. The capture of the CT became 
evident, even for an unacquainted observer, 
since two active PiS politicians, famous for 
their unrefined attacks against the oppo-
sition, were elected to the CT in the fall of 
2019. Anyone who might think that the state 
approaches the direction of so-called politi-
cal constitutionalism at the expense of legal 
constitutionalism is deeply mistaken. Parlia-
mentary organs are treated not as forums for 
exchanging opinions and wide public debate 
but as a rubber stamp of political decisions 
made by parallel political factors with PiS’s 
leader at the forefront. Perhaps the CJEU’s 
expected 2020 rulings regarding the new 
disciplinary regime for Polish judges, issued 
as a result of the European Commission’s in-
fringement procedure, may force the govern-
ment to ease its position a bit. In this regard, 
at the beginning of 2020, the European Com-
mission decided to request that the CJEU is-
sue interim measures that may contribute to 
abolishing or reforming the controversial DC 
of the SC. As Wojciech Sadurski rightly ar-
gues ‘while no PiS politician actively wants 
Poland to exit the EU, they have even less 
appetite for a system in which EU law takes 
priority and allows European institutions 
to call out democratic defects in a member 
state’.10 This may raise legitimate concerns 
as to the further functioning of Poland in the 
EU’s structures.
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2019 was a year marked by political change 
and social contestation. On the political quad-
rant, we saw the end of the highly publicized 
geringonça (contraption), due to the lack of 
consensus between the Socialist Party and 
its previous left-wing allies. We now have a 
minority socialist Government that will have 
to seek the support of other parties when 
necessary. The Portuguese Parliament also 
became more fragmented in the 2019 legisla-
tive elections, with the election of Parliament 
members by parties that, until then, had not 
achieved representation (in particular, a rad-
ical right-wing party was able, for the first 
time in our democracy, to elect one member 
of Parliament). 
The social field was also very active, with 
the summoning of several strikes in different 
professional sectors. Strikes by the drivers of 
dangerous goods transport vehicles were par-
ticularly felt, which led the Government to in-
voke administrative emergency powers. But 
discontent was also very acute among health 
professionals, teachers, and even policemen. 
And since the Government did not correspond 
to their demands, this scenario is likely to re-
peat itself in the next year. 
For its part, constitutional jurisprudence fo-
cused, once again, on the matter of family 
rights (revisiting its landmark decision on 
surrogacy, but also its previous rulings on 
paternity proceedings), while reaffirming the 
rights to citizenship and personality develop-
ment, as well as to privacy and the protection 
of communications. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. European elections and low turnout rate
In the 2019 European elections, the turnout 
rate increased in 20 of the 28 EU states.1 By 
contrast, the turnout rate in Portugal was very 
disappointing, scoring merely 31.40% and 
leaving the remaining 68.60% to abstention.2 
The centre-left Socialists (PS) won the 2019 
European Parliamentary (EP) elections with 
33.4%. This result was quite surprising and 
marked the first time that a sitting Govern-
ment won a European election. 
Notwithstanding the new measures that were 
introduced to boost voting in Portugal (such 
as advanced voting, pilot experiences with 
electronic voting, or postal voting abroad), 
abstention rates in the Portuguese 2019 EP 
elections hit record levels.3 Further studies 
1 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20190523STO52402/elections-2019-high-
est-turnout-in-20-years 
2 See https://election-results.eu/ 
3 Catarina Santos Botelho, ‘European Elections: The Silence of the Lambs and the Dangerous Political 
Resignation – The Portuguese Perspective’, in DCU Brexit Institute Blog, 03/06/2019, available at: http://
dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2019/06/european-elections-the-silence-of-the-lambs-and-the-dangerous-politi-
cal-resignation-in-portugal/
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are being held to try to understand the rea-
sons behind abstention rates and to put for-
ward possible solutions to overcome endoge-
nous and exogenous electoral problems.4 
2. Legislative elections
In the 2015 legislative elections, the colliga-
tion PàF (Portugal à Frente) – which gath-
ered the center-right party PSD (Social Dem-
ocratic Party) and the conservative CDS-PP 
(Popular Party) – won by 39%. However, as 
the colligation PàF was not able to pass its 
governmental program by the Parliament, it 
was dismissed just twenty-eight days after 
its nomination, making it the shortest Gov-
ernment ever in the Portuguese constitution-
al democracy.5  
Aiming at stability, the President of the Re-
public then nominated a Government draw-
ing on the Socialist Party (which was the 
second most voted party) after the other left-
wing parties – the coalition of the Commu-
nist Portuguese Party (PCP) and the Greens 
(‘Os Verdes’), and the Left Bloc (BE) – clar-
ified that they would provide parliamentary 
support. 
This arrangement was regarded abroad with 
some curiosity. Would it last? Would it be re-
peated with the same partners or with new 
ones? Or would the socialists secure an abso-
lute majority in the following elections and 
govern without allies? 
This unprecedented arrangement, that many 
believed would fade away soon at the first 
political impasse, surprisingly lasted through 
the four-year parliamentary term. It became 
known, not without a pejorative connota-
tion, as ‘contraption’ (geringonça). This 
contraption was not a coalition, but instead 
a post-electoral alliance that was even writ-
ten and made public. Naturally, the agree-
ment benefited both parties: the commu-
nists-greens and the Left Bloc would support 
the minority socialist Government while at 
the same time ensuring the implementation 
of some of their political initiatives. During 
the legislature, the Government was able to 
sustain the delicate balance between com-
plying to eurozone budget commitments and 
partially reversing austerity measures. 
Four years later, and as some predicted, ‘the 
likelihood of a potential geringonça 2.0’ 
highly depended on the electoral result for 
the PS.6 And, in fact, the political landscape 
changed in the 2019 legislative elections, 
which resulted in political fragmentation. 
The communists and the Green Party ‘Os 
Verdes’, as well as the PSD and the CDS-PP, 
lost a considerable number of votes. In turn, 
the People, Animals and Nature Party (PAN) 
had an excellent result and two new right-
wing parties (the radical right ‘CHEGA’ and 
the liberal ‘Iniciativa Liberal’) entered the 
Portuguese Parliament as well as the new 
left-wing party ‘LIVRE’. 
Immediately after the elections, the Prime 
Minister (PM), António Costa (of the So-
cialist Party), considered renewing the ger-
ingonça with one or more parties. However, 
after meetings with the other left-wing par-
ties represented in the Parliament, the PS 
decided that it would govern as a minority 
Government and seek support from the other 
parties when necessary.7
3. Social contestation
During 2019, social contestation against the 
Government, through strikes and demonstra-
tions, was intensified. Several professional 
sectors contested governmental policies: 
a. Drivers of dangerous goods transport 
vehicles complained about low wages 
and poor working conditions. Their sev-
eral strikes impacted public transporta-
tion, airports, factories, and petrol sta-
tions.8 The PM, António Costa, argued 
that these strikes jeopardized essential 
social needs and, therefore, invoked 
emergency powers. 
b. Doctors, joined by nurses, protest-
ed during a two-day national strike 
that gathered a high level of support 
amongst health professionals of the 
public health system. Apart from sal-
ary revindications, doctors argued for 
a stronger National Health Service 
(SNS), suggesting measures such as 
ensuring a family physician for every 
citizen, decreasing waiting lists, offer-
ing longer appointments, and so on. As 
far as nurses were concerned, they de-
manded better working conditions, the 
recognition of the health sector’s digni-
ty for the benefit of patients and health 
professionals, an earlier retirement age, 
and career progression.9 
c. Teachers reinforced the strikes that 
were held in 2018. They argued for ret-
roactive pay raises (going back almost a 
decade), less working hours per week, 
and the protection of the profession’s 
dignity.10 
4 See João Cancela and Marta Vicente, Portugal Talks – Abstenção e participação eleitoral em Portugal: diagnóstico e hipóteses de reforma (Portugal Talks 2019), 
available at: https://www.pttalks.pt/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Estudo_Portugal-Talks_Abstenção-e-Participação-Eleitoral-em-Portugal_2019-1.pdf 
5 Catarina Santos Botelho, ‘Portugal: The State of Liberal Democracy’, in Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna & Simon Drugda (eds.), 2017 Global Re-
view of Constitutional Law, I.CONnect and the Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College, 2018, pp. 230-234.
6 Celso Gomes, ‘Portuguese Election: What comes after the Geringonça?’, available at: https://europeelects.eu/2019/10/05/portuguese-election-what-comes-af-
ter-the-geringonca/ 
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d. Members of the Public Security Po-
lice (PSP) and the Republican National 
Guard (GNR) manifested outside the 
Parliament and demanded better work-
ing conditions and higher salaries.11 
As a global answer to these revindications, the 
Government stressed the need for financial re-
sponsibility and sustainability as well as main-
tenance of the country’s credibility abroad.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Ruling 465/19: Medically assisted procre-
ation (surrogacy)
Under an anticipatory review of constitution-
ality, the Portuguese Constitutional Court 
(PCC) analyzed Article 2 of Bill no. 383/
XIII, which intended to introduce changes to 
Act no. 32/2006 (the diploma that regulates 
medically assisted procreation). 
This provision reintroduced Article 8 § 8 of 
that same Act, which had been previously 
subjected to constitutional review and de-
clared unconstitutional. Therefore, the pres-
ent judgement revisited the reasoning behind 
that first decision (Judgement 225/2018). 
Article 8 § 8 (in articulation with Article 14 
§ 5 of Act no. 32/2006) allowed surrogates to 
revoke their consent, but merely until the be-
ginning of the medically assisted procreation 
treatments. In Judgement 225/2018, the PCC 
stated that such a rule was incompatible with 
the fundamental rights to personality develop-
ment and to reproductive self-determination.
To substantiate this decision, the PCC 
stressed that these procedures are only ad-
missible, with respect to these rights, be-
cause the surrogate has given her consent. In 
fact, the highly personal nature of the obliga-
tions stemming from this contract demands 
that they should only be complied with vol-
untarily. And such volition must be ensured 
in all phases: the contract’s conclusion, the 
implementation of medically assisted preg-
nancy techniques, the pregnancy, the birth, 
and the child’s relinquishing to the benefi-
ciaries. 
Therefore, one must ensure that the consent 
is truly informed, encompassing this pro-
cess’s full extent, which can be put into ques-
tion since the consent was given even before 
the pregnancy itself. In fact, during surroga-
cy, the woman’s body, as well as her psycho-
logical and emotional well-being, undergo 
several changes. Pregnancy is a complex, 
dynamic, and unique process, during which 
there is the creation of a bond between the 
pregnant woman and the fetus. The possibil-
ity to revoke consent is the only insurance 
that each of these phases is truly voluntary 
and, therefore, still an expression of the sur-
rogate’s right to personality development.
This means that the surrogate must be al-
lowed to deviate from this contract because 
she has decided either to terminate the preg-
nancy (in accordance with the law), or to 
pursue her own parenting project. To try to 
enforce this contract against her will would 
entail the surrogate’s instrumentalisation, 
encroaching her self-determination and dig-
nity. These considerations are equally valid 
if the surrogate is no longer willing to give 
the child up. However, in this case, the de-
cision must rest on the child’s superior inter-
est, which demands a case-by-case analysis.
In the present judgement, the PCC conclud-
ed by stating that Article 2 of Bill no. 383/
XIII intended to reintroduce the exact same 
solution that had been previously censured, 
without there being any supervening circum-
stances that would justify the reopening of 
this debate. Therefore, it considered this arti-
cle to be equally unconstitutional for breach-
ing the fundamental rights to personality de-
velopment and to raise a family.
2. Ruling 464/19: Meta-data
The PCC analyzed the constitutional compli-
ance of Articles 3 and 4 of Act no. 4/2017 
(which regulates the special procedure to 
access telecommunications and Internet data 
by information officers of the Portuguese 
Internal Intelligence Service and the Por-
tuguese External Intelligence Service) by 
means of a subsequent abstract review of 
constitutionality.
Article 3 allowed the access to baseline data 
and equipment location data in order to gath-
er necessary information to safeguard na-
tional defense and homeland security, and 
to prevent acts of sabotage, espionage, ter-
rorism, proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction, and highly organized criminality. 
Article 4 allowed the access to traffic data; to 
provide the necessary information to prevent 
acts of espionage and terrorism. 
In both cases, such access was dependent 
on the previous authorization of one of the 
criminal sections of the Portuguese Supreme 
Court to ensure an appraisal between the 
relevance of the request and the safeguard 
of fundamental rights (Article 5 of Act no. 
4/2017). 
In this judgement, the PCC promoted an in-
terjurisdictional dialogue, considering EU 
law and the jurisprudence of the EUCJ as 
well as the ECHR and the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR. To this effect, the PCC consid-
ered that, in abstract, a restriction to funda-
mental rights on this matter would be ad-
missible according to both Article 15 § 1 of 
Directive 2002/58/EC12 and Article 8 of the 
ECHR, assuming a few conditions were met. 
11 https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Portugal-Police-Demand-Better-Working-Conditions-Higher-Wages-20191121-0006.html 
12 It should be noted that on Judgement Tele2 (joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15), the EUCJ stated that the directive should be interpreted as precluding 
national legislation governing the protection and security of traffic and location data and, in particular, access of the competent national authorities to the 
retained data, where the objective pursued by that access, in the context of fighting crime, is not restricted solely to fighting serious crime, where access 
is not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority, and where there is no requirement that the data concerned should be 
retained within the European Union (point 2 of the ruling). Furthermore, when no longer liable to jeopardize the investigations, the persons affected should 
be notified of these procedures, to enable them to exercise their right to a legal remedy (par. 121).
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The PCC also differentiated between the data 
concerning intersubjective communication 
and the data that does not relate to any com-
munication but only identifies the subjects 
(their name, address, phone number) and the 
equipment location data as well as the traffic 
data that only involves the communication 
between the subjects and a machine, such as 
website consultation. 
The applicants only called upon the infringe-
ment of Article 34 § 4 of the Portuguese Con-
stitution, which enshrines the fundamental 
right to inviolability of one’s home and to pri-
vacy of correspondence. However, the PCC, 
under Article 51 § 1 of the Law of the Con-
stitutional Court, which allows the Court to 
consider other provisions, decided to also take 
into account Articles 26 § 1 and 35 §§ 1, 3, 
and 4 of the Portuguese Constitution. In fact, 
baseline data, which does not concern com-
munications per se, according to the PCC’s 
jurisprudence, is not encompassed by the 
right to confidentiality of communications, 
but instead, by the right to privacy (Article 
26) and to informative self-determination 
(Article 35). 
Taking that into account, and regarding Ar-
ticle 4, the PCC made a distinction between 
data that concerns intersubjective commu-
nication and data that does not. Concern-
ing the first category, the Court stated that 
such an access is unconstitutional. In fact, 
the Portuguese Constitution only allows 
for restrictions on the contents of Article 34 
within criminal procedures. And since that is 
not the case, where information officers are 
concerned, the Portuguese legislator did not 
respect the constitutional choice. 
Still on Article 4 but considering now the 
data that does not involve an intersubjec-
tive communication, the PCC found that 
this norm did not state objective criteria 
for the selection of the citizens affected by 
these measures. In fact, a mere suspicion of 
involvement, in any way, in the preparation 
or execution of terrorist attacks or serious 
crimes would allow the state to target a large 
number of people without them being aware, 
and therefore, without allowing them to sub-
sequently ask for the destruction of those 
materials and the accountability of those in-
volved in such an access.13  
In sum, the PCC declared the unconstitution-
ality, with general binding effects, of Article 
4 due to the violation of Article 34 § 4 of 
the Portuguese Constitution concerning the 
access to traffic data that involves intersub-
jective communication, and also due to the 
violation of Articles 26 § 1, 35 §§ 1 and 4, 
and 18 § 2 of the Portuguese Constitution 
regarding the access to traffic data that does 
not involve intersubjective communication. 
In turn, the PCC considered that the choic-
es enshrined in Article 3 were both adequate 
and necessary due to the inexistence of less 
harmful means to achieve the same results. 
However, this did not apply to the part that 
mentioned the usage of this data to safeguard 
national security and homeland security due 
to the lack of determinability of these con-
cepts. For this reason, Article 3 was declared 
unconstitutional, with general binding effect, 
on the part it bestowed on information offi-
cers access to baseline data and equipment 
location data to gather the necessary infor-
mation for the safeguard of national defense 
and homeland security due to the breach of 
Articles 26 § 1 and 35 §§ 1 and 4, as well 
as Article 18 § 2 of the Portuguese Consti-
tution. This ruling does not apply to the part 
of Article 3 that allows access to this data in 
order to provide the necessary information 
to prevent acts of sabotage, espionage, ter-
rorism, proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction, and highly organized criminality.
3. Ruling 497/2019: Portuguese Citizenship 
This judgement was issued under a consti-
tutional review applied to a concrete case. It 
concerned Article 6 § 1, d) of Act no. 37/81, 
the Nationality Law (version of 2015), ac-
cording to which, in case of naturalization, 
the applicant cannot have been convicted of a 
crime punishable by a penalty of up to three or 
more years of imprisonment. The applicant in 
question had been given a one-year suspend-
ed sentence for robbery, which is punishable 
by up to eight years of imprisonment. 
Meanwhile, this rule was modified in a way 
that would allow the applicant to obtain Por-
tuguese citizenship. But since the citizenship 
acquisition takes effect from the moment it is 
bestowed onwards, the PCC deemed it nec-
essary to analyze this matter. 
The PCC emphasized that the right to citizen-
ship has a fundamental nature (it is enshrined 
in Article 26 § 1 of the Portuguese Constitu-
tion) comprised of not only the right to retain it, 
but also the right to acquire it when legal con-
ditions are met. Therefore, these requirements 
must be adequate, necessary, and proportional, 
ensuring the assessment of the applicant’s bond 
to the Portuguese community. The imposition 
of criteria unrelated to this evaluation shall be 
considered disproportional. 
In this case, the applicant came from a Por-
tuguese-speaking country, had been living in 
Portugal since he was a minor, and had com-
pleted here at least one cycle of education. 
He was convicted to a very light sentence, 
and the court even determined that this con-
viction should not be transcribed to his crim-
inal record. 
The PCC also noted that suspended sentenc-
es are limited to reduced penalties (related to 
petty and average criminality) and they can 
only be bestowed when the offender’s life 
circumstances and behavior (before and after 
the crime), as well as the events surround-
ing the crime, make it possible to conclude 
that the mere reproach and threat of impris-
onment are sufficient. The requirements to 
prevent the sentence’s transcription to the of-
fender’s criminal record are even narrower. 
Hence, Article 6 § 1, d), by imposing a con-
dition merely based on abstract penalties, 
prevents the consideration of factors that 
objectively reflect the offender’s bond to the 
Portuguese community. Therefore, there is a 
breach of Articles 26 § 1 and 18 § 2 of the 
Portuguese Constitution, since this is not a 
necessary imposition, as the access to Por-
tuguese citizenship could lie on less burden-
some requirements. 
13 The PCC considered, furthermore, that the demand for a clearer and more precise regime is in line with the requirements established in the EUCJ and ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence. 
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By thwarting the weighting of circumstances 
that allowed for a lighter sentence, the pro-
vision at hand also infringes Article 30 § 4 
of the Portuguese Constitution, according to 
which no conviction shall entail, as a neces-
sary effect, the loss of any civil, professional, 
or political rights. 
4. Ruling 394/19: Dismissal of paternity pro-
ceedings 
Articles 1873 and 1817 § 1 of the Civil Code 
rule that a claim for the establishment of pa-
ternity may be brought at any time until the 
child reaches the age of majority.14  Howev-
er, the right to seek paternity recognition by 
judicial decision lapses ten years after the 
person has attained the age of majority.15 
Last year, and in dissonance with previous 
constitutional jurisprudence, the PCC, in 
a concrete review case, stated that Articles 
1873 and 1817 § 1 of the Civil Code violated 
Articles 18 § 2, 26 § 1, and 36 § 1 of the Con-
stitution on the grounds that the protection of 
the interests pertaining to the investigating 
party should not be limited, and that, even 
if it were allowed, such a restriction was not 
justified due to the lack of proportionality 
among the various conflicting interests.16  
According to Article 79 § 1 of the Law of the 
Constitutional Court, since in this concrete 
review ruling the Court decided ‘there has 
been unconstitutionality (…) in a manner 
different to what was previously adopted for 
the same rule by any of the Court’s sections’ 
(in the case, contrary to Ruling 401/2011), 
‘an appeal can be made on this decision be-
fore the Court’s plenary, compulsory for the 
state Attorney when he intervenes in the case 
as appellant or respondent’.17 
Recently, on Ruling 394/19, the Plenary of 
the PCC ruled that the imposition of a ten-
year limit, present in Articles 1873 and 1817 
§ 1 of the Civil Code, was not unconstitu-
tional.18 The Court held that ‘the constitu-
tional problem raised by the legal expiry 
periods for the exercise of the right of action 
does not lie in the possibility of its existence 
but in the restrictive intensity of its effects. It 
is accepted, therefore, that the state, through 
the legislator, can establish expiry periods 
for the exercise of the right of action in gen-
eral, which means setting (temporal) limits 
to effective judicial protection’.19  
In his dissenting opinion, Manuel da Costa 
Andrade, the president of the PCC, sustained 
that ‘from the point of view of the values and 
interests at stake, the filing of the paternity 
investigation action always arrives at the 
right time and in good time. Never too soon, 
never too late. (…) It is thus clear that per-
sonal identity, a very personal value of emi-
nent dignity that pontificates in the teleolog-
ical horizon of the right to the recognition of 
paternity, does not see its axiological density 
and weight progressively faded and reduced 
over time’.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In September and October 2020, there will 
be elections in the autonomous regions of 
Azores and Madeira. In 2020, the Parlia-
ment will debate the following issues: (a) 
legalization of euthanasia; (b) legalization 
of cannabis; (c) legalization of prostitution; 
(d) prohibition of bullfighting; (e) policies to 
increase fertility rates; (f) policies to attract 
citizens to rural land in the desertified areas 
of Portugal; (g) measures to improve the 
fight against corruption; and (h) legislation 
on shared parenting (shared physical custo-
dy) after separation and divorce.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Some of the constitutional developments of 
2019 continued the trends started in the pre-
vious two years. However, there were also 
new issues, especially in electoral matters 
and on constitutional amendment initiatives. 
The involvement of the Constitutional Court 
in political and judicial matters was also 
more obvious, whereas the number of funda-
mental rights-based constitutional decisions 
decreased. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
In Romania, 2019 was an electoral year im-
portant for three reasons.
First, the elections for the European Parlia-
ment, held in May 2019, brought old habits 
and new developments into the Romanian po-
litical and constitutional landscape. A novelty 
was that a referendum was convened simul-
taneously with the elections by the President 
of Romania in accordance with Article 90 of 
the Constitution (see below). Also, as a conse-
quence of the difficulties that occurred during 
voting outside the country in November 2014, 
the authorities claimed that the number of pol-
ling stations was increased and similar obsta-
cles would be avoided. However, this was not 
the case. Due to the high turnout, including 
abroad, the number of polling stations proved 
to be insufficient as did the newly introduced 
system of voting (each voter had to be first 
checked in an electronic device to avoid mul-
tiple votes, but this process was slowed down 
by the insufficient number of devices). As a 
consequence, as before, thousands of voters 
were prevented from exercising their funda-
mental right.
Second, the consultative referendum orga-
nised on the same day as the European elec-
tions, also known as “the referendum for the 
judiciary”, had two questions: “Do you agree 
with the prohibition of amnesty and pardon 
for corruption offences?” and “Do you agree 
with the prohibition of the adoption of Emer-
gency Government Ordinances in the field of 
criminal offences, criminal penalties and judi-
cial organisation and with the extension of the 
right to challenge Government Ordinances 
at the Constitutional Court?”. The referen-
dum was declared valid by meeting the legal 
turnout requirement of over 30% of the total 
number of registered voters. Both questions 
were answered “yes” with an overwhelming 
percentage of over 80% of the voters. As a re-
sult, two constitutional amendment initiatives 
were drafted (see below for the decisions of 
the Constitutional Court) and are now in the 
parliamentary procedure.  
Third, in November 2019, presidential elec-
tions took place. Following major changes in 
electoral legislation (including the introduction 
of vote by mail and the extension of voting to 
three days for voters abroad), there were no 
more incidents related to the exercise of the 
right to vote. Acting President Klaus Iohannis 
was re-elected with a comfortable majority.
This strong endorsement of pro-European and 
progressive values highlighted the existing 
gap between an electorate that has become 
accustomed to require action, results and ef-
ficiency from its political representation and 
some of the political forces over-represented 
in national and local public authorities. 
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Against this political background, the coali-
tion supporting the Government split on Au-
gust 26, and the Prime Minister had to sub-
mit a new reshuffle of the Government. This 
time, however, the reshuffle could no longer 
be considered a mere negotiation between 
the two heads of the executive power (PM 
and President, with the President limited 
to the role of rubber-stamping suggestions 
coming from the PM) but, according to the 
Constitution (Article 85), it had to be en-
dorsed by Parliament. In an attempt to avoid 
parliamentary scrutiny, being well aware of 
the fact that in at least one of the Houses 
the Government no longer enjoyed support 
from the parliamentary majority, the PM de-
cided to make a bold move and challenged 
the President before the Constitutional Court 
for not appointing ad interim ministers and 
refusing to provide legal reasons for his inac-
tion (according to the precedent established 
in Decision no. 875/2018). In its Decision 
no. 504/2019, the Constitutional Court ruled 
that the President was obliged to appoint the 
ad interim ministers suggested by the PM as 
he had no discretionary powers in that res-
pect, but the PM was also obliged to submit 
the new list of ministers for Parliament’s 
approval because a change in the political 
composition of Government had occurred. 
In a separate opinion, two judges found 
that the criteria for the identification of a le-
gal conflict of a constitutional nature were 
not met in this specific case as the apparent 
blockage claimed by the PM could easily be 
solved if the parliamentary procedure for the 
reshuffle of a Government with a new politi-
cal composition had been followed from the 
beginning.
However, none of the above happened be-
cause soon after, on October 10, the Go-
vernment was dismissed through a vote of 
no-confidence. A month later (on November 
4), a minority Government was invested by 
Parliament. With fragile and contextual sup-
port in Parliament, the new Government was 
reduced to governing via emergency ordi-
nances and the special legislative procedure 
of engaging its responsibility on various re-
forms. Most of the measures thus adopted 
were contested in front of the Constitutional 
Court and some of the emergency ordinances 
were invalidated up front by Parliament. The 
outcomes of these developments will only be 
seen in 2020.
  
III. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL 
CASES
1. Legal Effects of Constitutional Court’s De-
cisions
For a few years now, the Constitutional 
Court has given decisions that resemble a 
scalpel cut: either they tend to interfere with 
the tiny details of the judicial cases that bring 
the constitutionality issues in front of the 
Constitutional Court, generally contradicting 
the interpretation given by ordinary courts 
to the relevant laws, or they are meant for a 
specific purpose and, in order to achieve its 
target, the jurisdiction feels the need to be 
very explicit as to the required legal effect of 
its own decisions.
Falling into the first category are Decision 
no. 874/2018, published in January 2019, 
and Decision no. 220/2019. Both cases 
brought before the Constitutional Court dealt 
with issues where the judicial system took a 
different view from the Constitutional Court 
with regard to specific legal provisions. In 
both situations, the procedural details may 
look insignificant and the cases at hand may 
seem pernicious, but the impact of the deci-
sions adopted by the Constitutional Court is 
huge because, on the one hand, the Court ex-
pands its jurisdiction and interferes with spe-
cific cases ongoing before ordinary courts, 
changing their outcome, and on the other 
hand, the final result is the retroactivity of 
relevant laws. In both situations, the Consti-
tutional Court acted rather as a court of cas-
sation without being established as such by 
the Constitution.
Thus, ordinary courts took the view that the 
new Civil Procedure Code said that cases 
that had not been finally ruled upon should 
follow the previous civil procedure, while 
the Constitutional Court considered that 
new civil procedural rules should be ap-
plied immediately, including to cases which 
were ongoing when the new code came into 
force. Because the apex court issued a ge-
neral interpretation of the new Code that 
merely reproduced the relevant legal provi-
sion, saying that the new rules would only 
apply to cases started under the new Code, 
the Constitutional Court decided that not 
only was the provision of the Code uncons-
titutional but also the interpretation provided 
by the supreme court of the land (Decision 
no. 874/2018). Everything would be fine if 
the interpretation provided by the Constitu-
tional Court was not, in fact, retroactive and 
if the Constitutional Court and not the High 
Court of Cassation and Justice (HCCJ) had 
the jurisdiction to unify the case law of regu-
lar courts. But on both counts, the legal and 
constitutional answer is negative. 
Similarly, in Decision no. 220/2019, the 
Constitutional Court observed that some pro-
visions of the new Criminal Procedure Code 
had been invalidated in its previous Deci-
sion no. 540/2016. But instead of declaring 
that any attempt to validate those provisions 
should be void as a consequence of its pre-
vious decision, the Court resorted to expan-
ding retroactively the effects of its Decision 
no. 540/2016 to final Court decisions pro-
nounced 30 days before their publication in 
the Official Gazette, because 30 days is the 
time limit for the revision of such Court de-
cisions. The dissident opinion signed by one 
judge pointed to this retroactive application of 
Decision no. 540/2016, but to no effect. 
The second category of decisions can again 
be divided into two subcategories: decisions 
dealing with laws that approve delegated 
legislation and decisions dealing with the 
effects of previous decisions that have inva-
lidated laws.
The case law of the Constitutional Court 
with regard to the total invalidation of laws 
for extrinsic, i.e., formal/procedural, reasons 
has been constant over time. A law which 
has been found entirely unconstitutional in 
an a priori control for the infringement of 
procedural requirements ceases to exist as a 
legal act and Parliament is obliged to start a 
new legislative process from the beginning, 
starting with a new legislative initiative. 
This constant case law applies to all types 
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of laws, including those approving emergen-
cy ordinances issued by Government, and 
it has been validated also in Decision no. 
214/2019, where the Court ruled that “Par-
liament has to cease any legislative process 
in this matter and, in case it will initiate a 
new legislative process, it has to comply with 
those provided by this decision”. However, 
in Decision no. 412/2019, the Court gave 
a different solution without justifying this 
reversal of jurisprudence. Namely, only in 
this case did the Constitutional Court rule 
so that the delegated legislation (emergency 
ordinance) would survive, although the law 
meant to approve it was wholly invalidated 
in an a priori control for extrinsic reasons. 
To this end, the Court declared that, in the 
specific case of laws approving delegated 
legislation, their total invalidation for extrin-
sic reasons requires the resumption of the 
legislative procedure only from the parlia-
mentary phase and not from the stage of the 
initiative because, in this case, the initiative 
is precisely the delegated legislation. While 
the reasoning of the Court may be seducing, 
it would have been also convincing if it 
were duly motivated, particularly against a 
constant case law ruling to the contrary. Two 
judges noticed this reversal of jurisprudence 
in a separate opinion.
Finally, in order to achieve specific targets, 
the Constitutional Court modulates the ef-
fects of its own decisions in a manner which 
obliges the legislator to adopt specific laws, 
practically as drafted by the Court. A telling 
example is Decision no. 466/2019, which 
concerns the new Criminal Code. Thus, in 
Decision nos. 405/2016 and 368/2017, the 
Constitutional Court invalidated some provi-
sions of the new Criminal Code. The legisla-
tor had attempted to adopt revised versions 
of the concerned provisions, but they were 
found unconstitutional in 2018. This offered 
the Court the opportunity to elaborate on the 
effects of its own decisions in the following 
terms: “if in the case of a re-examination of 
a law required by the President of Romania 
the Parliament retains its full margin of ap-
preciation, in the case of a re-examination of 
a law imposed by an invalidation ruled by 
the Constitutional Court the margin of appre-
ciation of the Parliament is limited, because 
the legislator is obliged to re-analyse the 
normative substance of the law exclusively 
in order to make it compliant with the deci-
sion of the Court. […] Abandoning the le-
gislative procedure is not an option available 
because it equates with the infringement of 
the constitutional obligation of Parliament 
to comply with the requirements of a pre-
vious decision of the Constitutional Court”. 
In other words, in this specific situation, the 
legislator should no longer follow the esta-
blished case law, according to which a total 
invalidation of a law for extrinsic reasons 
has to put an end to the ongoing legislative 
process and may open the possibility of a 
fresh start, but the legislator necessarily has 
to adopt new legislation as instructed by the 
Constitutional Court. Such a modulation of 
the effects of decisions risks transforming 
the Constitutional Court from a negative into 
a positive legislator.
2. Quality of the Law
One of the major trends of the constitutional 
case law in 2019 was the Court’s focus on 
the quality of the law from a formal point of 
view (“external” or “extrinsic” unconstitu-
tionality). All components of the legislative 
procedure were examined, and the Court of-
ten decided the unconstitutionality only on 
grounds of violating these rules. 
In Decision no. 145/2019, the Court declared 
a law unconstitutional in its entirety on 
grounds of infringement of procedural rules. 
Thus, the law changing some public order 
and safety legislation was adopted without 
the advisory opinion of the Supreme Council 
of National Defence, which the Court consi-
dered as a compulsory step according to the 
law. Thus, the Constitutional Court argued 
that an essential element of the legislative 
procedure in the field of national security 
was missing and so the law was unconstitu-
tional as a whole. Moreover, the Court found 
another unconstitutionality ground, as the 
delay for silent adoption of the law had been 
exceeded, in breach of Article 75(2) of the 
Constitution. The absence of the assessment 
of the economic and social impact of the law 
and of the advisory opinion of the Economic 
and Social Council, compulsory according 
to the law, were also reasons of unconstitu-
tionality in Decision no. 139/2019, in which 
the Court invoked the breach of the principle 
of legality (Article 1(3) of the Constitution). 
In the more controversial Decision no. 
137/2019, in the context of judicial review, 
the Court assessed the role of the European 
supervision mechanism established by the 
European Commission (Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism – hereinafter CVM) 
in 2006. The object of the decision was the 
law approving the Emergency Governmental 
Ordinance (EGO), which made operational 
the new – and controversial1 – Special Sec-
tion for Investigating Magistrates from the 
General Prosecutor’s Office. The authors of 
the unconstitutionality complaint argued that 
by approving the ordinance, the law was not 
taking into account the 2018 CVM Report, 
the Venice Commission advisory opinion 
and the Ad-hoc Report on Romania of the 
GRECO and thus was in breach of several 
articles of the Constitution especially related 
to the rule of law principle (Articles 1(4) and 
(5)) and Romania’s obligations as an EU 
member state (Article 148(2)). The Consti-
tutional Court argued that the European 
law act that created the CVM – Decision 
2006/928/CE – does not provide concrete 
obligations for Romania (except for the one 
that required the creation of an integrity 
agency), but only draws guidelines with a 
wide, general character and with a mainly 
political value. Therefore, said the Court, 
such an act has no constitutional relevance 
for Romania and neither have the reports is-
sued by the European Commission as part of 
the CVM. Consequently, the Court did not 
consider that the law was in breach of any 
constitutional provision. 
1 Our Reports on 2017 and 2018 (http://www.iconnectblog.com/2019/10/now-available-the-2018-global-review-of-constitutional-law, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3215613).
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3. Decisions on Constitutional Amendment 
Initiatives
2019 was the year when three constitutional 
amendment initiatives reached the table of 
the Constitutional Court for initial review. 
According to the Constitution (Article 146 
(a)), the review of constitutional amendment 
by the Constitutional Court initiatives is 
mandatory. 
The first one was a popular initiative, which 
was exercised according to Article 150(1) of 
the Constitution (by over 500.000 voters, be-
longing to at least half of the counties, and in 
each county must be recorded at least 20.000 
signatures). The initiative was the result of 
the anti-corruption campaign of some of the 
opposition parties and aimed to prohibit per-
sons that were convicted by final decisions 
to be eligible for public office. Thus, the 
constitutional text on the “right to be elec-
ted” (or, more properly put, the right to run 
for elected public offices) would change as 
follows: “There cannot be elected in the lo-
cal administration organs, in the Chamber of 
Deputies, in the Senate and in the office of 
the President of Romania, citizens convicted 
of intentional crimes to freedom depriving 
penalties, until the occurrence of a situa-
tion that removes the consequences of the 
conviction”. By its Decision no. 222/2019, 
the Constitutional Court assessed, on the one 
hand, the formal conditions of the initiative 
(number of signatures and their geographi-
cal distribution) and, on the other hand, the 
conformity with the substantive limits of 
the amendment, set forth by Article 152 of 
the Constitution. Thus, more specifically, 
the Court had to rule if the initiative was a 
proportionate and justified limitation to the 
right to run for office as a fundamental poli-
tical right. The Court stated that the proposed 
change was a legitimate one, as it aimed to 
enhance “the morality, integrity and honesty 
that must be proven by any person who seeks 
access to public offices”. The proportionality 
comes from the fact that the prohibition was 
not intended to be a permanent one but to 
last only until one of the situations that re-
move the consequences of the conviction 
occurs. In its decision, the Court referred to 
the standards of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights in the field of electoral rights and 
to the Venice Commission’s Code of Good 
Practices on Elections as well as to some of 
the other European states’ legislation. 
The second and third constitutional amend-
ment initiatives were introduced almost 
simultaneously by the parliamentary po-
litical parties as a result of the referendum 
convened by the President and organised on 
26 May 2019 (see point II.2. of this report). 
They included the proposal that made the ob-
ject of the popular initiative (regarding the 
convicted persons’ access to public offices) 
and additional amendments that originated 
in the text of the questions asked at the re-
ferendum. Thus, for instance, the first par-
liamentary initiatives proposed to limit the 
power of the President to grant pardons by 
removing from the potential beneficiaries 
the persons convicted for corruption of-
fences. The Constitutional Court ruled that 
such a proposal would infringe the limits of 
constitutional amendment prescribed by the 
Constitution, because “its effects affect the 
principle of equality, a guarantee of funda-
mental rights and, indirectly, the human di-
gnity as a source of fundamental rights and 
freedoms”. In the Court’s view (Decision no. 
465/2019), the removal of the power of the 
President to grant pardons to persons convic-
ted for corruption would place those persons 
in a position of inferiority, “without a reaso-
nable and objective justification” and would 
amount to discrimination, violating thus the 
rights-based limit of constitutional amend-
ment prescribed by Article 152(2) of the 
Constitution. The same arguments were used 
by the Court when rejecting the amendment 
from the third proposal, to prohibit collective 
amnesty or pardon of persons convicted for 
corruption (Decision no. 464/2019).
Another amendment proposed by these par-
liamentary initiatives regarded the scope and 
the constitutionality review of Government 
Ordinances. These acts of delegated legisla-
tion, especially the Emergency Government 
Ordinances (EGO) have become very fre-
quent in the last decade, and their excessive 
use has been criticised by the CVM reports, 
especially in sensitive fields such as the judi-
ciary and criminal law. As regards the scope 
of the amendment – to prohibit the adoption 
of EGOs in the fields of criminal law and 
of judicial organisation – the Constitutional 
Court considered that there was no breach of 
the constitutional amendment limits. Never-
theless, the same initiatives aimed at introdu-
cing a direct form of constitutional review of 
the Government Ordinances, “at the request 
of the President, of a number of 50 deputies 
and 25 senators, of the High Court of Cassa-
tion and Justice and of the Ombudsman”. In 
this case, although the Court did not have, in 
principle, any objection to such a change and 
stated that it did not breach the limits of the 
constitutional amendment, it made some re-
marks regarding the wording of the proposed 
text. Thus, the Court emphasized that, espe-
cially given the urgent nature of EGOs, the 
review should be expressly qualified as an a 
posteriori one, i.e., to be exercised after the 
ordinances have entered into force. 
Following the decisions of the Constitutional 
Court, all three constitutional amendment 
initiatives are currently at the Parliament 
to follow the procedure established by the 
Constitution. 
4. Legal Paradigms
Continuing the trend started in 2018, when 
it arbitrarily expanded its jurisdiction from 
normative acts and legal conflicts of consti-
tutional nature to legal paradigms, in 2019 
the Constitutional Court ruled upon two 
most interesting cases dealing directly with 
the organisation and functioning of the ju-
dicial system in ways and manners which 
not only affected the efficiency of the fight 
against corruption but also challenged the 
core function of the judicial system of im-
parting justice to citizens.
In the first one (Decision no. 26/2019), the 
Court discovered a legal conflict of consti-
tutional nature between the Public Ministry 
(General Prosecutor) and Parliament, upon 
notification from the President of the House 
of Deputies in the “legal paradigm” that 
made possible for courts and prosecutors to 
be bound not only by laws but also by other 
legal documents such as the two secret pro-
tocols of cooperation concluded between an 
intelligence service and the Public Ministry 
with regard to the standard procedure to be 
followed in case a judicial mandate for the 
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interception of communication needed to be 
implemented with support from that intelli-
gence service. Based on a “seeming resem-
blance” of such a protocol with an adminis-
trative act, the Court inferred that the said 
intelligence service had been granted the 
power to interfere with judicial cases and the 
Public Ministry had overstepped the legisla-
tive powers of Parliament. In two dissident 
opinions, one, and respectively two other 
judges found that the criteria for the identifi-
cation of a legal conflict of constitutional na-
ture were not met in this specific case, while 
in a concurring opinion, one judge conside-
red that the two protocols examined by the 
Court were different in nature as they were 
based on different acts issued by the Supre-
me Council for National Defence. 
In the second one (Decision no. 417/2019), 
upon notification from the same President 
of the House of Deputies, the Court disco-
vered a legal conflict of constitutional nature 
between Parliament and the High Court of 
Cassation and Justice (HCCJ) in the “legal 
paradigm” that consisted in the fact that 
between 2003 and 2019, the HCCJ conside-
red that all judges who ruled upon criminal 
cases at the level of the HCCJ were specia-
lised ope legis to judge corruption cases. In-
deed, Law no. 78/2000 for the prevention, 
discovery and sanctioning of corruption 
offences requires that corruption cases be 
dealt with by panels of judges “specialised 
in ruling upon corruption”. Numerous revi-
sions of this law as well as the general law on 
judicial organisation, and intensive training 
of both incoming and sitting magistrates in 
the substantive matter of corruption offences 
made possible the interpretation made by 
all courts in Romania, not just the supreme 
court of the land, that all judges that have 
been specialised in criminal cases and who 
can sit in panels judging criminal cases are 
ope legis specialised in corruption cases as 
well. Despite this factual reality, the Consti-
tutional Court not only found a new “legal 
paradigm” that it considered unconstitutio-
nal without mentioning a reason but it also 
detailed the legal effects that its own deci-
sion should trigger, namely that all final 
court decisions that have been ruled between 
2003 and 2019 by panels which were not 
specialised should be considered null and 
void; as a consequence, such cases should be 
reopened and legal situations that had been 
considered settled now had to be put to fi-
nal trial again. Just as in 2018 with Decision 
no. 685/2018 dealing with the “legal para-
digm” of the five-judge panels at the HCCJ, 
Decision no. 417/2019 severely affected the 
principle of res judicata. This decision was 
adopted with a majority of five judges; the 
four others signed dissident opinions. Two 
judges signed a dissident opinion explaining 
why judges specialised in criminal cases can 
be considered specialised in corruption cases 
as well. Two other judges signed a dissident 
opinion explaining why legal paradigms 
are not part and parcel of the jurisdiction of 
the Constitutional Court and the situation 
addressed in this decision does not fulfill 
the criteria established in the case law of 
the Constitutional Court of Romania for the 
identification of a legal conflict of constitu-
tional nature.
5. Highlights of the Rights-based Review
In 2019, rights-based review was not as rich 
as before. The Constitutional Court see-
med more preoccupied to correct extrinsic 
unconstitutionality and to rule on conflicts 
between authorities. 
Among the most frequently invoked right in 
the Court’s case law in general is the right to 
a fair trial. Decision no. 87/2019 concerned 
an article of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
regarding the absolute nullity of procedural 
acts for absence of legal counsel. Thus, Ar-
ticle 90 c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
set forth that legal counsel is compulsory du-
ring the preliminary chamber procedure (i.e., 
when the judge decides on provisional mea-
sures, including pre-trial detention) and du-
ring trial only in cases where the law provi-
des life imprisonment or a prison sentence of 
more than five years. In the absence of such 
legal counsel, the nullity of procedural acts 
can be invoked (even when the parties are 
present, but without legal assistance). Article 
91(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
provides that in these cases and when the 
accused did not choose his/her own lawyer, 
the court must ensure the presence of an ex 
officio counsel.
  
The Constitutional Court noticed that the 
institution of a delay in which to invoke the 
nullity of procedural acts on the grounds of 
absence of legal counsel is depriving the 
right to defence of its effectiveness because 
the law also creates an imperative obliga-
tion of legal assistance. Therefore, the fact 
that the nullity can only be invoked within 
a certain delay “would mean that the right 
to defence has no actual substance”. As a 
consequence, the dispositions of the Code 
that provided that delay (Articles 281(4)(a) 
and (1)(f)) were declared unconstitutional 
for infringing the right to a fair trial. 
The right of property of legal persons was 
the subject of Decision no. 382/2019. The 
Court reminded that the right of property is 
not an absolute one, but that its restrictions 
cannot have as a consequence the suppres-
sion of the right itself. The provision of a law 
that automatically transferred the property of 
goods that remained in the patrimony of a le-
gal person, after its radiation from the com-
mercial records, within the private property 
of the state, was declared unconstitutional 
for creating an imbalance between the inte-
rests at stake. 
In the field of social and economic rights, 
the Court analysed the provisions of the 
law on national education regarding public 
transport of pupils, according to which the 
children who are not schooled in their home 
commune/town have the right to reimbur-
sement of their travel expenses only if they 
are in possession of a travel subscription. 
However, such travel subscriptions/cards are 
not available in all cases; therefore, the im-
position of such a condition would amount 
to discrimination and is therefore unconsti-
tutional (Decision no. 657/2019).
 
In the same field of social and economic 
rights, the Court decided that the restriction 
of the right of military employees to a leave 
of absence to care for an ill child, in the sense 
that this right is granted only for a shorter 
period than other employees, amounts to a 
violation of the constitutional right to health 
care of the child and to a discrimination. The 
Court also invoked the dispositions of Article 
20 of the Constitution, Articles 4 and 24 of 
the International Convention on the Rights 
2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 283
of the Child and Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Decision no. 
323/2019). 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
Almost all major decisions adopted by the 
Government that were voted towards the end 
of 2019 have been contested in front of the 
Constitutional Court, and some of them have 
already been invalidated based on formal 
grounds. 
2020 will be an important electoral year. First, 
local elections are expected in the spring. Se-
condly, following the installation of the mi-
nority Government in November 2019, the 
lack of support for its policies by the Social 
Democratic Party-dominated Parliament led 
to the idea of organizing early general elec-
tions (normally due in November 2020). The 
early elections procedure provided by the 
Constitution is a cumbersome one, involving 
the dismissal of the Government, the rejec-
tion of two new Governments by Parliament 
in a delay of 60 days and the dissolution of 
the Parliament by the President. It remains 
to be seen if all the conditions for this proce-
dure, which has never been used before, will 
be met in the first part of 2020. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During 2019, as in previous years, Russia 
was the center of attention in the internation-
al media for alleged interference in a number 
of important elections, including those of the 
European Parliament. These international 
geo-political speculations were intertwined 
with the narrative concerning the so-called 
‘illiberal democracies’, amongst which Rus-
sia is counted by some observers. The interest 
in these issues is linked to the global devel-
opment of populism, which has found inspi-
ration in some of President Putin’s speeches 
(including the interview published in the Fi-
nancial Times on 28 June 2019 in which he 
openly challenged the continuing validity of 
liberal ideas) and in those of the main archi-
tect of Russia’s ‘sovereign democracy’ doc-
trine, Vladislav Surkov. In an interview with 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 11 February 2019, 
Surkov legitimized Putin’s continuity in pow-
er as justified on the grounds of the ‘deep’ 
characteristics of the Russian people. At the 
same time, he acknowledged the attraction of 
‘Putinism’ outside Russia.
Russian relations with European organiza-
tions experienced both light and dark mo-
ments in 2019. While participation of the 
Russian delegation in the Parliamentary As-
sembly of the Council of Europe was rein-
stated by the Resolution of 26 June 2019, re-
lations with the European Union were some-
what more controversial. Two Resolutions of 
the European Parliament (one on 12 March 
2019 − ‘On the state of EU-Russia polit-
ical relations’ and the other on 19 Septem-
ber 2019 − ‘On the importance of European 
memory for the future of Europe’, of which 
the latter equates Nazism with Stalinism) – 
have provoked in Russia an acute resentment 
of Western ‘disinformation’. It is claimed 
that European institutions have misrepre-
sented a series of historical events consid-
ered by Russians as central to their sense of 
national identity; e.g., the victory over Nazi 
fascism during the ‘great patriotic war’ (see 
in particular the reaction of the speakers of 
the federal Parliament in their meeting with 
President Putin on 24 December 2019).
The trends in constitutional jurisprudence 
in 2019 did not differ greatly from previous 
years, although there were some attempts 
to mitigate the restrictions on the freedoms 
of assembly, political participation and the 
media. However, the Constitutional Court 
remained deferential towards authority, con-
tinuing a trend of consistent subordination 
that dates back to the entry into force of the 
current Constitution. This subordination was 
further reinforced by legislative reforms that 
have systematically reduced the autonomy of 
judges over the years. The Russian CC has 
never been an independent actor and does not 
deal with politically sensitive issues. Howev-
er, it plays a significant role in the protection 
of social and economic rights, which are quite 
fragile in the current political context.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
During 2019, three legislative packages re-
stricting the freedom of the Internet were 
adopted. They penalise defamation of the 
authorities and the nation, target fake-news 
1 Author of the following Sections: Introduction, Major Constitutional Developments, and Looking Ahead.
2 Author of the Section on Constitutional Cases. 
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sources and, lastly, introduce the so-called 
‘sovereign Internet’. In the first two pack-
ages (Acts of 18 March 2019), there was a 
modification of the federal Act ‘On Infor-
mation, on Information Technologies and on 
Information Protection’ and of the Code on 
administrative offenses. In the third legisla-
tive package (Acts of 1 May 2019) the Act 
‘On Communications’ was modified along 
with the Act ‘On information ...’. The pre-
vailing logic of the three legislative packag-
es is clear; the Kremlin intends to increase 
its control of the web particularly in the light 
of significant upcoming electoral events (the 
Duma in 2021 and the Russian presidency in 
2024).
With regard to the first package, the chang-
es equate the dissemination of content that 
‘insults the state, society or authorities’ with 
acts of minor vandalism, thus extending the 
concept of a ‘public place’ to include the 
virtual space of the web. With regard to the 
second package, ‘misinformation’ is consid-
ered a sort of abuse of free speech; therefore, 
those who disseminate as true false infor-
mation that is of public interest and which 
could have serious consequences for indi-
vidual health or social stability are punished. 
In both cases, the state communications 
watchdog Roskomnadzor (Federal Commu-
nications Supervision Service, introduced in 
2008) will play an important role. At its re-
quest, Internet Service Providers have a legal 
obligation to block websites where prohib-
ited information was published. The criteria 
for establishing whether the information or 
declarations are forbidden are vague, thus 
relying on the discretion of the prosecutor in 
establishing the adequacy, accuracy and thus 
legality of online content. 
The power of the Roskomnadzor and of oth-
er public bodies is even greater in the third 
package, which reforms the way in which 
the current global Internet access web infra-
structure and electronic communication ser-
vices work. The overall aim is to build an au-
tonomous national web network (RU.NET). 
Internet providers will be obliged to install 
devices to filter traffic, and the Roskom-
nadzor will have unparalleled powers, in-
cluding exclusive control of the ‘off switch’ 
to deploy as it sees fit. The official justifica-
tion for these measures is to avoid interrup-
tions of network services by foreign servers 
and/or cyber attacks originating mainly from 
the USA (thus providing for the progressive 
disconnection of service providers in Russia 
from foreign servers and their reconnection 
to a new national domain system). 
The Russian doctrine of constitutional law is 
almost entirely silent on concerns that pre-
occupy international legal doctrine, such as 
restrictions on the freedoms of association, 
assembly and manifestation of thought (In-
ternet censorship being the most recent ex-
ample). The main constitutional law journals 
continue to focus on the issues of ‘constitu-
tional values’ and ‘constitutional culture’, 
topics that seem to echo similar debates 
occurring in various European countries. 
In Russia, a conservative reading of consti-
tutional values predominates and sits well 
with the persistent anti-globalist and an-
ti-liberal rhetoric. However, there are some 
progressive ideas under discussion, such as 
those that touch upon election regulations. 
There is a widespread belief in the need to 
adopt a single election code to replace the 
conglomeration of rules that regulate far too 
minutely every single aspect of the registra-
tion of candidates, parties and associations. 
The excessive detail and the continuous 
modification of the electoral legislation (a 
phenomenon noticed since the beginning 
of the post-communist period) are a sign of 
a precise political intent: on the one hand, 
to control elections and parties as much as 
possible (in this sense, for example, the ex-
periment with electronic voting for the Mos-
cow Duma), and on the other, to continually 
change the rules to find the most effective 
combinations to achieve the desired result. 
This is how one might read the recent pro-
posals to strengthen the uninominal quota to 
elect the Duma in order to remedy discontent 
and apathy caused by the pro-Kremlin par-
ty, United Russia. Another approach saw it 
presenting its representatives as independent 
candidates in the September 2019 Moscow 
Duma elections. Both from the start and 
during the election campaign for the holding 
of these elections, the most heated public 
protests occurred in response to the failure to 
register a set of opposition candidates. The 
mechanisms of presentation of candidates at 
each level are overly complex to the point of 
arousing criticism by international election 
monitoring bodies.
The protests for ‘fair elections’, which 
ramped up in the summer of 2019 on the 
initiative of the candidates of the ‘non-sys-
temic’ opposition who had been refused 
registration mainly for formal reasons such 
as the collection of signatures in their sup-
port (since legislation exempts from the col-
lection of signatures only the candidates of 
parties already represented in the legislative 
bodies), were added in the last year to oth-
er types of protests (for pension reform, for 
corruption, for environmental reasons, etc.). 
These have also been treated by the police 
with extreme harshness. Although these pro-
tests are a cause for concern for the authori-
ties, they are unlikely to lead to systemic po-
litical changes and only a few cosmetic and 
opportunistic changes are expected. 
December 2019 saw a further change to the 
media law that now requires individuals to 
declare funding received from abroad. This 
change brings the regulations in line with 
the same requirement established in pre-
vious years for NGOs. In particular, such 
an amendment designates individuals who 
communicate with foreign media outlets as 
foreign agents. The amendment allows Rus-
sian authorities to investigate citizens for 
any information they spread to international 
media outlets. This provision is also part of 
the trend that considers street demonstrations 
and protests no longer an internal product of 
the extra-parliamentary ‘liberal’ opposition 
but instead a reflection of external interfer-
ence by the West. Such is the perceived in-
terference that a special parliamentary com-
mission of inquiry was established. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In 2019, the Constitutional Court issued a 
total of 3374 decisions: 41 judgments and 
3333 ordinances. The cases concerned po-
litical rights (freedom of peaceful assembly 
and freedom of the media), social rights (em-
ployment, pensions, including military pen-
sions) and economic rights. The majority of 
the applications were launched by citizens. 
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Other applicants included courts of general 
jurisdiction and arbitration courts, commer-
cial entities and a municipality. Applicants 
mostly challenged federal laws (especially 
the provisions of the federal codified stat-
utes: the Tax Code, the Labor Code, the Civil 
Code, etc.). Only in a handful of cases did 
the Court scrutinize the laws of subnational 
units. In eighteen judgements, the disputed 
provisions were declared completely or par-
tially unconstitutional. 
1. Review of the constitutionality of Article 
19.1 of the Act on Mass Media 
In January 2019, the Constitutional Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of Article 19.1 
of the Act on Mass Media (‘The Mass Media 
Act’). This article, adopted as an amendment 
to the Mass Media Act in 2014, provides 
that those Russian citizens who hold a citi-
zenship of another country cannot own more 
than 20 percent of shares in Russian mass 
media companies. As a result of this amend-
ment, Mr. Finkelstein, a Russian citizen who 
held a citizenship of the Netherlands, forfeit-
ed the right to participate in the management 
of radio station Chance LLC, in which he 
owned 49 percent of shares. Specifically, he 
could not contest the unilateral decision of 
the second shareholder to take over the ra-
dio’s broadcasting license. After a series of 
appeals, the matter came before the Consti-
tutional Court. The Court recognized that, al-
though by operation of law, Mr. Finkelstein’s 
shareholding in the company was reduced 
to 20 percent, he did not entirely forfeit his 
right to participate in the management of the 
company and avail of any other remedies 
and legal protections provided under appli-
cable laws. The failure to acknowledge the 
rights attached to Mr. Finkelstein’s reduced 
share in the company is in violation of sev-
eral articles of the Constitution, namely Arti-
cles 19.1 (equal protection under laws), 34.1, 
35.1, 35.2 (property rights and protection of 
private property), 55.3 (limitations on con-
stitutional rights and freedoms) and 62.2 
(citizenship).
However, the Constitutional Court, by lim-
iting its decision to the issue of rights and 
legal protections of shareholders, failed to 
address the concerns of those who opposed 
the law due to its negative impacts on the 
independence of the media. In this regard, 
in a separate opinion attached to the judg-
ment, Justice Konstantin Aranovsky offers 
useful guidance regarding the broader im-
plications of the Mass Media Act amend-
ments for constitutional rights and freedoms. 
Particularly, Justice Aranovsky argued that 
the amendments to the Act were unconsti-
tutional because they imposed unreasonable 
limitations on the freedom of expression and 
information under Article 29 of the Consti-
tution. Further, he pointed out that any con-
stitutional rights, freedoms and guarantees 
can be limited only to the extent necessary 
to protect the fundamental foundations of 
the constitutional system: morality, health, 
rights and legitimate interests of persons and 
purposes of national defense and security 
(the constitutional doctrine refers to this list 
contained in Article 55.3 of the Constitution 
as ‘constitutional values’). However, the ev-
idence provided by the government failed 
to demonstrate an immediate, potential or 
existing threat to the constitutional values. 
In other words, the contested article of the 
Mass Media Act limited access to informa-
tion without any reasonable justification. 
2. Review of the constitutionality of some 
provisions of the Act on Public Assemblies, 
Rallies, Demonstrations, Marches and 
Pickets
The Act on Public Assemblies, Rallies, 
Demonstrations, Marches and Pickets (‘The 
Act on Public Assemblies’) was adopted in 
2004 to regulate the exercise of the consti-
tutional right to peaceful assembly. Accord-
ing to Article 5.4.5 of this Act, organizers of 
public events − assemblies, rallies, demon-
strations, marches and pickets − must ensure 
public order and safety during these events. 
To comply with public safety requirements, 
organizers must cooperate with local law en-
forcement authorities and local government. 
Article 7 of the Act on Public Assemblies 
requires that an organizer of a public event 
notify local authorities about it and explain 
how he or she intends to ensure public safety. 
In August 2018, Mr. Teterin notified the 
Irkutsk city administration that he intend-
ed to hold a small public rally and that the 
city police and emergency services would 
be responsible for public safety during the 
event. Shortly after the notice was filed, city 
authorities informed Mr. Teterin that he had 
failed to comply with the requirements of the 
Act on Public Assemblies because referenc-
es to local law enforcement and ambulance 
services were insufficient to meet public 
safety requirements. 
The Constitutional Court found that this de-
cision of the Irkutsk city authorities violated 
several articles of the Constitution. Partic-
ularly, the Court held that local authorities 
could not limit the constitutional right to 
peaceful assembly by placing upon organiz-
ers of public events an obligation to ensure 
public order and safety. Moreover, the Court 
held that if the local authorities were not 
satisfied with the public safety information 
contained in the notice, they were required 
to cooperate with the organizers to meet the 
safety requirements.
3. Review of the constitutionality of some 
provisions of the Act of the Komi Republic 
on Holding Public Events in the Komi Re-
public
In 2012, the legislator of the Komi Republic 
(a federal subject located in the western part 
of Russia) adopted an Act that regulates the 
exercise of the constitutional right to peace-
ful assembly. It prohibits holding public 
assemblies in the central square of the Re-
public’s capital and also within a 50-meter 
radius of entrances to all state and municipal 
buildings of the Republic. 
In the summer of 2017, Ms. Tereshonkova 
and Ms. Sedova notified local authorities 
that they intended to hold assemblies in two 
locations that fell under the ambit of the Act. 
Local authorities, referring to the legal pro-
hibitions, refused to give their consent to the 
events. The applicants unsuccessfully con-
tested these decisions in the lower courts. 
In November 2019, the Constitutional Court 
declared the aforementioned provisions of 
the Act of the Republic of Komi unconstitu-
tional. First, it held that a general prohibition 
against the freedom of assembly in one of the 
central squares violated Section 11 (2) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and 
Article 31 of the Constitution, which guar-
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antee the right to peaceful assembly. The 
Court further acknowledged that the law of 
the Komi Republic placed unreasonable lim-
itations on the constitutional rights and free-
doms of citizens. As was mentioned above, 
Article 55.3 of the Constitution provides 
that constitutional rights and freedoms can 
be limited only to the extent that it is neces-
sary to protect the foundations of the consti-
tutional system: morality, health, rights and 
legitimate interests of other persons and to 
defend the country and ensure its national 
security. The Constitutional Court also noted 
that the legislator of the Komi Republic did 
not have jurisdiction to adopt laws that ban 
public assembly within a 50-meter radius of 
entrances to all state and municipal buildings 
of the Republic. This is because under Arti-
cles 72.1 (b) and 76.2 of the Constitution, the 
federal legislator has preemptive jurisdiction 
to adopt a list of locations where it is unsafe 
to hold a public assembly, and spaces near 
state and municipal buildings were not on 
the list.
4. Review of the constitutionality of some 
provisions of the Act on Countering Ter-
rorism and of the Act on the Monetary Al-
lowance and the Provision of Separate Pay-
ments to Military Personnel 
In 2013, Mr. Ponkratov was deployed in a 
counterterrorist operation in the Chechen 
Republic and sustained serious injuries that 
led to a disability. He then received a disabil-
ity allowance under the Act on Countering 
Terrorism and, following a rehabilitation pe-
riod, resumed military service. 
In 2017, the military medical board de-
clared that, due to the disability, Mr. Ponk-
ratov was not eligible for military service 
and he was fired from the Russian armed 
forces. Following the decision of the board, 
he applied for additional disability benefits, 
this time under the Act on the Monetary 
Allowance and the Provision of Separate 
Payments to Military Personnel (‘The Mon-
etary Allowance Act’). This Act provides 
for a disability payment for military veter-
ans. However, the military commission and 
the lower courts concluded that Mr. Ponkra-
tov’s claim for disability benefits could not 
be satisfied due to the fact that he had al-
ready received analogous disability payments 
under the Act on Countering Terrorism.
In a rather concise decision, the Constitu-
tional Court criticized the lower courts for 
failing to correctly interpret the purpose of 
the Act on Countering Terrorism. Particu-
larly, the Court pointed out that by adopting 
this Act, the legislator, among other things, 
acknowledged that military personnel de-
ployed in counterterrorism operations en-
joyed a special legal status and that they 
were eligible for additional social benefits. 
Therefore, the payments under the Act on 
Countering Terrorism did not substitute for 
the payments under the Monetary Allowance 
Act. The Court concluded that the contested 
administrative and judicial decisions were 
unconstitutional because they deprived Mr. 
Ponkratov of his right to equal protection un-
der laws under Article 19 of the Constitution. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Since the 2018 presidential elections, there 
has been intense speculation about the 
Kremlin’s plans for how it will transition 
power from Putin to Putin when his current 
term ends in 2024. During the year-end press 
conference of 19 December 2019, President 
Putin did not exclude changes to the orga-
nizational part of the Constitution as he has 
done in the past. This opens up speculation 
about constitutional amendments. The op-
tions discussed are essentially two: to allow 
further mandates to the same President or 
to strengthen the role of the Prime Minister 
and the parliamentary majority. This second 
option was advocated by the Duma speaker 
Volodin in an interview with Parlaments-
kaya Gazeta of 17 July 2019. But this se-
cond scenario has already occurred, with the 
Constitution unchanged in the period 2004-
2008. In Russia, the real problem does not 
lie with constitutional provisions but with 
the political feasibility of the different sce-
narios and with Putin’s own agenda, which 
he has not yet made public. The ‘system’ has 
its own strict internal logic and it is certainly 
not modification of the constitutional rules 
that will prevent alternation or continuity in 
power. Any change of mechanism occurs as 
a matter of practice following the adjustment 
of relations between rival power groups. The 
system still remains monolithic and self-re-
ferential, and is impervious to the ritual 
street protests in the run-up to elections that 
have been observed on several occasions in 
recent years.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The most important step in the procedure for 
the adoption of constitutional amendments 
undertaken during 2019 was the decision in 
June of the Committee on Constitutional and 
Legislative Issues of the National Assembly 
(NA) to accept the Government’s proposition 
(initiative) for constitutional changes. How-
ever, due to the forthcoming parliamentary 
elections in spring 2020, it is upon the new 
legislature to continue and, most likely, fin-
ish the procedure. Given that the NA is not 
formally tied by the content of the proposed 
amendments, it remains to be seen what the 
new constitutional provisions would bring 
regarding some of the key issues, like, for 
example, the composition of the High Judi-
cial Council, the conditions for the first ap-
pointment of judges, or the relations of the 
three branches of power. 
When it comes to the conditions under which 
the spring 2020 parliamentary elections will 
be held, there was a long process of negoti-
ations between the ruling party and the op-
position in summer 2019. In spite of the fact 
that some modifications in various areas of 
national legislation were adopted (more reli-
able and transparent registry of voters, con-
stitution and functioning of electoral com-
mittees, and misuse of public resources in 
electoral campaign), a significant number of 
opposition political parties announced that 
they would boycott the elections. 
The overwhelming majority of all judge-
ments adopted by the Constitutional Court 
of Serbia (CCS) over the last year concerned 
constitutional complaints, while other deci-
sions mainly treated the issues of constitu-
tionality and/or legality of laws and other 
general acts. Within the group of constitu-
tional complaints, numerous decisions were 
taken regarding the violation of the right to a 
trial within a reasonable time. The CCS also 
examined the constitutionality of the Law on 
Chambers of Commerce and constitutional-
ity and legality of an act adopted by the Na-
tional Council for Higher Education.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
As was the case both in 20171 and 2018,2 
the ongoing procedure for the adoption of 
constitutional amendments represented the 
quintessence of national constitutional de-
velopments, at least during the first half of 
the year. In June 2019, the Committee on 
Constitutional and Legislative Issues of 
the National Assembly accepted the Go-
vernment’s proposition (initiative) for the 
adoption of constitutional changes3 that was 
submitted on November 30, 2018. However, 
the entire procedure was then stopped, given 
that a clear political decision undoubtedly 
indicated that the new legislature resulting 
from the spring 2020 parliamentary elec-
tions would finally adopt the constitutional 
changes. In spite of the fact that there is no 
1 See 2017 Global Review of Constitutional Law, I-CONnect-Clough Center 2018, Report on Serbia, p. 240-243.
2 See 2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law, I-CONnect-Clough Center 2019, Report on Serbia, p. 258-262.
3 The term ‘constitutional changes’ is used because the Serbian Constitution does not mention the term 
‘amendment,’ only the proposition (initiative) for constitutional changes (Art. 203-1). However, the entity 
submitting the initiative (according to Art. 203-1, it can be one-third of the MPs, the President of the Repub-
lic, the Government, or 150.000 citizens) is entitled to motivate its initiative, therefore suggesting the content 
of the proposed changes.  
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constitutional, legal, and/or jurisdictional 
provision (or decision) demanding that the 
procedure for the adoption of constitutional 
changes has to be completed by the subse-
quent (and not the actual) legislature, the 
Minister of Justice declared in August 2019 
that, ‘taking into consideration the time lapse 
and the complexity of the procedure’,4 it is 
expected that the new legislature would be in 
the position to complete the process. In any 
case, the next procedural step5 should be the 
decision of the NA’s plenary, necessitating a 
two-thirds majority, regarding the adoption 
of the initiative for constitutional changes. 
The NA is not formally tied by the content 
of the proposed amendments given that – 
once it adopts the initiative for constitutio-
nal changes (Art. 203-3 of the Constitution) 
– it is formally entitled to autonomously 
elaborate the act comprising constitutional 
amendments (Art. 203-5). 
It remains to be seen whether the new legis-
lature will follow the major elements of the 
Government initiative adopted by the Com-
mittee on Constitutional and Legislative Is-
sues in June 2019. As was the case during all 
of 2018, the following three issues are still 
giving rise to major concerns: 1) composi-
tion of the High Judicial Council; 2) condi-
tions for the first appointment of judges; and 
3) provisions on the relations of the three 
branches of power.6
Given that, in the first months of 2019, seve-
ral opposition parties represented in the NA 
started boycotting parliamentary sessions, 
and taking into consideration the approa-
ching spring 2020 parliamentary elections, 
a complex and multi-phased process of ne-
gotiations between the ruling party and the 
opposition began in summer 2019. The main 
topic of these negotiations was improvement 
of the overall institutional and procedural 
framework for free and democratic parlia-
mentary elections. Even if it was clear from 
the beginning that these negotiations – pre-
dominantly held under the auspices of diffe-
rent EU representatives, including the rap-
porteur of the European Parliament for Ser-
bia – weren’t expected to bring any stricto 
sensu constitutional changes, some modifi-
cations in various areas of national legisla-
tion were adopted; for example, those related 
to more reliable and transparent registry of 
voters, the constitution and functioning of 
electoral committees, and misuse of public 
resources in electoral campaign. However, 
these initial results were seriously compro-
mised by at least two factors: 1) numerous 
opposition political parties left the negotia-
tions in their early stage, claiming that they 
did not bring any significant changes; and 2) 
the substantial lack of media freedom keeps 
compromising the achieved results. 
According to the latest findings of Repor-
ters Without Borders, the ranking of Serbia 
in the 2019 World Press Freedom Index was 
downgraded (from 76 to 90), given that the 
country ‘has become a place where practi-
cing journalism is neither safe nor supported 
by the state’,7 while ‘the number of attacks on 
media is on the rise, including death threats, 
and inflammatory rhetoric targeting journa-
lists is increasingly coming from governing 
officials’.8 In this context, even some unde-
niably positive steps taken in the direction 
of improving the election-related regulatory 
framework could not be expected to have 
their full effect. The legitimacy of the new 
spring 2020 legislature – and, consequently, 
the quality and political sustainability of for-
thcoming constitutional changes – critical-
ly depends on the overall conditions under 
which the spring elections will be held. In 
conclusion, one can only reiterate the assess-
ment given in our reports for years 2017 and 
2018 – the path before the initiated consti-
tutional changes in Serbia is still long and 
unpredictable.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In 2019, the Constitutional Court of Serbia 
(CCS) adopted 427 various decisions,9 out 
of which the overwhelming majority (416) 
concerned constitutional complaints, while 
other decisions treated the issues of consti-
tutionality and/or legality of laws and gene-
ral acts adopted by the National Assembly 
(5); the constitutionality or legality of other 
general acts (5); and one that concerned the 
conflict of competences in one correctio-
nal matter. Within the group of constitutio-
nal complaints, numerous decisions were 
taken regarding the violation of the right 
to a trial within a reasonable time (Art. 32 
of the Constitution); other CCS decisions 
treated violations of other rights, including 
the right to property (Art. 58 of the Consti-
tution) and the right to freedom and security 
(Art. 27 of the Constitution). When it comes 
to the issues of constitutionality of laws, in 
one of its most interesting decisions, the 
CCS examined two provisions of the Law on 
Chambers of Commerce. Finally, within the 
group of CCS decisions on constitutionality 
or legality of other general acts, two out of 
five rulings concerned various legal acts of 
cities and municipalities and another two 
treated the issue of collective agreements on 
work-related matters. In another of its ru-
lings, the CCS examined the legality of one 
general act of the National Council for Hi-
gher Education. In this chapter, we will ana-
lyse the CCS’s decisions regarding 1) two 
constitutional complaints, 2) constitutiona-
lity of the Law on Chambers of Commerce, 
and 3) constitutionality and legality of an act 
adopted by the National Council for Higher 
Education.
4 See <http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a508600/Kuburovic-Naredni-saziv-Skupstine-da-zavrsi-proces-izmena-Ustava-Srbije.html>, accessed 10 January 2020.
5 Art. 203 of the Constitution provides a complex procedure for the adoption of constitutional changes; this procedure includes five major phases: 1) adoption of 
the initiative for constitutional changes; 2) elaboration of the act on constitutional changes; 3) adoption of this act in the NA by the 2/3 majority, potentially followed 
by a 4) referendum (obligatory or not, depending on the provision to be modified); and 5) proclamation of the act on constitutional changes. 
6 See 2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law, I-CONnect-Clough Center 2019, Report on Serbia, p. 259.
7 See <https://rsf.org/en/serbia>, accessed 13 January 2020.
8 Ibid.
9 All the data in this chapter is based on the publicly accessible base of jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Serbia, published on its website; see <http://
www.ustavni.sud.rs/page/jurisprudence/35/>, accessed 11 January 2020.
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1. Case Už-185/2015 – Constitutional com-
plaint for violation of the right to freedom 
and security and other rights related to crim-
inal procedure: Judicial review
The CCS’s decision in this case is interes-
ting not only for its complex subject matter 
but also because of the important references 
the CCS has made to the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 
In spite of the fact that the CCS finally found 
that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights – in-
cluding the right to freedom and security – 
were not violated, it is worth examining the 
main circumstances and basic elements of 
the CCS’s reasoning. 
On 8 January 2015, B.J. from Novi Sad filed 
a constitutional complaint before the CCS, 
claiming that decisions of the High Court 
and Court of Appeal of Novi Sad (of 4 and 
26 November 2014, respectively) violated 
his following constitutional rights: right 
to freedom and security (Art. 27-1 of the 
Constitution), rights related to decisions on 
detention (Art. 30-1) and its limited duration 
(Art. 31-2), right to a fair trial (Art. 32-1), 
and right to presumption of innocence (Art. 
34-3). Given its fundamental importance 
for the protection of individual rights in the 
course of criminal proceedings, we will first 
focus on the issue of presumption of inno-
cence; then, the emphasis of this review will 
be on the right to freedom and the related 
right to the limited duration of detention. 
According to the plaintiff, the presump-
tion of innocence was violated because the 
High Court of Novi Sad in its ruling claimed 
that ‘the criminal offence in this matter, for 
which there is a reasonable doubt that it was 
committed by B.J., was perpetrated by him’, 
while, according to the plaintiff, the Court 
should have used the formulation claiming 
that ‘the criminal offence was committed,’ 
given that his responsibility was not duly es-
tablished in the procedure before the lower 
court, while the higher instance reiterated the 
same formulation. The CCS found that the 
High Court of Novi Sad had not violated the 
plaintiff’s right to presumption of innocence 
because in its decision it clearly and undoub-
tedly indicated that there was a reasonable 
doubt that the plaintiff had committed the 
criminal offence, and not that this affirma-
tion was certain. Given that the decision 
in question was related to the prolongation 
of detention, the CCS found that the High 
Court did not overstep the boundaries of a 
reasonable doubt, ‘in which the decision ma-
king in matters of detention can exclusively 
operate’, and that, consequently, the plaintiff 
was not declared guilty before the decision 
in this criminal matter was final. 
Concerning the right to freedom and the re-
lated right to the limited duration of deten-
tion, the plaintiff affirmed that the detention 
and its prolongation were unlawful, given 
that a reasonable doubt that the criminal of-
fence was perpetrated by him was not duly 
established. At this point, the CCS specified 
that, according to national legal provisions, 
the court can determine (and prolong) the 
detention only if two conditions are cumu-
latively fulfilled: 1) there is a reasonable 
doubt that the person in question perpetrated 
a criminal offence; and 2) the detention is 
necessary in the course of criminal procee-
dings. Furthermore, the second element 
should be duly motivated by the court with 
clear specification of the reasons for which 
the detention is necessary for an undisturbed 
course of criminal proceedings. In this res-
pect, the CCS invoked several judgements 
of the ECHR, in which it established that an 
arbitrary detention exists when there is no 
adequate motivation given by the competent 
courts that clearly indicate the reasons for 
which the detention was necessary (ECHR 
judgements in cases Kurt v. Turkey10 and 
Bazorkina v. Russi11). The CCS found that, 
in this matter, all these conditions were met. 
Finally, concerning the duration of the deten-
tion, the CCS established that, in line with its 
stable case law, the constitutional right (Art. 
31-2) is not violated if the competent court 
in its decision presented relevant and suffi-
cient reasons that justified the duration of 
the detention and gave particular motivation 
for urgency in the course of criminal procee-
dings (ECHR judgements in cases Lavents v. 
Latvia12 and Buzadji v. Moldova13).
Case Už-5342/2016 – Constitutional com-
plaint for violation of the right to property: 
Judicial review
The specificity of the CCS’s judgement in 
this case lies in the fact that – even if it is 
clear that the main constitutional right of the 
plaintiff, which the Court examined, was the 
right to property – there was a profound in-
terconnection between the right to property 
and the right to a trial within a reasonable 
time. Therefore, the constitutional basis of 
the CCS’s reasoning in this case was Art. 58 
of the Constitution, guaranteeing a ‘peace-
ful tenure of a person’s own property and 
other property rights acquired by the law’ 
(para. 1), while the ‘right of property may 
be revoked or restricted only in public in-
terest established by the law and with com-
pensation which cannot be less than market 
value’ (para. 2). However, the Constitution 
also guarantees that ‘everyone shall have 
the right to a public hearing before an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal established by 
the law within a reasonable time, which shall 
pronounce judgement on their rights and 
obligations’ (Art. 32, para. 1). 
In spite of the fact that the main ratio consti-
tutionalis of this provision is to guarantee 
individual rights in the course of criminal 
proceedings, the same constitutional right 
is also fully applicable in civil matters. Na-
mely, the plaintiff S.M., who was employed 
by the company S. Ltd. from the city of 
Čačak, was entitled to receive from his for-
mer employer financial compensation for 
10 Case 69481/01 of 27 July 2006.
11 Case 24276/94 of 25 May 1998. 
12 Case 58442/00 of 28 November 2002.
13 Case 23755/07 of 5 July 2016.
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unlawfully reduced salary according to the 
judgement of a competent Municipal Court 
on 31 March 2008. After several years and 
all necessary legal steps having been taken 
by the plaintiff, the adjudged financial com-
pensation still had not been paid after more 
than eight years. The plaintiff then initiated, 
before the High Court of Čačak, the proce-
dure for the protection of his right to a trial 
within a reasonable time. 
In its judgement of 20 May 2016, this Court 
established that the plaintiff’s right was vio-
lated. Given that the violation of his right to 
a trial within a reasonable time was due to 
the non-execution, by competent national ju-
dicial authorities, of an effective judgement, 
the CCS found that this also represented a 
violation of the plaintiff’s right to proper-
ty. Moreover, ‘taking into consideration the 
case law of international institutions for the 
protection of human rights’ (para. 4 of the 
judgement), the CCS also found that the 
plaintiff had the right to damage compensa-
tion. However, it refused – by invoking its 
own case law in similar matters (judgement 
of 8 May 2013 in case Už-633/2011) – the 
plaintiff’s demand for the compensation of 
costs of the procedure before the CCS itself.
3. Case IUz-249/2016 – Constitutionality of 
the Law on Chambers of Commerce
In spite of a relatively limited number of CCS 
judgements in this area (5) in 2019, the exa-
mination of constitutionality and/or legality of 
laws and general acts adopted by the National 
Assembly represents an important aspect of 
its jurisprudence. In one of its most important 
cases, the CCS examined the constitutionality 
and compliance with ratified international 
treaties of Articles 10 and 33 of the Law on 
Chambers of Commerce (LCC), adopted in 
2005 (Official Journal No. 112/2015). The 
procedure before the CCS was initiated by 
various associations and other legal entities 
(examination of the constitutionality) and by 
a group of Members of Parliament (examina-
tion of the compliance with ratified interna-
tional treaties). 
Regarding Art. 10 of the LCC (to which was 
dedicated practically the entire reasoning of 
both claimants and the CCS), the claimants 
argued that it was non-compliant with three 
constitutional provisions: 1) the principle of 
direct implementation of guaranteed rights 
(Art. 18 of the Constitution); 2) the freedom 
of association (Art. 55 of the Constitution 
and Art. 11 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms); and 3) freedom of 
entrepreneurship (Art. 83 of the Constitu-
tion). The main issue was the provision of 
Art. 10, para. 1, which obliges all business 
entities operating in Serbia to become (as 
of 1 January 2017) members of the Serbian 
Chamber of Commerce (SCC). According to 
the claimants, the SCC cannot be conside-
red an association of public law given that, 
if it were the case, the introduction of the 
principle of compulsory membership would 
compromise business entities’ negative right 
to freedom of association (right not to be a 
member), thus violating the constitutionally 
guaranteed freedom of association as well as 
freedom of entrepreneurship. 
The claimants were also pleading that the 
ECHR, in its stable case law, found that in 
spite of the fact that Art. 11 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights does not mention expressis verbis the 
protection of the negative right to freedom 
of association, it should be interpreted in 
the sense that this right should also be gua-
ranteed. Moreover, it was also argued by the 
claimants that the chambers of commerce 
cannot be considered associations of public 
law, ‘given that they are established in order 
to protect private interests of their members, 
and not the public interest’, as it was, accor-
ding to the claimants, established in the ju-
risprudence of the ECHR (e.g., cases Sigur-
dur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, Gustafsson v. 
Sweden, and Chassagnou v. France). 
In its long and complex reasoning, the CCS 
affirmed that it is beyond contention that all 
chambers of commerce are interest-based, 
professional, and non-profit business asso-
ciations. As for the SCC, the Court sustained 
that it enjoys certain entrusted public autho-
rities and has delegated public powers, like 
certain other legal entities such as bar asso-
ciations and associations of notaries. There-
fore, the competence of the SCC is not only 
to coordinate and represent the interests of 
its members but also to enhance business-re-
lated activities. Consequently, the CCS 
concluded that the provisions of the LCC, 
and in particular its Art. 10, were constitutio-
nal and in accordance with relevant ratified 
international treaties.  
4. Case IUo-134/2018 – Constitutionality and 
legality of an act adopted by the National 
Council for Higher Education
An important aspect of the CCS’s activity is 
examination of the constitutionality and le-
gality of general acts other than laws adop-
ted by the NA, including the decisions with 
an erga omnes effect of various national 
and local administrative and expert entities. 
The National Council for Higher Education 
(NCHE) has 21 members, elected by the 
NA, and its main competence is to ensure 
the development of higher education and to 
improve its quality. In November 2017, the 
NCHE, acting according to its prerogatives, 
adopted the specific criteria for contractual 
engagement of university professors older 
than 65 years. Article 3, para. 3 of this act 
specified that this specific criteria should 
also cover the period before the person in 
question acquired the academic status of full 
university professor. 
The claimant argued that this provision was 
contrary to Art. 93, para. 3 of the Law on Hi-
gher Education (LHE), which specifies that 
the examination and evaluation of the scien-
tific results of university professors can be 
performed only by taking into consideration 
the results achieved after the moment when 
the full professorship has been acquired. It 
was also argued by the claimant that, conse-
quently, this provision of the specific criteria 
is contrary to Art. 195, para. 1 of the Consti-
tution, which provides that the ‘general 
acts of organisations with delegated public 
powers, political parties, trade unions, and 
civic associations and collective agreements 
must be in compliance with the Law’. The-
refore, the NCHE is competent to adopt spe-
cific criteria for contractual engagement of 
university professors older than 65 years, but 
only within the limits of general provisions 
set by the LHE. 
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In this case, the the CCS found that the 
NCHE exceeded its prerogatives, given that 
it had not limited its decision to further ela-
boration of specific criteria, but effectively 
modified the provision of Art. 93, para. 3 of 
the LHE. By doing so, the NCHE acted not 
as an authority competent for further elabo-
ration of legal acts within the boundaries the-
reof but practically exercised the capacity of 
a legislator by modifying the provision of the 
LHE. Therefore, the CCS found that the pro-
vision of Art. 3, para. 3 of the specific crite-
ria for contractual engagement of university 
professors older than 65 years is contrary to 
the relevant provision of the LHE, and thus 
unconstitutional. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In spite of the fact that the entire procedure 
for the adoption of constitutional amend-
ments already lasts for more than two 
years, the new composition of the NA re-
sulting from the 2020 spring parliamentary 
elections would, probably, undertake steps 
towards their final adoption. It remains to 
be seen whether the conditions under which 
the 2020 parliamentary elections will be 
held will show some effective improvement 
of the overall institutional and procedu-
ral framework for the free and democratic 
competition of political parties. When it co-
mes to further reforms of the judiciary in the 
context of the EU membership negotiation 
process (Chapter 23 of the EU acquis), very 
limited progress in 2019 leaves important 
room for improvement in the future. Consti-
tutional complaints will certainly continue 
to represent the majority of cases before the 
Constitutional Court, with many of them 
most probably concerning the violation of 
the right to a trial within a reasonable time 
and the right to property.
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SINGAPORE
I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 2019 saw a flurry of important 
constitutional cases, alongside two significant 
legislative developments with constitutional 
implications. The Court of Appeal handed 
down its judgment on whether there is a 
constitutional requirement to call for a by-
election in the case of a single vacancy in 
a Group Representation Constituency. This 
is a case that implicated foundational issues 
of legal hierarchy in Singapore. The judicial 
power and constitutional requirements of the 
principle of separation of powers remained 
another crucial area of constitutional 
discourse. It was, however, freedom of 
speech and assembly that took center stage 
in 2019 within and outside the courts. Aside 
from two constitutional cases touching upon 
the scope of Article 14 of the Singapore 
Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech, 
association, and assembly, constitutional 
debate around the Protection from Online 
Falsehoods and Manipulation Act 2019 
(POFMA), Singapore’s anti-fake news law, 
also revolved around free speech concerns. 
Interestingly, however, amendments to the 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 
(MRHA), legislation that had previously 
been criticized for its impact on religious 
freedom and freedom of speech, have largely 
been accepted by religious groups, which 
were most affected by these changes. One 
possible reason for this is that there was 
widespread consultation among these groups 
before the amendments were introduced. 
Accordingly, as we observed generally last 
year, the Singapore government’s increasing 
reliance on public consultations could serve 
“not only as a ‘crowdsourcing’ of ideas but 
also to play a legitimating role in the final 
legislative product.” 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
A. Protection from Online Falsehoods and 
Manipulation Act 2019
In 2019, Singapore became one of sever-
al countries in the world that passed a law 
aimed at countering fake news. POFMA 
empowers the Government to deal swiftly 
with online falsehoods by providing a range 
of remedies targeting the communication of 
“false statements of fact” (FSOF), and the 
making or altering of bots or the provision 
of services for that purpose.1 An FSOF is de-
fined as a false or misleading statement that 
a reasonable person would consider to be a 
representation of fact.2  
Under POFMA, any Minister may issue a 
range of directions, including Correction 
Directions and Stop Communication Direc-
tions, if satisfied that an act communicating 
1 No. 18 of 2019. See ss 7-9.
2 Ibid s 2(2). 
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a false statement of fact has been committed 
and that it is in the public interest to do so.3 A 
Correction Direction requires the party who 
communicated the falsehood to put up a no-
tice admitting as such, and/or a correction to 
the falsehood and where the correction may 
be found. A Stop Communication Direction 
requires the party to take necessary steps to 
ensure that the falsehood communicated is 
no longer available on, or through, the In-
ternet to end-users in Singapore. These may 
include the removal of the falsehood from 
an online location by a specified time and 
stopping the publication, sharing, or posting 
of the falsehood in Singapore. In addition, 
POFMA enables Ministers to require Inter-
net intermediaries (such as Google and Face-
book) and providers of mass media services 
to communicate correction notices to all its 
end-users, or to disable end-user access to 
the relevant statement.4
POFMA provides remedies for parties issued 
a Direction. There is an initial expedited ap-
peal to the relevant Minister, and subsequent-
ly, the possibility of an expedited appeal to 
the court if the Minister rejects the appeal. 
The Minister must decide on an appeal no 
later than two working days after the appeal 
is received, and the court must fix a hearing 
within six days if the appellant requests an 
expedited hearing.
The enactment of POFMA garnered signif-
icant domestic and international attention, 
including from the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protec-
tion of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression.5 Opposition Members of Parlia-
ment argued that there was a risk that POF-
MA would be used against political dissi-
dents and opposition members.6 Academics 
were also concerned that it might affect their 
academic freedom.7 Despite assurances from 
the Government, a group of academics is-
sued a press statement urging it to include 
an exemption for academic work in the law.8 
The Government took this criticism into 
consideration, assuring that the law only tar-
gets false statements of fact and not opinions 
and fair criticism.9 It also clarified that POF-
MA is carefully calibrated in that it leaves 
the original content untouched except in the 
case of a Stop Communication Direction. In 
addition, POFMA provides more extensive 
and expeditious judicial oversight through 
an internal appeal process. In comparison, 
the courts’ usual oversight over other exec-
utive action is through judicial review only.
Notably, Singapore is by no means the only 
country that has anti-fake news laws; France, 
Germany, and Russia have also passed tough 
new laws against fake news or hate speech.10 
As countries around the world grapple with 
the proliferation of fake news, a difficult bal-
ance will have to be struck between freedom 
of speech and the need to protect the integri-
ty of a democratic system and the public in-
terests of the people in the democratic state. 
B. Maintenance of Religious Harmony 
(Amendment) Act 2019
Another major legislative amendment with 
constitutional implications concerned the 
MRHA. The MRHA serves to restrain re-
ligious speech that has the impact of threat-
ening religious harmony, defined as causing 
feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will, or hostility 
between different religious groups; carrying 
out activities to promote a political cause, or a 
cause of any political party while, or under the 
guise of, propagating or practising any reli-
gious belief; carrying out subversive activities 
under the guise of propagating or practising 
any religious belief; and/or exciting disaffec-
tion against the President or the Government 
while, or under the guise of, propagating or 
practising any religious belief. The MRHA 
had previously been criticized for its expan-
sive reach.11 However, no restraining order 
has ever been issued under the MRHA since 
it came into operation in 1990. The MRHA’s 
primary effect was in setting out the terms for 
discourse in Singapore. 
The MRHA was amended for the first time 
in 2019. The main purposes of the amend-
ment were to address the use of the Internet 
and social media to spread hate and mobil-
ise mobs against religious groups, and to 
regulate perceived foreign interference in 
domestic affairs globally. The significant 
amendments are, first, a restraining order 
3 Ibid ss 4, 10(1) and 20(1).
4 Ibid Part IV.
5 See David Kaye, “Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression” (24 April 2019) <https://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL_SGP_3_2019.pdf> accessed 9 February 2020.
6 Bhavan Jaipragas, “Singapore’s opposition calls fake-news bill a ‘Damocles sword’ hanging over the public” (South China Morning Post, 7 May 2019) <https://www.
scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3009263/singapores-opposition-calls-fake-news-bill-damocles-sword> accessed 9 February 2020.
7 See Ellie Bothwell, “Singapore ‘fake news’ law ‘threatens academic freedom worldwide’” (Times Higher Education, 23 April 2019) <https://www.timeshighereducation.
com/news/singapore-fake-news-law-threatens-academic-freedom-worldwide> accessed 9 February 2020.
8 See Fabian Koh, “Academics reject MOE’s assurances on fake news Bill, want assurances reflected in the legislation” (The Straits Times, 13 April 2019) <https://www.
straitstimes.com/singapore/academics-reject-moes-assurances-on-fake-news-bill-want-assurances-reflected-in-the?cx_testId=0&cx_testVariant=cx_2&cx_artPos=0#cx-
recs_s> accessed 9 February 2020.
9 Ong Ye Kung (Minister for Education), speech during the Second Reading of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill, Singapore Parliamentary 
Debates, Official Report (8 May 2019), vol 94.
10 See Fathin Ungku, “Factbox: ‘Fake News’ laws around the world” (Reuters, 2 April 2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-singapore-politics-fakenews-factbox/fact-
box-fake-news-laws-around-the-world-idUSKCN1RE0XN > accessed 9 February 2020.
11 Jothie Rajah, “Policing Religion: Discursive Excursions into Singapore’s Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act”, in Penelope Nicholson and Sarah Biddulph (eds.), 
Examining Practice, Interrogating Theory: Comparative Legal Studies in Asia (Brill, 2008). 
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takes effect immediately rather than after 14 
days post-amendment. Second, the amended 
MRHA requires the governing bodies and 
top leadership of religious organizations be 
comprised mostly of Singapore citizens or 
permanent residents. Third, the amended 
MRHA introduces a new disclosure require-
ment, whereby religious organisations have 
to declare one-time donations of $10,000 
and above from foreign sources as well as 
affiliations with any foreign individual or 
organisation that is in a position to exert con-
trol over them. Lastly, the amendments intro-
duce a community remedial initiative (CRI), 
which enables a person who has allegedly 
committed an offence under the MRHA to 
voluntarily undertake remedial action with 
the offended religious group. These mea-
sures may include issuing a public or private 
apology or participating in activities that 
promote religious harmony. They are aimed 
at resolving communal tensions and repair 
disrupted ties between religious communi-
ties using non-penal methods.12 Consistent 
with the objectives of restoration and reha-
bilitation, a person may not be prosecuted 
for an alleged offence when a CRI in respect 
of that offence is in force.
Criticism of the amendments was fairly mut-
ed, as they refine the MRHA to respond to new 
technological and geopolitical developments, 
and are justifiable. Furthermore, the formal-
ization of the CRI ensures that the MHRA 
prioritises reconciliation over criminal sanc-
tions. The amendments also reflect the pow-
er of consultation – religious organizations 
in Singapore were largely supportive of the 
new measures because they were closely con-
sulted before the changes were introduced. 
The Government also promised assistance to 
smaller religious organizations to help them 
meet the new reporting requirements. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v 
Public Prosecutor: Judicial Power and Jus-
ticiability
The separation of powers is a foundational 
principle of Singaporean constitutional law 
and has been recognized in Singapore as 
being part of the Constitution’s basic struc-
ture.13 Within this, ensuring the integrity of 
judicial power, enshrined in Article 93 of the 
Constitution, has become a key focal point 
for constitutional argumentation in Singa-
pore.14 The case of Nagaenthran a/l K Dhar-
malingam v Attorney-General, an appeal 
from a High Court decision summarized in 
last year’s Global Review,15 concerned the 
issue of when, if at all, legislation can oust 
the court’s power to review executive action 
without violating the Constitution. 
The challenge was brought by an offend-
er who had been convicted of a capital of-
fence of drug trafficking under the Misuse of 
Drugs Act (MDA).16 A person convicted of 
such a charge could escape the death penalty 
if he was merely a drug courier and was cer-
tified by the Public Prosecutor (PP) to have 
“substantively assisted” the Central Narcot-
ics Bureau in disrupting drug trafficking ac-
tivities in or outside Singapore.17 In this case, 
the PP had declined to grant the appellant a 
certificate of substantive assistance. The ap-
pellant unsuccessfully sought leave from the 
High Court to challenge the PP’s decision. 
Before the Court of Appeal, he contended 
that leave should be granted because the PP’s 
decision was made: (a) without taking into 
account relevant considerations; and (b) in 
the absence of a precedent fact. 
The anterior question for the Court was 
whether section 33B(4) of the MDA oust-
ed the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts 
over the PP’s non-certification decision ex-
cept on the grounds of bad faith, malice, and 
unconstitutionality.18 Section 33B(4) reads:
The determination of whether or not 
any person has substantively assisted 
the Central Narcotics Bureau in dis-
rupting drug trafficking activities shall 
be at the sole discretion of the Public 
Prosecutor and no action or proceeding 
shall lie against the Public Prosecutor 
in relation to any such determination 
unless it is proved to the court that the 
determination was done in bad faith or 
with malice.
The Court first drew a distinction between 
clauses that oust or exclude the court’s ju-
risdiction or authority to act in a matter and 
clauses that immunise parties from suit or li-
ability.19 The latter were exceptional preclu-
sions, commonly enacted to protect persons 
carrying out public functions. In the Court’s 
judgment, section 33B(4) of the MDA was 
not an ouster clause; rather, it immunised the 
PP, when acting under s 33B of the MDA, 
from suit save on the stated grounds.20 Two 
concerns dominated its reasoning in this re-
12 Sun Xueling (Senior Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Home Affairs), speech during the Second Reading of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony (Amend-
ment) Bill, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (7 October 2019), vol 94.
13 Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 1129, [69] (Court of Appeal); note, however, that the Court of Appeal declined to conclude whether the basic struc-
ture doctrine formed part of Singapore law and, even if it did, what its extent or effect would be: at [71]-[72].
14 See Jaclyn L. Neo, “Autonomy, Deference and Control: Judicial Doctrine of Separation of Powers in Singapore” (2018) 5 JICL 461, generally.
15 Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Attorney-General [2018] SGHC 112 (High Court). Jaclyn L Neo [et al.], “Singapore”, in Richard Albert [et al.] (eds.), 2018 Global 
Review of Constitutional Law (I-CONnect and the Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College, 2019) 263, 266-267.
16 Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed. See MDA s 33B(2)(b). Under the MDA, the death penalty is a prescribed punishment only where the quantity of drugs trafficked exceeds a 
prescribed threshold.
17 Ibid s 33B(2).
18 The former two grounds are expressly provided in MDA s 33B(4). The ground of constitutionality is premised on Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v Attorney-Gener-
al [2015] 5 SLR 1222, [35] (Court of Appeal).
19 [2019] 2 SLR 216 [47] (Court of Appeal).
20 Ibid [51].
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gard: respect for the separation of powers and 
the judiciary’s institutional competence.21 
The upshot of the Court’s interpretation of 
section 33B(4) was that the judicial review 
of the PP’s non-certification decision on 
the usual grounds such as illegality, irratio-
nality, and procedural impropriety was not 
excluded.22 The Court provided a glimpse 
into the reasoning it might have employed 
had section 33B(4) truly purported to oust 
the court’s power to review the legality of 
the PP’s non-certification. A clause ousting 
judicial review, the Court observed, would 
be constitutionally suspect for being in vi-
olation of Article 93 of the Constitution as 
well as the principle of the separation of 
powers.23 Such review was directed at the le-
gality and propriety of decision-making and 
the upholding of the rule of law, which were 
matters that the judiciary was well placed to 
adjudicate on.24 Thus, the Court held that a 
review of the merits of the PP’s non-certi-
fication decision was neither within judicial 
competence nor suitable for judicial inqui-
ry.25 By preventing an aggrieved offender 
from forcing the court to determine an issue 
that it was not inherently capable of deter-
mining, the conferral by section 33B(4) of 
immunity from suit augmented the conven-
tional legality-merits distinction in Singa-
porean administrative law.
2. Wong Souk Yee v. Attorney-General: 
Group Representation Constituencies 
The Court of Appeal judgment in Wong Souk 
Yee v Attorney-General26 had important im-
plications for constitutional interpretation 
and the right to vote in Singapore. Also an 
appeal from a decision summarized in last 
year’s Global Review,27 the case came about 
when a Member of Parliament (MP) in a 
Group Representation Constituency (GRC) 
resigned. Under Singapore’s system of par-
liamentary representation, electoral districts 
are either Single Member Constituencies 
(SMCs), where one candidate is elected an 
MP, or GRCs, where voters cast their bal-
lots for a team of candidates, at least one of 
whom must be from an ethnic minority com-
munity. The initial rationale for introducing 
GRCs was to ensure minority representation 
in Parliament. 
The key issue was whether the Government 
must call a by-election in order to fill a single 
vacancy in the GRC. Under section 24(2A) 
of the Parliamentary Elections Act,28 there is 
no requirement for a by-election. It states: 
In respect of any group representation 
constituency, no writ shall be issued […] 
for an election to fill any vacancy unless 
all the Members for that constituency 
have vacated their seats in Parliament.
The applicant, a resident of Marsiling–Yew 
Tee who had stood for election in the constit-
uency at the 2015 general election, argued 
before the High Court that this provision was 
inconsistent with Article 49(1) of the Consti-
tution. Article 49(1) states: 
Whenever the seat of a Member, not 
being a non-constituency Member, has 
become vacant for any reason other than 
a dissolution of Parliament, the vacancy 
shall be filled by election in the manner 
provided by or under any law relating 
to Parliamentary elections for the time 
being in force.
The applicant also argued that a requirement 
for a by-election when a single member of a 
GRC vacates her seat was the necessary im-
plication of a citizen’s constitutional right to 
vote. The High Court dismissed both these 
arguments.
The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s 
decision, though it disagreed with its reason-
ing. The Court reconciled Article 49(1) with 
section 24(2A) by essentially narrowing the 
scope of the constitutional provision. The 
Court noted that when Article 49(1) was 
enacted in 1965, GRCs did not exist. Thus, 
how the Article applied to GRCs was un-
clear. Indeed, both parties agreed that there 
must have been a legislative oversight when 
drafting the constitutional amendments 
which implemented the GRC scheme. As 
such, reference to extraneous materials was 
deemed necessary to ascertain the true mean-
ing of Article 49(1).29 Parliamentary debates 
showed that the intention was not to call a 
by-election unless all the seats in a GRC had 
been vacated, as per section 24(2A) of the 
PEA.
While the High Court had sought to apply ei-
ther a rectifying or updating construction to 
Article 49(1), the Court of Appeal expressed 
doubt about whether it was proper to apply 
these approaches towards statutory construc-
tion to constitutional provisions as the latter 
“are designed to be more deeply entrenched 
and are generally regarded as fundamental 
in nature”.30 A rectifying construction was 
ruled out because it could not be said with 
sufficient certainty what additional words the 
drafter would have inserted into the Article, 
while an updating construction also could 





25 Ibid [58]-[59], [64]-[66].
26 [2019] 1 SLR 1223 (Court of Appeal).
27 Wong Souk Yee v Attorney-General [2018] SGHC 80 (High Court). See Neo [et al.], “Singapore” (n 14) 263, 265-266.
28 Cap 218, 2011 Rev Ed.
29 Wong Souk Yee (n 25) [28]-[48]. See the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 2002 Rev Ed), s 9A(2)(b)(i): “[I]n the interpretation of a provision of a written law, if any material not 
forming part of the written law is capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision, consideration may be given to that material […] to ascertain 
the meaning of the provision when […] the provision is ambiguous or obscure”.
30 Ibid [64].
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ment had intended to make such substantial 
changes to the Article.31 Without specifying 
the applicable rule of construction for Article 
49(1), the Court upheld the interpretation of 
Article 49(1) that was in line with the par-
liamentary intention behind the PEA, name-
ly that Article 49(1) only referred to SMCs. 
The Court was concerned that it should not 
adopt an interpretation that would require 
additional words to be read into the Article, 
which might be seen as too adventurous.
The case strikes at the core of a critical con-
stitutional debate in Singapore involving the 
proper role of the courts in adjudicating the 
constitutionality of legislative acts. While 
the Court of Appeal affirmed the supremacy 
of the Constitution, it was concerned that it 
would not be seen as engaging in “judicial 
legislation” and “overstepping [its] consti-
tutional role”.32 On the right to representa-
tion, the Court was careful to say that even 
if such a right was implied in the Constitu-
tion’s basic structure, it would not mandate 
a particular form of representation as “fun-
damental and essential” to the Westminster 
model of government and thus immutable. In 
other words, there was nothing in principle 
preventing Parliament from allowing a GRC 
to be represented by fewer than its full com-
plement of MPs if some of them had vacated 
their seats.33 
3. Li Shengwu v Attorney-General: Scandal-
izing Contempt of Court
While recent decisions have illuminated 
the scope and effect of Article 93 of the 
Constitution within Singapore’s domestic 
constitutional system, Li Shengwu v Attor-
ney-General34 was the first decision to have 
explored its potential international effects. 
There, committal proceedings were institut-
ed against the applicant for his alleged act 
of scandalizing the judiciary, and commit-
tal papers were served on him in the United 
States. The applicant challenged the court’s 
jurisdiction to allow such service, a matter 
which the Court of Appeal acknowledged 
had never before been subject to considered 
judicial scrutiny.35  
The Court’s inquiry into its international ju-
risdiction involved two elements: its “sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction” over the matter, 
and its personal jurisdiction over the alleged 
contemnor. Personal jurisdiction could be 
established through the ordinary civil pro-
cess, under Order 11, rule 1 of the Rules of 
Court. However, the Court did not appear 
to establish its “subject-matter jurisdiction” 
by appealing to its international criminal or 
civil jurisdiction under the Supreme Court 
of Judicature Act.36 Indeed, the Court held 
that had its international criminal jurisdic-
tion been invoked, service out could only be 
achieved with foreign assistance, which had 
not been sought.37 Moreover, by bifurcating 
its jurisdictional inquiry as it did, the Court 
clearly did not apply its ordinary test for in-
ternational civil jurisdiction.38  
Instead, the source of the Court’s “sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction” to allow service out 
for contempt of court was its “inherent juris-
diction”, flowing from the “judicial power” 
under Article 93 of the Constitution.39 Thus, 
after Li Shengwu, it appears that Singapore’s 
courts have “subject-matter jurisdiction” to 
allow proceedings to be served out of the 
jurisdiction as long as the underlying cause 
of action is “inherent” to the judicial power 
under Article 93. It remains unclear whether, 
besides contempt of court proceedings, other 
such proceedings exist. 
4. Wham Kwok Han Jolovan v Public Prose-
cutor: Freedom of Assembly
In Wham Kwok Han Jolovan v Public Pros-
ecutor,40 the High Court considered the con-
sistency of section 16 of Singapore’s Public 
Order Act (POA) with a citizen’s right of as-
sembly under Article 14(2)(b) of the Consti-
tution. Section 7 of the POA grants the Com-
missioner of Police discretion to issue or 
refuse a permit to organize a public assembly 
while section 16 makes it a criminal offence 
to organize a public assembly without such a 
permit. The applicant was prosecuted under 
section 16, and argued, inter alia, that the 
section contravened his right of assembly. 
This was because section 16 imposes crim-
inal liability even if the executive decision 
which forms an element of the offence (here, 
the Commissioner’s decision to refuse a per-
mit under section 7) was unlawful under es-
tablished administrative law principles.41
The Court rejected the applicant’s argument 
on two grounds. First, it opined that where 
an accused was denied a section 7 permit 
but went ahead to hold the public assembly 
anyway, he would be engaging in “vigilan-
te conduct” which “cannot be condoned”. 42 
Second, the Court held that the applicant’s 




34 [2019] 1 SLR 1081 (Court of Appeal).
35 Ibid [124].
36 Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed.
37 Li Shengwu (n 33) [92]-[93].
38 Cf Burgundy Global Exploration Corp v Transocean Offshore International Ventures [2014] 3 SLR 381, [88] (Court of Appeal), where, in the context of civil proceed-
ings, the Court of Appeal held that doctrine of “subject-matter jurisdiction” was merely the interpretative “presumption against extra-territoriality” applicable to statutory 
provisions conferring personal jurisdiction, not a separate and additional requirement that applicants seeking leave to effect service out must fulfill.
39 Li Shengwu (n 33) [99] and [109].
40 [2019] SGHC 251 (High Court).
41 Ibid [26].
42 Ibid [25].
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and unsubstantiated” assumption that the 
Commissioner “may act in bad faith”, which 
could not support a finding of unconstitu-
tionality, especially given the “established 
principle that acts of high officials of state 
should be accorded a presumption of legality 
or regularity”.43 
The decision in Jolovan Wham is the first to 
have invoked the presumption of regularity, 
applicable to exercises of executive deci-
sion-making powers, in response to a chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of legislation. 
One may question whether the Court should 
have invoked the presumption of constitu-
tionality, applicable to legislation passed by 
Parliament, instead.44 Moreover, to the ex-
tent that the Court’s decision on the constitu-
tionality of section 16 of the POA rested on a 
need to deter “vigilante conduct”, it is some-
what circular. Since Article 4 of Singapore’s 
Constitution states that any statutory provi-
sion “which is inconsistent with [the] Con-
stitution shall […] be void”, conduct contra-
vening section 16 can only meaningfully be 
called “vigilante conduct” if that provision is 
in fact constitutional. If the constitutionality 
of section 16 of the POA is ever canvassed 
before the Court of Appeal, clarifications on 
these matters would be welcome.
5. Aljunied-Hougang Town Council v Lim 
Swee Lian Sylvia: Town Councils
Although the case of Aljunied-Hougang 
Town Council v Lim Swee Lian Sylvia45 did 
not directly raise constitutional questions, it 
has significant constitutional implications 
insofar as it determines the role and respon-
sibilities of parliamentarians in managing 
Town Councils. Under Singapore’s Town 
Councils Act,46 elected MPs are also appoint-
ed to Town Councils having governance 
over, and estate management duties in rela-
tion to, the constituencies they represent in 
Parliament. The intertwining of parliamenta-
ry duties with Town Council management is 
a significant innovation in Singapore.47  
The High Court held that town councilors, 
while an office created by statute, owe fidu-
ciary obligations to the Town Council, a body 
corporate.48 Their position vis-à-vis the Town 
Council was one of trust and confidence, not 
dissimilar to that of company directors. Thus, 
town councilors must manage the estate and 
serve the interests of their Town Council with 
single-minded loyalty and for proper purpos-
es.49 However, the Court also noted that town 
councilors did not owe fiduciary duties to 
the residents within a Town Council’s con-
stituency, since, under Singapore’s system of 
government, citizens hold their elected MPs 
to account primarily through the ballot box.50 
Nevertheless, it emphasized that the fiduciary 
duties town councilors owe to Town Councils 
were “entirely distinct from the political re-
lationship between town councilors and their 
constituents”.51 
On the facts, the Court found the various de-
fendants liable for an assortment of breach-
es of fiduciary duties (of good faith and 
non-conflict of interest) and duties of skill 
and care by, inter alia, waiving procurement 
tenders without adequate reason and making 
payments to conflicted parties.52 The Court 
further held that the statutory defence of good 
faith only shielded town councilors from li-
ability to third parties for acts done in their 
capacity as town councilors and not from li-
ability to the Town Council itself.53 The case 
is novel for the deployment of private law to 
safeguard and enforce the proper and good 
faith management of public resources. The 
fact that the defendants were opposition MPs 
unfortunately colored the proceedings and 
made it a more political case than the facts 
would have shown.54 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The year 2020 looks set to be a year of sig-
nificant constitutional and political signifi-
cance for Singapore. The High Court is set 
to issue its judgment on three constitutional 
challenges heard in 2019 on the constitu-
tionality of section 377A of the Penal Code, 
which criminalizes male homosexual inter-
course. Of relevance here is the publication 
of an article by former Chief Justice Chan 
Sek Keong, forwarding various arguments 
against the constitutionality of section 377A, 
which parties relied on heavily in court. 
Moreover, the Government’s use of POFMA 
and the judiciary’s role in overseeing the le-
gality thereof will be of key interest, espe-
cially since an opposition party has sought to 
appeal a Correction Direction issued against 
it.55 All this will likely take place against the 
backdrop of general elections, which the rul-
43 Ibid [27]-[29].
44 See Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489 [60]-[61] and [77]-[79] (Court of Appeal).
45 [2019] SGHC 241 (High Court).
46 Cap 392A, 2000 Rev Ed.
47 Ibid ss 8-9.
48 Sylvia Lim (n 44) [175] [191] [212] [216] [218] [223] and [225].
49 Ibid [218].
50 Ibid [189] and [219].
51 Ibid [219].
52 See Ibid [634] for a summary of liabilities.
53 Ibid [494]-[498].
54 See, e.g., the discussion in “FactCheck: Were the posts by ‘Fabrications About the PAP’ regarding the AHTC and PRPTC lawsuits against members of the Workers’ 
Party correct?” (Black Dot Research, 17 October 2019) <https://blackdotresearch.sg/factcheck-were-the-posts-by-fabrications-about-the-pap-regarding-the-ahtc-
and-prptc-lawsuits-against-members-of-the-workers-party-correct/> accessed 9 February 2020.
55 See Janice Lim, “SDP files first High Court appeal to challenge manpower minister’s POFMA action” (TODAY, 8 January 2020) <https://www.todayonline.com/singa-
pore/sdp-files-first-high-court-appeal-challenge-manpower-ministers-pofma-action> accessed 9 February 2020.
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ing People’s Action Party intends to hold in 
2020, and which will likely see leadership 
renewal for the party and Singapore.56  
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two important developments took place in 
Slovak constitutional law in the year 2019, 
which marked a watershed for the young 
democracy. First, the composition of the 
Constitutional Court changed dramatically. 
Nine out of thirteen judges of the Court were 
appointed in 2019 for a twelve-year term of 
office. The Parliament used for the first time 
live-streamed selection hearings to choose 
candidates for the positions on the Court. 
Second, the outgoing Court judges invalidat-
ed a constitutional amendment in a historic 
ruling that identified an implicit unamend-
able core of the Constitution. The decision 
established a great new power for the Court 
to review ex-post constitutional amend-
ments. When used, the Constitutional Court 
will weigh in on central questions of social 
organisation, morality, and politics, which 
had been until now reserved exclusively for 
the Constitution-maker. But even if avoided 
as a bad precedent, the case will surely affect 
constitutional thinking of Slovak lawyers, 
and the perceived limits of the power of the 
amending actors.
The Parliament, in its capacity as the Con-
stitution-maker, adopted four amendments 
to it in 2019. The Slovak Constitution is 
poly-textual, which means that it is not ful-
ly contained in one master-text document.1 
The amending actors adopted one direct 
amendment to the Constitution, adding the 
retirement age cap2 and a provision on the 
minimum wage to the master-text docu-
ment.3 The amending actors also adopted 
three amendments to the Constitutional Act 
on the Protection of the Public Interest in the 
Exercise of the Functions of Public Officials. 
These amendments are called “indirect” be-
cause they modify a stand-alone act of con-
stitutional force.
In another development, a presidential elec-
tion took place in March 2019 that saw Zu-
zana Čaputová win the electoral contest. 
Čaputová became the first female President 
in the history of the Slovak Republic. She is 
also a lawyer and has been previously active 
in the third sector, working for NGOs on le-
gal reforms. The office of the President has 
gained in prominence over the past couple 
of years, with the holder actively shaping 
constitutional politics. It will be interesting 
to see how Čaputová will conduct herself in 
office, and whether the trend of more active 
presidents continues.
In this report, we primarily examine the de-
cision of the Constitutional Court on the ma-
terial core as the single most important con-
stitutional development of the year. We also 
review three other salient court cases decid-
ed last year in the third section, and conclude 
with a prediction on what lies ahead. 
1 Constitution of the Slovak Republic, Act No. 460/1992 Coll.
2 Šimon Drugda, “Slovakia Amends the Constitution to Cap the Retirement Age” (I·CONnect, 16 May 2019) 
<http://www.iconnectblog.com/2019/05/slovakia-amends-the-constitution-to-cap-the-retirement-age> 
accessed 5 February 2019.
3 Constitutional Act No. 375/2004 Coll., amended by Act Nos. 66/2019, 232/2019, and 469/2019 Coll.
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II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
On January 30, 2019, the Constitutional 
Court, for the first time in the history of the 
Republic, invalidated a direct amendment 
to the Constitution because it breached its 
material core. Constitutional amendments 
have until now been considered outside of 
the Court’s power of judicial review. How-
ever, this time the Court found that the 
Constitution contains an implicit material 
core, with the basis in Article 1(1), which 
declares that the Republic “is a sovereign, 
democratic state governed by the rule of 
law.” The core cannot be changed through 
the ordinary amendment process, and if an 
amendment violates a core provision, it will 
be struck down.4 
The case, PL. ÚS 21/2014, concerned a 
constitutional amendment on judicial back-
ground checks. The Parliament introduced 
the vetting of judges and candidates for 
judicial office in the middle of 2014. The 
Slovak judiciary regularly scores the low-
est among court systems of all EU member 
states in its perceived independence, so 
politicians presented the reform as an ef-
fort to restore the confidence of the public 
in judges. The amendment was supposed to 
enhance judicial independence, but as the 
Constitutional Court found later, the vetting 
had the opposite effect.
Article 141a(5b) of the Constitution vest-
ed the Judicial Council with the authority 
to decide whether a candidate for a judi-
cial appointment meets requirements that 
will “guarantee that she will exercise the 
judicial office independently.” The change 
primarily concerned judicial candidates. To 
become judges, candidates in an open call 
for recruitment were selected based on their 
proficiency in law, and they also had to pass 
a background check. The background check 
had two components. Candidates first had 
to consent to the processing of their data, 
and they had to declare their assets, liabili-
ties, addictions, prior criminal convictions, 
and mental health. The National Security 
Authority then verified their declarations 
and prepared material for the decision of 
the Judicial Council. Candidates had the 
right to comment on their files, and also 
to appeal to the Constitutional Court in the 
event of an unfavourable decision of the Ju-
dicial Council.
The most contentious part of the reform was 
the applicability of the vetting procedure to 
sitting lower court judges. Article 154d(1) 
of the Constitution, a transitional provision, 
retroactively extended the scheme to judg-
es appointed before the amendment coming 
into force in 2014. Before the case went 
any further, however, the Court suspended 
the effect of the transitional provisions. As 
a result, for the last five years, candidates 
for judicial appointment were the only ones 
that had to be vetted.
The Court established its power to review 
the constitutional amendment on the guard-
ianship provision of the Constitution. It as-
serted that its “power to protect the Con-
stitution of the Slovak Republic extends 
across the whole sphere of constitutionality 
and is unconditional.”
 
The power of judicial review of constitution-
al acts structurally replicated the procedure 
for the review of legislation under Article 
125. Reviewing challenged provisions one 
by one, the Court found that the vetting of 
judges had been adopted in breach of the 
principle of judicial independence, which is 
a corollary to the rule of law, and was also 
retroactive. The direct amendment from 
2014, already being part of the Constitution 
itself by 2019, was therefore found uncon-
stitutional. After the Court invalidated the 
amendment, the amending actors had six 
months to redraft the act in accordance with 
the judgment but failed to do so. The amend-
ment, therefore, lapsed. The amending actors 
could challenge the Court over the contro-
versial decision but instead seemed to have 
accepted the outcome of the case.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The following section examines three salient 
constitutional cases from the year 2019 that 
concern hate speech, speech rights of MPs, 
and the distribution of their mandates after 
the election to the European Parliament. As 
before, we focus on cases of judicial review 
of legislation under Article 125 of the Con-
stitution and leave out most constitutional 
complaints and electoral disputes. Statistics 
on the decision-making activity of the Court 
are currently missing, as the practice of their 
publication has been discontinued. But be-
cause the Court was incomplete for most the 
year, it is reasonable to expect that the num-
ber of resolved cases significantly decreased 
and that there is a considerable backlog.
1. Hates Speech and Protected Groups un-
der Criminal Law
In another landmark judgment (PL. ÚS 
5/2017), the Court reviewed Criminal Code 
restrictions on speech crimes, which had 
been introduced to the law in 2016 to push 
back against the rising tide of extremism in 
civil society.5 The decision of the Constitu-
tional Court concerned two provisions of the 
Criminal Code that extended the definition 
of protected groups and added protection of 
political conviction.
First, the Court reviewed a provision that 
criminalised hate speech towards “another 
group of individuals” without distinction. 
Article 421(1) of the Criminal Code pro-
scribes the establishment, support, and pro-
motion of a movement aimed at suppressing 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
Anyone who promotes an existing or histori-
cal movement or ideology that advocates for 
4 Simon Durgda, “Slovak Constitutional Court Strikes Down a Constitutional Amendment—But the Amendment Remains Valid” (I·CONnect, 25 April 2019) <http://
www.iconnectblog.com/2019/04/slovak-constitutional-court-strikes-down-a-constitutional-amendment-but-the-amendment-remains-valid/#_ftnref4> accessed 5 
February 2020.
5 Criminal Code, Act No 300/2005 Coll.
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suppression of fundamental rights of protect-
ed groups in society is criminally liable for 
up to five years of imprisonment. Tradition-
ally protected groups in Slovakia have been 
racial, ethnic, national, or religious minori-
ties. After the change, the protection against 
hate speech was extended to other groups of 
the population irrespective of their charac-
teristics. The offence also covers the use and 
display of altered flags, badges, uniforms, 
or watchwords that imitate existing or his-
torical movements and ideologies aimed at 
suppressing fundamental rights of different 
groups in society. Second, the change to the 
Criminal Code also modified the criminal 
offence of incitement to national, racial, and 
ethnic hatred under Article 424. The provi-
sion stipulates that anyone who publicly in-
cites violence or hatred against an individual 
or group because of their actual or presumed 
affiliation with any race, nation, nationality, 
ethnic group, “actual or presumed” origin, 
skin colour, sexual orientation, religion, or 
because they are free confession or publicly 
inciting suppression of their rights and free-
doms can be criminally punished by impris-
onment for up to three years.6 The amended 
Article 424 also added “political conviction” 
as a protected group characteristic.
The Court found both amendments to the 
Criminal Code unconstitutional. After a 
broad analysis, invoking the philosophy of 
hate speech, various conceptions of battling 
against it, and assessing different interna-
tional documents, the Court applied the test 
of proportionality to the legislation. First, it 
considered the inclusion of an open catego-
ry of “another group” in Article 421 of the 
Criminal Code. The legislation did not pass 
the subtest of legality, although the Court not-
ed that the interpretation of the term “another 
group” in conformity with the Constitution 
could be possible. The reasons were the fol-
lowing: For the sake of certainty, the Court 
decided not to leave the open category to be 
tested and interpreted by general courts, and 
in the downstream application of the rule by 
the prosecutorial office. Second, if lawmak-
ers seek to protect individuals or groups un-
der the threat of criminal sanction to others, 
they must identify the protected group by a 
characteristic that will ensure consistency in 
the application of the rule. Third, unlike in 
the comparative constitutional law, the chal-
lenged legislation did not require a trigger 
of the breach of public order or violence for 
application of the norm, so it had to be inter-
preted narrowly. Finally, the Court noted that 
the open category was a rational design ele-
ment because it could have been extended to 
groups the legislator is not yet able to identi-
fy over time. However, a cautious approach 
against open categories in criminal law was 
required. Taken together, the clause did not 
withstand the subtest of legality.
The Court used similar arguments in the re-
view and invalidation of Article 424 of the 
Criminal Code, adding that the enhanced 
protection of political conviction against 
incitement to hatred could have a chilling 
effect on political discussion. The Court ad-
vised state institutions against overly relying 
on criminal law and expressed its readiness 
to clarify and update the standing elements 
of hate speech crimes and protected groups 
in individual constitutional complaints.
Several MPs in the current parliamentary 
term have been charged, and one expelled, 
for criminal speech against a minority ethnic. 
Most prominently, MP Milan Mazurek from 
the far-right party Kotleba lost his seat after 
being found guilty of anti-Roma hate speech 
by the Supreme Court. Mazurek was convict-
ed for remarks during a public radio broadcast 
in 2016.7 The law stipulates that an MP au-
tomatically loses a seat in the Parliament for 
being convicted of a deliberate crime.
 
Mazurek received only a 10,000 EUR fine for 
the racist speech, however, which if paid will 
not prevent him from running for office again.8 
With a stronger presence of far-right parties 
in the Slovak body politic, speech crimes are 
bound to become litigated more often.
2. Speech Rights of Members of Parliament
Free speech was at the heart of another im-
portant decision of the Constitutional Court 
(PL. ÚS 6/2017). A group of MPs challenged 
several provisions of Standing Orders of the 
Parliament that in their opinion limited free-
dom of expression of MPs and free competi-
tion of political forces. Namely, the amend-
ed rules from 2017 introduced variable time 
limits for speaking at the session;9 prohibited 
the use of video, audio, or other visual aids 
during the speech (including posters, leaf-
lets, banners, etc.); and privileged certain 
public office holders by allotting them more 
time to speak (the President, members of 
the Government, Speaker of the Parliament, 
etc.). Finally, the Speaker was given the new 
power to expel an MP who disrupts the or-
derly course of a session. The case received 
wide attention by the media and observers 
because it concerned the question of balance 
of power between the in- and out-groups in 
the Parliament as well as effective control of 
the executive, which traditionally commands 
a parliamentary majority.
The Court has always applied deference to-
wards the Parliament in establishing the rules 
for conduct of its business and had previous-
ly stressed that the Parliament enjoys wide 
autonomy on internal matters. However, this 
time the Court noted that the substantive rule 
of law requires even the Parliament to follow 
6 The offender may face up to six years of imprisonment if the offence of incitement to hatred was committed with a special motive (pursuant to Article 140 of the Crim-
inal Code), by a public official, a member of an extremist group, or in a state of emergency or war.
7 Max Steuer, “Democratic (Dis)Armament: Slovakia’s Legal Battle against Extreme Speech” (Verfassungsblog 17, December 2019) <https://verfassungsblog.de/demo-
cratic-disarmament/> accessed 5 February 2020.
8 “Far-right MP Mazurek found guilty. He will lose his seat” (Slovak Spectator, 3 September 2019) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22203605/far-right-mp-mazurek-found-
guilty-he-will-lose-his-seat.html> accessed 5 February 2020.
9 The allotted time was 30, 20, and 10 minutes depending on the specific situation and type of speech. 
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the Constitution because the quality partici-
pation of MPs in the legislative process and 
protection of parliamentary minority is par-
amount. In reviewing the Standing Orders, 
the Court also relied on comparative consti-
tutional law that has dealt with the allotment 
of time for speaking at parliamentary ses-
sions in several jurisdictions in Europe. The 
Court took special notice of the practice in 
Germany, France, and the Czech Republic. 
To review the ban on visual aids for presen-
tation in the Parliament, the Court also ex-
amined similar rules in the UK, France, Fin-
land, Belgium, and Denmark.
When analysing the time limit for a speech in 
the Parliament, the Court surprisingly denied 
MPs the protection of general freedom of ex-
pression under Article 26 of the Constitution 
and instead held that the situation should be 
assessed under Article 78, which stipulates 
the right of an MP to exercise her function. 
The application of the test of proportionality 
in this case also exhibited weaknesses and 
inconsistent reasoning, but the Court con-
cluded that time limits for intervention in 
parliamentary debates do not infringe on the 
freedom of speech of MPs. Moving on to the 
prohibition of visual aids, the Court took into 
account the decision of the ECtHR in Karác-
sony and Others v. Hungary,10 but read the 
case quite narrowly. According to the Court, 
the use of presentations, leaflets, or posters 
during a speech at a parliamentary session 
is not an essential element of MPs’ speech 
rights. The regulation limits the form but not 
the substance of the speech. Hence, the lim-
itation does not touch the core of the right of 
MPs to participate in the discussion. Finally, 
in reviewing the power of the Speaker to ex-
pel an MP disrupting the course of a session, 
the Court emphasised the existence of vari-
ous procedural safeguards against the expul-
sion, including a challenge of the expulsion 
order, the requirement that all of Parliament 
decides on the expulsion, and the right to 
full participation of the affected MP in dis-
ciplinary proceedings. The Court dismissed 
the challenge and upheld the constitutionali-
ty of Standing Orders of the Parliament.
3. Ghost Members of European Parliament 
Although this report is about Slovak consti-
tutional law, this section examines a prom-
inent case that resulted from an external 
development, namely the withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom from the European Union. 
A case that became colloquially known as the 
“Lexmann controversy” (PL. ÚS 15/2019) 
concerned the allocation of seats in the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP) after the election held 
in Slovakia in 2019. The case is named after 
an elected candidate to the EP, Miriam Lex-
mann, who became a “member-in-waiting” 
because her parliamentary status was condi-
tioned on Brexit. Lexmann was one of a cad-
re of MEPs-in-waiting across Europe, “tak-
ing no salary or expenses, standing by for the 
UK to leave the EU, so that they may take up 
seats after their British counterparts.”11 
The European Council adopted a decision on 
June 2018 that set out the composition of the 
EP for the 2019-2024 parliamentary term, 
already taking into account the UK’s expect-
ed withdrawal from the EU.12 The resolution 
stipulated that the UK seats in the EP would 
be redistributed among underrepresented 
member states. The EP would reduce in size 
from 751 to 705, and 27 out of the 74 seats 
of the UK were due to be redistributed. This 
rearrangement resulted in an increase in the 
number of MEPs from 13 to 14 for Slovakia. 
The fourteenth seat, however, would become 
available only once the UK effectively with-
drew from the Union.
The national distribution of MEP seats is 
a matter for domestic regulation of every 
member state. The Electoral Code of the 
Slovak Republic governs the procedure for 
readjustment of MEP seats in Article 220a: 
If the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland is a Member State 
of the European Union at the start of 
the 2019-2024 parliamentary term, the 
elected [Slovak] member of the Euro-
pean Parliament from the political party 
that achieved the lowest residual number 
of votes after a division shall not take of-
fice until the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland from the EU. If several parties 
have an equal number of residual votes 
after the division, the elected candidate 
of the political party or coalition that re-
ceived fewer votes shall not take office. 
If the number of valid votes of those 
candidates is equal, the decision will be 
made by drawing lots.13 
After the EP election in 2019, the distribu-
tion of EP mandates in the Slovak Republic 
caused certain numerical difficulties, since 
all 14 seats were not allocated in the first 
round of division. The pertinent provision 
of “the lowest residue after a division” from 
§220a could have been interpreted in vari-
ous ways. The State Electoral Commission 
applied a very controversial method of in-
terpretation by which the 14th (i.e., condi-
tional) mandate was allocated to a candidate 
who received more votes than the candidate 
who ended up in 13th (i.e., unconditional) 
position.
The State Electoral Commission did not take 
into consideration the final residue of votes 
after several rounds of division, but quite as-
tonishingly, the residue of votes (only) after 
the first round of division. Ultimately, this 
“mechanical” and quite absurd interpreta-
tion ultimately resulted in the candidate with 
fewer total votes achieving a higher residue 
(after the first round of division) and, con-
sequently, the unconditional MEP seat. The 
10 Nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13.
11 Daniel Boffey, “Ghost MEPs stuck with no pay as they wait for UK to give up seats” (The Guardian, 6 August 2019) <theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/06/ghost-
meps-stuck-no-pay-wait-uk-give-up-seats-brexit> accessed 6 February 2020.
12 European Council Decision no. 2018/937, 28 June 2018 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018D0937> accessed 6 February 2020.
13 Act No. 180/2014 Coll. on the Conditions of the Exercise of Voting Rights.
304 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
Commission interpreted this provision in 
contrast to any reasonable application of the 
Electoral Code as well as against the basic 
constitutional principles governing the right 
to vote (mainly the principle of equality).
The judge rapporteur suggested that the 
case be accepted for further deliberations. 
In these types of electoral cases, the Court 
must convene in a plenary session, in which 
it is constitutionally obliged to decide with 
a full majority of judges (i.e., with at least 
seven supporting the decision). Since at that 
time only seven judges were appointed to 
the Court, the procedural decision to accept 
the case for further deliberation had to be 
unanimous. The plenum was unable to reach 
that conclusion. Thus, the case was dis-
missed on procedural grounds. The verdict 
was condemned by the dissenting opinion of 
the chief judge for the Court’s procedurally 
awkward position that avoided adopting the 
decision on the merits.
Since then, all 13 judges have been appoint-
ed to the Court, and the case has been refiled 
and is currently being reargued. According 
to case law of the Court, a procedural ruling 
does not create an obstacle of res iudicata. 
Consequently, procedurally dismissed cases 
like this can be relitigated.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
After a turbulent half-decade, the Consti-
tutional Court sits again in full composi-
tion. The earliest upcoming vacancy on the 
Court, barring the unforeseen resignation 
of a judge, will not occur until 2026. That 
gives the Court time to stabilise and resolve 
the backlog in cases caused by staff shortage. 
Political actors, on the other hand, will have 
time to think if the appointment mechanism 
for constitutional judges needs updating, as 
the latest effort to change the system failed 
in 2018.14  
It will be interesting to see if the “fourth 
generation” of CC judges follows up on the 
jurisprudence of its predecessors, specifical-
ly the decision on constitutional unamend-
ability. The decision of the Constitutional 
Court invalidating parts of the Constitution 
was delivered during the selection hearings 
for the next judges of the Court, and al-
though some candidates agreed in principle 
that there is judicial power to protect the core 
of the Constitution in extreme cases, most 
disagreed with the application in the specific 
case of background checks for lower court 
judges. We will have to see, therefore, if the 
momentous new power of the Constitutional 
Court will be used again in the next term or 
fall into desuetude, with the precedent be-
coming lapsed.
The new Court will be tested by the upcom-
ing general election, which is scheduled for 
February 28, 2020. The Constitutional Court 
has an important role in electoral disputes, 
which is a seasonal agenda that surges ev-
ery time local or national elections take 
place. Related to the parliamentary election 
in 2020, the Constitutional Court will have 
to decide meritoriously on the new elector-
al law, which extended the silence period 
against the publication of opinion polls be-
fore an election. The Court suspended the 
effects of the law in the interim so that the 
prohibition would not affect the parliamen-
tary election, but the issue has still not been 
resolved determinatively.15 
The presence of far-right parties in the Par-
liament is, and will likely continue to be, a 
stress test for Slovak democracy.16 Old poli-
ticians have not been able to counter the rise 
of the far-right in the body politic despite the 
rhetoric of “acting as a dam” against the ris-
ing tide of extremism in society. At the time 
of the publication of this report, it seems that 
the People’s Party Our Slovakia will make 
gains in the general election, and with the 
larger number of MPs in the Parliament, 
will bring a bigger appetite to influence 
outcomes.17 Over the parliamentary term, 
People’s Party Our Slovakia successfully 
exploited Standing Orders of the Parliament 
to initiate disruptive proposals and blame 
failure on the “establishment.” It effective-
ly used legislative and Constitution-making 
power to attract media coverage.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2019, the Constitutional Court rendered 
several precedential and important decisions 
in which it bolstered the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
In so doing, it contributed to strengthening 
the overall constitutional order. While 
the Constitutional Court continues to be 
the most reliable rule of law institution in 
Slovenia, its stature in 2019 was diminished 
due to its growing ineffectiveness and intra-
institutional professional as well as personal 
disputes among judges, which have brought 
it a lot of negative press. 
In response to the Constitutional Court’s 
2018 decision in which electoral legislation 
was declared unconstitutional, the National 
Assembly initiated the laborious process 
of adopting a new law. Simultaneously, 
the Government proposed to the National 
Assembly to initiate the procedure for 
amending the Constitution by placing the 
right to Slovenian sign language into the 
constitutional framework.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The Slovenian Constitution is often depicted 
as a rigid one, as it requires a two-thirds ab-
solute Parliament majority to pass a constitu-
tional amendment. Accordingly, the Consti-
tution has so far been amended several times, 
namely in 1997, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2006, 
2013, and 2016. By the last amendment in 
2016, a new human right (the right to drink-
ing water) was inserted in the Constitution. 
At least two new constitutional amendments 
could be added in the future.  
The first, less problematic one concerns the 
placement of Slovenian sign language into 
the constitutional framework.1 This consti-
tutional change is welcome as it would in-
crease the importance of sign language and 
facilitate the integration of the deaf commu-
nity into Slovenian society. 
The second possible constitutional amend-
ment is politically sensitive as it refers to 
elections to the National Assembly following 
a Constitutional Court decision on the un-
constitutionality of the legislative provisions 
determining the size of electoral districts. 
By Decision No. U-I-32/15 of 8 November 
2018, the Constitutional Court reviewed the 
conformity of the National Assembly Elec-
tions Act and the Act Establishing Constit-
uencies for the Election of Deputies to the 
National Assembly to the Constitution.2  
The fifth paragraph of Article 80 of the Con-
stitution determines three fundamental ele-
ments of the electoral system: deputies are 
elected (1) according to the principle of pro-
portional representation (2) with a four-per-
cent threshold required for election to the 
1 See the governmental proposal Predlog za začetek postopka za dopolnitev II. poglavja Ustave Republike 
Slovenije z osnutkom Ustavnega zakona o dopolnitvi II. poglavja Ustave Republike Slovenije (UZ62a), EVA 2019-
2611-0009 [2019].
2 See Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. U-I-32/15 [2018], Official Gazette RS 82/18. 
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National Assembly, and (3) with due consid-
eration that voters have a decisive influence 
on the allocation of seats to the candidates.3 
The Constitutional Court assessed that the 
electoral system guarantees voters decisive 
influence on the allocation of seats to can-
didates.4 However, it also established that 
26 years after the adoption of the electoral 
legislation, the areas of the electoral districts 
are unconstitutional as they no longer corre-
spond to the criteria determined by Article 
20 of the National Assembly Elections Act 
(i.e., an equal number of inhabitants, geo-
graphical completeness, and the highest 
possible integrity of municipalities).5 The 
number of constituents differs greatly from 
one electoral district to another. Namely, the 
difference in the size of the biggest electoral 
district to the smallest electoral district has 
a ratio of 1:3.73.6  In the present situation, 
votes of those who cast their ballots in small-
er districts thus count more than those cast in 
larger districts. Furthermore, the territories 
of the electoral districts are not harmonised 
with the borders of the new municipalities 
and no longer fulfill the requirement of geo-
graphical completeness.7 The Constitutional 
Court imposed on the legislature a two-year 
time limit to eliminate the established un-
constitutionality. 
The political parties and the constitution-
al experts debated on possible solutions. 
Broadly speaking, there are two proposals, 
neither currently with sufficient support. 
Whereas one proposes changing electoral 
districts, the other seeks to abolish them. The 
electoral legislation should be changed be-
fore the next parliamentary elections, which 
are due in 2022.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Cases contained in this report have been 
included for their particular importance in 
complying with the following criteria: 1) a 
decision of the Constitutional Court entails 
the resolution of an important constitution-
al issue and 2) a decision directs courts and 
other state authorities or puts a limit on their 
power. It is worth adding that only important 
parts of these decisions are mentioned and 
referred for further reading.
1. Decision No. Up-619/17 of 14 February 
2019: Right to Respect for Home
In this decision, the Constitutional Court de-
cided on a complainant’s right whose lease 
for a non-profit rented property was can-
celled. The important constitutional ques-
tion considered by the Constitutional Court 
was whether the decision of cancelling the 
non-profit rent agreement inadmissibly in-
terfered with the complainant’s right to re-
spect for home. 
The Constitutional Court already established 
that such right is protected under the right to 
inviolability of dwellings referred to in the 
first paragraph of Article 36 of the Constitu-
tion (also Article 8 of the ECHR).8 This con-
stitutional and conventional right does not 
entail that an individual has a right to be pro-
vided with home. However, as the Constitu-
tional Court clarified, the right to respect for 
home guarantees judicial control of the pro-
portionality of the measure entailing an in-
terference with the right to respect for home 
prior to the loss of home. The Constitutional 
Court also took into account the principle 
of social state referred to in Article 2 of the 
Constitution that the loss of home is the most 
severe form of interference with the right to 
respect for home. The Constitutional Court, 
having looked into all the circumstances of 
the case, decided that the Higher Court did 
not carefully assess the proportionality of the 
interference with the complainant’s right to 
respect for home and, as such, it inadmissi-
bly interfered with this right. The Constitu-
tional Court abrogated the judgment of the 
Higher Court and remanded the case thereto 
for new adjudication.
2. Decision No. U-I-477/18, Up-93/18 of 23 
May 2019: Right to Personal Liberty of Per-
sons Suffering from a Mental Disorder
In case No. U-I-477/18, Up-93/18, the Con-
stitutional Court decided on a constitution-
al complaint against a judicial decision by 
which a person was committed to a secure 
ward of a social care institution without his 
consent.9 The committed person alleged, in-
ter alia, a violation of the right determined 
by Article 19 of the Constitution because he 
was placed in an institution that was over-
crowded. The Constitutional Court extended 
the review to the Mental Health Act. 
Within the framework of the review of the 
constitutionality of that Act, it first answered 
the question of whether the existing statu-
tory regulation of commitment to a secure 
ward of a social care institution is consis-
tent with the safeguards determined by the 
second paragraph of Article 19 of the Con-
stitution, under which personal liberty may 
be limited.10 It stressed that, when regulating 
by law a measure that entails an interference 
with the personal liberty of persons suffering 
from a mental disorder, the legislature must 






8 Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. U-I-64/14 [2017], Official Gazette RS 66/17. In this decision, the Constitutional Court decided on the constitutionality 
of several provisions of the Construction Act. 
9 Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. U-I-477/18, Up-93/18 [2019], Official Gazette RS 44/19.
10 Ibid [13].
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towards the realisation of the therapeutic ob-
jective of the measure.11 The determination 
of the conditions for the execution of the 
measure directed towards attaining both the 
protective and therapeutic objectives con-
currently entails a safeguard ensuring that 
the duration of the measure is limited to the 
period strictly necessary for the committed 
person’s health condition to improve and for 
preventing his or her condition from deterio-
rating.12 A statutory regulation that does not 
satisfy the mentioned requirements is incon-
sistent with the second paragraph of Article 
19 of the Constitution. 
When reviewing the conformity of the statu-
tory regulation with the first paragraph of Ar-
ticle 19 of the Constitution, the Constitution-
al Court proceeded from the constitutional 
requirement that only the judicial branch of 
power has the right to order deprivation of 
liberty that is longer than only momentary.13 
The reviewed statutory regulation enables 
courts to merely weigh the necessity of the 
measure from the viewpoint of ensuring the 
attainment of the protective objective, which 
is to be attained by excluding the person 
concerned from the environment. However, 
it excludes the possibility of the courts as-
sessing the appropriateness of the concrete 
institution charged with executing the mea-
sure from the viewpoint of ensuring security 
within the secure ward and the attainment of 
the therapeutic objective of the measure. A 
regulation that excludes such assessment by 
the court when ordering a measure involving 
the deprivation of liberty is not an appropri-
ate measure for achieving a constitutionally 
admissible objective and is thus inconsistent 
with the right determined by the first para-
graph of Article 19 of the Constitution.14 
3. Partial Decisions No. U-I-152/17, both 
dated 4 July 2019: Right to Protection of 
Personal Data
Two cases worth mentioning stem from a re-
quest lodged by the Human Rights Ombuds-
man arguing that various provisions of the 
Police Tasks and Powers Act were unconsti-
tutional.15 The Constitutional Court already 
adopted two partial decisions; one aspect of 
this regulation is still under consideration. 
Two new means for the performance of police 
tasks introduced by the challenged regulation 
that were under the review of constitution-
ality were the use of drones and the optical 
recognition of licence plates (the established 
abbreviation for automatic number plate rec-
ognition is ANPR). In both cases, the Con-
stitutional Court reviewed the challenged 
regulation from the perspective of the human 
right to protection of personal data. The Con-
stitutional Court stressed that the Constitu-
tion-framers specifically protected one aspect 
of one’s privacy, namely information privacy. 
This privacy has a special place in the Con-
stitution and is important within the overall 
protection of an individual’s privacy.
Regarding the use of drones in law enforce-
ment action, the Constitutional Court decid-
ed that the challenged regulation was not 
inconsistent with the right to protection of 
personal data determined in Article 38 of the 
Constitution. This decision was based on the 
fact that the Human Rights Ombudsman did 
not substantiate his allegations. 
The case of ANPR had a different outcome. 
The Constitutional Court first explained that 
this technical means functions in general in 
such a manner that the optical unit takes a 
photograph of the licence plate, the software 
then recognises the licence plate number, 
and these data are subsequently compared 
(cross-checked) with other personal data da-
tabases.16 If the data match, the system noti-
fies the police officer, and on such grounds 
the police officer may stop the driver and the 
vehicle and carry out a more detailed check. 
Licence plate data that produce no matches 
are further retained.17 In accordance with 
the established constitutional case law, any 
processing of personal data entails an inter-
ference with the constitutional right to pro-
tection of personal data which requires that 
the processing of personal data be subject to 
statutory regulation. This requirement sig-
nifies that there must exist a statutory basis 
for every single action taken in relation to 
personal data.18 The Constitutional Court de-
cided that the challenged provision did not 
fulfill this requirement. As it established, 
the challenged provision failed to determine 
that the collected licence plate data can be 
further processed by automatic comparison 
with other personal data databases. For this 
reason alone, the challenged regulation was 
therefore inconsistent with the Constitution, 
so the Constitutional Court abrogated it.
4. Decision No. Up-135/19, U-I-37/19 of 5 June 
2019: The Right to a Public Hearing in an 
Electoral Dispute Regarding Local Elections
The complainant claimed there were irregu-
larities relating to the financing of the elec-
tion of the members of the City Council of 
the Municipality of Ljubljana that took place 
in 2018.19 Since the Administrative Court de-
cided with finality on questions of law and 
fact and rejected the motion to carry out a 






15 See Partial Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. U-I-152/17 (ANPR) [2019], Official Gazette RS 46/19; Partial Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court 
No. U-I-152/17 (DRONES) [2019], Official Gazette RS 48/19.
16 Partial Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. U-I-152/17 (ANPR) [2019] [14].
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid [32].
19 Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. Up-135/19, U-I-37/19 [2019] Official Gazette RS 45/19.
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The Constitutional Court stressed that the 
right to a main hearing is a human right en-
sured by Article 22 of the Constitution.20 It 
held that whenever it is necessary to cor-
rectly establish the relevant facts by taking 
into account all the circumstances of the 
concrete case, the court at issue must hold 
a main hearing.21 A public main hearing on 
the electoral dispute initiated after the day 
of voting is of special importance as these 
disputes have to be carried out transparent-
ly to establish trust in the credibility of the 
election results.22 The Constitutional Court 
did not concur with the Administrative Court 
that in the electoral dispute proceedings only 
the questions of law were at issue.23 More-
over, it stated that ensuring the public nature 
of a judicial decision taken in such a dispute 
does not substitute for the right to a public 
hearing.24 Furthermore, the principles of ef-
fectiveness and procedural economy cannot 
qualify as a prevailing reason for the Admin-
istrative Court not to hold a public hearing in 
electoral disputes.25 Since the Administrative 
Court failed to carry out a public hearing, 
the Constitutional Court abrogated the chal-
lenged judgment in the part referring to the 
assessment of whether the allegations in the 
appeal were well founded, and in this part re-
manded the case to the Administrative Court 
for new adjudication.
5. Decision No. Up-672/16 of 13 March 
2019: Right of Aliens to Social Security
By Decision No. Up-672/16, the Constitu-
tional Court decided on the constitutional 
complaint of a foreign citizen who chal-
lenged the courts’ decisions finding that the 
Pension and Disability Insurance Institute 
correctly stopped disability allowance be-
cause the complainant was erased from the 
register of unemployed persons due to the 
expiry of his work permit. The Constitu-
tional Court stressed that the protection of 
the right to social security under the first 
paragraph of Article 50 of the Constitution 
is reserved to citizens of the Republic of 
Slovenia.26 However, this does not mean the 
Constitution doesn’t at all guarantee foreign 
citizens the right to social security. Such a 
narrowing constitutional interpretation could 
in certain circumstances lead to a denial of 
human dignity.27 The Constitutional Court 
already took the position that the right to a 
pension was also protected by the right to 
private property referred to in Article 33 of 
the Constitution, which, on the other hand, 
applied also to all aliens.28
6. Decision No. U-I-59/17 of 18 September 
2019: Amended Aliens Act in Light of the 
Mass Migration and Refugee Flows
Much awaited in the domestic as well as 
foreign milieu was a decision of the Con-
stitutional Court on the constitutionality of 
certain provisions of the Aliens Act.29 The 
Slovenian Government (Ministry of the Inte-
rior) proposed amendments to the Aliens Act 
in 2016. Changes, adopted by the legislature, 
were driven by fear of mass migration and 
refugee flow and possible border closures. 
However, the legislative amendments en-
countered criticism in Slovenia and abroad.30 
The request of the constitutionality of the 
challenged provisions regulating the specific 
legal regime for the treatment of persons ex-
pressing their intention to file an application 
for international protection in the light of the 
changed migration situation was lodged by 
the Human Rights Ombudsman. 
The Constitutional Court reviewed the 
amendments from the view of their consis-
tency with the principle of non-refoulement, 
which prohibits the direct and indirect return 
of individuals to a country in which they 
may face treatment that violates the right to 
the prohibition of torture.31 This principle 
has its constitutional protection in Article 18. 
The removal of individuals who claim that 
they need protection from a country without 
assessing the existence of substantial reasons 
that justify the conclusion that there exists a 
real risk of inhumane treatment is consistent 
with the principle of non-refoulement only 
if the third country is safe. That is when in-
dividuals enjoy effective protection against 
a violation of this principle. Based on the 
Constitutional Court’s established case law, 
the case law of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, the Constitutional Court 
established that the contested legislative pro-
visions are unconstitutional as they interfere 
with the right determined by Article 18 of the 







26 Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. Up-672/16 [2019], Official Gazette RS 32/19 [8].
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. 
29 Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. U-I-59/17 [2019], Official Gazette RS 62/19.
30 See, for example, Council of Europe, “Mission to Slovenia to discuss amendments to the Aliens Act” (Council of Europe Newsletter on Migration and Refugees, February 
2017) <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/mission-to-slovenia-to-discuss-amendments-to-the-aliens-act> accessed 24 January 2020; Saša Zagorc, Neža Kogovšek 
Šalamon, “Slovenia: Amendments to the Aliens Act Enable the State to Activate Closure of the Border for Asylum Seekers” (EU Migration Law Blog, 30 March 2017) <https://
eumigrationlawblog.eu/slovenia-amendments-to-the-aliens-act-enable-the-state-to-activate-closure-of-the-border-for-asylum-seekers/> accessed 24 January 2020.
31 Decision No. U-I-59/17 [26] [30].
32 Ibid [61].
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interferences with such right are inadmissi-
ble. The Constitutional Court thus abrogated 
the contested provisions.33  
There is another aspect of this decision 
worth mentioning. When the Constitutional 
Court reviews the constitutionality of a law 
falling within the scope of European Union 
law, it must also consider not only the case 
law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union but also the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. Namely, the 
Charter became legally binding with the en-
try into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (the 
first paragraph of Article 6 of the Treaty on 
the European Union).34 The Constitutional 
Court has not yet dealt with a case in which 
it would have had to apply the Charter as a 
direct (formal) criterion for its assessment. 
The importance of this decision lies in the 
Constitutional Court’s explanation when and 
how it will apply the Charter.35  
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Slovenia is currently ruled by a very fragile 
coalition with minority support in the Par-
liament. Snap elections, therefore, certain-
ly cannot be ruled out. These could also be 
spurred by a decision of the Constitutional 
Court, in front of which several much await-
ed and important decisions are due. The con-
stitutionality of a highly debated supplemen-
tary budget for 2019 was challenged before 
the Constitutional Court. Although the Fiscal 
Council issued a negative opinion on it due 
to excessive expenditure and a lack of reform 
measures, the legislature adopted the budget 
and its constitutionality is now under review. 
There is a request lodged by the Judicial 
Council and a petition to initiate the review 
procedure by the Office of the State Prosecu-
tor that question the constitutionality of the 
Parliamentary Inquiries Act, and the fact that 
this Act does not prevent ordering what they 
consider to be an unlawful parliamentary in-
quiry. These applications are related to a spe-
cific recent situation. However, it is worth 
remembering that the Constitutional Court 
back in 2011, by Decision No. U-I-50/11,36 
found that the Parliamentary Inquiries Act 
and the Rules of Procedure on Parliamentary 
Inquiries were inconsistent with the Consti-
tution as they failed to regulate a procedural 
mechanism that would ensure that motions 
to present evidence that are manifestly in-
tended to delay proceedings, to mob the par-
ticipants, or which are malicious or entirely 
irrelevant to the subject of the parliamentary 
inquiry are dismissed promptly, objectively, 
predictably, reliably, and with the main ob-
jective of ensuring the integrity of the legal 
order. As a result of this legal gap, the ef-
fective nature of the parliamentary inquiry, 
which is required by Article 93 of the Consti-
tution, was diminished in an unconstitutional 
manner. The time limit determined for rem-
edying the established unconstitutionality 
already expired in 2012, and the legislature 
has not yet responded appropriately thereto. 
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As the devastation of the economy, constitu-
tional institutions, and the foundations of con-
stitutionalism that characterized the Zuma era 
continues to come to light in investigations 
by the “Zondo Commission” amongst oth-
ers, Zuma’s successor, President Ramaphosa 
struggles to establish control over the ANC 
and the government. In the general elections 
in May, Ramaphosa’s organization lost some 
ground, but retained a significant parliamen-
tary majority amidst a growing trend of apa-
thy within the electorate.
In this context, and against the background 
of creeping socialism in the form of relent-
less centralization of state control over so-
ciety, 2019 saw an interesting, if sometimes 
disconcerting set of judicial interventions. 
The most visible failures were related to the 
state-owned power utility ESKOM, which 
has been teetering precariously on the brink 
of collapse due to demonstrated technical and 
managerial incompetence and corruption, and 
government’s refusal, on ideological grounds, 
to allow private electricity generation.
In the Zuma era, manipulation of a commis-
sion of enquiry’s 2015 report on fraud and 
corruption attending the government’s arms 
procurement process, which was launched 
in the late 1990s and known as the Strate-
gic Defence Procurement Package, became 
public knowledge when the flawed findings 
were reviewed judicially and set aside. Zu-
ma’s prosecution based on his conduct in this 
regard is still pending.
Much litigation also surrounded the work of 
the incumbent Public Protector, appointed 
by parliamentary majority under circum-
stances that gave rise from the outset to 
well-founded suspicions of a lack of objec-
tivity, so much so that it’s possible she may 
be removed by Parliament before complet-
ing her term of office.
Other cases reported here relate to the trend 
in government and judicial policies demon-
strating opposition to the constitutional ac-
knowledgment of cultural and linguistic 
diversity, and unlawful government inter-
ception of private and professional commu-
nications.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
Since the late 1990s, a range of laws and pol-
icies have been adopted with the clear inten-
tion of centralizing government control over 
all public and many previously private in-
struments of authority in the process of what 
the ANC government describes as a “na-
tional democratic revolution”. This process 
involves, inter alia, affirmative action based 
on racial classification; “cadre deployment” 
of ANC supporters to all public institutions; 
the nationalization (euphemistically termed 
“public trusteeship” and “custodianship”) 
of water, mineral, petroleum, and fishery re-
sources; “Black Economic Empowerment” 
aimed at transferring, by force of law, the 
ownership of a maximum amount of busi-
ness interests to “Black” owners; the rolling 
out of a system of social grants rendering 
around one-third of the total population to be 
clients dependent on the state for their ba-
sic survival; state control over the legal pro-
fessions; and proposals still in the process 
of development concerning a constitutional 
amendment to allow for expropriation of 
property without compensation (EWC), the 
virtual nationalisation of all health services, 
and increased state control over education 
and sport.
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This trend may justifiably be described as 
creeping socialism, which is clearly incon-
sistent with the prescripts of the Constitution: 
section 1 of the Constitution, for instance, el-
evates non-racialism, multi-party democratic 
government that ensures accountability, the 
rule of law, and responsiveness and openness 
to foundational constitutional values; section 
6 requires the state to elevate the status and 
advance the use of indigenous languages 
and to ensure parity of esteem of all official 
languages; section 14 affords everyone the 
privacy of their communications; section 
22 purports to protect every citizen’s free-
dom of trade, occupation, and profession; 
section 25(1) prohibits arbitrary deprivation 
of property; and section 29(2) guarantee’s 
everyone’s right to receive education in the 
official language of their choice. None of 
these rights are immune from limitation, but 
in terms of sections 36 and 39 of the Bill of 
Rights, limitations and the interpretation of 
the rights are determined by the question of 
whether they conform to the standards of 
an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality, and freedom. It is 
becoming increasingly doubtful whether the 
escalating trend of creeping socialism can be 
justified as conforming to the requirements 
of the rule of law and of the open and demo-
cratic society envisaged by the Constitution.
Background to the proposed amendment of 
section 25 of the Constitution to allow for 
EWC was given in last year’s report. In the 
meantime, a new Parliament was constituted 
following general elections in May. A parlia-
mentary ad hoc EWC committee published 
a draft bill on 3 December for public com-
ment, with 31 January 2020 as the deadline.
The explanatory memorandum accompa-
nying the draft provides the following con-
text: “The purpose of the Constitution Eigh-
teenth Amendment Bill, 2019 (“the Bill”) is 
to amend section 25 of the Constitution so 
as to provide that the right to property may 
be limited in such a way that where land is 
expropriated for land reform, the amount of 
compensation payable may be nil. Further 
to clarify that such limitation is a legitimate 
option for land reform, so as to address the 
historic wrongs caused by the arbitrary dis-
possession of land, and in so doing ensure 
equitable access to land and further empow-
er the majority of South Africans to be pro-
ductive participants in ownership, food secu-
rity and agricultural reform programs”. The 
preamble of the draft reiterates the notion of 
empowerment towards productive participa-
tion in agriculture.
The proposed amendment is silent on mech-
anisms designed to ensure productivity of 
expropriated land allocated to new owners, 
presumably on the assumption that the exist-
ing land reform system makes adequate pro-
vision therefor. The current system of land 
allocation, which has been in operation for a 
number of years, unfortunately has a disas-
trous record of administrative incompetence, 
corruption, and inadequate state support for 
maintaining or developing productive land 
that has been reallocated.1
The draft amendment of section 25 essential-
ly takes the form of two additions: first, by 
adding the possibility of a court determining 
that no compensation needs to be awarded 
“where land and any improvements thereon 
are expropriated for the purposes of land re-
form”; and second that parliamentary legis-
lation must “set out specific circumstances 
where a court may determine that the amount 
of compensation is nil”. If these amendments 
were adopted, the implication would be that 
the fundamental right not to be deprived of 
property would be rendered subject to fur-
ther extra-constitutional legislation. Such 
limiting legislation would, in terms of sec-
tion 36(1), which provides: “The rights in 
the Bill of Rights may be limited only in 
terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and free-
dom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including – (a) the nature of the right; (b) the 
importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and 
its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to 
achieve the purpose”. 
The ad hoc committee proposed that the pro-
cedure to be followed for the adoption of the 
constitutional amendment be determined by 
section 74(2) of the Constitution. That would 
entail support for the amending bill by two-
thirds of the members of the National As-
sembly and of six of the nine provincial dele-
gations to the National Council of Provinces. 
Furthermore, the committee expressed the 
opinion that the bill should also be referred 
to the National House of Traditional Lead-
ers (which does not form part of the national 
legislature) “since it contains provisions per-
taining to customary law or customs of tradi-
tional communities”. Whatever the position 
the traditional leaders may take on the mat-
ter, it would not be binding on Parliament.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Corruption Watch v The Arms Procurement 
Commission 2019 JDR 1491 (GP): Review of 
commission report on fraud and corruption
It is well known that the global arms industry 
is associated with corruption involving spec-
tacular amounts of money covertly expend-
ed for various reasons, including to influence 
government decision-making on the acquisi-
tion of arms and military hardware.2 Since its 
inception in 1997, an extensive government 
arms procurement process named the Strate-
gic Defence Procurement Package has been 
immersed in controversy involving its ratio-
nale, need, effects, and intended offsets, but 
more specifically due to indications that its 
decision-makers, which included later (now 
former) President Jacob Zuma, were improp-
erly and corruptly influenced in the award 
of procurement contracts. Under political 
1 The complexities attending land reform were illustrated, for instance, by Professor Ben Cousins of the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies in a public 
lecture in October 2019 – accessible online at <https://www.plaas.org.za/land-reform-accumulation-and-social-reproduction-public-lecture-by-prof-ben-cousins/> 
accessed 14 January 2020.
2 See, e.g., Francois Venter, ‘Arms deals, bribery and political interference: how (im)potent the (rule of) law?’ (2008) 125(4), SALJ 633.
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pressure in 2011, Zuma (then President) ap-
pointed a commission of enquiry to investi-
gate the allegations. At the end of 2015, the 
Commission delivered its report, finding no 
evidence of wrongdoing, undue influence on 
government functionaries, fraud, or corrup-
tion. The Commission rejected the evidence 
brought before it as “wild allegations and 
baseless hearsay”.
Two NGOs brought an application before 
the High Court in Pretoria to review and 
set aside the findings of the Commission, 
essentially due to fundamental procedural 
defects in the manner in which it conducted 
the inquiry under the guidance of its chair-
person, Judge Willie Seriti. In the absence 
of precedent regarding the jurisdiction of a 
court to undertake a review of the report of a 
commission of enquiry, a comparative inves-
tigation was undertaken, finding that it did 
have such jurisdiction if it found irregulari-
ties regarding the legality and objectivity of 
the proceedings.
The applicants argued that “the Commission 
failed to gather relevant material, to proper-
ly consider and investigate matters raised in 
this regard, failed to admit evidence which 
was highly material to its inquiry and which 
was in its possession, failed to seek and al-
low information or material evidence from 
key witnesses and failed to test the evidence 
of witnesses who appeared before it by put-
ting questions to them with the required open 
and enquiring mind” (summarized in para 18 
of the judgment).
The Court found (para 53) that “it is clear 
that the Commission failed to enquire fully 
and comprehensively into the issues which 
it was required to investigate on the basis 
of its terms of reference” and that (para 66) 
the chairperson of the Commission “adopted 
the position that the evidence given by what 
were referred to as non-critical witnesses 
were ‘known facts’ and evidence given by 
critical witnesses ... were merely theories”, 
and in conclusion (para 70) “where the un-
contested evidence reveals to manifest a set 
of errors of law, a clear failure to test evidence 
of key witnesses and a refusal to take account 
of documentary evidence which contained the 
most serious allegations which were relevant 
to its inquiry, the principle of legality dictates 
only one conclusion, that the findings of such 
a commission must be set aside”.
In 2005, Zuma associate Schabir Shaik was 
convicted of two counts of corruption and 
one of fraud on the evidence of him making 
numerous payments totaling a substantial 
amount of money to or on behalf of Zuma in 
connection with the Strategic Defence Pro-
curement Package. Zuma was subsequent-
ly also charged with corruption, fraud, and 
money laundering, although the matter has 
been delayed substantially due to a range of 
legal maneuvers, including indecision by the 
National Prosecuting Authority, various ap-
peals, and applications for an order to per-
manently stay prosecution. In November 
2019, the High Court in Pietermaritzburg 
rejected Zuma’s most recent application for 
a permanent stay of prosecution.
2. Democratic Alliance v The Public Protec-
tor 2019 JDR 1582 (GP): A failing constitu-
tional institution
The Public Protector (PP) is an institution 
created by Chapter 9 of the Constitution to 
support democracy. During the term of the 
previous incumbent, the Office of the PP 
flourished as a stalwart of constitutional in-
tegrity and produced various influential re-
ports exposing public wrongdoing and abuse 
of power. The appointment of the present in-
cumbent (Busisiwe Mkwebane) was strongly 
opposed by the official parliamentary oppo-
sition, expressing concerns about her politi-
cal objectivity and proficiency. Unfortunate-
ly, these misgivings have proven to be well 
founded. Various reports produced under her 
guidance have been challenged successfully 
on review before the courts, in some cases 
producing unusually strongly worded judi-
cial denouncements of Mkwebane. During 
the year, attempts to remove her from office 
through the required parliamentary process-
es have consequently gained momentum.
One instance of judicial intervention was 
an application launched in the High Court 
in Pretoria by the official opposition and an 
NGO to review the legality of a report of the 
PP on alleged provincial maladministration 
of an agricultural project in the Free State in 
which Ace Magashule, former premier of the 
province and now Secretary General of the 
ANC (known to be aligned with Zuma) and 
the notorious Gupta family were involved.3 
The Court stated (para 20) that the “PP is 
charged with rooting out improper conduct 
in Government for the public benefit. The 
institution of the PP was ultimately created 
to serve the people, and to protect their in-
terests against those in power, who might be 
tempted to abuse it for nefarious purposes”.
Mkwebane expressly chose not to investi-
gate core issues, such as who actually ben-
efited from the project besides the intended 
beneficiaries, the roles of leading politicians 
(including Zuma and Magashule) in the 
failed project, and why disciplinary action 
was not taken when irregularities were dis-
covered by the National Treasury. The Court 
found (para 47) that the PP’s “decision to 
limit the scope of her investigation so dra-
matically was irrational as it side-stepped all 
the crucial aspects regarding the complaints 
and led to a failure on her part to execute her 
constitutional duty”. 
The Court commented as follows on the 
PP’s view that compliance with relevant 
requirements for concluding public-private 
partnerships did not need to be investigated: 
“On what basis she could justifiably come to 
such a conclusion is unclear. It points either 
to ineptitude or gross negligence in the exe-
cution of her duties” (par 60). Regarding the 
PP’s failure to make findings on irregular ex-
penditure, the Court stated (para 75): “One 
may justifiably ask whether this was done 
for some ulterior purpose. Unfortunately 
no explanation was given by the PP”. The 
Court reached a clear conclusion regarding 
the PP’s investigation (para 84): “The failure 
of the PP to execute her constitutional du-
ties in investigating and compiling a credible 
3 See 2017 I-CONnect-Clough Center Global Review of Constitutional Law, 262.
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and comprehensive report points either to a 
blatant disregard to comply with her consti-
tutional duties and obligations or a concern-
ing lack of understanding of those duties 
and obligations”. Regarding the PP’s failure 
to investigate the reasons why the intended 
beneficiaries did not benefit from the project, 
the Court commented (para 91): “It is an ab-
solute disgrace that some as yet unidentified 
people benefited while the poor and the mar-
ginalized were yet again robbed of an oppor-
tunity to better their circumstances.”
The outcome of the case was that the PP’s 
report was reviewed, set aside, and declared 
unlawful, unconstitutional, and invalid. But 
this was not the end of the matter. The Court 
postponed the handing down of a costs order 
because the PP had appealed a punitive costs 
order in a previous case to the Constitution-
al Court, which delivered its judgment on 
this issue in July. Subsequently, the Gauteng 
High Court ordered the office of the PP to 
bear 85% of the costs of the applicants and 
ordered her to pay the balance of their costs 
in her personal capacity.
3. Gelyke Kanse v Chairperson of the Senate 
of the University of Stellenbosch 2019 (12) 
BCLR 1479 (CC): Emasculation of language 
rights
The South African citizenry has a pro-
nounced diversity in its cultural and lin-
guistic composition, which is expressly rec-
ognized, inter alia, in the preamble of the 
Constitution, where the belief is expressed 
“that South Africa belongs to all who live in 
it, united in our diversity” and in section 6, 
which proclaims eleven languages to be of-
ficial languages and demands the protection 
and promotion of all those languages plus 
various others, including the Khoi, Nama, 
and San languages. However, since 1994, 
the government has done little to comply 
with these constitutional demands and has in 
fact done much to emasculate the role in ed-
ucation of indigenous languages, especially 
Afrikaans.
None of the five universities that taught 
primarily in Afrikaans until two decades 
ago have withstood the political pressure to 
cease doing so in favour of teaching only, or 
primarily, in English. When the University 
of Stellenbosch officially committed itself 
in 2016 to teach essentially in English only, 
a group of Afrikaans-speaking students and 
others involved in the university challenged 
the constitutionality of the new policy on 
the basis of section 29(2) of the Constitu-
tion, which guarantees everyone “the right 
to receive education in the official language 
or languages of their choice in public edu-
cational institutions where that education is 
reasonably practicable.” 
The High Court in Cape Town determined 
that the new language policy did not contra-
vene the provisions of the Constitution if a 
“context-sensitive analysis” of “reasonable 
practicability” was made after assessing its 
fairness and feasibility, and specifically con-
sidering “the need to remedy the results of 
past discriminatory laws and practices”. On 
appeal, the Constitutional Court confirmed 
these findings in the culmination of a series 
of judgments in which it was made abun-
dantly clear that it preferred transformation 
towards cultural uniformity before diversity, 
despite paying lip service to the sentiment of 
accommodating diversity found in the Con-
stitution. 
Thus, for instance, the Court stated (para 
48): “Afrikaans has been recognised in this 
Court as ‘one of the cultural treasures of 
South African national life’. The flood tide 
of English risks jeopardizing the precious 
value of our entire indigenous linguistic 
heritage. Gelyke Kanse is entitled to invoke 
that risk. This is because the march of histo-
ry both in South Africa and globally seems 
relentlessly hostile to minority languages, 
including Afrikaans, which is the mother 
tongue of some seven million on a planet in-
habited by seven billion people”. This, it was 
found, should not be considered the problem 
of either the university or the Court because 
it “... is not the university’s burden, as little 
is the fact that Afrikaans has all but vanished 
at other tertiary institutions, barring only one 
other. And the dilemmas the global march of 
English poses is not the question before the 
Court.”
4. Amabhungane Centre for Investigative 
Journalism v Minister of Justice and Correc-
tional Services [2019] 4 All SA 343 (GP): Pri-
vacy and media freedom
 
In terms of the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communi-
cation Related Information Act 2002 (RICA), 
telecommunication service providers must 
obtain core identification data from every cus-
tomer before making their services available 
(typically for mobile phones). The interception 
of communications is prohibited, subject to a 
range of exceptions related to serious crime 
and espionage, including the routing of sig-
nals by a service provider to an “interception 
centre” established and maintained by the state 
for real-time surveillance and the examination 
of a person’s communications history. This ar-
rangement concerns various constitutionally 
protected rights, including the rights to privacy, 
freedom of expression (including media free-
dom), the right of access to a court, and to a 
fair trial.
Various abuses of the facilities provided for in 
RICA came to light, including irregular spying 
on a public prosecutor and journalists, trigger-
ing an application to the High Court in Pretoria 
to investigate the constitutionality of the Act, 
based on the argument that the limitations on 
the fundamental rights that RICA allows ex-
ceed the constitutional requirement that the 
limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on hu-
man dignity, equality, and freedom.
The relevant law was extensively analyzed by 
the Court to support a detailed set of orders. 
First, the Court declared seven specific pro-
visions of RICA to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution and therefore invalid insofar as 
no procedure is provided for to notify a per-
son whose communications are intercepted. In 
order to allow Parliament to rectify the legis-
lation, the declaration of invalidity was sus-
pended for two years, but the Court created 
additional provisions deemed to be part of the 
Act until Parliament may replace it. The effect 
of these “read-in” provisions is that subjects 
of surveillance have to be informed thereof 90 
days after the expiry of the permitted intercep-
tion of their communications.
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The second order concerned the absence of 
an appointment mechanism for judges desig-
nated to deal with applications by officials to 
be given admission to a person’s communica-
tions, which rendered RICA unconstitutional. 
Again, Parliament was given two years to rec-
tify the law, but a statutory definition of “des-
ignated judge” in the statute was fashioned by 
the Court to be deemed part of the Act in the 
meantime.
The third order declared invalid the ex parte 
nature of the procedure by which access to a 
person’s communications may be obtained, 
suspended until Parliament cures the defect.
The fourth order similarly invalidated the pro-
visions of RICA dealing with or failing to pre-
scribe proper procedures to be followed when 
state officials are examining, copying, sharing, 
sorting through, using, destroying, or storing 
the data obtained from interceptions.
Order five read-in an additional section (pend-
ing parliamentary intervention) to deal with 
circumstances where a subject of surveillance 
is either a practicing lawyer or a journalist. The 
additional provision requires the applicant to 
draw the designated judge’s attention to the 
fact that the subject is a journalist or practicing 
legal practitioner, and furthermore requires the 
judge to be satisfied that it would be necessary 
and appropriate to allow the surveillance of the 
journalist or lawyer concerned.
Lastly, the Court declared the bulk surveillance 
activities and foreign signals interception un-
dertaken by the National Communications 
Centre to be unlawful and invalid.
The remarkable legislative activity of the ju-
diciary (reading-in) seen in this judgment is 
founded upon the interpretation by the Con-
stitutional Court of section 172 of the Consti-
tution in various previous judgments. At first 
sight, the jurisdiction to create new legislative 
provisions judicially does appear to offend the 
principle of separation of powers. However, 
Parliament is not precluded thereby from inter-
vening by amending or rescinding the “judicial 
legislation”, and an order concerning the con-
stitutional invalidity by a High Court, as in this 
case, has in terms of section 172(2)(a) of the 
Constitution “no force unless it is confirmed by 
the Constitutional Court”. The Amabhungane 
matter has been placed on the roll of the Con-
stitutional Court for February 2020.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
It can be expected that if the amendment of 
section 25 of the Constitution allowing ex-
propriation without compensation is passed in 
the form currently proposed, the constitution-
ality of the effective seizure of property of pri-
marily white owners will be contested before 
the courts – and that the outcome of such a 
challenge will be determined by the eventual 
ideological stance of the Constitutional Court 
regarding the balance between constitutional-
ism and punitive transformation.
The courts may have to consider an argu-
ment that an amendment of this nature would 
require a parliamentary majority of 75% in 
terms of section 74(1)(a) because it effects 
the foundational values of non-racialism and 
the rule of law entrenched in section 1 of the 
Constitution. The ANC alone does not com-
mand a two-thirds majority in the National 
Assembly, but it’s possible – though unlikely 
– that it would be able to garner sufficient 
support from minority parties to make up the 
shortfall.
Beyond the issue of expropriation, reactions 
to the continuing revelations of corruption in 
public life and government responses there-
to – either increased socialist centralization 
or a return to the foundational values of the 
Constitution – will determine the social and 
economic stability of the country.
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South Korea
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Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION
2019 was the third year of the liberal Jae-
in Moon administration, and people were 
expecting secured human rights, which 
were limited during the past conservative 
administration. As a matter of fact, in 2018, 
the Constitutional Court ruled Article 5 (1) 
of the Military Service Act, which did not 
provide alternative service for conscientious 
objectors, was nonconforming to the Consti-
tution. A year later, the Court ruled that the 
abortion ban in the Criminal Act was non-
conforming to the Constitution. 
However, in the same year, the Moon admin-
istration confused Korean society when it 
sent back to the North two North Korean fish-
ermen seeking asylum, in a continued show 
of affinity towards North Korea. Because of 
the conciliatory attitude by the South Kore-
an government, people suspected an illegal 
transfer of goods from South Korea to North 
Korea, which led the Japanese government 
to exclude South Korea from the “white list,” 
the group of its trusted trading partners. The 
South Koreans regarded Japan’s decision 
as political retaliation against the Supreme 
Court’s decision in October 2018 regarding 
wartime laborers. Due to these circumstanc-
es, the relationship between Japan and Korea 
is worsening each year.
Also, in domestic politics, President Moon 
appointed Kuk Cho, a professor of criminal 
law at Seoul National University and for-
mer Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil 
Affairs, as the Minister of Justice. However, 
Cho and his family have aroused numerous 
suspicions of corruption, which seems no 
different from the previous conservative ad-
ministration. This disappointed the Korean 
people, which led to a decreased approval 
rating for the Moon administration.
This report focuses on the most notable rul-
ings by the Constitutional Court and dis-
cusses the Moon administration’s political 
achievements in 2019.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
The most prominent constitutional event in 
Korea in 2019 was the decision of noncon-
formity to the Constitution of the abortion 
ban. According to Articles 269 and 270 of the 
Criminal Act, abortion was prohibited and 
punishable for anyone who received or per-
formed an abortion. However, this section of 
the report focuses on other important issues.
1. Kuk Cho Scandal
One of the biggest incidences that severely 
impacted Korean society was the appoint-
ment of Kuk Cho as the Minister of Justice, 
notwithstanding the numerous scandals 
pending on him.
Article 12 (3) of the Constitution established 
that prosecutors can request warrants of ar-
rest, detention, seizure, or search, which 
gives them enormous power. In order not 
to be involved in corruption trials by prose-
cutors, President Moon tried to alter and re-
duce their power.1 So he appointed Kuk Cho 
as the Minister of Justice in August 2019 to 
begin this curtailed power.
1 The National Assembly passed the prosecution reform bill to establish an anti-corruption agency in De-
cember. (See Jung-a Song, ‘South Korea passes bill to set up anti-corruption agency,’ Financial Times (30 
December 2019) <https://www.ft.com/content/11b3f736-2aec-11ea-bc77-65e4aa615551> accessed 1 
February 2020.
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However, the confirmation hearing at the Na-
tional Assembly made note of Cho’s suspi-
cious actions, which involved his daughter’s 
inappropriate university admission, a fabri-
cated testimonial for his daughter from the 
university that Cho’s wife was affiliated with, 
and opaque investments by his relatives.
While the presidential system in the United 
States requires the President to receive con-
firmation by the Senate to appoint Cabinet 
members, Article 94 of the Korean Constitu-
tion does not require the President to obtain 
recognition by the legislative branch in order 
to appoint ministers. Currently, the President 
appoints ministers after a confirmation hear-
ing held at the National Assembly. However, 
the confirmation hearing decision cannot bind 
the President, so Moon successfully appoint-
ed Cho to follow Kyung-wha Kang, who has 
been the Foreign Minister since 2017. 
Since the Moon administration accused the 
previous conservative administrations of in-
justice with the phrase jeokpye cheongsan, 
meaning “eradication of deep-rooted evils,” 
Cho’s numerous scandals deeply disappoint-
ed the Korean people. In response, students at 
Seoul National University, where Cho worked 
as a professor of criminal law, and students 
at Korea University, where Cho’s daughter 
graduated from, held demonstrations to pro-
test against Cho’s appointment. Also, demon-
strations were frequently held demanding 
Cho’s resignation as Minister of Justice. As a 
result, he resigned as Minister only a month 
after his appointment and returned as a pro-
fessor to Seoul National University.
As a result of the numerous scandals, Cho’s 
wife was arrested under suspicion of fabri-
cating a testimonial in order to easily allow 
her daughter to attend graduate school, and 
Cho’s younger brother was arrested for brib-
ery at the school operated by his relatives.2 
The Moon administration’s support rate 
plummeted to 39%, the lowest since the be-
ginning of his administration.3 
2. Sending North Korean Fishermen Back to 
the North
In 2019, human rights of North Koreans 
were ignored, as the current Moon admin-
istration took a conciliatory attitude toward 
the North Korean government.
According to Article 3 of the Constitution, 
“the territory of the Republic of Korea shall 
consist of the Korean peninsula and its ad-
jacent islands.” Therefore, South Korea re-
gards the northern part of the Korean penin-
sula as belonging to the Republic of Korea 
and the North Koreans as the nationals of the 
Republic of Korea. Although South Korea 
previously accepted residents who escaped 
from the North, under Article 3 of the Con-
stitution, the Moon administration sent two 
North Korean fishermen back to North Ko-
rea, even after they demanded asylum.
The South Korean government insisted that 
the two North Korean fishermen killed six-
teen colleagues while heading to the South, 
and thus they could not be protected under 
Article 9 (1) of the North Korean Refugees 
Protection and Settlement Support Act. The 
government decided to send them back to 
the North; they were reportedly brought to 
Panmunjeom and extradited to the North, 
where they supposedly fainted with disap-
pointment. 
These behaviors by the government were 
strongly criticized by South Korean scholars 
of constitutional law. For instance, Young-
soo Chang insisted that the government ig-
nored the spirit of the Constitution because 
it did not thoroughly investigate if the two 
North Korean fishermen actually murdered 
their colleagues, and then sent them back to 
the North and potentially caused their deaths 
despite the Constitution regarding North Ko-
rean residents as South Korean nationals.4 
Also, the international NGO Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) accused the Korean govern-
ment of sending back the two North Kore-
ans5 despite the fact that South Korea joined 
the “Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.” Since the Moon administra-
tion’s attitude toward North Korea appears 
too conciliatory, international and domestic 
communities have questioned if its actions 
were appropriate.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
1. The Decision of Unconstitutionality on Not 
Giving Permission to Meet Suspect for “The 
Attorney Willing to be the Counsel” (2015 
Hun-Ma 1204, February 28, 2019)
A suspect was arrested and detained at night 
and requested to have assistance of counsel. 
However, Article 58 (1) of the Enforcement 
Decree of the Administration and Treatment 
of Correctional Institution Inmates stated 
that the meeting time was limited under Ar-
ticle 9 of the State Public Officials Service 
Regulations to 9 AM to 6 PM on weekdays. 
Therefore, the suspect, who was arrested at 
night, was not permitted to have assistance 
of counsel and was interrogated.
In these circumstances, the attorney, who was 
willing to be the suspect’s counsel, became 
the plaintiff and insisted that not permitting 
2 Jung-hwan Kim and Jung-goo Lee, ‘Kuk Cho’s Brother is Arrested. Court Recognized the Necessity to Arrest from the Additional Suspicions,’ Chosun Ilbo (1 Novem-
ber 2019) <http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/11/01/2019110100269.html> (in Korean) accessed 16 December 2019.
3 Mi-na Kim, ‘[New analysis] Unclear how Cho Kuk’s resignation affects Moon’s approval ratings,’ Hankyoreh (21 October 2019) <http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edi-
tion/e_national/914015.html> accessed 17 December 2019. According to the article, another survey shows 45.5% approval.
4 Gi-chol Kim, ‘I am Worried about the President and the Government Who Threaten the Spirit of the Constitution,’ Chosun Ilbo (11 December 2019) <https://news.
chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/12/11/2012121100179.html> (in Korean) accessed 21 December 2019. 
6 ‘South Korea Deports Two from North to Likely Abuse,’ Human Rights Watch (12 November 2019) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/12/south-korea-deports-two-
north-likely-abuse> accessed 21 December 2019.
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the suspect to meet the attorney violated the 
right to prompt assistance of counsel, se-
cured by Article 12 (4) of the Constitution, 
and filed a constitutional complaint. 
In this case, the plaintiff was not the suspect 
but “the attorney who was willing to be the 
counsel.” Although the Constitution secures 
suspects’ right to prompt assistance of coun-
sel, the central point was whether or not the 
attorney’s right to meet the suspect can be 
regarded as a fundamental right secured by 
the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court argued that sus-
pects and defendants would not have enough 
opportunity to have assistance from counsel 
if attorneys are not secured to meet suspects. 
Therefore, the Court decided that the right of 
“attorneys who are willing to meet suspects” 
was a fundamental right secured by the Con-
stitution and ruled that Article 58 (1) of the 
Enforcement Decree of the Administration 
and Treatment of Correctional Institution In-
mates was unconstitutional.
2. Decision of Nonconformity to the Consti-
tution6 in Abortion Ban (2017 Hun-Ba 127, 
April 11, 2019)
The Criminal Act in Korea prohibits abor-
tion in Articles 269 and 270. The former 
prohibits women from receiving abortions, 
and the latter bans physicians from perform-
ing abortions. The Constitutional Court had 
decided previously in 2012 regarding the 
plaintiff, a midwife who assisted in the prac-
tice of abortion on a woman who was six 
weeks pregnant. However, the Court upheld 
contested provisions by giving priority to the 
right of the fetus’s life over the female’s right 
to self-determination.
Despite the ruling of the Constitutional Court 
in 2012, there were many women who want-
ed abortions. In order to stop illegal abor-
tions, the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
toughened punishments for physicians who 
performed them. In these circumstances, the 
discussion of legalizing abortion arose again.
In April 2019, the Constitutional Court ruled 
that the abortion ban by the Criminal Act as 
nonconforming to the Constitution. In this 
case, three justices insisted that it was simply 
unconstitutional, while four justices insisted 
on nonconforming to the Constitution. There-
fore, seven out of nine justices voted against 
the abortion ban, and the decision of noncon-
formity to the Constitution was adopted. 
In Korea, legal abortion can be limited by 
Article 14 of the Mother and Child Health 
Act in such cases as pregnancy harming the 
woman’s health or the woman being the vic-
tim of rape. However, there were still many 
women eager to abort, thus physicians were 
helping them illegally.
In this case, the plaintiff was the physician 
who performed the abortion and was indict-
ed for the violation of Articles 269 (1) and 
270 (1) of the Criminal Act. The physician 
insisted that Article 269 (1) violates wom-
en’s right to self-determination, right to 
health, and right to maternal protection. The 
plaintiff also insisted that the Article violated 
equal rights, because it is only forcing wom-
en to endure unwanted pregnancy and birth.
 
Subsequently, the plaintiff insisted that Ar-
ticle 270 (1) violates the physician’s equal 
rights and right of occupation because it 
punishes only with imprisonment, whereas 
Article 269 (2), which is consent to an abor-
tion by a non-physician and considered to be 
more risky, includes punishment with a fine. 
The four justices of the Constitutional Court 
pointed out that a fetus can live by itself after 
around 22 weeks of gestation, thus women 
have time for self-determination on wheth-
er to keep the pregnancy or interrupt it until 
that point. However, since the current situa-
tion does not provide enough time for this, 
women must abort by unsafe procedures.
Also, the justices considered that the cur-
rent Mother and Children Health Act does 
not allow women to abort for economic and 
social reasons (e.g., if they study or work, 
if the couple does not plan to marry, and if 
minors become pregnant). Therefore, the 
current Criminal Act punishes women who 
abort for economic and social reasons, and 
thus the Article violates the principle of pro-
portionality.
The Constitutional Court recognized that 
abortion by physician in Article 270 (1) is 
an accomplice with women’s self-abortion, 
thus abortion by physician must be unconsti-
tutional if women’s self-abortion became un-
constitutional. However, since it is necessary 
for the legislative branch to define the pre-
cise time limit to practice abortion legally, 
and what kind of social and economic reason 
can be acceptable for a legal abortion, the 
Constitutional Court ruled the Criminal Act 
as nonconforming to the Constitution instead 
of the decision of regular unconstitutionality.
3. The Decision of Constitutionality on the 
Medical Service Act (2014 Hun-Ba 212, 2014 
Hun-Ga 15, 2015 Hun-Ma 561, 2016 Hun-Ba 
21 [consolidated], August 29, 2019)
According to Article 33 (8) of the Medical 
Service Act, a physician is prohibited from 
establishing or operating multiple medical 
institutions. The Act provides for a sanction 
of up to five years’ imprisonment or up to a 
fifty million won fine for physicians respon-
sible for violating the regulation. Therefore, 
the physicians who established and operated 
multiple medical institutions were prosecut-
ed under these Articles of the Medical Ser-
vice Act. 
The physicians became the plaintiff in this 
case and claimed that the Articles of the 
Medical Service Act violated the freedom of 
occupation and right to property. Also, the 
plaintiff insisted that the previous Medical 
Service Act before the amendment only pro-
hibited physicians to “establish,” thus add-
ing “operation” violates the principal of clar-
ity, which is derived from “no punishment 
without law.”
6 The publication of the Constitutional Court of Korea translated this form of decision into English as “nonconformity to the Constitution” (See Constitutional Court of 
Korea [ed.], Thirty Years of the Constitutional Court of Korea [Constitutional Court of Korea, 2018] p. 152). However, the website of the Constitutional Court uses the 
term “unconformable.” (See Constitutional Court of Korea <http://english.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/eng/decisions/casesearch/caseSearch.do> accessed 26 January 
2020). I have unified the term to “nonconformity.”
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The Constitutional Court ruled that the pur-
pose of the Act was to regulate excessive pur-
suit of profit and to maintain medical quality 
by concentrating on working responsibly at 
only one medical institution. Also, the Court 
argued that it is possible to predict that the 
word “operate” means “management,” thus 
the Act does not violate the principal of clarity 
deriving from “no punishment without law.”
4. Disclosure of Identity of the Sexual Of-
fender for the Children and Juveniles (2017 
Hun-Ma 399, November 28, 2019)
In November 2019, the Constitutional Court 
rejected a constitutional complaint on Article 
42 (1) of the Act on the Protection of Children 
and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse. The plain-
tiff committed an indecent act toward children 
and youth, which is prohibited in Article 7 (3) 
of the Act on the Protection of Children and 
Youth against Sex Offenses, and was sen-
tenced to pay a five million won fine and attend 
a medical program for sexual offenders.
According to Article 42 (1) of the Act on Spe-
cial Cases Concerning the Punishment, etc., 
of Sexual Crimes, the criminal must register 
his/her personal information if the verdict is 
confirmed. Also, the convicted person must 
submit personal information to the head of 
the local police office and must submit cor-
rected information when the information 
changes (Articles 43 (1) and (2)). Article 
43(2) requires the convicted person to report 
to the head of the local police office and in-
form them of the country where he/she goes, 
along with the length of stay, when he/she 
goes abroad for more than six months. The 
personal information of the convicted person 
is registered by the Minister of Justice (Arti-
cle 44 (1)), where it is retained and managed 
by the Minister for a certain period (Article 
45 (1)). The Act decrees that the head of the 
local police office periodically visits the con-
victed person to verify the truthfulness of any 
changes to the registered information (Article 
45 (7)). Article 46 (1) enables the Minister of 
Justice to distribute the registered information 
to public prosecutors or the heads of various 
levels of police offices.
The plaintiff filed a constitutional complaint 
to the Constitutional Court claiming that the 
articles of the Act on Special Cases Concern-
ing the Punishment, etc., of Sexual Crimes 
violates his right of self-determination re-
garding his personal information. However, 
the Court argued that the public interest of 
preventing sexual crimes is much bigger 
than his right of personal information, thus 
the plaintiff’s complaint was not accepted.
5. Dismissal of the “Comfort-Women” Agree-
ment between Japan and Korea (2016 Hun-
Ma 253, December 27, 2019)
In 2015, the Japanese and Korean gov-
ernments reached the “Comfort-Women” 
Agreement. According to the Agreement, 
Prime Minister Abe expressed his most sin-
cere apologies, the Japanese government 
paid funds to establish a foundation to sup-
port former “Comfort Women,” and the 
matter was resolved finally and irreversibly. 
However, former “comfort women” and 
their descendants became the plaintiff, and 
they insisted that the Agreement in 2015 vi-
olated their human worth and dignity, and 
filed a constitutional complaint.
On December 27, the Court pointed out that 
the Agreement was not even documented or 
recognized by the National Assembly, unlike 
other documented treaties. Subsequently, the 
Court described the Agreement as “general 
and declarative” because it did not include 
any concrete plan or procedures to settle the 
matter. Therefore, the Court argued that the 
Agreement does not have binding force and 
does not violate the plaintiffs’ rights.7 Also, 
the Court argued that the eligibility of the 
plaintiff, who died after filing the constitu-
tional complaint, had expired with the plain-
tiff’s death.
Since the Constitutional Court dismissed the 
complaint, the Court did not mention if the 
Agreement in 2015 is constitutional or not. 
However, there will be strong opposition 
from the Japanese government because the 
Court mentioned that concrete rights and ob-
ligations do not arise from the Agreement.
Regarding the wartime issue under Japanese 
rule, on the same day as the dismissal of the 
“Comfort-Women” Agreement, the Constitu-
tional Court dismissed the claim against Ja-
pan by the Koreans abandoned in Sakhalin. 
The Court described that the Korean govern-
ment offered to negotiate with the Japanese 
government several times, so the Korean gov-
ernment is fulfilling its legal duty, although 
the result has been insufficient.8 
6. Decision of Nonconformity to the Consti-
tution on Prohibiting Establishment of Sup-
port Group for Governor of Area-Wide Unit 
of Local Government (2018 Hun-Ma 301, 
2018 Hun-Ma 430 [consolidated], December 
27, 2019)
In Korea, support groups are established 
for the President and National Assembly 
members. However, Article 6 of the Politi-
cal Funds Act does not include governors 
or congressional members of local munici-
palities. In these circumstances, Jae-myung 
Lee, the governor of Gyeonggi-Do, filed a 
constitutional complaint because he was not 
allowed to establish his support group at the 
local election held on June 13, 2018. The 
ruling consolidated multiple filings. Other 
plaintiffs included the candidate for the gov-
ernor of Gwangju City, the candidates for 
the ward assembly in Gwangju, and the res-
idents who tried to establish support groups.
The Constitutional Court compared the 2016 
national election and the 2018 local elec-
tion, and pointed out that the elections of the 
7 I introduced the different mindsets on international and domestic law between Japan and South Korea and mentioned that the binding force of the “Comfort Women” 
Agreement would be weak in the Global Review in 2017. (Leo Mizushima, “South Korea – Developments in South Korean Constitutional Law,” Richard Albert, David 
Landau, Pietro Faraguna, and Simon Drugda (eds.), 2017 Global Review of Constitutional Law (I-CONnect-Clough Center 2018) p. 269).
8 2012 Hun-Ma 939, December 27, 2019.
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governors of area-wide units of local gov-
ernment spent a larger amount of election 
expenses than the national election. Thus, it 
was necessary to secure the election funds 
specifically for the candidates belonging to 
the new party or independent candidates. 
Also, the Court considered that the support 
group does not inhibit the integrity of the 
governors of area-wide units of local gov-
ernment, so it made a decision of nonconfor-
mity to the constitution.
However, on the other hand, the candidates 
of the ward assembly were not allowed to 
establish their support groups. The Consti-
tutional Court pointed out that it is not nec-
essary to secure a larger amount of election 
expenses, and the quality and quantity of 
the political activities of the ward assembly 
members are lower than that of the President 
and National Assembly. The Court also men-
tioned that members of the ward assembly 
have frequent opportunities to contact local 
residents. Thus, it is necessary to regulate 
funds by establishing support groups in or-
der to maintain political integrity.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD  
1. Amending Public Official Election Act and 
National Election in 2020
On December 27, 2019, the National Assem-
bly passed a reformed bill of the Public Of-
ficial Election Act. According to the revised 
act, the voting age was lowered from 19 to 18 
years old. The amended act adopted “semi-in-
terlocking proportional representation,” 
which is advantageous for small parties at 
proportional representation. The Liberal Ko-
rea Party, the current largest opposition party, 
was strongly against the bill, but the ruling 
Democratic Party successfully passed it with 
the cooperation of small parties such as the 
Bareun Mirae Party, the Party for Democracy 
and Peace, the Justice Party, and the prepara-
tory group to form the New Alternative Party.
A national election is scheduled in 2020, and 
the new electoral system will be adopted. 
Thus, the upcoming election ensures that the 
two-party system can be maintained, or small 
parties can increase their representation at the 
proportional representation election.
2. Worsening Japan-Korea Relations
Since the beginning of the Moon adminis-
tration, the relationship between Japan and 
Korea has been gradually worsening. Due to 
South Korea’s current conciliatory attitude 
toward North Korea, Japan suspected a secu-
rity problem in the export control system in 
South Korea and announced that it expunged 
South Korea from the list of countries that 
have preferential trade with Japan.
In these circumstances, Korea faces diffi-
culty importing materials for manufacturing 
semiconductors. Thus, the Korean govern-
ment demanded that Japan withdraw the 
toughened rule and accused Japan of taking 
“retaliatory action” after the Supreme Court 
ruling on wartime laborers in 2018. Subse-
quently, the Korean government announced 
that it would terminate the General Security 
of Military Information Agreement (GSO-
MIA) between Japan and Korea in August. 
On November 22, the Korean government fi-
nally decided not to terminate the GSOMIA, 
but the controversy is still unsettled within 
the Japan, South Korea, and United States 
alliance.
Despite the deterioration of the relationship 
between Japan and Korea, some Korean 
scholars are expressing deep concern with 
the current excessive antipathy toward Japan 
and published a book titled Ban-il Jongjok 
Jueui (Anti-Japan Tribalism). It discusses 
the past Japan-Korea relationship objective-
ly and became a bestseller in Korea. Kore-
an society is increasingly paying attention 
to different points of view, not limited to a 
perspective expressing strong antipathy to-
ward Japan. 2020 must be the year for both 
countries to maintain continuous discussion 
until reaching a mutual understanding and 
strengthening their bond as neighboring 
countries. 
V. FURTHER READING
Constitutional Court of Korea (ed.), Thirty 
Years of the Constitutional Court of Korea 
(Constitutional Court of Korea, 2018)
Lee, Young-hoon et al., Ban-il Jongjok Jueui 
(Anti-Japan Tribalism) (Miraesa, 2019) (in 
Korean)
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I. INTRODUCTION
The case law of the Spanish Constitutional 
Court in 2019 was once again marked by 
various elements related to the independence 
process in Catalonia. Four main themes are 
identifiable in this respect: a) the attempted 
investiture of an absent candidate as presi-
dent of the Generalitat, b) Catalan parlia-
mentary resolutions defining its position 
with respect to the institutions of the state, 
c) the pre-trial detention of the pro-indepen-
dence leaders, and d) the reach and limits 
of Art. 155 CE. Some of these themes have 
ruptured the unanimity that the Constitution-
al Court justices had previously displayed in 
judgments related to the pro-independence 
process. Beyond the Catalan question, there 
have been many varied topics on which the 
CC has had to rule, from the evidential va-
lidity of the Falciani list, to the civil register 
rights of transsexual minors, to the exhuma-
tion of Franco.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. Procedures of state coercion (Judgments 
89 & 90/2019) 
In the period that interests us, the judgments 
that particularly stand out are those respond-
ing to appeals of unconstitutionality raised 
against the agreement in the plenary session 
of the Senate on 27 October 2017, which ap-
proved the measures the government want-
ed to take with respect to the Generalitat de 
Cataluña [Government of Catalonia] under 
Article 155 of the Constitution (Judgments 
89 & 90/2019). With these judgments, the 
Court, with the unanimous agreement of all 
of the justices, endorsed the application of 
this coercive mechanism. 
Art. 155 CE states in its first paragraph that 
“If a Self-governing Community does not 
fulfill the obligations imposed upon it by the 
Constitution or other laws, or acts in a way 
that is seriously prejudicial to the general in-
terest of Spain, the Government, after having 
lodged a complaint with the President of the 
Self-governing Community and failed to re-
ceive satisfaction therefore, may, following 
approval granted by the overall majority of the 
Senate, take all measures necessary to compel 
the Community to meet said obligations, or to 
protect the above-mentioned general interest”. 
Its second paragraph states that “With a view 
to implementing the measures provided for in 
the foregoing paragraph, the Government may 
issue instructions to all the authorities of the 
Self-governing Communities”.
This (October 2017) was the first application 
of this singular, extraordinary instrument of 
control of the autonomous communities (in-
spired by Art. 37 of the Bonn Basic Law) 
since the Constitution was approved in 1978. 
It was a consequence of the referendum on 
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Catalan independence held that same Octo-
ber and the subsequent declaration of inde-
pendence (although only for a few moments, 
as it was immediately suspended) by the 
president of the Generalitat de Cataluña. It is 
worth remembering that while almost twen-
ty years previously the national government 
had sent a demand to the president of a differ-
ent autonomous community under the threat 
of applying the aforementioned Art. 155 CE 
(the Canary Islands in 1989, in connection to 
a tariff issue arising from the then-European 
Community), subsequent negotiations led 
to agreements between the national govern-
ment and the autonomic government which 
made it unnecessary to continue the Art. 155 
CE process or resort to the Senate to approve 
any measures.
Judgments 89 and 90/2019 rejected the ap-
peals (the first raised by more than fifty mem-
bers of Congress from the parliamentary 
group Unidos Podemos-En Comú Podem-En 
Marea, and the second by the Catalan Par-
liament) against the plenary agreement of 
the Senate, understanding that the applica-
tion of Art. 155 CE in this specific case was 
in line with the Constitution. The appeal of 
unconstitutionality was the appropriate pro-
cess route for an agreement with the force 
of law. This is different from regulations or 
implementing acts which lack this force, and 
which led to the partial non-admission of the 
appeal in the second of the judgments.
The main measures adopted included the re-
moval of the government of Catalonia and 
the automatic calling of elections for the re-
gional assembly, along with taking over run-
ning the Catalan administration for a limited, 
although indeterminate time (dies certus an 
incertus quando), with a new Catalan gov-
ernment taking over following the elections.
It is important to note that only on a very 
specific point was one aspect of the appeal 
approved, related to a collateral issue to the 
intervention itself, and referring to official 
publications and the validity of the content 
therein for certain matters, which were de-
clared unconstitutional for reasons of legal 
certainty.
In these judgments, the Constitutional Court 
endorsed both the measures taken by the 
government and the procedures the govern-
ment and the Senate followed, as guarantors 
of the integral organization of the state, for 
the approval of this extraordinary instrument 
of direct coercion that has no other objective 
than redirecting autonomy to its own consti-
tutional, statutory, and legal framework. It 
is an instrument for re-establishing consti-
tutional order and the normal institutional 
function of the autonomous community so 
ordered, which as the Court itself highlight-
ed, “in some way could give rise to the indef-
inite suspension of autonomy, and not least 
to the institutional suppression of that auton-
omous community as a territorial, political 
public entity”.
2. The Faciani list and illegally obtained evi-
dence (Judgment 97/2019) 
Judgment 97/2019 responded to the appeal 
for amparo raised by an individual who had 
been found guilty of various tax-related 
crimes and sentenced to fines and imprison-
ment in a process that began with his name 
being found on the so-called “Falciani list”.
The data about Spanish taxpayers in this 
list was given to Spanish authorities by the 
French tax office in 2010 (they did the same 
for other countries affected by the fraud) after 
it was found in a search that was carried out 
in compliance with applicable French law. 
It gave rise to various cases in our country. 
This included the case brought by the special 
anti-corruption prosecutor against the appel-
lant in this judgment, who was found guilty 
in the Madrid Provincial Court in April 
2016, with the sentence being confirmed in 
the Supreme Court in February 2017, before 
being appealed to the Constitutional Court.
The petitioner alleged the violation of the 
fundamental rights to effective legal protec-
tion, to a fair trial, and to the presumption of 
innocence (Arts. 24.1 and 2 CE). The Court, 
following a thorough examination of consti-
tutional case law on illegal evidence, unani-
mously rejected the appeal.
The underlying question in this complex 
case, which had multiple elements and as-
pects at stake, is whether illegally obtained 
evidence can be used. Remember, the data in 
the list (which listed thousands of accounts 
suspected of tax evasion with the account 
holders and the amounts held in each) were 
obtained illegally by H. Falciani in Switzer-
land between 2006 and 2008 while he was 
working in a bank subsidiary, for which he 
was convicted in abstentia of economic espi-
onage in 2015. It was after he fled to France 
that the French authorities obtained the list 
following a legally sound search. As the 
Court highlighted, the minor nature of the 
violation of the petitioner’s financial privacy 
(only the account data and the amount held), 
which would be protected by the procedures 
in place in the country where it happened, 
does not alter the canon of constitutionality 
to apply nor does it require extending the 
needs of substantive protection of rights to 
the area of criminal procedure.
In its judgment, the Court made a very de-
tailed summary of its doctrine on illegal 
evidence, recalling its three guiding princi-
ples: 1) “the procedural non-admission of 
evidence obtained by violating a substan-
tive fundamental right does not constitute 
a requirement that derives from the content 
of the affected fundamental right”, 2) “the 
expectation of exclusion of illegal evidence 
comes from the preferential position of fun-
damental rights in the legal system, it is 
strictly procedural and must be approached 
from the perspective of guaranteeing a fair 
process –Art. 24.2 CE–”, and 3) “the viola-
tion of procedural guarantees in Art. 24.2 CE 
must be determined in relation to the ille-
gally obtained evidence, following a careful 
evaluation to ensure balance and equality to 
the parties, that is, the integrity of the pro-
cess in question as a fair, equitable process”.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Investiture of the president of the govern-
ment in the Parliament of Catalonia 
Judgment 19/2019 was issued in response to 
the appeal raised by the national government, 
challenging the resolution of the speaker 
of the Catalan Parliament proposing Carles 
Puigdemont as a candidate for the president 
of the Catalan government [Gobierno de la 
Generalitat de Cataluña]. The Spanish gov-
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ernment based their appeal on the fact that 
Puigdemont, by fleeing from justice and hav-
ing a judicial order against him ordering his 
capture and imprisonment, was not going to 
personally attend the investiture session. He 
would not be able to present his government’s 
legislative program, nor participate in the de-
bate in Parliament. The Constitutional Court 
declared the Catalan Parliament resolution 
proposing Puigdemont as a candidate for the 
presidency of the Catalan government void, 
as the physical presence of the candidate in 
Parliament is a necessary requirement in the 
parliamentary system of government de-
scribed in the Constitution.
Judgment 52/2019, related to judgments 
19/2019 and 45/2019, responded to a request 
for protection of fundamental rights [amparo 
request] brought by the parliamentary group 
Socialistes i Units per Avançar against the 
Catalan Parliament decision to indefinitely 
defer the investiture of Carles Puigdemont 
as president of the Catalan government. The 
Catalan Parliament alleged that the conditions 
were not right to ensure the exercise of Puig-
demont’s political rights, as he was a fugitive 
in Belgium. The parliamentarians who raised 
the request believed that this violated their 
right to exercise their representative func-
tions, as the delay in the investiture blocked 
the formation of a government in Catalonia, 
the legislative function of Parliament, and the 
powers of the members of Parliament. The 
Constitutional Court judgment did not resolve 
the matter, as the situation resolved itself with 
other candidates subsequently being proposed 
for the presidency of the Generalitat. In fact, 
when the Court gave its judgment, Catalonia 
already had a president.
Judgment 96/2019 responded to an amparo 
request brought by socialist members of the 
Catalan Parliament against the parliamentary 
decision to use emergency procedures for the 
modification of Law 13/2008 to allow the in-
vestiture of the president of the Generalitat in 
abstentia. The Constitutional Court, applying 
case law from judgment 45/2019, ruled that 
this had not infringed the petitioning mem-
bers’ rights to exercise their representative 
functions.
2. Decisions of the Catalan Parliament and 
its relationship with the Spanish state 
Judgments 41/2019 and 42/2019 responded 
to amparo requests brought by the Ciudada-
nos parliamentary group in the Catalan Par-
liament against the legislative processing of 
two laws: the foundational law of the repub-
lic and the law about the self-determination 
referendum. The Catalan Parliament had de-
cided to eliminate all of the legally required 
legislative steps in order for the laws to be 
voted on in Parliament without the necessary 
parliamentary debate. The Constitutional 
Court ruled that the parliamentary procedures 
required by the legislative process aimed at 
ensuring the participation of minorities and 
all citizens through their representatives. Be-
cause of that, omitting these procedures was 
a violation of the fundamental right to exer-
cise the representative role of the petitioners.
Judgment 98/2019 responded to an appeal 
brought by the Spanish government against 
various sections of Resolution 92/XII passed 
by the Catalan Parliament. This resolution 
included various statements rejecting and 
condemning the position exhibited by King 
Felipe VI about the events of 1 October 2017 
in Catalonia, and reaffirmed the commitment 
to republican values in favor of the abolition 
of the Monarchy. The Constitutional Court 
ruled the resolution unconstitutional, consid-
ering the fact that the resolution was beyond 
the competencies of the Parliament of an au-
tonomous community and contradicted the 
constitutional position of the King, which 
recognizes his status as “inviolable” and 
“not subject to responsibility”.
Judgment 111/2019 was very similar, re-
sponding to an appeal raised by the Spanish 
government against the Catalan Parliament’s 
decision to create an investigative parlia-
mentary commission on the Monarchy. The 
objective of the commission was, among 
other things “to investigate irregular or crim-
inal activities of people linked to the Spanish 
royal family (…)”. The Constitutional Court, 
applying the case law of Judgment 98/2019, 
ruled that the Catalan Parliament’s decision 
was contrary to the constitutional position of 
the King.
During the final quarter of 2019, the Con-
stitutional Court passed various orders to 
ensure compliance with the above judg-
ments in the face of Catalan parliamentary 
agreements that have reiterated the right to 
self-determination, the objective of indepen-
dence, and the condemnation of the King.
3. Imprisonment of pro-independence leaders
Judgment 62/2019 was in response to the 
amparo request brought by Jordi Cuixart 
(one of those tried and sentenced in October 
2019 for acts related to the independence 
process in Catalonia). He contested the Su-
preme Court orders for him to be tried for 
the crime of rebellion and ordering him to 
be remanded in custody due to him being a 
flight risk, carrying the risk of continued of-
fending, and for obstruction of justice. The 
petitioner claimed violation of his rights to 
personal liberty, to a safe legal process, and 
to effective legal protection, claiming that 
provisional imprisonment was against the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court ruled 
that provisional imprisonment complied with 
the Constitution, as it is justified by risks of 
reoffending and the accused fleeing justice, 
and the acts for which he was being held 
are not protected by the rights of assembly, 
demonstration, or freedom of expression.
Ruling 75/2019 was in response to an ampa-
ro request brought by Jordi Sánchez (another 
of those sentenced in 2019 for actions related 
to the Catalan independence process) against 
a punishment imposed by the disciplinary 
commission of the prison he was being held 
in as a result of a telephone call he made 
from there which was recorded to be distrib-
uted as part of an electoral campaign. The 
petitioner alleged the violation of the right 
to participate in public acts, access to public 
office, and sanctioning legitimacy. The Con-
stitutional Court rejected the amparo request 
as it was raised outside of the time limits set 
by law.
4. Gender equality 
Judgment 2/2019 was issued in response 
to an amparo request brought by a parent 
against the decision of a local administration 
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to not give him the same-length paternity 
leave as the law sets out for maternity leave. 
The petitioner claimed that this was a vio-
lation of the principle of equality. The Con-
stitutional Court ruled, referring to its prece-
dent Judgment 111/2018, that this was not a 
violation of the principle of equality because 
the difference in treatment had an objective, 
reasonable justification. The longer duration 
of maternity leave aims at contributing to the 
mother’s best possible physical recovery.
Judgment 91/2019 was in response to an ap-
peal raised against the social security law, 
which included a “part-time coefficient” for 
the calculation of part-time workers’ pen-
sions. The Constitutional Court ruled that the 
law was unconstitutional because it violated 
the right to equality and constituted indirect 
sex discrimination. Referring to the right to 
equality, the Constitutional Court noted that 
the law did not have an objective, reason-
able justification, as the part-time coefficient 
meant a reduction in the base salary of part-
time workers, in view of the reduction in ef-
fective time worked, which was already less 
than full-time workers. Referring to gender 
equality, the law produced implicit discrim-
ination against women, as they make up the 
majority of the part-time workforce.
Judgment 99/2019 was in response to a ques-
tion of unconstitutionality raised about the 
law regulating modification of registry in-
formation about individuals’ sex. The Con-
stitutional Court ruled that, in contrast to the 
law in question, minors with sufficient matu-
rity who are in a stable transsexual situation 
could request their sex to be changed in the 
civil registry.
Judgment 118/2019 was in response to a 
question of unconstitutionality raised against 
an article of the law regulating the status of 
workers that allows for contracts of work to 
be terminated due to justified absences when 
they reach a certain number of working days. 
The Constitutional Court ruled that the dis-
puted law did not violate workers’ rights 
to health, but rather maintained a balance 
between the right to health and the protec-
tion of business interests. There were three 
dissenting votes who claimed that the sen-
tence elevated the interests of business over 
the rights of workers. One of the dissenting 
opinions stated that the disputed law would 
be indirect sex discrimination as it is wom-
en who have to take more sick and personal 
days due to their family responsibilities.
5. Guarantees in the criminal process
Judgments 10/2019, 15/2019, 23/2019, and 
80/2019 were in response to amparo requests 
against various law court rulings which de-
clared themselves not competent to judge 
certain crimes committed outside Spanish 
territory by non-Spanish nationals. The pe-
titioners claimed that these legal rulings had 
violated the right to effective legal protec-
tion. They claimed that this law should be 
interpreted in accordance with the principle 
of universal criminal justice recognized in 
international law. The Constitutional Court, 
referring also to its Judgment 140/2018, 
found that neither the case law of the Inter-
national Criminal Court nor the European 
Court of Human Rights grounded an abso-
lute principle of universal criminal justice, 
but rather thought that this principle could 
be subject to the requirements set by national 
states. Therefore, limiting the efficacy of the 
principle of universal criminal justice did not 
violate the right to effective legal protection.
Judgment 97/2019 responded to an amparo 
request due to supposed violation of the right 
to a safe trial and the presumption of inno-
cence. The petitioner had been found guilty 
by the Supreme Court of tax fraud, with the 
so-called “Falciani list” as the main evi-
dence. This is a list of tax evaders obtained 
and published by a computer engineer work-
ing for a Swiss bank. The Supreme Court 
ruled that the “Falciani list” was valid evi-
dence to support a conviction, having been 
correctly included in the legal process. The 
Constitutional Court ruled that the Supreme 
Court judgment did not violate the right to 
a safe legal process or the right to the pre-
sumption of innocence, as they had carried 
out a correct assessment of all the interests 
at stake. 
6. Historic rights and the Constitution
Judgment 158/2019 was in response to an 
appeal of unconstitutionality raised by the 
Popular Party congressional group against 
the Aragón Parliament law 8/2018 on updat-
ing historical rights in Aragón. The Constitu-
tional Court declared the unconstitutionality 
of the articles of the law in which historical 
rights were invoked as authentic bases for 
self-government and the power of the auton-
omous community of Aragón.
7. Exhumation of the dictator Francisco 
Franco
Order 119/2019 announced the rejection of 
the amparo request brought by Francisco 
Franco’s granddaughter against the govern-
ment’s decision to exhume the remains of 
the dictator from the “Valley of the Fallen”, 
owned by the state. The government’s deci-
sion was backed by law 52/2007, which rec-
ognized the rights and established measures 
for those who had suffered persecution or 
violence during the Civil War and the dicta-
torship. The Constitutional Court considered 
that the government’s decision to exhume 
did not violate the principle of equality, or 
the rights to personal and family privacy, the 
right to religious liberty, or the right to effec-
tive legal protection.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD TO 2019
2020 began with the investiture of a coalition 
government between the PSOE and Unidas 
Podemos, presided over by Pedro Sánchez, 
who in the investiture debate repeatedly indi-
cated his desire to de-judicialize the political 
conflict in Catalonia. It remains to be seen 
what the repercussions of similar announce-
ments are for the Constitutional Court, par-
ticularly the effects on all of those constitu-
tional processes in which there is recognition 
of the government’s active legitimacy. In any 
case, we expect the Court to still rule on nu-
merous questions with a background in the 
secessionist process. It will be interesting to 
see whether the justices maintain the divi-
sions of STC 155/2019 or whether they re-
turn to their previous unanimity. In addition, 
it is quite plausible that the Constitutional 
Court will be called upon to rationalize the 
powers of majorities and minorities in Par-
liament, given the fragmentation in Con-
gress. An increase in litigiousness is certain.
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SRI LANKA
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2019 presidential election ended the life 
of the government of national unity elect-
ed in 2015 to reform the Constitution and 
strengthen democracy and good governance. 
After some early successes, the reform pro-
cess had been in terminal decline for a while. 
But the government’s poor record in other 
areas such as the economy, and especially 
its lapses in relation to national security as 
revealed by the Easter Sunday terror attack, 
sealed its fate. With the country turning to 
strong leadership, the newly elected Presi-
dent Gotabhaya Rajapaksa offered an alter-
native vision of majoritarian nationalism, 
economic populism, and soft authoritarian-
ism. He has been clear about his opposition 
to the Nineteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution enacted in 2015, the most significant 
curtailment of presidential power since the 
1978 Constitution was established. It is very 
likely that he will win a legislative majority 
in the parliamentary elections due in 2020, 
and it is then also possible that he would ben-
efit from post-election political realignments 
to secure a two-thirds majority for constitu-
tional change. While the precise content of 
forthcoming changes is yet to be seen, it is 
expected that there will be a recentralisation 
of power in the presidency, a process that 
has already begun informally. It seems likely 
therefore that the 2019 presidential election 
has set a democratic regression in motion in 
Sri Lanka for the foreseeable future.  
The superior courts delivered important 
judgments in a number of cases relating to 
the right to life, the rights of the child, and 
the system of government in the devolved 
Provincial Councils, which are discussed in 
this report. Politically, the most significant in 
terms of the change of regime in 2019 was 
the decision of the Court of Appeal dismiss-
ing a challenge to the citizenship status of 
Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, which cleared a major 
legal obstacle in his path to the presidency. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The major constitutional crisis of Octo-
ber-December 2018 had ended with what 
seemed like a demonstration of institutional 
resilience against an attempt at democratic 
backsliding and executive self-aggrandise-
ment (see 2018 report). The performance of 
constitutional restraints, Parliament, and the 
courts, and the spontaneous public mobilisa-
tion in defence of constitutional government, 
seemed good portents for deepening democ-
ratisation. However, 2019 showed why such 
an assessment was over-sanguine. The fa-
vourable outcome of the crisis provided no 
impetus whatsoever for a kick-start of the 
stalled constitutional reform process, or for 
ensuring the legal or political accountability 
of the President for precipitating the crisis. 
Preoccupied with strategic and tactical ma-
noeuvring in an election year, the political 
elite abandoned both reform and account-
ability. 
One of the worst terror attacks in Sri Lankan 
history occurred on 21st April, the first since 
the end of the war a decade ago in 2009, and 
the first with avowedly Islamist motives. On 
Easter Sunday, terrorists of an ISIS-inspired 
local organisation, the National Thowheeth 
Jama’ath (NTJ), launched coordinated sui-
cide bomb attacks in churches and hotels 
across the country. The eventual death toll 
was over 250 killed and many more injured. 
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The attacks caused maximum immediate im-
pact by targeting religious observances and 
tourism, post-war Sri Lanka’s best perform-
ing economic sector. It also had extraordi-
nary constitutional implications by revealing 
serious weaknesses of institutional structures 
and political culture. 
An astonishing picture of incompetence and 
negligence emerged in the aftermath of the 
attack. The intelligence services and police 
appeared to have been working at cross pur-
poses, even though the perpetrators, their 
violent ideology and intentions, and their 
organisational networks had been known to 
the authorities for years previously. There 
had been many indications of impending at-
tacks, including through specific intelligence 
sharing from foreign and neighbouring gov-
ernments. The ultimate cause of the dysfunc-
tion, however, was rooted in the political 
dynamics that had led to the constitutional 
crisis in 2018 and the changes to internal 
procedures that resulted from it. 
The breakdown in the cohabitation relation-
ship between the President and the Prime 
Minister had led to the President’s attempt-
ed unconstitutional power-grab in October 
2018. At this time, the President had mo-
nopolised control over the National Security 
Council (NSC), the key coordinating insti-
tution for anti-terrorism measures. The Pres-
ident, ex officio the Commander-in-Chief, 
was also the Minister of Defence and the 
Minister of Law and Order. The military, po-
lice, and intelligence services all came with-
in his purview. On Easter Sunday morning 
when the attack took place, the President was 
overseas on a private visit, without having 
appointed acting ministers to any of the rele-
vant ministries, or indeed an Officer Admin-
istering the Government. It also emerged that 
the Prime Minister, the junior defence minis-
ter, and the Inspector General of Police had 
all been excluded from NSC meetings since 
October. None of them, however, had seen 
fit to object to this unusual situation until the 
attacks took place. The Permanent Secretary 
to the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of 
the State Intelligence Service, serving in the 
period before the attacks, publicly attested to 
the erratic nature of NSC meetings and its 
functioning according to presidential whims 
rather than any institutionalised procedures. 
A state of emergency was declared on 23rd 
April, and a harsh set of emergency regu-
lations promulgated the following day. The 
scope of offences and penalties, the extraor-
dinary powers adversely affecting personal 
liberty and property, the potential for the 
imposition of undue and illegitimate restric-
tions on the freedoms of expression and as-
sembly, the granting of police powers to the 
military, and the absence of effective over-
sight mechanisms all gave serious cause for 
concern.
In May, a Select Committee of Parliament 
was appointed to investigate the attacks and 
the institutional failures that led to them. In 
October, its report strongly criticised the in-
telligence services and the President for mul-
tiple failures and negligent acts as well as the 
Prime Minister for omissions. It suggested 
that the failures were such as to lead to the 
impression that certain elements within the 
intelligence apparatus colluded in allowing 
the attacks to go ahead so as to create panic 
and help in changing the government in the 
presidential election due later in 2019. It also 
recommended institutional reform of the 
intelligence sector, in particular putting the 
NSC on a statutory footing, and introducing 
an independent National Security Advisor.
There was a significant rise in Islamopho-
bia, including increasingly virulent rhetoric 
by Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists, as well 
as orchestrated attacks by vigilante groups 
on Muslim civilians and their property. 
The record of the authorities in this regard 
was mixed at best, with evidence of police 
collusion with mobs on some occasions, 
although localised violence was generally 
contained without further escalation. The ad-
vent of Islamist terrorism, coupled with the 
political vacuum created by a dysfunctional 
government, gave a new lease on life to the 
politicised Buddhist clergy to engage in an-
ti-minority nationalist activism. Moreover, 
the public failures of the civilian political 
authorities and the police emboldened the 
armed forces and the intelligence services, 
still at wartime strength and unreformed for 
a post-war peacetime role, to suggest a more 
active role for themselves in governance in 
the name of combating the threat of interna-
tional terrorism. 
All of these developments pointed to a 
change of government in the next presiden-
tial election, which duly occurred on 16th 
November. The reform government elected 
in 2015 had not delivered on its promise of 
a new Constitution, and even the significant 
achievements it managed to attain were nev-
er presented as such due to poor communica-
tions. The economy never got off the ground, 
the reform coalition’s public bickering dis-
credited the very idea of constitutional re-
formism, and after the Easter Sunday crisis, 
the public mood drifted increasingly in the 
direction of a presidential strongman who 
could create order out of political chaos and 
deliver development out of economic stasis. 
The new President, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, 
offers this populist authoritarian solution. 
After an expected consolidation of a legis-
lative majority in the parliamentary elections 
due after March 2020, he may well under-
take a rollback of the democratising consti-
tutional reforms of the past five years.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Rathnayake v. Abeykoon (SC FR 577/2010) 
[17 December 2019]: Right to Life Implied by 
the Constitution and International Law
This was a case of torture and death of a sus-
pect in police custody. The suspect, alleged 
by the police to have connections to organ-
ised crime, had been arrested and interrogat-
ed without regard to applicable provisions of 
criminal law and police standing orders in 
the course of a murder investigation. Several 
days after the suspect was taken into custo-
dy, on 18 September 2010, the police alleged 
that the suspect suffered accidental death 
when a police firearm was discharged during 
a scuffle with a police officer. The widow of 
the deceased filed a petition in the Supreme 
Court alleging the violation of the deceased’s 
fundamental rights to freedom from torture 
(Art. 11) and freedom from arbitrary arrest 
and detention (Art. 13(1)). The petition 
averred that the deceased had been arrested 
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on false charges without any credible mate-
rial and without reasons being given for the 
arrest; that the deceased has been detained 
in custody without adherence to procedure 
established by law and without justification; 
that the deceased had been subject to torture 
and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
by being assaulted whilst in custody; that the 
deceased was killed by the police whilst he 
was in their custody; and that the police then 
fabricated a version of events to justify the 
killing and escape liability. 
This was not a difficult case for the Supreme 
Court in establishing the violation of the 
deceased’s fundamental rights on the facts. 
The illegal actions of the police had been 
undertaken in an extraordinarily transpar-
ent manner, perhaps on the belief that the 
deceased’s alleged underworld connections 
would dissuade his relatives from pursuing 
justice in the courts. What was noteworthy 
as a matter of constitutional law was that this 
decision was a reaffirmation of a previous 
precedent in which the Supreme Court had 
held that an implied fundamental right to 
life was recognised by the Constitution even 
though that right is not expressed in the text. 
In Silva v. Iddamalgoda [2003] 2 SLR 6, 76-
77, the Court had observed that Art. 13(4), 
read with Art 11., “recognises a right not to 
deprive life whether by way of punishment 
or otherwise, and by necessary implication, 
recognises a right to life.” Even though Art. 
13 (4) was not pled in the present petition, 
the Court extended the principle that no per-
son shall be punished with death or impris-
onment except by order of a competent court 
to the circumstances of the case. Adopting a 
normative approach, the Court relied on the 
guarantee of human dignity in the preamble 
in interpreting the positive rights under Arts. 
11 and 13. It also deployed a reference to 
international law in the Directive Principles 
of State Policy to establish that Sri Lanka’s 
international obligations under the UDHR 
and the ICCPR required the recognition of 
a right to life. For the violation of this right 
of a deceased person, punitive compensation 
was awarded to the widow payable by the 
state as well as personally by the respondent 
police officers. 
2. Landage v. Bogahawatte (SC FR 677/2012) 
[12 June 2019]: Rights of the Child; Judicial 
Use of International Law; and Judicial Policy 
Making 
In this case, the violation of a minor’s fun-
damental rights was the subject of the peti-
tion to the Supreme Court by her legal next 
friend, her mother. Acting on the false com-
plaint of a third party, and despite consistent 
denials by the minor, the police attempted 
through harassment and intimidation to ex-
tract an admission that she had been subject-
ed to sexual abuse by a local politician. The 
subjection of an innocent girl to this illegal 
and unconscionable treatment seems to have 
been part of some elaborate political scheme 
to have the local politician implicated in a 
sexual abuse scandal in which police officers 
apparently colluded with no regard to their 
legal functions and duties. In the process, her 
fundamental rights relating to freedom from 
torture, arbitrary arrest, and judicial supervi-
sion of detention were all found on the facts 
to have been breached by the actions of the 
police (Arts. 11, 13(1) and 13(2)). The dis-
tressing and bizarre facts of the case aside, 
judgment is noteworthy for three reasons. 
First, it contains an important exposition of 
children’s rights in Sri Lanka, as derived 
from international and domestic law and oth-
er non-statutory standards. In particular, it is 
held in Art. 11 that a higher standard of care 
that must be exercised in the criminal justice 
system when children’s rights are implicated 
demanded a lower burden a proof in estab-
lishing a violation of a child’s fundamental 
rights against torture and other cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment. In the words of 
the judgment, “…what amounts to a ‘high 
degree of maltreatment’ [i.e., the standard 
established in previous cases in relation to 
Art. 11 rights] in relation to an adult does not 
always resonate with the mental constitution 
of a minor. Therefore, when a minor com-
plains of degrading treatment, the Court as 
the upper guardian must not be quick to dis-
miss the claims for failing to meet the same 
high threshold of maltreatment. Instead, it 
must carefully consider the impact the al-
leged treatment may have had on the mental-
ity and the growth of the child.” [p.18]. 
Second, the Court’s use of authority was 
expansive. It relied on international trea-
ties, domestic statutes, and its own case law 
(distinguishing long lines of authority where 
required, as above) as well as statements of 
international soft law (e.g., UN Rules for the 
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Lib-
erty, GA Res. 45/113, 14th December 1990) 
and domestic non-statutory standards (e.g., 
The Charter on the Rights of the Child). The 
Court, it would seem, was concerned to make 
a complete judicial restatement in this area of 
child rights law, and so took care to mention 
every source from which those rights derived. 
In particular, its deployment of the Sri Lankan 
Charter on the Rights of the Child provides 
judicial recognition and imprimatur to what 
is otherwise a purely declaratory and legally 
unenforceable document. 
Finally, in the most unique aspect of the 
judgment, the Court took the highly unusual 
step of ordering the Inspector General of Po-
lice to lay down guidelines for law enforce-
ment authorities, and set out 20 principles to 
be followed in the framing of such guide-
lines. This was not a relief prayed for, but 
the Court noted that abuses of power in law 
enforcement were endemic and only a frag-
ment of such cases reached it by way of ju-
dicial proceedings. Guidelines reflecting the 
requirements of Sri Lankan law, internation-
al instruments, and global best practice were 
necessary to clarify the applicable standards 
and the rights of those affected. The Court 
seemed to suggest that, once promulgated, it 
would enforce those guidelines in addition 
to the law. There is no doubt the Court was 
responding to a serious systemic defect of 
Sri Lankan law enforcement, with real and 
persistent consequences for individual lib-
erty. The principles set out by the Court are 
a useful distillation of a large body of law 
emanating from multiple sources, and some 
will welcome this (limited) judicial activism. 
Others may see in it an instance of judicial 
overreach, with the Court trying to emulate 
its Indian counterpart in giving prescriptive 
directives to the executive for the making of 
policy. The more serious question, however, 
is the efficacy of the strategy, given that the 
cause of the problem is not the shortage of 
written guidance in law.
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3. Deniswaran v. Wigneswaran (CA (Writ) 
285/2017) [19 October 2019]: Power to Dis-
miss a Provincial Minister 
The petitioner in this case was a member of 
the Board of Ministers of the Northern Pro-
vincial Council who sought writs of certio-
rari from the Court of Appeal to first quash 
his dismissal from ministerial office by the 
Chief Minister of the Northern Province, and 
second, to quash the appointment of replace-
ments to portfolios previously held by him 
by the Governor of the Northern Province on 
the advice of the Chief Minister. 
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution (1987) establishes a system of devo-
lution by which legislative and executive 
powers are devolved to Sri Lanka’s nine 
provinces. In each province, devolved leg-
islative power is exercised by the elected 
Provincial Council, and executive power is 
exercised by the Governor and a Board of 
Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. The 
Governor is appointed by the President of 
Sri Lanka, and the Chief Minister and oth-
er Ministers are drawn from the Provincial 
Council. The manner in which executive 
power is shared and exercised by the Gover-
nor and the Chief Minister and the Board of 
Ministers is set out in Arts. 154C and 154F, 
read with Arts. 154B(2) and 4(b). In terms 
of these provisions, there are two ways in 
which executive power is exercised at the 
provincial level: directly by the Governor, 
where he is specifically required to do so by 
or under the Constitution; and more general-
ly by the Governor on the advice of the Chief 
Minister and Board of Ministers. The legal 
issues implicated in this case fall within the 
second category. In terms of Art. 154F(5), 
the Governor appoints Ministers on the ad-
vice of the Chief Minister, and although that 
provision does not expressly provide for 
dismissal, s.14(f) of the Interpretation Ordi-
nance is clear that any person who has the 
power to appoint also has the power to dis-
miss. Therefore, the dismissal of provincial 
ministers is an act that is formally done by 
the Governor, but it can only be done on the 
substantive advice of the Chief Minister. 
In this case, it appears that this constitutional 
framework was not understood by either the 
Chief Minister or the Governor, or indeed 
by the Court of Appeal. The Chief Minister 
erred in law when he purported to directly 
dismiss the petitioner from ministerial of-
fice. The correct way was to advise the Gov-
ernor to formally dismiss the petitioner. The 
Governor erred in law when he acceded to 
the Chief Minister’s advice to appoint two 
other Provincial Councillors to fill the va-
cancies created by the petitioner’s dismissal, 
thereby going over the five-member limit 
on the Board of Ministers imposed by Art. 
154F(1). The Court of Appeal was therefore 
right to quash both those acts, but it over-
reached when it declared that, “There cannot 
be a scintilla of doubt that…it is the Gover-
nor who has the power to appoint Ministers, 
of course on the advice of the Chief Minis-
ter” (emphasis added), and that “there is no 
room for a different interpretation.” [pp.5-6]. 
This interpretation is patently inconsistent 
with both the clear words of Art. 154F(5) as 
well as the underlying scheme of provincial 
executive power. It denudes the Chief Minis-
ter of his constitutional role in the dismissal 
of Ministers, and in purporting to vest this 
power exclusively in the Governor, it ne-
gates a crucial democratic safeguard within 
the system of devolution. The Constitution 
limits the Governor’s formal power over the 
appointment (and by implication the dis-
missal) of Ministers by the requirement of 
responsible advice from the Chief Minister. 
The Chief Minister in turn is able to tender 
that advice by virtue of commanding the 
confidence of the Provincial Council. If, as 
the Court of Appeal holds, the Governor, 
who is appointed by the President and main-
ly responsible only to the President, enjoys 
both the formal and substantive power in this 
regard, then the whole framework of dem-
ocratic accountability within the Provincial 
Councils is undermined. It is to be hoped 
that the Supreme Court will on appeal cor-
rect this serious interpretational error by the 
Court of Appeal. 
4. Viyangoda and Thenuwara v. Rathnayake 
(CA (WRT) 425/2019) [15 October 2019]: Cit-
izenship Status of a Presidential Candidate; 
Executive Powers of the President; Constitu-
tional Interpretation
The present case arose by way of an appli-
cation for writs of certiorari to the Court of 
Appeal. The petitioners’ main prayer was to 
have the certificate of dual citizenship grant-
ed to Gotabhaya Rajapaksa on 21 November 
2015 by his brother, then-President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa, acting as the Minister in charge 
of citizenship, declared a nullity by the court. 
It would then follow that he would not fulfill 
the requirement of Sri Lankan citizenship for 
the purpose of nomination as a candidate in 
the 2019 presidential election. The factual 
basis for this argument was that on the date 
at which the certificate was issued, President 
Rajapaksa had not fulfilled the constitution-
al requirements that would have enabled 
him to exercise the ministerial power of au-
thorisation under the Citizenship Act. These 
mandatory requirements, under Arts. 44(1) 
and (2) of the Constitution (as they were at 
the time), were that he had to have first ap-
pointed the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 
of Ministers, and assigned subjects and func-
tions to them, before he could as President 
assign to himself any ministerial role and ex-
ercise any statutory power of a Minister. Put 
another way, there was no restriction on the 
President to immediately exercise any power 
by or under the Constitution as the President 
(e.g., emergency powers), but he could only 
exercise the powers given to a Minister un-
der any Act of Parliament once the Cabinet 
had been appointed and subjects assigned. 
Since these steps had not been taken prior to 
the issuance of the certificate, the certificate 
and everything that flowed from it were null 
and void. 
The Court rejected this argument on two 
related grounds. The first was a prudential 
objection to the highly formalist and rigid 
proceduralism of the petitioner’s argument 
with regard to the constitutional framework 
of government formation after an election 
in which a new President had been elected. 
It observed that political negotiations in as-
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sembling legislative coalitions, for example, 
could result in some legitimate delay in the 
appointment of Ministers, and it could not 
have been intended that numerous statutory 
powers vested in Ministers would be held 
in limbo during this period. Secondly, the 
Court noted that if such restrictions were in-
deed intended, then the framers would have 
placed express time limits on government 
formation. Affirming a consistent line of cas-
es, the Court also rejected the respondents’ 
argument that a “plenary” executive power 
vested in the President (which validated his 
actions upon election notwithstanding any 
procedural limitations). But it did agree with 
the respondents that the President was, under 
the Constitution, the “repository” of execu-
tive power, and as such, he could exercise 
statutory powers of Ministers before he had 
appointed any Ministers or assigned func-
tions to them.
While this was on the whole an interpreta-
tion that supported a presidential rather than 
a semi-presidential view of the Constitu-
tion, the precedential value of the decision 
is limited by the fact that provisions in issue 
have now been removed by the Nineteenth 
Amendment. Its lasting significance, there-
fore, could be the political one of having 
paved the way for Gotabhaya Rajapaksa to 
become President. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
With the political opposition in complete 
disarray and civil society demoralised and 
stifled, it is expected that President Rajapak-
sa will win a majority in the parliamentary 
elections coming after March 2020, and that 
this may enable a two-thirds majority to be 
put together with further party realignments. 
This will in turn empower him to change the 
Constitution. No details have been revealed, 
but it can be predicted with a high degree 
of certainty that this would involve recen-
tralisation of power in the presidency and 
the weakening of checks and balances. The 
democratic regression to come could prove a 
high price to pay for the squandering of the 
opportunity for reform that was provided by 
the regime change of 2015. 
V. FURTHER READING
Asanga Welikala (ed.), ‘Special Issue on 
Constitutional Reforms in Sri Lanka’ [2019], 
The Round Table 108(6): 605-719
330 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
Sweden
Anna Jonsson Cornell, Professor in Comparative Constitutional Law, Uppsala University 
Mikael Ruotsi, Doctoral Candidate in Constitutional Law 
SWEDEN
I. INTRODUCTION
Three main constitutional law questions 
dominated the Swedish constitutional law 
debate in 2019. First, the relationship be-
tween the Council on Legislation and the 
Government,1 second the criminalization of 
joining and supporting terrorist organiza-
tions and the outlawing of racist organiza-
tions, and third, whether the independence 
of the judiciary needs to be enhanced and its 
constitutional protection strengthened. The 
relationship between the Council on Legisla-
tion, which exercises abstract constitutional 
review a priori, and the Government contin-
ued to be tense throughout 2019. This trend 
culminated in the Government retracting a 
draft bill that would criminalize joining and 
supporting terrorist organizations after the 
Council reached the conclusion that the draft 
partly violated the freedom of association as 
protected by the Swedish Constitution. The 
scope of the constitutional protection of free-
dom of association was debated in Sweden 
for yet another reason. In 2019, the Govern-
ment appointed a Commission of Inquiry 
with the task of investigating whether racist 
organizations could and should be criminal-
ized. The background is the increasing visi-
bility of Nazis on the streets of Sweden and 
the threat they pose to other individuals and 
democracy as a whole.2 The independence 
of the judiciary has been debated for sever-
al years already. However, as a result of the 
dismantling of the rule of law and judicial in-
dependence in Poland and Hungary, concrete 
measures of how to secure judicial indepen-
dence in Sweden are increasingly being de-
bated. Thus far, this debate has not generated 
any changes to the Constitution. However, 
in early 2020, a Commission of Inquiry into 
this matter was appointed.3 In addition, the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) was implemented as Swedish law 
as of 1 January 2020. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS 
The relationship between the Council on 
Legislation and the Government is still 
tense, and potentially increasingly so. In sev-
eral opinions, the Council has heavily criti-
cized draft bills put forward by the Govern-
ment. There is an obvious tension between 
the political ambitions of the Government 
and the a priori abstract assessment made 
by the Council on Legislation. The latter has 
to take into account, for example, the draft 
bill’s constitutionality, the manner in which 
it relates to the legal system in general, and 
whether it is likely to achieve the stated end. 
A statement of opinion is not binding on the 
legislature. However, should the Council 
find a draft bill to be unconstitutional, it is 
highly unlikely that the Government will put 
that draft to the legislature for a vote. 
Early in 2019, the Government presented a 
draft bill to the Council on Legislation that 
would criminalize joining and supporting 
terrorist organizations. The Council assessed 
the constitutionality of the draft bill and 
concluded that if adopted by the legislature 
(riksdagen) it would infringe the Constitu-
tion, in particular the freedom of association 
(see the Instrument of Government (IG) Ch. 
1 See the 2018 Global Review on Sweden. 
2 Dir 2019:39.
3 Dir 2020:11.
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2, Sect. 1, p. 5).4 The Government retract-
ed the draft, referring to the assessment of 
the Council. At the end of summer 2019, the 
Government presented a new, more narrow-
ly tailored draft law that was later passed by 
the legislature. The new law criminalizes 
supporting terrorist organizations through, 
for example, the handling of weapons, pro-
viding communications and transport means, 
or making property such as housing or land 
available to terrorist organizations. The legal 
background is that the Swedish anti-terror 
laws are many and fragmented. As a result, 
their efficiency and degree of legal certainty 
have been questioned. Still, there are import-
ant gaps in the law compared to other states’ 
anti-terror laws, especially as regards the 
joining of a terrorist organization (EU states 
in particular). 
In July 2019, a Commission of Inquiry was 
appointed and tasked with investigating the 
legal preconditions for and ramifications of 
criminalizing racist organizations. The back-
ground is the increasing number of violent 
acts of racist organizations taking place in 
Sweden and the threat they pose to a demo-
cratic and open society as well as to individu-
als. Freedom of association is a fundamental 
right that enjoys strong protection in Swed-
ish constitutional law. It can only be restrict-
ed in a few cases, explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution under IF 2:24, Sect. 2. Racist 
organizations can in principle be prohibited 
under the Constitution. Still, important and 
difficult questions remain as to the definition 
of what constitutes a racist organization and 
whether the banning of such organizations 
would be in congruence with the Swedish 
tradition of content-neutral restrictions on 
fundamental rights, especially freedom of 
expression and association, whether it can 
be deemed proportional and necessary in a 
democratic society, and last but not least, 
whether criminalization is likely to bring the 
expected results, in this case to abolish rac-
ism and the violent actions that come with it. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
1. NJA 2019 s. 72 (the Flag): Applicability of 
the Freedom of the Press Act
In the town of Eskilstuna, on a public space, 
two persons raised a flag depicting the Nazi 
swastika. One of them was apprehended by 
the police and was subsequently charged 
with the offence of incitement to racial hatred 
(hets mot folkgrupp). The Supreme Court de-
termined that, since the flag had been pro-
duced using screen printing, the case was to 
be tried under the constitutional Freedom 
of the Press Act – which is normally appli-
cable to messages disseminated via printed 
newspapers or books. The Court emphasized 
that the Freedom of the Press Act applies to 
any “publication” produced using a printing 
technique, i.e., the applicability of the Act is 
not limited to traditional publications but ex-
tends even to printed fabric.
2. NJA 2019 s. 577 (the Laser Pointer III): The 
Principle of Legality
The Swedish criminalization of possession 
of laser pointers on public spaces has gen-
erated three Supreme Court judgments. The 
two previous cases concerned the standard 
of negligence required for criminal respon-
sibility (NJA 2011 s. 725, the Laser Pointer 
I), and the requirement that a technical stan-
dard, referred to in a criminal statute, must 
be made available to the public for free (NJA 
2017 s. 157, the Laser Pointer II). The third 
part of this Laser Pointer trilogy related to 
the requirement that, under the principle of 
legality, a technical standard referred to in 
a criminal statute must be available in the 
Swedish language. Since the technical stan-
dard at issue, which determined whether a 
laser pointer fell under the scope of crimi-
nalization, was available only in English, the 
principle of legality led to the accused being 
acquitted. 
3. HFD 2019 ref. 1: Access to Information 
under the Freedom of the Press Act
Under the Freedom of the Press Act, individ-
uals have a right to access public documents 
(that are not confidential) in their original 
form, unless significant obstacles exist. Re-
gardless of any such obstacles, the Freedom 
of the Press Act gives individuals an absolute 
right to request and receive a copy of public 
documents for a fee determined by statute. In 
the case at hand, an individual had requested 
to access documents from the Swedish Na-
tional Archives. The documents dated back 
to the 15th and 16th centuries, and some 
were severely infested by mold and fire dam-
aged. Hence, the documents were extremely 
fragile and could, according to the Swedish 
National Archives, not be handled without 
inflicting loss of information. The Supreme 
Administrative Court concluded that under 
these circumstances, there existed significant 
obstacles that hindered access to the docu-
ments in the original. Furthermore, the Court 
held that, despite the absolute nature of the 
right to access copies of public documents 
under the Freedom of the Press Act, the right 
to access public documents presupposed that 
it was possible to provide access without de-
stroying the relevant documents. Hence, the 
request to access the documents was denied.
4. HFD 2019 ref. 24: Access to Information 
under the Freedom of the Press Act
As mentioned under the previous case, the 
Freedom of the Press Act gives individuals 
the right to access public documents, pro-
vided that the documents are not confiden-
tial. Under the Act, a document is “public” 
if it is in the possession of an authority, and 
the document (i) has been created by the 
authority and is finalized, or (ii) has been 
received by the authority from an external 
source. In the case at hand, an individual 
had been denied a request to access public 
(but confidential) documents relating to a 
police investigation, and appealed the Po-
lice Authorities’ denial to the Administrative 
Court of Appeals. When the Administrative 
Court of Appeals obtained the files in ques-
tion from the Police Authority, the plaintiff 
requested to access the documents in order 
to determine the merits of the appeal. The 
4 Council on Legislation, Statement of Opinion from March 20, 2019. 
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Court of Appeals denied the request for 
access, holding that the Court had not “re-
ceived” the documents in the meaning of the 
Freedom of the Press Act and hence, that the 
documents possessed by the Court were not 
“public”. The Supreme Administrative Court 
held that the documents in question had in 
fact become public when received by the Ad-
ministrative Court of Appeals, arguing that a 
public document cannot lose its character of 
being public when sent from one authority 
(the Police Authority) to another (the Ad-
ministrative Court of Appeals). However, 
the Supreme Administrative Court also held 
that the public documents in question should 
not be viewed as being part of the Admin-
istrative Court of Appeal’s case file. This is 
significant, since the parties to a case have a 
far-reaching right to access the Court’s case 
file, even if it contains confidential informa-
tion. The Supreme Court of Appeals argued 
that any other determination would have ren-
dered the process of appealing a denial of ac-
cess to public documents meaningless, since 
it would in fact give the appellant access to 
the confidential information sought simply 
by initiating an appeal.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
It is clear that the constitutional debate in 
Sweden is heavily influenced by the politi-
cal and constitutional illiberal trend globally. 
Several important Commissions of Inquiry 
into important constitutional matters have 
been formed. In addition to the two inquiries 
mentioned above, an inquiry is currently as-
sessing the possibility of claiming damages 
for violations of constitutional rights.5 The 
Supreme Court is developing important case 
law on this matter and the questions assigned 
to the inquiry are whether the right to dam-
ages should be regulated by law. Since this 
is the case concerning violations of rights 
protected by the ECHR (skadeståndslagen 
(1972:207) Ch. 3 § 4), there are strong ar-
guments to be made in favor of such a law. 
In addition, rights of the Samí people are in-
creasingly on the political and legal agenda. 
As natural resources are being exploited to 
an increasing extent in the northern parts of 
Sweden, in combination with climate chang-
es, the circumstances under which the Samí 
people can exercise their traditional way of 
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SWITZERLAND
I. INTRODUCTION: FOREIGN 
POLICY AND DIRECT  
DEMOCRACY
The Swiss Federal Constitution of 18 April 
1999 (Swiss Fed. Const.)1 is a ‘popular con-
stitution’.2 Formally, it ranks amongst the 
most rigid given the considerable hurdles 
amendments must clear.3 Not only are con-
stitutional amendments subject to a referen-
dum but require a double majority of both 
the voters nationwide and the 26 constitu-
ent states (Cantons) to be approved.4 The 
result of the popular vote in each Canton 
determines its respective vote.5 Constitution-
al amendments are nevertheless frequent. 
Swiss citizens are usually called upon four 
times a year to vote on two to four referenda 
regarding constitutional amendments, inter-
national treaties, or federal statutes. In 2019, 
however, the voters and the Cantons failed 
to approve any constitutional amendment. 
On 10 February 2019, they rejected a pop-
ular initiative against urban sprawl aimed at 
mitigating the deprivation of cultivated land 
by barring the Cantons from creating new 
residential zones.6 Federal Parliament had 
met some of the demands by amending the 
Federal Statute on Spatial Planning in 2012.
In small and open economies like Switzer-
land, referenda on international treaties may, 
in both political and legal terms, rise to the 
same importance as referenda on far-reach-
ing constitutional amendments. This is sup-
ported by empirical evidence according to 
which voter turnout tends to be significantly 
higher in referenda on foreign policy than 
on domestic issues.7 Unlike all of its neigh-
bours, Switzerland is neither a member of 
the European Union (EU) nor the European 
Economy Area. The country is nonetheless 
closely linked with the EU by a densely knit 
network of bilateral treaties allowing, among 
other things, for free movement of persons.8 
Coupling the EU’s dynamic acquis commu-
nautaire, including secondary legislation 
and decisions by the European Court of Jus-
tice, with static treaties under international 
law, however, creates inevitable tensions. 
Such friction resurfaced with regard to the 
EU’s ‘Schengen Agreement’, which largely 
abolished internal border checks within the 
European ‘Schengen Area’,9 of which Swit-
1 Swiss Federal Constitution, 18 April 1999, Classified Compilation of Swiss Federal Law (SR) No. 101; official 
titles are in German, French, and Italian. Available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compila-
tion/19995395/index.html (non-official English translation).
2 Johannes Reich, ‘Switzerland: The State of Liberal Democracy’, in Richard Albert et al. (eds), 2017 Global 
Review of Constitutional Law (I•CONnect & Clough Center 2018) 280, 280.
3 Astrid Lorenz, ‘How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity’ 2005 (17), Journal of Theoretical Politics 339, 359.
4 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 140 section 1a.
5 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 142 section 3.
6 ‘Popular Initiative Against Urban Sprawl’. Vote of 10 February 2019. Available at: https://www.bk.admin.ch/
ch/f/pore/va/20190210/index.html.
7 For empirical evidence see, e.g., Lionel Marquis and Pascal Sciarini ‘Opinion formation in foreign policy: the 
Swiss experience’ (1999) 18 Electoral Studies 453, 458.
8 See ‘Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss 
Confederation, of the other, on the Free Movement of Persons’ [21 June 1999], O J L 114, 30/04/2002, 6-72. 
Available in French at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19994648/index.html.
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zerland has been part since 2008 based on 
its ‘Schengen Association Agreement’.10 The 
latter committed Switzerland to adopt the 
‘Schengen acquis’11, and a failure to comply 
would lead to the termination of the trea-
ty by default.12 Each national referendum 
launched against the adoption of the devel-
oping Schengen acquis therefore amounts 
to a flirtation with terminating Switzerland’s 
membership of the ‘Schengen Area’ alto-
gether. This would not only lead to reintro-
duced checks at the Swiss border but put 
Switzerland’s participation with the EU’s 
‘Dublin Regime’, determining which coun-
try bears the responsibility to examine an ap-
plication for asylum, in jeopardy.13  
In January 2019, a referendum was launched 
against adopting a further development of 
the Schengen acquis on control of the acqui-
sition and possession of weapons. In Swit-
zerland, where the Constitution provides for 
general conscription for all male Swiss citi-
zen of full age,14 individual ownership of a 
firearm and full membership of the citizenry 
have been emblematically linked for centu-
ries. The Federal Constitution of 1874, in 
force until 1999, even stated, that the ‘fire-
arm shall … remain in the hands of the ser-
viceman’ off duty.15 Despite these persistent 
yet slowly fading traditions, the voters re-
jected the referendum against the adoption 
of the Schengen acquis and thus allowed for 
continued membership of Switzerland in the 
Schengen Area.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS: GENERAL 
ELECTION OF THE SWISS  
FEDERAL PARLIAMENT
1. Bicameral Swiss Federal Parliament: 
Constitutional Framework
On 20 October 2019, Swiss voters were 
called upon to elect the Federal Parliament. 
When the first Swiss Federal Constitution of 
12 September 1848 was drafted, transform-
ing the former confederacy into a federal 
state, the ‘United States Congress served as 
a blueprint for Switzerland’s bicameral par-
liamentary system’.16 The bicameral Swiss 
Federal Parliament consists of the National 
Council and the Council of States, the former 
resembling the United States House of Rep-
resentatives, the latter emulating the United 
States Senate. Both houses, the National 
Council and the Council of States, which 
taken together are called Federal Assem-
bly,17 are, unlike the chambers of the U.S. 
Congress, equal and have identical powers.18 
The National Council consists of 200 repre-
sentatives of the People.19 They are elected 
directly by the voters according to a system 
of proportional representation for a term of 
four years.20 Proportional representation is, 
however, severely distorted by the fact that 
each of the 26 Cantons forms a constituency 
(electoral district).21 The seats of each Can-
ton are allocated according to their perma-
nent resident population.22 The authority to 
adjust the allocation of seats based on the 
most recent census is delegated to the fed-
eral executive branch (Federal Council).23 
Voters domiciled in the Canton of Zurich, for 
instance, were therefore entitled to elect 35 
representatives in 2019, whereas the voters 
residing in one of the six smallest Cantons 
could each elect a sole representative only.24 
The Council of States, in turn, consists of 
46 members.25 Each Canton elects two rep-
resentatives, bar those six Cantons that 
emerged from partition of a single Canton 
into two between the Late Middle Ages and 
the 19th century. These Cantons each elect 
one representative to the Council of States 
9 See ‘Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual 
abolition of checks at their common borders’ [14 June 1985], O J L 239, 22/09/2000, 13-18.
10 See ‘Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implemen-
tation, application and development of the Schengen acquis’ [26 October 2004], O J L 53, 27/02/2008, 52-79. Available in French at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/
classified-compilation/20042363/index.html.
11 See M Oesch, Switzerland and the European Union (Nomos & Dike, 2018) 42-3, 103-10.
12 See ‘Schengen Association Agreement’ (note 10), article 7 section 4.
13 See ‘Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the Free Movement of 
Persons’ [21 June 1999], O J L 114, 30/04/2002, 6-72. Available in French at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19994648/index.html.
14 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 59 section 1.
15 Swiss Federal Constitution, 29 May 1874, in force until 31 December 1999, article 18 section 3.
16Johannes Reich ‘The Americanization of Swiss Legal Culture [Book Review]’ (2018), 66 American Journal of Comparative Law 723, 725.
17 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 148.
18 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 148 section 2.
19 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 149 section 1.
20 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 149 section 2.
21 See Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 149 section 3.
22 Federal Act on Political Rights, 17 December 1976, article 16 section 2; SR (see note 1) 161.1; official titles are in German, French, and Italian. Available at: https://
www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19760323/index.html (unofficial English translation).
23 See Federal Act on Political Rights (note 22), article 16 section 2 and Decree on Political Rights, 24 May 1974, article 6a; SR (see note 1) 161.1; official titles are in 
German, French, and Italian. Available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19780105/index.html.
24 Decree on the Allocation of Seats regarding the General Election of the National Council, 30 August 2017; official titles are in German, French, and Italian. Available 
at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/official-compilation/2017/4259.pdf.
25 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 150 section 1.
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only.26 It is for the Cantons to determine the 
rules governing the elections regarding the 
Council of States.27 All of the Cantons elect 
their representatives directly by the people 
for a term of four years, all but two Cantons 
by majority voting.28
2. Climate Change: Environmental and 
Political Impacts
Global warming has had a profound and vis-
ible impact on the Swiss landscape already: 
Alpine glaciers have lost around 60 percent 
of their volume since 1850, the number of 
days with snowfall has halved since 1970 at 
altitudes below 800 metres above sea level, 
heatwaves have doubled in both frequency 
and intensity since 1901, and near-surface air 
temperature has increased by 1.5 °C over the 
last 150 years, which is considerably more 
than the global average of 0.9 °C.29 Within a 
period being shorter than today’s life expec-
tancy at birth, average temperatures are esti-
mated to rise up by a further 4 to 7 °C during 
the summer season.30 Such dramatic climatic 
changes are most likely to have profound so-
cietal and economic consequences even for 
Switzerland, being a highly developed and 
land-locked country. They thus call for deci-
sive political action.31
Climate change consequentially was fea-
tured among the issues dominating the 
election campaigns. The Swiss Green Party 
(GPS) increased its share of the national vote 
by 6.1 percent, gaining 17 additional seats in 
the National Council32 – the most significant 
increase of any party since proportional rep-
resentation had been introduced by a popular 
initiative in 1918. The Green Liberal Party 
(GLP) increased its share of the vote by 3.2 
percent and secured nine additional seats. 
All of the remaining parties stagnated or suf-
fered defeats: The right-wing Swiss People’s 
Party (SVP) lost 12 mandates, albeit hold-
ing on to its position achieved in 1999 as the 
most influential political group in Parliament 
by a large margin, while the Social Demo-
cratic Party’s (SP) share of the national vote 
dropped to 16.8 percent – the lowest since the 
party came into being in the late 19th centu-
ry. Both the centre-right Democratic Liberal 
Party (FDP) and the moderate-conservative 
Christian Democratic Party (CVP) stagnat-
ed at historically low levels with 29 and 25 
seats, respectively. Both of them, neverthe-
less, continue in their roles as the dominating 
forces in the Council of States33 as a result of 
majority voting in all but two Cantons, hold-
ing 12 (FDP; – 1) and 13 (CVP; +/– 0) of the 
46 seats, respectively. The GPS jumped from 
one to five mandates while the SP holds nine 
(– 3) and the SVP six (+ 1) seats.
3. Composition of the Federal Executive 
Branch – Still ‘a Kind of Magic’?
The Federal Council, the executive branch 
of the federal government, forms a singular-
ity in a comparative perspective: It consists 
of seven members with equal rights and 
powers and is elected by the National Coun-
cil and the Council of States in a joint meet-
ing (‘United Federal Assembly’) for a term 
of four years after each general election of 
the National Council.34 The right of 50,000 
citizens eligible to vote to launch a referen-
dum against any federal statute decided by 
Parliament provides for incentives to strive 
for a broad consensus at an early stage of 
legislative proceedings even before the draft 
bill is put on the agenda of Parliament. As 
the Federal Council usually conducts prelim-
inary legislative proceedings,35 at least four 
different political parties have been repre-
sented in the Federal Council continuously 
since the so-called ‘magic formula’, a polit-
ical convention according to which all five 
parties with the largest share of the nation-
al vote hold at least one seat in the Federal 
Council, has taken root in 1959 to enhance 
the possibility to reach a broad political con-
sensus.36 According to this ‘epitome of Swiss 
consociationalism’,37 the GPS would have 
qualified for a seat in the Federal Council. 
The unprecedented gains of the GPS in the 
general election failed to alter the composi-
tion of the Federal Council, however, as Par-
liament reelected all of the incumbent Fed-
eral Councilors. The Federal Council thus 
furthermore consists of two members of the 
SVP, the FDP, and the SP and one member of 
the CVP; four of the members have German, 
two French, and one Italian as their native 
language.38 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES: 
26 See Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 150 section 2
27 See Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 150 section 3.
28 See, inter alia, W Haller, The Swiss Constitution in a Comparative Context (2nd ed, Dike, 2016) 130-2.
29 National Centre for Climate Services [NCCS], Climate Scenarios for Switzerland (2018), 18 (available at: https://www.nccs.admin.ch/dam/nccs/en/dokumente/web-
site/klima/CH2018_broschure.pdf.download.pdf/CH2018_broschure.pdf).
30 NCCS (note 29) 6-13.
31 See Johannes Reich, ‘Abwendung der Klimakatastrophe durch Gerichte?’ (2019), 120 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 413 (available 
at: https://www.ivr.uzh.ch/en/institutsmitglieder/reich/publikation.html).
32 Federal Statistical Office FSO, Élections fédérales 2019 (FSO, 2019) 9-12, 16 (https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfsstatic/dam/assets/10907688/master).
33 Federal Statistical Office, ‘Élections au Conseil des États’ (https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/politique/elections/conseil-etats.html).
34 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 175 sections 1-3 and article 177 section 1. 
35 Government and Administration Organisation Act, 21 March 1997, article 7; SR (see note 1) 172.010; official titles are in German, French, and Italian. Available at: 
https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19970118/index.html (unofficial English translation).
36 Johannes Reich, ‘An Interactional Model of Direct Democracy – Lessons from the Swiss Experience’ (2008), 12-4, 17-8 (https://ssrn.com/abstract=1154019).
37 Adrian Vatter, ‘Switzerland on the Road from a Consociational to a Centrifugal Democracy?’ (2016), 22 Swiss Political Science Review 59, 71.
38 On the legal relevance of multilingualism in Switzerland, see Johannes Reich, ‘Auslegung mehrsprachigen Rechts unter den Bedingungen der Polyglossie in der 
Schweiz’ in Frank Schorkopf and Christian Starck (eds.), Rechtsvergleichung – Sprache –Rechtsdogmatik (Nomos, 2019) 145-173.
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JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS, 
ISLAMIC HEADSCARVES, AND 
HOMESCHOOLING
1. First-ever Judicial Nullification of a Fed-
eral Ballot – a Judicialization of Politics? 
The Federal Constitution guarantees each 
citizen the right ‘to form an opinion and to 
give genuine expression to his or her will’ in 
particular with regard to their political rights 
(elections and ballots).39 The Federal Court, 
Switzerland’s supreme court, thus consis-
tently held that no result of a ballot shall be 
approved failing to reflect ‘the genuine and 
undistorted will of the voters’.40 Accord-
ingly, the Court has regularly nullified such 
ballots at the levels of the Cantons and the 
municipalities in which public authorities 
had interfered by means of unbalanced infor-
mation or distorting propaganda. Pursuant to 
an explicit constitutional provision, howev-
er, acts of both the Federal Assembly and the 
Federal Council remain outside of the scope 
of judicial review.41
In the run-up to each federal ballot, ballot 
papers are mailed to voters together with an 
official information booklet. All information 
contained therein must comply with ‘the 
principles of completeness, objectivity, trans-
parency, and proportionality’.42 The official 
information booklet is an ‘act of the Federal 
Council’, as it is responsible for providing 
for the respective ‘short’ and ‘objective ex-
planation’43 of the referenda and popular ini-
tiatives to be decided upon at the ballot box. 
In a decision of 2011,44 the Federal Court held 
that despite the official information booklet’s 
character as ‘an act of the Federal Council’, 
the Court would still scrutinize the ‘general 
state of information prevailing at the time of 
a popular vote’.45 As the Federal Council’s 
official information booklet plays a crucial 
role in the decision-making process,46 this ef-
fectively amounted to a circumvention of the 
constitutional restrictions on judicial review.
Drawing on the aforementioned case law, the 
Federal Court, on 10 April 2019,47 nullified 
a federal ballot for the first time in Swit-
zerland’s history. The Court’s judgment an-
nulled the federal ballot of 28 February 2016 
on a popular initiative seeking to abolish 
what is commonly referred to as ‘the penalty 
on marriage’. The term describes the phe-
nomenon according to which the tax due for 
married couples and homosexual couples liv-
ing in a registered partnership is determined 
based on the total income and wealth of both 
individuals involved. Due to progressive tax 
rates, the tax levied on individuals joint in 
marriage or registered partnership tend to 
be higher than the tax imposed on two sin-
gle persons in the same situation, provided 
both individuals gain income. In its official 
information booklet, the Federal Council 
estimated that 80,000 couples would be af-
fected by the ‘penalty on marriage’, only to 
correct this figure to 454,000 two years lat-
er. The Federal Court not only deemed the 
previous estimate to be ‘grossly misleading’ 
but assumed that it significantly impacted 
the ‘general state of information prevailing 
at the time of a popular vote’. It nullified the 
ballot as a consequence.
Whereas the Federal Court, with its decision 
of 10 April 2019, strengthened the integrity 
of the process of direct democracy at the fed-
eral level, both the lack of manageable stan-
dards to assess the ‘general state of informa-
tion prevailing at the time of a popular vote’ 
and the circumvention of the constitutional 
limits imposed on judicial review with re-
gard to ‘acts of the Federal Council’ amount 
to a constitutionally unwarranted judicial-
ization of federal politics.
2. Prohibition of ‘Visible Religious Symbols’ 
in Court Hearings
Whereas the Islamic headscarf has featured 
frequently in the case law of Switzerland’s 
highest court, all previous decisions have 
so far related to public schools. In 1997, the 
Court held a prohibition for teachers at pub-
lic schools to wear Islamic headscarves to be 
constitutional both in view of the constitu-
tional commitment of Geneva, the Canton in 
question, to a strict separation of religion and 
state (laïcité) and the teachers’ role repre-
senting the state and thus being bound to re-
main neutral on religious matters.48 In 2015, 
the Court ruled that banning ‘headgear’ in 
general and headscarves in particular for stu-
dents would unconstitutionally infringe on 
their freedom of religion.49 
On 11 March 2019, the Federal Court held 
a mere ordinance issued by the Council of 
Justice of the Canton of Basel-City commit-
ting all court officials (judges and clerks) to 
39 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 34.
40 See, e.g., Swiss Federal Court, BGer., decision BGE 140 I 394 section 8.2 (26 September 2014). Available at: www.bger.ch.
41 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 189 section 4.
42 Federal Act on Political Rights (note 22), article 10a section 2.
43 Federal Act on Political Rights (note 22), article 11 section 1.
44 Swiss Federal Court, BGer., decision BGE 138 I 61 (20 December 2011). Available at: www.bger.ch.
45 See Swiss Federal Court, BGE 145 I 207 (10 April 2019) at section 1.5 (‘…l’état d’information global prévalant au moment d’une votation populaire…’). Available at: 
www.bger.ch.
46 See Alexander H Trechsel and Pascal Sciarini, ‘Direct democracy in Switzerland: Do elites matter?’ (1998), 33 European Journal of Political Research 99, 113-5 and, 
for a contextual assessment, Hanspeter Kriesi, Direct democratic choice: The Swiss experience (Lexington, 2005) 230-9.
47 BGE 145 I 207 (note 45).
48 Swiss Federal Court, BGer., decision BGE 123 I 296 (12 November 1997). Available at: www.bger.ch.
49 Swiss Federal Court, BGer., decision BGE 142 I 49 (11 December 2015). Available at: www.bger.ch; for a critical assessment see Johannes Reich, ‘BGE 142 I 49’ 
(2016), 117 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 369 (available at: https://www.ivr.uzh.ch/en/institutsmitglieder/reich/publikation.html); see 
also Swiss Federal Court, BGer., decision 1C_76/2018 (20 August 2019). Available at: www.bger.ch.
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abstain from ‘wearing visible religious sym-
bols’ during both public pronouncements of 
judgments and court hearings with the par-
ties or the public being present to be constitu-
tional.50 The Court found that the prohibition 
would pursue a legitimate public interest by 
seeking to prevent parties from being giv-
en the impression that court officials would 
be ‘guided by their religious convictions in 
their decision-making process’. The Court 
furthermore stated that the regulation would 
not severely restrict the freedom of religion 
of court officials as it would only apply to cir-
cumstances being strictly limited both in time 
and subject matter, leaving ‘the everyday life’ 
of court officials mostly unaffected. Against 
this backdrop, the prohibition would, accord-
ing to the Court, not only be proportionate but 
rest on a sufficient legal basis. This is uncon-
vincing as firmly held and religiously rooted 
beliefs tend to form part of an individual’s 
self-conception. An obligation to visually dis-
associate oneself from one’s religious convic-
tions when appearing in public even in one’s 
professional life thus amounts to a severe re-
striction of freedom of religion, asking for a 
proper legal basis.
3. No constitutional right to home-school
‘Home-schooling’ – to teach one’s child 
school subjects at home – remains a rare 
phenomenon in Switzerland. In 2012, 
around 500 children were home-schooled, 
representing 0.055 percent of all children 
at compulsory school age.51 Even though 
these numbers may have risen consider-
ably in the meantime, they are most likely 
to have lingered well below the threshold 
of 1 percent. School education is a subject 
matter to be regulated by the Cantons rath-
er than the Federation.52 As a result, 26 dif-
ferent regulations apply to home-schooling 
across Switzerland.53 Despite such varying 
standards, every child has a constitutional 
right to adequate primary education being 
free of charge.54 Primary ‘education’ (not to 
be confused with ‘schooling’) is mandatory 
for all children living in Switzerland on con-
stitutional grounds.55 The Cantons are, at the 
same time, under a constitutional obligation 
to provide for schools allowing for such ad-
equate primary education free of charge.56 
Children furthermore have a constitutional 
right to ‘special protection of their integrity 
and to the encouragement of their develop-
ment’ (best interest of the child).57
In its first leading case on the subject, the 
Federal Court held on 22 August 2019,58 that 
the right to respect for one’s private and fam-
ily life enshrined in both the Federal Consti-
tution and European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) would not grant an individu-
al right to home-school. Regulations enacted 
by the Cantons severely restricting or even 
prohibiting home-schooling are thus, accord-
ing to the Court, in line with both the Federal 
Constitution and the ECHR as long as the 
schools of the respective Cantons provide for 
adequate primary education free of charge. 
Notably, the Court made no mention of the 
constitutional clause protecting the best in-
terest of the child. It thus turned a blind eye 
to the possibility that home-schooling might, 
as an exception and for a limited time only, 
indeed be in a child’s best interest.59
IV. LOOKING AHEAD: POPULAR 
INITIATIVES AS ‘SOCIETAL  
SEISMOGRAPHS’
Popular initiatives, which require only 
100,000 signatures of Swiss citizens to  be 
launched,60 often amount to ‘societal seis-
mographs’, putting issues on the political 
agenda that have been neglected by the po-
litical elites. The popular initiative ‘for more 
affordable housing’, to be decided on 9 Feb-
ruary 2020, sheds light on high rents in some 
Swiss cities, whereas the popular initiative 
‘for moderate immigration’ to be decided on 
17 May 2020 amounts to yet another flirta-
tion with Switzerland turning its back on the 
EU altogether. The initiative seeks to end the 
free movement of people within EU coun-
tries. Continually evaluating the inevitable 
trade-offs between self-governance, democ-
racy, and economic integration will, there-
fore, remain a defining feature of Switzer-
land’s direct democracy in the year to come.
V. FURTHER READING
Oliver Diggelmann, Maya Hertig Randall, 
Benjamin Schindler (eds.), Verfassungsrecht 
der Schweiz – Droit constitutionnel suisse 
(three volumes, Schulthess, 2020)
50 Swiss Federal Court, BGer., decision 2C_546/2018 (11 March 2019). Available at: www.bger.ch.
51Johannes Reich, ‘”Homeschooling” zwischen elterlichem Erziehungsrecht, staatlicher Schulpflicht und Kindeswohl’ (2012), 113 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für 
Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 567, 568, 607-9 (available at: https://www.ivr.uzh.ch/en/institutsmitglieder/reich/publikation.html).
52 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 19. 
53 For an overview of these regulations, see Reich (note 51) 607-9.
54 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 19.
55 See Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 62 section 2. 
56 See Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 62 section 2. 
57 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 11 section 1; for a detailed analysis see Johannes Reich, ‘”Schutz der Kinder und Jugendlichen” als rechtsnormatives und expres-
sives Verfassungsrecht’ (2012), 131(I) Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht 363 (available at: https://www.ivr.uzh.ch/en/institutsmitglieder/reich/publikation.html).
58 Swiss Federal Court, BGer., decision 2C_1005/2018 (22 August 2019). Available at: www.bger.ch.
59 See Reich (note 51) 605. 
60 Swiss Fed. Const. (note 1), article 139 section 1.
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I. INTRODUCTION
2019 was a year of uncertainty in Taiwan’s 
constitutional development. Although there 
was no election – which historically has been 
the impetus for landmark changes in Taiwan-
ese constitutional law and politics – in 2019, 
the constitutional landscape was nonethe-
less shaped in the shadow of elections. On 
the one hand, as reported last year, the local 
elections of 2018 not only shook the ruling 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to the 
core but also portended a tectonic constitu-
tional change with a cluster of controversial 
citizen-initiated referenda under the 2017 
Referendum (Amendment) Act. On the other 
hand, the presidential and general elections 
scheduled for 11 January 2020 undoubtedly 
bore greatly in the minds of constitutional 
players of all political persuasions. Both the 
preceding and the upcoming elections set the 
tone of Taiwan’s constitutional development 
in 2019. 
Against this backdrop, the development 
in 2019 was reactive in character, with the 
legislative arena as the main constitutional 
theater. As will be further discussed, in re-
action to the constitutionally controversial 
and politically divisive referenda aimed at 
curtailing the Taiwan Constitutional Court’s 
(TCC) historic Same-Sex Marriage Case, 
the government introduced legislation both 
to implement the TCC’s ruling on marriage 
equality and to amend the Referendum Act 
again to minimize the impact of referen-
dum politics on elections in the future. To 
propaganda and other forms of interference 
imputed to China, Taiwan’s undeclared en-
emy, which had been blamed for the DPP’s 
election defeat in 2018, the DPP government 
reacted with a series of legislative moves 
to tighten up national security measures to 
avoid repeating the same misfortune in the 
elections to come. 
Paralleling the reactive moves on the legis-
lative front were the seeming constitution-
al routines as manifested in the president’s 
judicial appointments in the anticipation of 
scheduled retirements from the TCC and 
the TCC’s decisions. Routine as they seem 
to be, both non-statutory constitutional de-
velopments, whether they played out in the 
judicial forum or not, were of long-term sig-
nificance in Taiwan’s constitutional develop-
ment in their own right. The constitutional 
story of Taiwan in 2019 starts with the stat-
utory and non-statutory constitutional acts 
playing out in the legislative arena.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. Statutory Enactment and Amendment
The major statutory changes of constitution-
al significance include the implementation of 
the TCC’s Same-Sex Marriage Case, reac-
tive reform on the conduct of referenda, and 
reaction to the interference from external 
hostile forces, which are discussed in order.
a. Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage
As has been reported previously, in the 2017 
Same-Sex Marriage Case – formally styled 
as Interpretation No. 748 in the official case 
report – the TCC issued a suspended reme-
dial order along with a declaration of un-
constitutionality as to the current statutory 
provisions governing the marriage institu-
tion in the Civil Code. Should the Legisla-
tive Yuan fail to legislate same-sex marriage 
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during the two-year remedial grace period, 
the TCC further decreed that the current Civ-
il Code would then be extended to same-sex 
couples who wish to enter into marriage. It 
was also reported last year that to push back 
against the TCC’s declaration of equal pro-
tection of freedom of marriage in respect of 
same-sex couples in the Same-Sex Marriage 
Case, conservative and religious groups ini-
tiated two proposals under the Referendum 
Act as amended in 2017. Specifically, the 
voters were asked to answer, inter alia, the 
following two questions in the referenda 
in December 2018: “Do you agree that the 
marriage provisions in the Civil Code should 
be applicable only insofar as the relationship 
between a man and a woman is concerned?” 
(Referendum Initiative No. 10) and “Do you 
agree to legislate some form of union, other 
than that as referred to in the marriage provi-
sions in the Civil Code, to protect the rights 
of same-sex couples who live together per-
manently?” (Referendum Initiative No. 12). 
With both questions answered in the affirma-
tive, there was little hope that the marriage 
institution as provided for in the Civil Code 
would be directly applicable to same-sex 
couples. Read together, the results of the two 
referendum initiatives were interpreted as 
preventing the provision for freedom of mar-
riage and the corresponding rights in respect 
to same-sex couples through the formal 
amendment of the Civil Code and mandating 
that the prospective legally protected rela-
tionship of same-sex couples be designated 
as something other than marriage. This was 
the line drawn on the subsequent legislative 
bill concerning marriage equality that was to 
be enacted in 2019 as ordered in the Same-
Sex Marriage Case.   
It was no surprise that the results of these 
two controversial referendum initiatives 
as interpreted above were disappointing to 
LGBTQ+ activists and advocates for civ-
il rights and liberties in general. Moreover, 
the exclusion of the marriage designation 
from the legally protected relationship of 
same-sex couples raised concerns about the 
equal protection of freedom of marriage as 
mandated in the Same-Sex Marriage Case 
being unconstitutionally weakened. Despite 
such constitutional concerns, the DPP had 
neither the political capital nor the political 
appetite for opening a new front on the battle 
for marriage equality beyond the scope de-
limited by the TCC after its dismal election 
performance in December 2018. As the two 
anti-same-sex marriage referendum initia-
tives were seen as instrumental in the mobi-
lization of opposition forces in the 2018 lo-
cal elections, the DPP was not prepared to be 
continuously entangled in the issue of same-
sex marriage with the 2020 presidential and 
general elections in sight.  
In reaction to the referendum results, civil 
rights advocacy groups and the DPP gov-
ernment eventually agreed on the osten-
sibly bland statutory title “A Bill for the 
Implementation of J.Y. Interpretation No. 
748,” which was enacted into law on May 
24, 2019. The most salient characteristic of 
“the Act for the Implementation of J.Y. In-
terpretation No. 748” (the Act)1 is not what 
is included but rather what is absent. The 
Act makes no mention of “marriage (婚姻)” 
whatsoever. As regards its legislative pur-
pose, it only states, “[t]he Act is enacted to 
implement the J.Y. Interpretation No. 748” 
(Article 1) without specifying what Interpre-
tation No. 748 is about or what it requires. 
To define the legally protected relationship 
of same-sex couples, Article 2 provides, 
“[t]wo persons of the same sex may form a 
permanent joint relationship of intimate and 
exclusive nature for the purpose of living a 
common life.” Notably, to avoid the implicit 
downgrading of the legally defined relation-
ship same-sex couples enter into under the 
Act vis-à-vis marriage as provided for under 
the Civil Code, the Act does not refer to such 
relationship as “union” or “civil union,” ei-
ther, as they had been considered inferior to 
marriage. Rather, it only provides for “such 
relationships as referred to in Article 2.” 
Despite the absence of references to mar-
riage or civil union, virtually all the rights 
available to heterosexual married couples 
under the Civil Code are replicated in the 
Act or apply, mutatis mutandis, to same-sex 
couples accordingly, except that same-sex 
couples are only allowed to adopt children 
genetically related to one of them. Thus, in 
terms of substance, the Act does satisfy the 
TCC’s requirement for marriage equality 
in the Same-Sex Marriage Case. Moreover, 
same-sex couples who enter into the rela-
tionship as provided for under the Act are 
allowed to register themselves as spouses 
for the purpose of matrimony registration (
結婚登記) as heterosexual married couples 
do under the household registration system, 
although their relationship is not legally des-
ignated as marriage (婚姻). 
b. Amendment to the Referendum Act
After the Referendum Act was amended to 
reduce procedural thresholds to initiate a ref-
erendum and make it binding in December 
2017, ten referenda were held alongside the 
local elections in December 2018. The con-
duct of referenda under the 2018 Referen-
dum (Amendment) Act received severe crit-
icism for several reasons. On the one hand, 
it was blamed for causing a disruptive delay 
in voting with the local elections and the 
referenda held in parallel. Also, it was crit-
icized for failing to make contingency plans 
for issues arising from the coordination of 
the local elections and the unprecedented ten 
parallel referendum initiatives. On the other 
hand, as suggested above, with the expanded 
referendum agenda put on the ballots, divi-
sive issues such as the anti-same-sex mar-
riage initiatives came to fore in the political 
debate and were adopted by political forces 
as a rallying cry for their political base. The 
2018 Referendum (Amendment) Act was 
not only held responsible for contributing to 
the DPP’s electoral misfortune in December 
2018 and curtailing the Same-Sex Marriage 
Case but also questioned for opening the 
door for malevolent populists.  
In reaction, the DPP-controlled Legislative 
Yuan pushed a package of amendments 
1 To be faithful to the spirit of the Act as expressed in its Chinese version, the following English translation of the provisions of the Act is our own. The official English 
translation is available at <https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=B0000008>.
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to the Referendum Act in June 2019. The 
key components of the 2019 Referendum 
(Amendment) Act concern a change in the 
timeframe of conducting referendum initia-
tives. On the one hand, the Central Election 
Commission is given sixty days, instead 
of thirty days, to verify the identity of the 
signees of the referendum initiative (Arti-
cle 10, paragraph 3). On the other hand, it 
is required that the referendum initiative and 
the relevant arrangements (including the 
government position paper in respect there-
of) be gazetted no less than ninety days, in-
stead of twenty-eight days, before voting day 
(Article 17, paragraph 1). By extending the 
timeframe, it is hoped that populist passion 
will cool down and give way to deliberative 
reasoning. Yet, the structural transformation 
in the timeframe is caused by the stipulation, 
“[t]he referendum day is formally scheduled 
to be held on the fourth Saturday of August, 
once every two years starting from [2021]” 
(Article 23, paragraph 1). As a result, no 
referendum will be held alongside ordinary 
elections in the foreseeable future as the 
latter take place in either December (local 
elections) or January (presidential and gen-
eral elections) unless the Legislative Yuan is 
dissolved or a special presidential election is 
required when both the office of the presi-
dent and that of the vice-president become 
vacant. The decoupling of referendums from 
ordinary elections marks a point of departure 
in the development of referenda in Taiwan.
The above changes on the timeframe are con-
troversial. Supporters have rallied around the 
amendment on the grounds that issues to be 
put on referendum ballots require reflection 
and deliberation before a choice is made. 
The extended timeframe and the decoupling 
of referenda from ordinary elections help the 
public to focus on the substance of the ref-
erendum initiatives without succumbing to 
emotion and ideology agitated by election 
campaigns. In contrast, critics raise concerns 
over the disempowering effect of the above 
changes. As reported last year, referendums 
had long been held as the means of mani-
festing Taiwanese sovereignty without hold-
ing an independence plebiscite or formally 
changing the state title. And, mass participa-
tion was regarded as the key to the success of 
referenda. Democratic forces, including the 
DPP, had insisted on holding referendums 
alongside ordinary elections to increase vot-
er turnout until the DPP’s electoral defeat 
in December 2018. Thus, the DPP’s eager-
ness to push through the 2019 Referendum 
(Amendment) Act in the name of delibera-
tive democracy was considered disingenu-
ous, betraying its stance on the sovereignty 
significance of referendums. In sum, the 
game-changing role expected of the 2018 
Referendum (Amendment) Act in Taiwanese 
constitutional law and politics turned out to 
be transitory and was deserted in the 2019 
amendment.  
c. Passage of the Anti-Infiltration Act 
Partly in correspondence to the growing 
concern over the increasingly assertive 
China under President Xi and partly in re-
action to the election results in 2018, the 
DPP government and its parliamentarians 
pushed through a series of legislative bills 
to strengthen Taiwan’s national security vis-
à-vis the interference and infiltration from 
China. It is noteworthy that these statutory 
enactments and amendments were pitched 
as part of the global defense of constitu-
tional democracy against anti-constitution-
alist forces such as populism and totalitar-
ian ideologies. The legislative initiative to 
strengthen national security culminated in 
the passage of the Anti-Infiltration Act on 
December 31, 2019, just less than two weeks 
before the scheduled presidential and gener-
al elections, despite strong objection from 
opposition parties.  
As a complement to existing statutory reg-
ulations, the Anti-Infiltration Act mainly 
focuses on activities such as interference, 
lobbying, disruption of social order, spread-
ing disinformation, and illegal political do-
nations by “external hostile forces” – a eu-
phemism for China – and provides increased 
penalties and longer custodial sentences. Al-
though the objective of the new Act is obvi-
ous and the DDP government has defended it 
as a necessary measure to curb Chinese influ-
ence in Taiwan’s democracy and sovereign-
ty, it still causes concerns about infringement 
of human rights because of its overbreadth 
and vagueness in the text.  
2. Non-Statutory Development in the Legis-
lative Yuan: New Judicial Appointments  
Another development in the Legislative 
Yuan was the confirmation of President Tsai 
Ing-wen’s nominees for the four scheduled 
retirements from the TCC in June 2019. Half 
of the nominees were female, making the 
female justices in the TCC four in total out 
of fifteen. With the four new appointments, 
eleven in total out of the fifteen Justices were 
appointed by President Tsai. As reported last 
year, the voting threshold for constitutional 
interpretation will be substantially lowered 
with the removal of the requirement of a su-
permajority in the Constitutional Court Pro-
cedure Act when it comes into effect in 2022 
as scheduled. Whether a majority of justices 
appointed by the same president under the 
lowered voting threshold after 2022 will 
change the dynamics of constitutional inter-
pretation remains to be seen. The four new 
appointees took office on October 1, 2019.   
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In 2019, the TCC received 627 new peti-
tions for either constitutional interpretations 
(603 petitions, about 96.2%) or uniform in-
terpretation of laws and regulations (24 pe-
titions, about 3.8%). Among these 627 new 
petitions, 563 (about 89.8%) were filed by 
the people, 61 by the courts, and only 3 by 
other governmental agencies. Out of the 627 
new petitions and 637 pending petitions, the 
TCC dismissed 601 and rendered 14 Inter-
pretations (Nos. 774 to 787), including 29 
combined cases.2 About 95.5% of the dis-
missed cases (574 out of 601) were brought 
by the people. Of the 14 Interpretations, only 
one (No. 787) was a uniform interpretation. 
Among the other 13 constitutional interpre-
2 As of the end of 2019, there were a total of 619 pending petitions. For statistics of the TCC’s new and decided cases in 2019, see Statistics of New and Terminated 
Cases of the TCC (in Mandarin), available at <https://www.judicial.gov.tw/tw/lp-1920-1.html>.
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tations, only one (No. 780) upheld the con-
stitutionality of the challenged laws in its 
entirety. The remaining 12 Interpretations 
declared the challenged laws unconstitu-
tional, either in their entirety or in part. In 
terms of decision outcome, the TCC has be-
come more active in striking down unconsti-
tutional laws, following its own path since 
Taiwan’s democratization began in the late 
1980s.
Of the 13 constitutional interpretations, the 
TCC touched upon issues involving vari-
ous subjects. They included pension reform, 
criminal justice, right to judicial remedy, and 
separation of prescribing and dispensing med-
icines, all of which will be discussed below. 
1. Interpretation Nos. 781, 782, and 783: Pen-
sion Reform
Pension reform was one of the top priorities 
on the platform list during Tsai’s presiden-
tial campaign in 2016. Immediately after 
her inauguration, she established an ad hoc 
commission to formulate the details of pen-
sion reform. In August 2016, two legislative 
bills governing the pension scheme of civ-
il servants and public school teachers, re-
spectively, were passed by the Legislative 
Yuan. In June 2018, the third bill governing 
the pension scheme of military personnel 
was also adopted by the legislature. These 
three new laws entered into force beginning 
on July 1, 2018. They lowered the ceiling 
amount for monthly pension payments and 
accordingly reduced the amount of monthly 
payments by a schedule of two (for civil ser-
vants and teachers) or ten (for the military) 
years. But the new laws also installed a new 
floor amount for each category of retirees 
to ensure their standard of living. For those 
incumbents, the new legislations extended 
the age and service length eligible for their 
retirement in the future, and increased the 
rate of their monthly premium contributions 
in order to increase the cash inflow of the 
Pension Funds and to delay projected bank-
ruptcy dates of the Pensions Funds. To af-
ford job opportunities for potential teachers 
of younger generations, the new laws would 
suspend the monthly pension payments of re-
tirees if they were hired as full-time teachers 
or administrative staff by any private school 
and receive a salary beyond the amount of 
statutory base salary.
Tens of thousands of retirees were affected 
by these three new laws. A significant por-
tion of them filed administrative litigations 
against the decisions to cut their individu-
al payments. But none of these complaints 
reached the TCC, as they are required to 
exhaust ordinary remedies first. The opposi-
tion parties soon filed three petitions to the 
TCC challenging the constitutionality of the 
three laws. The TCC held oral arguments on 
June 24 and 25, half a day for each case, and 
rendered three decisions, Interpretation No. 
781 on military personnel, Interpretation No. 
782 on civil servants, and Interpretation No. 
783 on public school teachers, all on August 
23. Judging from the complexity of consti-
tutional issues involved and the magnitude 
of social impact, these three interpretations 
undoubtedly stood out as the representative 
decisions of the TCC in 2019.
In all of the three interpretations, the TCC 
upheld nearly all provisions of the three laws 
except two. The first provision found uncon-
stitutional was the suspension of monthly 
pension payments for being employed by 
private schools as provided for in all three 
laws. The TCC held that the classification 
between private and public schools was 
over-inclusive and the classification between 
private schools and other private organiza-
tions (e.g., corporations and associations) 
was under-inclusive. By applying the stan-
dard of intermediate scrutiny, the TCC de-
clared that such suspension violated the 
equal protection of law and shall be null and 
void immediately after the publication of the 
respective interpretation. 
The second provision found unconstitution-
al concerned fixing the amount of monthly 
pension payment as determined at the time 
of retirement. In the case of a significant rise 
in inflation, the retirees would suffer unpre-
dictable loss in the real value of their pension 
payments. The TCC thus mandated that the 
authorities concerned amend the respective 
legislation as appropriate to provide timely 
adjustments in the amount of monthly pen-
sion payments in the future.
Taken together, these three interpretations 
on pension reform indicated the majority of 
the TCC did adopt a more lenient standard of 
review for adjudicating the constitutionality 
of the three laws. Under this standard, the 
TCC recognized most of the purposes or in-
terests (e.g., sustainable operation of the re-
spective pension funds, generational justice, 
and protection of the reliable expectation of 
those incumbents) asserted by the govern-
ment were either legitimate or even import-
ant. On the review of means, the TCC also 
found most means (e.g., lowering the ceiling 
amount for monthly pension payments, pro-
gressive reduction in the amount of monthly 
payments within two or ten years, install-
ment of the floor amount for each category 
of retirees, and extension of the retirement 
age and service length eligible for the incum-
bents’ retirement in the future) bore a ratio-
nal relationship to the respective legitimate 
governmental purpose.
2. Interpretation Nos. 775 and 777: Criminal 
Justice
The TCC rendered two Interpretations touch-
ing upon the issues of criminal law. In Inter-
pretation No. 775, it declared unconstitution-
al Article 47 of the Criminal Code, imposing 
a mandatory increase of up to one-half of the 
principal punishment (e.g., imprisonment). 
This was the first Interpretation that found 
the provision of the Criminal Code uncon-
stitutional, though the TCC has already de-
clared unconstitutional several provisions 
of special criminal statutes or regulations, 
e.g., the “Act for Eliminating Hoodlums” 
(Interpretation 636) and “Disciplinary Mea-
sures for the Prevention of Repeat Offenses 
by Communist Espionage Criminals during 
the Period of National Mobilization for the 
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” 
(Interpretation No. 567). In Interpretation 
No. 775, the TCC held the increased punish-
ment for recidivists did not violate the dou-
ble-jeopardy principle, as the increased pun-
ishment only applied to repeated criminal 
offenses instead of the original offense, and 
the legislature may take into account such 
repetition of criminal offenses in determin-
ing the range of punishment. However, the 
TCC held such increased punishment might 
produce evident excessive harshness as ap-
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plied to non-serious violations, and therefore 
violated the principle of proportionality. 
The other Interpretation on criminal law is-
sues was No. 777. This one declared anoth-
er provision (Article 185-4) of the Criminal 
Code partly unconstitutional. Article 185-
4 provides that any person who flees after 
the motor vehicle he or she was driving has 
caused an accident resulting in death or in-
jury of another shall be sentenced to impris-
onment for not less than one year but less 
than seven years. The TCC held that the 
term “has caused an accident” was void for 
vagueness, as the average person would not 
be able to understand whether this provision 
also included accidents that were not caused 
as a result of the driver’s intention or negli-
gence. This Interpretation further found that 
the sentencing range of between one and 
seven years’ imprisonment was also uncon-
stitutional in part, because the judges were 
not allowed to convert the imprisonment 
sentence into a fine in a case of non-serious 
violation. Such minimal sentence of one-
year imprisonment might produce evident 
excessive harshness, and therefore violated 
the principle of proportionality.
3. Interpretation Nos. 774, 784, and 785: 
Right to Judicial Remedy
In 2019, the TCC rendered three Interpreta-
tions on the right to judicial remedy. Inter-
pretation No. 774 expanded the application 
of Interpretation No. 156 of 1979 to the 
parties suffering damages as a result of any 
specific modification in an urban plan, even 
if such parties’ property is located outside of 
the urban plan in dispute. In Interpretation 
Nos. 784 and 785, the TCC finally broke 
the spell of special power relationships 
(besonderem Gewaltverhältnis) by allow-
ing school students of any level and civil 
servants, respectively, to bring administra-
tive litigations against a school or the gov-
ernment. Interpretation No. 784 explicitly 
overturned Interpretation No. 382 of 1995, 
which allowed students to bring administra-
tive litigations against their schools only in 
cases of an expulsion or similar action that 
would alter a student’s status as a student. In 
Interpretation No. 785, the TCC also cleared 
civil servants’ access to judicial remedies 
for any infringement of their rights or inter-
ests. However, the TCC adopted a different 
approach in Interpretation No. 785 to reach 
a similar conclusion. Without expressly 
overturning its previous interpretations on 
similar issues, e.g., Interpretation Nos. 243 
of 1989, 298 of 1992, and 323 of 1993, the 
TCC held that any civil servant should be 
granted the right to bring an administrative 
litigation against any government action 
infringing upon his or her rights, since the 
Administrative Litigation Act (amended in 
October 1998 and entered into force in July 
2000) has in fact allowed such litigation. 
If the said reasoning of Interpretation No. 
785 is sustainable, then the approach taken 
in Interpretation No. 784 would be wrong, 
or unnecessary, in overturning the previous 
Interpretation. In the view of Interpretation 
No. 785, Interpretation No. 382 should have 
become obsolete and lost its legal effect after 
the enactment of the Administrative Litiga-
tion Act in July 2000.  
4. Interpretation No. 778: Separation of Pre-
scribing and Dispensing Medicines 
Interpretation No. 778 was a rare decision on 
the issue of dispensing separation. Taiwan’s 
health care system is considered one of the 
best in the world. It provides universal, af-
fordable, efficient, and good-quality health 
care service to all Taiwanese and eligible 
foreigners. Since the introduction of the 
Western medical system in the early 1900s, 
physicians in Taiwan have been allowed to 
dispense and sell medicines to their patients 
without the assistance of pharmacists. Begin-
ning in 1997, two years after the establish-
ment of the current health care system, the 
government started to implement a policy of 
dispensing separation, city (county) by city 
(county). Not surprisingly, this policy has 
been resisted by physicians. An obstetrician, 
after being fined for dispensing medicines 
to her patient, brought a petition to the TCC 
and challenged the authorizing provision of 
the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act and its imple-
mentation regulations. In this interpretation, 
the TCC held the law itself is constitutional, 
but found the emergency exception clause 
provided by the Implementation regulations 
unconstitutional for adding new restrictions 
on the physicians beyond the authorization 
of the said Act.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
2019 may have been election-free, but it was 
cast in the shadow of elections. Apart from 
the elections in Taiwan, the district elections 
in Hong Kong and the general democrat-
ic movement in reaction to the aborted ex-
tradition bill also played a role in Taiwan’s 
changing constitutional landscape. The 
election campaign leading to the 2020 presi-
dential and general elections was influenced 
by Hong Kong’s civil resistance vis-à-vis 
Beijing. Undoubtedly, the result of the 2020 
elections will be shaped by what happened 
in 2019 in Taiwan and Hong Kong, with 
wide implications for Taiwan’s constitution-
al landscape in 2020. Looking ahead, anoth-
er development outside electoral politics is 
worth noting. The Transitional Justice Com-
mission is expected to publish a comprehen-
sive report on transitional justice in 2020 
unless its mandate is renewed. 
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THAILAND
I. INTRODUCTION
The first half of 2019 witnessed a time of tran-
sition. After five years in power and follow-
ing the coup it staged on 22 May 2014, the 
National Council of Peace and Order (NCPO) 
allowed the first general election to be held 
since 2014, and it proved to be one of the most 
eventful in modern history. Experts agreed 
that the election was by no means a return to 
democracy. Indeed, it marked the junta’s at-
tempt to transform the regime from one of a 
traditional military dictatorship to a competi-
tive authoritarian system. The junta employed 
every possible tactic to give itself an edge. The 
2017 Constitution was prepared by the junta, 
which also appointed its sympathizers in all 
the key positions. Furthermore, the election 
was rife with accusations of fraud, with the 
Election Commission (EC) refusing to take 
any action. The election result itself was in-
conclusive, yet the EC intervened in favour of 
the junta. In sum, a combination of unfair rul-
ings and biased umpiring brought the NCPO 
electoral victory at the price of democratic 
backsliding. The second half of 2019 saw the 
NCPO make several attempts to consolidate 
its power by invoking several constitutional 
provisions to dismantle the opposition. Most 
notably, the Future Forward Party, which po-
sitioned itself as being very anti-coup, faced 
a number of frivolous lawsuits that could in 
the near future eventually lead to its disso-
lution. Meanwhile, the NCPO government 
repeatedly showed blatant disregard towards 
the constitutional mandate and acted with im-
punity. The Constitutional Court’s reluctance 
in reviewing the case against the government 
starkly contrasted with its eagerness to scruti-
nize the government’s foes. This discrepancy 
has long been a characteristic of Thailand’s 
decade-long political crisis. Under the contin-
uation of this repressive regime, civil rights 
continue to suffer. Security forces continue 
to suppress political activities while assaults 
on activists were reported. At the same time, 
pressure to amend the present Constitution is 
growing. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Democracy continues to decline, adhering 
to the trend that began since the 2014 coup 
d’etat. The 24 March 2019 election was the 
first under the 2017 Constitution after several 
delays. However, the election did not restore 
democracy as claimed by drafters of the 2017 
Constitution. The NCPO leader simply used 
the election as a ritual to transform himself 
from that of a traditional military dictator to 
an elected autocrat.1 This whitewashing was 
possible because the NCPO had total control 
over preparation for the election. It closely 
monitored the drafting of the Constitution, 
making sure that the rules would work in its 
favour. Furthermore, it appointed sympathiz-
ers into key institutions that oversaw the elec-
tion, including the Election Commission (EC) 
and the Constitutional Court.2  
The election fell somewhere in the middle of 
the ideological cleavage between the pro- and 
1 Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, ‘Constitutionalizing Autocracy: A General Election Under Thailand’s 20th 
Constitution’, International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog (16 March 2019) at <http://www.iconnectblog.
com/2019/03/constitutionalizing-autocracy-a-general-election-under-thailands-20th-constitution/> accessed 
29 January 2020.
2 ‘ส่ีปี คสช. ใช้มาตรา44 + สนช. เข้ายึดองค์กรอิสระได้เบ็ดเสร็จตามใจ’ [Four years under the NCPO, Section 44 and 
NLA have absolute control over independent agencies], iLAW (15 November 2018) at <https://ilaw.or.th/
node/4808> accessed 29 January 2020.
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anti-dictatorship camps.3 The NCPO set up a 
proxy party, the Phalang Pracha Rath Party 
(PPRP), to compete with the anti-junta front, 
co-led by Pheu Thai (PT) and the Future For-
ward Party (FFP). Although Prime Minister 
Prayuth was not a member, PPRP showed 
strong support for him, with his own ministers 
running the party.4 The name Phalang Pracha 
Rath itself is the name of the NCPO’s main 
economic policy that copied Thaksin’s pop-
ulist style.
The 2017 Constitution adopted a mixed-mem-
ber apportionment electoral system whose 
main beneficiaries are small-sized parties, 
such as the PPRP. A single ballot deter-
mines both 350 constituency and 150 party 
list MPs.5 Total seats are determined by the 
overall votes that the party receives. Seats are 
first given to candidates who win in constitu-
encies. The remaining quota is then allocated 
to party list candidates. Thus, the more seats a 
party wins in a constituency system, the fewer 
seats it will get in a party list system. How-
ever, smaller parties may not win in any con-
stituency but still be allocated party list MPs.6 
In addition to the electoral design, the EC 
proved unfit to uphold a free and fair election. 
The NCPO and PPRP engaged in cheating 
and violations of election law, with no conse-
quences. While other parties were still under 
a ban, under the pretext of economic relief, 
the NCPO toured the country handing out 
cash and other benefits as well as promising 
more goodies if the PPRP was elected.7 The 
PPRP organized a fund-raising gala dinner 
where several business entities and govern-
ment agencies donated hundreds of millions 
of Thai Baht, clearly breaching donation 
rules.8 The NCPO even postponed the elec-
tion by a month to have additional time to 
channel more cash into the PPRP’s bases. The 
EC ruled out any wrongdoing in these cases 
and many others, its inertia contrasting with 
its enthusiasm in hounding the PPRP’s rivals. 
Election day was rife with complaints, partly 
due to the EC’s incompetence. Overseas bal-
lots arrived late and the EC discarded them en-
tirely.9 Undertrained staff mis-instructed vot-
ers, resulting in wasted ballots.10 Tallying was 
so full of errors that the EC ordered it to stop 
in the middle of the night, triggering specula-
tion of fraud.11 In some constituencies, the EC 
ordered up to five recounts, all with differing 
winners.12 But poor performance was also due 
to the EC’s prejudice. While the EC withheld 
election results for over a month, the main is-
sue was the method used to calculate party list 
MPs. The law here was ambiguous, so the EC 
enjoyed vast discretion. Finally, the EC arbi-
trarily adopted a calculation most generous to 
smaller parties, assigning them one MP each 
even though their votes did not amount to 
one full MP. The EC deducted these MP seats 
from the major parties. Such absurd calcula-
tions upended the pro-democratic coalition, 
which lost several MPs to small single-MP 
parties who, as expected, joined the PPRP 
coalition.13 Finally, the Constitutional Court 
refused to rule on the constitutionality of the 
EC’s interpretation.14 
Another player helping the NCPO complete 
its transition was the Senate. A special provi-
sion in the Constitution dictates that, for the 
first five years, the 250-strong Senate be ap-
pointed by the NCPO, with six seats reserved 
for armed forces commanders.15 This first 
Senate is allowed to vote on prime minister 
selection jointly with the Lower House. Un-
surprisingly, the NCPO filled the Senate with 
friends and colleagues, the majority of whom 
were army generals.16 Of the 500 votes in fa-
vor of Prayuth as the PM in the joint session, 
249 were from the cronyistic Senate, and only 
251 were from the Lower House.17 
In sum, experts agreed that Thailand was de-
volving into an illiberal democracy, referred 
to as a Thai-style democracy.18 The term was 
used in the 1970s as an alternative to liberal 
3 Duncan McCargo, ‘Southeast Asia’s Troubling Elections: Democratic Demolition in Thailand’ (2019), 30 Journal of Democracy 119, 124-125.
4 Siripan Nogsuan Swasdee, ‘Electoral Integrity and the Repercussions of Institutional Manipulations: The 2019 General Election in Thailand’ (2019), Asian Journal of 
Comparative Politics, 5-6.
5 2017 Constitution, sec. 85-86. 
6 See Siripan, Electoral Integrity, 3-4, 7-10. 
7 Jacob I. Ricks, ‘Thailand’s 2019 Vote: The General’s Election’ (2019), 92 Pacific Affairs 443, 450. Asian Network for Free Elections, The 2019 Thai General Election: A 
Missed Opportunity for Democracy (ANFREL, 2019) 77-75.
8 ‘Activist Wants Palang Pracharath Donations Probed’, Bangkok Post (19 January 2019) at <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/1614138/activ-
ist-wants-palang-pracharath-donations-probed> accessed 29 January 2020. 
9 ‘1,500 ballots from New Zealand invalidated after late arrival’, Bangkok Post (24 March 2019) at <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/1650428/1-500-bal-
lots-from-new-zealand-invalidated-after-late-arrival> accessed 29 January 2020; see ANFREL, 86.
10 ANFREL, 81, 84.
11 Siripan, Electoral Integrity, 11.
12 ANFREL, 56. 
13 Ricks, Thailand’s 2019 Vote, 448.
14 Const Ct Decision 6/2562 (2019): Const Ct Order 16/2562 (2019).
15 2017 Constitution, sec. 269. 
16 Ricks, Thailand’s 2019 Vote, 449.
17 ‘Prayuth officially chosen as Prime Minister of Thailand’, Prachatai (6 June 2019) at <https://prachatai.com/english/node/8081 https://prachatai.com/english/
node/8081> accessed 29 January 2020. 
18 In addition to McCargo and Ricks cited above, see, for example, Pravit Rojanaphruk, ‘Thailand’s Democratic Dictatorship’, DW (6 June 2019) at <https://www.
dw.com/en/opinion-thailands-democratic-dictatorship/a-49082008> accessed 29 January 2020.
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democracy. Thai-style democracy offered a 
regime with regular, but only ritualistic, elec-
tions where the army, the Senate, or the judi-
ciary tightly controlled, manipulated, or even 
intervened in politics through the claim of 
protecting national interest.19 Developments 
in the second half of 2019 provided further 
credence to such observation.   
The Prayuth government showed little regard 
to the Constitution. Prayuth was actually in-
eligible as PM because of his position in the 
NCPO. In further disregard, he appointed a 
former drug trafficker who had been jailed in 
Australia as a Cabinet member.20 He also de-
liberately avoided swearing his allegiance to 
the Constitution during the inauguration cer-
emony. Regardless of the controversies, the 
Constitutional Court endorsed the legality of 
his actions.21  
There is little change under the Prayuth admin-
istration. Human rights have suffered as usu-
al.22 Political activists were murdered and as-
sailed.23 Security forces intimidate any political 
gathering, including climate change protests.24 
They virtually enjoy absolute impunity.
The conservatives’ next goal is to consoli-
date its power further by eradicating the op-
position. The main target is the FFP, which 
they have charged with several lawsuits. The 
FFP was a rising star, modelled after several 
left-leaning parties in Europe, therefore mak-
ing it the biggest threat to the right-wing na-
tionalists.25 In what is described as ‘lawfare’, 
the PPRP, the EC, and their supporters filed 
several frivolous lawsuits, mostly accusing 
the FFP of violating electoral law and being 
disloyal to Thainess.26 
This is the beginning of another episode of 
crisis. The 2017 Constitution did not tackle 
any underlying problems; instead, it fueled 
them: an unaccountable judiciary and watch-
dog agencies, presence of the army, a crony 
Senate, the exaggerated problem of corrup-
tion as a pretext for authoritarianism, and a 
weak, fractious House that hinders effective 
public administration.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The Constitutional Court remains one of 
the most significant allies of the NCPO. It 
consistently ruled in favor of the pro-junta 
camp while punishing its rivals. Inevitably, 
the Constitutional Court faces accusations 
of bias, which render its decisions unreliable 
for pro-democratic Thais. However, there is 
no accountability mechanism to be enforced 
upon the judiciary, leaving many greatly 
frustrated. Worse, the judiciary began to si-
lence its critics with a new law authorizing 
the Constitutional Court to punish those who 
made unfavorable comments.27 One academic 
has been summoned so far. A few cases be-
low have been picked as the highlights of the 
Court’s 2019 case law. 
(1) Constitutional Court Decision 3/2562: 
Political Party Ban 
According to the 2017 Constitution, a politi-
cal party must nominate in advance up to three 
PM candidates.28 Candidates may or may not 
be their MPs, a provision that allows Prayuth 
to run as a PM candidate without becoming a 
member of the PPRP. Shortly prior to election 
day, Thai Raksa Chat (TRC), another proxy 
party of Thaksin Shinawatra, nominated Prin-
cess Ubolratana. 
The eldest daughter of the late King Bhumi-
bol, Ubolratana relinquished her title decades 
ago to marry an American. Although she has 
never been given her title back, she still enjoys 
royal perks such as a motorcade, attendance at 
royal functions, and being addressed as Her 
Royal Highness. It appeared that Thaksin was 
about to exploit the ambiguity of her status to 
combine the sacredness of the royal family 
with his strong popular political network. The 
amalgamation would have silenced his critics 
while gaining him an avalanche of support.29 
Meanwhile, some observers of Thai politics 
dreaded that the deal could have brought 
about the collapse of the constitutional mon-
archy, establishing a neo-absolute monarchy. 
The campaign was short-lived as the conser-
vatives were furious after learning that the 
palace may have been making a deal with 
their enemy.30 A few hours later, King Vaji-
ralongkorn, Ubolratana’s brother, issued a 
19 See Kevin Hewison and Kengkij Kitirianglarp, ‘Thai-Style Democracy: The Royalist Struggle for Thailand’s Politics’, in S. Ivarsson and L. Isager (eds.), Saying the 
Unsayable: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2010). 
20 Michael Ruffles and Michael Evans, ‘From Sinister to Minister: Politician’s drug trafficking jail time revealed’, The Sydney Morning Herald (9 September 2019) at < 
https://www.smh.com.au/national/from-sinister-to-minister-politician-s-drug-trafficking-jail-time-revealed-20190906-p52opz.html> accessed 29 January 2020. 
21 Const. Ct. Decision 11/2562 (2019).  
22 See Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2019 report for Thailand at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/thailand. 
23 ‘ผู้ล้ีภัยทางการเมือง: คนเห็นต่าง หรือพวกหนักแผ่นดิน’ [Political Refugees: Dissenters or Worthless Humans], BBC Thai (2019) at <https://www.bbc.com/thai/extra/
Y0IB3TQXys/thai_exiles> accessed 29 January 2020; Thammachart Kri-aksorn, ‘Fallout from assault against Sirawith; no police protection unless activism ends’, 
Prachatai (10 July 2019) at <https://prachatai.com/english/node/8131> accessed 29 January 2020. 
24 ‘Police Order Bangkok Climate Protest to Disperse’, Khaosod English (29 November 2019) at <http://www.khaosodenglish.com/politics/2019/11/29/police-order-
bangkok-climate-protest-to-disperse/> accessed 29 January 2020. 
25 McCargo, Democratic Demolition, 127.
26 Piyabutr Saengkanokkul [From Warfare to Lawfare], Facebook Official Fanpage (4 November 2019) at <https://www.facebook.com/PiyabutrOfficial/photos
/a.2260340760916461/2529105320706669/?type=3&theater> accessed 29 January 2020. 
27 Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, ‘The Thai Constitutional Court’s War on Freedom of Expression’, New Mandala (14 November 2019) at <https://www.newmandala.
org/the-thai-constitutional-courts-war-on-freedom-of-expression/> accessed 29 January 2020. 
28 2017 Constitution, sec. 160. 
29 McCargo, Democratic Demolition in Thailand, 128-129. 
30 Id., 129. 
2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 347
proclamation condemning the deal and forbid-
ding his sister from such activity.31 The TRC 
promptly withdrew her nomination but the EC 
asked the Constitutional Court to ban the TRC.
The Constitutional Court found that the 
TRC’s nomination could potentially be hos-
tile to Thailand’s democratic regime with the 
king as the head of the state, an offence un-
der Section 92 of the Political Party Organic 
Act B.E. 2560 (2017). It referred to the first 
Constitution of 1932, which prohibited senior 
royal members from being involved in pol-
itics. The clause was later removed, but the 
Court insisted it had become a convention, 
and a fundamental principle of Thailand’s 
constitutional monarchy. Nomination would 
attract criticism, and eventually hatred of the 
royal family. Ubolratana is still a member of 
that family, despite her stepping down. Thus, 
the Constitutional Court dissolved the TRC.
The Constitutional Court also revoked the po-
litical rights of TRC executives for ten years. 
The law was not explicit about the political 
ban or the length of it. In the 2007 Constitu-
tion, a party executive could get banned for 
up to five years.32 In the 2017 Constitution, 
a party executive is only barred from taking 
an executive position in another party for 
ten years.33 The Court carefully reviewed the 
case, admitting that the TRC had acted out of 
negligence and shown remorse for the mis-
take. Still, it imposed the ten-year ban, a mea-
sure which could be seen as arbitrary. 
It is debatable whether the TRC’s nomination 
amounted to an act ‘potentially hostile to the 
democratic regime with the king as the head 
of the state’ as prescribed by the law. More-
over, does a potentially hostile act deserve a 
ban even if the damage did not materialize? 
It is also doubtful whether the Constitution-
al Court has the authority to impose a ban so 
severe without an explicit mandate from a 
written law. Many believe that the dissolution 
was simply to get rid of the TRC, enabling an 
easier victory for the PPRP in the upcoming 
election. Political party dissolution has only 
been invoked since the 2006 coup, which was 
backed by royalist conservatives.34 The mea-
sure is regarded as a tool to thwart or weaken 
democratic movements.
Ironically, while the Constitutional Court in-
sisted that the decision would help uphold the 
status of the royal family to be politically su-
per partes, other circumstances suggested that 
it actually confirmed the role of the monarchy 
in politics, as mentioned above: the palace an-
nouncement, the EC’s prompt response, and 
the harsh punishment for TRC’s daring deal.  
 
(2) Constitutional Court Order 36/2562: 
Failure to Complete a Constitutional Proce-
dure  
The Cabinet’s inauguration was prescribed 
by the Constitution, including taking an oath 
before the king or his representatives.35 How-
ever, this supposedly simple procedure was 
problematic when Prayuth disobeyed the pro-
tocol. In front of the king, he pledged that he 
would serve with honesty, for the interest of 
the country and its people, forever. He omitted 
the last part of the oath about upholding and 
following the Constitution while adding for-
ever into his oath.36 It appeared that the mis-
take was deliberate, as his script was prepared 
as such. There was an uproar about what his 
intention was, but the PM refused to provide 
any explanation, insisting that the inaugura-
tion was complete.37 The opposition tried to 
have a censure debate on the issue.38 Howev-
er, the king appeared supportive of the PM’s 
actions, granting the Cabinet an audience and 
a printed speech giving them support.39 
There is no channel to directly challenge the 
legality of the inauguration so a complaint 
was lodged to the Ombudsman stating that 
failure to properly take the oath posed a risk 
that any subsequent act of the Cabinet was 
void, therefore jeopardizing a claimant’s 
rights as a citizen. 
The Constitutional Court rejected the case, rea-
soning that an oath was a political issue, or an 
act of government, which was not subject to ju-
dicial review. This decision is problematic for 
two reasons. First, an act of government con-
sists of a purely political act when a Cabinet 
acts in a capacity as the executive branch. Gen-
erally accepted examples of an act of govern-
ment include a decision to dissolve the House, 
a declaration of war, and a decision to enter 
into a treaty. Taking an oath is not one of them.
Another reason for rejection was that, at the 
end of the decision, the Constitutional Court 
elaborated further that the king had already 
accepted the oath. The issue was thus beyond 
scrutiny by anybody. Although the Constitu-
tional Court did not make an explicit state-
ment, it was implying that the Constitution 
was not the supreme law of the land and that 
it could be exempted under particular cir-
cumstances. Is it possible that there is anoth-
er body more supreme than the Constitution 
since it could rule on an exception? 
The oath-taking case was also a reminder, and 
perhaps a harbinger, of what may happen in 
the coming year.40 When the supremacy of 
the Constitution is undermined, even the most 
simplistic task may be ignored. No drafter has 
foreseen such a problem, so there is no chan-
nel to review or redress it.     
31 Id. 
32 2007 Constitution, sec. 237.
33 Organic Act on Political Party B.E. 2560 (2017), sec. 94 para 2.
34 See Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, ‘Thailand: An Abuse of Judicial Review’, in Po Jen Yap (ed.), Judicial Review of Elections in Asia (Routledge, 2016). 
35 2017 Constitution, sec. 161. 
36 Thammachart Kri-aksorn, ‘Oath Error: recapping case that shakes government’, Prachatai (13 September 2019) at <https://prachatai.com/english/node/8212> 
accessed 29 January 2020. 
37, 38, 39 Id.
40 Nidhi Ewosriwong, ‘หน้าใหม่ของประวัติศาสตร์ไทย’ [New Episode of Thai History], Prachatai (29 September 2019) at <https://prachatai.com/journal/2019/09/84547> 
accessed 29 January 2020; Kasian Tejapira, ‘ระบบนิรนาม’ [The Regime with No Name], Matichon Online Newspaper (22 September 2019) at <https://www.matichon-
weekly.com/column/article_249336> accessed 29 January 2020. 
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(3) Constitutional Court Decision 14/2562: 
Conflict of Interest 
 
Since 2007, Thai Constitutions have prohibited 
an owner or shareholder of a media business to 
take public office. This ban was proposed on 
the assumption that Thaksin Shinawatra, whose 
background was a telecommunications tycoon, 
misused his business to influence the public. 
The law was intended to guarantee the rights 
of Thais to have access to impartial, honest, 
and professional media, but it had never been 
invoked. Moreover, in reality, many newspa-
pers and TV stations clearly had ties with either 
left- or right-wing political groups. The quality 
of Thai journalism has remained questionable.
During the campaign period, one FFP candi-
date was accused of running a media business. 
In reality, the candidate owned a printing shop 
but his memorandum of association (MOA) 
contained an objective of running a media 
business. A MOA is a document stating the de-
tails and nature of one’s business entity given 
to an owner once he registers his business with 
the Ministry of Commerce. A widespread prac-
tice, even encouraged by the registrar itself, is 
for a company to register as many objectives as 
possible for the sake of flexibility. The standard 
MOA as provided by the registrar contains a 
wide range of objectives including operating 
as both a massage parlor and private hospital. 
However, the Supreme Court strictly followed 
a document-based approach and disqualified 
him.41 The case sets a very awkward standard 
for other politicians whose companies have 
also used the same standard MOA form. How-
ever, the only real victim of the media share 
law was the FFP leader, Thanathorn Juang-
roongrueangkit.
Thanathorn was accused of holding shares in 
V-Luck Media. The defunct company used to 
publish a lifestyle magazine but was now no 
longer in business. Thanathorn argued that he 
had already transferred the shares to his mother 
prior to registering for an election, but the EC, 
whose evidence was supplied by right-wing 
media, decided to pursue a case against him. 
The Constitutional Court then issued Thana-
thorn a temporary suspension so he could not 
attend a joint session to vote for PM, where he 
would surely have voted against Prayuth.42  
Thanathorn tried to argue that the company 
was already out of business, but the Consti-
tutional Court adopted a document-based ap-
proach here too. As V-Luck was not officially 
dissolved, there was always the chance that it 
could return to the media business.
The main issue was when did Thanathorn 
transfer shares to his mother? Did he miss the 
deadline set by the EC? As the norm, in a pri-
vate company such as V-Luck, the transfer is 
made when both parties sign a private share 
transfer instrument, so there is no way outsiders 
will know the exact date. Later, the change in 
share-holding is then registered with the Depart-
ment of Business Development. However, the 
registration is required only once or twice a year, 
so it does not reflect the actual transaction.
Although the Constitutional Court found no 
evidence suggesting otherwise, it dismissed 
Thanathorn’s evidence of share transfer based 
solely on doubt; that the paperwork was too neat 
and too unreal; that Thanathorn left a cheque 
longer than normal business practice; and that 
the business plan looked unrealistic. The judges 
seemed to be asserting their personal preference 
in Thanathorn’s case even though none had any 
business background. The Constitutional Court 
disqualified Thanathorn as an MP. 
Thanathorn’s case was compared to a previ-
ous case, that of Don Pramudwinai, a Foreign 
Minister in Prayuth’s Cabinet. His wife was 
also accused of owning shares, an offence 
that could have disqualified her husband 
due to conflict of interest. Don claimed that 
the transfer took place some time ago but his 
wife’s staff member was slow to prepare the 
relevant documents and register the transfer. 
Many people suspected that the document 
was only forged after the case emerged. How-
ever, the Constitutional Court was willing to 
give her the benefit of the doubt.43
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
As the government continues to consolidate 
its dominance, the Constitutional Court re-
mains a crucial partner in subordinating the 
opposition. There are several more lawsuits, 
on campaign finance and treason, currently 
filed against the FFP. Five of the nine Con-
stitutional Court judges were due to retire 
last October but the Senate has been unusu-
ally slow in recruiting successors. The current 
panel, some members of which have been 
serving for more than a decade, is known for 
its hostility towards elected politicians. The 
delay is possibly intentional.  
In response to the government’s harassment, 
citizens have begun to exercise their consti-
tutional rights to public assembly and politi-
cal expression44  More anti-government mass 
gatherings are set to be held in the coming 
months. It remains to be seen how faithful 
the government will honor civil rights. The 
movement to amend the current Constitution 
is brewing.45 The number of Thais demanding 
a new electoral system that could produce a 
fairer outcome in the next election is growing. 
40 Nidhi Ewosriwong, ‘หน้าใหม่ของประวัติศาสตร์ไทย’ [New Episode of Thai History], Prachatai (29 September 2019) at <https://prachatai.com/journal/2019/09/84547> 
accessed 29 January 2020; Kasian Tejapira, ‘ระบบนิรนาม’ [The Regime with No Name], Matichon Online Newspaper (22 September 2019) at <https://www.matichon-
weekly.com/column/article_249336> accessed 29 January 2020. 
41 ‘Abuse of media share law a growing concern’, Bangkok Post (27 April 2019) at <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/1668132/media-share-minefield> 
accessed 29 January 2020.
42 ‘Court suspends Thanathorn from MP’, Bangkok Post (23 May 2019) at <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/1682696/court-suspends-thanathorn-
from-mp> accessed 29 January 2020. 
43 Const Ct Decision 5/2561 (2018).
44 Caleb Quinley, ‘Thousands of Thanathorn backers rally against Thai establishment’, Al Jazeera (14 December 2019) at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/
thousands-thanathorn-backers-rally-thai-establishment-191214134451210.html> accessed 29 January 2020. 
45 Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, ‘Undoing Authoritarianism: Thailand’s Campaign to Amend the 2017 Constitution’, International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog (8 
January 2020) at http://www.iconnectblog.com/2020/01/undoing-authoritarianism:-thailand’s-campaign-to-amend-the-2017-constitution/> accessed 29 January 2020.
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THE NETHERLANDS I. INTRODUCTION
The Netherlands is a parliamentary democra-
cy and constitutional monarchy. The king, as 
head of state, operates under the full political 
responsibility of the ministers. Proportional 
representation is used for electing both hous-
es of Parliament, the provincial councils, and 
municipal councils. The Netherlands is one 
of four countries in a quasi-confederal struc-
ture called the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
It consists of the ‘European’ Netherlands, and 
the Caribbean islands of Aruba, Curaçao, and 
Saint Maarten. Three smaller islands, Bonaire, 
Saint Eustatius, and Saba, are overseas public 
bodies within the decentralized organization 
of the European Netherlands. Distinctively, 
Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution forbids 
the constitutional review of Acts of Parliament 
by the judiciary. At the same time, Articles 93 
and 94 of the Constitution acknowledge the 
direct applicability of international law that is 
binding on all persons, granting it precedence 
over national law. Consequently, fundamental 
rights protection is mainly based on the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
This report first addresses three major consti-
tutional developments in part II, namely the 
response of the government to the recommen-
dations of the State Commission to strength-
en the parliamentary system, evolutions with 
regard to militant democracy as a response 
to criminal activities of outlaw motorcycle 
gangs, and the establishment of a temporary 
parliamentary committee on the digital future. 
Part III discusses court cases with a constitu-
tional impact that are relevant to an interna-
tional audience: the judgment of the Supreme 
Court (i.e., the Court of Cassation) on 20 
December 2019 in the Urgenda case on cli-
mate change, and the judgment of the Central 
Appeals Tribunal on 15 May 2019, in which 
the Tribunal adopted the judicial framework 
to review automated decision-making as de-
veloped by the Council of State in 2017 and 
2018. We conclude the report in part IV with 
some upcoming events.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
1. State Commission
In June 2019, the government announced that 
it was preparing legislative proposals aimed at 
strengthening parliamentary democracy.1 The 
announcement was a response to an extensive 
report (384 pages) published in December 
20182 by a ‘State Commission’: an advisory 
body established by Royal Decree in 2017 to 
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tary system. Besides assessing the powers and 
activities of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, the State Commission also cov-
ered other aspects of representative democra-
cy as well as the rule of law and formulated 83 
recommendations for strengthening both. In 
its response, the government announced the 
implementation of 11 of the Commission’s 
recommendations, including electoral system 
reform, the adoption of a Political Parties Act, 
a new election method for the Senate, and a 
revision of the formal constitutional amend-
ment procedure. 
The reform of the electoral system aims to 
improve the representation of the people. Ac-
cording to the current system, voters can only 
cast a vote for a specific person on an elec-
toral list. These lists are compiled by political 
parties and typically headed by party leaders. 
The Commission suggested a new elector-
al system in which citizens either vote for a 
specific candidate on an electoral list (pref-
erential vote) or vote for the electoral list as 
a whole (party vote). As a result, preferential 
votes will carry more weight than the case is 
now. The government endorsed this sugges-
tion, believing that under the new system vot-
ers will identify themselves more with their 
representatives because it will be easier for 
their preferred candidate to obtain a seat in 
Parliament. Not only should this strengthen 
the citizens’ feeling that their votes actually 
matter but it should also foster the represen-
tation of as many political opinions in Parlia-
ment as possible. 
The proposed adoption of the Political Parties 
Act aims to bring together the rules on politi-
cal parties. Political parties play a crucial role 
in Dutch democracy but are not mentioned in 
the Constitution. They are, however, subject-
ed to different regulations; for example, to the 
Civil Code (political parties are associations 
and therefore qualify as private legal entities) 
and to the Political Parties Funding Act. The 
Political Parties Act would probably com-
prise new rules on prohibiting political par-
ties; transparency rules relating to income and 
expenditure on behalf of election campaigns 
of political parties and individual candidates, 
including the already existing rules laid down 
in the Political Parties Funding Act; rules on 
digital election campaigns of political parties; 
the maximum limit for gifts to political par-
ties and individual candidates; and amend the 
rule currently laid down in the Elections Act 
(Art. G1(1)) that political parties must be an 
association.
The proposed new election method for the 
Senate aims to ‘depoliticize’ it. The Parlia-
ment consists of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate. The House of Representatives 
counts 150 members that are elected direct-
ly by national citizens, whereas the Senate 
counts 75 members who are elected by pro-
vincial councils. These elections take place 
every four years and, as a consequence, the 
term for all members of Parliament (thus of 
both Houses) is four years. As a result, the 
Senate may obtain a more recent mandate 
than the House of Representatives during a 
government period, which could cause fric-
tion between the two Houses and between the 
government and the Senate. The government 
has therefore proposed that members of the 
Senate be elected for six years instead of four, 
and that half of the seats be contested every 
three years. As a result, changes in the politi-
cal party landscape during a government pe-
riod would only have an indirect and delayed 
effect on the composition of the Senate. An 
additional argument in favour of this election 
method is that the elections for the provincial 
councils might no longer be captured by na-
tional opposition parties campaigning against 
the national government but instead revolve 
around actual provincial matters.
Lastly, the government wants to change the 
constitutional amendment procedure. The 
Dutch Constitution is rather rigid. A consti-
tutional amendment needs to be adopted by 
an ordinary majority in both Houses in the 
first reading and a two-thirds majority in 
both Houses in the second reading. The latter 
takes place after the members of the House 
of Representatives have been newly elected. 
The government wants to change the amend-
ment procedure in the second reading. It is 
not for the explicit aim to make constitutional 
amendment easier, but to avoid the possibility 
under the current procedure that 26 out of 75 
senators block a constitutional amendment, 
even if a two-thirds majority of the directly 
elected House of Representatives supports the 
amendment. The government therefore wants 
both Houses to convene in a joint session 
when voting on the constitutional amend-
ment in the second reading. A constitutional 
amendment would still require a two-thirds 
majority in its favour of votes cast in both 
Houses sitting together. 
Next to these envisaged changes, the govern-
ment is still considering seven of the other 
recommendations that the State Commission 
proposed in December 2018. It concerns, in-
ter alia, the introduction of a binding referen-
dum, the lifting of the ban on constitutional 
review of legislation by the judiciary, lower-
ing the voting age to 16 years, and the power 
for the Senate to ‘send back’ a legislative bill 
to the House of Representatives if the Senate 
feels the House of Representatives should re-
consider the bill. 
2. Militant democracy
In recent years, outlaw motorcycle gangs 
(OMGs) have served as major vehicles for or-
ganized crime in the Netherlands. Members of 
Hells Angels, Satudarah, Bandidos, No Sur-
render, and other gangs have been involved 
in the production and trafficking of cannabis, 
hard drugs, synthetic drugs, and weapons as 
well as human trafficking, related violence, 
and other criminal activities. These crimes are 
regarded as ‘subversive’ because the criminal 
activities of these organizations not only pen-
etrate the licit economy but also undermine 
public trust in authorities and the rule of law 
in general since administrative and judicial 
authorities – until recently – have been inca-
pable of effectively combating them. 
Mayors in particular faced difficulties due 
to these problems. According to the Munic-
ipal Act, mayors have a general responsibil-
ity for safeguarding public order and safety 
within their municipality. They are usually 
the first to be confronted with the activities 
of criminal organizations, and with the need 
to react. Mayors have used various adminis-
trative powers to combat OMGs, such as re-
fusing permits, orders to close down buildings 
when evidence of drug trafficking is found, 
and temporary orders limiting the freedom 
of movement of specific groups of people. 
Nevertheless, mayors have no truly effective 
powers to dismantle criminal organizations 
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on a national level, which is why many of 
them have joined in an urgent call for national 
action and more effective legal instruments to 
tackle the issue.
Until 2017, however, courts were reluctant 
to dissolve and prohibit organizations, valu-
ing the freedom of association over the need 
for repressive measures. Although Article 
2:20 of the Civil Code provides courts with 
an instrument to dissolve and prohibit a le-
gal person whose activities or statutory goals 
violate public order, associations were rarely 
dissolved and prohibited. Most prominent 
examples are the dissolution and prohibition 
of a racist political party by the District Court 
in Amsterdam in 1998, and of an association 
called Martijn, which aimed to promote the 
social acceptance of sexual relations between 
adults and children, by the Supreme Court in 
2014 (ECLI:NL:HR:2014:948).
The reluctance of courts to restrict the freedom 
of OMGs is demonstrated by the failed attempt 
to dissolve and prohibit the Dutch chapter of 
the Hells Angels in 2009. The Supreme Court 
decided that the criminal actions of individu-
al members of Hells Angels could not be at-
tributed to the association as a whole (ECLI:N-
L:HR:2009:BI1124). The Court also argued 
that the dissolution and prohibition would be 
disproportionate and would therefore consti-
tute an unlawful interference with the freedom 
of association, as protected under Article 8 of 
the Constitution and Article 11 ECHR.
Worried by the lack of effective instruments to 
combat OMGs, several MPs drafted a bill in 
November 2018 (Parliamentary Documents 
No. 35 079) that would grant the Minister of 
Interior Affairs the power to prohibit and dis-
solve criminal organizations. This would en-
able a faster response to criminal activities of 
criminal organizations, subject to ex post ju-
dicial review. However, the Council of State, 
Advisory Division, vehemently criticized the 
bill in April 2019. The Council questioned the 
necessity of the proposed instrument and con-
tested that it would be a swifter method to stop 
criminal activities, as the minister would have 
to prepare a case with sufficient diligence for 
it to successfully pass judicial scrutiny. The 
bill is still awaiting parliamentary debate.
Subsequently, in 2019, a government bill was 
drafted to sharpen Article 2:20 of the Civil 
Code. It specifies which activities or statutory 
goals violate public order, and therefore war-
rant a court decision to dissolve and prohibit 
an organization. Furthermore, it aims to regu-
late some of the consequences of a prohibition 
in order to prevent individual members from 
simply moving their activities to a new orga-
nization. The bill (Parliamentary Documents 
No. 35 366) was introduced in Parliament on 
18 December 2019 and will probably be de-
bated in 2020.
Nonetheless, the question should be posed 
whether new legislation is necessary. In the 
past two years, district courts have become 
more active in order to protect constitu-
tional democracy from subversive crime. 
They have adopted a new interpretation of 
Article 2:20 of the Civil Code and ruled in 
cases against OMGs from 2017 to 2019 that 
organizations that ‘stimulate and uphold a 
culture that promotes and glorifies criminal 
activities and violence’ may be dissolved 
and prohibited. This new interpretation has 
led to the actual dissolution and prohibition 
of various OMGs, such as Bandidos in 2017 
(ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2017:6241), and Sat-
udarah and Catervarius in 2018 (ECLI:N-
L:RBDHA:2018:7183 and ECLI:N-
L:RBMNE:2018:113, respectively). In 2019, 
courts moreover dissolved and prohibited the 
Dutch chapters of Hells Angels and No Sur-
render (ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2019:2302 and 
ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2019:2445, respective-
ly). Although some of these cases are still 
pending appeal, the fact that district courts 
have become more militant towards OMGs 
in order to protect constitutional democracy 
from subversive crime is indeed a striking 
development.
3. Parliamentary grip on digitization
On 2 July 2019, the House of Representatives 
established a temporary parliamentary com-
mittee on the digital future in order to get a 
better grip on fast-growing developments in 
digitization, such as the use of algorithms and 
AI, in many sectors of the economy, society, 
and government functioning.  The House of 
Representatives seeks to create frameworks, 
stimulate developments, and determine 
boundaries in this regard. Most importantly, 
Parliament aims to reflect on its own internal 
organization in order to effectively deal with 
digital evolutions in society.
The committee mainly inquires how Parlia-
ment can better use its right to be informed 
to enhance access to information in the field 
of digitization in order to get control of pos-
itive and negative digital evolutions given its 
duties to check government and co-legislate. 
In order to answer this main question, three 
sub-questions have been formulated. The first 
is which digitization issues require the House’s 
attention and why. The second is which les-
sons can be learned from the current practice 
of the House and from other countries, and 
which methods or assessment frameworks 
can be adopted. The third addresses which 
instruments, contents, and organizational and 
institutional arrangements for the House are 
necessary to get a better grip on digitization. 
The committee aims to present its report and 
recommendations in April 2020.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Urgenda: climate change
On 20 December 2019, the Supreme Court 
delivered its judgment in the Urgenda case on 
climate change (ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2006). 
The matter originated in the District Court 
of The Hague, judgment of 24 June 2015 
(ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145), after it was 
appealed before the Court of Appeal of The 
Hague, judgment of 9 October 2018 (ECLI:N-
L:GHDHA:2018:2591). The Supreme Court 
rejected the state’s arguments, thereby con-
firming the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
which again confirmed the judgment of the 
District Court. Urgenda and its claim will be 
addressed first, after which the judicial route 
of this private law case starting in the District 
Court will be summarised.
3 See https://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/members_of_parliament/committees/tcdt.
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The plaintiff, Urgenda, is a Dutch foundation 
established in 2008, the name being a contrac-
tion of ‘urgent’ and ‘agenda’. The foundation 
originated from the Dutch Institute for Tran-
sitions (Drift) at Erasmus University Rotter-
dam. Urgenda’s stated aim is to achieve a fast 
transition to a sustainable society. It brought 
the case on its own behalf, and on behalf of 
886 individuals in whose interests it acted. 
Urgenda lodged 10 claims against the state 
in the District Court, the most important for 
present purposes being that the state would 
act unlawfully should it fail to reduce or have 
reduced the annual emission of greenhouse 
gasses in the Netherlands by 40%, or at least 
by 25%, by the end of 2020 when compared 
to emissions in 1990 (the base year). The state 
only pursued a policy of achieving a reduction 
of at least 20% in the context of its Europe-
an Union membership, while previously the 
country pursued a reduction of at least 30%.
The judgment of the District Court ordered 
the state to limit the annual emission of green-
house gasses in the Netherlands by at least 
25% by the end of 2020 when compared to 
the base year. The figures in Urgenda’s claim 
were taken from the recommendation made 
in the Fourth Assessment Report by the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) in 2007 for so-called Annex I parties 
(of which the Netherlands is one). The IPCC 
is an intergovernmental organisation of the 
United Nations entrusted with assessing sci-
ence related to climate change. The recom-
mendation was made in order to prevent a 
global temperature rise of 2 degrees Celsius 
when compared to the period before industri-
alisation. By 2050, a reduction of 80% to 95% 
was advised. 
The District Court held that the Netherlands’ 
UN/international (and EU) climate commit-
ments resulted in duties between states, and 
not in commitments, which are legally en-
forceable before a national court. Instead, the 
District Court relied on private law. The state 
had to achieve a reduction of at least 25% to 
avoid acting unlawfully based on the Civil 
Code provision on tort law (Article 6:162). 
By not achieving the lower end of the recom-
mendation in the fourth IPCC report, the state 
would violate its duty of care to prevent dan-
gerous climate change. In arriving at this con-
clusion, the District Court used constitutional, 
international, and EU law sources indirectly 
as interpretative aids to apply open-ended na-
tional (private) law standards and concepts in-
cluding ‘social proprietary’, ‘reasonableness’, 
and the ‘general interest’. This meant inter-
national law had a so-called ‘reflex effect’ in 
national law. 
The Court of Appeal confirmed the District 
Court’s order, albeit for different reasons. The 
Court of Appeal allowed the order based on 
Article 2 (the right to life) and Article 8 (the 
right to respect for private and family life) 
ECHR. These rights were recognised as sub-
jective and enforceable according to Articles 
93 and 94 of the Constitution. The Court of 
Appeal emphasised the state’s positive obliga-
tions under these rights in environmental cases, 
finding they would be violated if the state did 
not pursue a reduction of at least 25%.
The Supreme Court – which only considers 
legal and not factual questions – agreed with 
the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court not-
ed that climate change posed a ‘real and im-
mediate risk’, warranting positive action from 
the state to protect Articles 2 and 8 ECHR. 
This action was also required by Article 13 
ECHR, enjoining the state to provide an ef-
fective national remedy in protecting ECHR 
rights. The Supreme Court held that no legal 
questions arose which warranted an advisory 
opinion from the European Court of Human 
Rights based on Protocol 16 ECHR. More-
over, questions related to judges stepping into 
the political domain, thereby raising separa-
tion of powers issues, could not prevent the 
order, as courts are duty bound to keep the 
state to its legal obligations. Important in this 
regard is that the order only legally requires 
the state to achieve the 25% reduction, leav-
ing the way in which this is achieved (for in-
stance through specific measures and legisla-
tion) to the state’s discretion.
2. Judicial review of algorithmic or automat-
ed decision-making
On 17 May 2017 (ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:1259) 
and 18 July 2018 (ECLI:NL:HR:2018:1316), 
the Council of State, Administrative Jurisdic-
tion (one of the four highest administrative 
courts), ruled on the programme for assess-
ment of nitrogen deposition that used the 
AERIUS software system. AERIUS enables 
algorithmic-driven, partially automated deci-
sion-making regarding activities that emit ni-
trogen. In the landmark judgment of 17 May 
2017, the Council of State developed, for the 
first time, a specific judicial framework to re-
view automated decision-making, adopting 
transparency and readability requirements 
for (partially) automated decision-making. 
In order to guarantee equality of arms be-
tween parties, the Council of State ruled that 
in this case the ministers and state secretary 
are obliged ‘to make the choices, the used 
data and assumptions public, fully, in a time-
ly manner and on their own initiative so that 
these choices, data and assumptions are ac-
cessible to third parties in a suitable manner’, 
implicitly based on the duties of due diligence 
and reason-giving. According to the Council, 
this complete, timely, and adequate availabil-
ity of data must enable parties to assess the 
choices made and the data and assumptions 
used and to have them assessed or if neces-
sary challenged, so that effective legal protec-
tion against decisions based on these choices, 
data, and assumptions is possible. As a result, 
the judge would be able to check the legality 
of these decisions. 
In its ruling of 18 July 2018, the Council of 
State refined this framework of judicial re-
view by making a distinction between custom 
input data and standard input data. The gov-
ernment must make custom input data, i.e., 
individual data, entered by the users them-
selves, on its own initiative available on paper 
or otherwise observable as data relating to the 
case pursuant to Article 8:42 of the General 
Administrative Law Act. This is necessary for 
interested parties to determine whether they 
want to initiate an administrative appeal or 
judicial appeal, and to be able to contest the 
accuracy of the data used, calculations made, 
and the assumptions, choices, and decisions 
based on them. The obligation to make data 
available on its own initiative does not au-
tomatically apply to the standard input data, 
which are independent of the specific case.
Following the landmark judgment of the 
Council of State of 17 May 2017, the Su-
preme Court conformed its case law to this 
review framework in its judgment of 17 
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August 2018 (ECLI:NL:HR:2018:1316). Fi-
nally, on 15 May 2019, the Central Appeals 
Tribunal also explicitly adopted the Council 
of State’s framework to review automated 
decision-making. One can situate these judg-
ments within a broader debate on the use of 
algorithms in society and in particular on the 
use of algorithms to support or automate de-
cision-making of administrative authorities, 
leading to ensuing complexity and the dangers 
of a so-called ‘black box’. This might clash 
with general principles of good administration, 
such as the duty of reason-giving and due dil-
igence, which could ultimately also hamper 
effective judicial review. In order to break the 
latter’s vicious circle, the Council of State has 
started to develop a review framework based 
on transparency and readability requirements. 
In the near future, it will be up to Parliament to 
enact specific legislation on algorithmic deci-
sion-making or, in the absence thereof, admin-
istrative authorities will have to operationalize 
the general principles of good administration 
themselves in order to meet the established 
transparency and readability requirements, 
which will require a ‘by design’ approach. 
As a result, software developers, government 
lawyers, and policy-makers will have to work 
together already in the very early stages of soft-
ware development to turn the ‘black box’ into 
a ‘glass box’ that meets the case law require-
ments adopted by the highest administrative 
courts in the Netherlands.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In 2020, the government will introduce mea-
sures to strengthen parliamentary democracy 
and articulate its vision on the relationship 
between forms of direct democracy and 
representative democracy. A constitutional 
amendment initiated by an MP to introduce a 
binding referendum awaits parliamentary de-
bate as well as a proposal to criminalise sexu-
al street harassment, which would restrict the 
freedom of expression. In the SyRI case, the 
Court will reach a verdict on whether the re-
course to data-driven surveillance techniques 
for welfare fraud detection by the government 
complies with human rights and privacy pro-
tection standards. After the preliminary ruling 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
in March 2019 (ECLI:EU:C:2019:189), the 
Council of State will reach a final verdict in 
Tjebbes e.a. on the question of whether the 
minister lawfully refused passport renewal of 
Dutch citizens possessing a second national-
ity of a non-EU country since the refusal re-
sulted in the loss of EU citizenship. 
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Elections shaped the 2019 constitutional 
agenda in Tunisia. We can qualify 2019 as the 
year of the constitutional revolution, and like 
any revolution, it witnessed ups and downs: 
from a failure to create some of the needed in-
stitutions for democracy, to a youth electoral 
contestation over policy and decision-making 
results, to a radical change that shook both 
political figures and parties in Tunisia. The 
government initiated a proposal to change the 
electoral law, and the draft was approved by 
the Parliament and the Temporary Author-
ity for the Control of the Constitutionality 
of Draft Laws. The interim president at the 
time unconstitutionally aborted the attempt to 
change the electoral law. 
After the death of the president in power, 
Tunisia managed to show the world that a 
democratic and peaceful power transition was 
possible in an Arab country. The Parliament 
declared the position of the president open 
and the electoral management body set the 
presidential elections in motion. In Septem-
ber, the country held its second democratic, 
free and transparent elections under the Con-
stitution of 2014.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
In May 2019, a proposal to change the election 
law was made by the government’s bloc in the 
Tunisian National Assembly. Several political 
parties, figures and civil society organizations 
objected to the proposed amendments, as they 
considered them unconstitutional and harm-
ful to political diversity in the Assembly since 
they set an electoral threshold of 3%, which 
damaged the small parties. Several candi-
dates, including Olfa Terras Rambourg, Abir 
Moussi and Nabil Karoui, considered the 
amendments a violation of their constitutional 
right of candidacy.1 Subsequently, on June 18, 
2019, the government bloc formed a consen-
sus with the Islamist party Ennahda, and they 
passed the law with a majority of 128 votes. 
By June 24, 51 deputies challenged the con-
stitutionality of the amendments before the 
Temporary Authority for the Control of the 
Constitutionality of Draft Laws. The Tempo-
rary Authority ruled in favour of the amend-
ments in one of its more controversial rulings 
since its creation.2  
The disputed judgment brought back the de-
bate over the Tunisian Constitutional Court, 
as the Tunisian Constitution, in Article 118, 
grants Tunisia a constitutional court, man-
dated mainly to oversee the constitutionality 
of its laws. The creation of this independent 
constitutional body was to take place within 
one year of the 2014 elections.
The Parliament has failed to elect the needed 
members of the Court since the elections of 
2014,3 except electing Judge Raoudha Wer-
sighni in 2018.
1 Digital Tunisia: [online]  Available from: https://ar.tunisienumerique.com [Accessed 1 Jan 2020]
 تاباختنالاب قلعتملا نوناقلا نأشب مدقملا نعطلا الصأ ضفرتو الكش لبقت نيناوقلا عيراشم ةيروتسد ةبقارمل ةيتقولا ةئيهلا :قورشلا 2
[AlChourouk [online] Available from: http://www.alchourouk.com/article/ [Accessed 30 Jan 2020 .ءاتفتسالاو
 [Kapitalis , [online .تاوصألا نم بولطملا ددعلا ىلع نيحشرملا نم يإ لصحت مدع :ةيروتسدلا ةمكحملا ءاضعأ باحتنإ :Kapitalis سنوت ءابنأ 3
Available from: http://www.kapitalis.com/anbaa-tounes/2019/07/10/ [Accessed 30 Jan 2020]   
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On June 27, 2019, then-President Beji Caid 
Essebsi had a severe health crisis,4 and ac-
cording to Article 84 of the Constitution, the 
competent body to declare a void in the Pres-
ident’s position is the Constitutional Court. 
Its absence led the country into the unknown, 
as the President’s deteriorating health con-
dition and resulting political vacuum came 
with two terrorist attacks in the capital, Tu-
nis. A week later, President Essebsi left the 
hospital and signed a decree calling voters to 
the polls for 2019 elections.5
The deteriorating health of the acting pres-
ident at the time pressured the National As-
sembly to speed up the elections of Consti-
tutional Court members; thus, on July 10, 
2019, the chairman of the Tunisian Parlia-
ment6 called for a plenary session to choose 
four members of the Court. As stipulated in 
paragraph 2 of Article 118, the Parliament 
shall appoint 4 among the 12 members of the 
Court. The Parliament failed again, as none 
of the candidates managed to receive the re-
quired number of votes stipulated in Article 
11 of the organic law N° 50-2015 of Decem-
ber 2015 related to the Constitutional Court. 
The article specifies that the four Court 
members need to be elected by a two-thirds 
majority, which corresponds to 145 votes.
Two weeks after the plenary parliamentary 
session, on July 25, the President passed 
away without the Constitutional Court in 
place, which would have been the competent 
body to acknowledge the permanent vacan-
cy and notify the Assembly’s speaker so he 
could take the oath as interim president. The 
country was facing a constitutional void and 
an unknown fate due to the negligence of 
its ruling elites. From a political angle, the 
irresponsible and unreasonable lack of con-
sensus between the political blocs in the Par-
liament made it difficult to appoint any of the 
existing candidates. From a technical angle, 
the impossibility of meeting the candidacy 
criteria set by the organic law of the Consti-
tutional Court limited the range of persons 
who qualified.
To avoid any form of political tension, and to 
keep the power transition with the Constitu-
tion, the Temporary Authority for the Control 
of the Constitutionality of Draft Laws acted 
as the constitutional court despite being con-
stitutionally incompetent. It acknowledged 
the vacuum and directed the head of the As-
sembly of the Representatives of the People 
– the speaker of the Assembly – to take the 
oath and address the people as the interim 
president.7 In its 63rd year, the Republic of 
Tunisia was hailed as the only successful 
post-Arab uprising country to make a dem-
ocratic and very smooth power transition in 
exceptional constitutional conditions.
The Electoral Commission announced that the 
presidential election would be pushed up, and 
the date was fixed at September 15 in compli-
ance with the deadlines set by the Constitution.8 
Tunisia held its third set of elections as a 
democratic state since 2011. According to 
the supreme Independent High Authority 
on Elections, Tunisia’s election-govern-
ing body, September’s presidential election 
witnessed an increase in voter numbers by 
a half-million from previous local elections. 
The number of candidates reached 97, among 
them 11 women. The Authority retained 26 
candidates for the first round, among them 
two women. This election also witnessed the 
candidacy of the first openly gay candidate 
in a Muslim country, but it was rejected be-
cause of the non-conformity of his ‘popular 
support’ form.9
On October 6, the parliamentary election 
took place. Only 41% of the registered vot-
ers voted, 8% lower than the first round of 
the presidential election.10 As no candidate 
won a majority in the presidential election, 
a runoff was held on October 19 between 
the two top candidates, Kais Said and Nabil 
Karoui. The conservative constitutional law-
yer Kais Said won with 73% of the vote.
To sum up, we can consider 2019 the year 
of democratic consolidation, and that dem-
ocratic rule is on the rise in Tunisia despite 
all the earthquakes that the constitutional 
framework has witnessed.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The Tunisian Constitution of 2014 estab-
lished the most advanced constitutional 
framework in the region. It contains the first 
limitation clause in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA). The Constitution had 
been in force for six years, but unfortunately, 
as mentioned above, one of the key institu-
tions to protect, implement and interpret it is 
still missing.
4 BBC News, Tunisia President Beji Caid Essebsi has ‘severe health crisis’ [online], available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48790068  [Accessed 30 
Jan 2020].
5 Tunisia Africa Press Agency:  Caid Essebsi says decree calling voters to polls signed, TAP [online], available from: https://www.tap.info.tn/en/Portal-Poli-
tics/11614704-caid-essebsi-says [Accessed 31 Jan 2020].
[Truths online, [online]  Available from: https://www.hakaekonline.com/article/106613  [Accessed 30 Jan 2020  ةيروتسدلا ةمكحملا ءاضعأ ةيقب مويلا بختني ناملربلا :نايال نوأ قئاقحلا  6
7 AlChourouk [online] Available from:http://www.alchourouk.com/article/ [Accessed 31 Jan 2020]
8 Middle East Online, Tunisian Parliament speaker sworn in as interim president [online], available from: https://middle-east-online.com/en/tunisian-parliament-speak-
er-sworn-interim-president [Accessed 31 Jan 2020].
9 According to Article 74 of the Tunisian Constitution, each candidate must have the support of 10 members of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People 
or heads of the elected local authority councils, or 10,000 registered voters from 10 different electoral circumscriptions. The application form of Mr. Mounir Baatour 
contained the names of 30,000 citizens declaring their support for his candidacy. However, the Electoral Commission was unable to verify the legitimacy of support as 
voters’ signatures were missing.
10 Mosaïque, L’ISIE annonce le taux de participation aux législatives, Mosaïque FM [online], available from: https://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/legislatives/618704/l-isie-an-
nonce-le-taux-de-participation-aux-legislatives [Accessed 31 Jan 2020].
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We must acknowledge the Temporary Author-
ity for the Control of the Constitutionality of 
Draft Laws and the Administrative Tribunal, 
which declared itself a constitutional judge in 
the absence of the Constitutional Court.
The most important event in 2019 was the 
attempt by both judges to apply the propor-
tionality principle, which had been incor-
porated in Article 49 of the Constitution, in 
their decisions. 
1. Al-sharfi v. The Elections Commission: 
Right to candidacy
In this case, following a miscommunication 
between the officer in charge receiving the 
candidacy files of the lists to check their 
conformity and seriousness before adding 
them to the electoral lists, as specified in the 
Electoral Commission Decision N° 16-2014 
of August 1, 2014, related to the rules and 
conditions of candidacy of legislative elec-
tions. The officer was unable to verify the 
existence of the candidate Anas Kadoussi in 
the commission headquarters due to its over-
crowding. This resulted in the unacceptance 
of the candidacy of the Social Democratic 
Union list in Tunis II circumscription.
The list, represented by its head, sued the lo-
cal election commission. Decision N° 2019-
2023 of the Administrative Tribunal con-
firmed the commission decision. An appeal 
was submitted by the list to review the court 
decision and they presented a statement from 
the head of the commission confirming the 
signature and existence of Anas Kadoussi on 
registration day and within the deadlines.
The court ruled that the decision of the com-
mission was an unreasonable limitation to 
the right to candidacy of the list, and that the 
commission’s failure to include the name of 
the candidate in the electoral list compro-
mised the essence of the list’s right. It or-
dered the modification of the electoral lists 
to include the Social Democratic Union list 
in Tunis II circumscription.
2. Decision N° 04-2019 of 8 July 2018: Deci-
sion of Temporary Authority for the Control 
of the Constitutionality of Draft Laws on the 
amendments of the Elections Law
On June 18, 2019, the government’s bloc in 
the Parliament and their allies managed to 
pass a law to change the Elections Law five 
months before the elections.
This law raised much concern in Tunisian 
political, legal and civil society. Fifty-one 
deputies in the Tunisian Parliament signed a 
demand to challenge the constitutionality of 
the amendments before the Temporary Au-
thority for the Control of the Constitutional-
ity of Draft Laws, contesting several articles 
within this law. The first instituted an elec-
toral threshold of 3%, which is considered 
by the deputies as harmful to political diver-
sity in the Assembly, damaging small parties 
and institutionalizing the big parties’ control 
over the political scene in Tunisia.
The second article of the draft set some ex-
clusionary criteria and conditions, as the pro-
posal made it mandatory for every candidate 
to present a clean criminal record certificate. 
Also, Article 20a ordered the Electoral Com-
mission to refuse the candidacy in legislative 
and presidential elections of anyone who 
had enjoyed any activity or publicity pro-
hibited for political parties. This article was 
considered an attempt to exclude Olfa Terras 
Rambourg and especially Nabil Karoui, the 
second candidate in the runoff of the presi-
dential election.11
Article 42 of the proposal was considered an 
unreasonable limitation to the liberty of ex-
pression and a violation of Section 49 of the 
Tunisian Constitution, as it states: 
The independent high authority for elec-
tions rejects the candidacies of all those 
who prove explicitly and repeatedly an 
expression of speech that:
Does not respect the democratic system, 
the principles of the Constitution and 
the peaceful alternation in the exercise 
of power and threatens the republican 
system and pillars of the rule of law.12 
Despite all the contestations and the petition 
signed by national and international civil 
society in Tunisia, the Temporary Author-
ity for the Control of the Constitutionality 
of Draft Laws accepted the demand of Par-
liament members. Still, it ruled in favour of 
the proposal in one of its most controversial 
decisions. According to Temporary Authori-
ty members, the crucial political context of 
the country forced them to approve the draft 
law despite all the concerns raised. The gov-
ernment explained these amendments as an 
attempt to fight money laundering, as sev-
eral political actors, including Nabil Karoui 
and Olfa Terras Rambourg, have used a legal 
loophole to get foreign financing for their 
political ambitions through forming associa-
tions. In Tunisia, it is prohibited for political 
parties to obtain external funding. Regard-
less of the political context, the Temporary 
Authority was convinced that these activities 
were a violation of the equality principle. 
Also, the conditions of the clean criminal re-
cord and the income report were considered 
reasonable and proportional with the govern-
ment’s objectives of combatting tax evasion 
and money laundering.
 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Given the political context, it is essential for 
Tunisia as a newly established democracy to 
complete its institutional framework – the 
Constitutional Court; an independent consti-
tutional commission, such as a human rights 
commission; a good-governance commis-
sion; and others. It is also essential to review 
the Tunisian legal framework to assure its 
conformity to the new democratic standards 
set by the 2014 Constitution. Accordingly, it 
is crucial to build the capacity of the state’s 
institutions to help them adapt to the new re-
11 Middle East Online, Tunisia: Dispute over amendment of election law months before elections [online], available from: https://www.middleeastmonitor.
com/20190614-tunisia-dispute-over-amendment-of-election-law-months-before-elections/ 
12 Article 19, Tunisia: Latest amendments to Electoral Law are unconstitutional and violate the right to freedom of expression [online], available from: https://www.
article19.org/resources/tunisia-latest-amendments-to-electoral-law-represent-are-unconstitutional-and-violate-the-right-to-freedom-of-expression/ 
2019 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 357
ality of the country, which will help to create 
a modern, democratic and free society.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A wise man once said: ‘Just when you think 
things cannot get any worse, they will.’ The 
year 2019 was such a dramatic year for Tur-
key. The agenda was as loaded as ever. In 
early 2019, the stinging defeat of the ruling 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 
the municipal elections made international 
headlines. The main opposition Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) managed to record 
a resounding victory by winning mayoral 
elections in the country’s three largest cit-
ies – Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. The AKP 
and the right-wing Nationalist Movement 
Party (MHP) lodged an extraordinary ap-
peal with the Turkish Supreme Board of 
Elections seeking the cancellation of the Is-
tanbul polls due to alleged irregularities. In 
a rather controversial decision, the Turkish 
electoral board decided to annul and renew 
the metropolitan election in Istanbul that 
saw the CHP’s candidate Ekrem Imamoğlu 
winning the mayoral position. In June 2019, 
the AKP suffered another blow as Imamoğ-
lu massively increased his majority. In the 
aftermath of the March 2019 elections, the 
arrests and arbitrary dismissals of demo-
cratically elected mayors affiliated with the 
Kurdish movement continued apace. Since 
last year’s elections, more than 30 elected 
mayors of the pro-Kurdish People’s Demo-
cratic Party (HDP) were removed (under the 
usual terrorism pretext) and replaced with 
government-appointed trustees. Moreover, 
Turkey’s military ‘Peace Spring’ operation 
in Syria also attracted a lot of international 
attention.
Most importantly, the full entry-into-force 
of Turkey’s new presidential system in July 
2018 and its over one-year implementation 
received the most attention and shaped much 
of the constitutional agenda of the country 
in 2019. This chapter first zooms in on the 
implementation of Turkey’s new presidential 
system, as it was the most important consti-
tutional development in 2019. It then reports 
on the cases of the Turkish Constitutional 
Court (TCC) during that year under three 
categories, and finally looks ahead to sever-
al important issues that will arise next year, 
including possible vacancies in the TCC and 
interesting pending cases.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
As noted above, much of the constitutional 
debates in 2019 concerned the implementa-
tion of Turkey’s new presidential system. One 
of its most notable features is the power of the 
President to issue decrees. While the constitu-
tional amendments made clear that such de-
crees can only be issued on executive matters 
outside the areas that remain the prerogative 
of the Parliament, in practice, they regulated 
a broad range of social and economic policy 
issues, including restructuring public admin-
istration, making key public appointments, 
introducing major economic policies, estab-
lishing new agencies and offices, and merging 
ministries and other institutions. Moreover, a 
closer examination of presidential decrees re-
veals that they serve as a means of shortening 
legislative procedure. Since the presidential 
system took force on 9 July 2018, the Parlia-
ment has reportedly passed 53 pieces of leg-
islation whereas the President has issued 55 
executive decrees.1 When contrasted with the 
number of pieces of legislation approved by 
1 ‘Son 29 yılın en işlevsiz Meclisi,’ BirGün, 21 January 2020 <birgun.net/haber/son-29-yilin-en-islevsiz-me-
clis-i-284795>. See also, Kemal Gözler, ‘Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükûmet Sisteminin Uygulamadaki Değeri – Bir 
Buçuk Yıllık Bir Bilanço’ <anayasa.gen.tr/cbhs-bilanco.htm> accessed 23 January 2020.
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the Parliament in 2017 (314) and 2018 (120), 
it reveals a drastic decrease (89%).2 This data 
alone clearly shows that the new system has 
significantly curtailed the Parliament’s legis-
lative functions. 
Furthermore, under the new system, the draft-
ing of legislative proposals, originally done 
by ministers, lies now with members of Par-
liament. Throughout the year 2019, several 
opposition members directed severe criti-
cisms at the ruling majority (AKP and its de 
facto coalition with the MHP) due to their re-
peated attempts to ignore many proposed leg-
islations. The lack of necessary resources or 
expertise on the part of Parliament to do this 
complex task also remains a persistent issue. 
As regards the Parliament’s oversight func-
tions, there has been further regression. At 
the most fundamental level, presidential 
decrees remain exempt from parliamenta-
ry control. Moreover, traditional oversight 
mechanisms such as the vote of confidence 
and the possibility to put oral questions to 
the executive are no longer possible. The 
only living instrument – the right to submit 
written questions – can only be addressed to 
the Vice-President and ministers, and such 
questions are seldom answered in practice. If 
three-fifths of its members agree, the Turk-
ish Parliament may launch a parliamentary 
investigation into alleged criminal actions by 
the President, Vice-President, and ministers 
related to their functions, but in reality, this 
is almost impossible. So it is clear that the 
President’s accountability is limited mainly 
to elections, and that the Parliament is large-
ly unable to exercise such a role.
The executive also increased its grip over 
the judicial branch through controversial ap-
pointments. President Erdoğan’s last overtly 
political appointments to the TCC in 2019 
are in point: the newly appointed members, 
Judge Yıldız Seferinoğlu and Judge Sela-
haddin Menteş, both previously served as 
Deputy Minister of Justice. Ultimately, then, 
it could be concluded that the presidential 
system perpetuated executive dominance 
and eradicated the key checks and balances 
required to safeguard against such excessive 
concentration of power, and thus facilitated 
the process of ‘constitutional capture’3 and 
pushed the country toward the brink of the 
‘constitutional autocracy’ abyss. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Under these circumstances, the TCC strug-
gled to give consistent decisions. While 
some decisions in very controversial cases 
were favourable to defending human rights, 
its general trajectory is quite worrying. The 
TCC’s decisions rendered in 2019 fell into 
three main categories. The first category 
concerned pre-trial detention and prosecu-
tion of journalists and civil society leaders.4 
While all applications raised similar issues, 
the Court did find violations in only four of 
them.5 In the remaining applications, it found 
no violation of any rights.6 Juxtaposing the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
findings in some of the applicants’ cases 
with what the TCC found in their applica-
tions reveals a stark contrast. For the sake of 
brevity, only three cases will be elaborated 
below. The second category concerned sev-
eral constitutionality review decisions of the 
TCC in which it legally validated problemat-
ic provisions originally adopted by emergen-
cy decrees. These decisions should be read 
as a confirmation of the blank check given 
to the Government for an institutionalized 
state of emergency. The third category con-
cerned decisions in which the TCC upheld 
rights and freedoms by providing convincing 
and plausible reasoning – probably at the ex-
pense of political pressure.
A) Detention Cases 
1) İlker Deniz Yücel
Deniz Yücel, a German-Turkish journalist 
for Die Welt, was detained in February 2017 
on charges of disseminating propaganda and 
inciting hatred or hostility in support of a ter-
rorist group. He was held without a formal 
indictment for over a year, and was released 
in February 2018. In its decision of May 
2019, the TCC found that the charges Yücel 
was facing were based on nothing more than 
a journalistic activity – an interview he con-
ducted with Cemil Bayık, one of the lead-
ers of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). 
Highlighting that ‘persecuting or punishing 
a journalist for things an interview partner 
says would greatly hamper the media’s abil-
ity to discuss relevant topics publicly,’ the 
Court found a violation of the right to liberty 
and freedom of expression.
2) Ahmet Hüsrev Altan
Ahmet Altan, a prominent novelist and jour-
nalist, was detained on 10 September 2016 
as part of an operation against the Gülenists’ 
media network along with fellow journal-
ists, including Nazlı Ilıcak, and his brother, 
Mehmet Altan, a professor of economics, 
for allegedly giving subliminal messages the 
night before the failed coup of 15 July 2016. 
They were charged with attempting to over-
throw the Government and abrogating con-
stitutional order through the use of violence 
based merely on their newspaper columns 
2 ‘Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sistemi,’ BBC News, 28 Haziran 2019 <bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-48788902> accessed 23 January 2020.
3 See Jan-Werner Müller, ‘Rising to the Challenge of Constitutional Capture: Protecting the rule of law within EU member states,’ Eurozine, 21 March 2014 <eurozine.
com/rising-to-the-challenge-of-constitutional-capture/> accessed 23 January 2020.
4 For a critique of these decisions, see Turkey Human Rights Litigation Support Project, ‘Commentary on the May 2019 Judgments Adopted by the Turkish Constitu-
tional Court,’ 2 August 2019. <turkeylitigationsupport.com/blog/2019/8/2/commentary-on-the-may-2019-judgments-adopted-by-the-turkish-constitutional-court-on-
the-detention-of-journalists-and-a-civil-society-leader> accessed 23 January 2020.
5 TCC, Individual Applications of Ahmet Kadri Gürsel (App. No. 2016/50978), Murat Aksoy (App. No. 2016/30112), Ali Bulaç (App. No. 2017/6592), and İlker Deniz Yücel 
(App. No. 2017/16589).
6 TCC, Individual Applications of Ahmet Altan (App. No. 2016/23668), Nazlı Ilıcak (App. No. 2016/24616), Murat Sabuncu (App. No. 2016/50969), Akın Atalay (App. No. 
2016/50970), Önder Çelik and others (App. No. 2016/50971), Ahmet Şık (App. No. 2017/5375), and Osman Kavala (App. No. 2018/1073).
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and comments given to media outlets that 
had been dissolved by the Turkish Govern-
ment’s emergency decrees. On 16 February 
2018, they were sentenced to life in prison. 
Though an Istanbul Regional Court of Jus-
tice upheld this conviction in October 2018, 
the Turkish Supreme Court of Appeals on 5 
July 2019 cleared the Altan brothers’ charges 
due to the lack of sufficient and credible evi-
dence, thus overturning the life sentences. In 
the meantime, the Altan brothers lodged sep-
arate individual applications with the TCC in 
November 2016. Despite the nearly identical 
circumstances of their cases, the TCC hand-
ed down opposite rulings. On 11 January 
2018, in the case of Mehmet Altan, the TCC 
recognized that his right to liberty and free-
dom of expression were violated. On 3 May 
2019, the TCC ruled there was no violation 
in the case of Ahmet Altan.
3) Osman Kavala
Osman Kavala, a businessman and prom-
inent civil society activist, was arrested on 
18 October 2017 on suspicion of attempting 
to overthrow the Government and the con-
stitutional order through force and violence 
– charges linked to the Gezi Park events and 
to the 15 July 2016 attempted coup, respec-
tively. In justifying Kavala’s pre-trial deten-
tion on 1 November 2017, the Turkish mag-
istrate court found that there existed concrete 
evidence indicating that he had led, organ-
ised, and financially supported the Gezi Park 
events. Regarding the charge concerning the 
15 July attempted coup, the magistrate al-
leged that Kavala had been in contact with 
H.J.B. (Professor Henri J. Barkey, allegedly 
one of the instigators of the attempted coup) 
based on reports from base transceiver sta-
tions that their mobiles emitted signals from 
the same station. On 28 June 2019, the TCC 
ruled, by ten votes to five, that there existed 
factual evidence giving rise to a strong suspi-
cion that Kavala had committed the alleged 
offence during the Gezi Park events, and that 
his detention was thus neither arbitrary nor 
unjustified. 
B) Constitutionality Review Decisions 
1) 14-day Unsupervised Detention Period
On 22 July 2016, the first post-coup emer-
gency decree, Decree No. 667, was issued, 
authorising detention without access to a 
judge for up to 30 days ‘due to the difficul-
ty of collecting evidence or a higher number 
of suspects.’7 Another decree, No. 684 of 23 
January 2017, reduced it to seven days, with 
the possibility of an extension a further sev-
en days (14 days in total), the time during 
which a suspect had to be brought before 
a competent judicial authority.8 Following 
their approval by the Turkish Parliament on 
29 October 2016 and 8 March 2018, respec-
tively,9 two separate appeals were lodged 
with the TCC seeking annulment of these 
two provisions (among many others) on the 
ground that they violated the Turkish Con-
stitution. On 24–25 July 2019, the TCC re-
jected these appeals and held the relevant 
provisions specifically permitting pre-trial 
detention for up to 14 days to be constitu-
tionally valid,10 even though it substantially 
exceeds the outer limit the ECtHR has held 
to be justifiable in times of derogation under 
Article 15 of the ECHR.11 
2) ‘Security Investigation/Archive Check’ 
Requirement for Public Employment
On 29 October 2016, Decree No. 676 intro-
duced one of the most controversial mea-
sures of Turkey’s post-coup emergency rule. 
Article 74 of that Decree amended Turkish 
Law No. 657 on Public Servants and stipulat-
ed that applicants for public sector employ-
ment must undergo ‘a security investigation 
and archive check’ before being appointed.12 
Stringent security and background checks 
enabling a detailed assessment of every re-
cord on an applicant held by security and in-
telligence services ranging from traffic fines 
to detention records are already necessary 
for those to be recruited in some confiden-
tial units of state, such as military, police, 
and intelligence. That amendment, howev-
er, extended the scope of security investi-
gations for all fields of public employment 
and even further to include an assessment of 
moral character, political views, and affilia-
tions based on some generic terms, such as 
‘cooperation with,’ and ‘loyalty to the state.’ 
In 2018, an appeal challenging its constitu-
tionality was lodged before the TCC. On 24 
July 2019, the TCC ruled that the ‘security 
investigation/archive check’ requirement for 
public employment was contrary to Article 
13 (‘fundamental rights may only be restrict-
ed by law’), Article 20 (‘right to privacy’), 
and guarantees that public servants should 
enjoy under Article 129 of the Turkish Con-
stitution.13 While a wide swath of Turkish 
society praised the ruling, one cannot inter-
pret this decision as bringing the discussion 
on the ‘security investigation/archive check’ 
requirement to an end. Some of the TCC 
findings could indeed leave the door open 
7 See Decree on Measures to be Taken Under State Emergency, No. 667, 22 July 2016. 
8 Decree on Specific Regulations Under the State of Emergency, No. 684, 23 January 2017. 
9 See Law No. 6749 published in the Official Gazette on 29 October 2016 and Law No. 7074 published in the Official Gazette on 8 March 2018. Whether they have 
become ordinary pieces of legislation is questionable. 
10 TCC Constitutionality Review, Plenary Assembly, Docket No. 2016/205, Decision No. 2019/63, 24 July 2019 at paras. 78–79 and TCC Constitutionality Review, 
Plenary Assembly, Docket No. 2018/92, Decision No. 2019/67, 25 July 2019 at paras. 48–73.
11 In exceptional circumstances, e.g., under a state of emergency, the ECtHR has acknowledged that a longer period of detention may be justified. However, even un-
der such circumstances, the ECtHR, in Aksoy v. Turkey (App. No. 21987/93, Merits, 18 December 1996 at paras. 70–78) held that holding a suspect for fourteen days, 
and in Nuray Sen v. Turkey (App. No. 41478/98, Merits, 17 June 2003 at para. 28) for eleven days, without judicial intervention, was not a proportionate derogation from 
Article 5 ECHR. 
12 See Article 74 of Decree Law on Specific Regulations Under the State of Emergency, No. 676, 23 January 2017. The decree was approved by the Turkish Parliament 
on 8 March 2018 and became Law No. 7070. 
13 TCC Constitutionality Review, Plenary Assembly, Docket No. 2018/73, Decision No. 2019/65, 24 July 2019 at paras. 161–173.
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for another version of the security check. 
Specifically, the TCC highlighted that such a 
provision stipulating security investigations 
for public employment falls within the mar-
gin of appreciation of the legislative branch 
provided that it is introduced by a normal 
piece of legislation that possesses guidance 
as to how these investigations would be car-
ried out within the limits of the constitution-
al right to privacy. Against this backdrop, it 
came as no surprise that the ruling majority 
(AKP and MHP) are working on new draft 
legislation as reported by the Turkish media 
in January 2020.14 
3. ‘Immunity’ Decision 
Decree No. 667 introduced another prob-
lematic provision of Turkey’s two-year-long 
emergency rule and absolved Government 
officials of any responsibility for actions 
taken in the context of the decrees. Notwith-
standing the potential for abuse, Article 9 of 
that decree granted full immunity from legal, 
administrative, financial, and criminal liabil-
ities to Government officials who could oth-
erwise be subjected to criminal investigation 
and prosecution.15 This effectively prevented 
accountability for all abuses that might have 
been perpetrated during that time.16 In a con-
stitutionality review decision, the TCC ruled 
that this provision aimed at protecting state 
agents in fulfilling their legally mandated 
duties in the fight against a terrorist organi-
zation (FETO) which posed a grave threat 
to the survival and security of the nation 
through its clandestine infiltration of state 
mechanisms.17 
C) Favourable Decisions 
1. Ayşe Çelik 
Ayşe Çelik, a teacher, joined a national-scale 
live TV show by phone and made some 
comments during a period of conflict be-
tween the Turkish army and the PKK, stating 
that in southeast Turkey, ‘unborn children, 
mothers and people are being killed’ and that 
the media must ‘not keep silent.’ She was 
prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to one 
year and three months’ imprisonment for the 
broad-reaching and ill-defined crime of ‘dis-
seminating propaganda’ in favor of a terror-
ist organization. The case had attracted broad 
attention, and Ms Çelik, who also gave birth 
to a child during the domestic proceedings, 
became a symbol of the peace demanders. 
On 9 May 2019, the TCC ruled that her im-
prisonment constituted a violation of free-
dom of expression, requesting both a retrial 
and an end to the violation. The TCC high-
lighted that mere expression of thoughts in 
parallel to a terrorist organisation’s ideology 
or social or political goals could not be con-
sidered as terrorist propaganda unless they 
involve statements encouraging recourse to 
violence.
2. Erdal Karadaş 
Erdal Karadaş, a dismissed teacher sacked 
after the coup attempt in 2016 and a mem-
ber of a left-wing trade union, joined protests 
in the western province of Aydın by distrib-
uting fliers and promoting petitions. He re-
ceived an administrative fine for taking part 
in protests. On 28 May 2019, the TCC ruled 
that his freedom of assembly had been vio-
lated and that it was natural for people who 
lost their jobs during the emergency rule to 
voice their objections. The Court pointed out 
that banning peaceful meetings and demon-
strations on arbitrary grounds was unlawful.
3. Zübeyde Füsun Üstel and Others – Aca-
demics for Peace 
In a very important decision, the TCC ruled 
that a group of Turkish academics (publicly 
known as ‘Academics for Peace’) had their 
freedom of expression violated for signing 
a peace petition condemning state violence 
against the Kurds. The declaration signed by 
the applicants contained statements charging 
the state with ‘massacring,’ ‘slaughtering,’ 
and ‘torturing’ people. Soon after that, 
criminal investigations were launched, and 
some of them were dismissed from their 
jobs through emergency decrees. In most of 
the cases, the Turkish courts issued custodi-
al sentences, but allowed the academics to 
serve them on parole. In its ruling, the TCC 
emphasized that, although the petition was 
written in accusatory and severe language 
and it was even unilateral, contradictory, and 
subjective, it did not necessarily mean that it 
incited violence. The Court highlighted that 
such interferences impose a severe restric-
tion on the public’s right to be informed of a 
different perspective on the particularly sig-
nificant events taking place in the country. In 
a rather unusual manner, the majority of the 
Court also noted that they do not agree with 
the statements in the declaration. 
4. The Wikimedia Foundation 
After refusing to remove pages that contain 
references of the Turkish Government’s al-
leged ties with Syrian militants, on 29 April 
2017, the Information and Communication 
Technologies Authority blocked access to 
14 ‘Kamuda çalışanlara “Güvenlik soruşturması” mı geliyor?’ Deutsche Welle, 21 January 2020 <dw.com/tr/kamuda-çalışanlara-güvenlik-soruşturması-mı-geliy-
or/a-52068253> accessed 23 January 2020.
15 See Article 9 of Decree No. 667. Article 37 of Decree No. 668 of 27 July 2016 and its subsequent amendment (Article 121 of Decree No. 696, 27 December 2017) 
extended this immunity to civilians, thus raising concerns of pro-state vigilantism. 
16 See Article 6 (1 (e)) of Decree No. 667. Beginning in the early days after the attempted coup, some disturbing images have fueled allegations of torture and ill 
treatment of detainees in Turkey that were widely reported by the media and international organisations. See, i.e., Human Rights Watch ‘A Blank Check – Turkey’s Post-
Coup Suspension of Safeguards Against Torture,’ 24 October 2016, <hrw.org/report/2016/10/24/blank-check/turkeys-post-coup-suspension-safeguards-against-tor-
ture> accessed 23 January 2020. 
17 TCC Constitutionality Review, Plenary Assembly, Docket No. 2016/205, Decision No. 2019/63, 24 July 2019 at paras. 130–137.
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Wikipedia in Turkey. Following the ban, 
Wikipedia had applied to the TCC after sev-
eral unsuccessful applications lodged before 
magistrate courts. On 26 December 2019, 
the TCC ruled by ten votes to six in favour 
of the world’s largest internet encyclopaedia, 
holding that there was not enough reason for 
the prevention of access to the site, and that 
such an interference was not necessary for a 
democratic society and led to a violation of 
the right to freedom of expression. The dis-
senting judges argued that the content of the 
entry violated national security and the Wi-
kimedia Foundation should instead be held 
accountable for not cooperating with Turk-
ish authorities. Following the publication of 
the TCC’s reasoned judgment, the ban was 
eventually lifted on 16 January 2020.
5. Sırrı Süreyya Önder 
Süreyya Önder was a member of the Turkish 
Parliament who played an active role during 
a long-standing democratic initiative process 
in Turkey. He delivered a speech during the 
Newroz celebrations in 2013 in which he 
allegedly called the head of the PKK, Ab-
dullah Öcalan, as the leader of the Kurd-
ish people and referred to the southeast of 
Turkey as ‘Kurdistan.’ After the collapse of 
peace talks in June 2015, his parliamentarian 
immunity, along with many other MPs, was 
lifted through an amendment made to the 
Turkish Constitution that bypassed normal 
procedures. Önder was sentenced to three 
years and six months’ imprisonment for dis-
seminating terrorist propaganda in 2018. The 
TCC held that the impugned speech was de-
livered within the context of increasing and 
improving the possibility of ceasing violent 
acts in the country and called for the con-
tinuation of the policies initiated to resolve 
protracted problems through non-violent 
methods. It eventually ruled his speech did 
not incite violence and found his freedom of 
expression was violated.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The year 2020 will be challenging. A number 
of constitutionality review appeals concern-
ing the controversial provisions originally 
adopted by the post-coup emergency decrees 
are already on the TCC’s agenda for Janu-
ary 2020. Moreover, the ECtHR is expected 
to hand down judgments in several applica-
tions arising out of alleged post-coup human 
rights violations, such as Selçuk Altun v. Tur-
key and 545 Other Applications, concerning 
the provisional detention of dismissed judg-
es and prosecutors – all of whose individual 
applications were declared inadmissible by 
the TCC – and the Grand Chamber’s ruling 
in the case of Selahattin Demirtaş, the previ-
ous co-chair of the HDP. Another important 
issue is the upcoming vacancies in the TCC: 
between 2020 and 2023, five members are 
expected to retire. On top of the five appoint-
ments President Erdoğan made to the TCC 
since he became President in 2014 (under 
the abolished parliamentary system), he will 
have had a direct or indirect influence in 10 
out of the 15 members by 2023.18 Turning 
back to the quote that opened this chapter, 
in 2019, the Turkish people had hard times. 
Whether the year 2020 will bring harder 
times or a beacon of hope for the entire na-
tion to change its course, we’ll have to wait 
and see.
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Our 2018 report ended by emphasizing 
the impossibility of predicting the United 
Kingdom’s immediate constitutional fu-
ture. If 2019 brought significant clarity with 
the achievement of a Brexit deal by year’s 
end, it was not easily achieved, as the UK 
Constitution weathered its stormiest period 
in recent decades. Two developments will 
long stand out in collective constitutional 
memories: the government’s failed attempt 
to prorogue Parliament in September 2019; 
and the landslide victory of the Conserva-
tive Party in the December general election 
– widely described as the most important in 
a generation – handing Prime Minister Bo-
ris Johnson a mandate to shape not only the 
Brexit process but also a supportive legisla-
ture able to reshape the wider political and 
constitutional landscape. This report focuses 
on the constitutional tensions generated by 
the Brexit process in Parliament and two key 
Supreme Court judgments: finding the pro-
rogation of Parliament unlawful; and ruling 
on the attempted ouster of the High Court’s 
jurisdiction to review decisions of a tribunal 
established to supervise security and intelli-
gence services.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
Building on analysis in the 2018 report, 
this section focuses on the challenges Brex-
it posed for the Westminster Parliament in 
2019. As in 2018, Brexit dominated Parlia-
ment in 2019 but saw the dramatic battle 
between the Government and the House of 
Commons intensify. Boris Johnson’s ap-
pointment as the new Prime Minister in July 
2019 led to a more direct conflict with the 
Commons. The deterioration of relations be-
tween the executive and legislatures ended 
up in the courts (as detailed below). In Mill-
er (No. 2), discussed in the next section, the 
Supreme Court may have re-asserted Parlia-
ment’s supremacy over the executive, but in 
political terms, the Government ended 2019 
firmly in control. In the long term, the po-
litical effect of the parliamentary dramas 
of 2019 may end up being more significant 
than the constitutional effect of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling. The Conservative Party se-
cured a significant majority in the House of 
Commons at the general election on 12 De-
cember 2019, winning 365 of the 650 seats, 
based on a message of ‘get Brexit done’. A 
core part of this message was based on the 
idea that both Parliament and the courts were 
blocking the ‘will of the people’. The suc-
cess of this message is likely to see further 
challenges to the value of checks and balanc-
es in 2020. 
A Failed Brexit Deal under Prime Minis-
ter May’s Government
In January 2019, Theresa May’s Govern-
ment was trying desperately to secure the 
support of a majority of MPs for the With-
drawal Agreement, an international treaty 
negotiated with the EU. The Government 
only managed to secure the support of un-
der one-third of the total 650 MPs for the 
deal during the first meaningful vote on 15 
January 2019. While subsequent attempts 
to negotiate (including legislative conces-
sions on workers’ rights and environmental 
standards) with the official opposition, the 
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Labour Party, persuaded some additional 
Labour and Conservative MPs to support the 
deal, the Government could not convince the 
Labour leadership to endorse it. In the UK’s 
majoritarian political culture, the Labour 
Party sensed there was little to be gained 
from helping the Government get the deal 
approved in the House of Commons. 
The Government’s efforts were also hin-
dered by unavoidable constitutional realities. 
It could not offer cast-iron guarantees on the 
nature of the UK’s long-term relationship 
with the EU because Article 50 dictated that 
the future relationship would only be nego-
tiated once the UK had formally withdrawn. 
Further, parliamentary sovereignty meant 
that the Government could not entrench any 
commitments in law. The first few months 
in 2019 highlighted the difficulty of a par-
liamentary system based on majoritarian 
principles adapting to the need to build a 
cross-party consensus to deliver the consti-
tutional changes needed to deliver Brexit. 
The second meaningful vote on the original 
deal (12 March 2019) saw 242 MPs vote for 
the deal. The third and final meaningful vote 
(29 March 2019) achieved only 286 MPs’ 
support. By that point, the Government’s 
credibility, even though it formally retained 
the confidence of the House, was severely 
weakened. 
Much of the parliamentary drama of 2019 
was generated by MPs’ efforts to stop the 
UK leaving the EU without an agreement, 
commonly known as a ‘no-deal Brexit’. The 
Government had long maintained that the 
House of Commons faced a simple choice 
between the deal that had been negotiated or 
leaving the EU without a deal on 29 March 
2019. This was based on the strict legalism 
of both the UK Government’s and the EU’s 
positions: that under Article 50, the UK 
would leave ‘automatically’ two years after 
the notification was given (29 March 2017) 
unless either a deal was in place or an exten-
sion was requested and agreed to by the Eu-
ropean Council; the UK Government’s posi-
tion since 2017 that no such request would 
be made even if the deal was rejected; and 
that the Withdrawal Agreement, once final-
ised, could not be changed. 
The battle to stop a no-deal Brexit saw MPs 
and the Speaker of the House of Commons 
take unprecedented steps to pass legislation 
requiring the Government to seek an exten-
sion from the EU. The first of these Acts of 
Parliament, known as the ‘Cooper-Letwin 
Bill’ was passed on 8 April 2019. Before 
this legislation was in force, Theresa May’s 
Government sought a second extension (the 
first had been granted until 12 April 2019), 
which was granted and shifted exit day to 31 
October 2019. By rejecting both no deal and 
the Withdrawal Agreement, the Government 
was left with little room to manoeuvre and 
Theresa May announced her resignation on 
24 May 2019. 
A New Prime Minister, Prorogation, and 
Parliamentary Drama
Boris Johnson formally became Prime Min-
ister on 24 July 2019. A core part of his ap-
peal to the Conservative Party was that he 
would renegotiate the Withdrawal Agree-
ment and get it approved by a majority in 
the Commons. If the EU refused his Gov-
ernment’s demands to change the deal, or if 
the Commons did not approve the amended 
deal, then the UK would leave without a deal 
on 31 October 2019. This determination was 
reinforced by the speculation, and then con-
firmation, that the Government would ‘pro-
rogue’ Parliament to prevent a repeat of the 
Cooper-Letwin Bill being passed (proroga-
tion is discussed in the next section). In real-
ity, the proposed prorogation provoked MPs 
to act quickly and the Benn Act, mandating 
the Government to seek an extension by Sat-
urday 19 October 2019, was enacted on 9 
September 2019. 
To pass both the Cooper-Letwin Bill and the 
Benn Act, MPs secured time on the floor of 
the House of Commons by suspending the 
procedural rule, Standing Order No. 14, 
which gives the Government control of the 
House of Commons’ agenda. Legislating in 
this way was extremely controversial, being 
perceived by some as subverting the rela-
tionship between the Government and the 
House of Commons. The impasse was in 
part a product of the fact that a majority of 
MPs were determined to take steps to stop a 
no-deal and had rejected the Government’s 
main policy goal – passing the Brexit deal – 
but were not prepared to install an alternative 
Government. The Fixed-term Parliaments 
Act 2011 was blamed for contributing to this 
impasse by enshrining a statutory require-
ment that the House of Commons approve 
an early general election. In the run-up to 31 
October, MPs were reluctant to agree to an 
election, fearing that the resulting dissolu-
tion would enable the Government to leave 
the EU without a deal.
The Government planned to avoid seeking 
an extension by obtaining House of Com-
mons approval of the Withdrawal Agreement 
before 19 October 2019. The Government 
defied the expectations of many experts by 
securing changes to the Withdrawal Agree-
ment at the European Council summit on 17-
18 October 2019. Eurosceptic Conservative 
MPs had objected to the arrangements in 
the Northern Ireland Protocol in the original 
Withdrawal Agreement negotiated by There-
sa May. On 29 January 2019, a majority of 
MPs voted to change the Protocol, and Bo-
ris Johnson’s Government made changing 
the Protocol his priority. To secure approv-
al for the amended Withdrawal Agreement, 
the Commons sat on a Saturday for the first 
time since the Falklands War in 1982. The 
Commons declined to approve the deal on 
Saturday 19 October, instead voting to ap-
prove an amendment by Conservative Par-
ty backbencher Oliver Letwin, fearing that 
approving the deal in principle but without 
enacting the legislation needed to ensure its 
ratification would mean the UK could still 
leave the EU without a deal on 31 October 
2019. As a result, the legal obligation to se-
cure an extension was triggered and the EU 
granted an extension until 31 January 2020. 
The terms of the extension meant that the UK 
could still leave on 31 October if Parliament 
could pass the necessary legislation before-
hand. The Government asked the Commons 
to approve the European Union (Withdrawal 
Agreement) Bill, which would implement 
the Withdrawal Agreement into domestic 
law, on 22 October 2019. A majority of MPs, 
329 to 299, approved the bill. However, the 
House of Commons rejected its programme 
motion, which sought to see the bill pass 
through the Commons in three days. A num-
ber of MPs that supported the deal felt that it 
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was not appropriate to pass such a significant 
constitutional bill so quickly, especially as it 
was certain there would be intense discus-
sion over possible concessions. In response 
to the MPs’ refusal to agree on the timetable 
for the bill, the Government sought to trigger 
a general election on 12 December. On Mon-
day 28 October 2019, a majority of MPs, 
299 to 70, voted in favour of an early elec-
tion, but this did not meet the two-thirds of 
MPs required by the Fixed-term Parliaments 
Act 2011. The next day, the Labour Party 
changed its position and agreed to approve 
an election through an Act of Parliament, 
which enabled its date to be set by law for 12 
December 2019. 
A Brexit Deal, Newly Empowered Execu-
tive, and Constitutional Change
The general election on 12 December re-
turned the House of Commons to a more 
conventional majority Conservative Govern-
ment. This change of dynamic meant that the 
legislative concessions that were promised 
in the earlier European Union (Withdrawal 
Agreement) Bill vanished. The bill sailed 
through Parliament in under a month and 
was enacted on 23 January 2020, enabling 
the UK to leave the EU with a deal on 31 
January 2020. 
In terms of constitutionalism, there is a range 
of different narratives that can be extracted 
from 2019. The House of Commons showed 
that it could act as an effective check on ex-
ecutive power by stopping a no-deal Brex-
it and that it could influence the substance 
of a treaty. At the same time, the actions of 
MPs in delaying Brexit led to vociferous 
criticisms of Parliament from politicians, 
which appeared to gain traction with the 
public. Further, the inability to approve the 
Brexit deal before the election meant that 
many of the concessions designed to form a 
cross-party consensus – for example, by giv-
ing Parliament a bigger role in supervising 
the next stage of the Brexit negotiations – 
were lost. The Government’s current major-
ity promises more stability but this does not 
mean that the constitutional challenges pre-
sented by Brexit will be any less significant. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
This section discusses two key judgments 
of the Supreme Court: finding the proroga-
tion of Parliament unlawful; and ruling on 
the ouster of the High Court’s jurisdiction 
to review decisions of a tribunal established 
to supervise the conduct of key security and 
intelligence services.
1. R (on the application of Miller) v. The 
Prime Minister; Cherry and others v. Advo-
cate General for Scotland: Legality of Proro-
gation of Parliament
Also known as Miller (No. 2) or Cherry/
Miller, the petitioners included Joanna Cher-
ry MP and Gina Miller, the same petitioner 
as in the Miller (No. 1)1 case in 2017, seek-
ing an answer to the question of whether 
Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s advice to the 
Queen to prorogue Parliament for five weeks 
in September 2019 was unlawful. Proro-
gation refers to the ending of a session of 
Parliament, which also brings an end to any 
bills that have not become law in addition to 
any parliamentary debates or scrutiny. It is 
an unlegislated prerogative power exercised 
by the Queen upon the advice of the Prime 
Minister. At the point Parliament was pro-
rogued, there were eight weeks left until the 
UK’s (revised) scheduled departure from the 
EU on 31 October 2019. For any outcome 
other than a no-deal Brexit, wherein the UK 
would depart without any agreement on the 
future of trade or movement between the UK 
and EU, it was necessary for Parliament to 
legislate for it, which was not possible while 
Parliament was prorogued. 
Legal action was launched in all three ju-
risdictions that constitute the UK (England 
and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland) 
seeking a judicial review of the Govern-
ment’s advice to the Queen, and a ruling 
that such advice was unlawful. As the mat-
ter concerned the use of prerogative power, 
Government lawyers argued that it was not 
justiciable, making a strong objection to the 
Court’s involvement in political matters: 
simply, ‘if Parliament had a problem with it, 
it is for Parliament to sort it out’. If the Court 
were to find it a justiciable matter, the Gov-
ernment would argue that the prorogation 
was a normal exercise of an ordinary pow-
er to, among other matters, allow sufficient 
time for a new legislative agenda. 
The English High Court found that the Prime 
Minister’s advice was not justiciable, obvi-
ating any need to determine its lawfulness.2 
Less than four days later, the Scottish Court 
of Session found that the issue was justicia-
ble and the advice was ‘unlawful and is thus 
null and of no effect’.3 The Northern Irish 
High Court declined to give judgment on the 
question of prorogation.
The English High Court rejected consider-
ation of the Prime Minister’s advice to the 
Queen as it considered there to be no appro-
priate or judicial or legal standards against 
which the legality of the executive decision 
could be assessed. The Court acknowledged, 
though did not examine, the variety of po-
litical reasons both allowed and given for 
prorogation. It also conjectured that it would 
be impossible for a court to find the length 
of time to be excessive or to assess ‘by any 
measurable standard how much time is re-
quired to hold the Government to account’. 
[57] Scotland’s highest court, the Scottish 
Inner Court of Session, was dismissive of a 
wide discretion and deference to the execu-
tive, finding that the courts have jurisdiction 
to decide ‘whether any power, under the pre-
rogative or otherwise, has been legally exer-
cised’. [103] The Court rejected the position 
that there could be no legal standard against 
which to measure the Prime Minister’s ad-
vice. While acknowledging that power used 
for legitimate political purposes could not be 
1 R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. Discussed in our 2018 report. 
2 R (Gina Miller) v. The Prime Minister [2019] EWHC 2381.
3 Joanna Cherry & ors v. Advocate General of Scotland [2019] CSIH 49.
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challenged, the Court found that the ‘purpose 
was to stymie parliamentary scrutiny of the 
executive, which was a central pillar of the 
good governance principle enshrined in the 
constitution; this followed from the princi-
ples of democracy and the rule of law’. [51]
Hearings in the UK Supreme Court took 
place within a week of the Scottish judg-
ment, with the Court sitting as a full bench 
of 11 judges under the presidency of Bar-
oness Hale. The expediency necessitated 
by circumstances was unprecedented. On 
24 September 2019, two weeks following 
the prorogation of Parliament, the Supreme 
Court handed down its unanimous judgment, 
ruling that such prorogation was ‘unlawful, 
null, and of no effect’. [69] On the question 
of justiciability, the Court recalled its cen-
turies-old supervisory jurisdiction over the 
lawfulness of Government acts and ruled 
the exercise of the prerogative power to be 
justiciable. [44] The fact that ministers had 
political accountability to Parliament did not 
negate legal accountability to the courts. In 
determining the limits on the exercise of ex-
ecutive power, the Court relied on the two 
fundamental principles of parliamentary 
sovereignty and parliamentary accountabil-
ity. Parliamentary sovereignty was interpret-
ed to mean not just Acts of Parliament but 
the actions of Parliament. The Court held 
that the exercise of the power to prorogue 
without reasonable justification to frustrate 
or prevent Parliament from carrying out its 
constitutional functions as a legislature and 
as the body responsible for the supervision 
of the executive was unlawful. No reason 
had been submitted in evidence by the Gov-
ernment for such a long prorogation, which 
by the degree of its detrimental constitution-
al effect was found to be unlawful. As the 
advice was held unlawful and outside the 
powers of the Prime Minister to give, it was 
quashed. The Court also quashed the Order 
in Council, otherwise simply understood as 
the exercise of the Queen’s power, as having 
no effect – a ‘blank piece of paper’ [69]. Par-
liament returned the following day, continu-
ing the previous session.
The Cherry/Miller case follows Wightman4 
and the seminal 2017 Miller (No. 1) decision 
as again deliberating on the fundamental 
principles of the rule of law, parliamentary 
sovereignty, and the separation of powers 
in the UK. While all cases have emphasised 
the sovereignty of Parliament and the limits 
of executive and delegated powers, Cherry/
Miller provided a sharp rebuke to the notion 
that any unlegislated power could be unlim-
ited or immune from judicial scrutiny, par-
ticularly when parliamentary scrutiny had 
been removed by its very exercise. The Gov-
ernment’s negative response included the 
Leader of the House of Commons, Jacob Re-
es-Moog, calling it a ‘constitutional coup’. 
Following the December elections, Boris 
Johnson mooted the possibility of wide-scale 
judicial reforms, including the possibility of 
executive control over the appointment of 
judges to the UK Supreme Court.
2. R (on the application of Privacy Internation-
al) v. Investigatory Powers Tribunal and others5 
The Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) is a 
specialist tribunal established under the Reg-
ulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
(RIPA) with supervisory jurisdiction to ex-
amine inter alia the conduct of the Security 
Service, the Secret Intelligence Service, and 
the Government Communications Head-
quarters. Under Section 67(8) RIPA, except 
where otherwise provided for by the relevant 
Secretary of State, decisions of the IPT were 
excluded from appeal or oversight of any 
court. This section was essentially an ouster 
clause: removing the jurisdiction of the High 
Court to judicially review decisions of the 
IPT. The applicants, Privacy International, 
sought a review of this clause on two issues: 
first, whether Section 67(8) ‘ousts’ the su-
pervisory jurisdiction of the High Court to 
quash judgments for error of law and in ef-
fect immunises the IPT from legal challenge; 
and second, if so, in accordance with what 
principles could Parliament by statute ever 
‘oust’ such jurisdiction to quash the decision 
of an inferior court or tribunal of limited stat-
utory jurisdiction. 
By a majority of 4 to 3, the Supreme Court 
held that Section 67(8) RIPA does not oust 
the High Court’s jurisdiction. Following the 
ratio of Anisminic,6 a decision vitiated by 
an error of law could not be a determina-
tion beyond the remit of the courts: only a 
legally valid determination could therefore 
be referenced within Section 67(8). This was 
grounded on a common law presumption 
that the legislative drafters did not intend to 
oust the jurisdiction of the High Court, and 
so could only apply such exemption to le-
gally invalid determinations: judicial review 
may only be excluded with the most ‘clear 
and explicit words’, which, in section 67(8) 
RIPA, may be both ‘determination’ and ‘pur-
ported determination’. 
The majority concluded there was no need 
to consider the second issue based on the 
determination that RIPA had not ousted the 
jurisdiction of the High Court, but neverthe-
less commented that it was for the courts, not 
the legislature, to determine the proper limits 
and scope set by the rule of law to the power 
to exclude review. Agreeing with the majori-
ty, Lord Lloyd-Jones added in obiter that 
consistently with the rule of law, binding 
effect cannot be given to a clause which 
purports wholly to exclude the supervi-
sory jurisdiction of the High Court to 
review a decision of an inferior court 
or tribunal, whether for excess or abuse 
of jurisdiction, or error of law. It should 
remain a matter for the court to deter-
mine the extent to which such a clause 
should be upheld, having regard to its 
purpose and statutory context, and the 
nature and importance of the legal issue 
in question. [144] 
Essentially, a necessary consequence of par-
liamentary sovereignty is the rule of law, as 
understood to mean an authoritative and in-
dependent judicial body providing oversight 
(and limits) to the exercise of legislative 
power: ‘it is ultimately for the courts, not the 
legislature, to determine the limits set by the 
rule of law to the power to exclude review’. 
4 Case C-621/18 Wightman and others v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (judgment of 10 December 2018) ECLI:EU:C:2018:999.
5 [2019] UKSC 22.
6 Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 14.
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[131] In a system premised on parliamentary 
sovereignty, or unlimited legislative authori-
ty, this raises significant questions. 
In dissent, Lord Sumption concluded that the 
effect of the section was to exclude the High 
Court’s jurisdiction, which followed from a 
plain reading of the text. On the key question 
of the tribunal having the power to determine 
the limits of its own jurisdiction by the fact 
of its immunity from the review, he accepted 
that Parliament’s intention was not consistent 
with the capacity of the courts to enforce such 
limits. [210] Lord Sumption, however, found 
that the rule of law was sufficiently met by 
the judicial character of the IPT, which conse-
quently required no right of appeal. 
In practical terms, s.67(8) has already been 
repealed, though its legacy continues. In crit-
ical comment, Mike Gordon writes that this 
judgment may have ‘reached an intolerable 
level of artificiality in the interpretation of 
legislative language, and, from a rule of law 
perspective, the regrettable position where 
only an elite understanding of legal doctrine 
will provide the necessary context to com-
prehend the meaning of statute law’.7 The 
majority’s interpretation of the drafters’ use 
of the term ‘determination’ to exclude errors 
of law (and so allow for judicial review in 
the High Court) could be more readily iden-
tified as a ‘disguised prohibition’ on such 
ouster by the courts.8 In an otherwise turbu-
lent year for the constitutional foundations 
of the UK, Privacy International does not sit 
as a counterpoint to Cherry/Miller but in par-
allel to it: both deliberations considered the 
meaning of parliamentary sovereignty, and 
both recognised the rule of law not only as 
a constitutional principle in theory but also 
in practice.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Compared to the miasma of uncertainty not-
ed at the end of our 2018 report, this report 
– finalised in February 2020 – faces a some-
what clearer vista: the Government has a 
significant majority; the UK withdrew from 
the EU on 31 January 2020; and Northern 
Ireland’s Government was restored in Janu-
ary 2020. However, fundamental questions 
abound. The details of the UK’s future rela-
tionship with the EU remain to be hammered 
out. The Conservative Party election mani-
festo has promised a wide-ranging review 
of the UK Constitution, covering everything 
from the courts, to the relationship of state 
powers, to the royal prerogative power. We 
see renewed calls for a second referendum 
on Scottish independence, and intensifying 
discussion of a potential unification of the 
island of Ireland. A reinvigorated spirit of 
experimentation – embodied in the prolifer-
ation of citizens’ assemblies across the UK, 
discussing everything from the constitution-
al future of Scotland to climate change – re-
flects dissatisfaction with the existing model 
of representative democracy. 
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2019 was a crucial year for Venezuela and 
its ongoing social, economic and humanitar-
ian crisis. Against this backdrop, the country 
experienced a sharper turn towards authori-
tarian rule and the emergence of a major con-
stitutional standoff between the government 
and the opposition that, at the time of this 
writing, has no end in sight.
The main reason for the crisis was Nicolás 
Maduro’s insistence in keeping power for a 
second term following the May 2018 pres-
idential election, deemed unconstitutional 
and fraudulent by most of the opposition 
and a large number of countries worldwide. 
In January 2019, the President of the Parlia-
ment (National Assembly), Juan Guaidó, as-
sumed the interim presidency of the country 
based on Article 233 of the Venezuelan 1999 
Constitution with the goal of ending Madu-
ro’s unconstitutional claim to power, install-
ing a transitional government and holding 
free elections. In the following weeks, over 
50 countries recognized Guaidó as Interim 
President, including the United States, a 
large number of neighboring countries and 
several European governments. However, 
Maduro – who had been the constitutional 
President of the country since April 2013 
– has retained de facto control over the ex-
ecutive branch, counting with the support of 
his party (the United Socialist Party of Ven-
ezuela, PSUV) the armed forces and several 
countries, particularly authoritarian regimes 
like China, Cuba, Iran, Russia and Turkey.
Thus, throughout the year 2019, Venezuela 
had Maduro as a de facto President with inter-
nal control of the country while more than 50 
countries recognized Guaidó instead. Hence, 
while the Interim President was focused on 
foreign policy with little local effects in Vene-
zuela, Nicolás Maduro failed to make his de-
cisions recognized in many key countries that 
recognized Guaidó as Interim President, and 
his government faced a variety of pressures 
at the international level, including econom-
ic sanctions enacted by the US, the European 
Union and several countries. 
The National Assembly and Interim Presi-
dent Guaidó passed several acts to achieve a 
political transition. The Statute to Govern a 
Transition to Democracy and to Re-establish 
the Full Force and Effect of the Constitution 
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was 
the main piece of legislation enacted to orga-
nize and implement this process. However, 
the legislature’s authority was challenged 
by Maduro’s regime and its authorities in de 
facto control of the rest of the government, 
including the Supreme Court and the Attor-
ney General’s Office. The most concerning 
aspect was that an unconstitutional ‘National 
Constituent Assembly’ remained installed 
(since August 2017). This institution claims 
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to have wide official prerogatives based on 
its interpretation of constituent power, in-
cluding legislative functions. However, the 
National Constituent Assembly failed to 
comply with its supposed role of writing a 
new constitution, serving instead as a key 
authoritarian institution.
This report offers a survey of these devel-
opments, particularly the constitutional di-
mension of the crisis, and briefly discusses 
the decisions issued by the Venezuelan Su-
preme Tribunal in the past year – especially 
the Constitutional Chamber – as part of the 
country’s turn towards autocracy. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. The interim presidency of the President of 
the National Assembly
In 2017, amid growing confrontations be-
tween the opposition and the government, 
and the regime’s refusal to allow a recall ref-
erendum to be attempted against the President 
(in the terms established in the 1999 Consti-
tution and applicable legislation), Maduro 
proceeded to convene a National Constituent 
Assembly that would exercise full preroga-
tives as exclusive ‘constituent power’. This 
body was meant to make decisions outside 
of the existing constitutional framework and 
abide with all existing authorities, including 
the opposition-controlled National Assembly 
(the legislature). The creation of the National 
Constituent Assembly was denounced by the 
political opposition, several governments and 
many scholars as fraudulent and unconstitu-
tional, among other reasons, due to its lack of 
fulfillment with the imperatives established in 
the 1999 Constitution for its creation and the 
openly fraudulent election of its delegates in 
August 2017. 
The following year, in May 2018, despite 
persistent social and economic troubles, an 
unfolding humanitarian crisis, very high lev-
els of unpopularity and mass migration, Mad-
uro’s regime held a fraudulent presidential 
election where he was declared the winner. 
This election was unconstitutionally called 
by the National Constituent Assembly and 
organized under illegal and unfair conditions, 
including (i) the illegalization of most oppo-
sition political parties so no major opposition 
leader could run, (ii) electoral corruption and 
government abuse during the campaign and 
(iii) the requirement of a government-issued 
ID – the ‘fatherland’s card’ or carnet de la 
patria that would be checked next to voting 
booths across the country, among other ma-
jor unconstitutional and illegal activities. The 
opposition filed several claims against the 
election, but the Supreme Tribunal rejected 
them. In response, the Parliament declared the 
presidential election as ‘non-existent’. A large 
part of the international community – includ-
ing many governments, scholars and organi-
zations – also decided not to recognize this 
election and pointed out the country’s lack of 
electoral integrity.
According to Articles 230 and 231 of the Ven-
ezuelan Constitution, the presidential term 
begins on January 10. Thus, on January 10, 
2019, a new presidential term began with-
out a legitimately elected President since the 
2018 presidential election was electoral fraud. 
However, Maduro decided to bypass the Na-
tional Assembly – the constitutional authori-
ty that swears in an elected President – and 
wanted to take the oath for a second term 
before the Supreme Tribunal. The Parliament 
considered this a usurpation of power and on 
January 15, 2019, based on Articles 233 and 
333 of the Constitution, issued a statement 
declaring its president – Juan Guaidó – as 
Venezuela’s Interim President (chief execu-
tive) until the usurpation ceases and free and 
transparent elections are called and held. In 
this respect, Article 233 of the Constitution 
establishes that, in the absence of a President 
on the first day of the presidential term, the 
President of the National Assembly must as-
sume the presidency of the republic as an In-
terim President. 
Guaidó assumed the interim presidency on 
January 23, 2019, and over the past year has 
led an effort to ensure a transition back to de-
mocracy. Maduro’s regime has denounced the 
opposition’s efforts, and has sought to keep 
power at all costs, at odds with the 1999 Con-
stitution and at a significant cost to it and the 
nation as a whole. A year later, the standoff 
persists without a clear end in sight – Guaidó 
remains President of the National Assembly 
and exercises prerogatives as Interim Pres-
ident that are recognized by external actors 
and the legislature while the rest of the gov-
ernment and the state as a whole remain under 
Maduro’s de facto control. 
2. The Statute for the Transition and other 
acts of the National Assembly
To guide a political transition and the coun-
try’s return to democratic rule and constitu-
tional normalcy, the National Assembly en-
acted the Statute to Govern a Transition to 
Democracy to Re-establish the Full Force 
and Effect of the Constitution of the Bolivar-
ian Republic of Venezuela. Accordingly, Ar-
ticle 2 of the statute states: ‘For the purposes 
of this Statute, a transition is understood as 
the democratization and reinstitutionaliza-
tion itinerary that includes the following 
stages: the liberation of the autocratic regime 
that oppresses Venezuela, the formation of a 
provisional Government of national unity 
and holding free elections’. In addition, a 
deep humanitarian crisis was identified as 
a problem that should be solved during this 
transitional period. According to the statute, 
the President of the National Assembly is the 
Interim President of the Republic until Mad-
uro’s usurpation of power ceases and free 
and fair elections take place. The opposition 
majority of the National Assembly re-elect-
ed Guaidó as President of the Parliament this 
past January 2020, so he continues holding 
office as interim chief executive. 
Within the aforementioned statute, the role 
of Interim President is crucial and includes 
a range of important prerogatives. For in-
stance, it gives Guaidó the power to desig-
nate several authorities to restore democra-
cy, including members of the board of public 
companies (such as the Venezuelan oil com-
pany PDVSA and its American subsidiary 
CITGO) and a special attorney general to de-
fend the interests of the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela in court (especially US courts). 
Throughout 2019, Interim President Guaidó 
decreed several acts to restore democracy; 
designate ambassadors in 36 countries and 
two multilateral organizations (OAS and 
Lima Group); and to protect and recover as-
sets outside of the country via negotiations 
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or litigation (several US courts have also rec-
ognized Guaidó as Interim President). 
The statute also outlined important prerog-
atives for the National Assembly during the 
transition period. During this time, the Na-
tional Assembly will control the particular 
actions of the Interim President in matters 
of protection of assets and interests of the 
republic and appoint heads of diplomatic 
missions, corruption and money launder-
ing, among others. Additionally, besides the 
Statute to Govern a Transition, the National 
Assembly also passed the Law of Guaran-
tees for Public Sector Officials and Workers 
and Social Sectors Participating in the Res-
toration of Democracy, and the Law for the 
Re-entry of Venezuela to the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
Thus, in 2019, the National Assembly focused 
its efforts towards the political route designed 
in the Statute to Govern a Transition. In par-
ticular, the National Assembly: (i) reversed 
the decision to withdraw Venezuela from the 
OAS; (ii) ratified again the American Con-
vention on Human Rights; (iii) approved the 
re-entry of Venezuela into the Inter-Ameri-
can Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance; (iv) de-
fended the historical position of Venezuela in 
the dispute over the Esequibo territory with 
Guyana; and (v) with the support of the Lima 
Group, the European Union and the Europe-
an Parliament for the restoration of Venezue-
lan democracy, defended the permanence of 
Venezuela in the MERCOSUR Parliament 
(PARLASUR). The National Assembly also 
presented and passed a plan of public poli-
cies called ‘Plan País’ that a new government 
could implement to face the complex human-
itarian emergency in Venezuela.
Also in 2019, national deputies of Maduro’s 
party, the Socialist United Party of Venezu-
ela (PSUV), returned to sessions of the Na-
tional Assembly. They had decided not to 
attend the sessions back in April 2017 after 
the Supreme Tribunal of Justice declared the 
National Assembly in ‘contempt’. With the 
participation of the PSUV, the National As-
sembly also installed the preliminary com-
mission for the appointment of the Electoral 
Nominations Committee, and eventually 
proceeded with the renewal of the Elector-
al Power authorities according to the 1999 
Constitution. It is still unclear when (and if) 
this process will take place, but it certainly is 
one of the most important developments of 
the past year. 
Finally, in December 2019, the Parliament 
approved the inclusion of the electronic vote 
in its debate rules book. This would allow na-
tional deputies to vote in the sessions of the 
National Assembly even if they were outside 
the country. This was an important develop-
ment, since a large number of deputies are in 
exile, detained or otherwise unable to attend 
sessions due to government prosecution.
3. The National Constituent Assembly in 2019
On the other hand, Maduro’s government was 
reluctant to negotiate or otherwise facilitate 
an electoral transition in Venezuela. Differ-
ent attempts to broker an agreement between 
Maduro and his ruling elite and the opposi-
tion floundered – as was the case of the good-
will efforts of the Norwegian government 
last year. In the meantime, Maduro sought to 
consolidate his rule in Venezuela via execu-
tive decisions and the active collaboration of 
all state institutions under his control, and a 
range of pro-government informal actors that 
enhance the regime’s ability to control (and 
repress) the population, enhance governance 
and preserve power (such as pro-government 
armed groups known as colectivos).
Given that the Maduro regime lacks the sup-
port of the opposition-controlled National 
Assembly, it resorted to governing with the 
active assistance of two key institutions: the 
National Constituent Assembly and the Ven-
ezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ), 
especially its Constitutional Chamber. The 
National Constituent Assembly, convened 
and elected in 2017, remained active during 
2019. As we mentioned above, its creation 
was the breakpoint of the already-weak 
Venezuelan rule of law. Its installation was 
clearly against the Constitution – as it was 
directly called by the President instead of the 
Venezuelan people – and the election of its 
members was unconstitutional and illegal. 
The National Constituent Assembly was 
installed not only to write a new constitu-
tion but also to concentrate powers. It was 
formed exclusively by Chavistas representa-
tives and, as has been pointed out in recent 
work, its vast powers help to position it as an 
open threat against the opposition and as a 
key governance mechanism vis-à-vis the rest 
of the regime. 
After more than two years, the National Con-
stituent Assembly has not produced a single 
debate or released a working paper regarding 
the new constitution that it should be produc-
ing. From a political perspective, in 2019, 
the importance of the National Constituent 
Assembly was relatively marginal – as most 
major decisions seemed to lie elsewhere in 
the Maduro regime, with the de facto Pres-
ident himself as the main decision-maker 
(in a nominal and/or real sense). However, 
the National Constituent Assembly still ful-
fills the role of ‘last trench’ of the regime, 
making decisions that still have an important 
influence in the country’s constitutional tra-
jectory in these volatile times. For example, 
during the last year, the National Constituent 
Assembly issued several decisions to lift the 
constitutional immunity of several deputies 
of the National Assembly, openly usurping 
a prerogative of that body. More recently, it 
also threatened by playing an important role 
in organizing and convoking the next legis-
lative elections in Venezuela. 
III. THE VENEZUELAN SUPREME 
TRIBUNAL: CONSTITUTIONAL 
CASES
The Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal continued 
to be a bulwark of authoritarianism, this time 
playing a key role in protecting the Maduro 
regime, legitimizing repression against the 
opposition and, most importantly, continuing 
to issue decisions against the opposition-con-
trolled National Assembly. Although its role 
was not as significant as in previous years (as 
we mentioned above, the core of the Maduro 
regime’s actions lie in the executive branch), 
the Tribunal continued to offer the regime re-
liable support during the crisis. In addition to 
rulings, the support manifested itself in the 
open actions of several justices – especially 
Chief Justice Maikel Moreno – on behalf of 
the regime. 
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Since its creation by the 1999 Venezuelan 
Constitution, the Constitutional Chamber of 
the Supreme Tribunal of Justice has tended to 
support the regime’s interests and, over time, 
fulfilled a very important role in the demise 
of democracy and the emergence of autocratic 
rule in Venezuela. As has already been point-
ed out in a range of scholarly works in the past 
few years, the Supreme Tribunal’s Constitu-
tional Chamber has used, misused and abused 
its power in many matters: allowing a consti-
tutional reform that helped the President to 
further extend his powers in 2007; abolishing 
presidential term limits in 2008; overruling 
the legislative body and giving its power to 
the President in 2016; refusing to curb any 
possible electoral fraud, particularly in presi-
dential elections (2013, 2017, 2018); allowing 
the President to declare a state of economic 
and social emergency for more than four 
years and reducing human rights guarantees 
during Maduro’s time in office (2014–2019); 
and finally, allowing the President to convoke 
himself a constituent assembly in 2017 that 
concentrated the power in only one branch, 
consolidating a dictatorship (Urosa: 2019). 
The Constitutional Chamber’s role assisting 
in the regime’s authoritarian governance con-
tinued during 2019. In January 2019, a few 
days after the Parliament declared Guaidó the 
Interim President of the Republic until fair 
elections could take place, the Constitution-
al Chamber overruled the legislative body 
and stated that Maduro was the legitimate 
President (Hernández: 2019). The Constitu-
tional Chamber also overruled every legisla-
tive act of Interim President Guaidó in 2019: 
the Statute to Govern a Transition (Decision 
06/2019); the appointment of board members 
for the state oil company Petróleos de Vene-
zuela SA and its US refining arm Citgo (De-
cisions 39/2019 and 74/2019); the appoint-
ment of the Special Attorney General of the 
Republic (Decision 75/2019); the selection 
of the directors of the Central Bank of Ven-
ezuela (Decision 247/2019); the reinsertion 
of Venezuela in the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance (Decision 248/2019); 
and the reform of the National Assembly’s 
debate rules book (Decision 517/2019). Thus, 
Venezuela’s Constitutional Chamber is a clear 
example that non-independent constitutional 
courts are very dangerous not only because 
they evade applying their constitutional re-
view power but also because they can actively 
pave the way for the advance of authoritarian-
ism (Urosa: 2019). 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
As we mentioned above, Venezuela should 
be considered (and analyzed as) an authori-
tarian regime given its lack of separation of 
powers, complete disrespect of checks and 
balances and overall autocratic governance 
logic. Maduro, as de facto President, keeps 
control over the judicial branch, the electoral 
branch, the citizens branch and the National 
Constituent Assembly. There is no indepen-
dent judicial review system or impartial elec-
toral arbitrator but there is an overall lack of 
transparent and rule-abiding government as 
the 1999 Constitution orders. The Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice – particularly its Consti-
tutional Chamber – and the National Constit-
uent Assembly remain as instances of control 
of the political opposition and as political 
instruments in charge of supporting the deci-
sions of Maduro’s authoritarian regime. 
On January 5, 2020, Juan Guaidó was 
re-elected as the President of the National 
Assembly and was confirmed as the Inter-
im President of the Republic. Earlier that 
day, several national deputies decided to 
convoke an inauguration session and elect-
ed Congressman Luis Parra as President of 
the National Assembly without fulfilling the 
requirements established in the Constitution 
and the Parliament’s debate rules book. Par-
ra has been recognized as the President of 
the National Assembly by Nicolás Maduro. 
However, it is expected that Guaidó will take 
other decisions to try to restore democracy 
through a political transition driven by the 
National Assembly.
On the other hand, according to the Consti-
tution, in 2020 new members of the National 
Assembly must be elected. The National Elec-
toral Council will likely convoke the election 
of the deputies to the National Assembly. It 
is difficult to know if the political opposition 
will participate in a parliamentary election. 
Finally, it seems that the National Constitu-
ent Assembly will continue to function during 
2020. As we pointed out above, this is a major 
obstacle for the return to institutional normal-
cy based on the 1999 Constitution.
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SUMMARY
Albania
2019 was characterized by a constitutional 
conflict between the President and Parlia-
ment leading up to the impeachment of the 
head of state. Because the opposition boy-
cotted the local election, only a single can-
didate ran in most municipalities, winning 
by default. The implementation of justice re-
form slowly progressed throughout the year, 
affecting the renewal of justice institutions.
Argentina
In an election year, the Supreme Court was 
not at the forefront of public discussion. 
However, a handful of important and politi-
cally charged decisions timidly evinced the 
emergence of a majority inclined to check 
the government and protect some rights. 
Political change and economic turbulence 
may alter this.
Australia
Religious freedom dominated public con-
sciousness in 2019 as the government 
consulted on and developed a Religious 
Discrimination Bill to be introduced to 
Parliament in February 2020. If passed, the 
Bill will protect against religious discrimi-
nation (and discrimination against atheists 
and agnostics) and establish a Freedom of 
Religion Commissioner.
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Austria
In 2019, the Federal Government’s break-
down after the “Ibiza scandal” ended a 
phase of bold legislative reforms that also 
induced the Constitutional Court to exam-
ine several and repeal part of them. The 
Federal Constitution proved to be a high-
ly stabilizing factor during the breakdown 
phase and following political events.
Bangladesh
The Awami League commenced its third 
consecutive term. The BNP, the real op-
position to the ruling party, joined the cur-
rent parliament with just six seats after five 
years. The larger Supreme Court mostly 
showed reluctance on civil rights. But its 
activism in compensation and gender-based 
violence cases attracted appreciation.
Belgium
Elections were held and resulted in an ardu-
ous formation process of the federal govern-
ment. Moreover, an attempt to amend Arti-
cle 7bis of the Constitution in order to adopt 
a “Special Climate Act” was unsuccessful, 
yet the provision was again included in the 
list of articles that can be amended.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
The distribution of mandates after the elec-
tions in 2018 proved to be a contentious 
issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite 
the decisions of the Constitutional Court, 
political stakeholders held that impugnable 
constitutional provisions were still in effect. 
This put enormous pressure on the Election 
Commission of the country. 
Brazil
Brazil under President Bolsonaro, a populist 
with an explicit authoritarian mindset, is cer-
tainly a threatening scenario for democracy. 
Interestingly enough, Brazil’s democracy, up 
to this point, has shown some resilience and 
its institutions have provided a reasonable 
degree of horizontal accountability. 
Bulgaria
For Bulgaria, 2019 was marked by rising 
tensions among the highest echelons of 
state power, particularly between the Presi-
dent and the government. Against this back-
ground, the most significant constitutional 
developments concerned the controversial 
appointment of a new chief prosecutor and 
a long-overdue reform aimed at ending the 
impunity of this office.
Canada
In June, the legislature of the province of 
Québec made a rare use of the Canadian 
Charter’s ‘notwithstanding clause’ in pass-
ing an act to prohibit public sector employ-
ees ‘in a position of authority’ from wearing 
religious symbols at work. Four lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of the act 
ensued.
Cape Verde
The year 2019 was especially marked by 
an increase of constitutional complaints 
lodged with the Constitutional Court, and 
subsequently to the continuous develop-
ment of case law in the field of protection 
of accused persons in the criminal frame-
work and in other proceedings that led to 
the application of sanctions. 
Chile
The constitutional reform of December 24, 
which was the result of a bipartisan agree-
ment that tried to offer a political way out of 
a crisis, established the steps of a Constitu-
tion-making process that, if successful, will 
generate a total constitutional replacement. 
Colombia
The core 2019 constitutional developments 
concerned matters on limitations to free-
doms, gender equality, and non-discrimina-
tion between nationals and non-nationals; 
the protection of the environment; and the 
relationships between constitutional law, on 
the one hand, and international investment 
law and inter-American human rights law 
on the other.
Costa Rica
Politicians’ growing dissatisfaction with 
the Constitutional Court’s exercise of its re-
view powers engendered a backlash in Con-
gress that resulted in significant delays in 
the election of new magistrates and a highly 
contentious debate over the fairness of the 
procedures used to elect them to the coun-
try’s apex court.
Croatia
2019 was marked by important decisions 
of the Constitutional Court on the protec-
tion of the freedom of thought and expres-
sion. The Court underlined that protecting 
freedom of expression not only relates to 
non-offensive information and/or ideas but 
also ‘to those which are offensive, shock-
ing or disturbing’. This has implications for 
democratic dissent.
Cyprus
2019 was marked by a significant amend-
ment of the Cypriot Constitution. It intro-
duced the notion of ‘non-taken parliamen-
tary seats’ in an attempt to fill the 56th seat 
that remained vacant following the 2016 
parliamentary elections due to the impasse 
created by the non-affirmation of one of the 
elected candidates. 
Czech Republic
In 2019, the Senate prepared a constitution-
al charge against President Zeman, claim-
ing serious breaches of the Constitution. 
However, it was rejected by the Chamber of 
Deputies, mostly thanks to the votes of PM 
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Babiš’s party, ANO. Also, the investigation 
of PM Babiš’s conflicts of interest contin-
ued on national and European levels.
Denmark
The new government strengthened the state 
but was accused of arrogating judicial pow-
er to its own hand through a new law aimed 
at revoking citizenship, while a large ma-
jority of MPs agreed to adopt an ambitious 
climate law, expected to influence Danish 
politics for a decade. 
Dominican Republic
Through several decisions on political party 
and electoral laws in 2019, the Constitution-
al Court made key decisions regulating both 
the internal organization of political parties 
and the political competition between them. 
The Court is now firmly placed at the center 
stage of Dominican politics.
Ecuador
The transitory Council for Public Partici-
pation and Social Control dissolved and ap-
pointed several public officials, and also gave 
birth to a new Constitutional Court. While 
there have been crucial steps made towards a 
stronger constitutional democracy, the fruits 
of this transition are still to be seen after a 
much-anticipated period of consolidation.
Egypt
The most significant development in 
Egypt’s constitutional status in 2019 was 
the constitutional amendments adopted in 
late April. Those amendments widened the 
scope and level of the executive branch’s 
power vis-à-vis other authorities, and gave 
the military a new constitutional duty of 
protecting the Constitution and democratic 
pillars of the country. 
Estonia
2019 was marked by elections to the Esto-
nian Parliament. They had a decisive effect 
on the claims the Supreme Court had to deal 
with and brought the so-called far right into 
government. This led to a tense relationship 
between the government and the president 
and raised several constitutional issues.
Finland
The proposed legislation on civil and military 
intelligence and on the oversight of intelli-
gence gathering, the implementation of which 
Section 10 of the Constitution of Finland on 
the secrecy of confidential communications 
had been amended, was approved by the Par-
liament and entered into force on 1 June 2019.
France
In a period of intense social protest and 
claims for a renewal of democratic partici-
pation, the Constitutional Council ruled for 
the first time on a joint Parliament- and cit-
izen-initiated referendum. It also reviewed 
major bills relating to the right to protest 
and a major reform of the judicial system.
Gambia
2019 saw The Gambia move from setting up 
key institutions such as the Constitutional 
Review Commission (CRC); Truth, Rec-
onciliation, and Reparations Commission 
(TRRC); and National Human Rights Com-
mission (NHRC) to actualising the key tran-
sitional justice standards required to restore 
the rule of law and democracy to the country.
Georgia
This report provides a brief introduction to 
the constitutional system of Georgia, con-
stitutional amendments, civil protest, local 
elections, media, and main challenges fac-
ing the judiciary. It also provides an over-
view of landmark judgments of the Consti-
tutional Court in 2019 and developments 
expected in 2020, including court vacan-
cies, court cases, and other related events.
Germany
The federal Constitutional Court recalibrat-
ed its stance towards the European Union, 
also ruling for the first time on the digital 
right to be forgotten. In short, the Court 
promoted the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights to the constitutional standard of re-
view when EU law is applicable.
Ghana
The most important development in 2019 
emerged from the decision of the Supreme 
Court to uphold state resource expenditures 
on one particular religion if they benefit so-
ciety as a whole. As a legally secular, cul-
turally multi-religious society, Ghana can 
ill afford religious disaffection. Religious 
equality was guaranteed in the 1992 Consti-
tution to prevent that. 
Greece
A toothless yet useful constitutional revi-
sion marked 2019. The Constitution had re-
mained formally unaltered throughout a cri-
sis, first because of a mandatory time lapse 
between revisions and then due to a lack of 
consensus. Nine out of forty-nine proposed 
amendments were made. All formal change 
is now frozen for many years. 
Greenland
The most important constitutional devel-
opment was the unilateral decision to draft 
a subregional constitution for Greenland 
in two stages: the first, to enter into force 
under the Danish constitutional framework; 
the second to take effect only when (or if) 
Greenland becomes independent.
Guatemala
2019 was a year marked by the intervention 
of the Constitutional Court in the election 
and selection of the traditional powers of 
the state: Executive, Congress and the Ju-
diciary. However, this came at a cost. The 
year was also marked by strong backlash 
against the Constitutional Court.
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Hong Kong
Misjudgment of public opinion by the Hong 
Kong and Chinese Governments contrib-
uted to the mass civil unrest in 2019. The 
state’s hardline approach against the protes-
tors prompted further violence. The Hong 
Kong judiciary’s independence and credi-
bility were tested as disputes related to the 
movement found their way to the courts.
Hungary
Government influence on courts increased 
in 2019. Although amending actors aban-
doned the idea of establishing a separate 
administrative court system through the 8th 
Amendment to the Fundamental Law, new 
statutory provisions constrained judicial 
power to interpret legal and constitutional 
rules. Institutional tensions in the entire ju-
dicial system increased.
India
In 2019, the Indian state of Jammu and Kash-
mir lost its constitutional status as a semi-au-
tonomous region and was brought under com-
plete federal control. The absence of public 
consultation contributed to widespread protests 
at the annulment of the historical guarantee 
granted at its accession to the Indian union. 
Indonesia
In 2014, the Court issued a decision on 
the simultaneous general election. But the 
Court has come under fire after around 400 
polling station workers died in the 2019 
election. In this term, the Court has to de-
cide on whether to nullify its decision or 
re-affirm the simultaneous election.  
Iran
The gas price hike regulations in November 
2019 via the Supreme Council for Econom-
ic Coordination (SCEC) put the Constitu-
tion on edge. They opened several fractures 
between the latent conflicts in the Consti-
tution, making constitutional dysfunctions 
more clearly and dramatically visible.
Ireland
2019 saw the passage of legislation to es-
tablish a Judicial Council. This had been 
discussed for over two decades, with the 
senior judiciary becoming increasing-
ly vocal on the issue in recent years. The 
Council will have responsibility for judicial 
conduct, disciplinary matters, training and 
representation.
Israel
The most important developments in Israeli 
constitutional law in 2019 were the politi-
cal deadlock resulting in recurring general 
elections and the unprecedented criminal 
indictment of a sitting Prime Minister, Ben-
jamin Netanyahu, for bribery, fraud and 
breach of trust. These two combined to gen-
erate a constitutional crisis in Israel.
Italy
In 2019, the Italian Constitutional Court 
ruled in continuity with its most recent case 
law and strengthened its institutional role 
by coordinating the exercise of its powers 
and competences with both other constitu-
tional actors and supranational institutions. 
Kazakhstan
2019 was marked by the surprising volun-
tary resignation of the country’s first Pres-
ident, Nazarbayev, in the spring, and the 
transfer of the presidential office to Toka-
yev, former Senate Speaker, in the summer. 
The Constitutional Council of Kazakhstan 
upheld these developments. 
Kenya
The most important constitutional develop-
ment was something that has not happened 
– yet. Namely, a debate about whether to 
make major shifts, and whether by a refer-
endum, in the system of government, with 
the purpose of creating one that is more in-
clusive (especially of ethnic groups).
Luxembourg
The dominant theme in Luxembourg re-
mained the questions of whether and how 
the Constitution should be rewritten. This 
long-lasting discussion came to a sudden 
end in November 2019. The transformation 
of the Constitution into a “living instru-
ment,” however, continues to occupy all 
institutions, notably the strengthened Con-
stitutional Court.
Malaysia
Securing meaningful reform in the post-tran-
sition era remained the main challenge in Ma-
laysia, given the formidable vested interests 
against it. Abortive attempts by the new gov-
ernment to amend the Federal Constitution 
and to ratify several international conventions 
emphasized the areas in which reform is need-
ed, as well as the challenges ahead.  
Mexico
The National Guard (a civil police institu-
tion composed of members of the Federal, 
Military, and Naval Police responsible for 
guaranteeing public security) was intro-
duced in the Constitution. The Constitution 
was also amended to introduce the revoca-
tion of the mandate as a popular consulta-
tion mechanism that will be applied to the 
President.
Montenegro
The year was not marked by major constitu-
tional developments but controversies and 
challenges to the autonomy and consistency 
of the judicial authorities and their com-
mitment to the rule of law, particularly the 
power imbalance between the Constitution-
al Court and the Supreme Court.
Nepal
The implementation and operationalisation 
of the 2015 Constitution remained the pri-
mary constitutional focus. Federalisation 
persisted as a significant challenge. While 
the ineffective transfer of governmental 
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responsibility to subnational governments 
spurred intergovernmental conflict and 
weakened the foundations for federalism, 
devolution appears to be conferring new 
forms of legitimacy on government.
New Zealand
In response to the March 15 gun attack on 
two mosques by a lone far-right extremist, 
which murdered 51 people and injured an-
other 49, New Zealand had to reconsider a 
swathe of laws relating to gun ownership 
and terrorist activity.
Nigeria
Nigeria’s democratic trajectory seemed to 
veer off course in 2019. Pre- and post-elec-
tion violence and the threat of violence and 
electoral manipulation marred the 2019 
general elections. Also, horizontal account-
ability mechanisms appeared to weaken 
during the period. A course correction will 
be required in the coming years.
North Macedonia
Combatting impunity in high-level corrup-
tion cases remained a challenge in 2019 as 
citizens still awaited the prosecution and 
punishment of high-level officials involved 
in wire-tapping scandals from 2015. Fight-
ing corruption is a precondition for the 
country’s EU integration, especially after 
its historic name change this year. 
Norway
Following unlawful administration of social 
welfare benefits, citizens were wrongfully 
convicted. The secret police unlawfully col-
lected airline passenger data. Central cases 
concerned retention of DNA profiles, the 
Norway-EFTA Court relationship, and chil-
dren’s right to privacy in social media. In 
the ECtHR, cases about the Norwegian child 
welfare system dominated. 
Palestine
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas dis-
solved the Palestinian Legislative Council 
but did not call for new elections as per the 
SCC ruling on the matter. He also replaced 
the sitting High Judicial Council with a tem-
porary one. This concentration of powers 
makes it harder to counteract his power/s and 
ensure accountability in government. 
Peru
In 2019, Peru managed to overcome a tough 
fight between the legislative and the execu-
tive, which culminated in the closure of Con-
gress, by constitutional means. Since Peru 
has a history of overcoming political crises 
by coup d´états, this cannot be overstated.
Poland
In 2019, the rule of law further deteriorated 
in Poland, including the undermining of the 
judiciary’s independence. This was possible 
by applying legal measures that were intro-
duced in previous years. In December, the 
first chamber of Parliament passed a law al-
lowing the extensive punishment of judges.
Portugal
2019 was a year marked by elections and, 
subsequently, parliamentary fragmentation, 
governmental change, and social contestation 
(with the summoning of several strikes and 
manifestations by dissatisfied professional 
sectors). The Constitutional Court dealt with 
issues such as surrogacy, citizenship, data 
protection, and paternity proceedings, revisit-
ing some of its previous jurisprudence. 
Romania
The most important development of 2019, 
besides the Constitutional Court’s involve-
ment in the political and judicial spheres, 
was a significant shift in the options of the 
electorate, manifested in the outcome of 
three major popular consultations. This led 
to an unexpected but rather conjunctural 
change of parliamentary majority and to the 
change of Government. 
Russia
The Constitutional Court continued a trend 
of consistent political subordination that 
dates back to the entry into force of the cur-
rent Constitution. It has never been an inde-
pendent actor and does not deal with polit-
ically sensitive issues. However, it plays a 
significant role in the protection of social and 
economic rights.
Serbia
In June 2019, the Committee on Constitu-
tional and Legislative Issues of the National 
Assembly accepted the Government’s ini-
tiative for constitutional changes. However, 
due to the forthcoming parliamentary elec-
tions in spring 2020, it is upon the new leg-
islature to continue and, most likely, finish 
the procedure.
Singapore
Besides the usual constitutional issues, it was 
the enactment of the Protection from Online 
Falsehoods and Manipulation Act that had 
the strongest constitutional impact in 2019, 
and beyond. By regulating online false-
hoods, the law attempts to balance freedom 
of speech against the integrity of democracy 
and other public interests. 
Slovakia
In a historic ruling, the Slovak Constitutional 
Court held that the Constitution contains an 
implicit material core that cannot be changed 
through the ordinary amendment process. If 
an amendment violates a core provision, it 
will be struck down. The Court’s composition 
changed dramatically in 2019, possibly having 
implications for the endurance of this ruling.
Slovenia
In 2019, the Constitutional Court ren-
dered several precedential and important 
decisions, strengthening the protection of 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
While the Court continues to be regarded 
as the most reliable rule-of-law institution 
in Slovenia, its stature was diminished in 
2019, in particular due to its growing inef-
fectiveness.
South Africa
The proposed amendment of section 25 of 
the Constitution, intended to allow the gov-
ernment to seize property without compen-
sation, continued to be an ongoing project 
reflecting accelerated creeping socialism and 
a concomitant decline of constitutionalism 
amidst ongoing revelations of corruption 
and attempts to remedy its consequences. 
Meanwhile, lively constitutional litigation 
continued.
South Korea
The South Korean Constitutional Court de-
cided on the nonconformity to the Constitu-
tion of the abortion ban; the Moon adminis-
tration was criticized for returning two North 
Korean fishermen demanding asylum to the 
North; and the scandal surrounding Kuk 
Cho, the former Minister of Justice, deeply 
disappointed the Korean people.
Spain
Judgment 89/2019 reviewed the constitu-
tionality of the process of activation and 
application of the instrument of state coer-
cion on autonomous communities in case of 
serious non-compliance with the constitu-
tional system. The article was applied for 
the first time by the government following 
the events in Catalonia in autumn 2017.
Sri Lanka
The 2019 presidential election ended the 
government elected in 2015 to strengthen 
democracy and good governance through 
constitutional reform. With the country turn-
ing to strong leadership, the new President, 
Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, offered an alternative 
vision of nationalist authoritarianism. A pe-
riod of democratic regression has followed. 
Sweden
Three constitutional issues dominated the 
Swedish constitutional law debate in 2019: 
the relationship between the Council on 
Legislation and the Government, the crimi-
nalization of joining and supporting terror-
ist organizations and the outlawing of racist 
organizations, and lastly, the constitutional 
enhancement of the independence of the ju-
diciary. 
Switzerland
The Green Party won the general election 
to the Federal Parliament but failed to get 
a seat in the executive branch. The Federal 
Court nullified a federal ballot for the first 
time in history and held that a prohibition 
barring court officials from wearing ‘visi-
ble religious symbols’ in court hearings was 
constitutional.
Taiwan
Taiwan’s constitutional development in 2019 
was reactive in character, with the legislative 
arena as the main theater. In reaction to the 
disappointing referenda on the legalization 
of same-sex marriage in 2018, laws were 
passed reworking the relationship between 
referendums and elections while finally re-
alizing marriage equality in law, but without 
a name.
Thailand
For the first time in Thailand’s history, the 
military junta successfully became a dem-
ocratically elected government, regardless 
of the democratic quality of the Constitu-
tion. The regime remains as repressive as 
ever. However, this arrangement provided a 
flimsy disguise, posing a challenge to those 
wishing to question the regime’s legitimacy. 
The Netherlands
The government responded to the State 
Commission’s recommendations to strength-
en the parliamentary system. Also, a tempo-
rary parliamentary committee on the digital 
future was established; the Supreme Court 
delivered the Urgenda climate change judg-
ment; and there were evolutions regarding 
militant democracy as a response to criminal 
activities of outlaw motorcycle gangs.
Tunisia
Eight years after its revolution, Tunisia 
made a milestone step toward the creation 
of sustainable democracy despite political 
challenges. The North African resource-poor 
country managed to complete its third set 
of elections and, despite imperfections, was 
hailed as the only democracy in the region.
Turkey
A comprehensive implementation of the new 
presidential system in Turkey perpetuated 
executive dominance, eradicated key checks 
and balances, and pushed the country toward 
the brink of becoming a constitutional autoc-
racy. Under these worrying circumstances, 
the Turkish Constitutional Court struggled to 
give consistent judgments.
United Kingdom
In 2019, the battle between the Government 
and the House of Commons concerning 
Brexit intensified. In September 2019, two 
weeks after the prorogation of Parliament, 
the Supreme Court unanimously ruled the 
prorogation ‘unlawful, null, and of no ef-
fect’, reaffirming the need for judicial and 
parliamentary scrutiny of government acts. 
Venezuela
In 2019, Venezuela experienced a major con-
stitutional standoff. Following the fraudulent 
May 2018 presidential election, President 
Juan Guaidó of the opposition-led legislature 
acted as Interim President to achieve a dem-
ocratic transition via elections, yet Nicolás 
Maduro clung to power supported by the 
Supreme Tribunal and National Constituent 
Assembly.


